The 10th of April at two o’clock in the morning the light division

passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock the

whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different

columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced

posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre’s

columns, marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol

with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help

of some temporary bridges, when the French general following his

instructions retired to the horn-work on the Calvinet platform.

The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the

Portuguese guns under major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade

against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars,

marched from Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind

the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy

ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his

artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and

difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his

left, Vivian’s cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s

horsemen back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes which

the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last

moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge

of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a

detachment of cavalry sent there by Berton who remained himself in

position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

While these operations were in progress, general Freyre who had

asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error

or impatience assailed the horn-work on that platform about eleven

o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine

thousand strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with

great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as

to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musquetry and

great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their

centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were

exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was

also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment

wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter

into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this

part of the French entrenchments; but the left wing and the second

line run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under

colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover

of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of

their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road

poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled

in the gulph below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau,

constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to

flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals rallying the troops who had fled, led them back

again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage

below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror.

Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches

pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of

Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road

of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong

flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and

vehemence increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that point,

covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s cavalry, and the

reserve artillery which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the

Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of

the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the

victorious French who immediately retired to their entrenchments on

Calvinet: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or

wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such

occasions being known were especially given, had turned his false

attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy

fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and

approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of

nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel

Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who

commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to

the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the

allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although

general Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering

St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much

more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed.

The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time, but a prodigious

cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the

allies’ side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left

by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the

Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet

platform: injudiciously it has been said because the ammunition

thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital

advantage might have been gained.

[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.]

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford,

and yet from Picton’s error lord Wellington had no reserves to

enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry

only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to

cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery

employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached

with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton,

the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second

line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first

Taupin’s whole division, and then one of Maransin’s brigades from

that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three

divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly fifteen thousand

combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in

any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on

the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford,

whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was

cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles

through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses.

For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French

musquetry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont

Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented

so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent

halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became

narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was

ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French

divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right

flank! Fortune came to their aid. Soult always eyeing their march,

had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division

to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade

of D’Armagnac’s division disposed the whole about the redoubts.

From thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered

Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a

regiment of Vial’s cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road

and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen assailed

the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was

not half of the force which the French general might have employed.

Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets

of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took

ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his

flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action it is said, at

last poured down the hill, but some rockets discharged in good time

ravaged the ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance,

unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British

skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, and

Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade

and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an

error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert’s

brigade I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French

turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen trotting down

the Lavaur road now charged on the right flank, but the second and

third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed

them, and on the other flank general Cole had been so sudden in his

advance up the heights, that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity

to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his

front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a

check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended

in pursuit on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his left, general

Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the

height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts

were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder

sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected

so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their

resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his

success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal.

Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of

Vial’s cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the

works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and

rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the

same moment, and the mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve

immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh

order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of

the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had

decided the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the

platform on the line of the Lavaur road, menacing the flank of the

French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and

Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the

sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march

against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy.

And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the

bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of

the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the

fourth division they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from

whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns

played incessantly.

The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The

French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a

square. Their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the

redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert,

who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere while the

redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French

left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau awaited the renewed

attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not

exceeding a thousand yards on each side with the angles all defended

by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and

entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while

the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured

the power of retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, the

whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of

D’Armagnac’s, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the

St. Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division. On the allies’

side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to

be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton

being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far paralyzed, the

Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another

attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light

division, which lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the

action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a

repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left,

and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s brigade and the

fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French

troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This

heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot’s reserve, the half of

D’Armagnac’s division and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment

belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere,

was commanded by general Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in

advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o’clock, when

Beresford renewed the action with Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the

Portuguese of the sixth division under colonel Douglas. These troops,

ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, had been

hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works, but now

scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their

left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending

the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of

cannon and musquetry carried all the French breast-works, and the

Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action when

the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty

of the ground is considered; but the French although they yielded

at first to the thronging rush of the British troops soon rallied

and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their

reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe,

who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French

seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh

men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude

absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths

of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. The British troops

were however supported by the seventy-first and ninety-first, and

the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful

courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order

of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the

British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a

charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there

were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in

perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued fiercely,

the French from their numbers had certainly the advantage, but they

never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents

down from the brow of the hill. At last when the whole of the sixth

division had rallied and again assailed them, flank and front, when

their generals Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded and

the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, the battle turned,

and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by

their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of

Matabiau.

It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards during this contest had

once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight,

and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in

that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled,

and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle and receive his

artillery: it came to him indeed about this time, yet with great

difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence of the heavy

cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However

Soult seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division,

had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge

of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of

three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit,

deemed farther resistance useless and relinquished the northern end

of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock he withdrew his

whole army behind the canal, still however holding the advanced

works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the

Spaniards in the abandoned works and so became master of the Mont

Rave in all its extent. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The

French had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men killed

or wounded and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost

four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men

and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable

spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon

had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was

constituted at Paris.

During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed,

replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and

augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made

dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet

looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to

inform him of the result of the contest and proposed a combined plan

of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his

temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan

upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then

retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper

Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall

his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that

city and make a diversion in our favour.”

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the

English general was not. The French position, within musquet-shot of

the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and

eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary

step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and

other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of

throwing the army as originally designed on to the south side of the

town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and

a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the parc on

the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations,

to ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to give that

general farther instructions, lord Wellington repaired on the 11th

to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by

removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent

before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the

passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore

deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt

the communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat by the

road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the

heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations

in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would

not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his

arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals,

the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds

were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of

the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march

of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper

Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same

day general Hill’s troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit,

and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the

French with the loss of twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of

gensd’armes on the side of Revel.

Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was

displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted

the Bourbon colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had

retired with the French army. The British general, true to his

honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that

their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk, but in the

afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French

colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to make known to the

armies the abdication of Napoleon they had been detained near Blois

by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress

Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the

Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a

stop to the war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission reached

Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause,

demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities

until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers

of the emperor: then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to

Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudary and

awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede

to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban,

acknowledged the authority of the provincial government and readily

concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil

war and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on

the point of engaging when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received

official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, notified

his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France: and with this

honourable distinction that he had faithfully sustained the cause of

his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention which included Suchet’s army was immediately agreed

upon, but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours

of his own motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted the

intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops

at Bayonne. Too late it came for both and useless battles were

fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne

misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest

soldiers of the British army.

SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

During the progress of the main army in the interior sir John

Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne, with all the zeal the

intelligence and unremitting vigilance and activity which the

difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great

stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack

the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet

indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal

communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s authority.

These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps

lulled the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular

communications which might be intended to deceive the governor

naturally paid little attention.

[Sidenote: Beamish’s History of the German Legion.]

The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time

furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the

extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also

one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s German brigade

was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first

division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state,

about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming

over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an

exact account of the projected sally. The general not able to speak

French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the

man’s story to general Hay, assembled his own troops under arms,

and transmitted the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear

that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no additional

precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade

nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but

for the activity of general Hinuber. However at three o’clock the

French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as

a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three

thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts

breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with

one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne

with exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain

Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part

and overthrowing all who stood before them they drove the picquets

and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed general

Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings

of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the

whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his

Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied

some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of

general Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit bravely

gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and

church.

The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the

centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the

fury of the assault and the battle was most confused and terrible;

for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the

enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together

in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes

friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The

guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musquetry

sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of

fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river opened their fire

upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion

by sir John Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the

side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were

in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine

depôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the

striving masses.

Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew

how or wherefore at the time, but it afterwards appeared, that

having brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the torrent in

that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led

close behind the line of picquets; the French had however lined both

banks, and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck him in the

arm, while his horse, a large one as was necessary to sustain the

gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His

followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them,

captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of sir John Moore, seeing his

helpless state turned back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy

fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus

engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French

carried them all off, and sir John Hope was again severely hurt in

the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

The day was now beginning to break and the allies were enabled to

act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of

St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly

disposed, by general Howard who had succeeded to the command,

suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove

them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers

admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. But on

the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss

was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these more than

two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is

generally acknowledged that captain Forster’s firm defence of the

fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with

which general Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the

allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult

became known and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body

under the command of Suchet, but they were so little inclined to

acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the

duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy

for a sum of money to quiet them.

The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain,

the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the

Cortez against the king, but they were diverted from their purpose by

the influence and authority of lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for

England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at

Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran’s

services.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

[Sidenote: 1814.]

Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have been accused of fighting

with a full knowledge of Napoleon’s abdication. This charge

circulated originally by the Bourbon party is utterly unfounded. The

extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced

posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to

induce sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor

could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him,

and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the

works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay impossible,

must it not have appeared, that the emperor Napoleon, whose victories

at Mont-Mirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment

of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a

few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts

without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.

As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.

[Sidenote: Memoirs of captain Kincaid.]

The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the duke of

Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly

have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain

himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable: but

there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was

the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the

provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could

not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct

way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession

of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually

invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached

the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was

lord Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore

bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the

most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army

and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny

success. He also was the person of all others called upon, by honour,

gratitude, justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of

his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his

inhuman adversary.

Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny?

Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated

the accusation in the house of lords and reviled the minister for

being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime.

Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that

marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know

of the emperor’s abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable

distinction of sporting with men’s lives by wholesale attaches to

no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the

murderer of Glencoe. And though marshal Soult had known of the

emperor’s abdication he could not for that have been justly placed

beside that cold-blooded prince, who fought at St. Denis with the

peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because “_he would not deny himself

a safe lesson in his trade_.”

The French marshal was at the head of a brave army and it was

impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been

constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and

other intriguers, forming a provisional government, self-instituted

and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect

from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor’s legal

power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong

enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become

the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France

even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine it was a question of

patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general

of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference always

to the real will and desire of the people at large.

It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the

battle and when he had seen colonel St. Simon.

[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]

Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says, “The circumstances which

preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create

astonishment. The 7th the provisional government informed me of

the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and

7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th the

duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice,

that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately

forward to me another. The 9th the prince Berthier vice-constable and

major-general, wrote to me from Fontainbleau, transmitting the copy

of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with

the allied powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force

and condition of my army; but neither the prince nor the duke of

Feltre mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a proclamation

of the empress, dated the 3rd, _which forbade us to recognize any

thing coming from Paris_.

“The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army

under the orders of lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the

French army the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the allies

from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington might perhaps have

dispensed with it.

“The 12th I received through the English the first hint of the events

at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused, I renewed the

demand it was again refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse,

and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted

and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each

other. The 19th I ratified this convention and gave my adhesion to

the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought

to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I

manifested my sentiments in order that my will and that of the army

should be free. _That neither France nor posterity should have power

to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will

of the nation was a homage I owed to my country_.”

The reader will observe in the above letter certain assertions,

relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the

allies, which are at variance with the statements in this History;

and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse

force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration by some French

writers, who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army

although the French general himself made no such claim at the time,

and so far as appears has not done so since.

_Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences._ By this

test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse.

Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject,

including the generals on both sides, are agreed, that Soult

fortified Toulouse the canal and the Mont Rave as positions of

battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin’s division was beaten,

that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts and entrenchments fell into

the allies’ power. Finally that the French army abandoned Toulouse,

leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred men, several

guns and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries:

and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any

remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere.

[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 29th March.]

[Sidenote: Soult to Suchet, 7th April.]

Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or

voluntary? Let the French general speak! “I have entrenched the

suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy

will not I think attack me there unless he desires to lose a part

of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the

Garonne two leagues above the city, but he will probably try to

pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force

may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut

off from Montauban where I have made a bridge-head.”—“I think the

enemy will not move on your side _unless I move that way first,

and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can_.”—“If I could

remain a month on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight

thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarass me, and who

want arms which I expect with great impatience from Perpignan.”—“I

am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the

superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a _position_,

which, _supported by the town and the canal_, furnishes me with

a retrenched camp susceptible of defence.”—“I have received the

unhappy news of the enemy’s entrance into Paris. This misfortune

strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen.

The preservation of the place which contains establishments of all

kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily I am

forced to quit it, my movements will naturally bring me nearer to

you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because

the enemy will inevitably follow me.”—“The enemy appears astonished

at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse, four days ago

he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the bad

weather is the cause.”

[Sidenote: Soult’s Orders.]

[Sidenote: Choumara.]

From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible

not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight

for the preservation of his communications with Montauban; yet he

finally resigned this important object for the more important one of

defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that

having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery

not of immediate utility, to be sent away, he on the 2d of April

forbade further progress in that work and even had those things

already removed brought back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to

abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and

consequences of defeat.

These points being fixed, we find him on the evening of the 10th

writing to the same general thus.

“The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has

been horribly maltreated, but he succeeded in _establishing himself

upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse_. The

general of division Taupin has been killed, general Harispe has lost

his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded.

I am prepared to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but _I do

not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even happen that I shall

be forced to open a passage to get out_.”

On the 11th of April he writes again:

“As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in the necessity

of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my

way at Baziege where the enemy is directing a column to cut my

communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche,

because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my

passing.”

To the minister of war he also writes on the 10th.

“To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend

myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army

in march, yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to

abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so

as to rally upon the troops of the duke of Albufera.”

Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events

previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were

fulfilled to the letter. That is to say, the loss of the position

of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to

join Suchet. On the other hand lord Wellington clearly obtained all

that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it;

he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave and he did win

them; he desired to enter Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror

at the head of his troops.

Amongst the French writers who without denying these facts lay claim

to a victory Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman,

known as an able engineer, with a praise-worthy desire to render

justice to the great capacity of marshal Soult, shews very clearly

that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater

lustre if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a

cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara heated by his subject completes the

picture by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal himself

appears not to recognize. The work is a very valuable historical

document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but

with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as

to facts, and the inferences are untenable though the premises were

admitted.

The substance of Mr. Choumara’s argument is, that the position of

Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress. That the canal was the real

position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which

weighed little in the balance, because the French army was victorious

at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes

against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton,

at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally that the French general

certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and

did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night.

Now admitting that all these facts were established, the fortress was

still taken.

But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first marshal Soult

himself tells Suchet that the Mont Rave was his _position of battle_,

and that the town and the canal _supported it_. Nothing could be

more accurate than this description. For when he lost the Mont

Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take

measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the

canal untenable, why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of

the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont

Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not

necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon and

the bridge of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the canal

would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French

in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Lord

Wellington once established on the south side of the city and holding

the Pech David could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet,

above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with

Hill; the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no

easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave

was therefore not only the position of battle, it was also the key of

the position behind the canal, and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this

dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main

position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was

sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]

But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the

Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of

movements for the battle proves indeed that this general’s attack was

intended to be a false one; he disobeyed his orders however, and one

of his brigades was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss of

three or four hundred men, is a small matter in a battle where more

than eighty thousand combatants were engaged.

[Sidenote: Official Returns.]

The light division made a demonstration against the convent of

the Minimes and nothing more. Its loss on the whole day was only

fifty-six men and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula

but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless

division could be so stopped.

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien was

occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the

allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from

that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have been the object,

General Hill got possession of it, and was so far victorious. He was

ordered not to assail the second line seriously and he did not, for

his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and officers.

From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the French gained an

advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards;

but Beresford’s attack was so decisive as to counterbalance these

failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the

height they had originally contended for in vain.

Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford’s success to Taupin’s errors and to

a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. “Fifty-three

thousand infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, and a reserve of

eighteen thousand men of all arms, opposed to twenty-five thousand

French infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve of

seven thousand conscripts three thousand of which were unarmed.” Such

is the enormous disproportion assumed on the authority of general

Vaudoncourt.

[Sidenote: Kock’s Campaign of 1814.]

Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen

are the best judges of his demerit; but the numbers here assumed

are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later

date than December 1813, yet an official table of the organization

of Soult’s army, published by the French military historian Kock,

gives thirty-six thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on

the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, twenty-eight thousand

six hundred were infantry, two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and

five thousand seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers, miners,

sappers, gensd’armes, and military workmen. Nothing is said of the

reserve division of conscripts commanded by general Travot, but

general Vaudoncourt’s table of the same army on the 1st of April,

adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are

there set down seven thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this

cipher being added to Kock’s, gives a total of forty-three thousand

nine hundred fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from

the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but on the

other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th

of March, that three thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of

Orthes were still wandering behind the army: the greatest part must

have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular

garrison of that city, composed of the depôts of several regiments

and the urban guards, all under Travot. Thus little less than fifty

thousand men were at Soult’s disposal.

Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1º. the urban guard which was

only employed to maintain the police of the town, 2º. the unarmed

conscripts, 3º. the military workmen not brought into action, 4º.

the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with La Fitte

in the Arriege, and to reinforce general Loverdo at Montauban. There

will remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all arms. And

with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult after the action,

directing seven field-batteries of eight pieces each to attend the

army; and the French writers mention, besides this field-train, 1º.

fifteen pieces which were transferred during the battle from the

exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts. 2º.

Four twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders mounted on

the walls of the city. 3º. The armaments of the bridge-heads, the

works on Calvinet and those at Saccarin and Cambon. Wherefore not

less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of French artillery were

engaged.

An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made

it remains to show the number of the allies, and with respect to

the Anglo-Portuguese troops that can be done very exactly, not by

approximative estimates but positively from the original returns.

[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.]

The morning state delivered to lord Wellington on the 10th of April

bears forty-three thousand seven hundred and forty-four British

and Germans, and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three

Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five hundred and thirty-seven

soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillery-men.

Of this number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven hundred and

eighty-eight being Portuguese.

The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina’s bands investing St. Jean

Pied de Port, were 1º. Giron’s Andalusians and the third army under

O’Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2º. The Gallicians under general Freyre,

fourteen thousand. 3º. Three thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as

many more under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of

ninety thousand combatants with somewhat more than a hundred pieces

of field-artillery.

[Sidenote: See note at the end of the Appendix.]

[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sections 6 and 7.]

Of this force, O’Donnel’s troops were in the valley of the Bastan,

Longa’s on the Upper Ebro; one division of Freyre’s Gallicians was

under Carlos D’España in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo’s

division was blockading Navarens, the other half and the nine

thousand Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of

Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions, and

three unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of cavalry,

were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at

Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march

from the Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen

were partly employed on the communications in the rear, partly near

Agen, where sir John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment had an

engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partizan Florian. The

second, third, fourth, sixth, and light divisions of infantry, and

Le Cor’s Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with lord

Wellington, who had also Bock’s, Ponsonby’s, Fane’s, Vivian’s, and

lord E. Somerset’s brigades of cavalry.

These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered under arms, in round

numbers, thirty-one thousand infantry, of which four thousand three

hundred were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving twenty-six

thousand and six hundred bayonets. Add twelve thousand Spaniards

under Freyre and Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand

five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to seven thousand, and

there were sixty-four pieces of artillery. Hence about fifty-two

thousand of all ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight

thousand French with more than eighty pieces of artillery, some being

of the largest calibre.

But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men with fifty-two guns

can be said to have been seriously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres

and bayonets with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne

under general Hill. Neither the light division nor Ponsonby’s heavy

cavalry, nor Bock’s Germans were really engaged. Wherefore twelve

thousand six hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine

thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand five hundred

of Picton’s division really fought the battle. Thus the enormous

disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for

if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry,

and horsemen were of little avail against the entrenched position and

preponderating artillery of the French general.

The duke of Dalmatia’s claim to the admiration of his countrymen is

well-founded and requires no vain assumption to prop it up. Vast

combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment,

unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering

fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can

justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of only nine months,

although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his

countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places

and entrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself

would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations

and either attacking or defending delivered twenty-four battles and

combats. Defeated in all he yet fought the last as fiercely as the

first, remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing

the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts.

Those efforts were fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because

the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse;

because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world

at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians

were at Arbela, Hannibal’s Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar’s Romans at

Pharsalia, Napoleon’s guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington’s

British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at

Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse. Six years of

uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and

fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by

this measure Soult’s firmness and the constancy of his army is to be

valued, and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at

Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put

forward rather than suppress.

Was he not a great general who being originally opposed on the Adour

by nearly double his own numbers, for such was the proportion after

the great detachments were withdrawn from the French army by the

emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his able

marches and combinations, oblige his adversary to employ so many

troops for blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse

his army was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing

to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier,

and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most

astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour. And this not

because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force

of combinations which embracing all the advantages offered by the

country left him no option.

That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important

was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the

leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he says because the place

could not hold out fifteen days without the entrenched camp, and

the latter required men; but the result proved Napoleon’s sagacity,

for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp,

and on the 18th of March lord Wellington knew not the real force

of the garrison. Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to

blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of gathering the

necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the

siege though resolved upon was not even commenced on the 14th of

April when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence

the citadel could not even with a weaker garrison have been taken

before the end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé’s division

of six thousand good troops in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse.

Had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to

bar lord Wellington’s progress altogether, especially in the latter

position. Here it is impossible not to admire the sagacity of the

English general, who from the first was averse to entering France

and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great

reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed

to organize a Bourbon army. What could he have done if Soult had

retained the twenty thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had

joined, or the people had taken arms?

How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he

trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne

below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed

the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties lord

Wellington had to encounter have been already touched upon. But

Mr. Choumara has assumed that the English general’s reason for

relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of

the 27th, was not the want of pontoons but the fear of being attacked

during the operation, adducing in proof Soult’s orders to assail the

heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three

days after the attempt of which Soult appears to have known nothing

at the time: they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington

wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid general Hill

while descending the Arriege. And what reason has any man to suppose

that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a

like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of

a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive

was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the rest

of the army was more difficult, Soult’s disposable force larger, his

counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution.

At Portet the passage, designed for the night season, would have

been a surprise, and the whole army, drawn close to that side could

have been thrown over in three or four hours with the exception of

the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien.

Soult’s orders did not embrace such an operation. They directed

Clauzel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in

the disorder of a later passage which was expected and watched for.

General Clauzel having four divisions in hand was no doubt a

formidable enemy, and Soult’s notion of defending the river by a

counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one

thing to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only

issued on the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the

Arriege. Lord Wellington’s design was then not to force a passage

at Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack St. Cyprien

when Hill should have descended the Arriege. Nor did Soult himself

much expect Clauzel would have any opportunity to attack, for in his

letter to the minister of war he said, the positions between the

Arriege and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French and his

intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the

south; yet he still believed Hill’s movement to be only a blind and

that lord Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.

[Sidenote: Notes by general Berton, MSS.]

The French general’s views and measures were profoundly reasoned

but extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to

secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of

St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes.

He thus gained time, and as he felt sure that the allies could not

act in the Arriege district, he next directed his attention to the

bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and

the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile

contrary to his expectation lord Wellington did attempt to act

on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of necessity in

observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon

however he had proof that his first notion was well-founded, that his

adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse;

wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont

Rave and prepare a field of battle on the northern and eastern

fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the

wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced lord Wellington

to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and

being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first

design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the

line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse then became his

great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which

befel lord Wellington’s bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French

and English, have blamed him for letting slip that opportunity of

attacking Beresford. It is said that general Reille first informed

him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack

the troops on the right bank; but Choumara has well defended him on

that point; the distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the

works on the Mount Rave would have stood still meanwhile, and the

allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien.

[Sidenote: Morning State of lord Wellington, 4th of April, MSS.]

Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for Beresford, or rather

for himself, because each day he passed the river in a boat and

remained on that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand

including sergeants and officers, principally British; his position

was on a gentle range the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne;

he had eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was likewise

flanked by thirty other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor

was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not

have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the

rest of the army pass on his rear, unless, reverting to his original

design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now

matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to

strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all

directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the

Mount Rave where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed.

He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not entrench

the Hill of Pugade. Choumara holds that troops placed there would

have been endangered without adequate advantage. This does not seem

conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height, it might

have been entrenched with works open to the rear, and St. Pol’s

brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed

there without any entrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up

the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this

would have cost men. It is therefore probable that want of time

caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error

during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin’s division

only when he could have employed D’Armagnac’s and Villatte’s likewise

in that attack. He should have fallen on him also while in the deep

country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of

the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre was

defeated, the light division was protecting the fugitives, and one

of Maransin’s brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced

the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet platform.

Beresford’s column entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery

and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted

such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington can scarcely escape

criticism for placing him in that predicament.

A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of

their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring,

and the English general who could not remain inactive before Toulouse

was not deterred by danger or difficulty: twice he passed the broad

and rapid Garonne and reckless of his enemy’s strength and skill

worked his way to a crowning victory. This was hardihood, greatness.

But in Beresford’s particular attack he did not overstep the rules

of art, he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged by the

shock is owing to his good fortune the fierceness of his soldiers and

the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown

on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if

by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank.

Beresford’s failure would have been absolute ruin and that alone

refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of

attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavaur road to

assail the platform of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered

to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and because the

platform of Calvinet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly

entrenched than that of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too

much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns, and

quite separated from the rest of the army seeing that the cavalry

intended to maintain the connection were unable to act in that miry

labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of

carrying the strongest part of the Calvinet platform, Beresford’s

fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this

same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, and an advanced

guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault

would then have been made with unity, by a great mass and on the

most important point: for the conquest of St. Sypiere was but a step

towards that of Calvinet, but the conquest of Calvinet would have

rendered St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed that

the Spaniards attacked too soon and their dispersion exceeded all

reasonable calculation: so panic-stricken they were as to draw from

lord Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen

many curious spectacles but never before saw ten thousand men running

a race.

Soult’s retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was

made in the night. This proves the difficulty of his situation.

Nevertheless it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his

adversary’s generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under

the allies’ guns as an English writer has erroneously assumed. For

first those guns had no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord

Wellington though eager to fall upon him on the 11th could not do

so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great

canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point

occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant. Nor

do I believe that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever

designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal

of military insolvency to which his proposal, that Suchet should join

him at Carcassone and retake the offensive, written on the night of

the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French

warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are

ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of

war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts

to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let

some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent

sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded

energy: the fear of death never checks him he will attempt anything.

But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance

wears his fury out; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the

sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle more full and

terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong

unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column before

whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given

way.

Napoleon’s system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and

augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of

the national character. His discipline, severe but appealing to the

feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the

French soldiers to patience under hardships and strong endurance

under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents,

to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to

dare every thing even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous

valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their

attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and

to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and

the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine

spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same

confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed,

nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier,

but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of

their exploits surpassed those of all other nations: the Romans not

excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the

Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so

great and important was but an episode in their military history,

be considered. “_In Spain large armies will starve and small armies

will be beaten_” was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and this was

no light phrase of an indolent monarch but the profound conclusion

of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon’s enormous armies were so

wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six

years, and without cessation, for to them winters and summers were

alike. Their large armies endured incredible toils and privations

but were not starved out, nor were their small armies beaten by the

Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a single fact recorded

by lord Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong

place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at

them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed

the siege! Before the British troops they fell, but how terrible was

the struggle! how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave

men they slew, what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred

before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And

this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were

capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud

the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the

merit of his constancy. England could not alone have triumphed in the

struggle, but for her share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let

this brief summary speak.

She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own

operations, she subsidised Spain and Portugal besides, and with

her supplies of clothing arms and ammunition maintained the armies

of both even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand

British troops were employed by her constantly, and while her naval

squadrons continually harassed the French with descents upon the

coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and

innumerable combats; they made or sustained ten sieges, took four

great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved

Alicant, Carthagena, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed wounded and took

about two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand

British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the

Peninsula.

Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native army and supplied

officers who led it to victory, and to the whole Peninsula she gave a

general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and

more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula from France!

The duke of Wellington’s campaigns furnish lessons for generals of

all nations, but they must always be peculiarly models for British

commanders in future continental wars, because he modified and

reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties

which attend generals controlled by politicians who depending upon

private intrigue prefer parliamentary to national interests. An

English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk

much however conscious he may be of personal resources when one

disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must therefore

be subordinate to this primary consideration. Lord Wellington’s

caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike

into wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The French call it

want of enterprize, timidity; the English have denominated it the

Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as

that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it

with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight;

and thus prepared he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the

offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his

art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural

genius, but always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically

a pains-taking man.

That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution,

neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon must be

admitted, and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed

that he learned something of the art from that greatest of all

masters; yet something besides the difference of genius must be

allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never even in

his first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as Wellington

was by the English Spanish and Portuguese governments. Their systems

of war were however alike in principle, their operations being

necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great

bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to

protect their flanks and communications without scattering their

forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring;

in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, but

always operating by the flanks in preference to the front: in these

things they were alike, but in following up a victory the English

general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington

was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The

battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before

which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards

covering all.

Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprize to

be discerned in the English general’s campaigns. Neither was he of

the Fabian school. He recommended that commander’s system to the

Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. His military policy

more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal’s

veterans, red with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on

the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and

valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible

military resources of Rome. Lord Wellington was never loath to

fight when there was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal

with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack Junot who had

twenty-four thousand. At Roliça he was the assailant, at Vimiera

he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during

the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the

daring and successful assailant. In the Talavera campaign he took

the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained

the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive,

because the Portuguese army was young and untried, but his pursuit of

Massena in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously so,

as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at

a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including

the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera the first siege of Badajos

and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the

campaign of Salamanca; but the campaign of Vittoria and that in the

south of France were entirely and eminently offensive.

Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for

the Englishman’s hardiness and enterprise bear witness the passage

of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming

of Badajos, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to

Vittoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle,

the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, the

crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is

only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a

great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want

of light. How few of his combinations failed. How many battles he

fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure

vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of

laborious minute investigation and arrangement; all these qualities

he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty of coming to

prompt and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This is the

certain mark of a master spirit in war, without it a commander may

be distinguished, he may be a great man, but he cannot be a great

captain: where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed

the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment.

At the Somosierra, Napoleon’s sudden and what to those about him

appeared an insensate order, sent the Polish cavalry successfully

charging up the mountain when more studied arrangements with ten

times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not

yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would

have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun’s refusal to charge with

his cavalry saved general Craufurd’s division, the loss of which

would have gone far towards producing the evacuation of Portugal.

At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day,

and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that

formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly

suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been

decisive. At Albuera, Soult’s column of attack instead of pushing

forward halted to fire from the first height they had gained on

Beresford’s right, which saved that general from an early and total

defeat; again at a later period of that battle the unpremeditated

attack of the fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa, general

Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched the victory at the very

moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even

the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it if

general Reynier had possessed this essential quality of a general.

At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity

which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At

Orthes, Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies

with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.

At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a

signal illustration of this intuitive generalship, but at Busaco and

the heights of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena

and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand

he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in

which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden

retreat from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his

passage of the Douro in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the face of

Marmont’s overwhelming numbers; the battle of Salamanca; his sudden

rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria;

his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; his battle of

the 30th two days afterwards; his sudden passage of the Gave below

Orthes. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs

are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive

perception which distinguishes the greatest generals.

Fortune however always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from

a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow that in every

age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial.

Napoleon’s march upon Madrid in 1808 before he knew the exact

situation of the British army is an example. By that march he lent

his flank to his enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage and

though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his

astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula

was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore,

Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized

for resistance, and the jealousy of the Spaniards would never

have suffered Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that

general’s after-successes would then have been with the things that

are unborn. It was not so ordained. Wellington was victorious, the

great conqueror was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant

nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied

people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without

intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and

threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a

stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the

smallest insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms which cannot

be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage,

obedience, modesty and temperance, excites the brave man’s patriotism

and is a chastening corrective for the rich man’s pride. It is yet no

security for power. Napoleon the greatest man of whom history makes

mention, Napoleon the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious

politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland,

Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. Fortune, that name for

the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and

without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled

ocean.

[Illustration: _Nº. 1. Vol. 6._

_Explanatory_

Sketch

_of the_

CATALONIAN OPERATIONS

1813-14

_with the Plan of a_

position at

CAPE SALOU

_proposed by_

GEN^L. DONKIN

_to_

SIR S. MURRAY.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 2. Vol. 6._

_Explanatory_

Sketch of

SOULT’S OPERATIONS

_to relieve_

PAMPELUNA

July 1813

BATTLE OF THE 28^{th}.

Enlarged

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 3. Vol. 6._

Combat of

MAYA

July 25^{th}.

1813.

Combat of

RONCESVALLES

July 25^{th}.

1813.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 4. Vol. 6._

_Explanatory_

Sketch

_of the_

ASSAULT OF S^T. SEBASTIAN

August 31^{st}.

1813.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 5. Vol. 6._

Explanatory Sketch

of

Soult’s passage of the

Bidassoa,

Aug^t. 31^{st}.

_And_

Lord Wellington’s

Passage _of that_ River

October 7^{th}.

1813.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 6. Vol. 6._

Explanatory Sketch

of

The Battle of the Nivelle,

Nov^r. 10^{th}.

1813.

Centre Attack

Right Attack

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 7. Vol. 6._

Explanatory Sketch

_of the_

Operations round

Bayonne

in

Dec^r. & Feb^y.

1813-1814.

Battle of the

10^{th}. Dec^r.

1813.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 8. Vol. 6._

Explanatory

Sketch

_of the_

Passage of the Nive,

And

Battle of S^t. Pierre;

December

9^{th}. and 13^{th}.

1813.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 9. Vol. 6._

Explanatory Sketch

of the Battle

of Orthez;

And the Retreat of Soult,

To Aire:

1814.

_Drawn by Col. Napier_ _London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._

]

[Illustration: _Nº. 10. Vol. 6._

Explanatory Sketch

_of the_

operations

_about_

Tarbes,

_and the_

Battle of Toulouse.

_London, Pub^d. by T. & W. BOONE, 1840._ _Drawn by Col. Napier_

]

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

_Lord William Bentinck to sir E. Pellew._

_At sea, June 18th, 1813._

SIR,

Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack

upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It

seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should

reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily,

or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the

intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily

in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The most important

question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy.—I have no

difficulty in saying on my part, that in the present disposition

of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any

national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force,

if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily

the island would be conquered.

(Signed) W. BENTINCK.

_Sir E. Pellew to lord W. Bentinck._

_H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813._

MY LORD,

I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the

Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N.

W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres islands,

without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may

have from twelve to twenty-four hours’ start of me in chasing them.

When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me

such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to

the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether

in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French admiral

would be able to embark Murat’s army artillery and stores, and land

them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them.—The facility

of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would

certainly apprize Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but

for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking

them either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily before

they could make good their landing.

_Lord Wm. Bentinck to lord Wellington._

_At sea, June 20th, 1813._

MY LORD,

By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to lord Castlereagh,

your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negociation

with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility

to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with

Murat’s agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat

to hold twenty thousand men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily

in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter

I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his

answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without

the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have

received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my dispatch

to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan

troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of

danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this

circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions

which had been withdrawn from Spain.

_Lord Wellington to lord William Bentinck._

_Huarte, July 1st, 1813._

MY LORD,

In answer to your lordship’s despatch, I have to observe, that

I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger

whatever.

No. II.

_Letter from general Nugent to lord William Bentinck._

_Vienna, January 24th, 1812._

MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,

I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after

my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his

departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his

letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result

it would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor

and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of

sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then

destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused

the delay of the present which otherwise you would have had much

sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you

of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations

that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose relative

to the arch-duke. There was no decisive answer given, and the only

manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing

and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly

convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is

only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more

positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly

in La Tour’s affair which has produced no change whatsoever nor led

to any discovery of views or connexions. There is even now less

difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They

get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming

to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to

which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is

not even requisite and I am convinced that when the thing is once

done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King’s and Hardenberg’s

and Johnson’s opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to

express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here

makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient in the

Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.

They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in

England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much pleased with

the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs

of Prussia. These are however not decided yet. But whatever the

consequence may be and whatever this country may do for the present,

I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much

to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from

England that every thing seems to have been settled there by you.

The recruiting business of major Burke is going on rapidly. As it

was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it

to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is

come to the most favorable resolutions relative to the arch-duke,

and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated.

The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good

as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis and without

that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the

same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be

very expedient, to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat

regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be

much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited

in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint.

The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at

all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to

Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary

orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the

place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He

knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people,

and understands every thing that relates to commercial affairs. As

to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to

you. Lissa or one of the nearer islands would give too much jealousy

in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as

to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important

to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to

be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time.

Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean.

They will be directed to Messina where I request you will send orders

for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for

transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to

establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and

the latter. Johnson who soon sets off from here will in the meantime

establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in

those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find

that he is an able active and zealous man and will certainly be very

useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy

of your full confidence, should you adopt the proposition relative

to the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the

requisite funds.

You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you

whether cloth &c. can be had at a cheaper rate from this country

or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this

object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have

clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many

important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the

Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope however not to be

detained much longer and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think

to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will

be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the

means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned

name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I

shall endeavour to hasten my journey as I have important information

in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative

to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an

alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi’s journey. Part of your

object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy

&c. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in the

army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government

in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person

of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions,

and he will go to Milan &c. as soon as it can be done with safety.

His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that

he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you

have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time,

you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not.

Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged

relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person

for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will

for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed it

hitherto being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of

giving all possible extent to the arch-duke’s establishment, and

particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all

will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of

augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The

place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is

much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined

by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted

in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers

particularly acquainted with the country and provide every other

assistance such as plans &c. and I think it would be expedient to

prevent for the present any enterprize in that country that would

alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris.

The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready

for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north and

every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg

that he would begin in April and all circumstances seem to agree

with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace

with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is

to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte

notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavouring to prevent it. I

should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house well

inclined as the emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no

resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out.

The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which

prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half

measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the

wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation

to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised

at any thing they may do. On the other side our speculations are

not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and

whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if

the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of

mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case

that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the

augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition.

The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you

have give me the best hopes of your overcoming every difficulty.

I must yet observe that as Johnson’s proceedings are entirely

subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in

general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be

so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and

assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall

combine with him in my passage through Bosnia every thing in the

hopes that you will approve of this.

_Letter from Mr. King to lord William Bentinck._

_Vienna, January 24th, 1812._

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s

letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the

latter end of October by captain Frizzi whom I should immediately

have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose

of carrying your lordship’s instructions into effect, had it not

appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival

here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship’s

intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for

your lordship’s perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers

whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining

the state of the public mind, particularly in the ci-devant Venetian

territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very

satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through

various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are

ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity

to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable. I have also

the honour to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from

count Montgelas, the minister of foreign affairs in Bavaria, to

the commissary-general at Nimpten, from which it appears that the

Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of

the Swiss and Tyroleze, but I am happy to have it in my power to

inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the

suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of

our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with

their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we

should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of

emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the

alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least

occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously

consulted with general N. to whom captain Frizzi was particularly

addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion) I think it

eligible to send this officer back to Sicily and I trust that in so

doing I shall meet with your lordship’s approbation. I beg leave to

observe that the only service captain Frizzi could render in Italy at

the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution

of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual

changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential

agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at

a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the

French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such

intelligence.

The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France

and Russia in the month of April at which period the preparations of

the French government will be completed, and there is little reason

to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval,

either to annihilate the army of the duchy of Warsaw or to advance to

the assistance of the king of Prussia, who will in all probability

ally himself with France notwithstanding his former declarations to

the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that count

St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which

demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses,

and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being

placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted

that the king is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals,

but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to

inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is

highly discouraging; the injudicial financial measures which count

Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for

government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have

considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however

still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The

government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the

approaching crisis if possible.

In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of

establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers &c.

&c. and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state

of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated

assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those

parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion

of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake

off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present

moment not to neglect an object of this nature I have desired Mr.

Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connections in Albania,

Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the

spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr.

Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past

as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and

abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to

some other town in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic and will there

reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his

arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible.