OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF
GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
Conditions of season exerted great influence upon the time and place
of hostilities during the maritime war of 1778; the opening scenes
of which, in Europe and in North America, have just been narrated.
In European seas it was realised that naval enterprises by fleets,
requiring evolutions by masses of large vessels, were possible only
in summer. Winter gales scattered ships, impeded manoeuvres, and
made gun-fire ineffective. The same consideration prevailed to limit
activity in North American waters to the summer; and complementary
to this was the fact that in the West Indies hurricanes of excessive
violence occurred from July to October. The practice therefore was
to transfer effort from one quarter to the other in the Western
Hemisphere, according to the season.
In the recent treaty with the United States, the King of France had
formally renounced all claim to acquire for himself any part of the
American continent then in possession of Great Britain. On the other
hand, he had reserved the express right to conquer any of her islands
south of Bermuda. The West Indies were then the richest commercial
region on the globe in the value of their products; and France wished
not only to increase her already large possessions there, but also to
establish more solidly her political and military tenure.
[Illustration]
In September, 1778, the British Island of Dominica was seized by an
expedition from the adjacent French colony of Martinique. The affair
was a surprise, and possesses no special military interest; but it
is instructive to observe that Great Britain was unprepared, in the
West Indies as elsewhere, when the war began. A change had been made
shortly before in the command of the Leeward Islands Station, as it
was called, which extended from Antigua southward over the Lesser
Antilles with headquarters at Barbados. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Samuel
Barrington, the new-comer, leaving home before war had been declared,
had orders not to quit Barbados till further instructions should
arrive. These had not reached him when he learned of the loss of
Dominica. The French had received their orders on the 17th of August.
The blow was intrinsically somewhat serious, so far as the mere
capture of a position can be, because the fortifications were strong,
though they had been inadequately garrisoned. It is a mistake to build
works and not man them, for their fall transfers to the enemy strength
which he otherwise would need time to create. To the French the
conquest was useful beyond its commercial value, because it closed a
gap in their possessions. They now held four consecutive islands, from
north to south, Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, and Santa Lucia.
Barrington had two ships of the line: his flagship, the _Prince of
Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70. If he had been cruising, these would
probably have deterred the French. Upon receiving the news he put
to sea, going as far as Antigua; but he did not venture to stay away
because his expected instructions had not come yet, and, like Keppel,
he feared an ungenerous construction of his actions. He therefore
remained in Barbados, patiently watching for an opportunity to act.
The departure of Howe and the approach of winter determined the
transference of British troops and ships from the continent to the
Leeward Islands. Reinforcements had given the British fleet in America
a numerical superiority, which for the time imposed a check upon
d'Estaing; but Byron, proverbially unlucky in weather, was driven
crippled to Newport, leaving the French free to quit Boston. The
difficulty of provisioning so large a force as twelve ships of the
line at first threatened to prevent the withdrawal, supplies being
then extremely scarce in the port; but at the critical moment American
privateers brought in large numbers of prizes, laden with provisions
from Europe for the British army. Thus d'Estaing was enabled to sail
for Martinique on the 4th of November. On the same day there left New
York for Barbados a British squadron,--two 64's, three 50's, and
three smaller craft,--under the command of Commodore William Hotham,
convoying five thousand troops for service in the West Indies.
Being bound for nearly the same point, the two hostile bodies steered
parallel courses, each ignorant of the other's nearness. In the
latitude of Bermuda both suffered from a violent gale, but the French
most; the flagship _Languedoc_ losing her main and mizzen topmasts. On
the 25th of November one[54] of Hotham's convoy fell into the hands
of d'Estaing, who then first learned of the British sailing. Doubtful
whether their destination was Barbados or Antigua,--their two chief
stations,--he decided for the latter. Arriving off it on the 6th of
December, he cruised for forty-eight hours, and then bore away for
Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal French depot in the West Indies,
where he anchored on the 9th. On the 10th Hotham joined Barrington at
Barbados.
Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore lost not a
moment in deliberation. The troops were kept on board, Hotham's convoy
arrangements being left as they were. On the morning of December 12th
the entire force sailed again, the main changes in it being in the
chief command, and in the addition of Barrington's two ships of the
line. On the afternoon of the 13th the shipping anchored in the Grand
Cul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of Santa Lucia, which is seventy
miles east-north-east from Barbados. Part of the troops landed at
once, and seized the batteries and heights on the north side of the
bay. The remainder were put on shore the next morning. The French
forces were inadequate to defend their works; but it is to be observed
that they were driven with unremitting energy, and that to this
promptness the British owed their ability to hold the position.
[Illustration]
Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the Carénage;
now Port Castries. At its northern extremity is a precipitous
promontory, La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of which
depended not only control of that anchorage, but also access to the
rear of the works which commanded the Cul de Sac. If those works fell,
the British squadron must abandon its position and put to sea, where
d'Estaing's much superior fleet would be in waiting. On the other
hand, if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops were
isolated and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and the
squadron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either
would be decisive.
By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line from
La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Morne
Fortuné (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island. The feeble French
garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked, and its
ammunition and stores untouched,--another instance of the danger of
works turning to one's own disadvantage. It was Barrington's purpose
now to remove the transports to the Carénage, as a more commodious
harbour, probably also better defended; but he was prevented by
the arrival of d'Estaing that afternoon. "Just as all the important
stations were secured, the French colours struck, and General Grant's
headquarters established at the Governor's house, the _Ariadne_
frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for the approach of an
enemy."[55] The French fleet was seen soon afterwards from the heights
above the squadron.
The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still spared
no time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers in
strengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Admiral in rectifying
his order to meet the expected attack. The transports, between fifty
and sixty in number, were moved inside the ships of war, and the
latter were most carefully disposed across the mouth of the Cul de
Sac bay. At the northern (windward)[56] end was placed the _Isis_, 50,
well under the point to prevent anything from passing round her; but
for further security she was supported by three frigates, anchored
abreast of the interval between her and the shore. From the _Isis_
the line extended to the southward, inclining slightly outward; the
_Prince of Wales_, 74, Barrington's flagship, taking the southern
flank, as the most exposed position. Between her and the _Isis_ were
five other ships,--the _Boyne_, 70, _Nonsuch_, 64, _St. Albans_, 64,
_Preston_, 50, and _Centurion_, 50. The works left by the French at
the north and south points of the bay may have been used to support
the flanks, but Barrington does not say so in his report.
D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and two days after this was
able to land seven thousand troops. With such a superiority it is
evident that the British would have been stopped in the midst of their
operations, if he had arrived twenty-four hours sooner. To gain time,
Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Royal,
less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of his
squadron, to cover the approaches to Santa Lucia; but, despite his
care, d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, as
has been said, was off Santa Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the
15th he stood in for the Carénage; but when he came within range, a
lively cannonade told him that the enemy was already in possession.
He decided therefore to attack the squadron in the Cul de Sac, and
at 11.30 the French passed along it from north to south, firing, but
without effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directed
upon the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British had
three men killed; the French loss is not given, but is said to
have been slight. It is stated that that day the sea breeze did not
penetrate far enough into the bay to admit closing. This frequently
happens, but it does not alter the fact that the squadron was the
proper point of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, an
opportunity to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably by
the soldierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assault
the works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Carénage,
he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm the
British lines at La Vigie. The neck of land connecting the promontory
with the island is very flat, and the French therefore labored under
great disadvantage through the commanding position of their enemy.
It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other ill-judged
and precipitate frontal attacks. After three gallant but ineffectual
charges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with the
loss of forty-one officers and eight hundred rank and file, killed and
wounded.
[Illustration]
D'Estaing reëmbarked his men, and stood ready again to attack
Barrington; a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to give
notice when the wind should serve. On the 24th she signalled, and the
fleet weighed; but Barrington, who had taken a very great risk for an
adequate object, took no unnecessary chances through presumption. He
had employed his respite to warp the ships of war farther in, where
the breeze reached less certainly, and where narrower waters gave
better support to the flanks. He had strengthened the latter also by
new works, in which he had placed heavy guns from the ships, manned
by seamen. For these or other reasons d'Estaing did not attack. On the
29th he quitted the island, and on the 30th the French governor, the
Chevalier de Micoud, formally capitulated.
This achievement of Barrington and of Major-General James Grant, who
was associated with him, was greeted at the time with an applause
which will be echoed by the military judgment of a later age. There
is a particular pleasure in finding the willingness to incur a great
risk, conjoined with a care that chances nothing against which the
utmost diligence and skill can provide. The celerity, forethought,
wariness, and daring of Admiral Barrington have inscribed upon the
records of the British Navy a success the distinction of which should
be measured, not by the largeness of the scale, but by the perfection
of the workmanship, and by the energy of the execution in face of
great odds.
Santa Lucia remained in the hands of the British throughout the war.
It was an important acquisition, because at its north-west extremity
was a good and defensible anchorage, Gros Ilet Bay, only thirty miles
from Fort Royal in Martinique. In it the British fleet could lie, when
desirable to close-watch the enemy, yet not be worried for the safety
of the port when away; for it was but an outpost, not a base of
operations, as Fort Royal was. It was thus used continually, and from
it Rodney issued for his great victory in April, 1782.
During the first six months of 1779 no important incident occurred in
the West Indies. On the 6th of January, Vice-Admiral Byron, with ten
ships of the line from Narragansett Bay, reached Santa Lucia, and
relieved Barrington of the chief command. Both the British and the
French fleets were reinforced in the course of the spring, but the
relative strength remained nearly as before, until the 27th of June,
when the arrival of a division from Brest made the French numbers
somewhat superior.
Shortly before this, Byron had been constrained by one of the
commercial exigencies which constantly embarrassed the military
action of British admirals. A large convoy of trading ships, bound
to England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought necessary to
accompany it part of the homeward way, until well clear of the French
West India cruisers. For this purpose he left Santa Lucia early in
June. As soon as the coast was clear, d'Estaing, informed of Byron's
object, sent a small combined expedition against St. Vincent, which
was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On the 30th the French
admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet,--twenty-five
ships of the line and several frigates,--directing his course for the
British Island of Grenada, before which he anchored on the 2d of July.
With commendable promptitude, he landed his troops that evening, and
on the 4th the island capitulated. Except as represented by one small
armed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in this
transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships were captured in the
port.
At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of the
line, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying
troops and equipments. He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st,
and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that the
French had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put to sea on the
3d, with the force mentioned.
[Illustration]
The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night of
July 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown,
at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been under
way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.[57] At 4 A.M. the French
began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle on
the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possible
without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully made, the
British fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, close
inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east.
It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships
nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been
in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident
excuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly
that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency,
or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when the
imminent probability of a meeting exists. The worst results of the day
are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of frigates, Byron had
assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, to
the convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, and
somewhat in the rear. It was understood, however, that these would be
called into the line, if needed.
When the French (AA) were first perceived by Byron, their line
was forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to the
north-north-west, from the confused cluster[58] still to be seen at
the anchorage. Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled "a
general chase in that quarter,[59] as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley
to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the
enemy's ships appeared to be in line, the signal was made for the
ships to engage, _and form as they could get up_."[60] It is clear
from this not only that the ships were not in order, but also that
they were to form under fire. Three ships, the _Sultan_, 74, the
_Prince of Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70, in the order named,--the
second carrying Barrington's flag,--were well ahead of the fleet (b).
The direction prescribed for the attack, that of the clustered ships
in the French rear, carried the British down on a south-south-west, or
south by west, course; and as the enemy's van and centre were drawing
out to the north-north-west, the two lines at that time resembled the
legs of a "V," the point of which was the anchorage off Georgetown.
Barrington's three ships therefore neared the French order gradually,
and had to receive its fire for some time before they could reply,
unless, by hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course.
This, and their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When they
reached the rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerably
formed, and Barrington's ships wore (w) in succession,--just as
Harland's had done in Keppel's action,--to follow on the other tack.
In doing this, the _Sultan_ kept away under the stern of the enemy's
rearmost ship, to rake her; to avoid which the latter bore up. The
_Sultan_ thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead,
standing along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward.
Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for the
first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in thinking
the French force inferior to his own. "However, the general chase
was continued, and the signal made for close engagement."[61] The
remainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first three
had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they followed; but
before reaching the point of wearing, three ships, "the _Grafton_,
74, the _Cornwall_, 74, and the _Lion_, 64 (c), _happening to be to
leeward_,[62] sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it
passed on the starboard tack." It seems clear that, having had the
wind, during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it
should not have "happened" that any ships should have been so far to
leeward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing as
an advocate of Byron, says,[63] "while the van was wearing ... the
sternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker....
Among these ships, the _Cornwall_ and _Lion_, from being nearer
the enemy than those about them (for the rear division had not
then _formed into line_), drew upon themselves almost the whole of
the enemy's fire." No words can show more clearly the disastrous,
precipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted. The
_Grafton_, White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, these
three were so crippled, besides a heavy loss in men, that they dropped
far to leeward and astern (c', c"), when on the other tack.
When the British ships in general had got round, and were in line
ahead on the starboard tack,--the same as the French,--ranging from
rear to van of the enemy (Positions B, B, B), Byron signalled for
the eight leading ships to close together, for mutual support, and
to engage close. This, which should have been done--not with finikin
precision, but with military adequacy--before engaging, was less
easy now, in the din of battle and with crippled ships. A quick-eyed
subordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief.
Rear-Admiral Rowley was still considerably astern, having to make
up the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he followed the
latter, he saw Barrington's three ships unduly separated and doubtless
visibly much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly following his
leader, he cut straight across (aa) to the head of the column to
support the van,--an act almost absolutely identical with that which
won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was followed by the
_Monmouth_, 64, the brilliancy of whose bearing was so conspicuous to
the two fleets that it is said the French officers after the battle
toasted "the little black ship." She and the _Suffolk_, 74, Rowley's
flagship, also suffered severely in this gallant feat.
It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up with the
enemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, broad on the weather bow
of the two fleets. "They seemed much inclined to cut off the convoy,
and had it much in their power by means of their large frigates,
independent of ships of the line."[64] On the other hand, the
_Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_, though they got their heads round,
could not keep up with the fleet (c', c"), and were dropping also to
leeward--towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing bore
up with the body of his force to join some of his vessels that had
fallen to leeward. Byron very properly--under his conditions of
inferiority--kept his wind; and the separation of the two fleets, thus
produced, caused firing to cease at 1 P.M.
The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance apart;
still on the starboard tack, heading north-north west. Between the
two, but far astern, the _Cornwall, Grafton, Lion_, and a fourth
British ship, the _Fame_, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3
P.M., the French, now in good order, tacked together (t, t, t), which
caused them to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at once
imitated the movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiously
watched the result. Captain Cornwallis of the _Lion_, measuring the
situation accurately, saw that, if he continued ahead, he would be
in the midst of the French by the time he got abreast of them. Having
only his foremast standing, he put his helm up, and stood broad off
before the wind (c"), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He was
not pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, which
would put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, passed to windward
of the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to the
northward. The _Monmouth_ was equally maltreated; in fact, she had
not been able to tack to the southward with the fleet. Continuing
north (a'), she became now much separated. D'Estaing afterwards
reestablished his order of battle on the port tack, forming upon the
then leewardmost ship, on the line BC.
Byron's action off Grenada, viewed as an isolated event, was the most
disastrous in results that the British Navy had fought since Beachy
Head, in 1690. That the _Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_ were not
captured was due simply to the strained and inept caution of the
French admiral. This Byron virtually admitted. "To my great surprise
no ship of the enemy was detached after the _Lion_. The _Grafton_ and
_Cornwall_ might have been weathered by the French, if they had kept
their wind,... but they persevered so strictly in declining every
chance of close action that they contented themselves with firing upon
these ships when passing barely within gunshot, and suffered them to
rejoin the squadron, without one effort to cut them off." Suffren,[65]
who led the French on the starboard tack, and whose ship, the
_Fantasque_, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote: "Had our
admiral's seamanship equalled his courage, we would not have allowed
four dismasted ships to escape." That the _Monmouth_ and _Fame_ could
also have been secured is extremely probable; and if Byron, in order
to save them, had borne down to renew the action, the disaster might
have become a catastrophe.
That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage
is therefore to be ascribed to the incapacity of their
Commander-in-Chief. It is instructive to note also the causes of the
grave calamity which befell the British, when twenty-one ships met
twenty-four,[66]--a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These
facts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due to
attacking with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder.
He had the weather-gage, it was early morning, and the northeast
trade-wind, already a working breeze, must freshen as the day
advanced. The French were tied to their new conquest, which they could
not abandon without humiliation; not to speak of their troops ashore.
Even had they wished to retreat, they could not have done so before
a general chase, unless prepared to sacrifice their slower ships.
If twenty-four ships could reconcile themselves to running from
twenty-one, it was scarcely possible but that the fastest of these
would overtake the slowest of those. There was time for fighting, an
opportunity for forcing action which could not be evaded, and time
also for the British to form in reasonably good order.
It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must be
approved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed for
attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch opportunity from
an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pick
and choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he brought his fleet into action,
giving mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line.
What Byron did has been set forth; the sting is that his bungling
tactics can find no extenuation in any urgency of the case.
The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either
nation, were: British, 183 killed, 346 wounded; French, 190 killed,
759 wounded. Of the British total, 126 killed and 235 wounded, or two
thirds, fell to the two groups of three ships each, which by Byron's
mismanagement were successively exposed to be cut up in detail by
the concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss in spars and
sails--in motive-power--also exceeded greatly that of the French.
After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron went
to St. Kitts to refit; but repairs were most difficult, owing to the
dearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies. With
all the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages, the
ships remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for the
other islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved, as he
had his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, parade his superior
force before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor; but, beyond the
humiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling the
sea, no further injury was done.
In August Byron sailed for England. Barrington had already gone home,
wounded. The station therefore was left in command of Rear-Admiral
Hyde Parker,[67] and so remained until March, 1780, when the
celebrated Rodney arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands
Station. The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral Marriot
Arbuthnot, who had under him a half-dozen ships of the line, with
headquarters at New York. His command was ordinarily independent of
Rodney's, but the latter had no hesitation in going to New York on
emergency and taking charge there; in doing which he had the approval
of the Admiralty.
The approach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation of
operations, both naval and military, in the northern part of the
American continent, and had led to the transfer of five thousand
troops to the West Indies, already noted. At the same time, an
unjustifiable extension of British effort, having regard to the
disposable means, was undertaken in the southern States of Georgia and
South Carolina. On the 27th of November a small detachment of troops
under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, sailed from Sandy
Hook, convoyed by a division of frigates commanded by Captain Hyde
Parker.[68] The expedition entered the Savannah River four weeks
later, and soon afterwards occupied the city of the same name.
Simultaneously with this, by Clinton's orders, General Prevost moved
from Florida, then a British colony, with all the men he could spare
from the defence of St. Augustine. Upon his arrival in Savannah he
took command of the whole force thus assembled.
These operations, which during 1779 extended as far as the
neighbourhood of Charleston, depended upon the control of the water,
and are a conspicuous example of misapplication of power to the point
of ultimate self-destruction. They were in 1778-79 essentially of a
minor character, especially the maritime part, and will therefore be
dismissed with the remark that the Navy, by small vessels, accompanied
every movement in a country cut up in all directions by watercourses,
big and little. "The defence of this province," wrote Parker, "must
greatly depend on the naval force upon the different inland creeks.
I am therefore forming some galleys covered from musketry, which
I believe will have a good effect." These were precursors of the
"tin-clads" of the American War of Secession, a century later. Not
even an armored ship is a new thing under the sun.
In the southern States, from Georgia to Virginia, the part of the Navy
from first to last was subsidiary, though important. It is therefore
unnecessary to go into details, but most necessary to note that here,
by misdirection of effort and abuse of means, was initiated the fatal
movement which henceforth divided the small British army in North
America into two sections, wholly out of mutual support. Here Sir
William Howe's error of 1777 was reproduced on a larger scale and
was therefore more fatal. This led directly, by the inevitable logic
of a false position, to Cornwallis's march through North Carolina
into Virginia, to Yorktown in 1781, and to the signal demonstration
of sea power off Chesapeake Bay, which at a blow accomplished the
independence of the United States. No hostile strategist could
have severed the British army more hopelessly than did the British
government; no fate could have been more inexorable than was its own
perverse will. The personal alienation and official quarrel between
Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, their divided counsels and
divergent action, were but the natural result, and the reflection, of
a situation essentially self-contradictory and exasperating.
As the hurricane season of 1779 advanced, d'Estaing, who had orders
to bring back to France the ships of the line with which he had sailed
from Toulon in 1778, resolved to go first upon the American coast, off
South Carolina or Georgia. Arriving with his whole fleet at the mouth
of the Savannah, August 31st, he decided to attempt to wrest the city
of Savannah from the British. This would have been of real service
to the latter, had it nipped in the bud their ex-centric undertaking;
but, after three weeks of opening trenches, an assault upon the place
failed. D'Estaing then sailed for Europe with the ships designated
to accompany him, the others returning to the West Indies in two
squadrons, under de Grasse and La Motte-Picquet. Though fruitless
in its main object, this enterprise of d'Estaing had the important
indirect effect of causing the British to abandon Narragansett Bay.
Upon the news of his appearance, Sir Henry Clinton had felt that, with
his greatly diminished army, he could not hold both Rhode Island and
New York. He therefore ordered the evacuation of the former, thus
surrendering, to use again Rodney's words, "the best and noblest
harbour in America." The following summer it was occupied in force by
the French.
D'Estaing was succeeded in the chief command, in the West Indies and
North America, by Rear-Admiral de Guichen,[69] who arrived on the
station in March, 1780, almost at the same moment as Rodney.
[Footnote 54: The French accounts say three.]
[Footnote 55: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs," iv. 390.]
[Footnote 56: Santa Lucia being in the region of the north-east trade
winds, north and east are always windwardly relatively to south and
west.]
[Footnote 57: To the westward. These islands lie in the trade-winds,
which are constant in _general_ direction from north-east.]
[Footnote 58: Admiral Keppel, in his evidence before the Palliser
Court, gave an interesting description of a similar scene, although
the present writer is persuaded that he was narrating things as they
seemed, rather than as they were--as at Grenada. "The French were
forming their line exactly in the manner M. Conflans did when attacked
by Admiral Hawke." (Keppel had been in that action.) "It is a manner
peculiar to themselves; and to those who do not understand it, it
appears like confusion. They draw out ship by ship from a cluster."]
[Footnote 59: That is, towards the ships at anchor,--the enemy's rear
as matters then were.]
[Footnote 60: Byron's Report. The italics are the author's.]
[Footnote 61: Byron's Report.]
[Footnote 62: Ibid. Author's italics.]
[Footnote 63: "Naval Researches." London, 1830, p. 22.]
[Footnote 64: Byron's Report.]
[Footnote 65: Pierre A. de Suffren de Saint Tropez, a Bailli of the
Order of Knights of Malta. Born, 1726. Present at two naval actions
before he was twenty. Participated in 1756 in the attack on Port
Mahon, and in 1759 in the action off Lagos. Chef d'escadre in 1779.
Dispatched to the East Indies in 1781. Fought a British squadron
in the Bay of Praya, and a succession of brilliant actions with Sir
Edward Hughes, 1782-83. Vice-Admiral, 1783. Killed in a duel, 1788.
One of the greatest of French naval officers.--W.L.C.]
[Footnote 66: Troude says that one French seventy-four, having touched
in leaving port, was not in the engagement.]
[Footnote 67: First of the name. Born 1714. In 1780, he fell under
Rodney's censure, and went home. In 1781, he commanded in the general
action with the Dutch, known as the Dogger Bank. In 1782, he sailed
for the East Indies in the _Cato_, 64; which ship was never again
heard from.]
[Footnote 68: Sir Hyde Parker, Kt. Second of the name, son of the
first. Born, 1739. Captain, 1763. Rear-Admiral, 1793. Vice-Admiral,
1794. Admiral, 1799. Died, 1807. Nelson's chief at Copenhagen, in
1801.]
[Footnote 69: Louis Urbain de Bouënic, Comte de Guichen. Born, 1712.
Entered the navy, 1730. Commanded the _Illustre_ with success in North
America in 1756. Second in command in the action off Ushant in 1778.
Thrice fought Rodney in the West Indies in 1780. Fought Kempenfelt off
the Azores in 1781. Died, 1790.--W.L.C.]