THE CROSSING OF THE BROEMBEEK (THE GUARDS DIVISION)
[Sidenote: The Guards Division. Oct. 9-12. 1917.]
The crossing of the Broembeek and the occupation of the southern edge
of Houthulst Forest by the Guards Division was one of those
brilliantly executed attacks which are apt to be counted among minor
operations simply because of their success. There had been plenty of
time to make the arrangements, and General Feilding was determined to
ensure the success of the whole operation. The weather was an
important factor, as the ground was low, and there had been much rain.
If the Broembeek should become swollen by the rain, it would develop
into a serious obstacle, and the ground, already very deep in places,
might become a morass over which the troops would pass with
difficulty. Two patrols, which had gone out the week before the
attack, reported that mats would be necessary for crossing the stream,
but the weather fortunately improved, and on the day of the attack the
passage of the Broembeek presented few difficulties.
[Illustration: Broembeek Oct. 10. 1917.
_Emery Walker Ltd._]
General Feilding decided to hold the line with Seymour’s Brigade until
the 9th, and to carry out the attack with De Crespigny’s Brigade on
the right and Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade on the left. De Crespigny’s
Brigade was to cross the Broembeek from Panther and Leopard trenches,
and continue on either side of the Koekuit Road through Vee Bend to
its final objective, on the edge of the forest, from Egypt House to
about 800 yards east of Les Cinq Chemins. Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade,
starting from Craonne Farm and Panther trench, was to advance across
the stream through Ney Wood and Gruyterszaale Farm to Louvois Farm,
and a strong point beyond on its left, while on the right the group of
houses from Obtuse Bend to Suez Farm was to be taken, so that the line
up to the road to Les Cinq Chemins on the edge of the wood would be
secured.
Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour, who had to hold the original
line for the two days before the attack, placed the 4th Battalion
Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in the front trenches, and
these two Battalions had a strenuous time preparing accommodation for
the other two Brigades, and placing mats in readiness for the crossing
of the stream. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh
Guards had also to work hard forming forward dumps, and dragging guns
into their new position.
On the evening of the 7th the relief was successfully accomplished,
and De Crespigny’s and Sergison-Brooke’s Brigades moved up into their
assembly positions.
[Sidenote: Oct. 9.]
At 5.20 A.M. on the 9th the attack began. In De Crespigny’s Brigade,
the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion Coldstream advanced
after an intense bombardment, which lasted four minutes, and having
crossed the stream with comparatively little difficulty secured the
first objective. In Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade, the 1st Battalion Scots
Guards and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards succeeded in crossing the
stream, and reaching the first objective by the appointed time. They,
however, experienced some difficulty at Ney Wood, where the enemy had
posted a strong machine-gun nest.
At 7 A.M. the advance to the second objective commenced, and was
equally successful, although in De Crespigny’s Brigade the 2nd
Battalion Coldstream met with some resistance from a group of
block-houses at Vee Bend.
As soon as the second objective had been secured, the remaining
Battalions in each Brigade moved up, and passing through the leading
Battalions attacked the third objective. In De Crespigny’s Brigade the
3rd Battalion Coldstream and 1st Battalion Irish Guards advanced, but
found that their task was not so easy as that of their predecessors.
Concrete block-houses had to be disposed of, and in some places a very
determined resistance was encountered. The Newfoundland Battalion of
the 88th Brigade had been unable to keep pace with the advance of the
Guards Division, whose right flank was consequently exposed. But the
third objective was reached according to the scheduled time.
In Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Coldstream encountered little opposition, and seized Suez
Farm, where they captured two field-guns. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers
reached the third objective so quickly that it was able to open fire
on the Germans retreating into Houthulst Forest and inflict on them
heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion Coldstream had some difficulty
with a strong point at Louvois Farm, but after working round it
succeeded in effecting its capture, together with the forty Germans
who formed the garrison.
When the third objective was secured the two Brigades dug themselves
in, and prepared for the expected counter-attack, but, although the
enemy showed some signs of activity, no actual attack took place. The
position was maintained until the night of the 10th, when Seymour’s
Brigade took over the line. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers was placed on
the right, the 4th Battalion in the centre, and the 1st Battalion
Welsh Guards on the left. In order to improve the front line, and at
the same time slightly to alter its direction, General Feilding
decided on a farther advance. The Welsh Guards had to remain where
they were; the 4th Battalion in the centre had to advance a short
distance, and the 1st Battalion on the right had to go somewhat
farther. All this was successfully carried out under a protective
barrage, though the 1st Battalion found it difficult to maintain
contact with the 51st Brigade on the right flank.
The new line was held until the evening of the 13th, when De
Crespigny’s Brigade took over the line. On the 17th the Guards
Division was relieved, and retired for a period of rest. The
casualties in the Division amounted to 67 officers and 1899 other
ranks. The total number of prisoners captured was 28 officers and 1152
other ranks, in addition to 3 field-guns, 1 howitzer, 36 machine-guns,
and 9 trench mortars.
THE 2ND BATTALION
[Sidenote: Oct. 7-13.]
On October 7 the 2nd Battalion with the remainder of the 1st Guards
Brigade reached Charterhouse Camp between the Yser Canal and
Elverdinghe. The afternoon was spent in distributing fighting stores
to the companies who were to undertake the attack.
The following officers took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer.
Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon, D.S.O. Second in Command.
Lieut. F. A. M. Browning Acting Adjutant.
Lieut. J. C. Cornforth No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. S. H. Pearson ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. D. Stratford ” ”
Capt. Sir A. L. M. Napier, Bart.[2] No. 2 Company.
Lieut. the Hon. F. H. Manners ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan ” ”
Capt. C. N. Newton, M.C. No. 3 Company.
Lieut. A. W. Acland ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. White ” ”
Lieut. G. R. Westmacott No. 4 Company.
Lieut. R. A. W. Bicknell ” ”
Lieut. J. Tabor ” ”
Capt. J. A. Andrews, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Nos. 1 and 2 Companies took up their battle positions on the night of
the 7th, but the relief was long and troublesome owing to the sodden
and shattered state of the ground, and the night was cold and windy.
On the following day Nos. 3 and 4 Companies came up into their places
behind Nos. 1 and 2. The day was fine until 4 P.M., when a steady rain
commenced, which increased to a downpour, and continued until early
the next morning. It was a miserable night for the men who were going
to attack the next morning, and well calculated to depress the spirits
of the boldest. Rum and rations were sent up in addition to hot tea,
and everything possible was done to make the position bearable.
The condition of the Broembeek, which ran parallel to our front line,
was a matter for great anxiety. During the past week patrols had
reported it to be impassable at various places, and it was feared that
the recent rains had converted it into a serious obstacle. Both
companies sent out patrols to reconnoitre it during the night without
very reassuring results, although Lieutenant the Hon. F. Manners found
one or two points at which he was able to wade across. Mats and light
bridges were carried to the front companies to be used by the leading
waves of the attack.
The 2nd Battalion was on the right of the Guards Division, with the
2nd Battalion Coldstream on its left, and the 4th Battalion
Worcestershire Regiment on its right. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies were to
capture the first objective, and Nos. 3 and 4 were then to pass
through and secure the second objective. The capture of the third
objective was allotted to the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, which was to
pass through the Battalion after the second objective had been taken.
The line of advance of the 1st Guards Brigade was parallel to and 300
yards from the Staden――Langemarck railway.
There was no preliminary bombardment, but at zero hour, 5.20 A.M., an
intense barrage from 18-pounder guns and Stokes mortars dropped on and
beyond the Broembeek. It was considered of the first importance that
the effects of the barrage should not be lost by delay in crossing the
stream, but in the half light its exact line was not easy to
determine, and some casualties were caused by men pressing too close
to it. The stream proved far easier to cross than was anticipated, and
fallen trees, planks, and duckboards were of great assistance. The
German Division who held this part of the line appears to have been
taken by surprise, for it made a very poor resistance, and in places
where the crossing was difficult, the curious sight of Germans holding
out their hands to help our men out of the mud could be seen. Its line
was held by a series of posts, mostly converted shell-holes. In spite
of the line of advance being oblique to the trench from which they
started, No. 1 Company under Lieutenant Cornforth, and No. 2 Company
under Captain Sir A. Napier, managed to keep the direction, and the
advance continued unchecked. Minor adjustments were necessary from
time to time with the Battalion on the right, which at one time lost
direction, and swerved too far to the left, but the first objective
was gained and consolidated without any great opposition or serious
loss. No. 3 Company under Captain Newton and No. 4 under Lieutenant
Westmacott passed through, and advanced on the second objective. This
attack was equally successful, and this objective also was secured and
consolidated up to time. Both advances had been carried out with the
greatest steadiness and precision, and the skilful way in which the
N.C.O.’s handled their sections was remarkable. Although the task
allotted to the Battalion had been successfully carried out, its
troubles began after the second objective had been consolidated. It
had hardly had time to make the position secure, when the enemy’s
aircraft flying very low became unpleasantly attentive, and soon
afterwards it was subjected to a very heavy shelling from the enemy’s
artillery. Lieutenant Tabor was shot in the ankle, and soon afterwards
Second Lieutenant Stratford was wounded in the thigh. Captain Sir A.
Napier was slightly wounded, but remained at duty. The total
casualties in the Battalion were 33 killed, 123 wounded, 11 missing,
21 slightly wounded, total 188.
THE 3RD BATTALION
[Sidenote: Oct. 8-11.]
On October 7 the 3rd Battalion reached H Camp in Forest Area, and on
the following day moved up towards its assembly positions. There had
been heavy rain during the 7th, but on the 8th the weather improved.
The attack of the 2nd Guards Brigade was to be undertaken by the 1st
Battalion Scots Guards and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, who were to
seize the first two objectives, while the attack on the third
objective was entrusted to the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st
Battalion Coldstream.
The following officers of the 3rd Battalion took part in these
operations:
Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Battalion.
Capt. the Hon. A. G. Agar-Robartes, M.C. Adjutant.
Lieut. F. W. R. Greenhill Intelligence Officer.
Capt. J. C. Craigie, M.C. No. 1 Company.
Lieut. E. G. A. Fitzgerald ” ”
Lieut. E. W. Seymour ” ”
Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt, M.C. No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. W. H. S. Roper ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. Chapman ” ”
Lieut. J. C. D. Tetley No. 3 Company.
Lieut. N. Thornhill ” ”
Lieut. the Hon. H. E. Eaton ” ”
Capt. G. F. R. Hirst No. 4 Company.
Lieut. F. J. Heasman ” ”
Lieut. J. F. Worsley ” ”
Lieut. H. Dearden, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore Chaplain.
Patrols which had been sent out by the leading Battalion reported the
ground in front to be wet and boggy, but passable. Lieut.-Colonel
Thorne sent forward guides to make themselves thoroughly acquainted
with the assembly position, so that they might lead the Battalion to
its destination without delay. This comparatively simple task was not
without danger, and when Second Lieutenant Greenhill, who was in
charge of the guides, met the Battalion at Wood 15, his party had
already suffered six casualties. At 5.20 A.M. the attack commenced,
and the leading Battalions started off preceded by a barrage. The
Broembeek was crossed without difficulty, and the first objective was
secured according to the scheduled time. The companies in support then
passed through and captured the second objective. The 3rd Battalion
Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream received instructions not to
cross the Broembeek until the first objective had been secured. They
accordingly waited until 7.30 A.M., and then advanced. On nearing the
second objective the 3rd Battalion deployed with No. 3 Company under
Lieutenant J. C. D. Tetley on the right, and No. 4 Company under
Captain G. Hirst on the left. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies under Captain J.
Craigie and Captain W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt were in support. The moment
had now arrived for the two rear Battalions to pass through the troops
in front, and attack the third objective. There were, however, some
very strong concrete posts to be disposed of before the third
objective could be reached, and there seemed every prospect of
desperate fighting. The 1st Battalion Coldstream had one particularly
strong post to deal with, and by working round the flanks it succeeded
in effecting its capture. Barring the way of the 3rd Battalion
Grenadiers was a concrete block-house, the garrison of which no doubt
thought it held an impregnable position. Lance-Sergeant Rhodes
determined to silence the fire from this post, and most gallantly
advanced towards it by himself. His bravery was rewarded in an
astonishing manner, for the whole garrison of eight men surrendered to
him under the impression that he was the leading man of a large party.
For this conspicuous act of gallantry Sergeant Rhodes was recommended
for the V.C., the award of which was published on November 27, the day
on which he was mortally wounded in the attack on Fontaine in the
Cambrai offensive.
Nor was this the only notable act of gallantry during the advance, for
Lance-Sergeant Horgan and Lance-Corporal Unsworth, on reaching Suez
Farm, succeeded in capturing two field-guns and fifteen prisoners. The
Germans who took refuge in dug-outs were a constant trouble; in cases
where they surrendered at once, they were simply made prisoners. In
certain instances, however, when they imagined they were stronger than
their captors, some of them tried to fight their way out. In this way
three men of No. 4 Company found a dug-out full of Germans, and there
seemed no reason why they should surrender. The leading men who
emerged from the dug-out, finding their captors only numbered three,
determined to fight, but were instantly killed, and the remainder,
numbering fifteen, were made prisoners.
Thus the third objective was secured. Carrying parties with wire from
No. 1 and No. 2 Companies came up, and consolidation was at once
begun. Two machine-guns were also sent up to be placed at the strong
posts east of Veldhoek Cemetery. In the afternoon the enemy was seen
advancing down the Panama House――Faidherbe road, and they were
dispersed by machine-gun fire.
All through the day the Chaplain, Capt. Phillimore, behaved with great
gallantry, attending to the wounded and encouraging the men during the
advance――quite oblivious of the shells and rifle-fire. When it was
dusk the sad task of burying the dead had to be undertaken, and Capt.
Phillimore stood up with his head uncovered, and read the service.
Although the shells fell unpleasantly close to the burial-ground,
which was in the open, he refused to shorten the service in any way,
and when one of the men silently handed him a helmet, he merely shook
his head, and continued to read the service as if there were no
shells.
During the 10th the 3rd Battalion remained in the line they had
captured. About 4.30 A.M. the Germans put down a heavy barrage on our
line, but no infantry attack developed, and the remainder of the day
was quiet. Before nightfall the Battalion established two strong posts
on the road east of Faidherbe Cross-roads, and that night, relieved by
the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards, it retired to H Camp.
Lieutenant F. W. R. Greenhill and Lieutenant J. C. D. Tetley were
killed, and Second Lieutenant W. H. S. Roper died of the wounds he
received. Lieutenant N. Thornhill and Lieutenant E. G. A. Fitzgerald
were wounded. Among other ranks there were 13 killed, 61 wounded, 3
missing, and 2 slightly wounded remained at duty.
During the attack the Battalion captured 2 field-guns, 4 machine-guns,
2 trench mortars, and 93 prisoners.
THE 1ST BATTALION
[Sidenote: Oct. 7-13. 1917.]
Although the 1st Battalion took no part in the attack on October 9, it
had a very strenuous time during the preparations. All the men worked
every night for the five nights previous to the attack, and were
employed in forming dumps for the attacking Brigades, and in helping
to get the artillery into their forward positions in the Steenbeek
Valley.
On the 9th the 1st and 4th Battalions Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion
Welsh Guards were assembled in the neighbourhood of Wood 15. The
following officers of the 1st Battalion took part in these operations:
Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton-
Maitland, D.S.O. Commanding Battalion.
Capt. P. J. S. Pearson-Gregory Adjutant.
2nd Lieut. A. S. Chambers Intelligence Officer.
Lieut. D. H. S. Riddiford Transport Officer.
Capt. L. G. Fisher-Rowe, M.C. King’s Company.
Lieut. L. de J. Harvard ” ”
2nd Lieut. V. A. N. Wall ” ”
2nd Lieut. J. A. Lloyd ” ”
Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company.
Lieut. A. A. Moller ” ”
Lieut. L. G. Byng ” ”
2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth ” ”
2nd Lieut. R. Hall-Watt ” ”
Lieut. O. F. Stein No. 3 Company.
Lieut. J. P. Bibby ” ”
Lieut. P. G. Simmons ” ”
2nd Lieut. F. H. Ennor ” ”
Lieut. J. F. Tindal-Atkinson No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. C. C. Mays ” ”
Lieut. R. P. le P. Trench, M.C. ” ”
Capt. J. C. B. Grant, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
The attack by De Crespigny’s and Sergison-Brooke’s Brigades was so
successful that the services of Seymour’s Brigade were not required.
Owing to the strenuous work of the previous nights the men were
exhausted, and would have been glad of some rest, but the bad weather,
wet ground, and constant shelling made their position far from
comfortable. The German prisoners taken were employed in carrying the
wounded, but they were not sufficient for the purpose, and 100 men of
the 1st Battalion were told off to assist. Had it not been for this
impromptu assistance, the medical arrangements would have broken down
very badly. On the night of the 10th a relief was carried out, which
has an especial interest for the Regiment: by a curious chance the 2nd
and 3rd Battalions of the Grenadiers were relieved in the line by the
1st and 4th Battalions respectively. The line occupied by De
Crespigny’s and Sergison-Brooke’s Brigades was taken over by Seymour’s
Brigade, and the 1st Battalion Grenadiers placed all four Companies in
the front trenches.
The attack of the 9th had carried the Guards Division to its final
objective, but the troops on the right had not been so successful,
with the result that Seymour’s Brigade had taken over a salient more
acute than a right angle, which made the general plan for a further
attack rather awkward. On the evening of the 11th, Nos. 3 and 4
Companies moved up behind the King’s and No. 2 Companies with two
platoons of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which went to Egypt House.
These two platoons had been specially detailed to get in touch with
the 51st Brigade, which had met with so much opposition that it was
unable to advance. During the night the enemy put down a heavy
gas-shell barrage on the front line, and caused a large number of
casualties. On the 12th a further attack was commenced, and the
British barrage proved to be irregular and ragged, in marked contrast
to the excellent barrages of July 31 and October 9. Under this barrage
the 1st Battalion moved up to its objective, which it successfully
captured. Lieutenant J. P. Bibby was killed as he advanced with No. 3
Company, and there were a good many casualties among other ranks.
Unfortunately the Officer Commanding the two platoons of Scots Guards
was killed, and Second Lieutenant L. G. Byng was sent to take his
place.
Although the Battalions from the 51st Brigade reported themselves on
their objectives, the contact patrols which were sent out failed to
find any trace of them. It was afterwards found that this Brigade had
reached its objective, passing over many Germans in doing so, and had
swerved away too far to the right. Early in the morning the 1st
Battalion reported a field-gun in action on the edge of the forest a
few hundred yards in front of it. In response to an appeal for
assistance, our artillery applied destructive fire to the spot
indicated, and put down a box barrage to enable the patrols to go
forward and destroy the gun, but owing to the hostile sniping this was
impossible. On the night of the 12th the Battalion succeeded in
clearing up the situation on the right, and getting in touch with the
51st Brigade. The following day it was relieved by De Crespigny’s
Brigade, which now took over the line. During the relief Second
Lieutenant R. Hall-Watt was killed, and Captain Rhodes was wounded,
but remained at duty. The casualties among other ranks were 36 killed
and 200 wounded or missing.
THE 4TH BATTALION
[Sidenote: Oct. 7-13.]
For two days previous to the 7th, the 4th Battalion had been working
in the trenches in the front line and carrying up material to the
dumps. On the night of the 6th a large fatigue party under Lieutenant
Nash had worked for six hours with water and mud up to their waists,
endeavouring to lay mat crossings over the marsh. The following day
Lord Gort took round representatives of the 1st Guards Brigade, which
was to use these mats during the attack, and showed them the positions
of the bridges which had been made. Unfortunately in the early morning
many of them had been destroyed, and Lieutenant Nash was again at work
repairing them and relaying others. On the night of the 7th the 4th
Battalion was relieved, and retired to Dulwich Camp near Bluet Farm.
The following officers took part in the operations from the 9th to the
12th October:
Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O.,
M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer.
Capt. G. C. Sloane-Stanley Adjutant.
Lieut. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer.
Capt. J. N. F. Pixley No. 1 Company.
2nd Lieut. E. H. Tuckwell ” ”
2nd Lieut. T. T. Pryce, M.C. No. 2 Company.
2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ”
2nd Lieut. H. W. Windeler ” ”
Capt. J. B. M. Burke No. 3 Company.
Lieut. C. S. Nash ” ”
2nd Lieut. D. J. Knight ” ”
Lieut. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 4 Company.
Lieut. E. B. D. Hoare ” ”
Lieut. N. R. Abbey ” ”
Capt. N. Grellier, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
On the 9th Seymour’s Brigade was not called upon to fight, and after
reaching Wood 15 remained in shell-holes and abandoned gun-pits.
Lieutenant Ingleby, the acting Quartermaster, brought up hot soup in
the morning, and bivouac sheets were given to the men to protect them
from the rain which now came down heavily. On October 10 the 3rd
Brigade was sent up to take over the whole line, and relieve the other
two Guards Brigades. The 4th Battalion was to be in the centre, with
the 1st Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the 1st Battalion Welsh
Guards on the left, and the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in reserve.
Lieut.-Colonel Lord Gort and Lieut.-Colonel Maitland went up to
ascertain the exact positions their Battalions were to take up, and as
there seemed a good deal of uncertainty about the position on the
right, the Brigade-Major suggested they should wait until the contact
aeroplane had dropped its report. This would have entailed some delay,
and the Commanding Officers decided to bring up their Battalions at
once to Vee Bend. In order to ensure the close co-operation of the 1st
and 4th Battalions, it was agreed to have one Headquarters for both
Battalions. On arrival in the front line, No. 3 Company under Captain
Burke, and No. 2 under Second Lieutenant Pryce, were placed in the
front line with the remainder in reserve. The relief was arduous, as
the ground was a mass of shell-holes full of water, with the sides
slipping and crumbling. On the 11th detailed orders for the attacks on
the next day were issued, and the position of the enemy was carefully
studied. In the morning German aircraft came over flying at 300 feet:
the pilots were clearly visible leaning over the edge of their
fuselages, and dropping Véry lights on to the trenches to indicate
them to their artillery. They were received with a fusillade of
Lewis-gun and rifle fire, and No. 3 Company succeeded in bringing one
down in flames at the southern end of Houthulst Forest; but the
enemy’s artillery had received sufficient information to shell the
front trenches with considerable accuracy, and shells began to fall in
large numbers. That night a good deal of difficulty was experienced in
bringing up the rations, for it was extremely dark and the mud on the
sand-bags made it almost impossible to distinguish the marking. No. 4
Company under Lieutenant H. H. Sloane-Stanley were told off for this
task, and worked very hard under great difficulties. Sergeant Billings
of No. 3 Company, observing an enemy patrol approaching our lines, ran
out and captured the officer and his orderly, from whom much valuable
information and some maps were secured.
At 5.25 A.M. on October 12 the attack was launched. The task allotted
to Seymour’s Brigade was small compared with that of the troops on the
right, as the direction of the advance of the Division was half left.
Nos. 2 and 3 Companies under Second Lieutenant Pryce and Captain Burke
consolidated their positions on the new objective during the previous
night, although No. 3 Company had to withdraw to its original line at
daybreak, as it was in the direct line of the creeping barrage. The
Welsh Guards on the left remained stationary while the forward
movement was being made on the right, and No. 3 Company of the 4th
Battalion had only to go about 100 yards, so that these units were in
position before zero hour. The object of the attack was to bring the
whole line to within 150 yards of Houthulst Forest. As soon as our
barrage came down, two platoons of No. 3 under Lieutenant Nash
advanced and captured their objective with comparative ease, while two
platoons from No. 1 Company occupied the old front line in close
support. Not long afterwards Lieutenant Pryce reported that his two
platoons had also reached their destination. The whole advance had
been attended with but few casualties, as the enemy offered very
little opposition. While coming up to inspect his two front platoons,
Captain Pixley was killed by snipers, who had been left behind when
the enemy retired to harass the advance. Any movement immediately drew
the fire of these snipers, and after some of them had been located and
killed it was easier to move about. About 11.30 A.M. the enemy’s
barrage died down, and as there were no signs of any counter-attack,
the rest of the day was spent in consolidating the position and in
attending to the wounded. Two patrols were sent out into the fringes
of Houthulst Forest, and returned with reports of the enemy’s defences
and the condition of the ground, obtained from some prisoners they
captured. Since it was clear that the enemy knew the range of the
taped tracks, repeated hits having been registered on it, a party was
detailed to lay out a new course on the 13th. The construction of this
course was fully justified later by the absence of casualties when the
Battalion was relieved. Including the two days in bivouacs on the east
side of the canal, the Battalion had spent seven days in the open,
exposed to the rain, and lying on waterlogged ground with little or no
shelter.
The total casualties in the Battalion were 20 killed, 4 missing, and
64 wounded. On the night of the 13th the Battalion was relieved, and
travelled by train from Boesinghe to Ondank Station, where it went
into billets at De Wippe Corner.