WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND.
1778
The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the Americans
had strength and skill sufficient to embarrass Great Britain
seriously, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for taking
steps which scarcely could fail to cause war. On the 6th of February,
1778, France concluded with the United States an open treaty of
amity and commerce; and at the same time a second secret treaty,
acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and contracting
with them a defensive alliance. On the 13th of March, the French
Ambassador in London communicated the open treaty to the British
government, with the remark that "the United States were in full
possession of the independence proclaimed by their declaration of July
4th, 1776." Great Britain at once recalled her Ambassador, and both
countries prepared for war, although no declaration was issued. On
the 13th of April, a French fleet of twelve ships of the line and five
frigates, under the command of the Count d'Estaing,[19] sailed from
Toulon for the American coast. It was destined to Delaware Bay,
hoping to intercept Howe's squadron. D'Estaing was directed to begin
hostilities when forty leagues west of Gibraltar.
The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the imminence
of which had been felt during the previous year; but it had not got
ready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations of success
from the campaign of 1777. The ships, in point of numbers and
equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had represented;
and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impossibility, was
experienced in manning them. The vessels of the Channel fleet had to
be robbed of both crews and stores to compose a proper reinforcement
for America. Moreover, the destination of the Toulon squadron was
unknown, the French government having given out that it was bound to
Brest, where over twenty other ships of the line were in an advanced
state of preparation. Not until the 5th of June, when d'Estaing was
already eight weeks out, was certain news brought by a frigate, which
had watched his fleet after it had passed Gibraltar, and which had
accompanied it into the Atlantic ninety leagues west of the Straits.
The reinforcement for America was then permitted to depart. On the
9th of June, thirteen ships of the line sailed for New York under the
command of Vice-Admiral John Byron.[20]
These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of the
ill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manning
the fleet. A considerable number of West India ships, with stores
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at
Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the whole
fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had
assembled; "and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May, it
did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the _Boyne_
and the _Ruby_, not being ready." Forty-five owners and masters signed
a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. "The convoy," they
said, "was appointed to sail April 10th." Many ships had been ready
as early as February. "Is not this shameful usage, my Lords, thus to
deceive the public in general? There are two hundred ships loaded with
provisions, etc., waiting at Spithead these three months. The average
expense of each ship amounts to £150 monthly, so that the expense of
the whole West India fleet since February amounts to £90,000."
The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their fellow
colonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as for
other prime necessaries. Not only were these cut off as an incident of
the war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which elicited
vehement appeals from the planter community to the home government,
but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the commerce of the
islands, whose industries were thus smitten root and branch, import
and export. In 1776, salt food for whites and negroes had risen from
50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief support of the slaves,--the
laboring class,--by 400 per cent. At the same time sugar had fallen
from 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over 37 per cent. The words
"starvation" and "famine" were freely used in these representations,
which were repeated in 1778. Insurance rose to 23 per cent; and this,
with actual losses by capture,[21] and by cessation of American trade,
with consequent fall of prices, was estimated to give a total loss
of £66 upon every £100 earned before the war. Yet, with all this,
the outward West India fleet in 1778 waited six weeks, April 10th-May
26th, for convoy. Immediately after it got away, a rigorous embargo
was laid upon all shipping in British ports, that their crews might
be impressed to man the Channel fleet. Market-boats, even, were not
allowed to pass between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.
Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral Augustus Keppel also put
to sea with twenty-one ships of the line, to cruise off Brest. His
instructions were to prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brest
divisions, attacking either that he might meet. On the 17th of June,
two French frigates were sighted. In order that they might not report
his force or his movements, the British Admiral sent two of his own
frigates, with the request that they would speak him. One, the _Belle
Poule_, 36, refused; and an engagement followed between her and the
British ship, the _Arethusa_, 32. The King of France subsequently
declared that this occurrence fixed the date of the war's beginning.
Although both Keppel's and d'Estaing's orders prescribed acts of
hostility, no formal war yet existed.
Byron had a very tempestuous passage, with adverse winds, by which his
vessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of August, sixty-seven
days from Plymouth, the flagship arrived off the south coast of Long
Island, ninety miles east of New York, without one of the fleet in
company. There twelve ships were seen at anchor to leeward (north),
nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and showing other signs
of disability. The British vessel approached near enough to recognise
them as French. They were d'Estaing's squadron, crippled by a very
heavy gale, in which Howe's force had also suffered, though to a
less extent. Being alone, and ignorant of existing conditions,
Byron thought it inexpedient to continue on for either New York or
Narragansett Bay. The wind being southerly, he steered for Halifax,
which he reached August 26th. Some of his ships also entered there.
A very few had already succeeded in joining Howe in New York, being
fortunate enough to escape the enemy.
So far as help from England went, Lord Howe would have been crushed
long before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celerity,
partly to the delays of his opponent. Early in May he received advices
from home, which convinced him that a sudden and rapid abandonment of
Philadelphia and of Delaware Bay might become necessary. He therefore
withdrew his ships of the line from New York and Narragansett,
concentrating them at the mouth of Delaware Bay, while the transports
embarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supply
of the army in a hostile country. The threatening contingency of
a superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make it
imperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead the
alternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a year
before had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force.
Thus prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became necessary.
Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of May by Sir
Henry Clinton, and had returned to England, escaped the humiliation of
giving up his dearly bought conquest. On the 18th of June the British
troops, twelve thousand in number, were ferried across the Delaware,
under the supervision of the Navy, and began their hazardous march to
New York. The next day the transports began to move down the river;
but, owing to the intricate navigation, head winds, and calms, they
did not get to sea until the 28th of June. On the 8th of July, ten
days too late, d'Estaing anchored in the mouth of the Delaware. "Had a
passage of even ordinary length taken place," wrote Washington, "Lord
Howe with the British ships of war and all the transports in the river
Delaware must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have
had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession
under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least
the fate of Burgoyne."
Had Howe's fleet been intercepted, there would have been no naval
defence for New York; the French fleet would have surmounted the
difficulties of the harbour bar at its ease; and Clinton, caught
between it and the American army, must have surrendered. Howe's
arrival obviated this immediate danger; but much still needed to be
done, or the end would be postponed only, not averted. A fair wind
carried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Delaware to Sandy
Hook in forty-eight hours. On the morning of the 29th, as Howe was
approaching his port, he spoke a packet from England, which not only
brought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing, but also reported that
she herself had fallen in with him to the southward, not very far from
the American coast, and had been chased by his ships. His appearance
off New York, therefore, was imminent.
Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his great
reputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers was
despatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word of his
movements, while others kept touch with him. The ships at New York
were ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of the entrance
was to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed by Washington
throughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June--the day after Howe
himself--on the heights of Navesink, on the seacoast, just south
of Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the sea had made a breach
between the heights and the Hook, converting the latter into an
island. Across this inlet the Navy threw a bridge of boats, by
which the army on the 5th of July passed to the Hook, and thence was
conveyed to the city.
On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of Virginia
by a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th; and two days later
another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th off the
Delaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two days, which were
diligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same time
sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had heard.
Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from complete,
when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived, announcing
that the French were approaching. That evening they anchored outside,
four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who during all these days was
indefatigable, not only in planning but also in personal supervision
of details, hastened at once to place his vessels according to the
disposition which he had determined, and which he had carefully
explained to his captains, thus insuring an intelligent coöperation on
their part.
The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a northerly
direction from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay of New
York on the south side. The main ship-channel, then as now, ran nearly
east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close to its northern
end. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no solid ground for
fortification within the cannon range of that day. Therefore such guns
as could be mounted on shore, five in number, were placed in battery
at the end of the Hook. These formed the right flank of the defence,
which was continued thence to the westward by a line of seven ships,
skirting the southern edge of the channel. As the approach of the
French, if they attacked, must be with an easterly wind and a rising
tide, the ships were placed with that expectation; and in such wise
that, riding with their heads to the eastward, each successive one,
from van to rear, lay a little outside--north--of her next ahead. The
object of this indented formation was that each ship might bring her
broadside to bear east, and yet fire clear of those to the east of
her. In order to effect this concentration of all the batteries in
an easterly direction, which would rake the approach of the enemy,
a spring[23] was run from the outer, or port quarter of every ship,
except the leader.[24] These springs were not taken to the bow cable
or anchor, as was often done, but to anchors of their own, placed
broad off the port bows. If, then, the enemy attacked, the ships, by
simply keeping fast the springs and veering the cables, would swing
with their broadsides facing east. If the enemy, which had no bow
fire, survived his punishment, and succeeded in advancing till abreast
the British line, it was necessary only to keep fast the cables and
let go the springs; the ships would swing head to the east wind, and
the broadsides would once more bear north, across the channel instead
of along it. These careful arrangements were subject, of course, to
the mischance of shot cutting away cables or springs; but this was
more than offset by the probable injury to the enemy's spars and
rigging, as well as hulls, before he could use his batteries at all.
Such was the main defence arranged by Howe; with which New York stood
or fell. In the line were five 64's, one 50, and an armed storeship.
An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller vessels, was placed
just inside the bar--two or three miles outside the Hook--to rake
the enemy as he crossed, retiring as he approached; and four galleys,
forming a second line, were also stationed for the same purpose,
across the channel, abreast of the Hook.[25] The retreat of these was
secure into the shoal water, where they could not be followed. One 64
and some frigates were held as a reserve, inside the main line, to act
as occasion might require. The total available force was, six 64's,
three 50's, and six frigates. D'Estaing's fleet, in detail, consisted
of one 90-gun ship, one 80, six 74's and one 50. Great as was this
discrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely by
Howe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circumvent. If
the latter once got alongside, there was little hope for the British;
but it was impossible for the French to evade the primary necessity
of undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme range of
their enemies' cannon up to the moment of closing. The stake, however,
was great, and the apparent odds stirred to the bottom the fighting
blood of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, Howe
called for volunteers from the transports. Such numbers came forward
that the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board;
and many whose names were not on the lists concealed themselves in
the boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. The
masters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner offered
their services, taking their stations at the guns. Others cruised off
the coast in small boats, to warn off approaching vessels; many of
which nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.
Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington, one of whose
aides-de-camp visited his flagship. A number of New York pilots also
were sent. When these learned the draught of the heavier French ships,
they declared that it was impossible to take them in; that there was
on the bar only twenty-three feet at high water. Had that been really
the case, Howe would not have needed to make the preparations for
defence that were visible to thousands of eyes on sea and on shore;
but d'Estaing, though personally brave as a lion, was timid in his
profession, which he had entered at the age of thirty, without serving
in the lower grades. The assurances of the pilots were accepted after
an examination by a lieutenant of the flagship, who could find nothing
deeper than twenty-two feet. Fortune's favors are thrown away, as
though in mockery, on the incompetent or the irresolute. On the 22d of
July a fresh north-east wind concurred with a spring tide to give the
highest possible water on the bar.[26]
"At eight o'clock," wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet,
"d'Estaing with all his squadron appeared under way. He kept
working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for
crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind
could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from
the exact point from which he could attack us to the greatest
advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that
afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected
the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two
nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war been
defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have
been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us.
D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three
o'clock we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few
hours he was out of sight."
Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote: "The
weather having been favourable the last three days for forcing
entrance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted."
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the
impossibility of success for the enemy.
After the demonstration of the 22d, d'Estaing stood to the southward,
with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought back word
that they had kept company with him as far south as the Capes of
the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from land. When
their leaving freed him from observation, he turned, and made for
Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an American land
force, had been concerted between him and Washington. On the 29th
he anchored three miles south of Rhode Island, and there awaited a
suitable moment for forcing the entrance.
Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest, near
the sea, are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the more
westerly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself, is north
and south; and by them the entrance is divided into three passages.
Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable above Rhode
Island. The central, which is the main channel, is joined by the
western above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the upper Bay. The
town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode Island, four miles from
the main entrance.
On the 30th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived, two
of its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards celebrated
Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it near the
south end of Conanicut. One of them, as she passed, was hulled
twice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frigates and
a corvette entered Seakonnet; whereupon the British abandoned and
burned a sloop of war, the _Kingfisher_, 16, and some galleys there
stationed. The British general, Sir Robert Pigot, now withdrew his
detachments from Conanicut, after disabling the guns, and concentrated
the bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode Island and about
Newport. Goat Island, which covers the inner harbour of the town, was
still occupied, the main channel being commanded by its batteries, as
well as by those to the north and south of it upon Rhode Island. On
the 5th of August, Suffren's two ships again got under way, sailed
through the western passage, and anchored in the main channel, north
of Conanicut; their former positions being taken by two other ships
of the line.[27] The senior British naval officer, seeing retreat cut
off both north and south, now destroyed those ships of war[28] which
could not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode
Islands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports also
were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour,
to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary
operations cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besides
some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to increase
the defences; and their officers and crews, over a thousand in number,
served in the fortifications.
[Illustration]
On the 8th of August the eight remaining French ships of the line ran
the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above the latter,
between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by the four
previously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand American
troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to the northern
part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed four thousand
soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut, for a preliminary
organisation; after which they also were to pass to Rhode Island
and join in the operations. For the moment, therefore, the British
garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,[29] was hemmed in
by vastly superior forces, by land and by water. Its embarrassment,
however, did not last long. On the following morning Lord Howe
appeared and anchored off Point Judith, seven miles from the entrance
to the Bay, and twelve from the position then occupied by the French
fleet. He brought a stronger force than he had been able to gather for
the defence of New York, having now one 74, seven 64's, and five 50's,
in all thirteen of the line, besides several smaller vessels; but he
still was greatly inferior to opponent, by any rational mode of naval
reckoning.
Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to preparations
for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease with the
latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Philadelphia, he
had hastened to get his ships ready for sea, a pre-occupation which
somewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking their positions at
Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the watering-place when the
approach of the French was signalled. Owing to this diligence, no time
was lost by his fault when the new destination of the enemy was made
known to him, on the 28th or 29th of July, by the arrival of the
_Raisonnable_, 64,[30] from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped the
French fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steering
for Rhode Island. The _Renown_, 50, which on the 26th had reached New
York from the West Indies, had a similar close shave, having sailed
unnoticed through the rear of the enemy the night before. Besides
these two, Howe was joined also by the _Centurion_, 50, from Halifax,
and by the _Cornwall_, 74; the latter, which crossed the bar on the
30th, being the first of Byron's fleet to reach New York. The three
others belonged to Howe's own squadron. For the two Halifax ships
which helped to make this most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was
indebted to the diligence of the officer there commanding, who hurried
them away as soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the
coast. The opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. "Had
they appeared a few days sooner," says a contemporary narrative,
"either they must have been prevented from forming a junction with
our squadron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had the
mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy."
On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the _Cornwall_ had come
in from a stormy passage of fifty-two days, the squadron was ready for
sea, and Howe attempted to sail; but the wind hauled foul immediately
after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not become fair at the
hour of high water, when alone heavy ships could cross the bar, until
the morning of the 6th. "Rhode Island was of such importance," says
the narrator already quoted, "_and the fate of so large a portion
of the British army as formed the garrison was of such infinite
consequence to the general cause_, that it was imagined the Admiral
would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief."
He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, and
hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. In
short, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such critical
circumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chance
offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point Judith,
and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learned
the events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was well
provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part of
the Island.
As deGrasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach of
a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals of
Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essential
to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay,
was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferior
squadron.[31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by the
mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages depended
upon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in support
of the most extreme view of the effect of a "fleet in being;" but
the instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggest
the question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the
existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon
the characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary British
narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the
various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron,
says: "The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that
the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his
Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion: under
such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the
General any essential relief." In both these instances, the admirals
concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not
of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organised
forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect
produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither
case would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landed
the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships. The next
morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind came out strong at north-east,
which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to sea,
cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside, steering
for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32]
did not permit an engagement except on his own terms. To insure these,
he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, which
by keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from that
quarter should set in. The French Admiral had the same object, hoping
to crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-west
did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage with
which he had started, despite Howe's skill. At nightfall both fleets
were still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the French
five or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variable
at east. The same course was maintained throughout the night, the
French gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3
A.M. of the 11th. By Howe's dispatch, they bore in the morning, at an
hour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, but
somewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently kept
closer to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east.
In the course of the day Howe shifted his flag from the _Eagle_, 64,
to the _Apollo_, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, the
better to decide the movements of his own. Finding it impossible
to gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too
far from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleet
by a succession of changes of course: at 8 A.M. to south, then to
south-west and west, until finally, at 1.30 P.M., the ships were
steering north-west; always in line of battle. The French Admiral
seems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circle
but with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning,
which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard side
of the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P.M. the French bore
south-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, or
nearly astern but to leeward. At this time their van was estimated by
Howe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, according
to his reading of their manoeuvres, d'Estaing was forming his line
for the same tack as the British, with a view of "engaging the British
squadron to leeward," whereby he would obtain over it the advantage
of using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much
heavier. As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put his
heaviest ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the
British, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. He therefore ordered
his heaviest ship, the _Cornwall_, 74, to go there from the centre,
exchanging places with the _Centurion_, 50, and at the same time
signalled the fleet to close _to the centre_,--a detail worth
remembering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th,
1780. It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the
French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought
to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage; the
conditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier ships that
composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned the
attempt, and "bore away to the southward, apparently from the state of
the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain,
was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging." It may be added that
the hour was very late for beginning an action. At sundown the British
were under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe was
unable to return to the _Eagle_.[33]
The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged on
the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets into
confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous disasters. The
_Apollo_ lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night of
the 12th. The next day only two British ships of the line and three
smaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral. When the weather
moderated, Howe went on board the _Phoenix_, 44, and thence to the
_Centurion_, 50, with which he "proceeded to the southward, and on the
15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in the
sea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May."[34] Leaving there
the _Centurion_, to direct to New York any of Byron's ships that
might come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and on
the evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, the
appointed rendezvous. Many injuries had been received by the various
ships, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d the
fleet again put to sea in search of the enemy.
The French had suffered much more severely. The flagship _Languedoc_,
90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts followed
it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the rudder
unserviceable. The _Marseillais_, 74, lost her foremast and bowsprit.
In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale, each of
these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encountered singly
a British 50-gun ship; the _Languedoc_ being attacked by the _Renown_,
and the _Marseillais_ by the _Preston_. The conditions in each
instance were distinctly favourable to the smaller combatant; but both
unfortunately withdrew at nightfall, making the mistake of postponing
to to-morrow a chance which they had no certainty would exist after
to-day. When morning dawned, other French ships appeared, and the
opportunity passed away. The British _Isis_, 50, also was chased and
overtaken by the _César_, 74. In the action which ensued, the French
ship's wheel was shot away, and she retired;--two other British
vessels, one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned
in the British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this
drawn action. The French captain lost an arm.
After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe saw them
on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded again towards
Newport. It was in the course of this passage that they were seen by
Byron's flagship[35] on the 18th, to the southward of Long Island. The
_Experiment_, 50, which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay,
was chased by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York
by the East River; being the first ship of the line or 50-gun ship
that ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communicated
with General Sullivan, the commander of the American land forces on
Rhode Island; but it was only to tell him that in his own opinion,
and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squadron
necessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought of the
propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best understood
from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. "The rebels had advanced their
batteries within fifteen hundred yards of the British works. He was
under no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but,
should the French fleet come in, it would make an alarming change.
Troops might be landed and advanced in his rear; and in that case
he could not answer for the consequences." Disregarding Sullivan's
entreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing sailed next day for Boston,
which he reached on August 28th. On the 31st the indefatigable Howe
came in sight; but the French had worked actively in the three days.
Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-pounders, with six mortars, were already
in position covering the anchorage; and "the French squadron, far
from fearing an attack, desired it eagerly."[36] The withdrawal of the
French fleet from Rhode Island was followed by that of the American
troops from before Newport.
Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's
reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number of
vessels as before,--thirteen of the line,--the _Monmouth_, 64, of
Byron's squadron, having arrived and taken the place of the _Isis_,
crippled in her late action. Before reaching Newport, he learned
that the French had started for Boston. He hoped that they would
find it necessary to go outside George's Bank, and that he might
intercept them by following the shorter road inside. In this he was
disappointed, as has been seen, and the enemy's position was now
too strong for attack. The French retreat to Boston closed the naval
campaign of 1778 in North American waters.
[Illustration]
The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enterprise
against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this campaign
to Howe,--an honour he must share, and doubtless would have shared
gladly, with his supporters in general. That his fleet, for the most
part two years from home, in a country without dockyards, should have
been able to take the sea within ten days after the gale, while their
opponents, just from France, yet with three months' sea practice, were
so damaged that they had to abandon the field and all the splendid
prospects of Rhode Island,--as they already had allowed to slip the
chance at New York,--shows a decisive superiority in the British
officers and crews. The incontestable merits of the rank and file,
however, must not be permitted to divert attention from the great
qualities of the leader, but for which the best material would have
been unavailing. The conditions were such as to elicit to the utmost
Howe's strongest qualities,--firmness, endurance, uninterrupted
persistence rather than celerity, great professional skill, ripened by
constant reflection and ready at an instant's call. Not brilliant in
intellect, perhaps, but absolutely clear, and replete with expedients
to meet every probable contingency, Howe exhibited an equable,
unflagging energy, which was his greatest characteristic, and which
eminently fitted him for the task of checkmating an enemy's every
move--for a purely defensive campaign. He was always on hand and
always ready; for he never wearied, and he knew his business. To
great combinations he was perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not
associated with his name. The distant scene he did not see; but step
by step he saw his way with absolute precision, and followed it with
unhesitating resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have
saved, in one campaign, the British fleet, New York, and Rhode Island,
with the entire British army, which was divided between those two
stations and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassed
in the annals of naval defensive warfare. It may be added that his
accomplishment is the measure of his adversary's deficiencies.
Howe's squadron had been constituted in 1776 with reference to the
colonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore was
composed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the
smaller classes; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than
a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, having
long warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such a force
to be confronted by one so superior as that which sailed from Toulon,
in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way, or, failing
that, its arrival in America should have been preceded by a British
reinforcement. As it was, the government was saved from a tremendous
disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral and the inefficiency of
his antagonist. As is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by the
instinct of self-preservation from the national wrath, excited by
this, and by other simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was
made to disparage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was even
superior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all his
ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small
vessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the attack
was a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional credit, who
at this most opportune moment underwent a political conversion, which
earned him employment on the one hand, and the charge of apostasy on
the other. For this kind of professional arithmetic, Howe felt and
expressed just and utter contempt. Two and two make four in a primer,
but in the field they may make three, or they may make five. Not
to speak of the greater defensive power of heavy ships, nor of the
concentration of their fire, the unity of direction under one captain
possesses here also that importance which has caused unity of command
and of effort to be recognised as the prime element in military
efficiency, from the greatest things to the smallest. Taken together,
the three elements--greater defensive power, concentration of fire,
and unity of direction--constitute a decisive and permanent argument
in favor of big ships, in Howe's days as in our own. Doubtless,
now, as then, there is a limit; most arguments can be pushed to an
_absurdum_, intellectual or practical. To draw a line is always hard;
but, if we cannot tell just where the line has been passed we can
recognise that one ship is much too big, while another certainly is
not. Between the two an approximation to an exact result can be made.
On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there
Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker[37] with six ships of the line of Byron's
squadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided to
return to England, in virtue of a permission granted some time
before at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately his
fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although he
did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing,
refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to abandon
his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the British positions
secure, and superiority of force insured for the time being, he
gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home; burning against the
Admiralty with a wrath common to most of the distinguished seamen of
that war. He was not employed afloat again until a change of Ministry
took place, in 1782.
[Footnote 19: Charles H., Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1729. Served in
India under Lally Tollendal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at
Madras in 1759, exchanged into the navy. Commanded in North America,
1778-80. Guillotined, 1794. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 20: Grandfather of the poet.]
[Footnote 21: The Secretary of Lloyd's, for the purposes of this work,
has been so good as to cause to be specially compiled a summary of the
losses and captures during the period 1775-1783. This, so far as it
deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the following results.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| BRITISH VESSELS | ENEMY'S VESSELS
|---------------------------------+----------------------------------
| Merchantmen | Privateers | Merchantmen | Privateers
|----------------+----------------+----------------+-----------------
| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken
| Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran-
| [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed
-----+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------
1775 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1776 | 229 | 51 | --- | --- | 19 | --- | 6 | ---
1777 | 331 | 52 | --- | --- | 51 | 1 | 18 | ---
1778 | 359 | 87 | 5 | --- | 232 | 5 | 16 | ---
1779 | 487 | 106 | 29 | 5 | 238 | 5 | 31 | ---
1780 | 581 | 260 | 15 | 2 | 203 | 3 | 34 | 1
1781 | 587 | 211 | 38 | 6 | 277 | 10 | 40 | ---
1782 | 415 | 99 | 1 | --- | 104 | 1 | 68 | ---
1783 | 98 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3 | ---
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote 22: Including those re-taken or ransomed. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 23: A spring is a rope taken usually from the quarter (one
side of the stern) of a ship, to the anchor. By hauling upon it the
battery is turned in the direction desired.]
[Footnote 24: The leader, the _Leviathan_, was excepted, evidently
because she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down
channel. She was not a fighting ship of the squadron, but an armed
storeship, although originally a ship of war, and therefore by her
thickness of side better fitted for defence than an ordinary merchant
vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close the
gap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy's ships
turning in there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal
oversight made by Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.]
[Footnote 25: It may be recalled that a similar disposition was made
by the Confederates at Mobile against Farragut's attack in 1864, and
that it was from these small vessels that his flagship _Hartford_
underwent her severest loss. To sailing ships the odds were
greater, as injury to spars might involve stoppage. Moreover, Howe's
arrangements brought into such fire all his heavier ships.]
[Footnote 26: A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York,
states that "at spring tides there is generally thirty feet of water
on the bar at high water."]
[Footnote 27: These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet,
being one 74, two 64's, and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved his
heaviest ships to force the main channel.]
[Footnote 28: _Flora_, 32; _Juno_, 32; Lark, 32; _Orpheus_, 32;
_Falcon_, 16.]
[Footnote 29: I have not been able to find an exact statement of the
number; Beatson gives eight regiments, with a reinforcement of five
battalions.]
[Footnote 30: It may be interesting to recall that this was the ship
on the books of which Nelson's name was first borne in the navy, in
1771.]
[Footnote 31: Troude attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense of
the insecurity of his position; Lapeyrouse Bonfils, to a desire for
contest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure of the situation.]
[Footnote 32: For the respective force of the two fleets see pp. 66,
67, 71.]
[Footnote 33: This account of the manoeuvres of the two fleets is
based upon Lord Howe's dispatch, and amplified from the journal of
Captain Henry Duncan of the flagship _Eagle_ which has been published
(1902) since the first publication of this work. See "Navy Records
Society, Naval Miscellany." Vol. i, p. 161.]
[Footnote 34: At the mouth of Delaware Bay.]
[Footnote 35: _Ante_, p. 62.]
[Footnote 36: Chevalier: "Marine Française," 1778.]
[Footnote 37: Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart., who perished
in the _Cato_ in 1783. He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker,
who in 1801 was Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in
1778 commanded the _Phoenix_, 44, in Howe's fleet. (_Ante_, pp. 39,
46.)]