CAMBRAI AND GOUZEAUCOURT
_Diary of the War, October, November, December 1917_
Successful operations were carried out by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig in front of the Passchendaele Ridge at the beginning of October,
when a large number of prisoners were captured, and, in spite of
repeated counter-attacks by the Germans, the British forced their way
to Houthulst Forest. The French made a successful advance on the Aisne
front across the Soissons――Laon road, and penetrated the German line
in several places. At the beginning of November the Germans retreated
from the Chemin des Dames, and were closely followed by the French.
Sir Julian Byng with the Third Army gained a remarkable victory in the
direction of Cambrai, and penetrated the Siegfried line. Farther
advances were made, until the whole of the Bourlon Wood fell into the
hands of the British, but the Germans attempted an encircling
movement, to cut off the troops in the salient that had been created,
and forced back the British line at Gonnelieu and Bourlon. After some
very heavy fighting Sir Julian Byng was able to bring up
reinforcements, and restore the line.
In Italy the Austrians, reinforced by some German divisions, gained a
decisive victory over the Italians, and advanced far into Italy. So
serious was the situation that the Allied War Council decided to send
British and French Divisions to the aid of the Italians. The Italians
continued to retreat until they reached the Piave, and at one time
Venice seemed threatened, but eventually the Italian resistance
stiffened, and the Austrian invasion was checked.
In Palestine, after a series of brilliant operations, General Sir E.
Allenby captured Jerusalem.
From Mesopotamia came the sad news of the death of General Sir Stanley
Maude from cholera, and the appointment of General Sir W. R. Marshall
as his successor.
CAMBRAI AND GOUZEAUCOURT
[Sidenote: Nov.]
In November Sir Douglas Haig determined to take advantage of the
concentration of the enemy’s forces on other parts of the line, to
carry out a surprise attack in the direction of Cambrai, and to
penetrate as far as possible into the German lines, with a view to
dislocate one of the enemy’s nerve centres. In his despatch he makes
it clear that the capture of Cambrai itself was a secondary
consideration, and that his main object was to secure the right flank
of the principal objective north-east of Bourlon.
Sir Julian Byng, to whom these operations were entrusted, received
instructions to dispense with artillery preparation, and to depend
entirely on the tanks, to cut through the enemy’s wire. This was an
entirely new departure. Hitherto it had been generally admitted by
both sides that no infantry attack could possibly succeed, without an
artillery preparation and a creeping barrage, and it remained to be
seen whether the absence of all artillery support would be compensated
for by the tanks, and by the undoubted advantage of attacking without
giving the enemy any warning. With the utmost secrecy Sir Julian Byng
assembled flotillas of tanks, and hid them in the woods.
The attack started on November 20, and succeeded beyond all
expectations, for not only was the Siegfried line pierced to a depth
of six miles, but over 10,000 prisoners and 142 guns were taken. The
capture of Bourlon Wood was successfully effected, but the Germans
soon recovered from their surprise, and commenced to bring up
reinforcements, with the result that the Guards Division on attempting
a farther advance on Fontaine found the enemy in great strength.
The ground that had been gained during the British advance formed an
awkward salient about ten miles in width and six miles in depth, and
the problem that confronted Sir Douglas Haig was whether to continue
the advance or to withdraw. After weighing the various considerations
involved, he came to the conclusion that it would be best to advance.
On the enemy’s side the Germans were at first rather staggered at
finding that their impenetrable Siegfried line had been pierced, but
Ludendorff determined to take advantage of the situation that had been
created, and to strike on each side of the salient with a view to
cutting off the troops in front.
On November 30, after a severe bombardment with gas shells, the
Germans advanced under cover of the morning mist, and surprised our
men in the trenches. From Bonavis to Gonnelieu, the Germans pushed
through masses of men, and succeeded in capturing a large number of
prisoners, although their attacks between Mœuvres and the Scheldt
Canal were not so successful. The situation was extremely critical,
and at one time it seemed that the enemy would succeed in cutting off
all the British troops in the salient. They would undoubtedly have
done so, had it not been for the gallant stand made by the
Twenty-ninth Division at Masnières. This enabled Sir Julian Byng to
bring up reinforcements, and the Guards Division was thrown in to stop
the rush. The British troops retook the St. Quentin Ridge, and entered
Gonnelieu and Gauche Wood; but meanwhile the position at Masnières had
become precarious, and the Twenty-ninth Division was ordered to
withdraw. Although the situation was saved, Sir Julian Byng saw that
he must either retake Bonavis Ridge, or else withdraw to the
Flesquières line. The latter course was considered best under the
circumstances, and accordingly the shortening of the line commenced on
December 4.
_Divisional Account_
After the successful operations in October the Guards Division had a
month’s rest. On November 9 the move southward began, although the
eventual destination was not known, and many days were spent in long
marches. On the 11th Major-General Feilding was informed of the
proposal to attack Cambrai, but was warned that the success of the
whole operation depended on its being kept a profound secret. The
Guards Division was to move by easy stages to that area, marching
invariably by night, and the eventual attack was to depend on the
result of the operations then in progress in Bourlon Wood. If they
were successful, the Guards Division was to advance on Cambrai, but if
not, the attack was to be altered to a raid on a large scale.
Major-General Feilding confidentially informed his Brigadiers and
Commanding Officers of the impending attack, but in order that some
ostensible reason might be given for these continual marches, he told
them to announce that the Division was on its way to relieve the
French. It was, however, necessary to account for the order to leave
the kits behind, as this was generally associated in the men’s minds
with an impending attack. It was consequently announced that, on
account of the lack of accommodation in the part of the French line to
which the Division was going, the kits must be stored. It was
generally believed that these orders were also due to the transfer of
large forces to Italy and the consequent dearth of transport.
It was not until the 23rd that the Guards Division reached the
neighbourhood of Flesquières, and De Crespigny’s and Seymour’s
Brigades were sent up to relieve two Brigades of the Fifty-first
Division. This was a very long day for the men, involving a march of
over fifteen miles across an unknown country in the dark, and it was
far more difficult to find the way than it need have been, because the
positions of the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters were incorrectly
given by the Corps Staff. The cavalry, to be employed in certain
eventualities, stood about in large numbers, and blocked the road, but
eventually the relief was successfully accomplished. The Divisional
front extended from the south-eastern outskirts of Cantaing to the
north-eastern corner of Bourlon Wood, and was supported by four
Brigades of R.F.A. and two of Guards Divisional Artillery.
[Sidenote: Nov. 24.]
Although the situation remained unchanged during the 24th, the
Fortieth Division, on the left, had some severe fighting in Bourlon
Wood. The same night General Feilding placed the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards under the orders of General Ponsonby, commanding the Fortieth
Division, and sent them up to reinforce General Crozier’s 119th
Brigade, which was hard pressed. This Battalion moved up to the
south-east corner of Bourlon Wood, where it received orders to clear
the wood of the enemy. This attack, which started at 2 P.M., had the
effect of advancing the line some distance.
[Sidenote: Nov. 25.]
Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers, which had taken the place of
the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, received orders on the 25th to move up
in support of the Fortieth Division. This meant that it had to advance
in full view of the Germans, who at once put down a heavy barrage in
front of it. With the utmost coolness and steadiness the 4th Battalion
advanced through this barrage as if it was on parade, and earned
special praise from General Ponsonby. Though the 4th Battalion moved
up into close support in Bourlon Wood, its services were not needed,
as the Fortieth Division had secured all its objectives.
[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]
Next day General Feilding held a conference of Brigadiers, and
discussed in detail the plan of attack on Fontaine, which was to be
carried out by General Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade. The general scheme
did not appear to offer much prospect of success, since the whole
country between Bourlon Wood and Flesquières was overlooked by the
enemy, whose guns were posted on the ridges, west of Cambrai, north of
Bourlon Wood, and east of the Canal. The Germans would therefore be
able not only to concentrate their fire on Fontaine but to sweep the
back areas where our reserves would be massed. Major-General Feilding
had already pointed out that, unless these ridges were captured, it
would be quite impossible for any troops to remain in Fontaine. He had
only six available Battalions, and the line was 3800 yards in length,
so that it was expecting a great deal of half a division to attack a
position so strongly held. The Higher Command, in spite of these
weighty arguments, however, decided to attempt the experiment. The
attack was to be undertaken by the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st
Battalion Coldstream, and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, while the 1st
Battalion Scots Guards was to hold the right of the line.
ATTACK ON FONTAINE
[Sidenote: Nov. 27.]
It was 6.20 on the morning of the 27th that the attack started. As the
tanks were late in crossing the line, the infantry did not wait for
them. Advancing with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the
1st Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Irish
Guards on the left, the force at once came under heavy machine-gun
fire. All the ground on the way to the first objective――approximately
1000 yards off――was covered with houses, which were practically
untouched by shell-fire, and afforded cover to the enemy’s
machine-guns. Moreover, our artillery were not allowed to shell
Cambrai. But in spite of innumerable difficulties the three Battalions
went gallantly forward, and captured the first objective by 8.30 A.M.
The casualties, however, were very heavy, and so weakened the
attackers, that they had not enough men properly to “mop up” the
houses in the village and the dug-outs north of it. The tanks, which
had been detailed to move round the outskirts of Fontaine, were
knocked out almost at once, but one or two that later went through the
village itself were of great assistance in clearing the streets.
Everywhere the enemy were in large numbers, and though at one time
over 1000 prisoners had been taken, only 600 eventually reached the
Divisional cage, owing partly to the small numbers available for
escort, and partly to the incomplete “mopping-up.” Just the same
difficulty confronted the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, which had to go
through Bourlon Wood, lost many prisoners in the thick undergrowth,
and on reaching the northern edge of the wood, came in for a deluge of
shells from the enemy’s artillery.
When General Sergison-Brooke received the report that the first
objective had been secured, and that the Battalions had been greatly
weakened, he sent word to Lord Gort, in command of the 4th Battalion
Grenadiers, to move forward in support. One company was to support the
3rd Battalion Grenadiers, and two others the 1st Battalion Coldstream,
while the remaining company was to watch the left flank of the 2nd
Irish Guards. At the same time he asked that the 1st Welsh Guards from
General Seymour’s Brigade might be lent to him. This was immediately
done.
In the meantime the Germans had developed very strong counter-attacks
against the Irish Guards in Bourlon Wood, and, finding there was a gap
between that Battalion and the 1st Battalion Coldstream, endeavoured
to drive in a wedge. In their endeavours to close this gap the
Coldstream only succeeded in creating another gap between them and the
Grenadiers. The result was that the Irish Guards at the north edge of
Bourlon Wood were completely cut off, and there seemed every prospect
of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers in Fontaine and the 1st Battalion
Coldstream on the left being cut off too. The 3rd Battalion
Grenadiers’ casualties amounted to well over half of its attacking
strength, including nine officers out of twelve killed and wounded. It
was now seen that the enemy had brought up large masses of troops, and
were attacking vigorously on the whole front. General Sergison-Brooke
therefore gave orders for all three Battalions to withdraw to the line
from which they started.
Such a move was most disappointing to the men who had reached the
first objective, but in the circumstances there seemed no other
alternative. The enemy continued to throw in more men, and once more
the fighting became very fierce, but though our depleted Battalions
were unable to maintain their hold on Fontaine, the enemy found it
equally impossible to advance or make any impression on the line.
Under cover of darkness the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards took over the line that evening, and
Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade withdrew to La Justice, while the 4th
Battalion Grenadiers retired to Flesquières.
This was the first real failure the Guards Division had. In part it
was due to the enemy having masses of men available for the
counter-attack, but there was also a notable lack on our side of any
reinforcements at the critical moment, which was attributed at the
time to the faulty arrangements of the Corps Staff.
On hearing of the heavy casualties suffered by the Guards Division,
the Twenty-seventh Corps sent up two Brigades of the Fifty-ninth
Division, but they had a considerable distance to cover, and there was
no hope of their reaching the line that night. Consequently they were
sent to Ribecourt and Trescault, while De Crespigny’s Brigade was
moved from Ribecourt to Metz. Fortunately, the night of the 27th was
fairly quiet, and these movements were carried out without much
difficulty.
[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]
A day without any incident worth recording followed, and on November
29 the Fifty-ninth Division took over the whole area. The Guards
Division was disposed as follows: the Divisional Artillery at
Flesquières, the Royal Engineers at Trescault, De Crespigny’s Brigade
at Metz, Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade at Ribecourt, and Seymour’s Brigade
at Trescault. After a hard week in the line they were now to rest, and
retire by easy stages to billets.
[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]
Suddenly a telegram arrived announcing that the Germans had broken
through our line, and the whole Division was ordered to be ready to
move at a moment’s notice. Then came a stream of orders, conveying
instructions for different Brigades to be placed under different
Corps, that followed one another with bewildering rapidity, only to be
countermanded the next moment. Finally the whole Division was placed
under the Third Corps, and General Feilding motored off to get
instructions.
Information was now received that the enemy were holding the line
Villers Plouich――Gouzeaucourt, and as De Crespigny’s Brigade was
already marching on the latter place, orders were sent to divert
Seymour’s Brigade, which was moving south, and bring it up on the left
of De Crespigny’s forces.
Meanwhile General de Crespigny determined to ascertain for himself the
exact situation in front of his Brigade, for the roads were all
blocked with retiring troops, and all sorts of rumours had reached
him. So off he rode at full gallop in the direction of the enemy.
Having crossed the open, he came in view of Gouzeaucourt, and there
saw the Germans making preparations for a farther advance. He quickly
returned to his Brigade, and at once gave orders to attack. All the
four Commanding Officers had also ridden ahead of their Battalions, to
see for themselves what the ground was like; and so it came about that
this Brigade, which a few hours before had been resting and preparing
to retire, were now going forward to the attack, as if they had had
plenty of notice. The advance of De Crespigny’s Brigade in perfect
formation through all the stragglers and despite the general disaster
was a splendid and heartening sight, which restored confidence to all
the army in that area.
GOUZEAUCOURT
The ground consisted of undulating downs gradually descending from
Gouzeaucourt Wood, which occupied a commanding position, to the
village of Gouzeaucourt, and thence rising more steeply towards Gauche
Wood and Gonnelieu. One great disadvantage Major-General Feilding had
to contend with was the total absence of artillery support. The guns
had been left in the line at Flesquières, and it was impossible for
them to reach the Guards Division until 7 o’clock that evening. The
attack had therefore to be launched entirely unsupported by artillery,
and had there been any guns there was no Artillery Divisional
Commander or Artillery Staff. When they did eventually come into
action, they were too doubtful about the situation in front to be of
any real assistance.
About noon the head of the Brigade reached Gouzeaucourt Wood, and as
they arrived the Battalions formed up for attack. The 1st Battalion
Irish Guards were on the left, with their right on the Metz-Gouzeaucourt
road; the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, with their left on
this road, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the right; the 2nd
Battalion Grenadiers were in reserve in Gouzeaucourt Wood. Each
Battalion assumed artillery formation, with two companies in front and
two in support, and was responsible for 500 yards of frontage. There
was no time for written orders, and all instructions were given by
word of mouth.
At 12.30 the attack was launched, and, as soon as the leading troops
appeared on the crest of the hill, they came under heavy machine-gun
fire. No very striking incident marked the initial stages of the
attack, but when the leading Battalions came within 1000 yards of
Gouzeaucourt they found a few men of the Royal Engineers and some
remnants of the Twenty-ninth Division still holding on to a trench.
Later on the 20th Hussars (dismounted) came up on the right of the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream, and prolonged the line to the right. During the
descent of the slope towards the village, the machine-gun fire became
intense, but it never even checked the attacking Battalions, who swept
on down the hill and up again to the far side of the village. When
they reached the rise immediately east of the village, the shells from
the enemy’s artillery on St. Quentin’s Ridge raked them at very close
range, but in spite of this the whole objective, including the
village, was captured by 1.30 P.M.
General de Crespigny now found that his left flank was in the air, but
the Cavalry Corps sent up a regiment to fill the gap, and touch was
subsequently gained with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers in Seymour’s
Brigade. Soon after a cavalry regiment on the right came into action
mounted, and made a gallant attempt to turn the enemy’s left flank,
but was stopped by wire and machine-gun fire. The tanks came up on the
right, but directly they were seen by the enemy four of them were put
out of action. With great promptitude the crews got their Lewis guns
out and joined the 2nd Battalion Coldstream. It was now beginning to
get dark, and the battle died down. During the day about 100 prisoners
were captured, besides a number of machine-guns, and many British
howitzers were recovered. Two supply trains were found at Gouzeaucourt
station untouched.
While De Crespigny’s Brigade was taking Gouzeaucourt, Seymour’s
Brigade, which had come into the field with equal rapidity, was
ordered to prolong the line to the right. But this order was
subsequently cancelled, and they were told instead to hold the line
Gouzeaucourt――Villers Plouich. Moving off in artillery formation, they
advanced between Gouzeaucourt Wood and Havrincourt Wood, and lined the
railway line between Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich.
At this juncture General Feilding received orders to continue his
advance, and attack the ridge running from Gonnelieu through Gauche
Wood to Villers Hill. To General de Crespigny he entrusted the attack
on Gauche Wood, and to General Lord Henry Seymour the capture of
Gonnelieu. Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Claud Willoughby, in charge of the
tanks, had been kept at Divisional Headquarters in anticipation of an
attack, and so only verbal orders for their assembly direct to him
were needed. The tanks were to precede the infantry, while the
Divisional artillery put down a heavy barrage. The Fifty-ninth
Division were assigned to the left, and the Cavalry Division to the
right. The whole attack was only to take place if the Twentieth
Division failed, and it was not till 2.45 A.M. that the failure was
announced.
CAPTURE OF GAUCHE WOOD
[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]
The orders originally sent to the Division were to attack the line
from Gonnelieu to Gauche Wood (exclusive) but Major-General Feilding
quickly realised that until Gauche Wood was taken, there was small
prospect of success for the attack on the left. When the cavalry did
not appear on the left, he instructed General de Crespigny to make
Gauche Wood inclusive.
In De Crespigny’s Brigade the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and the 3rd
Battalion Coldstream on the right and left respectively started off.
But the tanks which were to have operated on the right of the Brigade
were late, as well as the cavalry that should have joined in the
attack. After waiting ten minutes in vain for the tanks,
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch attacked without them. The tanks detailed to the
left of the Brigade arrived just in time, and were of the greatest
possible assistance; in fact, it is doubtful whether the ridge could
ever have been taken without their help. However, the 2nd Battalion
Grenadiers reached the wood without any tanks to help them, apparently
because the enemy’s machine-guns were aimed too high.
Immediately the wood was reached two counter-attacks were launched by
the enemy, but a company from the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which had
gone out to protect the right flank of the Battalion, quickly disposed
of them. After much fighting the whole wood was eventually cleared of
the enemy, but the thickness of the trees gave the enemy’s snipers a
good opportunity of picking off our officers and N.C.O.’s, and the
casualties among them were very heavy. When the tanks on the right
came up, they were of little use in the wood, and as they appeared to
attract the enemy’s shells from all sides, they eventually retired.
Although the cavalry on the right were over an hour late, when they
did arrive they not only reinforced the men in the wood, but made the
right flank of the Brigade quite secure. There was some difficulty in
maintaining touch between the two Brigades, and a company of the 1st
Battalion Irish Guards at one time had to be sent up to fill the gap.
During this attack over 300 prisoners were captured, in addition to 3
field-guns and nearly 100 machine-guns, which had been packed, ready
for removal, near the railway-station.
ATTACK ON GONNELIEU
Seymour’s Brigade meanwhile attempted the more difficult task of
taking Gonnelieu and Quentin. There should have been a large number of
tanks to help, but at the last moment only nine could be procured.
Most of these arrived too late, but one that was working in
conjunction with the Welsh Guards was of great assistance, and was
largely responsible for clearing a trench held by machine-guns. The
1st Battalion Welsh Guards on the right and the 4th Battalion
Grenadiers began the advance, but were at once met by heavy
machine-gun fire――so intense was it that progress on the right was
completely arrested, until a tank saved the situation.
It seemed almost impossible to take this village without the aid of
artillery, as there were machine-guns bristling from every building,
and since the Twentieth Division had failed there appeared to be but
small hope of this second attempt succeeding. Yet so determined and
persistent was the onslaught of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers that
isolated parties managed to penetrate into the village. But this was
not enough to silence the enemy’s machine-guns, and soon it became
clear that all we could do was to hold the line 200 yards from the
western edge of the village. On the left of the line two Companies of
the 1st Battalion Grenadiers were sent up to strengthen that flank.
That night the position was as follows: the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards
was established on the high ground on the right, in touch with De
Crespigny’s Brigade; the 4th Battalion Grenadiers, reinforced by two
Companies of the 1st Battalion, held the line west of Gonnelieu, with
its left in touch with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, who were
covering Villers Plouich. Through the failure of the 183rd Brigade to
arrive in time for the relief on the night of December 1, the men in
the front line, who had had very heavy fighting, were obliged to
remain where they were for another twenty-four hours. Next day the
relief was carried out, and on the 3rd De Crespigny’s Brigade took
over the line.
[Sidenote: Dec. 5.]
Two bombing attacks were made by the enemy on the front line on the
morning of the 5th, and at one time they gained a foothold in our
trenches, but a prompt counter-attack by the 1st Battalion Irish
Guards soon re-established the line. On that night De Crespigny’s
Brigade was relieved by the 26th Infantry Brigade.
The casualties in the Guards Division between November 25 and December
5 were:
Officers. O.R.
1st Guards Brigade (De Crespigny) 44 820
2nd Guards Brigade (Brooke) 40 1136
3rd Guards Brigade (Seymour) 34 928
Divisional Artillery 4 49
Royal Engineers 2 10
R.A.M.C. 1 19
4th Guards Machine-Gun Company -- 4
--- ----
Total 125 2966
On December 5 Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed:
I desire to congratulate the Guards Division most warmly on
their fine counter-attacks at Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu.
The promptness of decision and rapidity of action displayed
by them were successful in dealing with a difficult
situation.
Lieut.-General Sir W. Pulteney sent the following message:
The Corps Commander wishes to express to all ranks of the
Guards Division his high appreciation of the prompt manner
in which they turned out on 30th November, counter-attacked
through a disorganised rabble, and retook Gouzeaucourt. The
very fine attack which they subsequently carried out against
Quentin Ridge and Gauche Wood, resulting in the capture of
these important positions, was worthy of the highest
traditions of the Guards.
THE 4TH BATTALION
[Sidenote: Oct.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 9.]
On October 20 the 4th Battalion left the Houthulst Forest area, and
went into billets at Le Marais, where the men were comfortably housed.
There it remained until November 9, when the march to the south
through Fiefs to Averdoingt was commenced. On November 2 Captain C. R.
Britten, Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith, and Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L.
Hardinge joined. The village of Averdoingt proved too small for the
whole Battalion, and one Company went to La Neuville Planquette, while
another was billeted at the Le Haut Barlet Farm.
The transport had been very much reduced, owing, it was said, to the
despatch of British Divisions to Italy, and an order was issued
restricting the officer’s kit to a minimum of 40 lb., including the
valise. But, as the officers never saw their kit after November 23,
these regulations made very little difference. Officers and men lived
out in the open, exposed to rain and frost, without any change of
uniform or underclothes.
[Sidenote: Nov. 17.]
On the 17th the march was continued through Ivergny, Bienvilliers-au-Bois
to Achiet-le-Petit, which the Battalion reached on the 20th. There the
news was received that the forward movement of the British Army had
resulted in a considerable gain of territory, and that the Division
was now to continue the advance. Lord Gort sent for the Company
Commanders, and explained the details of the operations, which were to
take place the following days, giving a sketch of the part to be
played by the Guards Division. There was still some distance to go
before our men reached the area of operations, and in order to avoid
aerial observation the advance was continued by night. The whole
Brigade moved in buses through Bapaume and Le Transloy to Rocquigny,
and reached Baumetz-les-Cambrai on the 23rd.
The following officers took part in the operations of November 24-28:
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant.
Capt. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer.
2nd Lieut. N. A. Pearce Transport Officer.
Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. H. Tuckwell ” ”
Capt. C. R. Britten, M.C. No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. W. Windeler ” ”
Lieut. C. S. Nash, M.C. No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. F. R. Oliver ” ”
2nd Lieut. G. W. Selby-Lowndes ” ”
Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. E. R. D. Hoare ” ”
Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith ” ”
Capt. N. Grellier, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
[Sidenote: Nov. 23.]
The march to Flesquières was very trying, and the whole Brigade had
some difficulty in finding the way in the dark. Owing to the constant
checks and hesitation, which betrayed the uncertainty of the leaders
as to the direction, there were brief halts, not long enough even to
allow the men to sit down, then sudden rushes followed again by abrupt
halts, and so on for several hours. As a bridge had been blown up by
the enemy, the 4th Battalion was forced to go some distance out of its
way through Graincourt, which was within 100 yards of the outpost
line. Flesquières itself was occupied by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers,
and the 4th Battalion was billeted just outside the village, in a
portion of the famous Hindenburg line, which the Germans had
considered impregnable!
Perfectly drained and dry underfoot, the trenches were 15 feet wide
and 10 feet deep. The men’s quarters were in dug-outs constructed with
massive wooden beams and reinforced concrete, and were fitted with
tiers of beds. The communication trenches were perfectly camouflaged
with rabbit-wire and boughs, so strongly staked to the side that a man
with full equipment could safely use the wire as a bridge. The belt of
wire in front of the trenches was 100 yards wide in places, and seemed
untouched by shell-fire. The effect of the attack by the tanks was
clearly visible, for great rides had been made through the wire, and a
number of bodies crushed out of all human semblance lay across the
tracks, while groups of dead Germans, killed in the act of flight, lay
scattered about between the trenches and the village. The trenches
were full of German equipment, abandoned in the panic, and two
valuable periscopic observation sets were found by the 4th Battalion,
and forwarded to General Headquarters.
The labour entailed in digging this stupendous work, which may fairly
be compared in conception and execution to the great Chinese Wall, was
clearly beyond the powers of any army actively engaged, however high
might have been its discipline and capacity for work. But the problem
of how this wonderful result had been achieved was solved when a
notice-board was discovered on which was printed “For Russian
Prisoners Only.”
BOURLON WOOD
[Sidenote: Nov. 24.]
On the morning of the 24th, a cold, wet day, with a gale blowing, a
warning order arrived, instructing the 4th Battalion to move to the
neighbourhood of Bourlon Wood. Later this order was cancelled, and the
Battalion was told to take over from the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards
the position north of Flesquières. It moved into its new position that
night, and by midnight the relief was complete. The Battalion
Headquarters were in a dug-out, cut out of the solid chalk, and formed
a good example of the comfort and luxury in which the Germans had been
living. The former occupant of this palatial abode had provided
himself with a wardrobe, looking-glass, and other luxuries, and had
actually arranged a number of flowering shrubs in pots at the entrance
to improve its appearance.
[Sidenote: Nov. 25.]
Early next day the 4th Battalion was placed under the orders of the
119th Infantry Brigade, and was sent up to relieve the 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards in Bourlon Wood. The Fortieth Division were engaged in
the difficult task of capturing Bourlon Wood, and both these
Battalions had been lent to Major-General Ponsonby. While Lord Gort
went off to Graincourt to report to his new Brigadier, Captain Chapman
proceeded with the Intelligence Party to Anneux chapel, to reconnoitre
the position to be occupied by the Battalion and the route it was to
follow.
By now the Germans had begun to recover from the defeat inflicted on
them, and were bringing up a number of guns to bear on our position.
Bourlon Wood and Anneux chapel were subjected to a severe shelling,
and the 119th Brigade suffered very heavy casualties. The Intelligence
Party had been ordered by Colonel Benzie, commanding the forward area
round Anneux chapel, to remain in the sunken roads, and were therefore
protected from shell-fire; but, when they returned by the road which
had been selected for the 4th Battalion to march by, they came in for
a certain amount of shelling and lost 2 men, while Captain Chapman
himself was slightly wounded. It seemed perfectly clear that, if a
small party could be seen by the enemy from Fontaine, a whole
battalion would necessarily offer a tempting target to the German
artillery. Captain Chapman therefore decided to alter the route, and
approach Anneux chapel by another road, leaving Graincourt on the
right.
Meanwhile the 4th Battalion, with No. 4 Company under Captain Paton
leading, waited in the position held on the previous night, south of
La Justice, along the southern edge of the Graincourt――Marcoing road,
until the Intelligence Party returned, and then advanced by the new
road that had been chosen. For the first 200 yards nothing happened,
and then suddenly the enemy put down a heavy barrage across the line
of advance. No doubt he imagined that his barrage would effectually
prevent any troops coming up; in practice it proved a perfectly
useless barrier, for the Battalion took not the slightest notice of
it. There was about half a mile to be crossed, on which the shells
continually fell, and the Battalion did not even check its pace.
Assuming artillery formation, it went straight through the barrage.
Spouts of earth sprang up at the men’s feet as if by magic, and the
noise was deafening, but they plodded on. So steady was the behaviour
of all ranks that General Ponsonby afterwards issued a special order
of the day, stating that the 4th Battalion had come up to his support
as steadily as if it had been on parade. It suffered 30 casualties,
which, in view of the amount of shell-fire, may be considered
astonishingly light.
The following graphic description of these two days was written by
Captain M. Chapman in a sketch entitled “Intelligence,” which he
began, but which he never lived to finish.
“On the morning of the ―― the Battalion marched up a long
wet _pavé_ road in the direction of the gun-flashes and the
Véry Lights, whilst the Battalion ‘drums,’ somewhere in the
dark, played the tune that Grenadiers call their own, and
the C.O. in silence watched his men file by. The test of
discipline and training had begun. The figures of the men
looked tall and grim, magnified by the shadows cast from the
shrouded lanterns of the motor-lorries. The night was dark,
and a driving rain soon soaked the tramping men. In an
hour’s time you could see by the light of a torch a mist
rising from the soaked and perspiring humanity in front.
“A halt was called and men were detailed to pick up
bivouac-sheets and petrol-tins of water. The already
heavy-laden troops moved on again more slowly with their
increased burden, along slippery wooden tracks laid across a
field of mud. Another halt. An officer appeared, dripping
with moisture, accompanied by guides who took charge of the
companies and allotted them their area in which to bivouac.
“To-morrow was zero day, not for the 4th Battalion, but for
some one else. If some one else failed, then the Grenadiers
would have to put matters straight; that is to say, the
Grenadiers were in reserve. The Intelligence Officer gave
one last look at the inky darkness, and going down on hands
and knees crawled into a long, low-arched dug-out. Sleeping
men sprawled across the floor, while at the farther end a
solitary candle burned. Picking his way across the recumbent
figures he saw the Commanding Officer lying on his back, his
head propped against a pack, silently smoking a cigarette
and thinking. The Intelligence Officer lay down by his side,
and, watching the Adjutant writing orders and speaking down
a telephone, fell into a fitful sleep.
“Zero hour for some one else left him cold, unmoved. The
accustomed environment of war and great fatigue dull the
sensibility of man. The steady roar of countless guns was a
pleasing murmur as of rippling water in his sleepy brain.
“A ray of sunlight struggled through the narrow entrance of
the dug-out, and the sleeping mass of humanity near the door
stirred uneasily. The Intelligence Officer shivered, and,
cautiously rising into a stooping posture, crawled out into
the open air. The sun was trying to pierce a passage through
the heavy ground-mist. The troops were cooking their
breakfast and beating their chests with a flapping motion to
restore the circulation in their half-frozen limbs.
“On a modern battlefield, lines of wooden ‘duckboards’ run
like arteries across the trackless waste towards the front.
Up the arteries flow fresh men, new blood, human forms
complete; food to support life, ammunition to destroy it.
Down the arteries flow ghosts of what yesterday were men,
with tissues torn, and muscles rent; gibbering prisoners and
men who have been spared to be shattered another day.
“An artery passed the dug-out door. The Intelligence Officer
observed the circulation to and from the battlefield, and
speculated on the fate of the tide going up, watching the
expression on the faces of the advancing and receding
groups. The men lazily watched the passing tide, exchanging
jokes with friends going either way. Prisoners alone excited
interest, but not sufficient to make men move more than a
few yards from where they stood.
“French gunners in a wood near by ran hotfoot to see each
band of prisoners pass, but our men with British phlegm
stayed where they stood, and eyed the foe with casual
glance. The passing wounded drew no expression of pity from
the onlookers, nor did the fate of the ingoing tide even
raise a questioning expression on their faces. This was the
last spot where selfishness still reigned supreme――the
fringe of the battle. Death and danger were not sufficiently
close to draw out the best in man; he behaved as he did in
civil life――each man for himself and the devil take the
hindmost.
“The men who marched up the endless ribbon to the front
looked just like other men, and anxiety for their own safety
left no trace in their expression. They might have been the
crowd that streams through the factory gates in the early
morning. The outgoing men were different. They hastened by
and looked neither to the left nor right. They felt that
fate had been too good to them and that it might change its
mind and rend them if they loitered by the way. They had
reached the fringe where the ‘Ego’ was whispering in their
ears with insistent voice. They were alive; the others――they
might be dead――what matter? They were alive.
“The wounded stared in front of them, except those in pain,
and the prisoners looked cowed and miserable. The escorts
walked with jaunty air, rifle slung, bayonets fixed, and
exchanged jokes with all who would pay attention. The
feeling of victory was still in their veins, for the
slouching prisoners spurred their pride of race; were they
not the symbol of all their friends ‘up there’ had done?
“The stretcher-bearers, intent on their work, passed the
fringe of selfishness untouched. The bond of pain and
suffering held them fast in unselfishness until the moment
when they delivered their charge to the clearing-station in
the rear. While other men hurried from the battlefield,
these slowly and with aching arms and legs carried their
burdens carefully. Human suffering must touch some special
chord of self-sacrifice in man. Duty, discipline, and other
self-taught virtues would never produce that careful studied
plod of the stretcher-bearer under heavy shell-fire, or
those deliberate halts to attend to their patients’ needs.
“Thus the second day passed. The Grenadiers were not called
upon, but sat in the pit and watched the puppets moving on
and off the stage. The Intelligence Officer had the critic’s
box and made his notes. The night passed quietly and slowly,
the news filtered back that our friends in front had taken
all their objectives and that all went well. The morning
brought the fateful news that the 4th Battalion was under
orders to take over the front line that night, and
afterwards to attack. Every one was busy, even the
Intelligence Officer, and the passing puppets moved
unnoticed. The 4th Battalion prepared to leave the pit and
occupy the stage.
“The third day passed quickly in preparation. At 4.30 in the
afternoon the first platoon stepped on to the wooden pathway
and moved up towards the front. The Intelligence Officer
started last, with Battalion Headquarters, while the
Commanding Officer and Adjutant and orderlies plodded off
alone. The sun had set and it was growing dark. That ribbon
of wood which led to the unknown had its advantages, for it
gave a hard, though slippery, foothold; but, once you
stepped upon it, you became its slave. The Path began to
assume a sinister character, when ahead you saw it lead into
a wood full of bursting shells. Then it took the form of an
endless moving staircase, surely leading to destruction. The
serpent of men moved into such a wood. The very name it bore
was ominous. No one spoke. The Intelligence Officer noticed
his throat was very dry. His heart pumped at the scream of
each arriving shell. He continued to move forward as in a
dream. At intervals he made way for stretcher cases. The
flash of the bursting shells disclosed a row of
gun-emplacements. Two gunners pinned under an overturned
carriage screamed.
“Still Battalion Headquarters moved on――out of the wood into
the open――away from death to what seemed like security. An
odd shell or two burst near the path, while others shrieked
their way overhead, dealing death somewhere behind. The mind
neglected the latter, focussing all attention on the former.
The pathway crossed two streams. By now the darkness was
complete. A snorting, sobbing noise came from somewhere in
front, succeeded by a splashing sound. The path went by a
dark and slimy pool, in which the head and ears of a bogged
horse waggled this way and that pathetically. Then all was
still. A man’s figure could be dimly seen attempting to cut
off the pack saddle before it was buried in the slough.
“The wooden track abruptly ended. A white tape feebly
glimmered in the dark, hanging loosely between upright iron
stakes, rifles driven muzzle down into the sodden soil, and
portions of broken branches.
“The Intelligence Officer seized the tape and floundered
slowly on. The men behind him breathed heavily, and in quiet
tones cursed the water and the mud, the tape and the hand
that laid it. Some one tripped. A halt was called. The
obstruction proved to be a comrade, some flotsam from the
men ahead. He was alive, warm, but inarticulate. A sergeant
felt him over in the dark. Some one said, ‘My Gawd, Sir,
’e’s got it through the throat.’ The Intelligence Officer
spoke words of promise to the man and left him there.
‘Outgoing troops would pick him up,’ and other well-worn
words of comfort, although he knew they might not see him.
He felt he was leaving him to die. This is war.
“The tape suddenly ended. Heaps of broken stone disclosed
the close proximity of a concrete dug-out. A guide
cautiously felt his way into the darkness and presently led
the Intelligence Officer down some steps below the ground.
At the foot of the steps hung a soaking blanket, behind
which a light glimmered feebly. The Intelligence Officer
cautiously pulled the blanket to one side, and blinked at
the group inside. Two Commanding Officers and two Adjutants
were talking. ‘Handing over’ was in process. The outgoing
were clearly anxious to be gone; the incoming were anxious
not to let them go without knowing what lay before them.
“A succession of officers and orderlies peered through the
doorway, saluted and uttered the magic words, ‘Relief
complete, Sir,’ and vanished into the outer darkness. Their
strained expressions did not belie the full meaning of the
sentence. The outgoing C.O. pushing back his chair with a
scraping noise said, with a half-apologetic air, he would be
off, and he and his satellites vanished. He had laid down
his burden; the 4th Battalion had assumed it. His footsteps
sounded light and care-free as they died away.
“All that night officers and men groped their way through mud and
filth, visiting outposts, distributing rations, each bent on a
mission involving the safety and comfort of the other. The
Intelligence Officer felt that the atmosphere had changed. The
Commanding Officer could have reclined on the German bed in the
dug-out, his feet out of the six inches of liquid slush. Actually
he spent his time going round the line, four hours of intense
physical strain. Shells and bullets do not sound more pleasant
because it is dark.
“The Transport Officer might have dumped the rations beyond
the barrage and returned to the security of the horse-lines,
and the warmth of his valise. As a matter of fact, he led
his struggling animals up a broken, shattered road, through
the barrage, round the trunks of fallen trees, and delivered
his consignment at B.H.Q. The Adjutant might have said with
reason that the ration parties had lost their way, that
conditions were impossible, but the Intelligence Officer
watched him supervise everything in person――in the open.
Before dawn the front line was rationed――every post
established, no chances taken. The Intelligence Officer saw
it all and said: ‘If this is war, some parts of it at least
are good.’
“At dawn the next morning he arose and stood shivering in
the cold mist. He visited his observation-post, and,
watching trenches through his telescope as the sun slowly
made its way through the haze, he smiled as he recognised
well-known N.C.O.’s and men moving about in the nonchalant
manner which all assume before the sniper starts his work,
and when tired gunners take their rest. He knew that later
he might search for hours and find no movement; all would be
hiding in their shell-hole lairs.
“A distant hum reminding him of some gigantic insect, drew
his attention from his work, and two aeroplanes appeared,
flying very low. In a few minutes the moving figures
vanished from the field of view of his telescope. The earth
swallowed them up. Then commenced manœuvres that reminded
him of sparrow-hawks quartering their haunting ground for
prey. The droning insects flew back and forth. No movement
was visible on the ground. A hooded head looked over the
fuselage of each machine. The Iron Cross showed clearly on
the wings. Then warning lights were dropped from each
machine. Each light marked the position of a trench and
seemed to say, ‘Eat, drink, and be merry, for soon you will
die.’ The whole proceeding revolted the men watching from
the O.P. They knew the full intent of it. Their imagination
heard the scream of the shells which would surely fall where
the lights had dropped. They felt for their friends out
there. Discovered by their enemies, the hiding men used
their weapons viciously. The rattle of machine-guns and
rifles was mixed with the drone of the aeroplanes. The
pilots knew their work was done. They turned to fly. One of
them staggered in his course. The Intelligence Officer
watched the machine crash in flames in a distant forest. The
hiding men in their shell-holes sat down to wait for the
punishment that they knew must come. The Intelligence men
watched great spouts of earth rise skywards and listened to
the rending crash that came slowly across the intervening
space. They longed to help; instead they noted the time and
place and entered the information in their Intelligence
report.
“Zero was set for 5 A.M., this time a zero that concerned
the 4th Battalion alone. The Commanding Officer and the
Intelligence Officer moved forward through the darkness to
an advanced position at three o’clock in the morning. Here
the nerve centre of the 4th Battalion was established. Here
would enter the news of battle. The Intelligence Officer
established himself in a corner of the new dug-out. His
carrier-pigeons made little noises to themselves, while the
telephone operators tested and re-tested their lines. The
Intelligence Officer’s hand kept wandering to his watch. The
Commanding Officer snored. His plans had been truly laid;
interference now would be fatal. He was a well-trained
soldier, and he slept.
“Five minutes before zero the Intelligence Officer woke the
Commanding Officer, and both waited for the well-known throb
of innumerable guns. One of them at least thought of his
friends waiting to follow up the moving death. What were
those others, his enemies, doing? Did they realise what hell
would break upon them? Did they suspect the impending
stroke?
“The blow fell to the minute. The dug-out rocked. A sheet of
flame lit up the sky. A thousand devils seemed to be forging
a red-hot band on the earth as far as the eye could see.
Their countless hammer-strokes were merged into one loud
growling, rumbling noise. Gradually the ear became
accustomed to the sound and detected the sharp crack of
answering bullets and the rattle of machine-gun fire. Dawn
was breaking and eyes were strained to pierce the
half-light. Minutes seemed like hours.
“The first messenger arrived at the nerve centre. He brought good
news. Others followed. All reported success. The Intelligence
Officer took out one of his pigeons, attached a message to its
leg, and released it. He noticed how clumsy his handling of the
bird had become. The pigeon circled once and flew straight as an
arrow in the right direction. This was dramatic, exciting, the
cream of war. Then came the sordid side.
“The enemy artillery awoke. Great shells came hurtling
through the sky.
“The shelling grew less. The machine-gun fire died away. The
enemy was accepting the new situation. We had won; he had
lost. Both sides prepared to settle down where they found
themselves, too tired to prolong the struggle.
“The Commanding Officer was satisfied with the position.
Emerging cautiously from its shelter, the party moved back
to the original Battalion Headquarters. As they passed the
trenches and the scooped-out holes in which the supports
sheltered, inquiries were made as to casualties, and brave
words spoken to cheer the exhausted men. The Intelligence
Officer, ruminating on death, saw many signs of it. The true
value of the body in which for a short period resides the
soul of man was brought home to him. Three men crouched in a
trench. Two were cooking; some conversation was in progress.
The third man sat by their side and took no part. He seemed
by his attitude to be thinking deeply, immersed in the
solution of a problem. His face was turned away. The
attitude was one of puzzled thought.
“The Intelligence Officer made inquiries as to how they had
fared. Two of the men looked up; they gave him a friendly
smile and told him all they knew. The other sat with his
head bent, still studying that inscrutable problem. The
Intelligence Officer noticed with a start the colour of his
ears, how wax-like in appearance; then he knew in a
flash――the man was dead. His comrades did not even explain
the fact. They seemed to realise that the figure by their
side no longer counted, that the soul and personality were
fled, that there was nothing dreadful in the husk that sat
there and still seemed one of them. War had taught them what
a small thing the body really is, what a matter of
indifference whether it is smashed or not. They had learned
one thing at least――the proportionate value of the body and
the soul.
“That night the 4th Battalion handed over its burden to some
one else. It was due to be relieved. The Chaplain had
arrived to see to it that the brave dead had decent burial.
When it was possible, the Grenadiers always carried down
their dead, so that in the future, grouped together, they
would stand as a memorial of the cause they fought for, and
indicate plainly to future generations how Grenadiers could
fight and die――a monument to the power of discipline,
self-sacrifice, and pride of race.”
No. 1 Company under Captain Sloane-Stanley, No. 3 under Lieutenant
Nash, and No. 4 under Captain Paton, dug themselves in with
entrenching tools along the Anneux chapel――Mœuvres road, while No. 2,
under Captain Britten, was placed in Anneux chapel itself. The
shelling was very violent, and all the roads, by which supplies and
supports had to move, were accurately and persistently shelled. The
Brigadier, Lord Henry Seymour, came along, quite unconcerned and not
even wearing a helmet, to see how these companies were getting on, and
told them they might have to move up later into Bourlon Wood. When it
got dark snow began to fall, and it became bitterly cold. The position
of a lent battalion is by no means an enviable one, and soon orders
and counter-orders from different authorities succeeded each other
with amazing rapidity. Finally definite orders were sent to the
Battalion to take up a position in Bourlon Wood, and at the same time
it was placed under the orders of the 186th Brigade. While this move
was being carried out, Lieutenant Nash was wounded in the leg and sent
back to the dressing-station. In order to keep in touch with the 186th
Brigade, Second Lieutenant Tuckwell was sent to Graincourt to act as
liaison-officer to General Bradford, V.C.
Bourlon Wood, which covers about 100 acres, might well have been a
typical English covert, with its tall trees interspersed with
undergrowth about eight feet high. The line to be held consisted of a
road running north and south, parallel to the front line. The ground
was soaking wet, and the men had to force their way through the
dripping leaves and lie out in the wood with no protection of any
kind. Digging through the stubborn soil and soaking undergrowth was no
easy matter with light entrenching tools, but they soon produced some
sort of cover. The Fortieth Division, however, had succeeded in its
attack, and so there was nothing for the 4th Battalion to do but to
remain in the wood where it was. In the evening, much to the
satisfaction of every one, it reverted to the command of the Guards
Division. Lieutenant Ingleby, the acting Quartermaster, arrived at
Battalion Headquarters at 11 that night, having guided the transport
up to Anneux chapel through intense shelling, and reported that Second
Lieutenant N. A. Pearce, the transport officer, who had shown great
determination and pluck in his efforts to bring all that was wanted up
to the men in the trenches, had been killed by a shell. Major-General
Feilding received the following message from Major-General Ponsonby:
I wish to express on behalf of my Division my sincere thanks
for the support given us on the 24th and 25th by the
Battalions of the Guards Division placed at my disposal for
the defence of Bourlon Wood, namely the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards and 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards.
I should like to bring to your notice particularly the 2nd
Battalion Scots Guards, who throughout the period prevented
the enemy from breaking through the right flank of the
position, and assisted in repelling at least two of the
enemy’s counter-attacks. I enclose extracts from the report
of the Brigadier-General commanding the 119th Infantry
Brigade:
“The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards reinforced the firing line,
which had become very thin, early in the morning of November
25, and remained in action until they came under the orders
of the 186th Infantry Brigade on the night of 26-27th
November. All ranks behaved with the utmost gallantry, and
assisted to repel at least two German counter-attacks in
addition to continual enemy pressure. They inspired all with
great confidence.
“The 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards came under my command in
the afternoon of the 25th inst. To reach a position of
readiness it had to cross the open in artillery formation
for a great distance under enemy observation, and were
heavily shelled in so doing. The men were as steady as if on
parade. To the above-mentioned units I wish to express my
gratitude.”
[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]
The next day passed quietly, and the company commanders were able to
go in turn to Battalion Headquarters to have some rest. In the evening
snow fell heavily, and the men had a cold and uncomfortable night. The
4th Battalion was again to be lent to another brigade, that of General
Sergison-Brooke, who received orders to attack Fontaine. It was not
actually wanted for the attack, but merely to form a defensive line,
on which the assaulting waves could fall back in case of failure.
The enemy put down a heavy barrage on the whole line that night, and
Lord Gort sent Captain Chapman to inquire from the 2nd Battalion Irish
Guards what was happening, but it proved to be merely the outcome of
nervousness on the part of the Germans, and no attack developed. The
Battalion moved off at 5.30 A.M., to take up new positions facing east
instead of north, at very short notice; and, as the night was very
dark and wet and the enemy was so close, the advance into position
required some care. In order to prevent any confusion in the
jumping-off line, the Battalion was told to occupy a position
immediately in rear of the line, and to move up in the line only when
the attack had actually started.
ATTACK ON FONTAINE
[Sidenote: Nov. 27.]
In a drizzle of rain, and under an intense enemy barrage, the attack
of Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade started at 6.30 in the morning of the
27th. It reached its objective, but the cost was so great, that the
survivors found it impossible to maintain the position they had so
dearly gained, without reinforcements. So weak were the attacking
battalions, that they were in danger of being overwhelmed by
counter-attacks. While the 4th Battalion was waiting for orders about
10 A.M., the German counter-attacks began to develop, and fire from
the left became very heavy. No. 2 Company under Captain Britten was
sent off to secure the left flank of the Division, which seemed to be
in a dangerously weak condition. As they came up Second Lieutenant
Windeler was killed by a sniper, and Captain Britten himself was
wounded in the arm by a rifle bullet. Soon afterwards Second
Lieutenant Oliver, who was now in command of No. 3 Company, was
severely wounded in the chest, arm, and foot, while going out to bring
in a wounded Irish Guardsman. The casualties among other ranks were
proportionately heavy.
A warning order arrived from Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke at
10.30 A.M., preparing the Battalion to supply two companies for the
support of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream,
but it seemed doubtful whether a couple of companies, or even four,
would be of any use in the circumstances. Captain Gerard, the
Adjutant, reported that he had heard from Captain Paton that already
the 2nd Guards Brigade was falling back to the original line.