RESERVES AND SHORE STATIONS
In the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the work of preparing
the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts: preparing
the existing fleet and preparing the rest of the navy.
The "rest of the navy" consists of the Navy Department itself,
the naval stations, the reserve ships and men, and also the ships
and men that must be brought in from civil life. As the department
is the agency for preparing the naval stations, the reserves, and
the men and ships brought in from civil life, it is clear that the
work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the
others. The work of preparing any Navy Department necessitates the
preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself
and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a
peace footing to a war footing; will be able to pass instantly
from a status of leisurely handling and supplying the existing
fleet by means of the offices, bureaus, and naval stations, to
the status of handling with the greatest possible despatch a force
which will be not only much larger, but also much less disciplined
and coherent.
In time of peace a Navy Department which is properly administered
for times of peace, as most Navy Departments are, can, by means of
its bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., handle the existing
fleet, and also these bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., by
labors which for the most part are matters of routine. The department
opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at
a certain time in the afternoon. During office hours the various
officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very
strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them.
The naval stations are conducted on similar principles; and even
the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine.
All the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that
men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours
for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements
for the future.
But when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. The
element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into
its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. In a routine life,
expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that
expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine
life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a
certain time. Surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected
things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. It is the office
of surprise to catch men unprepared.
Appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war
by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from
so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and
more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest
peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared
either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at
once. With whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight
in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin
on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will
depend on how soon they are gotten ready. In a navy, the active
fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the
craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added
to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that
they should be added immediately, which is impossible.
It is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as
quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential
that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the
tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible.
In other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active
fleet should be made as quickly as possible.
When the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men,
ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships
and men should at that time be ready for effective work. If the
ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being
out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having
been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men
not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerable time
will have to be lost by the necessity of getting the ships and the
men into proper condition--or else warlike operations will have to be
entered into while unprepared, and the classic _Chesapeake-Shannon_
tragedy re-enacted.
Therefore, the endeavor must be strongly made to have ready always
all the ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships
equipped for their duties in the fleet, and the men drilled for
their future tasks.
The matter of getting ready the navy ships that are in reserve
is largely a matter of getting the men to man them, as the ships
themselves are kept in repair, and so in a state of readiness,
materially speaking. At least this is the theory; and the successful
application of the theory, when tested in practice, depends greatly
on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept
on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the
vessels in reserve have done. The ideal conditions cannot be reached,
unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships
required to make frequent cruises. Of course, such a condition is
never met in reserve ships; there would be no reason for putting
ships in reserve if they were to be so handled. The more closely,
however, a ship is kept in that condition of readiness, the more
quickly she can be made absolutely ready in her material condition.
Unless one realizes how and why ships deteriorate in material,
it is surprising to see how many faults develop, when ships in
reserve, that are apparently in good condition, are put into active
service. Trouble is not found, of course, with the stationary parts,
like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving
parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and
gas tight at the same time--the parts found mainly in the steam
engineering and ordnance departments. Defects in the moving parts,
especially in the joints, are not apt to be found out until they
are moved, and often not until they are moved under the pressure
and with the speeds required in service.
Now "in service" usually means in service in time of peace; but the
service for which those ships are kept in reserve is war service,
and the requirements of war service are much more rigorous than
those of peace service. Objection may be made to this statement
by remarking that engines turn around and guns are fired just the
same in war as in peace, and that therefore the requirements are
identical. True in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be
forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels
in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of
deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea
under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full
service requirements. But when reserve vessels are mobilized and
sent into service for war, everything is done with the utmost haste;
and the men, being hurriedly put on board, cannot possibly be as
well trained and as ready to do skilful work as men sent on board
in peace time; and when reserve vessels get to sea they may be
required immediately to perform the most exacting service.
For all these reasons, it is highly desirable--it is essential
to adequate preparation--that vessels should be kept in a state
of material readiness that is practically perfect. Every vessel on
board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been
put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead
of an asset. She will be able to render no effective service, and
she will require the expenditure of energy by officers and men,
and possibly the assistance of other vessels, when their services
are needed for other work.
But the problem of how to keep reserve vessels in a state of material
readiness is easier than the problem of how to keep the reserve
men in a state of personnel readiness, which will insure their
reporting on board of the reserve ships quickly enough and with
adequate training. This problem is so difficult, and its solution
is so important, that in Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and
doubtless other navies, men are compelled to go into the reserves,
and to remain in for several years after completing their periods
of service in the regular navy. In this way, no breaking away from
the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed,
and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to
its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. Thus the
question of the reserve is a question that has been answered in
those countries, and is therefore no longer a question in them. If
battleship _A_ in any of those countries is to be mobilized, the
government knows just who are to go on board and when; and knows
that every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been
kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to
perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _A_.
The problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten
from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more
importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service
some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more
important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with
coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. Naturally, the
number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on
the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force
is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful
fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our Atlantic coast is
to be repelled. The difference, however, is largely numerical; so
that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part
in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate
number to meet a coast attack.
To receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be
made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the
seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself
from raids and similar expeditions.
The work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which
in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one
of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates
what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and
means. Logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans
to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns,
torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are
needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then
proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided.
This does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from
logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure
would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or,
through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining
from demanding as much as could be supplied. Logistics, of course,
does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order
that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation
between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent
conferences are required between the officers representing both.
The logistic work of expanding the naval forces to a war basis
may evidently be divided into two parts: the adding of vessels
and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active
fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense force, which will
be distributed along the coast and divided among the most important
commercial and strategic centres.
_Adding to the Fleet_.--Naturally, the additions to the fleet will
depend on the service for which the fleet is intended; that is, on
the plans of strategy. If the navy were to be gotten ready for a
definite undertaking, then the additions to carry out that undertaking
could be calculated and prepared; and of course this condition
does come up immediately before any war occurs. But in addition to
these preparations which are to be made at the last moment (many
of which cannot be made until the last moment), the staff must
prepare in the leisure of profound peace for several different
contingencies. Inasmuch as many of the additions will be needed,
no matter with what country the war may come; and inasmuch as the
same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there
must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which
modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. And
as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive,
no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our
coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree
(whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred),
it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding
the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to
special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it.
To carry out this plan, strategy must make a sufficiently grave
estimate of the situation; and logistics must make calculations to
supply the most difficult demands that the estimate of the situation
indicates as reasonable, and then arrange the means to provide what
the calculations show. If one has provided a little more than is
necessary, it is much easier to leave out something later than it
is to add more, if one has not provided enough; and one's natural
indolence then acts on the side of safety, since it tends to persuade
one not to leave off too much; whereas in the opposite case, it
tends to assure him that it is not really necessary to take the
trouble to provide what it might be hard to get.
_The Estimate of the Situation.--In no field of strategical work
is an accurate estimate of the situation more clearly necessary
than when it is to form the basis for the precise calculations
of logistics_. General strategical plans require a vividness of
imagination and a boldness of conception that find no field for
exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision
and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics
need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical
exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. Yet there
will be no use in working out the mathematically correct means to
produce certain result, if the real nature of the desired result
is underrated; there will be no use in working out laboriously how
many ships and tons of coal and oil are needed, if the estimate
of the situation, to meet which those ships and coal and oil are
needed, is inadequate.
The first step, therefore, in providing for the expansion of the
navy for war, is to estimate the situation correctly. The greatest
difficulty in doing this arises from a species of moral cowardice,
which tempts a man to underestimate its dangers, and therefore the
means required to meet them. _Probably no single cause of defeat
in war has been so pregnant with disaster as this failure to make
a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation_. Sometimes the
failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; Napoleon's
disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected Russian
campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this
may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with Napoleon.
But is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with
Napoleon? What professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was
ever more careful than Napoleon was, when dealing with problems of
war? Who was ever more attentive to details, who more industrious,
who more untiring? And yet Napoleon's plans for his Russian campaign
were inadequate to an amazing degree, and the inadequacy was the
cause of his disaster. But whether the cause was carelessness or
moral cowardice on his part, the fact remains that he did not estimate
the situation with sufficient care, and make due plans to meet it.
This unwillingness to look a difficult situation in the face one
can see frequently in daily life. Great difficulties seem to appall
some people. They hate so much to believe a disaster possible, they
fear so much to let themselves or others realize that a danger
is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them
"nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would
cause great exertions or great expenditures, that they are very
prone to believe and say that there is no especial danger, and
that whatever danger there may be, can be obviated by measures that
are easy and cheap to carry out.
If we yield to this feeling, we are guilty of moral cowardice,
and we vitiate all the results of all our labors. We _must_ make
a correct estimate of the situation--or rather we must estimate
the situation to be as grave as it is--or our preparations will
be of no avail. If we estimate the situation too gravely, we may
spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed,
and our preparations may be more than adequate. It may be that the
preparations which Prussia made before 1870 for war with France
were more than adequate. In fact, it looks as if they were, in
view of the extreme quickness with which she conquered France. But
does any military writer condemn Prussia for having made assurance
too sure?
_The Value of Superadequate Preparation_.--No, on the contrary.
The very reasons that make adequate preparation valuable make
superadequate preparation even more valuable. The reason is very
clear, as is shown by the table on page 284 illustrating the progressive
wasting of fighting forces, which the writer published in the _U.
S. Naval Institute_ in an essay called "American Naval Policy,"
in April, 1905.[*]
[Footnote *: I have recently been informed that Lieutenant (now
Commander) J. V. Chase, U. S. N., arrived at practically the same
results in 1902 by an application of the calculus; and that he
submitted them to the U. S. Naval War College in a paper headed,
"Sea Fights: A Mathematical Investigation of the Effect of Superiority
of Force in."--B. A. F.]
TABLE I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|
| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100|
|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100|
| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10|
|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990|
| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0|
|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| |
| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| |
|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| |
| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| |
|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | |
| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | |
|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | |
| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | |
|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | |
| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | |
| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | |
|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | |
| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | |
| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | |
|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | |
| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| | | | | |
| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| | | | | |
|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | |
| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | |
| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | |
|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | |
| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | |
| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | |
|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | |
| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | |
| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | |
|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | |
| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | |
| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | |
|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | |
| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | |
| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | |
|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | |
| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | |
| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | |
| | |etc.| | | | | | | | |
|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100|
| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10|
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These tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of
two contending forces change as the fight goes on. The offensive
power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at 1,000
in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at 900,
800, 700, 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and 100. These values are, of
course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they
are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two
forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is
always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of
two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical
factor is. Two forces with offensive powers of 1,000 and 900
respectively may mean 1,000 men opposed to 900 men of equal average
individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting
ability; or it may mean 10 ships opposed to 9 like ships, manned
by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean
two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships,
and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as
1,000 to 900. It may be objected here that it is ridiculous so
to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be
so mathematically tabulated. This, of course, is true; but the
fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for
supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of
high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value
of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this
factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as
indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors
that go to make them up.
Another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting
force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional
to the force itself; that a force of 1,000, for instance, can do
twice as much damage in a given time as a force of 500 can; also
that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions
that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it
can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one
hour, _provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same_.
Another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is
that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a
force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions;
that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under
given conditions, 1,000 men can disable 100 men, or 10 ships disable
1 ship, or 10 guns silence 1 gun. In the conflicts supposed to be
indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. It will
be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period
is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight.
In Table I, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the
penetrability are the same to each contestant. In other words,
it is assumed that the _effective targets_ presented by the two
forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit
at the same instant by like projectiles, equal injuries will be
done. In other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires,
say a 12-inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as
that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively.
For instance, if one force has 10 ships and the other has 9 like
ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one
ship will probably not hit another, the conditions supposed in Table
I, column 2, are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical
for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. Table
I supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change
until the target is destroyed.
As the desire of the author is now to show the advantage of having
a superadequate force, the following table has been calculated to
show the effect of forces of different size in fighting an enemy
of known and therefore constant size:
TABLE II
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3|
|--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|
|Value of offensive power at beginning. A | 1100 | 1500 | 2000 |
| B | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 |
|Damage done in 1st period by A | 110 | 150 | 200 |
| B | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 1st period A | 1000 | 1400 | 1900 |
| B | 890 | 850 | 800 |
|Damage done in 2nd period by A | 100 | 140 | 190 |
| B | 89 | 85 | 80 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 2nd period A | 911 | 1315 | 1820 |
| B | 790 | 710 | 610 |
|Damage done in 3rd period by A | 91 | 131 | 182 |
| B | 79 | 71 | 61 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 3rd period A | 832 | 1244 | 1759 |
| B | 699 | 579 | 422 |
|Damage done in 4th period by A | 83 | 124 | 176 |
| B | 70 | 58 | 43 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 4th period A | 762 | 1186 | 1716 |
| B | 616 | 455 | 252 |
|Damage done in 5th period by A | 76 | 119 | 172 |
| B | 62 | 46 | 25 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 5th period A | 700 | 1140 | 1691 |
| B | 540 | 336 | 80 |
|Damage done in 6th period by A | 70 | 114 | 169 |
| B | 54 | 34 | 8 |
|Value of offensive power at end of 6th period A | 646 | 1106 | 1683 |
| B | 470 | 222 | 0 |
|Damage done in 7th period by A | 65 | 110 | |
| B | 47 | 22 | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 7th period A | 599 | 1084 | |
| B | 405 | 112 | |
|Damage done in 8th period by A | 60 | 108 | |
| B | 41 | 11 | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 8th period A | 558 | 1073 | |
| B | 345 | 4 | |
|Damage done in 9th period by A | 56 | 4 | |
| B | 35 | 0 | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 9th period A | 523 | 1073 | |
| B | 289 | 0 | |
|Damage done in 10th period by A | 53 | | |
| B | 29 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 10th period A | 494 | | |
| B | 236 | | |
|Damage done in 11th period by A | 49 | | |
| B | 24 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 11th period A | 470 | | |
| B | 187 | | |
| | | | |
|Value of offensive power at end of 16th period A | 422 | | |
| B | 0 | | |
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It will be noted that if our force is superior to the enemy's in
the ratio of 1,100 to 1,000, the fight will last longer than if
it is superior in the ratio of 1,500 to 1,000, in the proportion
of 16 to 9; and that if it is superior in the ratio of 1,100 to
1,000 the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the
ratio of 2 to 1, in the proportion of 16 to 6. We also see that we
should, after reducing the enemy to 0, have forces represented by
422, 1,073, and 1,683, respectively, and suffer losses represented
by 678, 427, and 317, respectively.
Now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units
of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate
general guide. Two other factors of great importance enter, the
factors of skill and morale. Skill is perhaps more of an active
agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the
endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles
morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than
even skill. It is not vital to this discussion which is the more
important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale
are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds
of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and
inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in
most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree,
we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess
them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure
superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to
win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to
avert disaster.
The present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale,
while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and
react upon each other. Nothing establishes a good morale more than
does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill
more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale.
But superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in
merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case
war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in
preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. At the
present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood,
and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized,
that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for
extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success
are small. And as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also
realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and
skill of its forces are measurably greater than those of a probable
antagonist, no country and no alliance is apt to provoke war with
a nation whose armed forces are superior in number of units of
personnel and material; unless, of course, the nation is markedly
inferior in morale and skill, as the Persians were to the legions
of Alexander.
It is often insisted that superadequacy in armed force tends to
war instead of peace, by inducing a country to make war itself;
that the very principles which deter a weak country from attacking
a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one.
There is some truth in this, of course, and history shows many
cases of strong countries deliberately attacking weak ones for the
purpose of conquest.
Analysis of wars, however, in which strong countries have done
this, shows that as a rule, the "strong" country was one which was
strong in a military sense only; and that the "weak" country was
a country which was weak only militarily, but which was potentially
strong in that it was possessed of wealth in land and goods. Most
of the great conquests of history were made by such "strong" over
such "weak" countries. Such were notably those wars by which Persia,
Assyria, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Spain gained their pre-eminence;
and such were the wars by which they later fell. Such were the
wars of Ghenghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mahomet, and Napoleon; such were
the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by
which as nations they subsequently fell. No greater cause of war
has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes
of such a character that one was rich and weak, while the other
was strong and poor. Nations are much like individuals--and not
very good individuals. Highwaymen who are poor and strong organize
and drill for the purpose of attacking people who are rich and
weak; and while one would shrink from declaring that nations which
are poor and strong do the same, it may nevertheless be stated
that they have often been accused of doing so, and that some wars
are explainable on that ground and on none other.
The wars of Cæsar in Gaul and Britain do not seem to fall in this
category, and yet they really do; for Rome was poor in Julius Cæsar's
day; and while Gaul and Britain were not rich in goods, they were
rich in land, and Rome craved land.
Of course, there have been wars which were not due to deliberate
attacks by poor and strong countries on rich and weak countries;
wars like our wars of the Revolution, and with Mexico, our War
of the Rebellion, and our Spanish War, and many others in which
various nations have engaged. The causes of many wars have been
so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state;
but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that
were both rich and strong, as Great Britain and France are now,
have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart.
The reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become
not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. The
access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and
the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to
wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a
distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. For
this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to
aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression.
Physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical
fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to
abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think
they are attacked, or will be. The fact of being rich has the double
influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing
a distaste for it.
For all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when
making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war,
to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit.
The tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but
in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way."
This seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the
fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that
is reasonably probable. In the United States, this means that we
should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our
Atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous
temptation to any foe in Asia to make a simultaneous attack in
the Pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at
the same time on a cruise across the Pacific Ocean.
This clearly means that our estimate must include putting into
the Atlantic and Pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully
manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels
from civil life that will be needed. The vessels taken from civil
life will be mostly from the merchant service, and will be for
such auxiliary duties as those of hospital ships, supply ships,
fuel ships, and ammunition ships, with some to do duty as scouts.
For the purposes of the United States, therefore, the office of
naval strategy in planning additions to our fleet for war, is to
make a grave estimate of the naval requirements in both the Atlantic
and the Pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval
force between the Atlantic and the Pacific in such a way as shall
seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to each force; and
then to turn over to logistics the task of making the quantitative
calculations, and of performing the various acts, which will be
necessary to carry out the decisions made.
Objection may be made to the phrase just used--"to divide the total
force," because it is an axiom with some that one must never divide
his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning
part to the Atlantic and part to the Pacific, has been condemned
by many officers, the present writer among them.
This is an illustration of how frequently phrases are used to express
briefly ideas which could not be expressed fully without careful
qualifications and explanations that would necessitate many words;
and it shows how carefully one must be on his guard, lest he put
technical phrases to unintended uses, and attach incorrect meanings
to them. As a brief technical statement, we may say, "never divide
your force"; but when we say this, we make a condensed statement
of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as
a full statement. The full statement would be: "In the presence of
an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could
attack each division in detail with a superior force." Napoleon
was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of
an enemy's force, and he understood better than any one else of
his time the value of concentration. And yet a favorite plan of
his was to detach a small part of his force, to hold a superior
force of the enemy in check for--say a day--while he whipped another
force of the enemy with his main body. He then turned and chastised
the part which had been held in check by the small detachment, and
prevented from coming to the relief of the force that he attacked
first.
When we say, then, that strategy directs how our naval force should
be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific, this does not
mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would
be confronted with forces larger than themselves. It may mean,
however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall
be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other
ocean almost to zero.
Some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the
Atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the
Pacific to actual zero. Maybe contingencies might arise for which
such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition
exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain
small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas
those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in
protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. Practically
speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into
Atlantic and Pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal
in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests
on our Atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies
on our Pacific coast.
In estimating the work to be done by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, three
general objects suggest themselves:
1. To repel an attack made directly on our Atlantic continental
coast.
2. To repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the Caribbean,
preliminary to an attack on our Atlantic continental coast or on
the Panama Canal.
3. To make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation
of territory by a foreign government in the south Atlantic or the
Pacific.
_First Object_.--To repel an attack made directly on the Atlantic
coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to
the fleet with the utmost despatch. Owing to the keen appreciation
by European nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack
contemplated by one of them on our Atlantic coast would be prepared
behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be
allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking
force had actually sailed. For the force to reach our shores, not
more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at
mid-Atlantic islands to lay in fuel. It is very doubtful if the
fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the
commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. It is
possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report
the fact by radio, but it is not at all certain. A great proportion
of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report
it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because
of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with
a very considerable bribe." The probability, therefore, would be
that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from Europe, and
then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts.
This reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics
would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby
our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded,
would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might
indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. In
other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all
the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points
in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores
of Europe.
Of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy
will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships,
shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle.
Maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with
such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the
commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. Unless it is clear,
however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an
embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. The
issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything
will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be
spared that can assist in gaining victory. And even if the older
ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of
a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out
of the way, if need be. In case either side gains a conclusive
victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm;
but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both
sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may
then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements,
and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important
and may be decisive.
Probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places
of any value in the active fleet. These should be fully manned and
equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness
for them. One field will be in assisting the land defenses, in
protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending
submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense
system.
_Second Object_.--To repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish
a base in the Caribbean, preparation would have to be made for
as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of
invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such
early execution as would a direct attack on New York, yet the actual
establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages
to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent
it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and
despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves
many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder
by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been
established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon
it are much less productive of results.
The endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent
it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides.
Practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and
events on the largest possible scale may be expected. The operations
will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than
in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the
task of logistics will be greater. Actual battle between large
forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and
destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts
on shore--will be among the probabilities.
_Third Object_.--To send a large expedition to carry out naval
operations in far distant waters--in the south Atlantic, for instance,
to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in South America,
or in the western Pacific to defend our possessions there--calls
for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution,
but permitting a more leisurely procedure. The distances to be
traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so
difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time
to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so
evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of
preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured
without endangering thoroughness. Whether the projected expedition
shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate.
Troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the
difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed.
The critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only;
since nothing can be accomplished if the naval part of the expedition
fails to secure the command of the sea; and the troops cannot be
landed until it has been secured, unless the fact of securing it
can safely be relied on in advance. For these reasons, the troops
may be held back until the command of the sea has been secured,
and then sent out as an independent enterprise. This would seem the
more prudent procedure in most cases, since one successful night
attack on a group of transports by an active enemy might destroy
it altogether.
But whether a military expedition should accompany the fleet, or
follow a few hundred miles behind, or delay starting until command
of the sea has been achieved, it is obvious that the logistic
calculations and executive measures for sending a modern fleet to
a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite
period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. The difficulty
will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of
being able to secure a base which would be able to receive large
numbers of deep-draft ships in protected waters, to repair ships
of all classes that might be wounded in battle, and to store and
supply great quantities of ammunition, food, and fuel.
No expedition of such magnitude has ever yet been made--though some
of the expeditions of ancient times, such as the naval expedition
of Persia against Greece, B. C. 480, and the despatch of the Spanish
Armada in more recent days, may have been as difficult, considering
the meagreness of the material and engineering resources of those
epochs.
But even if no military force accompanies the expedition, the enormous
quantities of fuel, supplies, ammunition, medical stores, etc., that
will be required, especially fuel; the world-wide interest that
will be centred on the expedition; the international importance
attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall
underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a
long and steady finger at the necessity of attacking this problem
promptly and very seriously, and of detailing the officers and
constructing the administrative machinery needed to make the
calculations and to execute the measures that the calculations show
to be required.
_Static Defense of the Coast_.--But besides the mobile fleet which
is a nation's principal concern, strategy requires that for certain
points on the coast, where large national and commercial interests
are centred, arrangements shall be made for what may be termed a
"static defense," by vessels, mine-fields, submarines, aircraft,
etc., assigned as permanent parts of the defense of these points,
analogous to forts on the land. The naval activities of this species
of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of
their duty to defend. To guard these, and to get timely information
of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy
says we must get our eyes and ears well out from the land. To do
this, water craft and aircraft of various kinds are needed; and
they must be not only sufficiently numerous over each area to scout
the waters thoroughly, but they must be adapted to their purpose,
manned by adequate and skilful crews, and organized so as to act
effectively together.
The work of this patrol system is not to be restricted, however,
to getting and transmitting information. Certain of the craft must
be armed sufficiently to drive off hostile craft, trying to drag
or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to
add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must
be able to pilot friendly ships through the defensive mine-fields;
others still must be able to countermine, drag, and sweep for any
offensive mines that the enemy may plant.
Vessels for this patrol work do not have to be very large; in fact,
for much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they
were small, by reason of the ability of small vessels to turn in
restricted spaces.
It would seem that for the patrol service, the vessels of the Revenue
Marine and Lighthouse Service (coast guard) are ideally adapted;
but, of course, there are only a few in total. These would have to
be supplemented by small craft of many kinds, such as tugs, fast
motor-boats, fishing-boats, and trawlers. To find men competent
to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be
so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive
fighting ships. Good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men
would fit into the work with considerable ease, and in quite a
short time. Strategy declares, however, that a coast guard may
be needed a very short time after war breaks out; and that the
vessels and the men, with all the necessary equipment and all the
necessary organization and training, should be put into actual
operation beforehand.
Not only the fleet, however, but all the bureaus and offices of
the Navy Department, all the navy-yards, and an the radio stations,
recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, training stations, and
agencies for securing information from foreign countries, will have
to pass instantly from a peace basis to a war basis. To do these
things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged;
but if the General Staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges
measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried
out, and holds a few mobilization drills to test them, the various
bureaus and offices in the department can do the rest. If the fires
have all been lighted, the engine gotten ready, and the boilers
filled in time, the engineer may open the throttle confidently,
when the critical time arrives, for the engine will surely do its
part.
But if the proper plans have not been made and executed, the sudden
outbreak of war, in which any country becomes involved with a powerful
naval country, will create confusion on a scale larger than any
that the world has ever seen, and compared with which pandemonium
would be a Quaker meeting. A realization of facts will come to that
country, and especially to the naval authorities, that will overwhelm
them with the consciousness of their inability to meet the crisis
marching toward them with swift but unhurried tread--confident,
determined, unescapable. Fear of national danger and the sense
of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce
psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible.
Officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of
inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station
will do the same. No fitting answers can be given, because there
will be no time for reflection and deliberation. The fact that it
would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and
the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it
would be useless to do any less, will tend to bring on a desperate
resolve to accept the situation and let the enemy do his worst.
The actual result, however, will probably be like the result of
similar situations in the past; that is, some course of action
will be hastily decided on, not in the reasoned-out belief that
it can accomplish much, but with the feeling that action of any
kind will relieve the nervous tension of the public by giving an
outlet for mental and physical exertion and will, besides, lend
itself to self-encouragement, and create a feeling that proper
and effective measures are being taken.
Such conditions, though on a much smaller scale, are familiar to
naval officers and are suggested by the supposititious order "somebody
do something"; and we frequently see people placed in situations in
which they do not know what to do, and so they do--not nothing,
but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than
to do the thing they do do. Many of the inane remarks that people
make are due to their finding themselves in situations in which
they do not know what to say, but in which they feel impelled to
say "something."
Now what kind of "something" would be done under the stimulus of
the outbreak of a war for which a country had not laid its plans?
Can any worse situation be imagined--except the situation that
would follow when the enemy arrived? The parable of the wise and
foolish virgins suggests the situation, both in the foolishness of
the unpreparedness and in the despair when the consequent disaster
is seen approaching.
In nearly all navies and armies, until the recent enormous increase
in all kinds of material took place, the work of getting a navy
ready for war in personnel and material was comparatively simple.
This does not mean that it was easier then than now; because the
facilities for construction, transportation, communication, and
accounting were much less than now; but it does mean that the actual
number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number
of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that
the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated
construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have
done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies
have had their labors expedited or made less. On the contrary,
the very means devised and developed for expediting work is of
the nature of an instrument; and in order to use that instrument
successfully, one has to study it and practise with it; so that
the necessity for studying and practising with the instrument has
added a new and difficult procedure to those before existing.
Fifty years ago the various mechanisms of naval warfare were few,
and those few simple. In our Navy Department the work of supplying
those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau
was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its
particular quota. The rapid multiplication, during the past fifty
years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased
expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms;
the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the
increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for
handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and
methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and
for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of
details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds
of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about
not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus
assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously
the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured
that each bureau is doing its work. And it has brought about more
imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed
first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that
can be allowed for doing it.
Clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected
of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge
of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot
enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain
amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed
in addition. Clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance
to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere
technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally
the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not
to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a
technician.
A like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a
torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. The strategist,
by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a
certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it,
or does so to the best of his ability.
The statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two
sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division
does exist. This does not mean, however, that the strategist and the
technician should work independently of each other. Such a procedure
would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could
not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist
did not want, under a mistaken impression as to what the strategist
wanted. The fullest and most intimate understanding and co-operation
must exist between the strategist and the technician, as it must
equally between the architect and the builder of a house.
From an appreciation of such facts as these, every great Navy
Department, except that of the United States, has developed a General
Staff, which studies what should be done to prepare for passing
from a state of peace to a state of war; which informs the minister
at the head of the department what things should be done, and is
given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall
be able to do them when war breaks. This is the scheme which all
the navy departments, except the American, have devised, to meet
the sudden and violent shock of the outbreak of a modern war. _No
other means has yet been devised_, and no other means is even
forecasted.
The means is extremely simple in principle, but complex beyond
the reach of an ordinary imagination in detail. It consists simply
in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be
done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureaus
and offices that are authorized by law to do them, and then seeing
that the bureaus shall be able to do them in the time allowed.
The best way of ascertaining if the bureaus are able to do them is
to mobilize--to put into commission and send out to sea all the craft
that will be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with
a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief
to solve a definite strategic problem--say to defend the coast
against a hypothetical enemy fleet--the solution including tactical
games by day and night.
Before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire
naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises
of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of
training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills
that are difficult. The simplest of all the preparative drills--if
drills they correctly can be called--is the periodical reporting,
once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its
state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience
shows to be the best.
In the days when each bureau's preparation consisted of comparatively
few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do
the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance
to the secretary that--say all the ships had enough ammunition,
or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there
were enough enlisted men--would fulfil all requirements. But in the
past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold,
while the human mind has remained just as it was. So it has seemed
necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports,
to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest
any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought
to be done by only one.
Who should examine the reports? Naturally the same persons as decide
what should be done. The same studies and deliberations that fit
a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product
that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes
up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any
observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of
certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified;
and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any
bureau should or should not be adopted.
This procedure may seem to put the strategy officers "over" the
technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the General
Staff "over" a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an
idea seems hardly justified. In any well-designed organization
relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and
of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized,
for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey
the senior. But even this superiority is purely official; it is a
matter of position, and not a matter of honor. All the honor that
is connected with any position is not by reason of the position
itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must
have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue
to render in order to maintain it. So, in a Navy Department, the
General Staff officers cannot be "over" the bureau officers, unless
by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over
certain bureau officers. A procedure like this would seem to be
unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself,
who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by
law over the bureau chiefs.
The importance of the question, however, does not rest on a personal
basis, but a national basis. It makes no difference to the nation
whether Smith is put above Jones, or Jones above Smith; and in
all discussions of national matters it is essential to bear in
mind clearly not only that national questions must not be obscured
by the interjection of the personal element, but also that great
vigilance is needed to prevent it. For the reason that questions of
the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance,
questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude
themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main
object is to "make a living"--and as good a living as they can.
In the long struggle that has gone on in the United States Navy
Department between the advocates and the opponents of a General
Staff, the personal element has clouded the question--perhaps more
than any other element. Not only in the department itself, but in
Congress, the question of how much personal "power" the General
Staff would have has been discussed interminably--as though the
personal element were of any importance whatever.
Such an attitude toward "power" is not remarkable when held by
civilians, but it is remarkable when held by men who have had a
military or naval training. Of course, there is an instinct in
all men to crave power; but it is not recognized as an instinct
wholly worthy. It is associated in most men's minds with a desire
for material possessions, such as money or political position, and
not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. In other words,
a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable,
is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for
opportunity to do good service, is held to be commendable. So, when
public officials, either military or civilian, condemn a measure
because it will give somebody "power," the reason given seems to
be incomplete, unless a further reason is given which states the
harm that would be done by conferring the "power."
Military and naval men exercise "power" from the beginning of their
careers until their careers are closed; and they exercise it under
the sane and restraining influence of responsibility; without which
influence, the exercise of power is unjustifiable, and under which
influence the exercise of power is a burden--and oftentimes a heavy
one. That men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to
power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand--unless
it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates
its pleasing features more than its responsibilities, and regards
its duties more lightly than its glories. Few men, even those who
shoulder responsibility the most courageously, desire responsibility
for its own sake--and so the fact of a man ardently desiring "power"
seems a good reason for withholding power from him.
And what is "power," in the sense in which officials, both military
and civilian, use the word? Is it ability to do good service, or is
it ability to bestow favors in order that favors may be received,
to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience,
or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? Of course,
"power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. But if
a man desires power simply to do good service, and if he holds
a highly conscientious view of the accompanying duties and
responsibilities, will he crave "power" as much as some men seem
to do?
It seems fundamental, then, that any strategic plan for preparing
the Navy Department for war should be framed with a strong endeavor to
leave out the personal element, and should regard national usefulness
only. If this be done successfully, and if good selections be made
of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of
the personnel will think no more about their "power" than does an
officer of the deck while handling a battleship in fleet formation
during his four hours on the bridge.
In preparing the department for war, one would be in danger of
being overwhelmed by the enormousness and the complexity of the
task, unless he bore in mind continuously that _it is only when we
get into details that any matter becomes complex_; and therefore
that if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles
that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is
divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide
those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that the
whole subject will seem to fall apart as a fowl does under the
hands of a skilful carver. The divisions and subdivisions of the
subject having been made, the remaining task, while onerous, will
be largely a matter of copying and of filling in blank forms.
As all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the
actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the
necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus
and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for
forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should
such forcing become necessary. Strategy being the art of being
a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of
executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising
generalship without having executive power. It is true that strategy
occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and
it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers
march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains
and corporals who make the soldiers march. The general plans the
campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions,
ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give
the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry
out the general's plans.
Strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could
think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed.
Of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes
of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's
behests. Policy is the employer, and strategy the employee.