OPERATING THE MACHINE
The naval machine, including the various vessels of all kinds,
the bases and the personnel, having been designed, put together,
and prepared for its appointed task of conducting war, and the
appointed task having at last been laid upon it, how shall the
machine be operated--how shall it be made successfully to perform
its task?
In order to answer this correctly, we must first see clearly what
is its task.
_War_.--War may be said to be the act of two nations or two sets
of nations, by means of which each tries to get its way by physical
force. The peaceful methods of diplomacy having been exhausted,
arguments and threats having been tried in vain, both parties resort
to the oldest and yet the latest court; the same court as that to
which resort the lions of the desert, the big and little fishes
of the sea, the fowls of the air, and even the blades of grass
that battle for the sunshine.
The vastness of the issue decided by war, the fact that from its
decision there is no appeal, the greatness of the forces that nations
can produce, the length of experience of war extending through
8,000 wars, and during more than three thousand years of recorded
history, the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that
more brain power, energy, and character have been devoted to war
than to any other fruit of man's endeavor--combine to give to the
conduct of war an importance that no other subject can possess.
The thing that each side brings forward against the other side is
force; "that which moves or tends to move matter." In all ages, it
has been directed primarily against the physical bodies of individual
men, threatening each individual man with suffering and death. It
appeals to the primal instinct of men, self-preservation, and is
the _ultima ratio regum_, the last argument of kings--and not only
of kings, but of all other living things as well.
The first feeling aroused by the threat against life, or physical
well-being, is fear; and, therefore, the first force with which
to oppose the threat is a force of the same spiritual nature as
fear, but opposite in direction. This force is called in the English
language "courage." Without courage every man and every nation
would be at the mercy of every man or nation that made a threat
against it. The inherent necessity for courage is thus apparent;
and the reason is therefore apparent, for the fact that in every
nation and tribe physical courage has been esteemed the greatest
virtue in a man. In Latin, we know, the word _virtus_ meant courage,
and also virtue--showing that the Romans held the two qualities
to be identical or similar.
In discussing the operations of war, little is usually said of
courage. The reason, however, is not that its value is unrecognized,
but that its existence is assumed; in the same way as that in which
all the other faculties among the men are assumed, such as physical
health, ability to march, etc. Movements to inspire fear, however,
actions to break down the morale, are of frequent use; because,
if the morale of the opposing side is broken down, its power of
resistance is destroyed.
In the operations, therefore, of two contending parties, force is
opposed by force. If the forces on both sides could be concentrated
at a single point, and exerted in opposite directions, the result
would be decided in an instant. Such an arrangement has never yet
been brought about; though fairly close approximations have been
made, when two parties have selected two champions who have fought
for them--the victory going by agreement to the side whose champion
became the victor.
Barring such rare occasions, contests in war have usually been
between two forces spread over considerable areas of land or water;
and the contest has usually been decided by the defeat of one of
the two. If in any individual combat, all the forces possessed
by both sides had been engaged, and if either force had been
annihilated, the entire war between the two parties would have
been decided. This was nearly the case in the naval battle off
Tsushima between the Russian and Japanese fleets--and the treaty
of peace was signed soon after. Usually, however, neither party to
the quarrel has had all its forces on the field in any one battle,
and neither force in the battle has been annihilated. Usually,
only partial forces have been engaged, and only partial victories
have been won; with the result that wars between contending nations
have usually consisted of a series of battles, with intervals of
rest between.
If two opposing forces in any battle were exactly equal in fighting
power, neither side in any battle would gain a victory, the two
sides would inflict identical amounts of damage on each other, and
the two sides would end the battle still equal in force. At rare
intervals, such conditions have been approximated; but usually one
side has had more fighting power than the other, and has inflicted
more damage of various kinds than it has received, with the result
that it attained an advantage more or less important over the other,
and with the further result that the original disproportion between
the two forces was increased. The increase may not necessarily
have been due to a greater number of killed and wounded or even
to a greater loss of material, such as guns or ships; there may
have been no increase in inequality in either of these ways, for
the increase in inequality may have consisted in the fact that
the weaker force was driven to a position less advantageous to it
for conducting operations in the future. But whatever the nature
of the advantage gained by the stronger side, the result has been
that the weaker side has come out of the battle relatively weaker
than it was before.
For this reason, it is highly desirable to each side to win each
battle. This does not mean that the loss of any one battle by either
party to a war means that the party losing that battle will necessarily
lose the war; for many battles may be fought by such small portions
of the whole nations' forces, or be lost by such small margins that
the loss of one battle, or even several battles, may be retrieved;
in fact, in few wars have the victories been all on one side. It
does mean, however, that each lost battle is a backward step; and
that for this reason the effort must be that no battle shall be
lost.
_Strategy and Tactics_.--Now, to win battles, two things combine,
strategy and tactics. The strategy of each side tries to arrange
matters so that the forces on its side shall enter each battle
with the greatest chance of victory; tactics tries to handle the
forces with which it enters a battle in such a way that its side
shall gain the victory. Strategy prepares for battles; tactics
fights them.
The tactics of any battle must be in the hands of the
commanders-in-chief on both sides. Any other arrangement is
inconceivable; but the strategy controlling the series of battles
in any war cannot now be committed to them solely; though it was
usually committed to them until lately. In the days when Alexander
went to war, or even when Napoleon and Nelson went to war, twenty-one
centuries later, no telegraph by sea and land made swift communication
possible; and the commanders on the spot were the only ones in
possession of enough information about the contending forces to
decide what measures should be taken. Even in those days, however,
the capitals of the countries engaged in war, by reason of their
knowledge of what was passing in the way of policy, exerted an
influence on the strategy of the forces on both sea and land; Cæsar,
for instance, was embarrassed in many of his operations by the Roman
Senate, and it was for this reason that he crossed the Rubicon
and passed from Gaul into Italy. When William I and Napoleon III
went to war in 1870, however, Von Moltke had foreseen the effects
of the telegraph and of rapid-mail communications, in giving to the
headquarters of the army information of a much greater scope and
reliability than had previously been the case, and had established
a General Staff which had elaborated plans whereby not only would the
commanders-in-chief in the field have the assistance of information
compiled at headquarters, but whereby the general nature of the
operations of a war, especially those operations at the outset on
which the future conduct of the war would largely depend, would
be decided and laid down in advance and during times of peace. The
reason for the rapid victory of the Prussians over the French in
1870 was that the Prussians were better prepared in almost every
way; especially in the most important thing--the war plans.
Now, these war plans could not, of course, be of such a kind that
they would foresee every contingency and prescribe the conduct
to be followed, so that a commander in the field could turn to
page 221 of volume 755, and get directions as to what he ought to
do; nor could they furnish the chief of staff, Von Moltke, with
printed recommendations which he should offer to the King. In other
words, the war plans could be only plans and, like all plans for
future action, could be only tentative, and capable of being modified
by events as they should come to pass. They were only plans of
preparation, not plans of operation.
Yet there were plans of preparation for operations; plans prepared in
accordance with the principles of strategy, and based on information
as to the enemy's resources, skill, point of view, and probable
intentions. They formed the general guide for future operations.
Since 1870, the invention and practical development of the wireless
telegraph, and especially its development for use over very great
distances, has modified the relations of commanders on the spot
to home headquarters, and especially of naval commanders to their
navy departments. The wireless telegraph, under circumstances in
which it operates successfully, annihilates distance so far as
communication is concerned, though it does not annihilate distance
so far as transportation is concerned. It improves the sending and
receiving of news and instructions, both for the commander at sea
and for his department at home; but it does it more effectively
for the department than for the man at sea, because of the superior
facilities for large and numerous apparatus that shore stations
have, and their greater freedom from interruptions of all kinds.
This condition tends to place the strategical handling of all the
naval machine, including the active fleet itself, more in the hands
of the department or admiralty, and less in the hands of the
commander-in-chief: and this tendency is confirmed by the superior
means for discussion and reflection, and for trial by war games,
that exist in admiralties, compared with those that exist in ships.
The general result is to limit the commander-in-chief more and
more in strategical matters: to confine his work more and more to
tactics.
Such a condition seems reasonable in many ways. The government
decides on a policy, and tells the Navy Department to carry it
out, employing the executive offices and bureaus to that end, under
the guidance of strategy. Strategy devotes itself during peace to
designing and preparing the naval machine, and in war to operating
it, utilizing both in war and peace the bureaus and offices and
the fleet itself. And in the same way as that in which the bureaus
and offices perform the calculations and executive functions of
logistics, for furnishing the necessary material of all kinds, the
fleet performs those of tactics. From this point of view, strategy
plans and guides all the acts of navies, delegating one part of
the practical work needed to carry out those plans to logistics,
and the other part to tactics.
Operating the naval machine in war means practically operating
the active fleet in such a way as to cause victories to occur, to
cause the fleet to enter each battle under as favorable conditions
as practicable, and to operate the other activities of the navy in
such a way that the fleet will be efficiently and promptly supplied
with all its needs. Strategy employs tactics and logistics to bring
these things to pass; but this does not mean that strategy stands
apart and simply gives logistics and tactics tasks to do. The three
agencies are too mutually dependent for any such procedure and
require for their successful working, both individually and together,
the most thorough mutual understanding and support.
_Flanking, T-ing, etc._--It being a fact that no nation can put
a force upon the sea that is concentrated at one point; it being
a fact that every naval force must be spread over a considerable
area and made up of various parts, and that the efficacy of the
various parts in exerting force upon a definite enemy depends on
the unity of action of the various parts, it results that the most
effective way in which to attack any naval force is not to attack
all the parts at once, thus enabling all to reply, but to attack
the force in such a way that all the parts cannot reply. If we
attack a ship for instance, that can fire 10 guns on a broadside
and only 4 guns ahead, it is clear that we can do better by attacking
from ahead than from either side. Similarly, if 10 ships are in a
column, steaming one behind the other, each ship being able to
fire 10 guns from either side and only 4 ahead, the 10 ships can
fire 100 guns on either side and only 4 ahead; and therefore it
would be better to attack the column from ahead (to "T" it), than
to attack it from either side.
It is curious to note how widely this simple illustration can be
made to apply to both strategy and tactics; how the effort of each
is to dispose our force so toward the enemy's force that we can
use our weapons more effectively than he can use his. An extreme
illustration might be made by imagining 1,000 soldiers standing
in line and unable to face except to the front; in which case it
is clear that, no matter how perfectly they might be armed, or
how quickly and accurately they could fire, one man standing on
the flank, or behind them, could kill one soldier after the other,
until all the 1,000 were killed, and be in no danger himself.
In case of attacking a ship or a column of ships from ahead, or
of attacking a line of soldiers on the flank, the effectiveness of
the method of attack lies in the fact that a number of the weapons
that are present in the force attacked cannot be used in reply.
[Illustration: Fig. 1]
_Concentration and Isolation_.--The value of "concentration" is
often insisted on, but the author desires to call attention to
a misunderstanding on this point, to which he called attention
in an essay in 1905. To the author, it seems that concentration
is a means and not an end, and that the end is what he called
"isolation" in the essay. If a man concentrates his mind on any
subject, the advantage he gains is that he prevents other subjects
from obstructing the application of his mental powers to that subject;
he pushes to one side and isolates all other subjects. In this
particular activity it does not matter whether we call his act
"concentration" or "isolation" because the whole operation goes
on inside of his own skull, and concentration on one subject
automatically produces isolation or elimination of all others.
But when concentration is attempted on external objects, the case
is very different, for concentration may not produce isolation
at all. For instance, if 4 ships in column _A_ concentrate their
fire on the leading ship in column _B_, the other 3 ships in column
_B_ are not isolated, and can fire on the ships of column _A_,
even more effectively than if column _A_ was not concentrated on
the leading ship of _B_, because they are undisturbed by being
fired at. If, however, the 4 ships of _A_ "flank" or "T" the ships
of column _B_, as shown in Fig. 2, and concentrate on the leader of
B, they thereby isolate the other ships, and practically nullify
their ability to fire at _A_.
[Illustration: Fig. 2]
This effect is approximated by an approximate "T-ing" or "flanking,"
such as is shown in Fig. 3; because the average distance from the
ships of _A_ to the leading ship in _B_ is less than the average
distance from the ships in _B_ to any ship in _A_; and because the
direction of fire from each ship in _A_ is more nearly abeam than
is the direction of fire from the ships of _B_. These positions
are very difficult to gain, even if _A_'s speed is considerably
greater than _B's_; since all _B_ has to do to prevent it is to
head to the right, unless shoals or other dangers such as enemy
battleships, _C_, are on that side, co-operating with _A_.
[Illustration: Fig. 3]
An interesting position is that shown in Fig. 4, which may be assumed
by _A_, either for flight, or to get the advantage in torpedo fire.
The advantage is that the _A_ ships are running away from torpedoes
fired by _B_, while _B_ is running into torpedoes fired by _A_.
This advantage is not great if the distance between _A_ and _B_
is so little that _B's_ torpedoes can reach _A_. But if _A_ is
able to make this distance equal to the entire range over which
_B's_ torpedoes can run, or near it, _B's_ torpedoes cannot reach
_A_ at all.
[Illustration: Fig. 4]
A similar advantage, though in a modified degree, is that shown
as possessed by _A_ in Fig. 5. Due to the direction of movement
of the _A_ and _B_ fleets, it is easier for _A's_ torpedoes to
reach _B_, than for _B's_ torpedoes to reach _A_.
[Illustration: Fig. 5]
Positions of advantage are usually gained by superior speed. One
of the main reasons for the development of the battle cruiser has
been the fact that her high speed and great offensive power enable
her to gain positions of advantage and utilize them. The _A_ positions
shown in the figures are attainable by battle cruisers against
battleships, and are very effective.
A procedure analogous to that of flanking is one in which part
of a force is attacked when it is separated from the rest of the
force, and cannot be supported by it--in that some of the weapons of
one force cannot be used. The effect is similar in the two cases, but
the events leading up to the two conditions may be quite different.
In the former case, that of being flanked, or T'd, the force caught
at a disadvantage was together, and was able to operate effectively
as one force against a force located in a given direction; but
was attacked by a force located in another direction; while in
the latter case, the force was divided, and one part was caught,
while distant from and entirely unsupported by the other part. The
former condition is more likely to result from tactical operations,
and the latter from strategical operations--and yet, especially in
land operations, the flanking of one force may be brought about
by the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other
force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by
the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of
an actual or a simulated battle.
In naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's
force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that
of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from
ahead or astern. It seldom happens, with the great number of vessels
of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable
to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable
to do so. The closest approximation to keeping a large naval force
together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the
ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and
act like one long, flexible body. But the vessels of a modern fleet
would make a column many miles long--a column of 20 battleships alone
would be 5 miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers,
destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that
it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other
vessels could not come to their relief. Besides, the duties of
battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines,
are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies
of the various types operate separately and apart from those of
other types.
Not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often
the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of
battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or
that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main
body of destroyers.
Any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and
sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided,
and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a
man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails
some danger. Suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a
war carried on in the Caribbean, the Navy Department should get
trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed 3 battle cruisers
to speed north and bombard New York. The department would probably
have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent
the bombardment. Yet not only would the force so sent be in danger
until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body
from which it was detached would be thereby weakened; furthermore, the
information might have been incorrect--it might have been originated
and given out by the enemy, in the hope that it would cause such a
diversion of force.
Every operation in war entails a risk more or less great; and if
no risks were to be taken, it would be better not to go to war.
It is true that some wars have been undertaken in which the
preponderance of force was so great that there was very little
doubt of the actual outcome, and very little risk taken by one of
the two parties. Such wars, however, have been very few; and they
were hardly wars in the usual sense, any more than the beating of
a little boy by a big boy could properly be called a "fight."
Reference may again be made here to Table I on next page, which
shows the way in which fights between unequal forces proceed, and
the advantage of fighting the separated parts of an enemy rather
than the united force. We can see this clearly if we note that, if
two forces each aggregating 1,000 were in each other's vicinity,
and if the entire force _A_ was able to engage half of _B_, or
500, it would whip half of _B_, and have 841 remaining, with which
to engage the other half (500) of _B_. Reference to the end of
the third period in this table shows also that if a force of 789
engages a force of 523, it will have 569 left, after the other
has been reduced to zero. So, a force of 1,000 that engages two
forces of 500 separately, will have more than 500 left, after the
others have both been reduced to zero: whereas, if it engages both,
when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero,
remaining equal all the time.
TABLE I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|Col.|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Value of offensive power A|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|1000|
| at beginning B|1000| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100|
|Damage done in 1st A| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100| 100|
| period B| 100| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10|
|Value of offensive power A| 900| 910| 920| 930| 940| 950| 960| 970| 980| 990|
| at end of 1st period B| 900| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100| 0|
|Damage done in 2nd A| 90| 91| 92| 93| 94| 95| 96| 97| 98| |
| period B| 90| 80| 70| 60| 50| 40| 30| 20| 10| |
|Value of offensive power A| 810| 830| 850| 870| 890| 910| 930| 950| 970| |
| at end of 2nd period B| 810| 709| 608| 507| 406| 305| 204| 103| 2| |
|Damage done in 3rd A| 81| 83| 85| 87| 89| 91| 93| 95| | |
| period B| 81| 71| 61| 51| 41| 31| 20| 10| | |
|Value of offensive power A| 729| 759| 789| 819| 849| 879| 910| 940| | |
| at end of 3rd period B| 729| 626| 523| 420| 317| 214| 111| 8| | |
|Damage done in 4th A| 73| 76| 79| 82| 85| 88| 91| | | |
| period B| 73| 63| 52| 42| 32| 21| 11| | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 656| 696| 737| 777| 817| 858| 899| | | |
| at end of 4th period B| 656| 550| 444| 338| 232| 126| 20| | | |
|Damage done in 5th A| 65| 70| 74| 78| 82| 86| | | | |
| period B| 65| 55| 44| 34| 23| 13| | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 591| 641| 693| 743| 794| 845| | | | |
| at end of 5th period B| 591| 480| 370| 260| 150| 40| | | | |
|Damage done in 6th A| 59| 64| 69| 74| 79| 85| | | | |
| period B| 59| 48| 37| 26| 15| 4| | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 532| 593| 656| 717| 779| 841| | | | |
| at end of 6th period B| 532| 416| 301| 186| 71| 0| | | | |
|Damage done in 7th A| 53| 59| 66| 72| 78| | | | | |
| period B| 53| 42| 30| 19| 7| | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 479| 551| 626| 698| 772| | | | | |
| at end of 7th period B| 479| 357| 235| 114| 0| | | | | |
|Damage done in 8th A| 48| 55| 63| 70| | | | | | |
| period B| 48| 36| 24| 11| | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 431| 515| 602| 687| | | | | | |
| at end of 8th period B| 431| 302| 172| 44| | | | | | |
|Damage done in 9th A| 43| 52| 60| 69| | | | | | |
| period B| 43| 30| 17| 4| | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 388| 485| 585| 683| | | | | | |
| at end of 9th period B| 388| 250| 112| 0| | | | | | |
|Damage done in 10th A| 39| 49| 59| | | | | | | |
| period B| 39| 25| 11| | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 349| 460| 574| | | | | | | |
| at end of 10th period B| 349| 201| 53| | | | | | | |
|Damage done in 11th A| 35| 46| 57| | | | | | | |
| period B| 35| 20| 5| | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 314| 440| 569| | | | | | | |
| at end of 11th period B| 314| 155| 0| | | | | | | |
|Damage done in 12th A| 31| 44| | | | | | | | |
| period B| 31| 16| | | | | | | | |
|Value of offensive power A| 283| 426| | | | | | | | |
| at end of 12th period B| 283| 111| | | | | | | | |
| | |etc.| | | | | | | | |
|Total damage done by A| 717| 789| 800| 700| 600| 500| 400| 300| 200| 100|
| B| 717| 574| 431| 317| 228| 159| 101| 60| 30| 10|
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most
of the operations of strategy and tactics; how--the mechanical
tools in the way of ships and guns and torpedoes having been
supplied--the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage
of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force
from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force
superior to it. Opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try
to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part
of his force, under circumstances such that you can attack it,
or the weakened main body, with a superior force. Naturally, one
must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy.
This does not mean that the sole effort of naval operations is
finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort
is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and
to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. Before
the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however,
the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in
which his force shall have the advantage. The advantage having
been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being
recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason
that _every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner_.
This does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force
that is temporarily separated from its main body. It is readily
understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases:
1. A case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and
were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller
force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged
would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed.
For instance, a reference to Table I shows that an _A_ force of
1,000 engaging a _B_ force of 800 would have 569 left when _B_ was
reduced to zero. This is impressive: but if the _B_ force of 800
were part of a total _B_ force of 2,000, in other words if there
were an _A_ force of 1,200 near at hand, _B_ would have 569 left
with which to oppose 1,200, a proportion a little less advantageous
than the proportion he started with--1,000 to 2,000.
2. A case by which the _B_ force may have divided with the express
purpose of luring _A_ to attack; arrangements having been made
whereby the inferior _B_ force would simply hold the _A_ force
until the whole _B_ force could come to its assistance; arrangements
having been also made that this would be accomplished before the
detached part of _B_ should get very badly damaged.
Attention is invited to Table III, which is a continuation of Table
I. It represents what would happen if a force of 1,000 should fight
separately two forces, one of 800 and the other of 200. In column
1, _A_ is supposed to have engaged the 200 first, and so to have
become reduced to 970, and to engage 800 afterward. In column 2,
_A_ is supposed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced
to 569, and then to engage the 200 force. The table indicates that
it makes no difference whether _A_ engages the stronger or the
weaker force first.
Column 3 shows that a force of 841, the part remaining after a
force of 1,000 had annihilated a force of 500, would have 653 left
after annihilating a second force of 500. Taken in connection with
columns 1 and 2, this indicates that it is easier to defeat two
separated _equal_ forces than two separated _unequal_ forces of the
same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force
is into _equal_ parts. This fact is mathematically demonstrated by
Mr. F. W. Lanchester in a recent book called "Air Craft in Warfare."
TABLE III
-------------------------------------------------------------------
| |Col. 1|Col. 2|Col. 3|
|---------------------------------------------|------|------|------|
|Value of offensive at beginning A| 970 | 569 | 841 |
| B| 800 | 200 | 500 |
|Damage done in 1st period by A| 97 | 57 | 84 |
| B| 80 | 20 | 50 |
|Value of offensive power at end 1st period A| 890 | 549 | 791 |
| B| 703 | 143 | 416 |
|Damage done in 2d period by A| 89 | 55 | 79 |
| B| 70 | 14 | 42 |
|Value of offensive power at end 2d period A| 820 | 535 | 749 |
| B| 614 | 88 | 337 |
|Damage done in 3d period by A| 82 | 54 | 75 |
| B| 61 | 0 | 34 |
|Value of offensive power at end 3d period A| 759 | 526 | 715 |
| B| 532 | 32 | 262 |
|Damage done in 4th period by A| 76 | 53 | 72 |
| B| 53 | 3 | 26 |
|Value of offensive power at end 4th period A| 706 | 523 | 689 |
| B| 456 | 0 | 190 |
|Damage done in 5th period by A| 71 | | 69 |
| B| 46 | | 10 |
|Value of offensive power at end 5th period A| 660 | | 670 |
| B| 385 | | 121 |
|Damage done in 6th period by A| 66 | | 67 |
| B| 39 | | 12 |
|Value of offensive power at end 6th period A| 621 | | 658 |
| B| 319 | | 54 |
|Damage done in 7th period by A| 62 | | 66 |
| B| 32 | | 5 |
|Value of offensive power at end 7th period A| 589 | | 653 |
| B| 257 | | 0 |
|Damage done in 8th period by A| 59 | | |
| B| 26 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end 8th period A| 563 | | |
| B| 198 | | |
|Damage done in 9th period by A| 56 | | |
| B| 20 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end 9th period A| 543 | | |
| B| 142 | | |
|Damage done in 10th period by A| 54 | | |
| B| 14 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end 10th period A| 529 | | |
| B| 88 | | |
|Damage done in 11th period by A| 53 | | |
| B| 9 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end 11th period A| 520 | | |
| B| 35 | | |
|Damage done in 12th period by A| 52 | | |
| B| 4 | | |
|Value of offensive power at end 12th period A| 516 | | |
| B| 0 | | |
------------------------------------------------------------------
The main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the
ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and
to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance,
to T or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from T-ing
or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before
they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own
force without undue risk. For these purposes, speed is an element
of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power
or armor protection--or both--and the fact that speed cannot always
be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul
bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise
they would have.
Owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship,
the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the
further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases
more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete),
the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is
attainable in the largest ship. In other words, the larger the
ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and
the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most
good.
_Strategic Operations_.--These may be divided into two classes,
offensive and defensive. The two classes are distinct; and yet there
is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between
two contiguous colors in the spectrum. Defensive operations of the
kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would
be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack,
and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the
blows of fists. Such a defense can never succeed, for the reason
that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance
as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in
unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of
fatigue. Reference to Table I will render this point clear, if we
make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant,
and no reductions of the power of the other contestant.
Defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is,
a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the
ability of the enemy to do damage. In fact, no operations are more
aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's
personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order
to defend something. No animal is so aggressively belligerent as
a female "defending" her young.
Offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different,
especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative
or attack, and the other the distance to the home. In offensive
operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack
is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character,
and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet
the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive
operations, and the other side defensive. Offensive operations are,
as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. If
_A_ is carrying on offensive operations against _B_, _A_ is usually
farther away from his home than _B_ is from his home. We see from
this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of
making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has
the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the
defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or
whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of
various kinds given by home bases. In other words, the offensive
has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable
conditions.
For this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires
to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the
offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular
case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the
lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the
initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would
be such that the side accepting the defensive rôle and staying near
home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could
the other. An illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive,
and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be
seen in Napoleon's expedition against Russia; for the Russians were
able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible
offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army.
Another illustration was the expedition made by a weak Spanish fleet
under Cervera to the Caribbean in 1898. Another illustration was
that of the Russians in the war of 1904; the practical disadvantages
under which the Russian fleet operated at Tsushima were too great
to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the
situation was such that the Japanese were able to foretell with
enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack
would be delivered, and the time.
Operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in
opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries.
If two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel
columns--say of ten ships each--are drawn up abreast each other,
the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of
the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized,
and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself.
But if any country--say the United States--finds herself involved
in war with--say a powerful naval Power or Powers of Europe, and the
realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized
the coming of war in August, 1914, and we hear the same day that
a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines,
aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed
by a fleet of transports carrying troops--there will be immediate
need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will
continue until either the United States or her enemy has been made
to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace.
As such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized
by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically
all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its
all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the Russians and
Japanese did at Tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically
annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy.
The first effort on hearing of the departure of the hostile fleet
will be, of course, to get our fleet out to sea, reinforced as much
as practicable, by our reserve ships; and to get the coast-guard
on their patrol stations. As we should not know the destination
of the enemy, we should either have to assume a destination and
send our fleet to that place (leaving the other places undefended)
or else send our fleet out to sea to some position from which it
would despatch scouts in different directions to intercept the
enemy, in order that our fleet might meet it and prevent its farther
advance.
Of course, the latter procedure could not be carried out reasonably,
unless we had a great enough number of trained scouts to make the
interception of the enemy fleet probable; because otherwise the
probabilities would be that an enemy having the battle cruisers
and scouts that European navies have, would succeed in evading
our fleet and landing a force upon our shores; and it could not
be carried out reasonably either, if we knew that our fleet was
markedly inferior to the coming fleet; because to send out our
fleet to meet a much more powerful one in actual battle would be
to commit national suicide by the most expeditious method.
In case the departure of the enemy fleet occurred in the stormy
months of the winter, we might feel warranted in guessing that its
immediate destination was the Caribbean; yet if our fleet were in
the Caribbean at the time, and if our coast lacked shore defenses as
at present, we might argue that the enemy would take the opportunity
to make a direct descent upon our coast, seize a base--say on the
eastern end of Long Island--and march directly on New York. It
would be very difficult to plan the development of a line of scouts
in such a way that the scouts would intercept an attack directed
at some unknown point between Boston and the West Indies, perhaps
in the southern part of the West Indies--say Margarita Island.
In fact, it would be impossible; with the result that, unless we
intercepted it by simple good luck, the enemy would succeed in
landing a force on our eastern coast, or else in the seizing of
a base in the West Indies or the southern part of the Caribbean
Sea.
Either one of these acts, successfully performed by an enemy, would
give him an advantage; that is, it would make his position relatively
to ours better than it was before. It would have the same effect,
therefore, as winning a battle; in fact it would constitute the
winning of a battle--not a physical battle but a strategic battle.
It may be objected that, unless we knew our fleet to be more powerful
it would be wiser and more comfortable for all concerned to withdraw
our ships to the shelter of their bases, and let the enemy do his
worst--on the theory that he could not do anything else so ruinous
to us as to sink our fleet.
There is of course considerable reasonableness in this point of
view; and strategy declares the unwisdom of engaging in battles
that are sure to be lost. It must be remembered, however, that the
coming fleet will operate at a considerable strategic disadvantage,
owing to the necessity for guarding the "train" of auxiliary ships
that will come with it, holding fuel and supplies of various kinds;
that this handicap will offset a considerable advantage in offensive
strength; and that the handicap will be still greater if the enemy
fleet have near it a flotilla of transports carrying troops. It
must be remembered also that in all probability, we should not
have detailed information as to the number of vessels coming, and
should not really know whether it was superior to ours or not:
though we should be justified in assuming that the coming fleet
believed itself to be superior to ours in actual fighting power.
Absence of trustworthy information on such points is usual in warfare,
and is one of the elements that is the most difficult to handle.
The Navy Department would be more able to form a correct estimate
on this point than the commander-in-chief until such time as our
scouts might come into absolute contact with the enemy's main body;
but, until then, all that the department and fleet would know would
be that a large hostile force had left Europe. They would not know
its size or destination.
Clearly, the first thing we should need would be information. To
get this after war has broken out, the only means is scouts.
_Scouting and Screening_.--Scouts are needed by every navy; but
they are most needed by a navy that has a very long coast-line to
protect. If the great commercial centres and the positions that
an enemy would desire for advanced bases along the coast, have
local defenses adequate to keep off a hostile fleet for, say, two
weeks, the urgency of scouts is not quite so absolute; since, even
if the hostile fleet evades our scouts and our fleet, and reaches
our shores, our fleet will have two weeks in which to get to the
place attacked. But if the coast is not only long but also unguarded
by shore defenses, the urgency is of the highest order.
If we knew our fleet to be the weaker, but if we did not believe it
to be so much the weaker as to force it to seek safety in flight,
our natural plan would be that of Napoleon's in Italy in 1797--to
keep our force together, and to hurl it against detached parts
of the enemy's force, whenever possible. This plan might not be
difficult of execution, if the enemy were accompanied by his train
of auxiliary and supply ships; since such ships are vulnerable to
almost any kind of attack, have almost no means of defense whatever,
and therefore require that a part of the fighting force of the
main body be detached to guard them. Whether the enemy would have
his train quite close to him, or a day's steaming behind, say 240
miles, we should not, of course, know.
How could we ascertain?
If the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened
to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts
faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture
near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in
daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then
report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what
craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were
in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. Such
information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief,
as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. If, for
instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming
at a speed of 10 knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding
behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around
them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight
until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy
ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely.
But suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting
of a line 10 miles long of, say, 50 destroyers, 50 miles ahead of
the main body; followed by a line of, say, 10 battle cruisers,
25 miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle
cruisers on each flank--say, 20 miles distant from the main body.
How could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size,
composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and
direction of advance? The purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our
ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen
will do its best to carry out that purpose. All the vessels of the
screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph
apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication
will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood
by our ships. Any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the
screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of
the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the
daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try
to hold us off. Now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval Powers
of Europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers
whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones
(the _Birmingham_, _Chester_, and _Salem_) the degree of success
that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be
estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy.
The Laws of successful scouting and of the use of "search curves"
have been worked out mathematically, and they are used to find
an enemy of which one has certain information; but they are also
used by the enemy to avoid being found, and they aid the enemy that
is sought almost as much as they aid the seeker. And the sought
has the advantage that the use of force, if force can be employed,
breaks up the application of the mathematics of the seeker.
It is true that two main bodies of two fleets may stumble against
each other in the night-time, or in a fog or heavy mist. To prevent
this possible occurrence, or to prevent a night attack by destroyers,
no sure means has yet been found except examination before dark of
a very large area around the fleet that is sought; but the area
is too great for a search rigid enough to give complete security,
and will probably be so until swift aircraft can scout over long
distances at sea. Accepting for the minute the convention that
the main body of each side goes at the cruising speed of 10 knots,
and that darkness lasts 12 hours, each side will go 120 miles in
darkness; and if the two main bodies happen to be going directly
toward each other they will approach 240 miles in the darkness of
one night. Therefore, a coming fleet, in order to feel entirely
safe, would in daylight have to inspect by its scouts a circle
of 120 miles radius. To insure safety against destroyer attack,
the area would have to be much greater on account of the greater
speed of destroyers.
[Illustration]
Unless our defending fleet knew with reasonable sureness, however,
the location, speed, and direction of motion of the coming fleet,
so that it could make its dispositions for attack, it would hardly
desire to meet the enemy at night, unless it were confident that
it would meet the train and not the main fleet or the destroyers.
Night attacks, both on sea and land, are desirable, if the attacker
can inflict surprise on the attacked, and not be surprised himself.
In the darkness a flotilla of destroyers may make an attack on
the various vulnerable colliers and supply vessels of a fleet,
or even on the main body, and achieve a marked success, because
that is the rôle they are trained to play. But the tremendous power
and accuracy of battleships cannot be utilized or made available
in darkness; and therefore a commander-in-chief, anxious to defeat
by superior skill a coming fleet larger than his own, would hardly
throw away all chance of using skill by risking his main body in a
night encounter. Every operation planned by strategy is supposed
to result from the "decision" which follows the estimate of the
situation; even if in some simple or urgent cases, the decision
is not laboriously worked out, but is almost unconscious and even
automatic. Now, it is hardly conceivable that any estimate of the
situation would be followed by a decision to go ahead and trust to
luck, except in very desperate circumstances. In such circumstances,
when hope is almost gone, a desperate blow, even in the dark, may
save a situation--as a lucky hand at cards may redeem a gambler's
fortune at even the last moment. But strategy is opposed to taking
desperate measures; and pugilists and even gamblers recognize the
fact that when a man becomes "desperate," his judgment is bad,
and his chances of success are almost zero.
While it is possible, therefore, that the main bodies of hostile
fleets may come together in the night, we may assume that it will
not be as part of any planned operations, and therefore not within
the scope of this discussion; and that any combat which may result
will be one in which strategy will play no part, and in which even
tactics will yield first place to chance.
But while our defending fleet will have to base most of its decisions
on guesses, the coming fleet, on the other hand, having accepted
the strategical disadvantage of leaving its base far in rear, will
advance with all the advantage of the offensive, especially in
knowing where it intends to go and what it desires to do. Coming
over on a definite mission it will have been able to know what
preparations to make; and as the naval Powers of Europe understand
the need of co-ordination between policy and strategy, the fleet
will doubtless have had time to make those preparations; it will
not have started, in fact, and war will not have been declared,
until all those preparations have been made.
We may assume that the coming fleet will come across with all possible
precautions for protecting itself against detection by the defender's
scouts, and therefore against an unexpected attack, by night or by
day. It cannot receive an unexpected attack unless surprised; and
how can it be surprised, if it has more scouts, faster scouts, and
more powerfully armed scouts than the defending fleet has?
The possession of the more powerful scouts, however, will be valuable
to the enemy, not only for forming a screen as a protection against
enemy scouts, but also for scouting and thereby getting information
for itself. A numerous squadron of scouts of different kinds, sent
out ahead and on each flank would see any of our scouts that saw
them; and the scouts that were the more powerful would force the
weaker scouts back to the arms of their own main body, toward which
the more powerful scouts would, of course, advance. The weaker
scouts, therefore, would have no value whatever as a screen, save
in retarding the advance of the stronger scouts, and in delaying
their getting information.
If the coming fleet is more powerful than the defending fleet, and
has a more numerous and powerful scouting force, it will, therefore,
be able to push back the defending fleet, whether an actual battle
occurs or not; and it will be able to bring over, also, a large
invading force in transports if its fighting superiority be great
enough. Furthermore, if we have not fortified and protected the
places which the enemy would wish to seize and use as advanced naval
bases, the enemy will be able to seize them, and will doubtless
do so.
Of course, this is so obvious as to seem hardly worth declaring;
and yet some people hesitate even to admit it, and thereby they
assume a passive condition of moral cowardice; for they know that
a strong force has always overcome a weaker force that opposed
it in war; and that it always will do so, until force ceases to
be force. They know that force is that which moves, or tends to
move, matter; and that the greater the force, the more surely it
will move matter, or anything that opposes it.
If, however, we establish naval bases near our valuable commercial
and strategic ports, both on our coast and in the Caribbean, and if
we fortify them so that an enemy could not take them quickly, the
condition of the enemy fleet will be much less happy; because it
will have to remain out on the ocean, where fuelling and repairing
are very difficult, and where it will be exposed, day and night,
especially at night, to attack by destroyers and submarines; and
in case necessity demands the occasional division of the force,
it must beware of attacks on the separated portions of the fleet.
The condition of a large fleet under way on an enemy's coast is one
requiring much patience and endurance, and one in which the number
of vessels is liable to be continuously reduced by the guerilla
warfare of the defenders.
In the case of our attempting offensive operations against the
distant coast of an enemy, we would be in the same position as a
foreign enemy would be in when attacking our coast, in that our
chances of success would be excellent if our fleet were considerably
superior to the defending fleet in fighting power, and in the number
and strength of scouts, and if the enemy coast possessed numerous
undefended bays and islands which we could seize as bases. But even
if the superiority of our fleet in fighting power and scouts was
considerably greater than the enemy's our ultimate success would
be doubtful, if the enemy's coast and islands were so protected
by guns and mines and submarines that we could not get a base near
the scene of operations. It is true that the British were able to
maintain blockades of the French coast during many weary months
without any base nearer than England--a place far away to ships
whose only motive power was sails; but destroyers and submarines
and mines did not then exist, and these agencies are much more
valuable to the defender than to the blockader who has no base at
hand.
Our operations without a base on a distant enemy coast would be
apt to degenerate into warding off a continual series of more or
less minor attacks by the minor craft of the defender. The commander
of our fleet would be constrained to keep his fighting force pretty
close together, thus restricting his initiative; lest the entire
enemy fleet catch a detached part out of supporting distance of
the main body, and annihilate it with little loss to themselves.
We could probably shut off most of the enemy's sea-borne commerce;
and the war would become one of endurance between our fleet, on
the one hand, and the economic forces and the morale of the enemy
country on the other hand.
In the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both
fleets, operations like those that the French and British carried on
in the West Indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much
less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief
operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected
by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better
chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum.
Of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but
so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to
determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself
shall have decided it. Supposing the skill to be equal on both
sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most
numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds. But unless there is a
very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which
side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which
side has the more numerous. It is extremely difficult to compare
even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values
of their factors. Suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal
in all ways, except that one ship has ten 14-inch guns, and the
other has twelve 12-inch guns of higher initial velocity. Which is
the more powerful ship? Suppose one ship has more armor, another
more speed. Formulæ designed to assign numerical values to fighting
ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by Constructor Otto
Kretschmer of the German navy; but the results cannot be accepted
as anything except very able approximations. Furthermore, if ship
_A_ could whip ship _B_ under some conditions, _B_ could whip _A_
under other conditions. An extreme illustration would be battleship
_A_ engaged with submarine _B_ at close quarters; _B_ being on
the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case.
_Aircraft_.--The influence of aircraft on naval operations is to
be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it
would not be wise to attempt to predict. The most obvious influence
will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft
will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle
near the Skagerak. It is the belief of the author, however, that
the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large
size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order,
including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the Whitehead
type.
_Skill_.--The question of skill bears a relation to the question
of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very
elusive. If, for instance, ship _C_, firing ten 12-inch guns on a
side, fights ship _D_, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage
would seem to be with _C_; but it would not be if each gun on _D_
made three hits, while each gun on _C_ made one hit; a relative
performance not at all impossible or unprecedented. Similarily,
if the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were a very skilful
strategist, and the head of the admiralty of the _F_ fleet were
not, and if the various admirals, captains, lieutenants, engineers,
and gunners of the _E_ fleet were highly skilled, and those of
the _F_ fleet were not, the _E_ fleet might be victorious, even
if materially it were much the smaller in material and personnel.
In case the head of the admiralty of the _E_ fleet were the more
skilful, while the officers of the _F_ fleet were, on the average,
more skilful than those of the _E_ fleet, it would be impossible
to weigh the difference between them; but as a rough statement,
it may be said that if the head of the admiralty of either fleet
is more skilful than the other, his officers will probably be more
skilful than the officers of the other; so pervasive is the influence
of the chief.
The effectiveness of modern ships and guns and engines and torpedoes,
when used with perfect skill, is so great that we tend unconsciously
to assume the perfect skill, and think of naval power in terms
of material units only. Yet daily life is full of reminders that
when two men or two bodies of men contend, the result depends in
large though varying measure on their relative degrees of skill.
Whenever one thinks of using skill, he includes in his thought
the thing in the handling of which the skill is employed. One can
hardly conceive of using skill except in handling something of the
general nature of an instrument, even if the skill is employed in
handling something which is not usually called an instrument. For
instance, if a man handles an organization with the intent thereby
to produce a certain result, the organization is the instrument
whereby he attempts to produce the result.
If a man exercises perfect skill, he achieves with his instrument
100 per cent of its possible effect. If he exercises imperfect
skill, he achieves a smaller percentage of its possible effect.
To analyze the effectiveness of skill, let us coin the phrase,
"effective skill," and agree that, if a man produces 100 per cent of
the possible, his effective skill is 100 per cent, and, in general,
that a man's effective skill in using any instrument is expressed by
the percentage he achieves of what the instrument can accomplish;
that, for instance, if a gun is fired at a given range under given
conditions, and 10 per cent hits are made in a given time, then
the effective skill employed is 10 per cent.
From this standpoint we see that imperfect skill is largely concerned
with errors. If a man uses, say, a gun, with perfect skill, he
commits no error in handling the gun; and the smaller the sum total
of errors which he commits in handling the gun, the greater his
effective skill and the greater the number of hits.
The word "errors," as here used, does not simply mean errors of
commission, but means errors of omission as well. If a man, in
firing a gun, fails to press the button or trigger when his sights
are on, he makes an error just as truly as the man does who presses
the button or trigger when the sights are not on.
Suppose that, in firing a gun, under given conditions of range,
etc., the effective skill employed is 10 per cent. This means that
10 per cent of hits are made. But it means another thing equally
important--it means that 90 per cent of misses are made. To what
are these misses due? Clearly they are due to errors made, not
necessarily by the man who fires the gun, but by all the people
concerned. If the correct sight-bar range were given to the gun,
and if the gun were correctly laid and the pointer pressed the
button at precisely the right instant, the shot would hit the target,
practically speaking. But, in actual practice, the range-finder
makes an error, the spotter makes an error, the plotting-room makes
an error, the sight-setter makes an error, and the gun-pointer
makes an error. The sum total of all of these errors results in
90 per cent of misses.
Suppose that by careful training these errors are reduced in the
relation of 9 to 8, so that instead of there being 90 per cent
of misses there are only 80 per cent. This does not seem a very
difficult thing for training to accomplish, but note the result: the
hits are increased from 10 per cent to 20 per cent. In other words,
by a decrease in errors in the relation of 9 to 8, the effective
skill and the hits are doubled.
Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 9 to 10, the
misses would increase from 90 per cent to 100 per cent, and the
hits would be reduced from 10 per cent to 0.
Suppose now that the conditions are so very difficult that only
1 per cent of hits is made, or 99 per cent of misses, and that by
training the misses are reduced from 99 per cent to 98 per cent.
Clearly, by a decrease of errors of hardly more than 1 per cent
the effective skill and the hits are doubled.
Conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of 99 to 100,
the misses would increase from 99 per cent to 100 per cent, and
the hits would be reduced from 1 per cent to 0.
But suppose that the conditions are so easy that 90 per cent of
hits are made and only 10 per cent of misses. Clearly, if the errors
were divided by 10, so that only 1 per cent of misses was made,
instead of 10 per cent, the number of hits would increase only
9 per cent, from 90 per cent to 99 per cent.
Of course, this is merely an arithmetical way of expressing the
ancient truths that skill becomes more and more important as the
difficulties of handling an instrument increase; and that, no matter
how effective an instrument may be when used with perfect skill,
the actual result obtained in practice is only the product of its
possible performance and the effective skill with which it is used.
Applying this idea to naval matters, we see why the very maximum
of skill is required in our war mechanisms and war organizations,
in their almost infinite variety and complexity. The war mechanisms
and war organizations of the military nations are capable of enormous
results, but only when they are used with enormous skill. There
are no other instruments or organizations that need so much skill
to handle them, because of the difficulties attending their use
and the issues at stake. Their development has been a process long
and painful. On no other things has so much money been spent; to
perfect no other things have so many lives been sacrificed; on
no other things, excepting possibly religion, have so many books
been written; to no other things has the strenuous exertion of so
many minds been devoted; in operating no other things has such
a combination of talent and genius and power of will and spirit
been employed.
A battleship is an instrument requiring skill to handle well, considered
both as a mechanism and as an organization. Its effective handling
calls for skill not only on the part of the captain, but on the
part of all hands. The finest dreadnaught is ineffective if manned
by an ineffective crew. The number and complexity of the mechanisms
on board are so great as to stagger the imagination; and the
circumstances of modern warfare are so difficult that, as between
two forces evenly matched as to material, a comparatively slight
advantage in errors made will turn the scale in favor of the more
skilful. A difference in errors, for instance, in the relation of
9 to 8, under the conditions mentioned above, between two fleets
having an equal number of similar ships, would give one side twice
as many hits as the other in any given length of time.
In March, 1905, the writer published an essay in the _Proceedings
of the U. S. Naval Institute_ called "American Naval Policy," in
which the effect of initial superiority in gun-fire was shown in
tables. One table showed that an initial advantage of only 10 per
cent secured an overwhelming victory by an accumulative effect.
Now a difference of 10 per cent in hits, under conditions in which
the hits were about 10 per cent of the maximum, would mean, roughly
speaking, the difference between 10 hits and 9 hits in a given
length of time, or a difference between 90 misses and 91 misses;
a difference in errors made of a little more than 1 per cent.
The conclusion to be drawn is too obvious to be stated. Perhaps
the conclusion is not broadly new; but possibly the idea is new
that so small a difference in errors made will, under conditions
of sufficient difficulty, produce such a tremendous difference
in results.
Now, a division is more complex and more difficult to handle perfectly
than is a battleship; a squadron more so than a division; a fleet
more so than a squadron; a navy more so than a fleet.
_Necessity for Knowledge of the Naval Machine_.--There is no machine
or tool so simple that knowledge of it is not needed in order to
use it skilfully. This does not mean that intimate knowledge of
the details of construction of a machine is necessary in order to
operate it; it does not mean, for instance, that a sharp-shooter
must have a profound knowledge of the metallurgy of the metal of
which his gun is mainly made, or of the laws of chemistry and physics
that apply to powder, or of the laws of ballistics that govern
the flight of the bullet to its target. But it does mean that any
skilful handler of any machine must know how to use it; that a
sharpshooter, for instance, must know how to use his machine--the
gun.
Of course, a sharpshooter's skill is exercised in operating under
very limited conditions, the conditions of shooting; and it does not
include necessarily the maintenance of his gun in good condition.
The operating of some machines, however, includes the maintenance
of those machines; and a simple illustration is that of operating
an automobile. An automobile is constructed to be operated at
considerable distances from home; and a man whose knowledge and
skill were limited to steering, stopping, starting, and backing
the car--who had no knowledge of its details of construction and
could not repair a trifling injury--would have very little value
as a chauffeur.
A like remark might truthfully be made about the operation of any
complex machine; and the more complex the machine, the more aptly
the remark would apply. The chief engineer of any electric plant,
of any municipal water-works, of any railroad, of any steamship
must have the most profound and intimate knowledge of the details
of construction and the method of operation of the machine committed
to his charge. Recognition of this fact by the engineering profession
is so complete and perfect as to be almost unconscious; and no man
whose reasoning faculties had been trained by the exact methods
of engineering could forget it for a moment. The whole structure
of that noble science rests on facts that have been demonstrated
to be facts, and the art rests on actions springing from those
facts; and neither the science nor the art would now exist, if
machines created by engineering skill had been committed to the
charge of men unskilled.
It is obvious that the more complicated in construction any machine
is, the more time and study are needed to understand it fully; and
that the more complicated its method of operation is, the more
practice is needed in order to attain skill in operating it.
The more simple the method of operation, the more closely a machine
approaches automatism; but even automatic machines are automatic
only in so far as their internal mechanisms are concerned; and
the fact of their being automatic does not eliminate the necessity
for skill in using them. An automatic gun, for instance, no matter
how perfectly automatically it discharges bullets, may be fired
at an advancing enemy skilfully or unskilfully, effectively or
ineffectively.
In operating some machines, such as a soldier's rifle, or a billiard
cue, the number of mental, nervous, and muscular operations is
apparently very few; yet every physician knows that the number is
very great indeed, and the operations extremely complex--complex
beyond the knowledge of the psychologist, physicist, chemist, and
biologist. The operation of more complex mechanisms, such as
automobiles, seems to be more difficult, because the operator has
more different kinds of things to do. Yet that it is really more
difficult may be doubted for two reasons; one being that each single
operation is of a more simple nature, and the other reason being
that we know that a much higher degree of skill is possessed by
a great billiardist than by an automobile chauffeur. Of course,
the reason of this may be that competition among billiardists has
been much more keen than among chauffeurs; but even if this be
true, it reminds us that _the difficulty of operating any machine
depends on the degree of skill exacted_. It also reminds us that,
if a machine is to be operated in competition with another machine,
the skill of the operator should be as great as it can be made.
The steaming competitions that have been carried on in our navy
for several years are examples on a large scale of competitive
trials of skill in operating machines. These machines are very
powerful, very complex, very important; and that supreme skill
shall be used in operating them is very important too. For this
reason, every man in the engineering department of every ship,
from the chief engineer himself to the youngest coal-passer, is
made to pass an examination of some kind, in order that no man
may be put into any position for which he is unfit, and no man
advanced to any position until he has shown himself qualified for
it, both by performance in the grade from which he seeks to rise,
and by passing a professional examination as to the duties in the
grade to which he desires to rise.
The same principles apply to all machines; and the common sense
of mankind appreciates them, even if the machines are of the human
type. A captain of a company of soldiers, in all armies and in all
times, has been trained to handle a specific human machine; so has
the captain of a football team, so has the rector of a church. The
training that each person receives gives him such a subconscious sense
of the weights and uses of the various parts of the machine, that he
handles them almost automatically--and not only automatically but
instantly. The captain on the bridge, when an emergency confronts
him, gives the appropriate order instantly.
Now the word "machine" conveys to the minds of most of us the image
of an engine made of metal, the parts of which are moved by some
force, such as the expansive force of steam. But machines were in
use long before the steam-engine came, and one of the earliest
known to man was man himself--the most perfect machine known to
him now, and one of the most complicated and misused; for who of
us does not know of some human machine of the most excellent type,
that has been ruined by the ignorance or negligence of the man
to whose care it was committed?
A machine is in its essence an aggregation of many parts, so related
to each other and to some external influence, that the parts can
be made to operate together, to attain some desired end or object.
From this point of view, which the author believes to be correct,
a baseball team is a machine, so is a political party, so is any
organization.
Before the days of civilization, machines were few in type; but
as civilization progressed, the necessity for organizations of
many kinds grew up, and organizations of many kinds appeared. Then
the necessity for knowledge of how to operate those organizations
brought about certain professions, first that of the military,
second that of the priesthood, and later those of the law, medicine,
engineering, etc. As time has gone on, the preparation required
for these professions, especially the progressive professions,
has become increasingly difficult and increasingly demanded; and
the members of the professions have become increasingly strict
in their requirements of candidates for membership.
Now the profession that is the most strict of all, that demands the
greatest variety of qualifications, and the earliest apprenticeship,
is the military. The military profession serves on both the land
and the sea, in armies and navies; and while both the land and
the sea branches are exacting in their demands, the sea or naval
branch is the more exacting of the two; by reason of the fact that
the naval profession is the more esoteric, the more apart from the
others, the more peculiar. In all the naval countries, suitable
youths are taken in hand by their governments, and initiated into
the "mysteries" of the naval profession--mysteries that would always
remain mysteries to them, if their initiation were begun too late in
life. Many instances are known of men who obtained great excellence in
professions which they entered late in life; but not one instance in
the case of a man who entered the naval profession late in life. And
though some civilian heads of navies have shown great mental capacity,
and after--say three years'--incumbency have shown a comprehension
of naval matters greater than might have been expected, none has
made a record of performance like those of the naval ministers
of Germany and Japan; or of Admiral Barham, as first lord of the
admiralty, or Sir John Fisher as first sea lord, in England.
A navy is so evidently a machine that the expression "naval machine"
has often been applied to it. It is a machine that, both in peace and
in war, must be handled by one man, no matter how many assistants
he may have. If a machine cannot be made to obey the will of one
man, it is not one machine. If two men are needed, at least two
machines are to be operated; if three men are needed there are at
least three machines, etc. One fleet is handled by one man, called
the commander-in-chief. If there are two commanders-in-chief, there
are two fleets; and these two fleets may act in conjunction, in
opposition, or without reference to each other.
The fact of a machine being operated by one man does not, however,
prevent the machine from comprising several machines, operated
by several men. A vessel of war, for instance, is operated as a
unit by one man; the words "vessel of war," meaning not only the
inert hull, but all the parts of personnel and material that make a
vessel of war. The captain does not handle each individual machine
or man; but he operates the mechanism and the personnel, by means
of which all the machines and men are made to perform their tasks.
Now the naval machine is composed of many machines, but the machines
that have to be "operated" in war, using the word "operated" in
the usual military sense, are only the active fleet, the bureaus
and offices and the bases; including in the bases any navy-yards
within them. Using the word "operated" still more technically,
the only thing to be operated in war is the fleet: but the head
of the Navy Department must also so direct the logistical efforts
of the bureaus and offices and bases, that the fleet shall be given
the material in fuel, supplies, and ammunition with which to conduct
those operations. Like the chief engineer of a ship, he must both
operate and maintain the machine.
The fleet itself is a complex machine, even in time of peace. In
war time it is more so, for the reason that many additions are
made to the fleet when war breaks out; and these additions, being
largely of craft and men held in reserve, or brought in hurriedly
from civil life, cannot be so efficient or so reliable as are the
parts of the fleet that existed in time of peace.
The active fleet consists of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers
of various speeds and sizes, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft.
The fleet is under the immediate command of its commander-in-chief,
just as the New York naval station is under the command of its
commandant; but the commander-in-chief of the fleet is just as
strictly under the command of the head of the admiralty or Navy
Department as is the commandant. The commander-in-chief is the
principal part of the naval machine that is operated in war; and
the ultimate success of the naval machine in war depends largely
on the amount and degree of understanding that exists between the
commander-in-chief and the head of the Navy Department. That goodwill
and kindly feeling should exist between them may be assumed, since
both have the same object in view; but that real understanding
should exist between them is more difficult to assume, especially
if they have been trained in different schools and have not known
each other until late in life. In the latter case, misunderstandings
are apt to arise, as time goes on; and if they do, the most cordial
good feeling may change into mutual distrust and suspicion, and
even hatred. To see that such things have happened in the past,
we do not have to look further back in history than the records of
our own Civil War, especially the records of the mutual relations
of the head of the War Department and some generals. That a situation
equally grave did not exist between the head of the Navy Department
and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the
number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land,
to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller
number of operations. Perhaps a still greater reason was the greater
confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops,
compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets.
Even between the Navy Department and the officers, however, mutual
respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed. This
did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the Union navy; but that
could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the Union
navy was so much superior to the Confederate.
_Co-operation between the Navy Department and the Fleet_.--In any
war with a powerful navy, into which the U. S. navy may enter,
the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet
will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that
will face us. We shall be confronted with the necessity of handling
the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost
possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet
and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action
by the department, may cause a national disaster. One of the most
important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time. In
naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great
that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly;
so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented
if that be possible. If a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart,
the thrust must be parried--_in time_.
[Illustration: STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.]