THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE
ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES
GIBRALTAR
In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had become
much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same moment that
d'Estaing with twenty-five ships of the line had confronted Byron's
twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen gathering against
it a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-six were Spanish.
The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alliance
with France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the British
government would take betimes the reasonable and proper step of
blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty, thus
assuming a central position with reference to its enemies and
anticipating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministry
hurried its ships to sea on the 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers,
Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise near
the island of Cizarga, off the north-west coast of Spain, where
the Spaniards were to join him. On the 11th of June he was at the
rendezvous, but not till the 23d of July did the bulk of the Spanish
force appear. During this time, the French, insufficiently equipped
from the first, owing to the haste of their departure, were consuming
provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleasant summer weather.
Their ships also were ravaged by an epidemic fever. Upon the junction,
d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had not been furnished with the
French system of signals, although by the treaty the French admiral
was to be in chief command. The rectification of this oversight caused
further delay, but on the 11th of August the combined fleet sighted
Ushant, and on the 14th was off the Lizard. On the 16th it appeared
before Plymouth, and there on the 17th captured the British 64-gun
ship _Ardent_.
Thirty-five ships of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the 16th of
June, and now were cruising outside, under the command of Admiral Sir
Charles Hardy. His station was from ten to twenty leagues south-west
of Scilly; consequently he had not been seen by the enemy, who from
Ushant had stood up the Channel. The allies, now nearly double the
numbers of the British, were between them and their ports,--a serious
situation doubtless, but by no means desperate; not so dangerous for
sailing ships as it probably will be for steamers to have an enemy
between them and their coal.
The alarm in England was very great, especially in the south. On the
9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses and cattle
to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms had been
placed across the entrance to Plymouth Harbor, and orders were sent
from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's mouth. Many
who had the means withdrew into the interior, which increased the
panic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea, homeward bound.
If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the approaches to the Channel,
instead of to the Spanish coast, these might be taken; and for some
time his whereabouts were unknown. As it was, the Jamaica convoy, over
two hundred sail, got in a few days before the allies appeared, and
the Leeward Islands fleet had similar good fortune. Eight homeward
bound East Indiamen were less lucky, but, being warned of their
danger, took refuge in the Shannon, and there remained till the
trouble blew over. On the other hand, the stock market stood firm.
Nevertheless, it was justly felt that such a state of things as a
vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel should not have been. Sir
John Jervis, afterward Earl St. Vincent, who commanded a ship in the
fleet, wrote to his sister: "What a humiliating state is our country
reduced to!" but he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.
The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre and
St. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.
Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired
to cause reasonable anxiety; and the crisis, on its face, was very
serious. Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of their
enemies, in counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands
from invasion. What the results of this would have been is another
question,--a question of land warfare. The original scheme of the
French Ministry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as
an anchorage for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise from
this near and reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project,
d'Orvilliers wrote: "We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's,[70] and
then, if I find that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of
it, I will send word to Marshal De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform him
of the measures I will take to insure his passage, which [measures]
will depend upon the position of the English main fleet [dèpendront
des forces supèrieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will
lead the combined fleet on that side [against their main body], to
contain the enemy, and I will send, on the other side [to convoy],
a light squadron, with a sufficient number of ships of the line and
frigates; or I will propose to M. de Cordova to take this latter
station, in order that the passage of the army may be free and sure.
I assume that then, either by the engagement I shall have fought with
the enemy, _or by their retreat into their ports_, I shall be certain
of their situation and of the success of the operation."[71] It will
be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted then and now one of the best
officers of his day in the French navy, takes here into full account
the British "fleet in being." The main body of the allies, fifty
ships, was to hold this in check, while a smaller force--Cordova had
command of a special "squadron of observation," of sixteen ships of
the line--was to convoy the crossing.
These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a
change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, before
Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but
the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.
The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,--a
resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels
aiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin shore operations,
too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country
to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, but
could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterly
gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies
out of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that the
British fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, which
decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the
shipping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to
reënter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.
This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return
up Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but decline
action, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d of
September he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards received
orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anchored
there.
The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer campaign by
the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not ready
according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised
in the probable coõperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and
Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great
Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been
foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it was
essential to prevent a junction,--to take an interior position. The
Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.
After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention
of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked,
off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, they
were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however,
for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular
outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports. This,
indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes;
for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel.
With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become
partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one
point,--the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had its
own special aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced
divergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in the
contest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects of
her ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence.
Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chief
ambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, in
Europe,--to regain Minorca and Gibraltar.
In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and
affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the
world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving
it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled
her vessels from Brest. "The project of a descent upon England was
abandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in America and
Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take the
offensive in the West Indies,--such," wrote the French government to
its ambassador in Madrid, "was the plan of campaign adopted for 1780."
Immediately upon the declaration of war, intercourse between Gibraltar
and the Spanish mainland was stopped. Soon afterwards a blockade by
sea was instituted; fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance
of the Bay, where they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels,
neutral or British, bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively
supported from Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some ships of the
line and many small vessels also maintained it more directly from
Algeciras, on the Spanish side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British
Mediterranean squadron, then consisting only of one 60-gun ship,
three frigates, and a sloop, was wholly unable to afford relief. At
the close of the year 1779, flour in Gibraltar was fourteen guineas
the barrel, and other provisions in proportion. It became therefore
imminently necessary to throw in supplies of all kinds, as well as to
reinforce the garrison. To this service Rodney was assigned; and with
it he began the brilliant career, the chief scene of which was to be
in the West Indies.
Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station on the
1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there immediately by
only four or five ships of the line; but advantage was taken of his
sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his approved
reputation a great force, composed of his small division and a large
fraction of the Channel fleet, to convey supplies and reinforcements
to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December the whole body,
after many delays in getting down Channel, put to sea from Plymouth:
twenty-two ships of the line, fourteen frigates and smaller vessels,
besides a huge collection of storeships, victuallers, ordnance
vessels, troop-ships, and merchantmen,--the last named being the
"trade" for the West Indies and Portugal.
On the 7th of January, 1780, a hundred leagues west of Cape
Finisterre, the West India ships parted for their destination, under
convoy of a ship of the line and three frigates. At daylight on
the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to the north-east, the squadron
apparently having passed them in the night. Chase was at once given,
and the whole were taken in a few hours. Seven were ships of war, one
64 and six frigates; the remainder merchant vessels, laden with naval
stores and provisions for the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provision
ships, twelve in number, were diverted at once to the relief of
Gibraltar, under charge of the Spanish sixty-four, which had been one
of their convoy before capture, and was now manned by a British crew.
Continuing on, intelligence was received from time to time by passing
vessels that a Spanish squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent.
Thus forewarned, orders were given to all captains to be prepared
for battle as the Cape was neared. On the 16th it was passed, and at
1 P.M. sails in the south-east were signalled. These were a Spanish
squadron of eleven ships of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney
at once bore down for them under a press of canvas, making signal for
the line abreast.[72] Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying to
form line of battle ahead on the starboard tack, which with a westerly
wind was with heads to the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred miles
to the south-east, he changed the orders to a "General Chase," the
ships to engage as they came up; "to leeward," so as to get between
the enemy and his port, and "in rotation," by which probably was
meant that the leading British vessel should attack the sternmost of
the Spaniards, and that her followers should pass her to leeward,
successively engaging from the enemy's rear towards the van.
At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes later
the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40 one of the
Spanish ships, the _Santo Domingo_, 80, blew up with all on board, and
at 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January, darkness had set
in. A night action therefore followed, which lasted until 2 A.M., when
the headmost of the enemy surrendered, and all firing ceased. Of the
eleven hostile ships of the line, only four escaped. Besides the
one blown up, six were taken. These were the _Fénix_, 80, flag of
the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, the _Monarca_, 70, the
_Princesa_, 70, the _Diligente_, 70, the _San Julian_, 70, and the
_San Eugenio_, 70. The two latter drove ashore and were lost.[73] The
remaining four were brought into Gibraltar, and were ultimately added
to the Navy. All retained their old names, save the _Fénix_, which
was renamed _Gibraltar_. "The weather during the night," by Rodney's
report, "was at times very tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued
very bad weather the next day, when the _Royal George_, 100, _Prince
George_, 90, _Sandwich_, 90 (Rodney's flagship), and several other
ships were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail to
avoid the shoals of San Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till
the next morning."
It was in this danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately though
promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney's
consists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven ships of the line,
was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise;
which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-ships in war-time.
Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late. It was
Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather and
navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake.
His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness. It
is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, Walter
Young, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to the
latter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence to
affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, gives
the following account: "When it was close upon sunset, it became a
question whether the chase should be continued. After some discussion
between the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiral
being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same
course, with the signal to engage to leeward." Rodney at that time
was nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and
hands.
The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal character
to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in need
of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies from home was
itself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to see
following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile ships of
the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, and
to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed.
The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at the
Admiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of the
people for the unpreparedness of the Navy. "You have taken more
line-of-battle ships," wrote the First Lord to Rodney, "than had been
captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars."
It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that this
advantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as it were, in
the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own; for twenty Spanish
and four French ships of the line, under Admiral de Cordova, were
lying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days when the British
remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was made by Cordova to
take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the benefit of superior
force. The inaction was due, probably, to the poor condition of the
Spanish ships in point of efficiency and equipment, and largely to
their having uncoppered bottoms. This element of inferiority in the
Spanish navy should be kept in mind as a factor in the general war,
although Spanish fleets did not come much into battle. A French
Commodore, then with the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows:
"Their ships all sail so badly that they can neither overtake an enemy
nor escape from one. The _Glorieux_ is a bad sailer in the French
navy, but better than the best among the Spaniards." He adds: "The
vessels of Langara's squadron were surprised at immense distances
one from the other. Thus they always sail, and their negligence and
security on this point are incredible."
On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of bad weather, and the
strong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's ships and
convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was not till the
26th that the flagship herself anchored. The storeships for Minorca
were sent on at once, under charge of three coppered ships of the
line. The practice of coppering, though then fully adopted, had not
yet been extended to all vessels. As an element of speed, it was an
important factor on an occasion like this, when time pressed to get
to the West Indies; as it also was in an engagement. The action on the
16th had been opened by the coppered ships of the line, which first
overtook the retreating enemy and brought his rear to battle. In
the French navy at the time, Suffren was urging the adoption upon an
apparently reluctant Minister. It would seem to have been more general
among the British, going far to compensate for the otherwise inferior
qualities of their ships. "The Spanish men-of-war we have taken,"
wrote Rodney to his wife concerning these prizes, "are much superior
to ours." It may be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said
the same of the Spanish vessels which came under his observation. "I
never saw finer ships." "I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered
ships," wrote the First Lord to Rodney after this action; "and I
am therefore determined to stop your mouth. You shall have copper
enough."
Upon the return of the Minorca ships, Rodney put to sea again on the
13th of February, for the West Indies. The detachment from the Channel
fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his way, and then parted
for England with the prizes. On this return voyage it fell in with
fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two 64's, bound for the
Ile de France,[74] in the Indian Ocean. One of the ships of war, the
_Protée_, and three of the storeships were taken. Though trivial, the
incident illustrates the effect of operations in Europe upon war in
India. It may be mentioned here as indicative of the government's
dilemmas, that Rodney was censured for having left one ship of the
line at the Rock. "It has given us the trouble _and risk_ of sending
a frigate on purpose to order her home immediately; and if you will
look into your original instructions, you will find that there was
no point more strongly guarded against than that of your leaving
any line-of-battle ship behind you." These words clearly show the
exigency and peril of the general situation, owing to the inadequate
development of the naval force as compared with its foes. Such
isolated ships ran the gantlet of the fleets in Cadiz, Ferrol, and
Brest flanking the routes.
[Footnote 70: An anchorage three miles to seaward of Spithead.]
[Footnote 71: Chevalier, "Marine Française," 1778, p. 165. Author's
italics.]
[Footnote 72: In line "abreast," as the word indicates, the ships are
not in each other's wake, as in line "ahead," but abreast; that is,
ranged on a line perpendicular to the course steered.]
[Footnote 73: Rodney's Report. Chevalier says that one of them was
retaken by her crew and carried into Cadiz.]
[Footnote 74: Now the British Mauritius.]