_The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to
power_--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a
judgment), is the result of a will which _would fain have it_ as
similar as possible.
512.
Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted _that identical cases
exist_. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a
logical fashion, _this_ condition _must_ first be assumed. That is
to say, the will to _logical truth_ cannot be consummated before a
fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which
it follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing
both means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its
own point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth.
513.
The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service
of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of
signs, sounds, and abbreviations.--"Substance," "subject," "object,"
"Being," "Becoming," are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was
the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the
powerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the
categories.
514.
A moral--that is to say, a method of living which long experience
and experiment have tested and proved efficient, at last enters
consciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of
related values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable,
unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that
its origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become
master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories
of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have
proved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when
they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness
as a whole,--when belief in them was commanded,--that is to say, when
they acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed
as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they
may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality
answering the ends of a race and a species,--their usefulness alone is
their "truth."
515.
The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,--to impose as much
regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In
the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need
in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but
to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and
calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and
equal things,--the same process, which every sensual impression
undergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing "idea" had
anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things
can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly
as equal.... _Finality_ in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life
degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts
are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;--for Life
would then become too obscure, too unequal.
The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the
conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional
"truth." (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are
absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen
to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one
idiosyncrasy alone among many others....)
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here,
is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility
of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we _are_ almost this
instinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this
fact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict
anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth."
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that
is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least
"necessary," _but only a sign of inability._
If, according to Aristotle, the _principium contradictionis_ is the
most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all,
and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every
other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more
severely, in order to discover how many assumptions _already lie_ at
its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being,
as if these had become known in some other sphere--that is to say, as
if it were _impossible_ to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or
the proposition means: that the opposites _should_ not be ascribed to
it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, _not_ directed at the
knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world _which
must seem true to us._
In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic
adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone
we can, _create_ realities, or the concept "reality"?... In order to
affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen,
require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case.
The proposition therefore contains no _criterion of truth,_ but an
_imperative_ concerning that which _should_ pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as
every logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A
is in itself an _appearance,_ then logic would have a mere world _of
appearance_ as its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe
in that proposition, under the influence of an endless empiricism
which seems to _confirm_ it every minute. The "thing"--that is the
real substratum of A; _our belief in things_ is the first condition of
our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction
of the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic
into a criterion of _real being,_ we are already on the road to the
classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object,
subject, action, etc., as realities--that is to say, the conception of
a metaphysical world or a "real world" (--_this is, however, once more
the world of appearance..._).
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding
of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,--in so
far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very _right_
to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by a
belief, _that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,_ and _that
judgments can really hit the truth:_ in short, logic never doubts that
it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that
is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite
attributes _can_ be ascribed).
In this belief there _reigns_ the sensual and coarse prejudice that our
sensations teach us _truths_ concerning things,--that I cannot at the
same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is _hard_ and
_soft._ (The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations
at once," is quite _coarse_ and _false_.)
That all contradiction in concepts should be forbidden, is the result
of a belief, that we _are able_ to form concepts, that a concept not
only characterises but also _holds_ the essence of a thing.... As a
matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of
_assumed existences which we have created._ Logic is _the attempt on
our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being
devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the
actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for
our own purposes...._
517.
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary
to _acknowledge that which exists:_ logic only deals with formulæ for
things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in
the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics. The ego
regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
The _assumed world_ of subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary,
an adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power
resides in us. "Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold
sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to _classify_
phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out
with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as
real).
The character of the world in the process of Becoming _is not
susceptible of formulation;_ it is "false" and "contradicts itself."
_Knowledge_ and the process of _evolution_ exclude each other.
_Consequently,_ knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded
by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must
create the _illusion_ of _Being._
518.
If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make
and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very
proper to doubt whether an _illusion_ of perspective were not active
here--the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the
horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted
by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is
allowable to use that phenomenon which is _richer_ and more easily
studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, _knowledge is only possible
when based on a belief in Being._
519.
If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms
of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the
"ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the
metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the
"ego" is shown to be something that is _evolving: then----_
520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the
"individual," etc.; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should
know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not
believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things
moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect,
and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have
arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is
based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike.
Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know"
an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only
in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already
finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host
of mere appearances, but become fixed _to_ the extent in which this
kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is
"knowledge" possible--that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and
more recent errors by one another.
521.
_Concerning logical appearance._--The concept "individual" and the
concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "_Species_" only
expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at
the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their
further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long
time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are
of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of
evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium
_seem_ to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the
error of supposing _that an actual goal has been reached_--and that
evolution had a goal...).
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable;
but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often
"the same form is attained," it does not signify that it _is the
same form,--because something new always appears_; and we alone, who
compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the
latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form." As if a _type_ had
to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
_Form, species, law, idea, purpose_--the same fault is made in respect
of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a
piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of
obedient spirit--an artificial distinction is here made between that
_which_ acts and that _which_ guides action (but both these things are
only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they
are not "facts").
We should not interpret this _constraint_ in ourselves, to imagine
concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("_a world of identical
cases_") as if we were in a position to construct a _real world_; but
as a constraint to adjust a world by means of which _our existence_
will be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable,
simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.
The very same constraint is active in _the functions of the senses_
which support the reason--by means of simplification, coarsening,
accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the
ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our _needs_ have made
our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always
returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of _reality._
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only
of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we
did nothing _save introduce its postulates into the nature of things:_
now we find ourselves in their presence,--we can no longer help
it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee
of "truth." We it was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the
subject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and
the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening,
and simplifying as far as possible. The world _seems_ logical to us,
because we have already made it logical.
522.
_Fundamental solution._--We believe in reason: this is, however, the
philosophy of colourless _concepts._ Language is built upon the most
_naïf_ prejudices.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to
_think only_ in the form of language--we also believe in the "eternal
truth" of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.).
_We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control
of language_; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt
concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
_Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme
which we cannot reject._
(_f_) Consciousness.
523.
There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical
phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance.
By this means nothing is explained: the concept _"substance"_ is
utterly useless as a means of explanation. _Consciousness_ may be
regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing,
probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect
automatism--
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb
who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements
of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw
conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could
ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose.
For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a
_complexity which is thousandfold_ reaches our consciousness as a
simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite
the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of
the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more
than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence
has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief:
consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
_The part "consciousness" plays,_--It is essential that one should not
mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is our _relation to the
outer world; it was the outer world that developed it._ On the other
hand, the _direction_--that is to say, the care and cautiousness which
is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does
_not_ enter into our consciousness any more than does the _storing
activity_ of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling
force at work in these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing
committee, in which the various _leading desires_ make their votes and
their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us
from this sphere: as are also _acts of will_ and _ideas._
_In short:_ That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are
completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of
thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does not signify that
the order in which they come is a causal order: it is _so apparently,_
however, in the highest degree. We have _based_ the whole of our notion
of _intellect, reason, logic,_ etc., upon this _apparent truth_ (all
these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities),
and we then projected the latter into and _behind_ all things!
As a rule _consciousness_ itself is understood to be the general
sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a _means of
communication:_ it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to
the interests of intercourse.... "Intercourse" is understood, here,
as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world
upon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influence
_upon_ the outer world. It is _not_ the conducting force, but an _organ
of the latter._
525.
My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of
Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept,
"God is _spirit,_" God as perfection is "_denied...._"
526.
Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of
things, _spirit_ has always been regarded as the cause of this
co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking.
Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that
fact? Or why should the _notion_ of a complex fact have to precede it
as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining _finality_ by the spirit:
there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the
peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the
nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is
superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising,
consciousness plays no part at all.
527.
Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases
in _value_ in proportion as it _gains_ in clearness: the most lucid
consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the
_first_ order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value
determined?--In regard to the _discharge of will-power_ the most
superficial and _most simple_ thought is the most useful--it might
therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over).
_Precision in action_ is opposed to the _far-sighted_ and often
uncertain judgments of _caution:_ the latter is led by the _deeper_
instinct.
528.
_The chief error of psychologists:_ they regard the indistinct idea as
of a lower _kind_ than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance
from our consciousness and which is therefore _obscure, may_ on that
very account be quite clear in itself. _The fact that a thing becomes
obscure_ is a question _of the perspective of consciousness._
529.