RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN
RETURNS TO EUROPE, AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE
CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS
TO WEST INDIES
When Rodney arrived at Santa Lucia with his four ships of the line, on
March 27, 1780, he found there a force of sixteen others, composed in
about equal proportions of ships that had left England with Byron in
the summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by Rear-Admiral
Rowley in the spring of 1779.
During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker, between
the departure of Byron and the arrival of Rodney, a smart affair had
taken place between a detachment of the squadron and one from the
French division, under La Motte-Picquet, then lying in Fort Royal,
Martinique.
On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 A.M., the British
look-out ship, the _Preston_, 50, between Martinique and Santa Lucia
made signal for a fleet to windward, which proved to be a body of
French supply ships, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate.
Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarray, sails
unbent, ships on the heel or partially disarmed, crews ashore for
wood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain ships to
get under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapidity
gratifying to the two commanders, who also went out in person. The
British, however, were outside first, with five sail of the line and
a 50-gun ship. Nine of the supply vessels were captured by them, and
four forced ashore. The French Rear-Admiral had by this time got
out of Fort Royal with three ships of the line,--the _Annibal_, 74,
_Vengeur_, 64, and _Réfléchi_, 64,--and, being to windward, covered
the entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two hostile
divisions were now near each other, with a fine working breeze, the
British tried to beat up to the enemy; the _Conqueror_, 74, Captain
Walter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts. Coming
within range at 5, firing began between her and the French flagship,
_Annibal_, 74, and subsequently between her and all the three vessels
of the enemy. Towards sunset, the _Albion_, 74, had got close up with
the _Conqueror_, and the other ships were within distant range; "but
as they had worked not only well within the dangers of the shoals of
the bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the batteries, I called them
off by night signal at a quarter before seven."[75] In this chivalrous
skirmish,--for it was little more, although the injury to the French
in the loss of the convoy was notable,--Parker was equally delighted
with his own squadron and with his enemy. "The steadiness and coolness
with which on every tack the _Conqueror_ received the fire of these
three ships, and returned her own, working his ship with as much
exactness as if he had been turning into Spithead, and on every
board gaining on the enemy, gave me infinite pleasure. It was with
inexpressible concern," he added, "that I heard that Captain Walter
Griffith, of the _Conqueror_, was killed by the last broadside."[76]
Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange a flag of truce
with the French Rear-Admiral, he wrote to him; "The conduct of your
Excellency in the affair of the 18th of this month fully justifies the
reputation which you enjoy among us, and I assure you that I could not
witness without envy the skill you showed on that occasion. Our enmity
is transient, depending upon our masters; but your merit has stamped
upon my heart the greatest admiration for yourself." This was the
officer who was commonly known in his time as "Vinegar" Parker; but
these letters show that the epithet fitted the rind rather than the
kernel.
Shortly after de Guichen[77] took command, in March, 1780, he arranged
with the Marquis de Bouillé, Governor of Martinique, to make a
combined attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. For
this purpose three thousand troops were embarked in the fleet, which
sailed on the night of the 13th of April, 1780, intending first to
accompany a convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out of
reach of the British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the French
departure, put to sea in chase with all his ships, twenty of the line,
two of which were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of the
enemy to leeward (westward) of Martinique, beating up against the
north-east trade-winds, and intending to pass through the channel
between that island and Dominica. "A general chase to the north-west
followed, and at five in the evening we plainly discovered that they
consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, and one 50 gun ship."[78]
As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of battle, standing still to
the north-west, therefore on the starboard tack; and he was attentive
to keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched diligently
during the night. "Their manoeuvres," he wrote, "indicated a wish to
avoid battle," and he therefore was careful to counteract them. At
daylight of April 17th, they were seen forming line of battle, on the
port tack, four or five leagues to leeward,--that is, to the westward.
The wind being east, or east by north, the French would be heading
south-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order now was rectified by
signal from the irregularities of darkness, the ships being directed
to keep two cables'[79] lengths apart, and steering as before to
the northward and westward. At 7 A.M., considering this line too
extended, the Admiral closed the intervals to one cable (aa). The two
fleets thus were passing on nearly parallel lines, but in opposite
directions, which tended to bring the whole force of Rodney, whose
line was better and more compact than the enemy's, abreast the
latter's rear, upon which he intended to concentrate. At 8 A.M. he
made general signal that this was his purpose; and at 8.30, to execute
it, he signalled for the ships to form line abreast, bearing from each
other south by east and north by west, and stood down at once upon
the enemy (Fig. 1, bb). The object of the British being evident, de
Guichen made his fleet wear together to the starboard tack (bb).
The French rear thus became the van, and their former van, which was
stretched too far for prompt assistance to the threatened rear, now
headed to support it.
Rodney, baulked in his first spring, hauled at once to the wind on the
port tack (Fig. 1, _cc_), again contrary to the French, standing thus
once more along their line, for their new rear. The intervals were
opened out again to two cables. The fleets thus were passing once more
on parallel lines, each having reversed its order; but the British
still retained the advantage, on whatever course and interval, that
they were much more compact than the French, whose line, by Rodney's
estimate, extended four leagues in length.[80] The wariness of the
two combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth century
with its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the careful
reader. Rodney, although struggling through this chrysalis stage
to the later vigor, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still was
constrained by the traditions of watchful fencing. Nor was his caution
extravagant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessness
of Nelson's tactics. "The different movements of the enemy," he wrote,
"obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity that
offered of attacking them to advantage."
[Illustration]
The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses--the
French north by west, the British south by east--until the flagship
_Sandwich_, 90, (Fig. 2, S^1) was abreast the _Couronne_, 80, (C), the
flagship of de Guichen. Then, at 10.10 A.M., the signal was made to
wear together, forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being some
delay in execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced by
the pennant of the _Stirling Castle_, which, as the rear ship, should
begin the evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about
(Fig. 2, aa), for an order was then given for rectifying the line,
still at two cables. At 11 A.M. the Admiral made the signal to prepare
for battle, "to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the
enemy to an engagement,"[81] and to this succeeded shortly the order
to alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy.[82] Why he
thought that any of the fleet should have required such assurance
cannot certainly be said. Possibly, although he had so recently
joined, he had already detected the ill-will, or the slackness, of
which he afterwards complained; possibly he feared that the wariness
of his tactics might lead men to believe that he did not mean to
exceed the lukewarm and indecisive action of days scarce yet passed
away, which had led Suffren to stigmatize tactics as a mere veil,
behind which timidity thinks to hide its nakedness.
At 11.50 A.M. the decisive signal was made "for every ship to bear
down, and steer for _her opposite in the enemy's line_, agreeable
to the 21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Five
minutes later, when the ships, presumably, had altered their course
for the enemy, the signal for battle was made, followed by the message
that the Admiral's intention was to engage closely; he expecting,
naturally, that every ship would follow the example he purposed to
set. The captain of the ship which in the formation (aa) had been
the leader, upon whose action depended that of those near her,
unfortunately understood Rodney's signal to mean that he was to
attack the enemy's leader, not the ship opposite to him at the moment
of bearing away. This ship, therefore, diverged markedly from the
Admiral's course, drawing after her many of the van. A few minutes
before 1 P.M., one of the headmost ships began to engage at long
range; but it was not till some time after 1 P.M. that the _Sandwich_,
having received several broadsides, came into close action (S^2) with
the second vessel astern from the French Admiral, the _Actionnaire_,
64. The latter was soon beat out of the line by the superiority of
the _Sandwich's_ battery, and the same lot befell the ship astern of
her,--probably the _Intrépide_, 74,--which came up to close the gap.
Towards 2.30 P.M., the _Sandwich_, either by her own efforts to
close, or by her immediate opponents' keeping away, was found to be
to leeward (S^3) of the enemy's line; the _Couronne_ (C) being on her
weather bow. The fact was pointed out by Rodney to the captain of the
ship, Walter Young, who was then in the lee gangway. Young, going over
to look for himself, saw that it was so, and that the _Yarmouth_, 64,
had hauled off to windward, where she lay with her main and mizzen
topsails aback. Signals were then made to her, and to the _Cornwall_,
74, to come to closer engagement, they both being on the weather bow
of the flagship.
De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a little
later, attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiral
to break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. His
tactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rear
and centre, but there is no indication that he now aimed at breaking
the line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal to
wear together, away from the British line. The effect of this, in any
event, would have been to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward; but
with ships more or less crippled, taking therefore greater room to
manoeuvre, and with the exigency of re-forming the line upon them, the
tendency was exaggerated. The movement which the French called wearing
together was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. "The action
in the centre continued till 4.15 P.M., when M. de Guichen, in the
_Couronne_, the _Triomphant_, and the _Fendant_, after engaging the
_Sandwich_ for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of fire
from the _Sandwich_, and the gallant behavior of the officers and men,
enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat; though before attacked
by them, she had beat three ships out of their line of battle, had
entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the French Admiral." Possibly
the French accounts, if they were not so very meagre, might dispute
this prowess of the flagship; but there can be no doubt that Rodney
had set an example, which, had it been followed by all, would have
made this engagement memorable, if not decisive. He reported that the
captains, with very few exceptions, had placed their ships improperly
(cc). The _Sandwich_ had eighty shot in her hull, had lost her
foremast and mainyard, and had fired 3288 rounds, an average of 73
to each gun of the broadside engaged. Three of her hits being below
the water line, she was kept afloat with difficulty during the next
twenty-four hours. With the wearing of the French the battle ceased.
In the advantage offered by the enemy, whose order was too greatly
extended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered this
action of April 17th, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of his
life; and his wrath was bitter against those by whose misconduct he
conceived it had been frustrated. "The French admiral, who appeared
to me to be a brave and gallant officer, had the honour to be nobly
supported during the whole action. It is with concern inexpressible,
mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and my
country obliges me to acquaint your Lordships that during the action
between the French fleet, on the 17th inst, and his Majesty's, the
British flag was not properly supported." Divided as the Navy was
then into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or at
the throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet to
suppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigma
of the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any upon
his own. Rodney, however, in public and private letters did not
conceal his feelings; and the censure found its way to the ears of
those concerned. Subsequently, three months after the action, in a
public letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of five
of the captains, Walter Young, of the flagship, George Bowyer of
the _Albion_, John Douglas of the _Terrible_, John Houlton of the
_Montagu_, and A.J.P. Molloy[83] of the _Trident_. "To them I have
given certificates, under my hand," "free and unsolicited." Beyond
these, "no consideration in life would induce" him to go; and the
two junior flag-officers were implicitly condemned in the words, "to
inattention to signals, both in the van and rear divisions, is to be
attributed the loss of that glorious opportunity (perhaps never to
be recovered) of terminating the naval contest in these seas." These
junior admirals were Hyde Parker and Rowley; the latter the same who
had behaved, not only so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative,
in Byron's engagement. A singular incident in this case led him to a
like independence of action, which displeased Rodney. The _Montagu_,
of his division, when closing the French line, wore against the
helm, and could only be brought into action on the wrong (port) tack.
Immediately upon this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowley
followed them of his own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, he
stated the facts, justifying the act by the order that "the greatest
impression was to be made on the enemy's rear." Both parties soon wore
back.
Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later. The certificates to
Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably to Molloy, all of Parker's
division, bore the stinging words that these officers "meant well, and
would have done their duty had they been permitted." It is stated that
their ships, which were the rear of the van division, were going down
to engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker made them a
signal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's courage was beyond
all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old superstition of the
line, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney's later signals.
These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part of the history
of the British Navy, far more important than many an indecisive though
bloody encounter.
One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the _Stirling
Castle_, which had been the leading ship at the time the signal to
alter the course toward the enemy was made, wrote to Rodney that he
understood that his name had been mentioned, unfavourably of course,
in the public letter. Rodney's reply makes perfectly apparent the
point at issue, his own plan, the ideas running in his head as he made
his successive signals, the misconceptions of the juniors, and the
consequent fiasco. It must be said, however, that, granting the facts
as they seem certainly to have occurred, no misunderstanding, no
technical verbal allegation, can justify a military stupidity so great
as that of which he complained. There are occasions in which not only
is literal disobedience permissible, but literal obedience, flying in
the face of the evident conditions, becomes a crime.
At 8 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his purpose
to attack the enemy's rear. This, having been understood and answered,
was hauled down; all juniors had been acquainted with a general
purpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to lead. How he meant
to carry out his intention was evidenced by the consecutive course
of action while on that tack,--the starboard; when the time came, the
fleet bore up together, in line abreast, standing for the French rear.
This attempt, being balked then by de Guichen's wearing, was renewed
two hours later; only in place of the signal to form line abreast,
was made one to alter the course to port,--towards the enemy. As this
followed immediately upon that to prepare for battle, it indicated
almost beyond question, that Rodney wished, for reasons of the moment,
to run down at first in a slanting direction,--not in line abreast,
as before,--ships taking course and interval from the flagship. Later
again, at 11.50, the signal was made, "agreeable to the 21st Article
of the Additional Fighting Instructions, for every ship to steer
for her opposite in the enemy's line;" and here the trouble began.
Rodney meant the ship opposite when the signal was hauled down. He
had steered slanting, till he had gained as nearly as possible the
position he wanted, probably till within long range; then it was
desirable to cover the remaining ground as rapidly and orderly as
possible, for which purpose the enemy's ship then abreast gave each
of his fleet its convenient point of direction. He conceived that
his signalled purpose to attack the enemy's rear, never having been
altered, remained imperative; and further, that the signal for two
cables' length interval should govern all ships, and would tie them to
him, and to his movements, in the centre. Carkett construed "opposite"
to mean opposite in numerical order, British van ship against French
van ship, wherever the latter was. Rodney states--in his letter to
Carkett--that the French van was then two leagues away. "You led to
the van ship, notwithstanding you had answered my signals signifying
that it was my intention to attack the enemy's rear; which signal
I had never altered.... Your leading in the manner you did, induced
others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the
signal for the line was only at two cables' length distance from
each other, the van division was led by you to more than two leagues'
distance from the centre division, which was thereby not properly
supported."[84]
Carkett was the oldest captain in the fleet, his post commission
being dated March 12th, 1758. How far he may have been excusable in
construing as he did Fighting Instructions, which originated in the
inane conception that the supreme duty of a Commander-in-Chief was to
oppose ship to ship, and that a fleet action was only an agglomeration
of naval duels, is not very material, though historically interesting.
There certainly was that in the past history of the British Navy which
extenuated the offence of a man who must have been well on in middle
life. But since the Fighting Instructions had been first issued there
had been the courts-martial, also instructive, on Mathews, Lestock,
Byng, Keppel, and Palliser, all of which turned more or less on the
constraint of the line of battle, and the duty of supporting ships
engaged,--above all, an engaged Commander-in-Chief. Rodney perhaps
underestimated the weight of the Fighting Instructions upon a dull
man; but he was justified in claiming that his previous signals,
and the prescription of distance, created at the least a conflict of
orders, a doubt, to which there should have been but one solution,
namely: to support the ships engaged, and to close down upon the
enemy, as near as possible to the Commander-in-Chief. And in moments
of actual perplexity such will always be the truth. It is like
marching towards the sound of guns, or, to use Nelson's words, "_In
case_ signals cannot be understood, no captain can do very wrong if he
places his ship alongside that of an enemy." The "In Case," however,
needs also to be kept in mind; and that it was Nelson who said it.
Utterances of to-day, like utterances of all time, show how few
are the men who can hold both sides of a truth firmly, without
exaggeration or defect. Judicial impartiality can be had, and positive
convictions too; but their combination is rare. A two-sided man is apt
also to be double-minded.
The loss of men in this sharp encounter was: British, killed, 120,
wounded, 354; French, killed, 222, wounded, 537.[85] This gives
three French hit for every two British, from which, and from the much
greater damage received aloft by the latter, it may be inferred that
both followed their usual custom of aiming, the British at the hull,
the French at the spars. To the latter conduced also the lee-gage,
which the French had. The British, as the attacking party, suffered
likewise a raking fire as they bore down.
Rodney repaired damages at sea, and pursued, taking care to keep
between Martinique and the French. The latter going into Guadeloupe,
he reconnoitred them there under the batteries, and then took his
station off Fort Royal. "The only chance of bringing them to action,"
he wrote to the Admiralty on the 26th of April, "was to be off that
port before them, where the fleet now is, in daily expectation of
their arrival." The French represent that he avoided them, but as
they assert that they came out best on the 17th, and yet admit that he
appeared off Guadeloupe, the claim is not tenable. Rodney here showed
thorough tenacity of purpose. De Guichen's orders were "to keep the
sea, so far as the force maintained by England in the Windward Islands
would permit, without too far compromising the fleet intrusted to
him."[86] With such instructions, he naturally and consistently shrunk
from decisive engagement. After landing his wounded and refitting in
Guadeloupe, he again put to sea, with the intention of proceeding to
Santa Lucia, resuming against that island the project which both he
and De Bouillé continuously entertained. The latter and his troops
remained with the fleet.
Rodney meantime had felt compelled to return momentarily to Santa
Lucia. "The fleet continued before Fort Royal till the condition of
many of the ships under my command, and the lee currents,[87] rendered
it necessary to anchor in Choque Bay (Anse du Choc), St. Lucie, in
order to put the wounded and sick men on shore, and to water and
refit the fleet, frigates having been detached both to leeward and to
windward of every island, in order to gain intelligence of the motions
of the enemy, and timely notice of their approach towards Martinique,
the only place they could refit at in these seas." In this last clause
is seen the strategic idea of the British Admiral: the French must
come back to Martinique.
From the vigilance of his frigates it resulted that when the look-outs
of de Guichen, who passed to windward of Martinique on the 7th of
May, came in sight of Gros Ilet on the 9th, it was simply to find
the British getting under way to meet the enemy. During the five
following days both fleets were engaged in constant movements, upon
the character of which the writers of each nation put different
constructions. Both are agreed, however, that the French were to
windward throughout, except for a brief hour on the 15th, when a
fleeting change of wind gave the British that advantage, only to lose
it soon again. They at once used it to force action. As the windward
position carries the power to attack, and as the French were
twenty-three to the British twenty, it is probably not a strained
inference to say that the latter were chasing to windward, and the
former avoiding action, in favour, perhaps, of that ulterior motive,
the conquest of Santa Lucia, for which they had sailed. Rodney states
in his letter that, when the two fleets parted on the 20th of May,
they were forty leagues to windward (eastward) of Martinique, in sight
of which they had been on the 10th.
During these days de Guichen, whose fleet, according to Rodney, sailed
the better, and certainly sufficiently well to preserve the advantage
of the wind, bore down more than once, generally in the afternoon,
when the breeze is steadiest, to within distant range of the British.
Upon this movement, the French base the statement that the British
Admiral was avoiding an encounter; it is equally open to the
interpretation that he would not throw away ammunition until sure of
effective distance. Both admirals showed much skill and mastery of
their profession, great wariness also, and quickness of eye; but it
is wholly untenable to claim that a fleet having the weather-gage
for five days, in the trade-winds, was unable to bring its enemy to
action, especially when it is admitted that the latter closed the
instant the wind permitted him to do so.
On the afternoon of May 15th, about the usual hour, Rodney "made a
great deal of sail upon the wind." The French, inferring that he was
trying to get off, which he meant them to do, approached somewhat
closer than on the previous days. Their van ship had come within long
range, abreast the centre of the British, who were on the port tack
standing to the south-south-east, with the wind at east (aa, aa). Here
the breeze suddenly hauled to south-southeast (wind b). The heads
of all the ships in both fleets were thus knocked off to south-west
(s, s), on the port tack, but the shift left the British rear, which
on that tack led the fleet, to windward of the French van. Rodney's
signal flew at once, to tack in succession and keep the wind of the
enemy; the latter, unwilling to yield the advantage, wore all together
(w), hauling to the wind on the starboard tack, and to use Rodney's
words, "fled with a crowd of sail" (a', a').
[Illustration]
The British fleet tacking in succession after their leaders, (t, t),
the immediate result was that both were now standing on the starboard
tack,--to the eastward,--the British having a slight advantage of the
wind, but well abaft the beam of the French (bb, bb). The result, had
the wind held, would have been a trial of speed and weatherliness.
"His Majesty's fleet," wrote Rodney, "by this manoeuvre had gained the
wind, and would have forced the enemy to battle, had it not at once
changed six points (back to east, its former direction,) when near the
enemy, and enabled them to recover that advantage." When the wind thus
shifted again, de Guichen tacked his ships together and stood across
the bows of the advancing enemy (cc, cc). The British leader struck
the French line behind the centre, and ran along to leeward, the
British van exchanging a close cannonade with the enemy's rear.
Such an engagement, two lines passing on opposite tacks, is usually
indecisive, even when the entire fleets are engaged, as at Ushant; but
where, as in this case, the engagement is but partial, the result is
naturally less. The French van and centre, having passed the head of
the enemy, diverged at that point farther and farther from the track
of the on-coming British ships, which from the centre rearwards did
not fire. "As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the van
of our fleet could come in for any part of the action without wasting
his Majesty's powder and shot, the enemy wantonly expending theirs
at such a distance as to have no effect." Here again the French were
evidently taking the chance of disabling the distant enemy in his
spars. The British loss in the action of May 15th was 21 killed and
100 wounded.
[Illustration]
The fleets continued their respective movements, each acting as
before, until the 19th, when another encounter took place, of exactly
the same character as the last, although without the same preliminary
manoeuvring. On that occasion the British, who in the interim had
been reinforced by one 74 and one 50-gun ship, lost 47 killed and 113
wounded. The result was equally indecisive, tactically considered;
but both by this time had exhausted their staying powers. The French,
having been absent from Martinique since the 13th of April, had now
but six days' provisions.[88] Rodney found the _Conqueror, Cornwall_,
and _Boyne_ so shattered that he sent them before the wind to Santa
Lucia, while he himself with the rest of the fleet stood for Barbados,
where he arrived on the 22d. The French anchored on the same day
at Fort Royal. "The English," says Chevalier, "stood on upon the
starboard tack, to the southward, after the action of the 19th, and
the next day were not to be seen." "The enemy," reported Rodney,
"stood to the northward with all the sail they could possibly press,
and were out of sight the 21st inst. The condition of his Majesty's
ships was such as not to allow a longer pursuit."
By their dexterity and vigilance each admiral had thwarted the other's
aims. Rodney, by a pronounced, if cautious, offensive effort, had
absolutely prevented the "ulterior object" of the French, which he
clearly understood to be Santa Lucia. De Guichen had been successful
in avoiding decisive action, and he had momentarily so crippled a few
of the British ships that the fleet must await their repairs before
again taking the sea. The tactical gain was his, the strategic victory
rested with his opponent; but that his ships also had been much
maltreated is shown by the fact that half a dozen could not put to sea
three weeks later. The French admiral broke down under the strain,
to which was added the grief of losing a son, killed in the recent
engagements. He asked for his recall. "The command of so large a
fleet," he wrote, "is infinitely beyond my capacity in all respects.
My health cannot endure such continual fatigue and anxiety." Certainly
this seems a tacit testimony to Rodney's skill, persistence, and
offensive purpose. The latter wrote to his wife: "For fourteen days
and nights the fleets were so near each other that neither officers
nor men could be said to sleep. Nothing but the goodness of the
weather and climate would have enabled us to endure so continual a
fatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the people must have sunk under
it. For my part, it did me good."
Rodney stated also in his home letters that the action of his
subordinates in the last affairs had been efficient; but he gave
them little credit for it. "As I had given public notice to all my
captains, etc., that I expected implicit obedience to every signal
made, under the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, it
had an admirable effect; as they were all convinced, after their
late gross behaviour, that they had nothing to expect at my hands but
instant punishment to those who neglected their duty. My eye on them
had more dread than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal.
No regard was paid to rank: admirals as well as captains, if out of
their station, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages sent
by frigates; and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be, what
they had never been before,--_officers_." Rodney told his officers
also that he would shift his flag into a frigate, if necessary, to
watch them better. It is by no means obligatory to accept these gross
aspersions as significant of anything worse than the suspiciousness
prevalent throughout the Navy, traceable ultimately to a corrupt
administration of the Admiralty. The latter, like the government of
1756, was open to censure through political maladministration; every
one feared that blame would be shifted on to him, as it had been on
to Byng,--who deserved it; and not only so, but that blame would
be pushed on to ruin, as in his case. The Navy was honeycombed with
distrust, falling little short of panic. In this state of apprehension
and doubt, the tradition of the line of battle, resting upon men who
did not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seen
officers censured, cashiered, and shot, for errors of judgment or of
action, naturally produced hesitations and misunderstandings. An order
of battle is a good thing, necessary to insure mutual support and to
develop a plan. The error of the century, not then exploded, was to
observe it in the letter rather than in the spirit; to regard the
order as an end rather than a means; and to seek in it not merely
efficiency, which admits broad construction in positions, but
preciseness, which is as narrowing as a brace of handcuffs. Rodney
himself, Tory though he was, found fault with the administration. With
all his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as is
shown by a sentence in his letter to Carkett. "Could I have imagined
your conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anything
but error in judgment, I had certainly superseded you, but God forbid
I should do so for error in judgment only,"--again an illusion, not
obscure, to Byng's fate.
In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Spanish
squadron of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of ten
thousand troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28th for the West
Indies. The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on the
way. Rodney spread a line of frigates "to windward, from Barbados to
Barbuda," to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put to sea on
the 7th of June, to cruise to the eastward of Martinique to intercept
the enemy. The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a frigate,
fifty leagues east of the island, steering for it; but the Spanish
admiral, seeing that he would be reported, changed his course,
and passed north of Guadeloupe. On the 9th he was joined in that
neighbourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him only
fifteen sail,--a fact which shows that he had suffered in the late
brushes quite as severely as Rodney, who had with him seventeen of his
twenty.
Having evaded the British, the allies anchored at Fort Royal; but the
Spanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertaking against
the enemy's fleet or possessions. Not only so, but he insisted on
being accompanied to leeward. The Spanish squadron was ravaged by
an epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the ships and the
uncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was communicated to their
allies. De Guichen had already orders to leave the Windward Islands
when winter approached. He decided now to anticipate that time, and
on the 5th of July sailed from Fort Royal with the Spaniards. Having
accompanied the latter to the east end of Cuba, he went to Cap
François, in Haïti, then a principal French station. The Spaniards
continued on to Havana.
At Cap François, de Guichen found urgent entreaties from the French
Minister to the United States, and from Lafayette, to carry his fleet
to the continent, where the clear-sighted genius of Washington had
recognised already that the issue of the contest depended upon the
navies. The French admiral declined to comply, as contrary to his
instructions, and on the 16th of August sailed for Europe, with
nineteen sail of the line, leaving ten at Cap François. Sealed orders,
opened at sea, directed him to proceed to Cadiz, where he anchored
on the 24th of October. His arrival raised the allied force there
assembled to fifty-one sail of the line, besides the ninety-five sugar
and coffee ships which he had convoyed from Haïti. It is significant
of the weakness of Great Britain in the Mediterranean at that time,
that these extremely valuable merchant ships were sent on to Toulon,
instead of to the more convenient Atlantic ports, only five ships of
the line accompanying them past Gibraltar. The French government had
feared to trust them to Brest, even with de Guichen's nineteen sail.
The allied operations in the Windward Islands for the season of
1780 had thus ended in nothing, notwithstanding an incontestable
inferiority of the British to the French alone, of which Rodney
strongly complained. It was, however, contrary to the intentions
of the Admiralty that things so happened. Orders had been sent to
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, at New York, to detach ships to
Rodney; but the vessel carrying them was driven by weather to
the Bahamas, and her captain neglected to notify Arbuthnot of his
whereabouts, or of his dispatches. A detachment of five ships of the
line under Commodore the Hon. Robert Boyle Walsingham was detained
three months in England, wind-bound. They consequently did not join
till July 12th. The dispositions at once made by Rodney afford a very
good illustration of the kind of duties that a British Admiral had
then to discharge. He detailed five ships of the line to remain with
Hotham at Santa Lucia, for the protection of the Windward Islands.
On the 17th, taking with him a large merchant convoy, he put to sea
with the fleet for St. Kitts, where the Leeward Islands "trade" was
collecting for England. On the way he received precise information as
to the route and force of the Franco-Spanish fleet under de Guichen,
of the sickness on board it, and of the dissension between the allies.
From St. Kitts the July "trade" was sent home with two ships of the
line. Three others, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany the
September fleet, "and the remainder of the ships on this station,
which are in want of great repair and are not copper-bottomed, shall
proceed with them or with the convoy which their Lordships have been
pleased to order shall sail from hence in October next." If these
arrived before winter, he argued, they would be available by spring as
a reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admiralty
to send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his station.
As de Guichen had taken the whole French homeward merchant fleet from
Martinique to Cap François and as the height of the hurricane season
was near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French force would remain
in Haïti, and consequently that Jamaica would not require all the
British fleet to save it from any possible attack. He therefore sent
thither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker
that they were not merely to defend the island, but to enable him to
send home its great trade in reasonable security.
These things being done by July 31st, Rodney, reasoning that the
allies had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indies
for that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake the
fleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee shore, went to sea,
to cruise with the fleet off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclined
already to go to the continent, whither he inferred, correctly but
mistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go,
because it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from an
American vessel that a French squadron of seven ships of the line,
convoying six thousand troops, had anchored in Narragansett Bay on
the 12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina,
where he communicated with the army in Charleston, and thence,
"sweeping the southern coast of America," anchored with fourteen ships
of the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14th of September, unexpected and
unwelcome to friends and foes alike.
Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly and
with insubordination his wrath at this intrusion into his command,
which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of a
lucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Washington,
Rodney's coming was a deathblow to the hopes raised by the arrival
of the French division at Newport, which he had expected to see
reinforced by de Guichen. Actually, the departure of the latter made
immaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene; but this Washington
did not know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to Arbuthnot's
constituted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, before which,
vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French squadron in
Newport must have fallen. But Rodney, though he had shown great energy
in the West Indies, and unusual resolution in quitting his own station
for a more remote service, was sixty-two, and suffered from gout. "The
sudden change of climate makes it necessary for me to go on shore for
some short time," he wrote; and although he added that his illness
was "not of such a nature as shall cause one moment's delay in his
Majesty's service," he probably lost a chance at Rhode Island. He
did not overlook the matter, it is true; but he decided upon the
information of Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, and did not inspect
the ground himself. Nothing of consequence came of his visit; and on
the 16th of November he sailed again for the West Indies, taking with
him only nine sail of the line.
The arrival of de Ternay's seven ships at Newport was more than offset
by a British reinforcement of six ships of the line under Rear-Admiral
Thomas Graves which entered New York on July 13th,--only one day
later. Arbuthnot's force was thus raised to ten of the line, one
of which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come and gone, the French
division was watched by cruisers, resting upon Gardiner's Bay,--a
commodious anchorage at the east end of Long Island, between thirty
and forty miles from Rhode Island. When a movement of the enemy was
apprehended, the squadron assembled there, but nothing of consequence
occurred during the remainder of the year.
The year 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the Americans,
but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their staying power,
was more superficial than real. The successes of the British in the
southern States, though undeniable, and seemingly substantial, were
involving them ever more deeply in a ruinously ex-centric movement.
They need here only to be summarised, as steps in the process leading
to the catastrophe of Yorktown,--a disaster which, as Washington said,
exemplified naval rather than military power.
The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn of
1779[89] had left that place in the possession of the British as
a base for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia; lasting
success in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in those
States. When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, Sir
Henry Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for the
Savannah River, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details of
the operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not be
given here; for, although the Navy took an active part in them, they
scarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of May,
1780, the city of Charleston capitulated, between six and seven
thousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then returned to New York,
leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The latter proposed
to remain quiet during the hot months; but the activity of the
American partisan troops prevented this, and in July the approach of a
small, but relatively formidable force, under General Gates, compelled
him to take the field. On the 16th of August the two little armies
met at Camden, and the Americans, who were much the more numerous, but
largely irregulars, were routed decisively. This news reached General
Washington in the north nearly at the same moment that the treason of
Benedict Arnold became known. Although the objects of his treachery
were frustrated, the sorrowful words, "Whom now can we trust?" show
the deep gloom which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of the
American Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, that
Rodney arrived at New York.
Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to push on into
North Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his naval base
in Charleston, communication with which by land he had not force
to maintain, and could recover effective touch with the sea only in
Chesapeake Bay. This conclusion was not apparent from the first.
In North Carolina, the British general did not receive from the
inhabitants the substantial support which he had expected, and found
himself instead in a very difficult and wild country, confronted by
General Greene, the second in ability of all the American leaders.
Harassed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sent
by sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferior
port, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th of
April, 1781. The question as to his future course remained to be
settled. To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do so
would be an open confession of failure,--that he could not return by
land, through the country by which he had come--much the same dilemma
as that of Howe and Clinton in Philadelphia. To support him in his
distress by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successive
detachments to ravage the valley of the James River in Virginia.
These were still there, under the command of General Phillips; and
Cornwallis, in the circumstances, could see many reasons that thither
was the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th of
April, 1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the division
at Petersburg, Virginia, then commanded by Benedict Arnold; Phillips
having died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him for
the moment.
To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is necessary to mention
briefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but significant, not
only as associated with the greater movements of the campaign, but as
indicative of the naval policy of the States which were at war. The
two, though not otherwise connected, have a certain unity of interest,
in that the same British officer commanded on both occasions.
It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, in
July, 1779, the 64-gun ship _Lion_ received such injuries that her
commander, Captain Cornwallis, had been compelled to run down before
the trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save her from capture.
Since that time she had remained there, as one of the squadron of
Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still commanded by
Cornwallis, she was making an ordinary service cruise off the north
side of Haïti, having in company the _Bristol_, 50, and the _Janus_,
44. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a number of sail were
sighted to the eastward, which proved to be a French convoy, on its
way from Martinique to Cap François, protected by La Motte-Picquet's
squadron of two 74's, one 64, one 50, and a frigate. The French
merchant ships were ordered to crowd sail for their port, while the
men-of-war chased to the north-west. La Motte-Picquet's flagship, the
_Annibal_, 74, got within range at 5 P.M., when a distant cannonade
began, which lasted till past midnight, and was resumed on the
following morning. From it the _Janus_ was the chief sufferer, losing
her mizzen topmast and foretopgallant mast. It falling nearly calm,
the _Bristol_ and _Lion_ got out their boats and were towed by them to
her support. The two other French ships of the line got up during
the forenoon of the 21st, so that the action that afternoon, though
desultory, might be called general.
The two opposing commodores differ in their expressed opinions as to
the power of the French to make the affair more decisive. Some of La
Motte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the responsibility
of his position. "The _Janus_, being smaller and more easily worked,
lay upon our quarter and under our stern, where she did considerable
damage. A little breeze springing up enabled us (the _Annibal_) to
stand towards our own ships, which did everything possible to come
up and cover us, without which we should have been _surrounded_." It
is easy to see in such an expression the reflection of the commands
of the French Cabinet, to economise the ships. This was still more
evident in La Motte-Picquet's conduct next day. On the morning of the
22d, "at daylight we were within one and a half cannon-shot, breeze
fresh at the east-north-east, and I expected to overtake the British
squadron in an hour, when we perceived four ships in chase of us.
At 6.30 A.M. three were seen to be men-of-war. This superiority of
force compelled me to desist, and to make signal to haul our wind
for Cap François." These three new-comers were the _Ruby_, 64, and
two frigates, the _Pomona_, 28, and _Niger_, 32. The comparison of
forces, therefore, would be: French, two 74's, one 64, one 50, and one
frigate, opposed to, British, two 64's, one 50, and three frigates.
La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait to ascertain the size of
the approaching ships. His courage was beyond all dispute, and, as
Hyde Parker had said, he was among the most distinguished of French
officers; but, like his comrades, he was dominated by the faulty
theory of his government.
The captain of the _Janus_ died a natural death during the encounter.
It may be interesting to note that the ship was given to Nelson,
who was recalled for that purpose from the expedition to San Juan,
Nicaragua, one of the minor operations of the war. His health,
however, prevented this command from being more than nominal, and not
long afterward he returned to England with Cornwallis, in the _Lion_.
Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompany a body
of merchant ships for England as far as the neighborhood of Bermuda.
This duty being fulfilled, he was returning toward his station, having
with him two 74's, two 64's, and one 50, when, on the morning of
June 20, a number of sail were seen from north-east to east (a);
the British squadron (aa) then steering east, with the wind at
south-south-east. The strangers were a body of French transports,
carrying the six thousand troops destined for Rhode Island, and
convoyed by a division of seven ships of the line--one 80, two 74's,
and four 64's--under the command of Commodore de Ternay. Two of the
ships of war were with the convoy, the other five very properly to
windward of it. The latter therefore stood on, across the bows of the
British, to rejoin their consorts, and then all hauled their wind to
the south-west, standing in column (bb) towards the enemy. Cornwallis
on his part had kept on (b) to reconnoitre the force opposed to him;
but one of his ships, the _Ruby_, 64, was so far to leeward (b') that
the French, by keeping near the wind, could pass between her and
her squadron (b, b, b'). She therefore went about (t) and steered
southwest, on the port tack (c'), close to the wind. The French, who
were already heading the same way, were thus brought on her weather
quarter in chase. Cornwallis then wore his division (w), formed line
of battle on the same tack as the others (c), and edged down towards
the _Ruby_. If the French now kept their wind, either the _Ruby_ (c')
must be cut off, or Cornwallis, to save her, must fight the large
odds against him. De Ternay, however, did not keep his wind but bore
up,--yielded ground (cc). "The enemy," wrote Cornwallis, "kept edging
off and forming line, though within gunshot. At 5.30 P.M., seeing
we had pushed the French ships to leeward sufficiently to enable the
_Ruby_, on our lee bow, to join us, I made the signal to tack." As
the British squadron went about to stand east again (d), the French,
heading now west-south-west (cc), hoisted their colours and opened
fire in passing. The _Ruby_ kept on till she fetched the wake of the
British column (d'), when she too tacked. The French then tacked also,
in succession (d), and the two columns stood on for awhile in parallel
lines, exchanging shots at long range, the British to windward.
Cornwallis very properly declined further engagement with so superior
a force. He had already done much in saving a ship so greatly exposed.
[Illustration]
The account above followed is that of the British commander, but it
does not differ in essentials from the French, whose captains were
greatly incensed at the cautious action of their chief. A French
_commissaire_ in the squadron, who afterwards published his journal,
tells that de Ternay a few days later asked the captain of one of the
ships what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and received
the reply, "We have lost our opportunity of finding out." He gives
also many details of the talk that went on in the ships, which need
not be repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that de
Ternay had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might be
encountered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that he should
not risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The charge
of six thousand troops, under the then conditions, was no light
responsibility, and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now.
Comment upon his action does not belong to British naval history,
to which the firmness and seamanship of Captain Cornwallis added a
lasting glory. It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the French
Revolution, the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguished
himself by his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five ships safe
off, out of the jaws of a dozen. It illustrates how luck seems in many
cases to characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does.
Cornwallis, familiarly known as "Billy Blue" to the seamen of his day,
never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one; but in command
both of ships and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished himself by
successfully facing odds which he could not overcome.
The year 1780 was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodney's
relief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel Fleet
which accompanied him on that mission returned safely to England. The
"Grand Fleet," as it still was styled occasionally, cruised at sea
from June 8th to August 18th, an imposing force of thirty-one ships of
the line, eleven of them three-deckers of 90 guns and upwards. Admiral
Francis Geary was then Commander-in-Chief, but, his health failing,
and Barrington refusing to take the position, through professed
distrust of himself and actual distrust of the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral
George Darby succeeded to it, and held it during the year 1781.
The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the capture on
August 9th of a large British convoy, two or three hundred miles
west of Cape St. Vincent, by the allied fleets from Cadiz. As out of
sixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken sixteen
were carrying troops and supplies necessary for the West India
garrisons, such a disaster claims mention among the greater operations
of war, the success of which it could not fail to influence. Captain
John Moutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was brought to trial
and dismissed his ship; but there were not wanting those who charged
the misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in the captain a victim. It
was the greatest single blow that British commerce had received in
war during the memory of men then living, and "a general inclination
prevailed to lay the blame upon some individual, who might be punished
according to the magnitude of the object, rather than in proportion to
his demerit."[90]
During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic Powers, known
historically as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from Great Britain the
concession of certain points thought essential to neutral interests.
The accession of Holland to this combination, together with other
motives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain to declare war
against the United Provinces on the 20th of December. Orders were at
once sent to the East and West Indies to seize Dutch possessions and
ships, but these did not issue in action until the following year.
Towards the end of 1780 the French Government, dissatisfied with the
lack of results from the immense combined force assembled in Cadiz
during the summer months, decided to recall its ships, and to refit
them during the winter for the more extensive and aggressive movements
planned for the campaign of 1781. D'Estaing was sent from France for
the purpose; and under his command thirty-eight ships of the line, in
which were included those brought by de Guichen from the West Indies,
sailed on the 7th of November for Brest. Extraordinary as it may seem,
this fleet did not reach its port until the 3d of January, 1781.
[Footnote 75: Parker's Report.]
[Footnote 76: Ibid.]
[Footnote 77: _Ante_, p. 115.]
[Footnote 78: Rodney's Report. The French authorities give their line
of battle as twenty-two ships of the line. There was no 90-gun ship
among them--no three-decker; but there were two of 80 guns, of which
also the British had none.]
[Footnote 79: A cable was then assumed to have a length of 120
fathoms,--720 feet.]
[Footnote 80: A properly formed line of twenty ships, at two cables'
interval, would be about five miles long. Rodney seems to have been
satisfied that this was about the condition of his fleet at this
moment.]
[Footnote 81: Rodney's Report.]
[Footnote 82: Testimony of the signal officer at the court-martial on
Captain Bateman.]
[Footnote 83: Singularly enough, this officer was afterwards
court-martialled for misbehaviour, on the 1st of June, 1794, of
precisely the same character as that from all share in which Rodney
now cleared him.]
[Footnote 84: The words in Rodney's public letter, suppressed at the
time by the Admiralty, agree with these, but are even more explicit.
"I cannot conclude this letter without acquainting their Lordships
that had Captain Carkett, who led the van, properly obeyed my signal
for attacking the enemy, and agreeable to the 21st Article of the
Additional Fighting Instructions, bore down instantly to the ship
at that time abreast of him, instead of leading as he did to the van
ship, the action had commenced much sooner, and the fleet engaged in
a more compact manner...." This clearly implies that the _Additional_
Fighting Instructions prescribed the direction which Rodney expected
Carkett to take. If these Additional Instructions are to be found,
their testimony would be interesting.
Since this account was written, the Navy Records Society has published
(1905) a volume, "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816," by Mr. Julian
Corbett, whose diligent researches in matters of naval history and
warfare are appreciated by those interested in such subjects. The
specific "Additional Instructions" quoted by Rodney appear not to have
been found. Among those given prior to 1780 there is none that extends
to twenty-one articles. In a set issued by Rodney in 1782 an article
(No. 17, p. 227) is apparently designed to prevent the recurrence
of Carkett's mistake. This, like one by Hawke, in 1756 (p. 217),
prescribes the intended action rather by directing that the line of
battle shall not prevent each ship engaging its opponent, irrespective
of the conduct of other ships, than by making clear which that
opponent was. Lucidity on this point cannot be claimed for either.]
[Footnote 85: Lapeyrouse Bonfils, "Histoire de la Marine Française,"
iii, 132. Chevalier gives much smaller numbers, but the former has
particularised the ships.]
[Footnote 86: Chevalier, "Marine Française," 1778, p. 185.]
[Footnote 87: A lee current is one that sets to leeward, with the
wind, in this case the trade-wind.]
[Footnote 88: Chevalier, p. 91.]
[Footnote 89: _Ante_, p. 115.]
[Footnote 90: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs."]