the 3rd Battalion, and discussed the new situation with Colonel
Thorne. They decided that it would be inadvisable, in view of the
enemy’s strength, and the absence of any appreciable reserves on our
side, to renew the attack, and so use up the 4th Battalion with small
chance of success. Orders were accordingly issued for the original
line now held by the 4th Battalion to become the line of resistance,
under the command of Captain Paton and Captain Sloane-Stanley. That
night the 4th Battalion was relieved, and returned to the Hindenburg
line at Flesquières.
[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]
On the 28th it marched to Trescault, and pitched a camp on the open
ground between the Trescault――Metz road and Havrincourt Wood. The
enemy’s aircraft left them no peace, and so the tents were struck the
next morning, and pitched again in Havrincourt Wood. The undergrowth
was thick, and the cutting of it took some time, but when the camp was
finished it proved snug and sheltered.
[Illustration: _Attack on Fontaine_
_November 27. 1917._]
[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]
The officers had just finished breakfast on the 30th, and were about
to inspect their companies, when the news arrived that the Germans had
broken through the line near Gonnelieu. It was said that the enemy had
been seen marching in fours through Gouzeaucourt. Immediately orders
were given for the Battalion to be ready to start at a moment’s
notice. Although the men had expected a quiet day, and were quite
unprepared, so perfect were the organisation and discipline that in
half an hour’s time the Battalion was ready to move off.
Lord Gort’s orders were to concentrate on Metz, and accordingly the
Battalion moved off in that direction. The road was full of transport
moving in the opposite direction, and with it ran a stream of men
looking strangely unlike British soldiers, with no rifles or
equipment――wounded and unwounded with incoherent stories, officers
half-undressed, gunners with breechblocks in their hands, all with a
hunted look. Some high-explosive shells came streaming over, and
pitched not far from the road. Lord Henry Seymour with his commanding
officers rode on ahead to try and glean some information, while the
four battalions of his Brigade marched through Metz, past the beetroot
factory and on to the open ground beyond, where they lay down and
waited.
ATTACK ON GONNELIEU
About 2.30 P.M. the whole Brigade, in artillery formation, moved off
in the direction of Gouzeaucourt, and in the meantime the attack of De
Crespigny’s Brigade had been completely successful and required no
reinforcements. The direction of the march was consequently slightly
changed. The 4th Battalion crossed the Trescault――Gouzeaucourt road,
where, thanks to Lieutenant Ingleby, the cookers arrived, and the men
were provided with hot food. That night General Walker, commanding the
16th Brigade of the Sixth Division, held a conference at the 4th
Battalion Headquarters. His object was to ensure that the 4th
Battalion understood his scheme of attack, for if his brigade failed
it would have to carry out his plan. The hurried manner in which the
attack was planned, and the obviously scanty information on which the
plan was based, seemed to indicate that it was not likely to succeed.
At 1 A.M. a warning order was issued to the effect that Seymour’s
Brigade would assault Gonnelieu, if the attack of the 16th Brigade
failed. Lord Gort thereupon wrote out his orders with the very meagre
information at his disposal.
To have to select a definite objective after dark made things very
difficult, since the final disposition depended upon the attack of the
16th Brigade, and whatever happened an indefinite front line would be
the result. If the 16th Brigade succeeded, Seymour’s Brigade would
simply relieve it, but if it failed the attack would have to be
attempted a second time. These considerations alone made it necessary
to work out alternative schemes. Lord Henry Seymour fortunately
prepared a detailed plan for the worst event, and fully realised that
his Brigade was to be employed in a manner generally accepted as
impossible, except in a great emergency, involving the advance of
infantry, unsupported by artillery, across the open against an enemy
occupying trenches, and houses bristling with machine-guns.
The following officers took part in the attack on Gonnelieu:
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Major W. S. Pilcher, D.S.O. 2nd in Command.
Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant.
Capt. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer.
Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 1 Company.
Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. M. Chitty ” ”
2nd Lieut. B. J. Hubbard, M.C. No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ”
2nd Lieut. D. E. A. Horne ” ”
Capt. J. B. M. Burke, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L. Hardinge ” ”
Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith ” ”
Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company.
Lieut. B. C. Layton ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. J. M. Veitch ” ”
When the news of the failure of the 16th Brigade’s attack reached Lord
Gort, he at once started off with the Battalion, and crossed the
Villers Plouich road. On reaching the railway the companies extended,
and dug themselves in. There they waited in the dark for zero hour.
The order of battle for Seymour’s Brigade was as follows: The 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards on the right and the 4th Battalion Grenadiers
on the left were to undertake the attack. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers
was in support on the left, and had to protect the left flank as the
attack advanced, while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had already
occupied the high ground about Villers Plouich. In the 4th Battalion
No. 2 Company under Second Lieutenant Hubbard on the right and No. 3
under Captain Burke on the left formed the first line. No. 4 Company
under Captain Paton was in support, and No. 1 under Captain
Sloane-Stanley formed the reserve. Captain Chapman was sent forward to
establish a forward Battalion Headquarters.
[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]
Without any artillery preparation the attack started at 6.30 A.M. It
was still fairly dark, but the Germans could see enough to use their
machine-guns with considerable accuracy. The line of advance was over
open ground, up a gentle slope leading to Gonnelieu, and there was no
cover or protection of any kind for the attackers. On came the leading
companies of the 4th Battalion in perfect order. The men never wavered
for an instant, though they knew that they were to be sacrificed to
save the situation. They all understood that the rules of modern
warfare were to be defied, and that instead of following a creeping
barrage they were to advance across the open, with not even a
preliminary bombardment. Though they knew this, they never faltered.
The enemy’s machine-gun fire when it broke over them was terrible,
like a driving hailstorm, but the pace was never checked for a moment.
Especially on the right the fire was terrific, and No. 2 Company,
which had gone rather too far in that direction, suffered heavy
losses: one platoon was practically wiped out. Second Lieutenant
Hubbard himself was killed, and Second Lieutenant Denman was mortally
wounded, gallantly attempting to silence a German machine-gun, while
Second Lieutenant Horne was also wounded. No. 3 Company under Captain
Burke maintained its direction, and had few casualties until it came
up close to the village. On reaching a road running in the direction
of Vacquerie, it had to pause for a moment to allow No. 4 to come up
before continuing its advance. Second Lieutenant Veitch had his thigh
smashed by a bullet, and fell back into a shell-hole. Almost
simultaneously a man shot through the head fell on the top of him, and
being too weak to move the dying man, for twelve hours he remained in
this cramped position.
The left of the line met with less resistance than the right, and so
got far in advance. No. 3 Company dashed forward into the outskirts of
Gonnelieu, but the village seemed almost impregnable against infantry
unsupported by tanks or artillery. A small enclosure sheltered by
ruined buildings was the only protected spot, the ground all round it
was swept by machine-gun fire, and of course the shrubs and rank grass
were no cover at all. Captain Burke dashed in on the left, and
penetrated into the eastern outskirts of Gonnelieu, while Lieutenant
Hardinge with a few men got round to the north of the village, and
brought up a Lewis gun to a position in the cemetery. This had a most
disconcerting effect on the enemy, for it threatened his right flank,
and enfiladed the troops opposing Nos. 2 and 4 Companies.
The Germans quickly grasped the fact that this movement on Lieutenant
Hardinge’s part required immediate action. They managed to press back
the troops on the left of the Brigade, with a view of enfilading the
cemetery. With great ingenuity they worked round with their
machine-guns, and soon Lieutenant Hardinge’s position became
untenable. All his men were killed or wounded with the exception of
Sergeant Hull. Then the gun jammed. There was now nothing to be done
but to get back as best he could, and being luckily only slightly
wounded, he was able to make his way back, accompanied by Sergeant H.
Hull.
Meanwhile Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith and Sergeant Williams went down a
line of huts to the right, to see if an advance could be made in that
direction, but were met with a withering fire from the right flank.
With two platoons they therefore advanced a short distance down the
centre of the village, but the enemy’s machine-gun fire was so fierce
that the ground over which they crawled was plastered with bullets.
Some men, who were creeping along behind a wall, were killed by
bullets which pierced the brickwork, and Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith
himself was wounded.
This most gallant attempt on the part of No. 3 Company to capture the
village resulted in such heavy losses that it was obvious it would
have to retire. A German counter-attack as it was attempting to
consolidate its position settled the matter. A certain number of men
managed to get back, but most of them were killed or taken prisoners,
including Captain Burke himself, who died fighting to the last. The
same fate befell Second Lieutenant Chitty, who, with a party of No. 1
Company, had succeeded in entering the village.
Captain Paton with No. 4 Company had the difficult task of deciding
what he should do, on reaching the trench in front of Gonnelieu. No. 3
had gone on into the outskirts, and there was no sign of the Welsh
Guards on his right. It was obvious that his best plan would be to
hold the trench until the others came up into line, so that at least
those who had gone on would have a strong supporting line to retire
to. But there was a mixed medley of men on his left, who seemed to be
wavering in the face of the counter-attack. Captain Paton thereupon
leaped out of his trench, and ran across the open, with machine-gun
bullets ploughing up the ground all round him. With almost reckless
bravery he went from trench to trench in full sight of the German
machine-gunners, encouraging these groups of men from various
regiments. At first he seemed to have almost a charmed life, and his
splendid example inspirited all who saw him. The situation was saved,
and he fell soon afterwards mortally wounded. For this conspicuous act
of gallantry he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Captain
Gerard, the Adjutant, who came up to obtain information for Lord Gort,
found that owing to Captain Paton’s efforts the left flank was secure.
It was now clear that without considerable reinforcements and
unlimited sacrifices the village could not be taken. The enemy’s
machine-guns were too strong. The Germans were counter-attacking, and
were able to overpower any parties that had gained a footing in the
village. Only one of the fourteen tanks that had been expected
appeared, and, although it was undoubtedly a great help to the Welsh
Guards, it was quite inadequate by itself. The Brigade on the left and
the Welsh Guards on the right had been held up, so that even had the
Battalion taken the village they would not have been able to hold it.
A German officer captured that day stated that his battalion had
attacked from behind Gonnelieu at 6 A.M., and as our attack started at
6.30 they had been completely disorganised by our advance, which they
imagined was a counter-attack delivered with amazing rapidity.
Captain Sloane-Stanley, who had come up with No. 1 Company, determined
to consolidate the trench immediately in front of Gonnelieu, so that
it might be held with what remained of the attacking Companies.
Lieutenant Irby of the same Company held a block in the trench against
persistent bombing attacks, and eventually knocked out a German
machine-gun by counter-bombing. Lord Gort himself now came up to see
exactly how matters stood, and walked about, as he always did on such
occasions, with an absolute disregard for all danger. It was not long,
however, before he was severely wounded; the only wonder was that he
had not been hit before. There were many acts of individual bravery,
and perhaps the gallantry displayed by Sergeants Canham and Buckle was
one of the most conspicuous. At one time, when the enemy were
advancing dangerously near our line, these two sergeants left their
trench, and charged. The Germans, imagining that these two wore only
the foremost of a large party, fled in confusion.
Major Pilcher, who now assumed command of the 4th Battalion, was
confronted with a very difficult situation. The sadly depleted ranks
of the Battalion were holding the trench in front of Gonnelieu, and
there were only three officers left――Captain H. Sloane-Stanley,
Lieutenant Layton, and Lieutenant Irby. The tactical position was
hazardous in the extreme, for both flanks were in the air and
dangerously large gaps in the line seemed to invite a German attack.
When the troops on the left retired, Major Pilcher called on the 1st
Battalion Grenadiers to send up one Company to his assistance, and
Captain Rhodes was sent to form a defensive flank. Later, when further
assistance was required, two more Companies under Captain Spence and
Captain Lawford advanced down the sunken road, and prolonged the line
to the left. This timely assistance undoubtedly saved the left flank
of the 4th Battalion, and enabled it to maintain its position.
[Sidenote: Dec. 3.]
The line now formed a salient in front of Gonnelieu; the apex being
held by the 4th Battalion with some men of the Northants Labour
Battalion. On the left was the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, which formed
a defensive flank, while the Welsh Guards écheloned back to the right.
This position was maintained until December 3, when the 4th Battalion
was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which latter had been
due the night before. Owing to the delay the already exhausted
officers and men had to spend a further twenty-four hours in the
trenches, exposed to a hard frost. It was only through almost
superhuman efforts that they received their rations on the morning of
the 2nd, as the failure to relieve them had upset all arrangements for
supply.
On the night of the 3rd they marched back, and bivouacked in the open
on some ground north of Gouzeaucourt Wood, where they remained ready,
in case their services should be required.
When the Guards Division left the area of operations near
Gouzeaucourt, the 4th Battalion proceeded to Etricourt, where they
entrained for Laherliere. Thence they marched to Gouy-en-Artois, and
were placed in comfortable billets in a château. On December 11 they
proceeded to Dainville, where they remained till the end of the month
training. The weather became very cold and misty, and later there was
a good deal of snow. On the 23rd the following officers joined the
Battalion: Lieutenant F. C. Lyon, the Hon. C. C. S. Rodney, Second
Lieutenant B. R. Osborne, Second Lieutenant R. D. Richardson, and
Second Lieutenant C. J. Dawson-Greene.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: 1st Batt. Nov.]
After the operations at Bixschoote in October, the 1st Battalion
remained in billets at Zudroue, near Watten. During this period the
following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant I. C. Gascoigne,
Second Lieutenant D. B. Topham, Lieutenant R. D. Lawford, Second
Lieutenant A. H. Forbes, Second Lieutenant C. Cruttenden, and
Lieutenant H. G. Wiggins. Captain H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C., also arrived
to take the place of Captain P. H. Wells, R.A.M.C. While the Battalion
was at Zudroue, the Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal H.R.H. the
Duke of Connaught, paid them a visit.
On November 9 the move south began, and the 1st Battalion marched to
Enquin-les-Mines, continuing its march on the following day to Fabain
Palfart, and then on to Foolinricametz. Second Lieutenant S. J.
Hargreaves joined from the base on the 15th. The march was continued
on the 17th through Ivergny Pommier to Achiet-le-Petit, where the men
had twenty-four hours’ rest. The greatest secrecy was preserved, and
no orders were issued to the Company Commanders till the last moment,
though from the great concentration of troops it seemed clear that
some big move was impending. The 1st Battalion was brought up in buses
to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, and from there it marched with the rest of
Seymour’s Brigade to Flesquières. Though two Battalions of the Brigade
were sent up to support the Fortieth Division, which was taking
Bourlon Wood, the 1st Battalion did not take part in these operations.
On the night of the 27th the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st
Battalion Welsh Guards, assisted by two Companies from the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream Guards, relieved the 2nd Guards Brigade in the
front line. The following officers took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton-
Maitland, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. L. G. Fisher-Rowe, M.C. Second in Command.
Lieut. W. H. Lovell, M.C. Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. L. de J. Harvard King’s Company.
Lieut. J. A. Lloyd ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. H. Frere ” ”
Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. L. G. Byng ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth ” ”
2nd Lieut. W. U. Timmis ” ”
Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. H. G. Wiggins ” ”
Lieut. S. J. Hargreaves ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. Cruttenden ” ”
Capt. R. D. Lawford No. 4 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. P. P. Cary ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. C. Mays ” ”
Lieut. N. G. Chamberlain ” ”
Capt. H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Conditions were favourable for carrying out the relief, and the next
day passed without incident, although the enemy continued to shell the
valley south of Bourlon Wood. On the evening of the 28th the 3rd
Guards Brigade, having been relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division,
marched to the reserve trenches south-west of Ribecourt. Next day it
proceeded to Havrincourt Wood. A camp was pitched, and to make way for
the tents it was necessary to clear away the undergrowth, which so
delayed matters that it was not till 10 P.M. that every one had
settled down.
[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]
Barely had the officers finished breakfast on the morning of the 30th,
when rumours reached them that the Germans had broken through the
line. At first no one believed this possible, and, as the camp was
quite five miles from our front line, a further report that the
Germans were not far off was received with incredulity. But soon small
parties of men were seen coming over the hill, as well as gunners and
horses without guns. By degrees these isolated parties became a mob,
and the road was blocked by a torrent of transport and men. A few
shells pitched not far from the camp, and confirmed the news of the
approach of the Germans. At the same time there arrived a warning
order to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and soon the whole
camp was filled with bustle and excitement.
The first warning said that Seymour’s Brigade was to be ready to take
up a defensive position on the ridge of Havrincourt Wood. This was
cancelled later, and the Brigade was told to concentrate at a point
near Metz. As soon as the order was confirmed, the 1st Battalion moved
off to join the rest of the Brigade on the Trescault――Metz road. The
march was trying, as the road was blocked with traffic, all moving in
the opposite direction. At some points the Brigade encountered as many
as three limbers abreast. Sometimes, therefore, the troops had to go
in single file through a mass of vehicles and men, and then to double
so as to keep touch with those in front. Being on a hill, the road was
clearly visible for miles, and the Germans soon started hammering it
with high-explosive shells, which added to the general confusion. It
requires a very highly disciplined force to move quickly against such
a stream as this was, but the men never checked their pace for a
moment. Spades and shovels were drawn in Metz, and the whole Brigade
was soon ready to advance in artillery formation. The 1st Battalion
followed the Welsh Guards across country in the direction of
Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich. Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour
rode on in front with his Staff.
ATTACK ON GONNELIEU
The position taken up by the Brigade was just under the crest of the
ridge, running north from Gouzeaucourt Wood, and the 1st Battalion
bivouacked for the night within half a mile of the camp in Havrincourt
Wood, where the stores and transport had remained. As the night was
bitterly cold, one blanket per man and the officers’ trench kits were
fetched, and eventually, when the cookers came up, tea and porridge
was given out to the men.
[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]
At 4 A.M., after the Company Commanders had returned from
reconnoitring, orders were issued for the 1st Battalion to move by
Companies in artillery formation, and take up a line on the railway
between Gouzeaucourt on the right and Villers Plouich on the left. By
9 A.M. the Companies were in position: No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, on
the right and in touch with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers; No. 3, under
Captain Spence, in the centre; No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the
left; and the King’s Company, under Lieutenant Harvard, in reserve.
Both the railway and a sunken road which ran parallel with it were
shelled incessantly by the enemy, while machine-gun bullets also swept
down the line from the direction of Gonnelieu. The 4th Battalion
Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards were ordered to
undertake the attack, while the 1st Battalion was to be in support,
and guard the left flank as the advance progressed. At 6.20 A.M. the
attack began, and a rather feeble bombardment was continued for ten
minutes by three Brigades of R.F.A. Twenty-two tanks had been allotted
to the Division, eight of which were to co-operate with Seymour’s
Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel Maitland summoned the four Company Commanders to
Battalion Headquarters, and they started off just as the Germans were
putting down a heavy barrage on the railway. As they made their way
along the embankment, shells were pitching among the men, and causing
groups of casualties. As soon as any reinforcements were wanted,
Captain Rhodes was to take his Company up the sunken road from
Gouzeaucourt to Gonnelieu. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies were to advance
across the open, so as to be near at hand when called upon. The
Company Commanders scrambled back to their Companies, and explained
the general idea to their Platoon Commanders as far as time would
permit. It was a trying time for the men, who had to sit still as mere
targets for the German gunners, and watch their comrades again and
again being blown to pieces. They felt that even an advance under
machine-gun fire would have been preferable.
As soon as the attack started, the 1st Battalion advanced under a hail
of bullets, although there was no artillery fire, and many men fell at
once. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers, which it supported, was at first
so successful that it outstripped the troops on the left, and
consequently had that flank in the air. Lord Henry Seymour sent orders
to the 1st Battalion to secure the high ground to the north of
Gonnelieu, hoping that by this means it would not only secure the left
flank of the 4th Battalion, but also materially assist it to hold the
village. The 1st Battalion had therefore to advance half left, and
after going about 600 yards it was joined by men of various regiments.
Complete success attended the first part of the attack, and the three
leading Companies, by a free use of the bayonet, captured the first
German trench they reached. It was then necessary to “mop up,” and
clear all possible hiding-places where any Germans might be lurking.
Apparently the enemy had been taken unawares, and there were traces
everywhere of surprise and precipitate flight. One German officer was
caught while changing his clothes, and had nothing on but a shirt. The
men stood up, and fired their rifles from the shoulder at the
retreating Germans, and the Lewis gunners did their work well. A large
number of the enemy were killed, and 110 prisoners were taken. No. 3
Company, under Captain Spence, was on the right, in touch with the 4th
Battalion, and No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the left, in touch
with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, in
the centre, had the most difficult task, as it had continually to
swing round to keep up with the Companies on either flank.
Having succeeded so well with the first trench, the 1st Battalion
continued its advance until it arrived at a well-wired trench north of
Gonnelieu. The three leading Companies managed to get through gaps in
the wire, and push on, but when they topped the ridge they were met
with a terrific machine-gun fire, which staggered them, and caused
many casualties. It seemed madness to advance in the open against
well-posted machine-guns, and orders were therefore given to withdraw
to the trench they had already gained. In the meantime five tanks were
seen advancing up to the ridge south of Gonnelieu; three of them were
put out of action before they reached the village, and none were able
to enter the village itself. Captain Spence, finding that his Company
had run short of ammunition, sent back a small party to fetch some
from Battalion Headquarters.
During the last advance Lieutenant Chamberlain, who had gone on too
far, had been either cut off or killed, and half of No. 2 Company,
having gone astray, was nowhere to be seen. The whole line in fact had
been bent to a semicircle, and needed reorganising. Lieutenant Wiggins
was sent by Captain Spence to get touch with No. 2, which should have
been on his right, and, after hunting about for some time, reported
that he could find no trace of this half-Company. At the same time
Second Lieutenant Cruttenden went off to find Lieutenant Chamberlain,
and after a fruitless search was shot through the lungs by a sniper.
By degrees every one got into his right place, and the missing half of
No. 2 Company was retrieved by Captain Rhodes.
As soon as it became dark, began the difficult task of collecting the
wounded and getting them down to the dressing-station. The
stretcher-bearers worked indefatigably all night, and were assisted by
any men who could be spared. Another search-party, under Sergeant
Porter, went out to find Lieutenant Chamberlain, but was no more
successful than the first.
Next day the Battalion remained in the same position, but two platoons
were sent off to reinforce the line held by the 4th Battalion. That
night the 1st Battalion was relieved, partly by the 2nd Battalion
Scots Guards, and partly by a battalion of the 183rd Brigade, and was
sent off to relieve the Welsh Guards. As the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards did not arrive till dawn, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies had to hold on
all night. There was a rumour that Seymour’s Brigade would continue
the attack on Gonnelieu the next day, but nothing came of it. On
December 3 the whole position was severely shelled, and there were
several casualties, including Lieutenant Bevan, who was wounded.
In the evening the Battalion was relieved, and retired to
Gouzeaucourt, where it remained in reserve. On the 6th it moved to
Etricourt, where Second Lieutenant F. H. Ennor and Second Lieutenant
R. C. Bruce arrived, and on the 11th it retired to Arras, where it
remained till the end of the month. Second Lieutenant A. Forbes and
Second Lieutenant V. A. N. Wall rejoined from the Reinforcement
Battalion on the 16th.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]
For the rest of October the 2nd Battalion remained at Tournehem in the
area between St. Omer and Calais, carrying out training of all kinds.
Lieutenant O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant S. T. S. Clarke arrived on
the 18th.
[Sidenote: Nov.]
On November 11 the Battalion with the rest of De Crespigny’s Brigade
started their march south, through Herbelle, Lairs, and La Thieulloye.
A Divisional Reinforcement Battalion was now formed. This was a new
idea, which had gradually come to be adopted, whenever an attack was
impending, and which had been rendered necessary by the large numbers
of all ranks who were left behind whenever offensive operations were
undertaken. Companies at that time neither attacked nor went into the
line with a greater average strength than 32 other ranks per platoon
and 3 officers per Company, and the Reinforcement Battalion was
designed to take charge of the remainder. Though some such scheme was
doubtless necessary, its application inevitably proved chaotic, for a
hurriedly improvised Battalion Staff administered by the A. and Q.
branches, who were themselves always at their busiest time, when the
Reinforcement Battalion came into existence, hardly made an ideal
administrative machine. From the Battalion point of view the result
was desperate. All ranks returning from leave were usually detained at
the Reinforcement Battalion, so that it was never known from day to
day what officers, N.C.O.’s, and men would be available for duty, nor
was it possible to obtain appropriate substitutes to fill deficiencies
caused by sickness.
On the 13th there was a Divisional Conference, which was attended by
the Brigadiers and Commanding Officers, when Major-General Fielding
outlined the future operations. After four days spent at La Thieulloye
the Battalion marched to Manin, and on the 18th went into camp between
Blaireville and Hendecourt. There the Commanding Officer held a
conference, at which he explained the scope and intention of the
forthcoming operations. On the 19th the Battalion marched by night
from Blaireville, through Hamelincourt and Ervillers, to a tented camp
at Gomiecourt. A full moon lit the road, and the Battalion was in
great spirits, all the companies singing on the march, and all ranks
feeling the suppressed excitement which precedes an attack. The road
passed through an area which the Battalion was to know very well four
months later, when it was called upon to stem the German onslaught.
After two nights in this camp the Battalion proceeded in buses to huts
near Barastre, where it was quartered in very comfortable billets. It
was nearly dawn by the time the troops settled down, as the journey
had been slow and laborious owing to the congestion on the roads,
which, though deserted by day, were crowded with men and vehicles from
dark to dawn.
November 23rd was one of the most remarkable days in the Battalion’s
experience. Starting from camp near Barastre in the dark at 5.30 A.M.,
it marched through Velu to a field on the western outskirts of
Doignies, which was reached about 9.30 A.M. Here the men drew
bivouac-sheets, and set to work to make provision for the night,
having been told that no move would be undertaken that day, whilst the
Commanding Officer and most of the Company Commanders went out to
reconnoitre various routes. Early in the afternoon an order was
received that the Battalion would be required to move at short notice,
and that it would relieve a Battalion in the line that night. Marching
orders were issued, and bivouac-sheets returned. Shortly after 7 P.M.
an order was received that the Battalion was to march off immediately;
it was not known what Battalion was to be relieved, nor where it was,
but it was said that definite orders would be received at the Canal du
Nord. General de Crespigny had gone off to reconnoitre the forward
area, and had not returned.
The whole of De Crespigny’s Brigade and part of Seymour’s Brigade were
found to be on the same track, and as it was already congested by the
passage in both directions of ammunition limbers, ambulances, and
traffic of every description, progress was slow and wearisome. During
the course of the march, the Lewis-gun limbers, which had started with
the Battalion, but had become slightly separated in the press of the
traffic, were diverted by a Staff Officer. The Battalion Headquarters
were not informed of this, and consequently it was not until some time
after their departure that the absence of the guns became known. On
reaching the Canal crossing at Lock 7 the Battalion halted, and the
men fell out on the side of the road to snatch a few minutes’ sleep,
while Captain A. Penn, the Adjutant, rode forward to meet
Lieutenant-Colonel Follett, who was commanding the Brigade in the
temporary absence of General de Crespigny. From Colonel Follett it was
learnt that the Brigade to be relieved was in the neighbourhood of
Cantaing. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch thereupon rode forward to find the
outgoing Battalion, to arrange for guides, and to borrow Lewis guns,
while the Battalion wearily followed the road through Graincourt. The
men who were not required to take part in the operations were diverted
from the main body, and sent off under Lieutenant Drummond and
Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, to find their way to Ribecourt. The march
was undisturbed, and the night quiet, save on the hill crowned by
Bourlon Wood, which all night was intermittently shelled.
Near Brigade Headquarters at La Justice Farm, north of Orival Wood,
the Battalion met guides from the 9th Battalion Royal Scots (152nd
Brigade), which was holding the first line on the eastern outskirts of
Cantaing. Thanks to the admirable arrangements made by this Battalion,
which had been heavily engaged for some days past, the remainder of
the relief passed off without difficulty. Just before daylight the
Battalion completed a relief, which the Royal Scots at any rate
believed to be impossible of achievement, in view of the demands it
made on the endurance of the men, who had been on the move almost
unceasingly for twenty-four hours.
When once the relief was complete, the tour passed without incident,
except that Lieutenant Alexander was wounded in the hand, whilst
throwing from the slit he was occupying an enemy grenade, which had
fallen unexploded among his men.
No. 2 Company was on the right, stretching towards Bois Neuf, and in
touch with the 8th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment; No. 4 on the left
held a line of posts just east of the Cantaing――Fontaine road, facing
La Folie Wood, and in touch with the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, which
stretched towards Bourlon Wood; No. 1 was in support, and No. 3 in
reserve. Everywhere there were signs of the rapidity with which the
British attack had swept the enemy from his trenches, and derelict and
charred tanks, scattered in all directions, bore evidence of the
stubborn resistance with which our advance had been met. The country
was open and undulating, and the spires of Cambrai were distinctly
visible in the clear wintry light. On the 26th the Battalion was
relieved, and marched back in a blinding snowstorm to Ribecourt,
passing the Battalions of the 2nd Guards Brigade, on their way to
carry out the attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The night spent at
Ribecourt was one of the most miserable passed by the Battalion.
Soaked by the snowstorm, through which they had marched from Cantaing,
and sodden with mud from the line, the men, whose blankets and
greatcoats had been stored when the advance began, found no
accommodation but a few leaky shelters in the Hindenburg Line. All the
dug-outs with any possibilities of comfort had already been occupied
by the swarm of troops following the advance. In the afternoon of the
28th, orders were received to march to billets in Metz, and thither
the Battalion went in the evening, finding on its arrival rather
cramped but quite comfortable quarters.
THE CAPTURE OF GOUZEAUCOURT
At daybreak on 30th November the sound of a heavy bombardment on a
wide front made it clear that the enemy was undertaking a
counter-attack. At the same time a long-range gun began to drop shells
into Metz, where the Battalion was resting, causing casualties to the
troops billeted there. The village street was quickly choked with a
miscellaneous rabble of soldiers of every kind, all streaming back in
hopeless confusion, and spreading rumours of a break-through by the
enemy. Soon after 9 A.M. a message was received from General de
Crespigny that the Third Corps was being heavily attacked at
Gonnelieu, about four miles away, and ordering the Battalion to move
at short notice. At 10.30 Lieut.-Colonel Rasch was told to march the
Battalion towards Gouzeaucourt, and to clear Metz by 12.25 P.M. He
handed over the command of the Battalion to Captain Harcourt-Vernon,
and rode off to the Brigade Headquarters to get as much information as
possible.
The following officers took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon Second in Command.
Capt. A. H. Penn Adjutant.
Lieut. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. P. A. A. Harbord, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. S. H. Pearson ” ”
Lieut. F. A. M. Browning No. 2 Company.
Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt, M.C. ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. ” ”
Lieut. A. W. Acland, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. F. A. Magnay ” ”
Lieut. R. Y. T. Kendal ” ”
Lieut. G. R. Westmacott No. 4 Company.
Lieut. W. H. S. Dent ” ”
Lieut. F. P. Loftus ” ”
Capt. J. A. Andrews, M.C. Medical Officer.
Half a mile from Metz, Lieut.-Colonel Rasch and the Company
Commanders, who had preceded the Battalion, rejoined, with the news
that De Crespigny’s Brigade was to advance immediately towards
Gouzeaucourt, which was reported to be in the hands of the Germans:
the 1st Battalion Irish Guards on the north of the Gouzeaucourt――Metz
road, the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream on the right; the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers in
Brigade support.
The whole countryside was by this time dotted with men retiring, and
the A.P.M. at the Metz cross-roads was busily engaged in dealing with
stragglers; throughout the advance of the Brigade no trace was seen of
any defending infantry. On clearing the village, the Battalion assumed
artillery formation, and advanced to Gouzeaucourt Wood, a low scrubby
plantation crowning the ridge which bisects the ground lying between
Metz and Gouzeaucourt. Here the Battalion waited full of anxious
curiosity. Shelling caused a few casualties, but the protection of the
rising ground sheltered it from the rifle and machine-gun fire,
directed at the leading battalions, which were now advancing towards
Gouzeaucourt village. The capture of Gouzeaucourt was a fine
achievement carried out with wonderful precision. So successful was it
that the Battalion was never required: by nightfall the village had
been completely cleared of the enemy, and all British stores had been
recovered. When it was known that the Battalion was not likely to be
called upon until the next day, cookers were brought up, and provision
for the cold night was made as far as possible.
CAPTURE OF GAUCHE WOOD
[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]
At 2.30 A.M. General de Crespigny received orders to attack and
capture Gauche Wood, in co-operation with Seymour’s Brigade on the
left, and the cavalry on the right. The objective of the Battalion was
the eastern edge of Gauche Wood, and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream was
to be on the left. This wood was oblong in shape, and measured
approximately 700 by 300 yards; its nearest corner was about 1200
yards from the line which the Brigade had taken up the night before.
Orders were written and explained to the Company Commanders. The
Battalion was to form up behind a sunken road on the eastern outskirts
of Gouzeaucourt village, which then constituted the front line. Twenty
tanks were allotted to the Brigade, but as there seemed grave doubt as
to whether they would be able to reach their rendezvous at so short
notice, companies were ordered not to wait for them.
[Illustration: _Attack on Gonnelieu & Gauche Wood_
_December 1st 1917_
_Emery Walker Ltd._]
In the 2nd Battalion the attack was undertaken by No. 1 Company under
Lieutenant Cornforth on the right, and No. 3 under Lieutenant Acland
on the left, each in two lines of two platoons, followed at a distance
of 250 yards by No. 4 under Lieutenant Westmacott, and No. 2 under
Lieutenant Browning, in similar formation. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went
on ahead with the Company Commanders to reconnoitre the forming-up
ground, whilst the Battalion followed after breakfast, and picked up
tools on the way. At 6.30 the artillery support, which was most
attenuated, opened and searched the wood and the ravine behind it. No
tanks had yet put in an appearance, and, after giving them ten
minutes’ grace, the attack was launched without them.
The enemy retaliated with a heavy barrage, most of which fortunately
fell behind the advancing troops, but the machine-gun fire made it
doubtful whether any one would ever reach the wood. When the attack
opened, all four companies advanced at a great pace over the
intervening grass land, which rose in a gentle slope up to the wood.
It is difficult to understand why, with the machine-guns posted at the
edge of the wood, the enemy did not wipe out the whole Battalion.
Ignoring all regulations about short rushes, both officers and men
went straight for the wood as fast as they could. They instinctively
felt that the only chance was to cover the mile of naked slope in the
shortest possible time. In all probability the German machine-gunners
in the half-light of the morning became flurried, at seeing this
formidable attack sweeping over the ground, for, although the fire was
very hot, the bullets passed over the men’s heads, and it was not
until they had nearly reached the wood that casualties occurred. Here
the fringe of German machine-guns, established at the edge of the
wood, began to take heavy toll, and then began perhaps the fiercest
fighting of all. When the leading companies reached the wood, it
became a struggle of man to man. But the Germans soon found that with
the bayonet they were no match for the Grenadiers. Back into the wood
they were forced, and then-down into a hollow in the centre of it.
Their machine-guns were all captured, and, although some fought
stubbornly, most of them were driven slowly up the incline on the far
side into the corner of the wood. Second Lieutenant Pearson was killed
as he went through the wood, and Second Lieutenant Harbord, whilst
most gallantly rushing a machine-gun, received wounds from which he
died later in the day. Lieutenants Cornforth, Drummond, Dent, Kendal,
Acland, and Magnay were all wounded, and the Battalion lost many
valuable N.C.O.’s.
This left Lieutenant Browning and Lieutenant Westmacott responsible
for the whole Battalion front, and to them the success of the attack
was largely due. Between them they reorganised and controlled the
whole line, making their dispositions with great skill. On reaching
the wood, Lieutenant Westmacott faced part of his company to the right
flank, to guard against a counter-attack from the south. Hardly had he
done so when about seventy Germans appeared; they were met with steady
rifle-fire from the wood, and wavered for a moment, uncertain as to
what they should do, but they finally made for the wood. Our fire,
however, was too steady for them, and accounted for all but a handful
of men, who were taken prisoners. Soon afterwards another party of
sixty appeared from the same direction, but they also were met with so
well-directed a fire that they were staggered, whereupon the men of
No. 4 Company charged them with the bayonet.
Lieutenant Westmacott now decided that he must push his men farther
forward on the right flank of the wood, so as to command the valley,
which lay between the wood and the village of Villers Guislain. He had
just moved forward his company, and prolonged the right with two
platoons of No. 2 Company, when some dismounted cavalry, consisting of
the 18th Bengal Lancers and a detachment of the 7th Dragoon Guards,
appeared from the same direction as the enemy attacks. Their orders
had not enabled them to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Battalion,
and it was in all probability this delayed advance that precipitated
the two unfruitful attempts of the enemy to gain the wood. Their
arrival was of the greatest value, and at Lieutenant Westmacott’s
suggestion they proceeded to reinforce the other companies, which were
meanwhile fighting their way through the wood. Several tanks had by
now put in an appearance, although the majority had been knocked out
before they reached the wood, by a most accurate shell-fire directed
by a low-flying aeroplane. The lack of any particular trench for the
surviving tanks to attack made their fire ineffectual, and their
presence seemed to attract the shells of all the German batteries in
the neighbourhood, causing many casualties in the Battalion.
Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, who had been assisting Lieutenant Browning
to reorganise the companies in the wood, was wounded by a splinter of
a shell, and had to retire to a dressing-station. This left only
Lieutenant Browning in the wood, and Lieutenant Westmacott and
Lieutenant Loftus outside.
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went up to the line, and organised a readjustment
of the companies. Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Corbyn, commanding the 18th
Bengal Lancers, was asked to withdraw his men to the centre of the
wood so as to form a reserve, and dig a support line on some
commanding ground in the wood. The dash and fighting spirit of all
ranks of this regiment, and the help and experience which Colonel
Corbyn gave at that critical moment, made the greatest impression on
the Battalion, and enabled the Grenadiers to realise how great a loss
his regiment suffered, when he was killed by a shell later in the
afternoon.
In a letter describing this attack an officer of the 18th Bengal
Lancers wrote:
We then occupied the captured trench sandwiched in between
the Grenadiers and Coldstream.… I have now seen His
Majesty’s Guards in action and fought alongside of them, and
I take off my hat to them. They can die like gentlemen,
without a groan. Four of our men were carrying a Guardsman
who appeared to be suffering considerably. I asked him who
he was, and he instinctively straightened himself as best he
could and said, “A Grenadier,” his tone implying how proud
he was to be one, and, what I also thought, “how magnificent
they were.”
The comradeship between the two regiments was later marked by the
presentation of a Grenadier Bugle, with an inscription, which the
Battalion gave to the 18th Bengal Lancers. Subsequently the Lancers
presented the 2nd Battalion with a silver statuette of a mounted
Bengal Lancer, on the plinth of which was the following inscription:
“To Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O., and Officers of the 2nd
Battalion Grenadier Guards, as a memento of Gauche Wood.”
On the return of Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Harcourt-Vernon went up
to the line, taking with him some ammunition and also a company of the
2nd Battalion Coldstream, under Captain H. Brierley, M.C., which had
been sent to prolong the right flank, still dangerously in the air. In
the afternoon a party of Strathcona’s Horse began an attack, and made
very little headway. Half a squadron came into the wood, but was
withdrawn later to link up the right of the Brigade line with the
remainder of Strathcona’s Horse.
Shelling continued almost without cessation during the rest of the
day, but no further enemy action developed, and about 10 P.M., in
heavy rain, the Battalion began to be relieved by the Deccan and Poona
Horse and one company of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, under Captain
Ridley, and marched back to bivouacs in Gouzeaucourt Wood. There it
remained until December 5, when the Guards Division was relieved, and
retired out of the area of operations. The casualties in the Battalion
were 153 killed, wounded, and missing; among the twelve Company
Officers who went into action, one was killed, one died of wounds, and
seven were wounded. The percentage of N.C.O.’s killed was also very
high, including many first-rate sergeants. Three field-guns and twelve
machine-guns, in addition to many prisoners, were captured in this
attack. The Battalion proceeded by train to Beaumetz, and went into
billets at Berneville, where it remained until, the end of the month.
The following officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant F. J.
Langley, Lieutenant G. B. Wilson, Second Lieutenant R. T. Sharpe,
Second Lieutenant C. C. T. Giles, and Second Lieutenant S. C. K.
George.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]
During the last ten days of October and the first week of November,
the 3rd Battalion was in good billets at Moule. During that time,
Lieutenant G. W. Godman, Second Lieutenant G. H. R. Hoare, and Second
Lieutenant E. C. Long arrived. On the 21st the Battalion was inspected
by the Duke of Connaught, and lined both sides of the Calais――St. Omer
road. On the 25th the whole Guards Division was inspected by the
Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.
[Sidenote: Nov. 10.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]
On November 10 the march south began, and the 3rd Battalion proceeded
to Enquingatte. On the following days it marched through Heuchin,
Hernicourt, Houvin, Bailleulval, Courcelles-le-Comte, Beulencourt, and
Le Bacquiere to Ribecourt, which it reached after a fortnight’s hard
marching. There the men had twenty-four hours’ rest, during which they
managed to collect a considerable amount of salvage, and on the 26th
they quietly took over the line, round the south-east edge of Bourlon
Wood, opposite the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, from the 3rd
Battalion Coldstream. That evening Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade
received orders to attack a front, extending from the village of
Fontaine-Notre-Dame to a point about 1000 yards east of the centre of
Bourlon village――that is to say, a front of about 3500 yards. The
intention to attack Fontaine was only decided upon at the last moment
after much discussion, and even General Sergison-Brooke himself knew
nothing of it till the afternoon of the 26th. The orders reached the
3rd Battalion only as it was on its way up to relieve the 3rd
Battalion Coldstream.
ATTACK ON FONTAINE
The first objective, which was to be the main line of resistance, ran
through the road junction at the east end of Fontaine to the northern
edge of Bourlon Wood. The second objective was the station and the
eastern outskirts of Fontaine, which was to become the outpost line.
The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was to be on the right, the 1st Battalion
Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards on the
left. The first objective of the 3rd Battalion was half-way through
the village, including the church on the right, after which it was to
push its outposts on to the road leading from Fontaine to La Folie
Wood.
As soon as Colonel Thorne received his orders, he rode off, and
collected the Company Commanders, as the Battalion was moving through
Flesquières. Detailed orders were dictated, and the maps were
carefully marked. Two hours later the Company Commanders overtook
their companies, and the relief began. No. 1 and No. 3 Companies,
under Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon and Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, were to
form the first line, with No. 2 and No. 4, under Captain
Beaumont-Nesbitt and Captain Hughes, in support.
The following officers took part in the attack:
Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. D. Ridley, M.C. Second in Command.
2nd Lieut. C. C. Carstairs Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. G. P. Bowes-Lyon No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. St. C. Cooper ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. C. Long ” ”
Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt, M.C. No. 2 Company.
Lieut. J. F. Worsley ” ”
2nd Lieut. C. B. Hollins ” ”
2nd Lieut. G. H. R. Hoare No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. C. Knollys ” ”
2nd Lieut. W. B. Ball ” ”
Capt. J. S. Hughes No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. W. Carrington ” ”
2nd Lieut. Sir J. L. Hanham, Bart. ” ”
Lieut. H. Dearden, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore Chaplain.
The night was bitterly cold, with snow and sleet soon after midnight.
At 5.30 A.M. Colonel Thorne, accompanied by the Intelligence Officer,
Lieutenant Carstairs, went round the line and found all the companies
ready for the attack, which started at 6.20, after a very short and
light artillery preparation. It was practically dark, and as the sleet
had turned to a steady drizzle of rain it was difficult to see more
than a few yards ahead. The tanks were late, but it was decided not to
wait for them, and the signal to advance was given. Directly the 3rd
Battalion left its trenches, it was met by a heavy machine-gun fire
from a small house 200 yards to its right front, as well as from the
line of trenches, just east and south of Fontaine, and began to suffer
casualties. On reaching the German line, the wire was found to be
uncut, and this, combined with the absence of the tanks, nearly ruined
the success of the whole movement.
In spite of these difficulties, however, Nos. 1 and 3 Companies got
through the wire, and captured the trench, but their losses were very
heavy. It was asking a good deal of a battalion to advance against a
number of machine-guns, with strands of uncut wire intervening, and it
was truly a marvellous performance to take the enemy’s trench under
such conditions. Actually Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon with No. 1 Company
managed not only to penetrate the wire, but to seize the machine-guns
in the small house.
Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, who was on the left with No. 3 Company,
was wounded in the face by a bullet, as he arrived at the enemy’s
wire, and Second Lieutenant A. C. Knollys took over command. This
company was more fortunate than the others, for after it had
penetrated the enemy’s wire and was entering Fontaine, the tanks came
up, and enabled it to secure the first objective without much trouble
or many casualties. The difficulty was the mass of isolated houses,
which were admirably suited for defence, and which provided good cover
for the enemy’s machine-guns. The first house on the north side of the
road held up the advance, until Second Lieutenant Carrington with some
of No. 4 Company came up in support of No. 3, and seized the house,
together with all its occupants. On the south side of the road the
enfilade machine-gun fire was terrific, and before the men could reach
the shelter of any house, Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt was killed. The two
companies in support now came up, and the Battalion continued from
this moment to fight practically as two half-battalions. No. 1 and No.
2 Companies suffered most, and all the officers and most of the
N.C.O.’s were killed or wounded. In the village it became a difficult
matter to distinguish between the houses held by the enemy and those
occupied by our men, and thus several parties were cut off.
After some very fierce fighting the Germans were slowly driven back
all along the line. Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon, who had gallantly rushed
on, was killed, and Lieutenant Worsley shared the same fate. The
remaining officers of these two companies were all wounded: Second
Lieutenant Hollins through the foot, Second Lieutenant Cooper through
the arm, and Second Lieutenant Long in the face and arm. A dozen men
of one party, without an officer, fought their way through to the
church, where they joined up with some men of No. 3 Company.
The first objective was now secured, although the price paid had been
heavy, and the village had to be mopped up. Here was another
difficulty: the companies were so weak that they could not even find
enough men to escort the prisoners they had taken. Then the ammunition
began to run short, and the supply of bombs became alarmingly low. The
enemy remained in possession of two derelict tanks, captured in an
earlier attack, and from the trenches just south of the village were
able to keep up a harassing fire. Captain Hughes, when he came up with
No. 4 Company, determined to push on, but could find no signs of No. 2
Company in the labyrinth of houses. He divided his company into two
parties, one of which he himself led to attack the trench on the
Cambrai road, while the other, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was
ordered to secure the Station road as far as the Crucifix. Both
parties secured their objectives, and began to consolidate their
position.
It was shortly afterwards discovered that the right flank of No. 3
Company was in the air. At the time nothing was known of the failure
of No. 1 and No. 2 Companies to carry their objective, and in
anticipation of their arrival a defensive flank of a sergeant and
twelve men with a Lewis gun was formed. The valley to the south of the
village was filled with the enemy, and under the wall of the
churchyard there was a deep dug-out full of Germans, one of whom was
so placed at the entrance that he could not be seen. Every time a bomb
was thrown from round the corner he fired at the thrower’s hand, and
managed to kill one man and wound another. As no phosphorous bombs
were available, a guard was placed over the entrance, and the dug-out
was left for future treatment.
But it was beginning to dawn on the remaining officers of the 3rd
Battalion that all was not well, since not only did no reinforcements
arrive, but the troops on the left seemed to be in great difficulties.
Colonel Thorne went round, and told all the parties he saw to hold on
where they were, until reinforcements came up, but the men were being
shot at from houses in all directions. A determined counter-attack by
the Germans, who seemed to be in some force, drove back Captain
Hughes’s platoons, and Second Lieutenant Sir J. Hanham was wounded,
but the tables were soon turned when the tanks came up, and poured a
terrific fire into the retreating enemy. Captain Hughes, who had dealt
successfully with a very complicated operation, was now wounded, and
Second Lieutenant Carrington took command of No. 4 Company.
The situation had begun to look very precarious. The houses in the
village, most of which were undamaged, might easily mask the advance
of considerable numbers of the enemy, and the men did not know how
long they could hold on to their position, without being cut off.
Although the tanks had done wonders in clearing the streets, as well
as the trenches along the embankment, they were of very little
assistance in the village itself, where so many houses were still
untouched by artillery fire. The enemy’s shells, which never ceased to
fall, combined with the snipers’ bullets, made the position anything
but pleasant.
Two companies from the 4th Battalion were ordered up, but the
situation demanded more drastic measures, and before these small
reinforcements even started, the enemy made very heavy counter-attacks,
first from the railway-cutting north-east of Bourlon Wood, on the left
flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, then against the junction of
the 1st Battalion Coldstream and 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, while a
third took place round the southern edge of the village. Colonel
Thorne decided to hold the village with three centres of resistance,
one from the cross-roads in the centre of the village to the south
corner of the village beyond the church, under Second Lieutenant
Knollys, the second at the cross-roads in the centre of the village,
under Lieutenant Mackay of the Machine-Gun Guards, with two
machine-guns, and the third on the left from the cross-roads to the
right flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, under Second Lieutenant
Ball. At the same time Lieutenant Carstairs was sent up with six men,
to get touch with Lieutenant Carrington, who with thirty men was
stubbornly holding on to the position he had gained.
These measures would have been very effective if it had been merely a
matter of clinging on till reinforcements arrived, but as these
depleted companies could not expect to hold their own for long
unsupported, Colonel Thorne determined to go back himself, and press
for more troops to be sent up. It now appeared that there was a gap of
nearly 500 yards between the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Coldstream, and that the enemy were creeping through. But so
intent were they on cutting off the Coldstream that they did not
appear to notice the Grenadiers, with the result that they were
heavily enfiladed. They retired precipitately, but their retirement
was only momentary, for in a short time they returned with two
machine-guns. At the same time Germans were reported to be advancing
from the north in large numbers, while the counter-attack against the
Irish Guards was developing with renewed vigour.
The position of the 3rd Battalion was now perilous in the extreme.
They were outflanked, and the enemy in front was visibly increasing in
numbers. Lieutenant Mackay with the centre party was forced to retire
before a large number of the enemy, and his withdrawal rendered the
position of both Second Lieutenant Knollys and Second Lieutenant Ball
untenable. Quite apart from the danger of being cut off, these
platoons were not nearly strong enough to resist any attack in large
numbers.
Thus No. 4 Company, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was
practically cut off, with the enemy already behind it. It had held on
under the impression that another brigade would come to its support,
but found itself in danger of being surrounded. So the men faced about
and fought their way back to the original line. No attempt was made to
hold the old German front trench, for it was without a field of fire
on the east, and the wire was all on the wrong side, while it could be
raked by fire from the buildings on the western end of the village at
a range of about fifty yards.
This, as already remarked, was one of the only failures in which the
Guards Division took part. This splendid Brigade had been practically
decimated, and no advance had been made. The first objective had been
taken, and in some places even the second objective was reached, but
all the work was wasted, owing to the failure of the higher command to
bring up any reinforcements.
The casualties were: Three officers killed and six wounded; while
among other ranks the total casualties were 270.
[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]
On the 28th the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st Battalion Coldstream,
and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards were relieved by three battalions of
Seymour’s Brigade, and remained in support in La Justice area. That
night the Guards Division was relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division,
and withdrew to Trescault, Metz-en-Couture, and Bertincourt.
[Sidenote: Nov. 29.]
[Sidenote: Dec.]
On the 29th Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade moved from Trescault to
Bertincourt. There they remained until the dramatic news arrived that
the Germans had broken through our line, when it moved to Gouzeaucourt
Wood, where it bivouacked in the open, but its services were not
required. On December 1, when De Crespigny’s and Seymour’s Brigades
attacked Gauche Wood and Gonnelieu, it was in reserve, and that
evening it relieved De Crespigny’s Brigade in the front line and
occupied chalk trenches, in part of Gauche Wood, and in bitterly cold
weather, with no coats or blankets, until December 4. During those
four days there was the usual amount of shelling, but no attack was
made by either side. On the night of December 1 the Germans brought up
teams of horses to remove two field-guns, which had been abandoned
within twenty yards of the trenches by Villers Guislain, occupied by
No. 3 Company, but were driven off by rifle and revolver fire. On
December 4 the 2nd Brigade was relieved by the 1st and 2nd South
African Regiments, and retired from the area of operations with the
rest of the Guards Division. On the 7th the Battalion moved to
Simencourt, where it remained till the end of December. The following
officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant W. A. Pembroke,
Captain N. C. Tufnell, Lieutenant C. H. Bedford, Lieutenant W.
Champneys, Second Lieutenant E. J. Bunbury.