NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY
RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO
DE GRASSE
Rodney, returning to the West Indies from New York, reached Barbados
on December 6th, 1780. There he seems first to have learned of the
disastrous effects of the great October hurricanes of that year. Not
only had several ships--among them two of the line--been wrecked, with
the loss of almost all on board, but the greater part of those which
survived had been dismasted, wholly or in part, as well as injured
in the hull. There were in the West Indies no docking facilities;
under-water damage could be repaired only by careening or
heaving-down. Furthermore, as Barbados, Santa Lucia, and Jamaica,
all had been swept, their supplies were mainly destroyed. Antigua,
it is true, had escaped, the hurricane passing south of St. Kitts;
but Rodney wrote home that no stores for refitting were obtainable
in the Caribbee Islands. He was hoping then that Sir Peter Parker
might supply his needs in part; for when writing from Santa Lucia on
December 10th, two months after the storm, he was still ignorant
that the Jamaica Station had suffered to the full as severely as the
eastern islands. The fact shows not merely the ordinary slowness of
communications in those days, but also the paralysis that fell
upon all movements in consequence of that great disaster. "The
most beautiful island in the world," he said of Barbados, "has the
appearance of a country laid waste by fire and sword."
Hearing that the fortifications at St. Vincent had been almost
destroyed by the hurricane, Rodney, in combination with General
Vaughan, commanding the troops on the station, made an attempt
to reconquer the island, landing there on December 15th; but the
intelligence proved erroneous, and the fleet returned to Santa Lucia.
"I have only nine sail of the line now with me capable of going to
sea," wrote the Admiral on the 22d, "and not one of them has spare
rigging or sails." In the course of January, 1781, he was joined by a
division of eight ships of the line from England, under the command
of Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood,--Nelson's Lord Hood. These, with four
others refitted during that month, not improbably from stores brought
in Hood's convoy of over a hundred sail, raised the disposable force
to twenty-one ships of the line: two 90's, one 80, fifteen 74's, and
three 64's.
On the 27th of January, an express arrived from England, directing the
seizure of the Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and specifying,
as first to be attacked, St. Eustatius and St. Martin, two small
islands lying within fifty miles north of the British St. Kitts. St.
Eustatius, a rocky patch six miles in length by three in breadth,
had been conspicuous, since the war began, as a great trade centre,
where supplies of all kinds were gathered under the protection of
its neutral flag, to be distributed afterwards in the belligerent
islands and the North American continent. The British, owing to
their extensive commerce and maritime aptitudes, derived from such an
intermediary much less benefit than their enemies; and the island had
been jealously regarded by Rodney for some time. He asserted that
when de Guichen's fleet could not regain Fort Royal, because of its
injuries received in the action of April 17th, it was refitted to meet
him by mechanics and materials sent from St. Eustatius. On the other
hand, when cordage was to be bought for the British vessels after the
hurricanes of 1780, the merchants of the island, he said, alleged
that there was none there; although, when he took the island soon
afterwards, many hundred tons were found that had been long in stock.
Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Three days after their orders
arrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There being in Fort Royal four
French ships of the line, six British were left to check them, and
on the 3d of February the fleet reached its destination. A peremptory
summons from the commander of a dozen ships of the line secured
immediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty merchant ships were
taken; and a convoy of thirty sail, which had left the island two days
before, was pursued and brought back. The merchandise found was valued
at over £3,000,000. The neighbouring islands of St. Martin and Saba
were seized also at this time.
Rodney's imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatly
impressed by the magnitude of the prize and by the defenceless
condition of his capture. He alleged these as the motives for staying
in person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of
neutral and belligerent rights in the property involved, and to
provide against the enemy's again possessing himself of a place now
so equipped for transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehouses
and conveniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly
guarded, were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If they
passed into the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injury.
The illicit trade could start again at once in full force, with means
which elsewhere would have first to be created. There were a mile and
a half of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and these he must
leave at the least roofless, if not wholly demolished.
For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout February,
March, and April. The amount of money involved, and the arbitrary
methods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to much scandal,
which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing all the booty
to the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterestedness. Men
thought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other matters arose to
claim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel arrived from the
Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French sail of the line,
with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of December steering
for the West Indies. Rodney at once detached Sir Samuel Hood with
eleven ships of the line, directing him to take also under his command
the six left before Fort Royal, and to cruise with them to windward
of Martinique, to intercept the force reported. Hood sailed February
12th. The particular intelligence proved afterwards to be false, but
Hood was continued on his duty. A month later he was ordered to move
from the windward to the leeward side of the island, and to blockade
Fort Royal closely. Against this change he remonstrated, and the event
showed him to be right; but Rodney insisted, saying that from his
experience he knew that a fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months
without dropping to leeward, and that there ships detached to Santa
Lucia, for water and refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy's
fleet, discovered to windward, could come up. Hood thought the
Admiral's object was merely to shelter his own doings at St.
Eustatius; and he considered the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile,
if no descent upon the island were intended. "It would doubtless
have been fortunate for the public," he remarked afterwards, "had Sir
George been with his fleet, as I am confident he would have been to
windward instead of to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach."
The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the end
of March, and on the 22d of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse sailed,
having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships of
the line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five under
Suffren for the East Indies and one for North America. The remaining
twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted on the
28th of April. Before sunset, Hood's squadron also was discovered to
leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and off the
southern point,--Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to for
the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain
intelligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next
day.
The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, three 80's,
fifteen 74's, and one 64, in all 20 of the line, besides three armed
_en flûte_,[91] which need not be taken into account, although they
served to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in Fort
Royal, one 74 and three 64's, a junction of which with the approaching
enemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force of the
British was one 90, one 80, twelve 74's, one 70, and two 64's: total,
17. Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships Hood was inferior to
the main body alone of the French; but he had the advantage of ships
all coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence with the Admiralty. He also
had no convoy to worry him; but he was to leeward.
Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round the
southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sailing
ships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement, for
which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had not been
properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des Salines.[92]
Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter: "I never once lost
sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible.... Had I
fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy to close action
upon more equal terms, or they must have given up their transports,
trade, etc." Hood's subsequent career places it beyond doubt that had
he been to windward there would have been a severe action, whatever
the result; but it is not possible to decide positively between his
statement and Rodney's, as to where the fault of being to leeward lay.
The writer believes that Hood would have been to windward, if in any
way possible. It must be added that the British had no word that so
great a force was coming. On this point Hood and Rodney are agreed.
[Illustration]
Under the conditions, the French passed without difficulty round
Pointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, the ships of
war being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to the
northward for Fort Royal Bay (Cul de Sac Royal), Hood standing to the
southward until after 10, and being joined at 9.20 by a sixty-four
(not reckoned in the list above) from Santa Lucia, making his force
eighteen. At 10.35 the British tacked together to the northward. The
two fleets were now steering the same way, the French van abreast of
the British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire, to which no
reply was made then. At 11.20, the British van being close in with the
shore to the northward of the Bay, Hood tacked again together, and the
enemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also together, which brought
the two lines nearer, heading south. At this time the four French
ships in the Bay got under way and easily joined the rear of their
fleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were thus 24 to 18.
As their shot were passing over the British, the latter now began
to reply. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close the enemy,
shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defiance to
bring them down to him. At 12.30 the French admiral was abreast of
the British flagship, and the action became general, but at too long
range. "Never, I believe," wrote Hood, "was more powder and shot
thrown away in one day before." The French continuing to stand on,
Hood filled his sails again at 1 P.M., as their van had stretched
beyond his.
As the leading ships, heading south, opened the channel between Santa
Lucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused them
to draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1.34 made the signal
for a close order, and immediately afterwards ceased firing, finding
not one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engagement, however,
continued somewhat longer between the southern--van--ships, where, by
the account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that part of the line,
four of the British were attacked very smartly by eight of the French.
The _Centaur_, _Russell_, _Intrepid_, and _Shrewsbury_ appear to have
been the ships that suffered most heavily, either in hull, spars, or
crews. They were all in the van on the southern tack. The _Russell_,
having several shot between wind and water, was with difficulty kept
afloat, the water rising over the platform of the magazine. Hood sent
her off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, where she arrived on the 4th of
May, bringing Rodney the first news of the action, and of the numbers
of the French reinforcement. During the 30th Hood held his ground,
still endeavouring to get to windward of the enemy; but failing
in that attempt, and finding two of his squadron much disabled,
he decided at sunset to bear away to the northward, because to the
southward the westerly currents set so strong that the crippled ships
could not regain Santa Lucia. On the 11th of May, between St. Kitts
and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who, after hurried repairs to the
_Russell_, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th, with that ship, the
_Sandwich_, and the _Triumph_.
It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first
day seriously sought action, though his force was but three-fourths
that of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failing
that, to induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troude
is doubtless correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasse
to bring on a general engagement; and the writer finds himself in
agreement also with another French authority, Captain Chevalier,
that "Count de Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with
the safety of his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shown
himself much less circumspect on that day than he was on the next.
Notwithstanding our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept
near the land until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as
fencing cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, but
avoiding a decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version
of Hood himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward
at 12.30 P.M. of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable.
Hood having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whose
vessels, being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The
British commander consequently could afford to take risks, and he
therefore played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was
an officer of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. He
thoroughly understood a watching game, and that an opportunity might
offer to seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness
of pursuit, or any mishap, caused the French to separate. From
any dilemma that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power of
withdrawal, in relying upon which he was right. The present writer
adopts here also Chevalier's conclusion: "Admiral Hood evidently had
the very great advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron of
coppered ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the
confidence shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had
dropped behind through injuries received, he would have had to
sacrifice them, or to fight a superior force." This means that Hood
for an adequate gain ran a great risk; that he thoroughly understood
both the advantages and the disadvantages of his situation; and that
he acted not only with great skill, but warily and boldly,--a rare
combination. The British loss in this affair was 39 killed, including
Captain Nott, of the _Centaur_, and 162 wounded. The French loss is
given by Chevalier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119
killed and 150 wounded.
Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18th
of May put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt at
first for Santa Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As was
feared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with the
exception of one or two ships, going there, and twelve hundred troops
landing at Gros Ilet Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, which
Rodney had erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The works
elsewhere being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned.
At the same time, two French ships of the line and thirteen hundred
troops had sailed from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grasse
returned from the failure at Santa Lucia, he learned that the British
were at sea, apparently bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachment
before Tobago, he again sailed with the fleet for that island on the
25th of May, accompanied by three thousand more troops. Rodney learned
at Barbados of the attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched a
squadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel
Drake, to support the defence. On the 30th he heard that the French
main fleet had been seen to windward of Santa Lucia, steering south,
evidently for Tobago. On the same day Drake and de Grasse encountered
one another off the latter island, the French being to leeward,
nearest the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning of
June 3d was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed for
Tobago with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, and
next morning information was received that it had capitulated on the
2d.
The two fleets returning north were in presence of one another on the
9th; but no engagement took place. Rodney, who was to windward, having
twenty sail to twenty-three,[93] was unwilling to attack unless he
could get a clear sea. The strength of the currents, he said, would
throw his fleet too far to leeward, in case of reverse, into the foul
ground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing Barbados, which
had not recovered sufficiently from the hurricane to stand alone. He
therefore put into Barbados. De Grasse went to Martinique to prepare
the expedition to the American continent, which resulted in the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. On the 5th of July he sailed from
Fort Royal taking with him the "trade" for France, and on the 26th
anchored with it at Cap François in Haïti, where he found a division
of four ships of the line which had been left the year before by de
Guichen. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on the 20th
of June, and by which De Grasse received dispatches from Washington,
and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French troops in
America. These acquainted him with the state of affairs on the
continent, and requested that the fleet should come to either the
Chesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British power
in one quarter or the other.
[Footnote 91: This latter is applied to vessels, usually ships of war,
which are used as transports or supply ships, and therefore carry only
a part of their normal battery.]
[Footnote 92: Rodney said that Hood "lay-to" for the night. This is
antecedently incredible of an officer of Hood's character, and is
expressly contradicted by Captain Sutherland of the _Russell_. "At 6
P.M. (of the 28th) our fleet tacked to the north, and _kept moving_
across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right (_sic_), in line of battle."
Ekins, "Naval Battles," p. 136. The word "right" is evidently a
misprint for "night." Rodney's criticisms seem to the author captious
throughout.]
[Footnote 93: One French ship had left the fleet, disabled.]