(1) The senseless _overestimation of consciousness,_ its elevation to
the dignity of an entity: "a spirit," "a soul," something that feels,
thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a _cause,_ especially where finality,
system, and co-ordination appear;
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most
superior kind of being, as "God";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The "real world" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by
means of the facts of consciousness;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness,
wherever knowledge exists at all.
_Consequences:_--
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every
step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was
regarded as a falling-back upon the _passions_ and _senses--_as a
state of _animalism ..._.)
Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man _departs_
from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism....
To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit,
will, goodness--all one.
_All goodness_ must take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of
consciousness.
Every step made towards _something better_ can be only a step forward
in _consciousness._
(g) Judgment. True--false.
530.
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook,
ruled, guided, and directed him.
The πρῶτον ψεῡδος: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge
a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not _know_ what knowledge
is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing
as knowledge? Very _fine!_ But if I do not already "know" whether
there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably
ask the question, "What is knowledge?" Kant _believes_ in the fact of
knowledge: what he requires is a piece of _naïveté: the knowledge of
knowledge!_
"Knowledge is judgment." But judgment is a belief that something is
this or that! And not knowledge! "All knowledge consists in synthetic
judgments" which have the character of being _universally true_ (the
fact is _so_ in all cases, and does not change), and which have the
character of being _necessary_ (the reverse of the proposition cannot
be imagined to exist).
The _validity_ of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as
is also the _validity_ of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here
_moral ontology_ is the _ruling_ bias.
The conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we
believe to be universally true and necessary.
(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring
from experience.
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, _but
upon something else_, it must be derived from another source of
knowledge!
Kant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good
only on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring
from experience, but from pure reason.
Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for _believing_
in the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get
its cause? But the _origin of a belief,_ of a strong conviction,
is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience
frequently brings about such a belief! _It already presupposes_ that
there are not only "data _a posteriori_" but also "data _a priori_"--
that is to say, "previous to experience." Necessary and universal truth
cannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has
come to us without experience at all?
There is no such thing as an isolated judgment!
An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only in
_connection with,_ and when _related to,_ many other judgments, is a
guarantee of its truth forthcoming.
What is the difference between true and false belief? What is
knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal
truth cannot be given by experience! It is therefore independent of
experience, _of_ all experience! The view which comes quite _a priori,_
and therefore independent of all experience, _merely out of reason,_ is
"pure knowledge"!
"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of
contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all
experience."--But these principles are not cognitions, but _regulative
articles of faith._
In order to establish the _a priori_ character (the pure rationality)
of mathematical axioms, space _must be conceived as a form of pure
reason._
Hume had declared that there were no _a priori_ synthetic judgments.
Kant says there are--the mathematical ones! And if there are such
judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge
of things by means of pure reason!
Mathematics is possible under conditions which are _not_ allowed to
metaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.
A judgment is synthetic--that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas.
It is _a priori_--that is to say, this co-ordination is universally
true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but
by pure reason.
If there are such things as _a priori_ judgments, then reason must be
able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must _possess a
formative faculty._
531.
_Judging_ is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be
true or false, of asserting or denying, our certainty that something
is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"--_what_ is
believed to be true in all judgments?
What are _attributes_?--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely
as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and
which we only "perceive"; and we did _not_ class them as phenomena,
but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature
to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the _effect_
the _working cause,_ and _the latter_ we made _Being._ But even in
this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard
to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced
we ourselves are _not_ the cause, we still argue that they must be
effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change
must have its author";--but this belief in itself is already mythology;
for it _separates_ the working _cause from_ the cause in work. When I
say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action
and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully
affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is
_stable,_ which _is,_ and does not "come."--_To make the phenomenon the
working cause,_ and to make _the effect into a thing--into Being:_
this is the _double_ error, or _interpretation,_ of which we are guilty.
532.
The _Judgment_--that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every
judgment, therefore, there lies the admission that an "identical"
case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for
granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does _not_ create the
idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that
it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that
there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much _older_
function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which
in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that
second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc,
"That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal
to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations
equal, which regards them as equal?--There could be no judgments if
a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations:
memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has
already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed,
_the process of assimilation must already have been completed_: thus,
even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does
not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which
accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all
the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimilation,
rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the
general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much
more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly
established than the belief in spirit.
"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no
criterion of its truth." But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of
faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then _strength_ would
certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality.
533.
Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion
of truth ("_omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte
percipitur._"--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of
the world becomes desirable and credible.
But this is gross confusion: like _simplex sigillum veri._ Whence comes
the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in _this_ relation
to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this,
that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of
power and security, is _preferred, valued,_ and marked as _true_--The
intellect sets its _freest_ and _strongest faculty_ and _ability_
as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is
_true...._
"True"--from the standpoint of sentiment--is that which most
provokes sentiment ("I");
from the standpoint of thought--is that which gives thought
the greatest sensation of strength;
from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that
which calls forth the greatest resistance.
Thus it is the _highest degrees of activity_ which awaken belief in
regard to the _object_, in regard to its "reality." The sensations of
strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is
something which is being resisted.
534.
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.
535.
According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean
the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely
the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might
be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one
without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist;
whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as
conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard
of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted." Why
should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be "true"? This question
may exasperate the logicians who limit _things_ according to the
limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war
with this logician's optimism.
536.
Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true." That which is
real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.
537.
_What is truth?_--Inertia; _that_ hypothesis which brings satisfaction,
the smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc.
538.
First proposition. The _easier_ way of thinking always triumphs
over the more difficult way;--_dogmatically_: _simplex sigillum
veri_.--_Dico_: to suppose that _clearness_ is any proof of truth, is
absolute childishness. . . .
Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those
constant entities, is a _hundred times more easy_ than the teaching of
_Becoming_ and of evolution. . .
Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of _facilitating_
thought: a _means of expression_, --not truth. . . . Later on it got to
_act_ like truth. . . .
539.
Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";--we are
at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed,
is certainly fictional."
540.
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there
must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth.
541.
_Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum._
"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in
morality."--HERBERT SPENCER.
"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the
inconceivableness of its negation,"--HERBERT SPENCER.
542.
If the character of existence were false,:--and this would be
possible,--what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled
falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ...
543.
In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an
_anti-natural tendency_: its only purpose would be to provide a means
of attaining to a _higher degree of falsity._ For a world of truth and
Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created
(it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful").
Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting,
remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes,
dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as
"_God_" in His own image.
In order that truthfulness may be possible, the whole sphere in which
man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage
in every respect must be with the truthful one.--Lies, tricks,
dissimulations, must cause astonishment.
544.
_"Dissimulation"_ increases in accordance with the rising _order of
rank_ among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be
entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly _--ruse_
begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The
greatest men, such as Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark
concerning him),[3] as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks
(Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the very _essence_
of the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian
ideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest
vital instincts: the power which _will_ have error in all life; error
as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is
possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; the _picturing_ of
identical cases, of the _seemingness_ of identity, is more primeval
than the cognition of identity.
[Footnote 3: The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a
passage in his _Life of Napoleon_ (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche
had made a note in another place, and which reads: "Une croyance
presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand
il parle et à plus forte raison quand il écrit."]
_(h)_ Against Causality.
545.
I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the
latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time
as things in themselves do not exist. "Changes" are only appearances
(or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence,
however regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that
it has always happened so. The feeling that _post hoc_ is _propter
hoc,_ is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is
comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"!
546.
The interpretation of a phenomenon, _either_ as an action _or_ as the
endurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the
suffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation,
presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, _who_ is
"altered."
547.
Psychological history of the concept _subject._ The body, the thing,
the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of
distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent
is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at
length left the "subject" over.
548.
Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated
formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a _cause_; as, for
instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little
word "I." A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a _cause
of seeing in itself_: this was the feat in the invention of the
"subject" of the "ego."
549.
"Subject," "object," "attribute"--these distinctions have been _made,_
and are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false
fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does
something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a
quality.
550.
In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause
and effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the
result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and
even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that
faith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as
subjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject
of some sort.
I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally
this was, I look for an _intention_ behind it, and, above all, I
look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: every
phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind _all_
phenomena, this is our oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit?
As a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things
through itself. The question why? is always a question concerning the
_causa finalis,_ and the general "purpose" of things. We have no sign
of the "sense of the efficient cause"; in this respect Hume is quite
right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect
that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another,
but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm
faith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of
processes, but our _inability_ to _interpret_ a phenomenon otherwise
than as the result of _design._ It is the _belief in_ living and
thinking things, as the only agents of _causation_; it is the belief in
will, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that
all actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the "subject." Is
not this belief in the concepts subject and object an arrant absurdity?
Question: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon? Or is that also
illusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself?
551.
_A criticism of the concept "cause."_--We have absolutely no experience
concerning _cause_, viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept
from the subjective conviction, that _we_ ourselves are causes--that is
to say, that the arm moves.... _But that is an error._ We distinguish
ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of
this scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What
have we done? We have _misunderstood_ a feeling of power, tension,
resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the
action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to
do this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it. There is
no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to
be given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in_ order to
understand a phenomenon,_ it has been shown to be an illusion. Our
understanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject
who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in
which it happened. In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling
of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and
our design to do an action: _causa efficiens_ and _causa finalis_ are
fundamentally one.
We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state
in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes
according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On
the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing
how it will "act." The thing, the subject the will, the design--all
inherent in the conception "cause." We try to discover things in order
to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these
fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject."...
At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect
nothing: _because they are non-existent;_ and that the concept
causality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states,
the latter's causal relationship does _not_ follow (that would be
equivalent to extending their _active principle_ from 1 to 2, to 3, to
4, to 5). _There is no such thing as a cause or an effect._ From the
standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them.
But that does not matter. If I imagine _muscle_ separated from its
"effects," I have denied it....
In short: _a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting.
Causa_ is a _faculty to effect something,_ superadded fancifully to
what happens....
_The interpretation of causality is an illusion...._ A "thing" is the
sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an
image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality
of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula,
which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be
put on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states
(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.
_The calculability of a phenomenon_ does not lie in the fact that
a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have
projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the
_recurrence of "identical cases."_
There is no such thing as a _sense of causality,_ as Kant would have
us believe. We are aghast, we feel insecure, we will have something
familiar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the
existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The
so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the _fear of
the unfamiliar_, and the attempt at finding something in it which is
already _known._--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.
552.
_To combat determinism and teleology._--From the fact that something
happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it
does not follow that it happens _necessarily._ If a quantity of force
determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular
case, it does not prove that it has "no free will." "Mechanical
necessity" is not an established fact: it was _we_ who first read
into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of
_formularising_ phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law
over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined
thing, that I am bound to do it. _Compulsion_ cannot be demonstrated
in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same
phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we
fancied the existence of subjects "_agents_" in things, the notion
arose that all phenomena are the _consequence_ of a _compulsory force_
exercised over the subject--exercised by whom? once more by an "agent."
The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one, so long as people
believe in something that _causes,_ and a something that is _caused._
_(a)_ Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation.
***
_(b)_ When it is understood that the "subject" is nothing that _acts,_
but only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows.
Only with the subject as model we invented _thingness_ and read it into
the pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the _acting_
subject, the belief in _acting_ things, in reciprocal action, in cause
and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.
In this case the world of _acting atoms_ also disappears: for this
world is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that
subjects are necessary.
Ultimately, of course, _the "thing-in-itself"_ also disappears: for
at bottom it is the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we
have seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis
"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but in this way the
concept "_appearance_" also disappears.
***
_(c)_ If we abandon the idea of the acting _subject,_ we also abandon
the _object_ acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are
inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called
object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena
are apparently durable--they are distinguishable, for instance, by
the different tempo with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed
--loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means
of which _differences of degree_ only are expressed; from a certain
limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no
such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept
of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error
over all things).
***
_(d)_ If we abandon the ideas "subject" and "object"; then we must also
abandon the idea _"substance"_--and therefore its various modifications
too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things,
"eternity and the immutability of matter," etc. We are then rid of
_materiality._
***
From a moral standpoint _the world is false._ But inasmuch as morality
itself is a part of this world, morality also is false. The will
to truth is a process of _establishing things_, it is a process of
_making_ things true and lasting, a total elimination of that _false_
character, a transvaluation of it into _being._ Thus, "truth" is not
something which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it
is something _which has to be created_ and which _gives_ its name _to a
process,_ or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself
has no purpose: to introduce truth is a _processus in infinitum,_ an
_active determining_--it is not a process of becoming conscious of
something, which in itself is fixed and determined. It is merely a word
for "The Will to Power."
Life is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly
recurring things, the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world
of knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and
systematising are of assistance as means of existence.
Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to a certain extent
beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a
"thing-in-itself," a world already to hand. His requirements as a
creator make him _invent_ the world in which he works in advance; he
anticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay.
***
All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of
relations of degree and of force, as a contest....
***
As soon as we _fancy_ that some one is responsible for the fact that
we are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our
existence, our happiness, our misery, our _destiny,_ to that some one,
we corrupt the _innocence of Becoming_ for ourselves. We then have some
one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.
***
The "welfare of the individual" is just as fanciful as the "welfare
of the species": the first is _not_ sacrificed to the last; seen
from afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. "The
_preservation_ of the species" is only a result of the _growth_ of the
species--that is to say, _of the overcoming of the species_ on the road
to a stronger kind.
***
Theses:--The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of
means to end which far surpasses the art of man) is merely the result
of that "_Will to Power_" which manifests itself in all phenomena:--_To
become stronger_ involves a process of ordering, which may well be
mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end:--The _ends_ which
are apparent are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails
over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function
of the former, an order of _rank_ is established, an organisation which
must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and
ends.