THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT
1778
During the same two months that saw the contest between d'Estaing and
Howe in America the only encounter between nearly equal fleets in
1778 took place in European waters. Admiral Keppel, having returned
to Spithead after the affair between the _Belle Poule_ and the
_Arethusa_,[38] again put to sea on the 9th of July, with a force
increased to thirty ships of the line. He had been mortified by the
necessity of avoiding action, and of even retiring into port, with the
inadequate numbers before under his command, and his mind was fixed
now to compel an engagement, if he met the French.
The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-two
ships of the line. Of these, three--64, a 60, and a 50--were not
considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus reduced to
twenty-nine sail, carrying 2098 guns. To these the British opposed an
aggregate of 2278; but comparison by this means only is very rough.
Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes and weight of the
vessels need to be considered. In the particular instance the matter
is of little importance; the action being indecisive, and credit
depending upon manoeuvres rather than upon fighting.
The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he was expected to avoid
action, unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders,
until I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions,
and known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength; only, if I know him to be too superior,
I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but if the
enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to shun." These
words explain his conduct through the next few days.
On the afternoon of July 23d the two fleets sighted each other, about
a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to leeward.
Towards sunset, they were standing south-west, with the wind at
west-north-west, and bore north-east from the enemy, who were
lying-to, heads to the northward. The British remaining nearly
motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting, d'Orvilliers
availed himself of the conditions to press to windward, and in the
morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.[39] Their
relative positions satisfied both admirals for the moment; for
Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French, while
d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open retreat to his
port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage, to fulfil
his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of his ships,
however, the _Duc de Bourgogne_, 80, and a 74, were still to leeward,
not only of their own main body, but also of the British. Keppel
sent chasers after them, for the expressed purpose of compelling
d'Orvilliers to action in their support,[40] and it was believed by
the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to avoid being
cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was thus reduced to
twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until July 27th the wind
continued to the westward, and the wariness of the French admiral
baffled all his antagonist's efforts to get within range. Keppel,
having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pursued vigorously,
watching his chance. On the morning of July 27th the two fleets [Fig
1, AA, AA], were from six to ten miles apart, wind south-west, both on
the port tack,[41] steering north-west; the French dead to windward,
in line ahead. The British were in bow-and-quarter line. In this
formation, when exact, the ships of a fleet were nearly abreast each
other; so ranged, however, that if they tacked all at the same time
they would be at once in line of battle ahead close to the wind,--the
fighting order.[42] Both fleets were irregularly formed, the British
especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he would not
accomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning the order of
his going. He had therefore signalled a "General Chase," which,
by permitting much individual freedom of movement, facilitated the
progress of the whole body. At daylight, the division commanded by
Sir Hugh Palliser--the right wing, as then heading--had dropped astern
[R]; and at 5.30 A.M. the signal was made to seven of its fastest
sailers to chase to windward, to get farther to windward by pressing
sail, the object being so to place them relatively to the main body,
as to support the latter, if an opportunity for action should offer.
At 9 A.M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy and to
see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession,--to
countermarch. As the van ships went round (b) under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind (be), parallel to their former line, on
which those following them still were, until they reached the point to
which the rear ship meantime had advanced (c), when they could again
haul to the wind. This caused a loss of ground to leeward, but not
more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as things stood. Just after he
had fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to the
southward two points,[43] from south-west to south-south-west, which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the line
they were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continued
on the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard,
and at 10.15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships to
tack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the same
tack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. This
put the British in column,[44] still to leeward, but nearly astern of
the enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall came
up, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of an
hour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouring
the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them to
lay up for the enemy's rear after which (French BB) they were standing
and could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, the
French were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together,
and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).
Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and
from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter
could not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van
of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be
misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of
them as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage,
and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his ships
to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly,
but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
[Illustration]
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he
now. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy was avoiding
action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some
risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides,
thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these,
forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing,
were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades,
if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In short, practically the
whole force was coming into action, although much less regularly than
might have been desired. What was to follow was a rough-and-ready
fight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing.
Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just as
the firing began. The collision was so sudden that the ships at first
had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical,
were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of thirty ships, of
varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight of
sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated an action, which one
admiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meet
it with such shift as he could. The British (CC) being close-hauled,
the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45]
off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clear
to windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter could
reach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them. As
d'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute to
fight. The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, in
obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of battle, which
means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to draw them
gradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of the
British centre and rear. This, if imitated by their followers, would
render the affair even more partial and indecisive than such passing
by usually was. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire
soon after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, and
caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside. "The
distance between the _Formidable_, 90, (Palliser's flagship) and the
_Egmont_, 74, was so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose
three-decker, the _Ocean_, 90, was abreast and outside this interval,
"that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage,
without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the
_Egmont_,"--next ahead of the _Ocean_. The _Formidable_ kept her
mizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make the
needed room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear ships
to close. "At a quarter past one," testified Captain Maitland of the
_Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and a
midshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming on
board on the weatherbow. I put the helm up,... and found, when the
smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable's_ lee. She
was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as
I could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, I
was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_,
says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of action
bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her,
whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the
_Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board."
Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed
and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two
others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward,
which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as the
British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander,
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's wishes,
signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As the
French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to
windward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1
P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c),
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack
(Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just
before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down,
and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter
was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly
because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict
the urgent call for a re-formation.
At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the weather
bow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and
standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).
None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.
At 2.30 Palliser's ship, the _Formidable_ (R), on the starboard tack,
passed the _Victory_ to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet out
of action. A half-hour after this the _Victory_ had been joined by
three of the centre, which were following her in close order, the van
remaining in the same relative position. Astern of these two groups
from van and centre were a number of other ships in various degrees
of confusion,--some going about, some trying to come up, others
completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-east,
therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped. The
French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the
disadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d'Orvilliers'
next order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M.[49] he
signalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle
on the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior French
admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, and
spoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief's desire.
D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along the enemy's fleet
from end to end, to _leeward_, because in its disordered state there
was a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward--presenting
his weather side to the enemy--he could use the weather lower-deck
guns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports could
not be opened. Thus explained, the movement was executed, but the
favourable moment had passed. It was not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre
was evident to the British.
[Illustration]
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore the
_Victory_ again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack _off the wind_, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of
battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station
(Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy,
(F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight,--a
preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once
and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the
_Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in
behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair
damage and take their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the
line. Palliser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves
before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they
testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and
not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus,
on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, a
separate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of
the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig.
3, R). At 5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten
into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, as
they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British,
their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same time Harland was
directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at
once did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with
extraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoning
the rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at last
did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then
grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter
and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it
was thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight the
next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks;
but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the
mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the
British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161
killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicate
that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to
cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the motive-power. This would
be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed purpose of avoiding action
except under favourable circumstances. As the smoke thickened and
confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever
the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.
Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the
French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it is
certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was
greater than that of the British.
Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour,
or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppel
had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his will;
d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiority
of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal been
promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the British fleet, in
fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concentrated his fire
on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the delay, it was
distinctly in his power to renew the fight; and that he did not do so
forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of the better condition
of the French ships, Keppel, by running off the wind, had given his
opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet and to attack. Instead
of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the British lee, out of range,
and offered battle; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.
Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have permitted.
He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated; to windward,
or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the conditions, it
was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and to await his
pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted this chance, should
have renewed the fight; and here arose the controversy which set
all England by the ears, and may be said to have immortalised this
otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was to windward from
4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form line of battle, and
to bear down in the Admiral's wake; and Keppel alleged that, had these
been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have renewed the battle, having still
over two hours of daylight. It has been stated already that, besides
the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was
waiting only for him.
The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy;
and only this historical significance justifies more than a passing
mention. In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution
in 1757, and of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which
had materially influenced Byng in his action off Minorca. Keppel
repeatedly spoke of himself as on trial for his life; and he had been
a member of Byng's court-martial. The gist of the charges against
him, preferred by Palliser, was that he attacked in the first
instance without properly forming his line, for which Mathews had been
censured; and, secondly, that by not renewing the action after the
first pass-by, and by wearing away from the French fleet, he had not
done his utmost to "take, sink, burn, and destroy." This had been the
charge on which Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasons
for his course in general, alleged and proved his full intention to
attack again, had not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency
the same as that of Lestock, which contributed to Mathew's ruin.
In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had not
thrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle,--one of the
worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error, like a
whole lie, is open to speedy detection; half-truths are troublesome.
The Order of Battle[50] was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported
and censured; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being a
pedant by nature, would not break his line; the enemy slipped away,
Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-martial,
twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in the line were
summoned as witnesses. Most of them swore that if Keppel had chased
in line of battle that day, there could have been no action, and
the majority of them cordially approved his course; but there was
evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the rear
ships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in such
movements. Their commanders therefore had uncomfortable experience
of the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was meant to
insure.
Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation felt
in the rear ships to take post about their own admiral, and to remain
there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down in the
admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to whatever
cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him; but it appears
to the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not summoning those
ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to distrust the
purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing so till
7 P.M., as he did. It is a curious picture presented to us by the
evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the captain of
the ship, fretting and fuming on the _Victory's_ quarter-deck; the
signals flying which have been mentioned; Harland's division getting
into line ahead; and four points on the weather quarter, only two
miles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted," a group
of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in command,
apparently indifferent spectators. The _Formidable's_ only sign of
disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours,--a delay which,
being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then
throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board of
Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig that he
would not serve against the Americans; and he evidently feared that he
was to be betrayed to his ruin.
Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points: (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the _Formidable_;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, found
to be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As
regards the first, the signal was seen on board the _Ocean_, next
astern of and "not far from"[51] the _Formidable_; for the second, the
Admiral should have been informed of a disability by which a single
ship was neutralizing a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's
message could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging
feature to Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out
from under fire, he wore at once towards the enemy; afterwards he wore
back again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, might
have displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off
the wind,[52] at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is
impossible. To this writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of
a man in a sulk, who will do only that which he can find no excuses
for neglecting. In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip
over the line into grievous wrong.
Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him; the
accuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to recall
the ships which his own example was detaining. Against Palliser no
specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a general
inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found his
conduct "in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"--he
had fought well,--"but reprehensible in not having acquainted the
Commander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done either by
the _Fox_, or other means which he had in his power." Public opinion
running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was celebrated with
bonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got drunk, smashed the
windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser's own house, and came
near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty, in 1780, made him
Governor of Greenwich Hospital.
On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in sight
of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to
cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where he arrived
on the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against a
recurrence of the misdemeanor of the 27th by a general order, that
"in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had this
been in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station by
the Commander-in-Chief, and the _Formidable_ would have been left to
windward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his squadron
upon the centre in America; and Rodney, two years later, experienced
the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when the
leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.
Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the
Commander-in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not until
the matter got into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, that
the difficulty began which resulted in the trial of both officers,
early in the following year. After this, Keppel, being dissatisfied
with the Admiralty's treatment, intimated his wish to give up the
command. The order to strike his flag was dated March 18th, 1779. He
was not employed afloat again, but upon the change of administration
in 1782 he became First Lord of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a
brief intermission, until December, 1783.
It is perhaps necessary to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandoned
the field.[53] The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to
warrant further discussion of an episode the historical interest of
which is very slight, though its professional lessons are valuable.
The British case had the advantage--through the courts-martial--of
the sworn testimony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the
British kept on the same tack under short sail throughout the night,
and that in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far
as known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.
[Footnote 38: _Ante_, pp. 61, 62.]
[Footnote 39: Testimony of Captains Hood, Robinson, and Macbride, and
of Rear-Admiral Campbell, captain of the fleet to Keppel.]
[Footnote 40: See note on preceding page.]
[Footnote 41: A vessel is said to be on the port tack when she has the
wind blowing on her port, or left side; on the starboard tack, when
the wind is on the right side. Thus with an east wind, if she head
north, she is on the starboard tack; if south, on the port.]
[Footnote 42: See also note; _post_, p. 200.]
[Footnote 43: Twenty-two degrees.]
[Footnote 44: Column and line ahead are equivalent terms, each ship
steering in the wake of its next ahead.]
[Footnote 45: Forty-five degrees.]
[Footnote 46: Chevalier says, p. 89, "The English passed out of range"
of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice of
range, barring signals from their own admiral. In truth, they were
obeying his order.]
[Footnote 47: This evidence of the captains of the _Ocean_ and the
_Elizabeth_ contradicts Palliser's charge that his ship was not
adequately supported.]
[Footnote 48: It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an
accidental explosion on board the _Formidable_.]
[Footnote 49: Chevalier. Probably later by the other times used in
this account.]
[Footnote 50: The Order of Battle was constituted by the ships "of
the line" ranging themselves one behind the other in a prescribed
succession; the position of each and the intervals between being taken
from the ship next ahead. This made the leading vessel the pivot of
the order and of manoeuvring, unless specially otherwise directed;
which in an emergency could not always be easily done. Strictly, if
circumstances favoured, the line on which the ships thus formed was
one of the two close-hauled lines; "close-hauled" meaning to bring the
vessel's head as "near" the direction of the wind as possible, usually
to about 70 degrees. The advantage of the close-hauled line was that
the vessels were more manageable than when "off" the wind.]
[Footnote 51: Evidence of Captain John Laforey, of the _Ocean_.]
[Footnote 52: "I do not recollect how many points I went from the
wind; I must have bore down a pretty large course." Testimony of
Captain J. Laforey, of the _Ocean_, on this point.]
[Footnote 53: "During the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away
(_fit route_) for Portsmouth." Chevalier, "Marine Française," p. 90.
Paris, 1877. Oddly enough, he adds that "on the evening of the 28th
the French squadron, _carried eastward by the currents_, sighted
Ushant."]