_(a)_ With our _curiosity_--as though the interesting part was
somewhere else;
_(b)_ With our _submission_--as though it was not necessary to submit,
as though this world was not an ultimate necessity;
_(c)_ With our _sympathy_ and respect--as though this world did not
deserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us....
_In summa_: we have become revolutionaries in three different ways; we
have made _x_ our criticism of the "known world."
_B._
_The first step to reason:_ to understand to what extent we have been
_seduced,_--for it might be _precisely_ the reverse:
_(a)_ The _unknown_ world could be so constituted as to give us a
liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of
existence.
_(b)_ The other world, very far from taking account of our desires
which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things
which _this_ world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world
would be a means of satisfying us,
_(c)_ The _true_ world: but who actually says that the apparent world
must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts
contradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an
imaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality?
_In the first place,_ how do we know that _our_ world is _not_ the
true world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of
"appearance" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually
imagined a _region of shadows, a life of appearance,_ beside _real_
existence). And finally, what right have we to establish _degrees of
reality,_ as it were? That is something different from an unknown
world--that is already the _will to know something of the unknown._ The
"other," the "unknown" world--good! but to speak of the "true world" is
as good as "_knowing_ something about it,"--that is the _contrary_ of
the assumption of an _x_-world....
In short, the world _x_ might be in every way a more tedious, a more
inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.
It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were
several _x_-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world
besides our own. But this has _never been assumed...._
_C._
Problem: why has the _image of the other world_ always been to the
disadvantage of "this" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism
of it; what does this point to?--
A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending
path of Life, always; picture _another_ existence as lower and less
valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their
enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance
in regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never
admit that another people were the "true people"....
The very fact that such a distinction is possible,--that this world
should be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be
called the true world,--is symptomatic.
The places of origin of the idea, of "another world":
The philosopher who invents a rational world where _reason_
and logical functions are adequate:--this is the root of
the "true" world.
The religious man who invents a "divine world";--this is the
root of the "denaturalised" and the "anti-natural" world.
The moral man who invents a "free world":--this is the root
of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world.
The _common factor_ in the three places of origin: _psychological_
error, physiological confusion.
With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in
history, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious,
and moral prejudices.
The "other world" as it appears in the light of these facts, is
_synonymous_ with _not-Being,_ with not-living, with the _will_ not to
live....
_General aspect:_ it was the instinct of the _fatigue of living,_ and
not that of life, which created the "other world."
_Result:_ philosophy, religion, and morality are _symptoms of
decadence._
_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge.
587.
It might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning
"certainty". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the
criterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures
with which men had weighed heretofore--and to show that the question
concerning certainty is already in itself a _dependent_ question, a
question of the second rank.
588.
The question of values is more _fundamental_ than the question of
certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values
has been answered.
Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no "Being in
itself," no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance,
measured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for
appearance.
There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations,
but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is _not
annihilated,_ but only _driven to the background_ or _subordinated.
There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres._
589.
"End and means"
"Cause and effect"
"Subject and object"
"Action and suffering"
"Thing-in-itself and
appearance"
As interpretations (_not_ as established facts)--and in what respect
were they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as "preservative
measures")--all in the sense of a Will to Power.
590.
Our values are _interpreted into the heart_ of things.
Is there, then, any _sense_ in the absolute?
Is not sense necessarily _relative-sense_ and perspective?
All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with
it).
591.
The desire for "established facts"--Epistemology: how much pessimism
there is in it!
592.
The antagonism between the "true world," as pessimism depicts it, and
a world in which it were possible to live--for this the rights of
_truth_ must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these "ideal
forces" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the
nature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life,
cleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false,
richer, and fresher life. Thus it is not "truth" struggling with Life,
but _one_ kind of Life with another kind.--But the former would fain
be the _higher_ kind!--Here we must prove that some order of rank is
necessary,--that the first problem is _the order of rank among kinds of
Life._
593.
The belief, "It is _thus_ and _thus,_" must be altered into the will,
"Thus and thus _shall it be._"
_(m)_ Science.
594.
Science hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of
things by hypotheses which "explain everything"--that is to say, it
has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This
same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate _myself;_ I
should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world
for myself by means of a _scheme,_ and thus overcome intellectual
confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as
_recognised,_ as _known,_--Now we have annihilated morality--we have
once more grown _completely obscure_ to ourselves! I know that I know
nothing _about myself. Physics_ shows itself to be a _boon_ for the
mind: science (as the road to _knowledge_) acquires a new charm after
morality has been laid aside--and _owing to the fact_ that we find
consistency here alone, we must _order_ our lives in accordance with
it so that it may help us to _preserve it. _ This results in a sort of
_practical meditation_ concerning the _conditions of our existence_ as
investigators.
595.
Our first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take
good care to _avoid_ thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines
of thought for the lower orders.
596.
No "_moral_ education" of humanity: but the _disciplinary school of
scientific errors_ is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a
dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched
upon his _way,_ and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint
with tragic pride.
597.
The first principle of _scientific work:_ faith in the union and
continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to
work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts _will
not be in vain._
There is a great paralysing force: to work _in vain,_ to struggle _in
vain._
***
The periods of _hoarding,_ when energy and power are stored, to be
utilised later by subsequent periods: _Science_ as a _half-way house,_
at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings
find their most natural gratification and means of expression: all
those who do well to avoid _action._
598.
A. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and
with other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief
_that there is no such thing as truth,_ the Nihilistic belief, is a
tremendous relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, is
unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is
ugly.
599.
The "purposelessness of all phenomena": the belief in this is the
result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false,
it is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness--it
is not a necessary belief.
The arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he _denies_ that there
can be one!
600.
The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a
symptom of growth or decline.
Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a
sign of strength. One should not _desire to deprive_ the world of its
disquieting and enigmatical nature.
601.
Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also
belongs every attempt on the part of monism.
602.
This relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the
ear, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive
sensual apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its
practicability, its beauty, will begin to _near their end_ if we
_refine_ our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes
of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the _end_ is in
itself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more
superficially it is understood, the _more valuable,_ the more definite,
the more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more
deeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our
view,-_senselessness approaches!_ We have created the world that has
any value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth
is already the _result of illusion_--and that it is much more necessary
to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.
"All is false--everything is allowed!"
Only as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for
simplicity does the beautiful and the "valuable" make its appearance:
in itself it is purely fanciful.
603.
We know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily
produce a truth, but only one more piece of _ignorance;_ it is the
extension of our "empty space," an increase in our "waste."
604.
Of what alone can _knowledge_ consist?--"Interpretation," the
introduction of a sense into things, _not_ "explanation" (in the
majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which
has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There
is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates,
everything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all
things are our opinions.
605.
The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts
in general, is fundamentally different from the creative _placing,_
forming, moulding, subduing, and _willing_ which lies at the root of
_philosophy. To give a sense to things_--this duty always remains
_over,_ provided _no sense already lies in them._ The same holds good
of sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the
most varied interpretations and turns, _for different purposes._
A higher duty is to _fix a goal_ and to mould facts according to
it: _that is,_ the _interpretation of action,_ and not merely a
_transvaluation_ of concepts.
606.
Man ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid
in them--this process of finding again is science, the actual process
of laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both,
even if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one
should plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,--we
are the other,--to lay a sense in things.
607.
_Science_: its two sides:--
In regard to the individual;