NAVAL BASES
The nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of
fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue
of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships.
In case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of
stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not
only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies
of destruction, but actual loss of vessels.
To furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up
energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases.
A naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a
very great establishment. In such a naval base, one must be able
to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms
needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate
military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition,
and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of
material and personnel. Inasmuch as a naval base is purely a means
for expending energy for military purposes, and has no other cause
for its existence, it is clear that it cannot be self-supporting.
For this reason it is highly desirable that a naval base shall be
near a great city, especially if that city be a large commercial
and manufacturing centre.
It is true that many large naval bases, such as Malta and Gibraltar
are not near great cities; and it is true that most large naval
bases have no facilities for building ships. But it is also true
that few large naval bases fulfil all the requirements of a perfect
naval base; in fact it is true that none do.
The most obvious requirement of a naval base is a large sheet of
sheltered water, in which colliers and oil-carriers may lie and
give coal and oil to fighting craft, and in which those fighting
craft may lie tranquilly at anchor, and carry on the simple and yet
necessary repairs and adjustments to machinery that every cruising
vessel needs at intervals. Without the ability to fuel and repair,
no fleet could continue long at work, any more than a man could do
so, without food and the repairs which nature carries on in sleep.
The coming of oil fuel and the consequent ease of fuelling, the
practicability even of fuelling in moderate weather when actually
at sea, subtract partially one of the reasons for naval bases; but
they leave the other reasons still existent, especially the reasons
connected with machinery repairs. The principal repair, and the one
most difficult to furnish, is that given by docking in suitable
docks. The size and expense of docks capable of carrying dreadnaughts
and battle cruisers are so great, and their vulnerability to fire
from ships and from aircraft is so extreme, that the matter of
dry-docks is perhaps the most troublesome single matter connected
with a naval base.
The necessity of anchorage areas for submarines is a requirement of
naval bases that has only recently been felt; and the present war
shows a still newer requirement in suitable grounds for aircraft.
The speed of aircraft, however, is so great that little delay or
embarrassment would result if the camp for aircraft were not at the
base itself. Instead of the camp being on Culebra, for instance,
it might well be on Porto Rico. The extreme delicacy of aircraft,
however, and the necessity for quick attention in case of injuries,
especially injuries to the engine, demand a suitable base even
more imperiously than do ships and other rugged things.
That the vessels anchored in the base should be protected from
the fire of ships at sea and from guns on neighboring shores is
clear. Therefore, even if a base be hidden from the sea and far
from it as is the harbor of Santiago, it must be protected by guns,
or mines, or both; the guns being nearer to the enemy than are the
ships in the waters of the base. An island having high bluffs,
where large guns can be installed, and approached by gradually
shoaling waters in which mines can be anchored, with deeper water
outside in which submarines can operate, is desirable from this
point of view.
Ability to store and protect large quantities of provisions is
essential, and especially in the case of ammunition and high explosives.
For storing the latter, a hilly terrain has advantages, since tunnels
can be run horizontally into hills, where explosives can lie safe
from attack, even attack from aircraft dropping bombs above them.
Naturally, the country that has led the world in the matter of
naval bases is Great Britain; and the world at large has hardly
yet risen to a realization of the enduring work that she has been
quietly doing for two hundred years, in establishing and fortifying
commodious resting-places for her war-ships and merchant ships in
all the seas. While other nations have been devoting themselves
to arranging and developing the interiors of their countries, Great
Britain has searched all the oceans, has explored all the coasts,
has established colonies and trading stations everywhere, and formed
a network of intimate commercial relations which covers the world
and radiates from London. To protect her commercial stations and
her merchant ships from unfair dealings in time of peace, and from
capture in time of war, and to threaten all rivals with defeat
should they resort to war, Great Britain has built up the greatest
navy in the world. And as this navy pervades the world, and as her
merchant ships dot every sea and display Great Britain's ensign
in every port, Great Britain has not failed to provide for their
safety and support a series of naval stations that belt the globe.
Bases are of many kinds, and may be divided into many classes.
An evident ground for division is that of locality in relation
to the home country. Looked at from this point of view, we may
divide naval bases into two classes, home bases and distant bases.
_Home Bases_.--A home base is, as its name implies, a base situated
in the home country. The most usual type of the home naval base is
the navy-yard, though few navy-yards can meet all the requirements
of a naval base. The New York navy-yard, for instance, which is our
most important yard, lacks three of the most vital attributes of
a naval base, in that it has no means for receiving and protecting
a large fleet, it cannot be approached by large ships except at
high tide, and it could not receive a seriously injured battleship
at any time, because the channel leading to it is too shallow.
Home bases that approach perfection were evidenced after the battle
off the Skagerak; for the wounded ships of both sides took refuge
after the battle in protected bases, where they were repaired and
refitted, and resupplied with fighting men and fuel. These bases
seem to have been so located, so protected, and so equipped, as
to do exactly what bases are desired to do; they were "bases of
operations" in the best sense. The fleets of the opposing sides
started from those bases as nearly ready as human means and foresight
could devise, returned to them for refreshment after the operations
had been concluded, and, during the operations, were based upon those
bases. If the bases of either fleet had been improperly located,
or inadequately protected or equipped, that fleet would not have
been so completely ready for battle as, in fact, it was; and it
could not have gone to its base for shelter and repairs so quickly
and so surely as, in fact, it did. Many illustrations can be found
in history of the necessity for naval bases; but the illustration
given by this battle of May 31 is of itself so perfect and convincing,
that it seems hardly necessary or even desirable to bring forward
any others.
The fact of the nearness to each other of the bases of the two
contending fleets--the nearness of Germany and Great Britain in
other words--coupled with the nearness of the battle itself to
the bases, and the fact that both fleets retired shortly afterward
to the bases, bring out in clear relief the efficacy of bases; but
nevertheless their efficacy would have been even more strongly
shown if the battle had been near to the bases of the more powerful
fleet, but far from the bases of the other fleet--as was the case
at the battle, near Tsushima, in the Japan Sea.
Of course the weaker fleet in the North Sea battle would not have
been drawn into battle under such conditions, because it would
not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. It was the proximity of
an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected
waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and
taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. Similarly,
if the Russian fleet in the Japan Sea had had a base near by, from
which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have
retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the Russian
disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by
the Japanese might have been prevented. But there being no base
or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative
fashion, and the Russian fleet was annihilated in deep water.
If a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was
the case in the battle of Manila, the effect would in many cases
be but slight--as at Manila. If, however, the more powerful fleet
were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and
might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful
fleet were actually victorious. The Japanese fleet was practically
victorious at the battle of August 10, near Port Arthur; but if it
had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would
have met the Russian fleet later with much less probability of
success.
Mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are
position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that
position is the most important; largely because resources and strength
can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature,
and cannot be moved or changed.
Mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind
were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is
continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases
from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies.
His arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases,
for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases
from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which
fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations;
whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations
may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of
a war. The position of a home base, for instance, as referred to
any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared
with its ability to fit out a fleet; while, on the other hand, the
position of distant bases, such as Hong-Kong, Malta, or Gibraltar,
relatively to the coasts of an enemy, is vital in the extreme. It
is the positions of these three bases that make them so valuable
to their holders; placed at points of less strategic value, the
importance of those bases would be strategically less.
Home bases are valuable mainly by reason of their resources. This
does not mean that position is an unimportant factor; it does not
mean, for instance, that a naval base would be valuable if situated
in the Adirondack Mountains, no matter how great resources it might
have. It does mean, however, that the "position" that is important
for a home base is the position that the base holds relatively to
large home commercial centres and to the open sea. New York, for
instance, could be made an excellent naval base, mainly because of
the enormous resources that it has and its nearness to the ocean.
Philadelphia, likewise, could be made valuable, though Philadelphia's
position relatively to deep water is far from good. "Position,"
as used in this sense, is different from the "position" meant by
Mahan, who used the word in its strategic sense. The position of
Philadelphia relatively to deep water could be changed by simply
deepening the channel of the Delaware; but no human power could
change the strategic position of Malta or Gibraltar.
Yet for even home bases, position, resources, and strength must
be combined to get a satisfactory result; the "position" not being
related to foreign naval bases, however, but to large industrial
establishments, mainly in order that working men of various classes
may be secured when needed. The requirements of work on naval craft
are so discontinuous that steady employment can be provided for
comparatively few men only; so that a sort of reservoir is needed,
close at hand, which can be drawn up when men are needed, and into
which men can be put back, whenever the need for them has ceased.
And the same commercial and industrial conditions that assure a
supply of skilled workers, assure a supply of provisions and all
kinds of material as well.
_Distant Bases_.--Distant bases have two fields of usefulness which
are distinct, though one implies the other; one field being merely
that of supplying a fleet and offering a refuge in distress, and
the other field being that of contributing thereby to offensive and
defensive operations. No matter in which light we regard a distant
naval base, it is clear that position, resources, and strength
must be the principal factors; but as soon as we concentrate our
attention on the operations that may be based upon it, we come to
realize how strong a factor position, that is strategic position,
is. The base itself is an inert collection of inert materials;
these materials can be useful to the operations of a fleet that
bases on it; but if the fleet is operating in the Pacific, a base
in the Atlantic is not immediately valuable to it, no matter what
strength and resources the base may have.
The functions of a home base are therefore those that the name
"home" implies; to start the fleet out on its mission, to receive
it on its return, and to offer rest, refuge, and succor in times
of accident and distress.
The functions of a distant base concern more nearly the operations of
a prolonged campaign. A distant base is more difficult to construct as
a rule; largely because the fact of its distance renders engineering
operations difficult and because the very excellence of its position
as an outpost makes it vulnerable to direct attack and often to
a concentration of attacks coming from different directions.
If naval operations are to be conducted at considerable distance
from home, say in the Caribbean Sea, distant bases are necessary,
since without them, the fleet will operate under a serious handicap.
Under some conditions, a fleet operating in the Caribbean without
a base there, against an enemy that had established a satisfactory
base, might have its normal fighting efficiency reduced 50 per cent,
or even more. A fleet is not a motionless fort, whose strength
lies only in its ability to fire guns and withstand punishment; a
fleet is a very live personality, whose ability to fight well--like
a pugilist's--depends largely on its ability to move quickly and
accurately, and to think quickly and accurately. The best pugilists
are not usually the strongest men, though physical strength is
an important factor; the best pugilists are men who are quick as
well as strong, who see an advantage or a danger quickly, and whose
eyes, nerves, and muscles act together swiftly and harmoniously. A
modern fleet, filled with high-grade machinery of all kinds, manned
by highly trained men to operate it, and commanded by officers fit
to be intrusted with such responsibilities, is a highly developed
and sensitive organism--and, like all highly developed and sensitive
organisms, exists in a state of what may be called "unstable
equilibrium." As pointed out in previous pages, the high skill
needed to perform well any very difficult task can be gained only
by great practice in overcoming difficulties and eliminating errors
of many kinds; and when the difficulties are manifold and great, a
comparatively small increase or decrease in the overcoming of them
makes a great difference in the results attained. An interesting
though possibly not very correct analogy is to be seen in the case of
a polished surface; for we readily note that the more highly polished
the surface is, the more easily it is sullied. Another analogy may
be found in the performance of a great pianist or violinist; for
a very small failure in his skill for even an instant will produce
a painful feeling that could not be produced by a much greater
failure in an ordinary performer. Another analogy is to be found in
the case of a ship that is going at the upper limit of her speed;
for a very minor failure of any part of her machinery will produce
a much greater slowing than it would if her speed were slower.
Perhaps apologies are in order for dwelling so long on what may seem
to some an academic question, but it does not seem to the writer
to be academic at all. Certainly, the "condition" of a pugilist, or
a fleet, about to fight, is not an academic consideration; and if
it is not, no matter which affects this condition can rightfully be
considered academic. The whole usefulness of bases is due to their
ability to put fleets into good fighting condition and to maintain
them in it; and it seems a very proper and useful thing to note that
the more highly trained a fleet is, and the more highly organized
the various appliances the fleet contains, the more difference
results from a falling off in the condition of its personnel and
material.
This shows the advantage of having a base as close to the place
where a fight is going to happen as may be possible. This does
not mean, of course, that a fleet should remain for long periods
within its base; because a fleet, like any other practiser of any
art, needs constant practice. It merely means that the closer the
base is to the scene of the operations or the actual battle, the
better "tuned up" the personnel and material will be. It also means
that this consideration is of the highest practical importance.
_Advanced Bases_.--The extreme desirability of having a base near
the scene of operations, even if the base be only temporarily held,
has led to the use of what are called "advanced bases." An excellent
and modern illustration of an advanced base is the base which the
Japanese established at the Elliot Islands about sixty miles from
Port Arthur, which the Japanese were besieging. The Russian fleet
could issue from their base at Port Arthur whenever the Russians
wished, and return to it at will. While inside, until the Japanese
had landed and attacked them from the land side, the Russians could
make their preparations in security and leisure, and then go out.
The Japanese fleet, on the other hand, until they had established
their base, were forced to remain under way at sea, and to accept
action at the will of the Russians; so that, although Port Arthur
was besieged, the advantages of the offensive, to some extent,
resided with the Russians. The establishment of the base did not,
of course, change the situation wholly; but it permitted a very
considerable relaxation of vigilance and mental strain on the part
of the Japanese, and a considerable easement of the motive power
of their ships. Naturally, the Japanese made arrangements whereby
their heavy ships could remain in comparative tranquillity near
the base, while destroyers and scouts of various kinds kept touch
with Port Arthur, and notified the base by wireless of any probable
sortie by the Russian fleet.
The temporary advanced base at the Elliot Islands was, as temporary
advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as
compared with the permanent bases at home. It fulfilled its mission,
however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required.
The strategic ability of the Japanese was indicated quite early
in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established
this base.
Of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words
usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance."
An instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary
is the island of Jamaica, and another is the island of Bermuda;
another is Malta, and still another is Gibraltar. These bases form
stepping-stones, by which Great Britain's navy may go by easy stages
from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or
going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that
the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress.
Viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the
strategic value of a certain position for a base is important,
no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and
the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations
make it good for offensive operations also. For instance, if we
wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point,
it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable
from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full
of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and
equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well
to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the
enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank,
and later against his rear and his communications. Naval bases
looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that European
nations place along their frontiers.
It is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of
all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several
directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more
difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a
longer line of communications that has to be protected. But this
weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant;
and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to
support them, because the longer are their lines of communications.
Distant naval bases, therefore, are vulnerable in a high degree;
they are vulnerable both to direct attack and to an attack on their
lines of communications; and the factors that help a base in one
way injure it in another. If a naval base is placed on a rock,
or a rugged little island that holds nothing else, and on which
a hostile army could not land, it is very safe from land attack;
whereas, if it is placed on a large and fertile island, on which
an invading army could easily land, it is extremely vulnerable
to land attack. But, on the other hand, the naval base on the
inaccessible island could be starved out by simply breaking its
lines of communications, while the naval base on the large and
fertile island might be able to survive indefinitely, even though
the communications were wholly ruptured.
The establishment of any permanent distant naval base is a matter
of great expense, even if the natural conditions are favorable.
But favorable conditions have rarely existed; and the expense of
establishing such bases as Malta, Gibraltar, and Heligoland has
been tremendous. An important consideration has been the fact that,
unless the base were made so strong that it could not be taken,
it might be better not to attempt to fortify it, on the theory
that it would be better to let a poor naval base fall into the
hands of the enemy than a good one. To this reasoning, the answer
is usually made that no base can be made absolutely impregnable,
and that sufficient defense will be provided if it makes the task
and cost of capturing the base greater than the base is worth.
This means simply that the more valuable the base is, the more
money should be spent in defending it; and that _it is worse than
useless to defend it by any means that is obviously too small,
in proportion to its value_.
It often happens that the places that have the best position are
weak in strength and resources; a notable instance is Gibraltar,
another is Culebra, and the most notable of all is Guam. None of
these places is fortunate in either resources or natural strength,
though Gibraltar was strong for the artillery of the time when
the base was established there. In fact, it is hard to think of
any place that combines in itself the three advantages of a fine
strategical position, large resources, and great strength. The
three attributes seem almost incompatible; for how can a base far
distant from its home be well placed with reference to attacking
the lines of communication of any enemy intending to attack the
home coast, and yet have its own lines of communications safe? How
can it have a sheet of water, just deep enough but not too deep
to anchor a large fleet in, with all of its auxiliaries extensive
enough to accommodate all the vessels and far enough from the sea
to be safe from gun-fire, and yet be on an island so small and
so rugged, that an enemy could not land troops near the base and
capture it from the land side, as the Japanese captured Port Arthur?
The natural strategic advantages of a large and sheltered sheet
of water seem to entail the disadvantages of a large island, or
a continent.
There seems only one way in which to solve the problem of where
and how to establish a permanent naval base at a distant point, and
that is the way in which the world's preceptor--Great Britain--has
solved it; and the solution is to select a place that has already the
advantage of position, and then add to it the artificial advantages
of resources and military strength.
This brief statement makes the matter seem a little too simple;
and so it will have to be modified by adding that the mere fact
of a place having a fine position is not quite sufficient, because
the place must be of such a character that it is capable of having
resources and strength added to it; a sharp pinnacle rock in the
middle of the Mediterranean, for instance, might have a fine strategic
position, and yet be unavailable as a naval base. Even here, however,
we must pause to note that energy and will could do much toward
making even a pinnacle rock a naval base; for we see the gigantic
fortress of Heligoland erected on what was little but a shoal;
and we see the diminutive water areas of Malta and Gibraltar made
to hold in safety the war-ships of the greatest navy in the world.
Despite the paramount importance of strategic position, we must not
forget that a naval base should have sufficient military strength
to be able to hold out for a long time against hostile operations,
as many bases, notably Gibraltar and Port Arthur, have done, without
the assistance of the fleet. The German base at Kiao-chau held out
for more than two months in 1914, without any external aid. During
all the time of siege, even if surrender is ultimately to occur,
the enemy's forces are prevented from being utilized elsewhere.
This condition was clearly shown during the siege of Port Arthur,
because the large force of Japanese troops required to conduct
the siege were urgently needed in Manchuria--to which region they
were sent as soon as Port Arthur fell.
From this point of view, naval bases again look much like fortresses
on the land; fortresses like Metz and Strasburg, that had to be
subdued before an enemy could safely pass them.
_Strategic Position of Distant Bases_.--Since the strategic position
of an outlying naval base is the principal factor that goes to
make its value, it may be well to consider what elements make a
strategic position good.
To make the problem clear, let us take a concrete case, that of
our own country, and consider what elements would constitute a good
strategic position for a naval base of the United States, leaving
out of consideration for the moment any questions of resources and
military strength.
In the case of a war with a nation that had only one naval home
base, it is clear that the best position for our distant base would
be one as close to the enemy's base as possible; because, if placed
there, our fleet, if it were the more powerful, could do more to
injure the enemy's fleet, or prevent its going out, than if placed
at any point more distant from the enemy's base; and if it were
less powerful, it could do more to cut the enemy's communications,
because it could attack them at or near their source.
A poor position would be one far away from both countries, and
far away from the line joining them. In the case of a war between
this country and Norway, for instance, a very poor position for a
naval base would be a spot near--say Juan Fernandez--in the south
Pacific.
In case the enemy country has two home bases of equal importance,
the best position for our base clearly would be one equidistant
from them, and as near to each as practicable. If the distance
from our base to a point half-way between the two bases is shorter
than is the distance to it from either base, then a fleet at our
base could probably prevent the junction of two forces issuing
from those two bases--assuming, of course, that we had a proper
system of scouting. Our fleet would be able to operate on what
are often called "interior lines"--a technical expression that has
great efficacy in confusing a simple matter. It is also assumed
that our fleet is considerably stronger than either of the two
separated enemy forces; otherwise our case would be hopeless.
If the two home bases of the enemy are unequal in importance, it
would seem that our base should be nearer to the important base
than to the other. More strictly speaking, it should be nearer
to the base from which the larger force may be expected to come
out.
If the enemy country have three or more bases, from which parts of
a fleet may be expected to come out, the question seems a little
more complex; but nevertheless, since the first duty of our fleet
would probably be to prevent junctions or a junction, of the separated
parts of the enemy's fleet, the best position for our home base
would be at a point about equally distant from them all, and as
close to them as possible. In the wars between Great Britain and
France in the early part of the nineteenth century, the base of the
British fleet for operations on the western and northern coasts of
France was as close to the enemy home bases as practicable--though
the base was England itself. For operations on France's southern
coast, the base was at Gibraltar, or some Mediterranean island.
That any country should be able to hold a distant base close to
the home base of a possible naval enemy might seem impossible,
if we did not know that Great Britain holds Bermuda and Jamaica
near to our own coast, and Hong-Kong actually inside of China,
all far away from Britain; besides Malta and Gibraltar in the
Mediterranean, nearer to the coasts of sometime enemies than to
her own. That the United States should own a base far from her own
coasts, and near those of other countries, might seem improbable,
were it not for the fact that Guam is such a base, and is so situated.
It is true that Guam is not strictly a naval base, because it is
not so equipped or fortified; but we are thinking now of position
only.
In case the enemy country has several home bases, and it is impossible
to have our distant base so near to them as to prevent the junction
of parts of a fleet issuing from them, the value of the base is
less than it otherwise would be.
In this case, which is the one in which our country is actually
concerned, because of its great distance from other countries, its
value becomes merely the usual value attaching to a naval base;
and the fact that the entire enemy fleet can operate as a unit, that
it can divide into separate forces at will near its own shores,
or send out detachments to prey on the long line of communications
stretching from our distant base to that base's home, necessitates
that the base be fortified in the strongest possible way, and provided
with large amounts of supplies. Its principal function in war would
be to shorten the long trip that our vessels would have to make
without refreshment, and therefore the length of their lines of
communications, and to enable our vessels to arrive in enemy's waters
in better condition of readiness for battle than would otherwise
be the case.
We have thus far considered the best position for an advanced naval
base, in the case of operations against one country only.
It seems clear that, if we are to consider operations against two
countries separately, and at different times, we should be led
to conclude that the case of each country should be decided
individually; in the case of wars with Norway and Portugal, for
instance, the best places for our two bases would be as close to
the home bases of those countries as possible; and even in the
case of fighting two simultaneously, the conclusion would be the
same, if the two countries were in widely different directions
from us--as are Switzerland and China. If we consider the case
of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however,
it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward
the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home
bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect,
allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions
of one fleet.
As the United States possesses no island on the Atlantic side which
is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests
for the immediate future lie mostly on the Atlantic side, it may
be well now to apply the general principles just considered to
the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under
actual conditions.
Imagining a war between us and some one European naval Power, and
imagining a war also between us and two or three allied European
naval Powers, and realizing the length of our Atlantic and Gulf
coasts, extending from Maine to Panama, a glance at the map shows
us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts,
the position on American soil which is the closest to European
bases is on the little island of Culebra, which occupies a salient
in the northeastern end of the Caribbean Sea.[*]
[Footnote *: The acquisition by the United States of the island
of Saint Thomas, about 20 miles east of Culebra, if accomplished,
will extend the salient just so much farther toward Europe.]
The only reason an enemy would have for entering the Caribbean
would be an intention to attack the Panama Canal region, or an
intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct
more or less deliberate siege of our Atlantic coast and cities. In
either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no
adequate base in the Caribbean; because its line of communications
north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times;
and seriously wounded American ships would have little chance of
getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long
trip to Norfolk or New York.
In case the enemy fleet should start from Europe fully prepared in
every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination;
and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it
would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended
station at Guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the West Indies,
say the Bay of Samana, and then establish a base there, unless we
had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the
United States would then find itself in the anomalous position
of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well
based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. Not
only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess
the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. The
situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left
Europe, would be that the Caribbean Sea would contain a hostile
fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely
resting on a base; while ours had no base south of Norfolk, the
other side of Hatteras. Our fleet would be in a position similar
to that of the Russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction
in Tsushirna Straits, though not in so great a degree; because
it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home
ports, and the personnel would be fresher.
In case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly
equipped, at a salient in the Caribbean region, say at Culebra, and
if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were
considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and
enter the Caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the
fleet would exert on its communications. Even if the hostile fleet
should pass Culebra, and establish a base farther on, an American
force based on Culebra would continue to exert this threat on the
communications between the hostile base and its mother country.
An American base--say at Guantanamo--would be very effective in
embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of Guantanamo, because it
would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from
Europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing
operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications
would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main
body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending
forces around that main body. The coming hostile force would push
before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage
of its auxiliaries and supplies. A defending force, operating from
Guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing
a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively
than a force operating from Culebra. Not only would the force from
Guantanamo have to pass around the main body to attack the train;
it would again have to pass around the main body to get back to
Guantanamo; whereas a force operating from Culebra could make a
direct attack upon the enemy's train, and then a direct retreat
to Culebra.
This comparison assumes, as has been said, that the matter of resources
and strength are not in question; that is, that they are equal in
our two supposition bases. But, as in practice they would not be
equal, the practical point to consider is how much strength and
resources can compensate for inferiority of position, and how much
position must be insisted on.
Of course, no correct quantitative answer can be given, except
by accident. The problem, unfortunately, cannot be solved by
mathematics, for the simple reason that no quantitative values can
be assigned to the various factors, and because no mathematical
formula now exists that expresses their relations to each other. It
may be pointed out, however, that if a position be good, strength
and resources can be artificially supplied; and that the cost of
doing this, even on a tremendous scale, is relatively small compared
to the cost of the fleet which the base will support, and in distress
protect. In other words, we may be able to form an estimate of
the relative values of bases, say at Guantanamo and Culebra, even
if we cannot ascribe arithmetical values to each, and compare
arithmetically those arithmetical values. If, for instance, we see
that a fleet costing $500,000,000, would, if it operated from a
base at Culebra, be 10 per cent more effective than if it operated
from Guantanamo, and that it would cost $20,000,000 more to make a
strong base there than to make an equally strong one at Guantanamo,
we should conclude that, since 10 per cent of $500,000,000 is
$50,000,000, it would be wise to spend that $20,000,000, even if
we had to forego the building of one battlesbip.
We should come to the same conclusion, if we realized that no matter
what their comparative values might be, a base at one place would
not meet our necessities, and a base at the other place would. If
a base at Guantanamo would not meet our necessities in case of
an invasion of the Caribbean by a naval fleet superior to ours,
then it seems idle to discuss the value of Guantanamo relative to
some other place, no matter how good the position of Guantanamo
may be, and no matter how nearly it may approximate to adequacy.
There is no real usefulness in having a naval base anywhere, unless
that naval base can accomplish the purpose for which it is desired.
A naval base is desired for purposes of war, and for no other purpose
whatever; and to decide on a position for a base without keeping
this fact clearly in view, is to act on an underestimate of the
situation, the folly of which has been pointed out in previous
pages.
We may conclude, then, that in deciding on the place for a distant
permanent naval base, on which the operations of a whole fleet
are to base for war, we should select the best site available,
even if military strength and resources may have to be added to
it artificially--unless in the case of any site considered the
difficulties of adding them are insuperable.
The last sentence may seem like shirking the whole question, because
it does not state what "insuperable" means; so it may be well to add
that in modern days few engineering difficulties are insuperable, as
the existence of the fortress at Heligoland shows. If the submarine
and the mine did not exist, the difficulties would be greater than
they actually are; because guns alone, no matter how carefully mounted
and protected, could hardly be expected to keep off indefinitely the
attack of a heavy fleet, or even to save from injury the fighting
and auxiliary vessels anchored in its waters. But the submarine
and mine combine to keep fighting ships at distances greater than
those over which ship's guns can fire, and reduce the amount of
fortification required on shore.
One of the principal sources of expense in establishing bases at
some points would be that of dredging out harbors sufficiently
extensive, while harbors sufficiently extensive are provided already
by nature in such localities as Samana. But, as pointed out before,
harbors on large islands can be taken from the land side, as was
Port Arthur; and adequate protection from land attack is, in many
cases, almost impossible if the enemy has command of the sea, as
a superior hostile fleet would have in the Caribbean; while the
hills and waters of Culebra and Vieques Sound could long defy not
only actual invasion, but any fleet attack.
This brings us face to face with the fact that it may be less expensive
to establish and protect a naval base situated on a little island,
even if an artificial harbor has to be constructed, than to establish
and protect a base on a large island, even if the base on the large
island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended
against bombardment from the sea. It would be cheaper, for instance,
to protect a base on Culebra than one at Guantanamo, or even Samana,
if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the
forbidding rocks of Polillo or Guam than on the large and fertile
island of Luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of
which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because
protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very
large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast.
Aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the
position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on
a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of
aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great
distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned.
It seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as
inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops,
by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of
disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and
while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition,
supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds.
_Co-operating Bases_.--Discussion of the relative values of positions
for bases, say in the Caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the
fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as
many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the United
States, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent
naval bases at both Guantanamo and Culebra, should such a procedure
seem desirable. The fact that each locality has advantages that the
other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in
those localities, would form a powerful combination. In fact, the
great value of the position of Culebra being its distance toward the
enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental
coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest
an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. Analogous
cases are seen in all the countries of Europe, in the fortresses
that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less
as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme.
Two bases, one at Guantanamo and one at Culebra, would in time
of war in the Caribbean, add a value to our fleet that might make
the difference between defeat and victory. The effective work that
a fleet can do is a function of the material condition of the ships
themselves, and of the physical and mental condition of the personnel
that man them. Fighting is the most strenuous work that men can do;
it calls for the last ounce of strength, the last effort of the
intellect, the last struggle of the will; it searches out every
physical imperfection in men, in ships, in engines, in joints, in
valves. Surprise has sometimes been expressed at the quickness
with which the Japanese defeated the Russians at Tsushima; but would
any one express surprise if a pugilist, fresh from rest, quickly
defeated another pugilist who, exhausted from long travelling,
staggered hopelessly into the ring? And how would the betting be
before a football match, if it were known that one of the teams
would enjoy a rest of twenty-four hours before the game, whereas
the other team would walk from the railroad to the ball grounds
after a trip across the continent?
These analogies may seem forced--but are they? A living animal
requires hours of rest and refreshment, in order that the tissues
expended in action may be repaired by the internal mechanism of
the body, and the food consumed be supplied from some external
source. A fleet is in exactly the same category, even when operating
in times of peace: and in time of war it needs, in addition, a
station in which injuries may be repaired--a station analogous to
that of the hospital for wounded men.
In the Caribbean it would seem necessary to successful operations,
therefore, to have two bases, one say at Guantanamo and one at
Culebra; the one at Culebra to be the principal base, and the one
at Guantanamo the auxiliary. Culebra, by reason of the great work to
be accomplished, and the engineering difficulties to be encountered,
cannot be gotten ready for several years. Reliance, meanwhile,
will have to be placed on Guantanamo; and as the coming of any
war is not usually very long foretold, the urgency of fortifying
Guantanamo stands out in clear relief.
The mutual relations of Guantanamo and Culebra are much like the
mutual relations of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and Guam--and so are
the joint relations of each pair to the mother country. Culebra
and Guam are the potential bases of the United States farthest away
from the coast in the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively; and
the nearest to countries in Europe and Asia with any one of which,
of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable.
Each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military
strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but
connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. The
line of communications of Culebra would, of course, be safer than
that of Guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an
enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of Guam
would be longer. Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor are both stations about
half-way from the home country to Culebra and Guam respectively; and
though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists
in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor has been fortified,
and Guantanamo has not--and neither has Culebra. This sentence is
not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying Pearl
Harbor. The Hawaiian Islands occupy the most valuable strategic
position in the Pacific, and Pearl Harbor is the most important
strategic place in the Hawaiian Islands; and it ought to have been
strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is
contemplated now. But the sentence is intended as a protest against
our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval
bases whatever, especially in the Caribbean.
_Distant Base in the Philippines_.--The difficulty of finding suitable
positions for bases is exemplified in the Philippines, for no suitable
island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago
itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet
would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for
destroyer and submarine attack. A possible exception is the island
of Polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of Luzon; and in
many ways Polillo seems ideal. The practical difficulties are so
great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is
so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless Guam
be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question
has been hardly even mooted. Polillo made impregnable, with Guam
defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications
several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case
of war with an active Asiatic power be reduced to the zero of
effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its
accumulated stores would be exhausted.
This sentence may be modified by saying that the time might be
lengthened by the occasional arrival of supply ships and colliers
that might come by way of the Mediterranean, or the Cape of Good
Hope, or any other route which approached the Philippines from
the southward; and it is possible that, in the unfortunate event
of a war between us and some Asiatic power, our relations with
European countries might be such as to make the use by us of such
routes feasible and safe. In view, however, of the conditions of
island possession in the Pacific as they actually are, and because
of the rapid and abrupt changes that characterize international
relations, the probability of being able to use such routes seems
too small to receive grave consideration.
_Other Bases in the Pacific_.--The Pacific Ocean is so vast, and
the interests of the United States there will some day be so great,
that the question of establishing naval bases, in addition to bases at
Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Guam, will soon demand attention.
The localities that are the most obvious are the Panama Canal Zone
and the Samoan Islands in the south, and the Aleutian Islands in
the north. A moderately far-seeing policy regarding the Pacific,
and a moderately far-seeing strategy for carrying out the policy,
would dictate the establishment and adequate protection of bases in
both the southern and the northern regions; so that our fleet could
operate without undue handicap over the long distances required.
The same principles that govern the selection of positions and
the establishment of bases in the Atlantic apply in the Pacific;
the same requirements that a base shall be near where the fleet
will conduct its operations--no matter whether those operations
be offensive or defensive, no matter whether they concern direct
attack or a threat against communications.
* * * * *
In view of the great value of naval bases, one may be pardoned
perhaps for a feeling of surprise that the United States has no real
naval base, home or distant. Our large navy-yards are our nearest
approximation to real bases. The yards at Norfolk and Bremerton seem
to combine the three factors of position, strength, and resources
better than do any other stations; though both are surpassed in
resources by New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. Bremerton has
the greatest natural military strength of all our stations; in
fact, it is naturally very strong indeed, because of the length
and nature of the waterway leading to it from the sea and the ease
with which it could be denied. Norfolk is fortunate in its nearness
to Chesapeake Bay and Lynn Haven Roads, and the ease with which the
entrance to the Chesapeake from seaward could be defended; but the
fact that it is only 18 miles from the Atlantic coast-line makes it
more vulnerable than Bremerton to the attack of troops landed by
an enemy fleet. The yard at Mare Island, near San Francisco, is
faultily placed as regards deep water; but dredging could rectify
this. The Panama Canal Zone has great facilities for repairs, docking,
and supplies; but it must be adequately fortified in order to be
a trustworthy base in the case of operations in its vicinity.
New York, by reason of its enormous wealth of every kind, its steamer
terminals, and its excessively vulnerable position, within gunshot
of ships out in the deep water (a position without parallel in
the large cities of the world) must, of course, be protected. The
cheapest way to protect it is to do so locally, by means of
fortifications, and other shore defenses. The only other means
would be by a fleet permanently kept near New York, a measure that
would be expensive beyond reason.
In case the enemy should inform us that he would reach the vicinity
of New York at a certain time, and in case he should fulfil his
promise, the fact that New York was properly strengthened would
not be very important; since our fleet would go there, and the
whole war would be settled by one "stand-up fight." But wars are
not so conducted and never have been. From the oldest times till
now, and even among savage tribes, finesse has always been employed,
in addition to actual force--more perhaps by the weaker than by
the stronger side, but very considerably also by the stronger. A
coming enemy would endeavor to keep his objective a close secret,
and even to mislead us; so that our fleet would have to take a
position out at sea, perhaps far away, which would leave our bases
open to attack by the enemy fleet or at least exposed to raids.
The most effective local defense of a naval base is a combination
of mine-fields and heavy guns, which also give protection to which
the wounded vessels can retire, as the German vessels did after
the North Sea battle. Unless such protection be provided, swift
destroyers can complete the work that guns began, as the Japanese
destroyers did, after the artillery battle at Tsushima.
In addition to their value in defending navy-yards from raids,
and in giving wounded ships a refuge, the military strengthening
of home bases, if such home bases are wisely placed near large
commercial centres, prevents actual destruction of those commercial
centres themselves, in case an attack is made upon them, either
in the absence of the defending fleet, or after that fleet may
have been destroyed. The line of engineering advance during recent
years, although it has greatly increased the offensive power of
war-ships, has increased even more greatly the defensive power of
land works. For this reason, it is perfectly possible to defend
successfully almost any land position against attack by ships;
and it is so easy, that not to do so, is, in the case of large
commercial centres, a neglectfulness of the extremest character.
One important reason, therefore, for placing a permanent home base
near a large commercial centre is the fact that the fortification
of one is also the fortification of the other.
Assuming that New York is to be defended locally, we can state at
once that the New York naval station can easily be made to be a
permanent naval base of the highest order, and of the most efficient
type. In fact, it can be made into a naval base better than any other
now in the world, because of the large sheets of water tributary
to it in New York Bay, Hudson River, and Long Island Sound; the
proximity of the sea; the untold resources in money, supplies,
and men that it could on demand produce, and the ease with which
it could be defended. To make such a base, it would be necessary
to fortify the vicinity of Coney Island and the entrances from
the ocean to the Lower Bay, and Long Island Sound; to deepen the
channel to the navy-yard, and to make clear and safe the waterway
from the East River to Long Island Sound. It would be necessary
also to enlarge the navy-yard; and to this end, to buy back the land
adjoining it, which the government most unwisely sold to private
parties about twenty-five years ago.
Owing to the position of Block Island, relatively to the lines
of communication of a hostile force coming from Europe to attack
our eastern coast, and because of the sheltered waters held within
it, suitable for small craft, the advisability of establishing a
small naval base there is apparent. With a suitable base there
and another on Martha's Vineyard, and the present canal from
Massachusetts Bay to Buzzards Bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole
coast from Boston to New York, including Narragansett Bay, could
be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. Our
own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate
at will near Sandy Hook, Block Island, or Massachusetts Bay; and,
which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base
near New York would be made almost, if not quite, impossible.
In case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from Europe,
which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the
summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at Norfolk,
Philadelphia, New York, and Boston would influence vitally the
condition in which our fleet would go to battle. Owing to the
traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the United States,
and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably
assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost
haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea
in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of
our shores. We have no reason to suppose that the ships actually
cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason
to believe that they will be ready. But it is inconceivable that we
should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force
that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out
many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea.
The ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the Delaware
or Chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national
defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of
defending New York, and combined with the greater damage that an
enemy could inflict on New York, mark the vicinity of New York as
the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our
coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from Europe,
or indirectly from Europe by way of the Caribbean. To meet such
an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from
their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have
had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies.
The first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent
our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of Nelson and
other British commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from
the ports of France. But in view of the great distance from Europe
to our coast, and the impossibility of preventing the knowledge
reaching us of the departure of the fleet (unless indeed all the
powers of Europe combined to prevent it), it seems probable that
no such issuing could be prevented, and that a very considerable
American force would have time to take its station out at sea,
prepared to meet the coming foe.
The home bases if properly prepared would exert a powerful effect
on a battle near them by equipping the fleet adequately and promptly,
and also by preventing a possible defeat from becoming a disaster,
by receiving wounded ships before they sank. The wounded ships
of the enemy, on the other hand, would have no base near by, and
only those inconsiderably injured could probably be gotten home.