[Sidenote: Notes by general Reille and colonel De la Chasse, MSS.]

4º. The position adopted by the French general at Orthes was

excellent for offence. It was not so for defence, when Beresford and

Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could

then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication

with Hope, after which outflanking the right of the French he could

seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their

magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire, and force them to retreat by

the Pau road leaving open the way to Bordeaux. To await this attack

was therefore an error, but Soult’s original design was to assail the

head of the first column which should come near him and Beresford’s

approach to Baïghts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true

that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general’s

march too late and marred the combination, but there was still time

to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in

the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading

from the ford to the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal

appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive

position in which to receive battle.

However when the morning came he neglected another opportunity.

For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to

him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through

the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main

road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room

to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford who

was then in march by the heights of Baïghts to the Dax road. If

the French general had pushed a column across the marsh to seize

the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies;

then pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy’s, D’Armagnac’s and

Villatte’s divisions he would probably have overwhelmed the third

division before the other two could have extricated themselves from

the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.

With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes,

fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect

his retreat across the Luy of Bearn, but twice in twenty-four hours

he had neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth

and flight at the same instant; and as the value of his position,

essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike

may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless

a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing the human proportions, but

will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated

defeats, Soult in this campaign as in many others proved himself a

hardy captain full of resources.

5º. Lord Wellington with a vastness of conception and a capacity

for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed

in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of

inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns with

which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which

especially constitutes military genius. For so vast so complicated

are the combinations of war, so easily and by such slight causes are

they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and

they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of

their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of

commanders is to be measured.

In this campaign lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not

with a hasty incursion but solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne,

and if possible in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was the

direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the emperor, and

the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended;

because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally if

by operating against Soult’s left he could throw the French army

into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would

probably be destroyed.

To operate against Soult’s left in the direction of Pau was the most

obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering

the positions which the French general had fortified on the Gaves

useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force, which

was yet weak against an outer attack because separated in three parts

by the rivers; hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement on

Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army

and then fallen upon Hope’s troops on the right side of that river.

The English general was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted

line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this he collected his

principal mass on his right by the help of the great road leading to

St. Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks

he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had

fortified for defence, and so turned that general’s left with the

view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the

wilderness of the Landes. During these marches he left Beresford on

the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy’s attention and

cover the troops blockading Mousseroles. Meanwhile by the collection

of boats at Urt and other demonstrations indicating a design of

throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention

from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at

the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the

Port de Lannes to secure the communication with Hope by the right

bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were

fine combinations.

I have shown that Beresford’s corps was so weak at first that Soult

might have struck a counter-blow. Lord Wellington admitted the error.

Writing on the 15th he says, “If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I

am not so strong as I ought to be,” and he ordered up the fourth and

light divisions; but this excepted, his movements were conformable

to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of

operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the

enemy’s weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring.

His conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had

two distinct operations in hand, namely to throw his bridge below

Bayonne and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain

these objects but dared not use them lest he should put the Spanish

troops into contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely

dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo

to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put

his whole army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of military

strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless

so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel

lawless habits that their mere return across the frontier threw the

whole country into consternation.

6º. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight appear as if lord

Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes,

but it was not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is

proved by his letter to sir John Hope in which he tells that general

that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on

the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed

to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest

and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with

Hope and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he

finally worked by his left it was a sudden act and extraneous to the

general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill’s corps and

the light division by the right.

It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the morning of the 27th

lord Wellington first discovered Soult’s intention to fight, and that

consequently he was himself in a false position. Had he shewn any

hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive

position with either Beresford’s or Picton’s troops, he would

inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous

situation. Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the

instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently

pushed Picton’s skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of

the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their

right, and this with all the coolness imaginable. The success was

complete. Soult who supposed the allies stronger than they really

were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well

supported in the centre where the Roman camp could hide a multitude.

He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more

developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and

the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides but the crisis

was decided by the fifty-second, and when that regiment was put in

movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the

Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time and place does the

fate of battles turn.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]

7º. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at

Orthes, and it has been said that lord Wellington’s wound at the

most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army.

Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French general carried his

troops away, his prompt judgement, shown in the sudden change of his

line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted

and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all

proofs of no common ability. It was Wellington’s aim to drive the

French on to the Landes, Soult’s to avoid this, he therefore shifted

from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, not in confusion but

with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground.

The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his; he had

given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen

days before, but the matter depending upon the civil authorities

was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting

at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and

essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers

under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And here the

palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of

Orthes was less decisive than it should have been. I speak not of the

pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day’s march upon St.

Sever, but of Hill’s march on the right. That general halted near

Samade the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st and fought

the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2d of March. But from

Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin where

he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed

it so, have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived, and thus

spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed

that his attack did not receive a right direction. It should have

been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted

there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire

from, that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the

left. This was however an accident of war, general Hill had no time

to examine the ground, his orders were to attack, and to fall without

hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was

undoubtedly the right thing to do; but it cannot be said that lord

Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm

on the evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill and should

not have given the French army time to recover from their recent

defeat. “The secret of war,” says Napoleon, “is to march twelve

leagues, fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.”

CHAPTER III.

[Sidenote: 1814. March.]

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]

Extremely perilous and disheartening was the situation of the French

general. His army was greatly reduced by his losses in battle and

by the desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand stragglers,

old soldiers who ought to have rejoined their eagles, were collected

by different generals, into whose districts they had wandered, and

employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored

to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent the natural

offspring of misfortune prevailed amongst his officers, a powerful

enemy was in front, no certain resources of men or money behind, and

his efforts were ill-seconded by the civil authorities. The troops

indignant at the people’s apathy behaved with so much violence and

insolence, especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that Soult,

who wanted officers very badly, proposed to fill the vacancies

from the national guards that he might have “men who would respect

property.” On the other hand the people comparing the conduct of

their own army with the discipline of the Anglo-Portuguese, and

contrasting the requisitions necessarily imposed by their countrymen

with the ready and copious disbursements in gold made by their

enemies, for now one commissary preceded each division to order

rations for the troops and another followed to arrange and pay on

the spot, were become so absolutely averse to the French army that

Soult writing to the minister of war thus expressed himself. “If the

population of the departments of the Landes of Gers, and the Lower

Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is the moment to

make the enemy suffer by carrying off his convoys and prisoners, but

they appear more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the

army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage for transport and

I shall not be surprised to find in a short time these inhabitants

taking arms against us.” Soult was however a man formed by nature

and by experience to struggle against difficulties, always appearing

greater when in a desperate condition than when more happily

circumstanced. At Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia,

he had been inured to military distress, and probably for that

reason the emperor selected him to sustain this dangerous contest in

preference to others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of

battle.

On the 3d and 4th he retreated by Plaissance and Madiran to

Rabastens, Marciac, and Maubourget where he halted, covering Tarbes,

for his design was to keep in mass and await the development of the

allies’ plans. In this view he called in the detachments of cavalry

and infantry which had been left on the side of Pau before the battle

of Orthes, and hearing that Darricau was at Langon with a thousand

men he ordered him to march by Agen and join the army immediately.

He likewise put the national guards and _gensd’armes_ in activity on

the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the commanders of the military

districts in his rear to keep their old soldiers, of which there were

many scattered through the country, in readiness to aid the army.

While thus acting he received from the minister of war a note

dictated by the emperor.

“Fortresses,” said Napoleon, “are nothing in themselves when the

enemy having the command of the sea can collect as many shells and

bullets and guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore only a

few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent the siege is to keep the

army close to the place. Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other

of the enemy’s wings, and though you should have but twenty thousand

men if you seize the proper moment and attack hardily you ought to

gain some advantage. You have enough talent to understand my meaning.”

This note came fourteen days too late. But what if it had come

before? Lord Wellington after winning the battle of St. Pierre the

13th of December was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne,

and able to interrupt the French convoys as they descended from the

Port de Landes. It was evident then that when dry weather enabled

the allies to move Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the passage

of the Gaves, or risk being turned and driven upon the Landes from

whence it would be difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however

desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne, another division

would thus have been added to his field army, and this diminution

of the garrison would not have increased lord Wellington’s active

forces, because the investment of Bayonne would still have required

three separate corps: moreover until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade

was abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was not rigorously

speaking left to its own defence.

To the emperor’s observations Soult therefore replied, that several

months before, he had told the minister of war Bayonne was incapable

of sustaining fifteen days open trenches unless the entrenched camp

was well occupied, and he had been by the minister authorised so to

occupy it. Taking that as his base he had left a garrison of thirteen

thousand five hundred men, and now that he knew the emperor’s wishes

it was no longer in his power to withdraw them. With respect to

keeping close to the place he had done so as long as he could without

endangering the safety of the army; but lord Wellington’s operations

had forced him to abandon it, and he had only changed his line of

operations at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon Bordeaux

with little prospect of being able to pass the Garonne in time. He

had for several months thought of establishing a pivot of support

for his movements at Dax, in the design of still holding by Bayonne,

and with that view had ordered the old works of the former place to

be repaired and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of means

even the body of the place was not completed or armed at the moment

when the battle of Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the

insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended to man the works

had failed, not more than two hundred men had come forward. Neither

was he very confident of the advantage of such a position, because

Wellington with superior numbers would probably have turned his left

and forced him to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the desert

of the greater Landes.

The emperor ordered him to take the offensive were it only with

twenty thousand men. He would obey with this observation, that from

the 14th of February to that moment he had had no power to take the

initiatory movement, having been constantly attacked by infinitely

superior numbers. He had defended himself as he could, but had not

expected to succeed against the enormous disproportion of force. It

being thus impossible, even though he sacrificed his last man in the

attempt, to stop the enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much

as possible on the frontier, and by defending every position to keep

the invaders in check and prevent them from attacking Bordeaux or

Toulouse, save by detachments. He had taken his line of operations by

the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse, that is to say, by the

roots of the Pyrenees, calculating that if lord Wellington sent small

detachments against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding at

those places would be able if the national guards would fight for

their country to defend them.

If the enemy made large detachments, an attack in front while he was

thus weakened would bring them back again. If he marched with his

whole army upon Bordeaux he could be followed and forced to face

about. If he attempted to march by Auch against Toulouse he might be

stopped by an attack in flank. If he remained stationary he should

be provoked by an advance to develop his objects. But if, as was to

be expected, the French army was itself attacked it would defend its

position vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw the

allies into a difficult mountain country, where the ground might be

disputed step by step the war be kept still on the frontier and the

passage of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated deeply upon his

task and could find no better mode. But his army was weakened by

combats, still more by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast

that of five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds

were already gone without having seen an enemy.

Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the allies in the recent

operations. In other respects he displayed clear views and great

activity. He reorganized his army in six divisions, called in his

detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and local authorities

to hasten the levies and restore deserters, and he prepared a plan

of action for the partizans which had been organized towards the

mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased. The conscripts

who did arrive were for the most part unarmed and he had none to

spare. The imperial commissary Cornudet, and the prefect of the

Gironde, quitted Bordeaux, and when general L’Huillier attempted

to remove the military stores belonging to the army from Langon,

Podensac, and Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him. There

was no money they said to pay the expense, but in truth Bordeaux was

the focus of Bourbon conspiracy, and the mayor, count Lynch, was

eager to betray his sovereign.

Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. The storms prevented him

following up his victory while the French army was in confusion. Now

it was reorganized on a new line and could retreat for many days in a

direction parallel to the Pyrenees with strong defensive positions.

Should he press it closely? His army weakened at every step would

have to move between the mountains and the Garonne exposing its

flanks and rear to the operations of any force which the French

might be able to collect on those boundaries; that is to say all the

power of France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to find some

counterpoise, and to increase his field army. To establish a Bourbon

party at Bordeaux was an obvious mode of attaining the first object.

Should he then seize that city by a detachment? He must employ twelve

thousand men and remain with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult,

who he erroneously believed was being joined by the ten thousand men

which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The five regiments detached for their

clothing had rejoined the army and all the reserves of cavalry and

artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements from England

and Portugal, amounting to twenty thousand men, upon which he had

calculated were detained by the respective governments. Wherefore,

driven by necessity he directed Freyre to join him by the Port de

Landes with two divisions of the Gallician army, a measure which

was instantly followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and

excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided from the

English military chest. Now also Clinton was ordered to send the

British and Germans of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz.

This done he determined to seize Bordeaux. Meanwhile he repaired

the destroyed bridges, brought up one of Morillo’s brigades from

Navarrens to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell’s Portuguese

dragoons to Rocquefort, general Fane with two regiments of cavalry

and a brigade of infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes and

Vic Bigorre.

Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will of the people

would become fatal to him, endeavoured to arouse the energies of the

people and the army by the following proclamation which has been

unreasonably railed at by several English writers, for it was a

judicious well-timed and powerful address.

“Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your duty, the enemy’s

losses surpassed yours, his blood moistened all the ground he

gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other

combats are at hand, no repose for us until his army, formed of such

extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory or be

annihilated. Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are

unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy’s general that French

honour is not to be outraged with impunity.

“Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke you and your

countrymen to revolt and sedition, he speaks of peace but firebrands

of discord follow him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to a

civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects, our forces

are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial

eagles all those who deceived by appearances believed our enemies

would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious

nation! no peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they

quit the French territory! they have dared to insult the national

honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the

emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound

through the south of France, the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his

country and belongs to her enemies.

“Yet a few days and those who believe in English delicacy and

sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to

abate their courage and subjugate them. They will learn also that

if the English pay to-day and are generous, they will to-morrow

retake and with interest in contributions what they disburse. Let the

pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country

remember that the English have in view to reduce Frenchmen to the

same servitude as the Spaniards Portuguese and Sicilians who groan

under their domination. Past history will recall to those unworthy

Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to the safety of the great

family, the English making Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon;

it will show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious

political intrigues plots and assassinations, aiming to overthrow all

principles, to destroy all grand establishments of trade to satisfy

their immeasurable ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there

exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where

they have not destroyed by seditions and violence all manufactures

which could rival their own? Thus they will do to the French

establishments if they prevail.

“Devote then to opprobrium and execration all Frenchmen who favour

their insidious projects, aye! even those who are under his power

if they seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and reject as

Frenchmen those who think under specious pretexts to avoid serving

their country; and those also who from corruption or indolence hide

deserters instead of driving them back to their colours. With such

men we have nothing in common, and history will pass their names

with execrations to posterity. As to us soldiers our duty is clear.

Honour and fidelity. This is our motto and we will fight to the last

the enemies of our emperor and France. Respect persons and property.

Grieve for those who have momentarily fallen under the enemy’s

yoke, and hasten the moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and

disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards traitors and enemies

of the French name! War to death against those who would divide us to

destroy us; and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to

range themselves under another banner. Remember always that fifteen

ages of glory, triumphs innumerable, have illustrated our country.

Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great sovereign, his signal

victories which immortalize the French name. Let us be worthy of

him and we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity the

inheritance we hold from our fathers. Be in fine Frenchmen and die

arms in hand sooner than survive dishonour.”

Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation be considered. Let

it be remembered that no English writer orator or politician, had

for many years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, atheists,

and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen and their sovereign, that

lord Wellington even at this time refused that sovereign his title

of emperor, calling him Buonaparte; that on entering France he had

published an order of the day accusing the French commanders of

authorising and encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain;

finally that for six years the Spanish Portuguese and English state

papers were filled with most offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon

his ministers and commanders. Let all this be remembered and the

acrimony of Soult’s proclamation cannot be justly blamed, while the

noble energy, the loyalty of the sentiments, the exciting passionate

feeling of patriotism which pervades it must be admired. Was he,

sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the republic, a general of the

empire, after fighting thirty years under the tri-colour, to be

tame and measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he saw his

country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender to the throne stalking

behind their bayonets beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles,

inviting his countrymen to betray their sovereign and dishonour

their nation! Why the man was surrounded by traitors, and proud and

scornful of danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against

defeat and treason combined.

It has been said in condemnation of him that the English general did

not encourage the Bourbon party. Is that true? Did it so appear to

the French general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to the English

head-quarters with mystery, and following the invading army and

protected by its arms assemble round him all the ancient partizans

of his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations even

in Soult’s camp, endeavouring to debauch his soldiers and to aid

strangers to subjugate France. Soult not only knew this but was

suffering under the effects. On every side he met with opposition

and discontent from the civil authorities, his movements were made

known to the enemy and his measures thwarted in all directions. At

Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with open arms to the invaders.

At Tarbes the fear of provoking an action near the town had caused

the dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by the imperial

commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the aristocracy had secretly

assembled to offer homage to the duke of Angoulême, and there was a

rumour that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV. Was the

French general to disregard these facts and symptoms because his

opponent had avoided any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon

family? Lord Wellington would have been the first to laugh at his

simplicity if he had.

[Sidenote: Secret instructions from Lord Bathurst, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Published Despatches.]

And what was the reason that the English general did not openly

call upon the Bourbon partizans to raise the standard of revolt?

Simply that Napoleon’s astounding genius had so baffled the banded

sovereigns and their innumerable hordes that a peace seemed

inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; and therefore lord Wellington,

who had instructions from his government not to embarrass any

negociation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon party, acting as an

honest statesman and commander, would not excite men to their own

ruin for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging treason

to Napoleon on any other ground he avowed his anxious desire for it,

and his readiness to encourage every enemy of that monarch. He had

seen and consulted with La Roche Jacquelin, with de Mailhos and other

vehement partizans for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel

Castel an agent of Bernadotte’s until he found him intriguing against

the Bourbons. He advised the duke of Angoulême to form regular

battalions, promised him arms and actually collected eighty thousand

stand, to arm the insurgents. Finally he rebuked the timid policy of

the English ministers who having such an opportunity of assailing

Napoleon refrained from doing it. Before Soult’s proclamation

appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst.

“I find the sentiment as we advance in the country still more strong

against the Buonaparte dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I

am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the

people if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves.” “_I

cannot discover the policy of not hitting one’s enemy as hard as one

can and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not

so act by us, he would certainly overturn the British authority in

Ireland if it were in his power._”

Soult and Wellington acted and wrote, each in the manner most

suitable to their situation, but it was not a little remarkable that

Ireland should so readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.

It was in this state of affairs that the English general detached

Beresford with twelve thousand men against Bordeaux, giving him

instructions to occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port

for the allies, but to make the French authorities declare whether

they would or would not continue to exercise their functions

under the conditions announced by proclamation. For hitherto

lord Wellington had governed the country as he advanced in this

public manner, thus nullifying the misrepresentations of political

intriguers, obviating the dangers of false reports and rumours of

his projects, making his justice and moderation known to the poorest

peasant, and securing the French local authorities who continued

to act under him from any false and unjust representation of their

conduct to the imperial government if peace should be made with

Napoleon. This expedition against Bordeaux however involved political

as well as military interests. Beresford was instructed that there

were many partizans of the Bourbons in that city who might propose

to hoist the white standard and proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under

protection of the troops. They were to be told that the British

nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and while public

tranquillity was maintained in the districts occupied by the troops

there would be no hindrance to their political proceedings: they or

any party opposed to Napoleon would receive assistance. Nevertheless,

as the allied sovereigns were negociating with the French emperor,

however well inclined the English general might be to support a

party against the latter during war, he could give no help if peace

were concluded, and this they must weigh well before they revolted.

Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any declaration in

favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but he was not to oppose it, and if

revolt took place he was to supply the revolters with the arms and

ammunition collected at Dax.

On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon with the fourth and

seventh divisions, Vivian’s horsemen, and some guns; he was joined

on the road by some of Vandeleur’s cavalry from Bayonne, and he had

orders to observe the enemy’s movements towards Agen, for it was

still in Soult’s power by a forced march on that side to cross the

Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La Roche Jacquelin preceded

the troops and the duke of Angoulême followed closely, but his

partizans in the city frightened at the danger of their enterprize

now besought Beresford to delay his march. La Roche Jacquelin

vehemently condemned their hesitation, and his influence supported by

the consternation which the battle of Orthes had created amongst the

Napoleonists decided the question in favour of revolt.

Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the probable course

of the war would endanger Bordeaux, had given orders to place the

forts in a state of defence, to arm the flotilla and to organize the

national guards and the urban legions; he had urged these measures

again when the imperial commissioner Cornudet first arrived, but

according to the usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with

military affairs every thing was promised and nothing done. Cornudet

and the prefect quitted the city as early as the 4th, first burning

with a silly affectation of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks;

general L’Huillier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed the

fort of Médoc on the left bank of the Garonne, disarmed some of the

river batteries, and passing in the night of the 11th to the right

bank occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté and other points.

Meanwhile Beresford who reached Langon the 10th, left lord Dalhousie

there with the bulk of the forces and advanced with eight hundred

cavalry.

Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality and a great

body of Bourbonists, at the head of whom was the mayor count Lynch,

decorated with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, both

conferred upon him, and probably at his own solicitation, by the

sovereign he was then going to betray. After some formal discourse

in which Beresford explicitly made known his instructions Lynch very

justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of his country’s glory, from

his own shoulders, the white flag was then displayed and the allies

took peaceable possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême arrived

on the same day and Louis the Eighteenth was formally proclaimed.

This event, the act of a party, was not generally approved, and the

mayor conscious of weakness immediately issued with the connivance

of the duke of Angoulême a proclamation, in which he asserted, that

“the British Portuguese and Spanish armies were united in the south,

as the other nations were united in the north, solely to destroy

Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon king who was conducted thither

by these generous allies, and only by accepting that king could the

French appease the resentment of the Spaniards.” At the same time

the duke of Angoulême, as if quite master of the country, appointed

prefects and other authorities in districts beyond the limits of

Bordeaux.

Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of their precipitancy. The

English fleet which should have acted simultaneously with the troops

had not arrived; the Regulus a French seventy-four with several

inferior vessels of war were anchored below Blaye, and Beresford

was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry. Lord

Dalhousie remained with only the seventh division and three squadrons

to oppose L’Huillier’s troops and other French corps which were now

on the Garonne. He could not guard the river below Bordeaux, and some

French troops recrossing again took possession of the fort of Grave

near the mouth; a new army was forming under general Decaen beyond

the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from their first stupor

began to stir themselves, and a partizan officer coming down to St.

Macaire on the 18th surprised fifty men which lord Dalhousie had

sent across the Garonne from Langon to take possession of a French

magazine. In the Landes the peasants forming bands burned the houses

of the gentlemen who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux

itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever Decaen should be

ready to advance.

The prince frightened at these symptoms of reaction desired lord

Dalhousie to bring his troops into Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists,

and meanwhile each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours

and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories and defeats

were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon was dead from illness, had

committed suicide, was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were

related as certain with most circumstantial details. Meanwhile

Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême, denied the veracity of

the mayor’s proclamation and expressed his trust that the prince was

not a party to such a mendacious document. The latter however with

some excuses about hurry and confusion avowed his participation in

its publication, and defended the mayor’s conduct. He also forwarded

a statement of the danger his party was exposed to and demanded aid

of men and money, supporting his application by a note of council

in which with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued, that as

civil government could not be conducted without executive power, and

as lord Wellington had suffered the duke of Angoulême to assume the

civil government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive force,

he was bound to supply the deficiency from his army, and even to

furnish money until taxes could be levied under the protection of the

soldiers.

The English general was not a man to bear with such sophistry in

excuse for a breach of faith. Sorry he was he said to find that the

principle by which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon

party, though often stated, had made so little impression that the

duke could not perceive how inconsistent it was with the mayor’s

proclamation. Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct,

seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential agent of

three independent nations, he could not permit his views to be

misrepresented upon such an important question. He had occupied

Bordeaux as a military point, but certain persons contrary to his

advice and opinion thought proper to proclaim Louis the Eighteenth.

Those persons made no exertions, subscribed not a shilling, raised

not a soldier, yet because he would not extend the posts of his

army beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to protect their

families and property, exposed to danger, not on account of their

exertions for they had made none, but on account of their premature

declaration contrary to his advice, they took him to task in a

document delivered to lord Dalhousie by the prince himself. The

writer of that paper and all such persons however might be assured

that nothing should make him swerve from what he thought his duty to

the sovereigns who employed him, he would not risk even a company

of infantry to save properties and families placed in a state of

danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better then conduct his

policy and compose his manifestos in such a manner as not to force a

public contradiction of them. His royal highness was free to act as

he pleased for himself, but he was not free to adduce the name and

authority of the allied governments in support of his measures when

they had not been consulted, nor of their general when he had been

consulted but had given his opinion against those measures.

He had told him that if any great town or extensive district declared

in favour of the Bourbons he would not interfere with the government

of that town or district, and if there was a general declaration in

favour of his house he would deliver the civil government of all

the country overrun by the army into his hands, but the fact was

that even at Bordeaux the movement in favour of the Bourbons was

not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, not even to La

Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the army. The events contemplated

had not therefore occurred, and it would be a great breach of duty

towards the allied sovereigns and cruel to the inhabitants if he

were to deliver them over to his royal highness prematurely or

against their inclinations. He advised him therefore to withdraw

his prefects and confine his government to Bordeaux. He could give

him no money and after what had passed he was doubtful if he should

afford him any countenance or protection. The argument of the note of

council, affirming that he was bound to support the civil government

of his royal highness, only rendered it more incumbent upon him

to beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to speak plainly,

_permission_ to the Bourbonists to declare themselves. It was

disagreeable to take any step which should publicly mark a want of

good understanding between himself and the duke, but count Lynch had

not treated him with common fairness or with truth, wherefore as he

could not allow the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to

be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten days contradict

the objectionable parts of the mayor’s proclamation he would do so

himself.

Thus it appeared that with the French as with the Spaniards and

Portuguese neither enthusiastic declarations nor actual insurrection

offered any guarantee for sense truth or exertion; and most surely

all generals and politicians of every country who trust to sudden

popular commotions will find that noisy declamations, vehement

demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood

of such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public exertions.

[Sidenote: Official Reports and Correspondence of general Decaen upon

the formation of the army of the Gironde, 1814, MSS.]

When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the line of occupation was

too extensive for lord Dalhousie and lord Wellington ordered him to

keep clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing that

his own projected operations on the Upper Garonne would keep matters

quiet on the lower part of that river. Nevertheless if the war had

continued for a month that officer’s situation would have been

critical. For when Napoleon knew that Bordeaux had fallen he sent

Decaen by post to Libourne to form the “_army of the Gironde_.” For

this object general Despeaux acting under Soult’s orders collected

a body of gensd’armes custom-house officers and national guards on

the Upper Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was one of his

detachments that surprised lord Dalhousie’s men at St. Macaire on

the 18th. A battery of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne, other

batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive at Perigueux on the

11th of April, and three or four hundred cavalry coming from the side

of Rochelle joined Le Huillier who with a thousand infantry was in

position at St. André de Cubsac beyond the Dordogne. Behind these

troops all the national guards custom-house officers and gensd’armes

of five departments were ordered to assemble, and march to the

Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended army was a body of

Suchet’s veterans, six thousand in number under general Beurman, who

had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed upon Libourne.

[Sidenote: Published despatches.]

[Sidenote: Official Report by Mr. Ogilvie, MSS.]

Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April but Beurman’s troops had

not then reached Perigeaux, and lord Dalhousie’s cavalry were in

Libourne between him and L’Huillier. The power of concentration was

thus denied to the French and meanwhile admiral Penrose had secured

the command of the Garonne. It appears lord Wellington thought this

officer dilatory, but on the 27th he arrived with a seventy-four and

two frigates, whereupon the Regulus, and other French vessels then

at Royan, made sail up the river and were chased to the shoal of

Talmont, but they escaped through the narrow channel on the north

side and cast anchor under some batteries. Previous to this event

Mr. Ogilvie a commissary, being on the river in a boat manned with

Frenchmen, discovered the Requin sloop, half French half American,

pierced for twenty-two guns, lying at anchor not far below Bordeaux,

at the same time he saw a sailor leap hastily into a boat above

him and row for the vessel. This man being taken proved to be the

armourer of the Requin, he said there were not many men on board, and

Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm and judging that the crew would also

be fearful, with ready resolution bore down upon the Requin, boarded,

and took her without any opposition either from her crew or that of

his own boat, although she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men

with two officers on board.

[Sidenote: April.]

The naval co-operation being thus assured lord Dalhousie crossed the

Garonne above the city, drove the French posts beyond the Dordogne,

pushed scouring parties to La Reolle and Marmande, and sending his

cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted Decaen’s and La Huilhier’s

communications; the former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with

two hundred and fifty gensd’armes awaiting the arrival of Beurman,

and he found neither arms nor ammunition nor a willing spirit to

enable him to organize the national guards.

The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne on the 2d of April, but

on the 4th lord Dalhousie crossed it again lower down, near St.

André de Cubzac, with about three thousand men, intending to march

upon Blaye, but hearing that L’Huillier had halted at Etauliers he

turned suddenly upon him. The French general formed his line on an

open common occupying some woods in front with his detachments.

Overmatched in infantry he had three hundred cavalry opposed to

one weak squadron, and yet his troops would not stand the shock of

the battle. The allied infantry cleared the woods in a moment, the

artillery then opened upon the main body which retired in disorder,

horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers, leaving behind

several scattered bodies upon whom the British cavalry galloped and

made two or three hundred men and thirty officers prisoners.

If the six thousand old troops under Beurman had, according to

Napoleon’s orders, arrived at this time in lord Dalhousie’s rear,

his position would have been embarrassing but they were delayed on

the road until the 10th. Meanwhile admiral Penrose, having on the 2d

observed the French flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and

gun-boats, coming down from Blaye to join the Regulus at Talmont

sent the boats of his fleet to attack them, whereupon the French

vessels run on shore and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers

from Blaye lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant Dunlop who

commanded the English boats landing all his seamen and marines,

beat these troops and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla

with a loss to himself of only six men wounded and missing. This

operation completed and the action at Etauliers known, the admiral,

now reinforced with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack

the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in the night of

the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels. Captain Harris of the

Belle Poule frigate then landed with six hundred seamen and marines

and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right bank from Talmont

to the Courbe point. Blaye still held out, but at Paris treason had

done its work and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity known

for good, was overthrown to make room for despots, who with minds

enlarged only to cruelty avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very

moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose strength and

suffering they had conquered, of the only reward they demanded, _just

government_. The war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse,

Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this great event were

still battling with unabated fury.

CHAPTER IV.

[Sidenote: 1814. March.]

[Sidenote: Official Report, MSS.]

While Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux Soult and Wellington

remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than

himself. For the English general having intelligence of Beurman’s

march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had

actually joined Soult. On the other hand that marshal, who knew not

of Beresford’s march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still

had the twelve thousand men detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on

each side were however nearly equal. The French army was thirty-one

thousand, infantry and cavalry, yet three thousand being stragglers

detained by the generals of the military districts, Soult could only

put into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, twenty-eight

thousand sabres and bayonets with thirty-eight pieces of artillery.

On the allies’ side twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were

under arms, with forty-two guns, but from this number detachments had

been sent to Pau on one side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry

scouts were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper Garonne.

[Sidenote: April.]

[Sidenote: See Chap. VI., Book XXIII.]

Lord Wellington expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch and designing

to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops

towards the Upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin the army;

but the French general having early fixed his line of retreat by St.

Guadens was only prevented from retaking the offensive on the 9th or

10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced him first to organize

a system of requisition for the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile

his equality of force passed away, for on the 13th Freyre came up

with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and the next day Ponsonby’s

heavy cavalry arrived. Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet

he still awaited Beresford’s troops, and was uneasy about his own

situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet’s army, for it was at

this time the Spanish regency referred the convention, proposed by

that marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his decision.

He gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish twenty

thousand veterans for Soult while the retention of Rosas and Figueras

would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his

favour. But his anxiety was great because he foresaw that Ferdinand’s

return and his engagement with Suchet, already related, together with

the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted

to a convention would finally render that measure inevitable.

Meanwhile the number of his own army was likely to decrease. The

English cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish government,

had sent the militia, permitted by the recent act of parliament to

volunteer for foreign service, to Holland, and with them the other

reinforcements originally promised for the army in France: two or

three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne when the war

was over. To make amends the ministers proposed that lord William

Bentinck should send four thousand men from Sicily to land at Rosas,

or some point in France, and so join lord Wellington, who was thus

expected to extend his weakened force from the Bay of Biscay to

the Mediterranean in order to cover the junction of this uncertain

reinforcement. In fine experience had taught the English statesmen so

little that we find their general thus addressing them only one week

previous to the termination of the war.

Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes,

forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says:—

“There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend

and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety

and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful

exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish

troops.”—“The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to

the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will

be considered that that which is most important of all is not _to

lose_ the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for

nearly six years.”

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]

The French infantry was now re-organized in six divisions commanded

by Darricau, D’Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe;

general Paris’ troops hitherto acting as an unattached body were thus

absorbed, the cavalry composed of Berton’s and Vial’s brigades was

commanded by Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve division of seven

thousand conscripts, infantry under general Travot. The division

into wings and a centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general

continued, yet this distinction was not attended to in the movements.

Reille though commanding the right wing was at Maubourget on the

left of the line of battle; D’Erlon commanding the centre was at

Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch; Clauzel was at

Rabastens forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards

Plaissance on the right, Madiran in the centre, and Lembege on the

left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could move on a direct line by

good roads either to Auch or Pau.

[Sidenote: March.]

Lord Wellington driven by necessity now sent orders to Giron’s

Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops to enter France from the Bastan,

although Freyre’s soldiers had by their outrages already created a

wide-spread consternation. His head-quarters were fixed at Aire, his

army was in position on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all

the bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in his front, and

dispersed some small bands which had appeared upon his left flank and

rear: Soult had however organized a more powerful system of partizans

towards the mountains and only wanted money to put them in activity.

The main bodies of the two armies were a long day’s march asunder,

but their advanced posts were not very distant, the regular cavalry

had frequent encounters and both generals claimed the superiority

though neither made any particular report.

On the night of the 7th Soult thinking to find only some weak parties

at Pau sent a strong detachment there to arrest the nobles who had

assembled to welcome the duke of Angoulême, but general Fane getting

there before him with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of

cavalry the stroke failed; however the French returning by another

road made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons.

Meanwhile a second detachment penetrating between Pau and Aire

carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane

had quitted Pau, a French officer accompanied by only four hussars

captured there thirty-four Portuguese with their commander and ten

loaded mules. The French general having by these excursions obtained

exact intelligence of Beresford’s march to Bordeaux resolved to

attack the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had recently

sent him instructions to draw the war to the side of Pau keeping his

left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.

[Sidenote: See plan 10.]

Lord Wellington’s main body was now concentrated round Aire and

Barcelona, yet divided by the Adour and the advanced guards were

pushed to Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle and Pouydraguien, that

is to say, on a semicircle to the front and about half a march in

advance. Soult therefore thought to strike a good blow, and gathering

his divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th, marched on the

13th, designing to throw himself upon the high tabular land between

Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances.

[Sidenote: Memoirs by general Berton, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Note by sir John Campbell, MSS.]

The country was suited to the action of all arms, offering a number

of long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of

which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly

so open that troops could move along them without much difficulty,

and between these ranges a number of small rivers and muddy fords

descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour. This conformation

determined the order of the French general’s march which followed

the courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of cavalry to

watch the valley of the Adour he moved with the rest of his army by

Lembege upon Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clauzel thus seized the

high land of Daisse and pushed troops to Portet; Reille supported

him at Conchez; D’Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. In

this position the head of the columns, pointing direct upon Aire,

separated Viella from Garlin which was the right of general Hill’s

position, and menaced that general’s posts on the great Lees.

Meanwhile Pierre Soult marching with three regiments of cavalry

along the high land between the two Lees, reached Mascaras and the

castle of Sault, he thus covered the left flank of the French army

and pushed Fane’s cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers

taken and a few men wounded. During this movement Berton advancing

from Madiran with two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the

right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river

at a difficult muddy ford near the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell

leading a squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry overthrew the

head of his column, but the Portuguese horsemen were too few to

dispute the passage and Berton finally getting a regiment over

higher up, gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of

the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road killed

several and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà the

since well-known count of Bandeira.

This terminated the French operations for the day, and lord

Wellington imagining the arrival of Suchet’s troops had made

Soult thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his

reinforcements and detachments could come up. Hill however passed

the greater Lees partly to support his posts partly to make out the

force and true direction of the French movement, but he recrossed

that river during the night and finally occupied the strong platform

between Aire and Garlin which Soult had designed to seize. Lord

Wellington immediately brought the third and sixth division and

the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, leaving the light

division with the hussar brigade still on the right bank. The bulk of

the army thus occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau road.

The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the

greater Lees a river difficult to pass; Fane’s cavalry was extended

along the Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour

the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there back upon

Plaissance.

On the morning of the 14th Soult intending to fall on Hill, whose

columns he had seen the evening before on the right of the Lees,

drove in the advanced posts which had been left to cover the

retrograde movement, and then examined the allies’ new position; but

these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his

army on the heights between the two Lees, placing Clauzel and D’Erlon

at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and Reille in reserve at Portet.

Meanwhile Pierre Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac,

on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town and

to menace the right flank of the allies, against which the whole

French army was now pointing. Fane’s outposts being thus assailed

retired with some loss at first but they were soon supported and

drove the French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road to

Carere.

[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.]

Soult now seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing

from the peasants that forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated

there, feared to attack, but changing his plan resolved to hover

about the right flank of the allies in the hopes of enticing them

from their vantage-ground. Lord Wellington on the other hand drew

his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping close

on that side massed his forces on the right in expectation of an

attack. In fine each general acting upon false intelligence of the

other’s strength was afraid to strike. The English commander’s error

as to the junction of Suchet’s troops was encouraged by Soult, who

had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three to give

himself an appearance of strength, and in the same view had caused

his reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. And

he also judged the allies’ strength by what it might have been rather

than by what it was; for though Freyre’s Spaniards and Ponsonby’s

dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed thirty-six

thousand men, including the light division and the hussars who were

on the right bank of the Adour. This number was however increasing

every hour by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved

Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain

should fall, to watch that Wellington while holding the French in

check with his right wing did not strike with his left by Maubourget

and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.

This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of

Bordeaux, induced the French general to retire before day on the

16th to Lembege and Simacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the

two branches of the Lees and the heights between them; however his

outposts remained at Conchez, and Pierre Soult again getting upon

the Pau road detached a hundred chosen troopers against the allies’

communication with Orthes. Captain Dania commanding these men making

a forced march reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers

and eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other

prisoners and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprize

extended to such a distance from the army was supposed to be executed

by the bands, and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection;

wherefore lord Wellington to check it seized the civil authorities at

Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the peasants caught in

arms and burn their villages.

[Sidenote: Morning States, MSS.]

The offensive movement of the French general had now terminated, he

sent his conscripts at once to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid

retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced

too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th or 11th when

there were not more than twenty thousand infantry and two thousand

five hundred cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin. On the

other hand the passive state of Wellington, which had been too

much prolonged, was now also at an end, all his reinforcements and

detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could put in

motion six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions of infantry,

furnishing forty thousand bayonets, with five brigades of cavalry,

furnishing nearly six thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces

of artillery.

On the evening of the 17th, the English general pushed the hussars up

the valley of the Adour, towards Plaissance, supporting them with the

light division, which was followed at the distance of half a march by

the fourth division coming from the side of Roquefort, on its return

from Langon.

[Sidenote: Plan 10.]

The 18th at daylight the whole army was in movement, the hussars

with the light and the fourth division, forming the left, marched

upon Plaissance; Hill’s troops forming the right marched from Garlin

upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to Pau in observation

of Pierre Soult’s cavalry. The main body moved in the centre, under

Wellington in person, to Viella, by the high road leading from Aire

to Maubourget. The French right was thus turned by the valley of

the Adour, while general Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about

eighty British and Germans were killed and wounded, drove back their

outposts upon Lembege.

[Sidenote: Berton’s Memoir, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]

Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge having a small

river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, in his front, and his

right under D’Erlon was extended towards Vic Bigorre on the great

road of Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton’s cavalry, one regiment of which

retreating from Viella on the 16th disengaged itself with some

difficulty and loss, reached Maubourget, and took post in column

behind that place, the road being confined on each side by deep

and wide ditches. In this situation pressed by Bock’s cavalry,

which preceded the centre column of the allies, the French horsemen

suddenly charged the Germans, at first with success, taking an

officer and some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated

through Vic Bigorre. Soult thinking a flanking column only was on

this side in the valley of the Adour, resolved to fall upon it with

his whole army; but he recognised the skill of his opponent when

he found that the whole of the allies’ centre, moving by Madiran,

had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while he was retiring from

Lembege. This heavy mass was now approaching Vic Bigorre, the light

division, coming from Plaissance up the right bank of the Adour, were

already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens, upon which place the

hussars had already driven the French cavalry left in observation

when the army first advanced: Vic Bigorre was thus turned, Berton’s

horsemen had passed it in retreat and the danger was imminent. The

French general immediately ordered Berton to support the cavalry

regiment at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes. Then directing

D’Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre and check the allies on the main

road, he marched, in person and in all haste, with Clauzel’s and

Reille’s divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road leading through

Ger-sur-landes.

D’Erlon not seeming to comprehend the crisis moved slowly, with his

baggage in front, and having the river Lechez to cross, rode on

before his troops expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he met

the German cavalry there. Then indeed he hurried his march yet he

had only time to place Darricau’s division, now under general Paris,

amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic Bigorre, when

hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry and fell upon him.

_Combat of Vic Bigorre._—The French left flank was secured by the

Lechez river, but their right, extending towards the Adour, being

loose was menaced by the German cavalry while the front was attacked

by Picton. The action commenced about two o’clock, and Paris was

soon driven back in disorder, but then D’Armagnac’s division entered

the line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, which lasted

until D’Erlon, after losing many men, saw his right turned, beyond

the Adour, by the light division and by the hussars who were now

close to Rabastens, whereupon he likewise fell back behind Vic

Bigorre, and took post for the night. The action was vigorous. About

two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and

amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon so often mentioned in this

history. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war and

possessing a variety of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently

for himself and so usefully for the service that envy offered no bar

to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his

merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.

Soult’s march through the deep sandy plain of Ger was harassing, and

would have been dangerous if lord Wellington had sent Hill’s cavalry,

now reinforced by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; but

the country was unfavorable for quick observation and the French

covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was

difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill the

end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with

trees and defended by skirmishers. Lord Wellington was desirous to

know whether a small or a large force thus barred his way, but all

who endeavoured to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the

enemy. At last captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of

his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier,

made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through

the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropt his reins and

leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly

along the front of the enemy’s light troops, and they thinking him

mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus

passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill,

where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit

above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along the French main line

counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his

blue undress, his daring confidence and his speed, made the French

doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while

he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through

the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front.

Reaching the spot where lord Wellington stood he told him there were

but five battalions on the hill.

Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse by St. Gaudens was

inevitable, yet determined to dispute every position which offered

the least advantage, his army was on the morning of the 20th again

in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two or three miles behind

Tarbes, and covering Tournay on the road to St. Gaudens: however he

still held Tarbes with Clauzel’s corps, which was extended on the

right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of retreat by that road

to Toulouse. The plain of Tarbes although apparently open was full of

deep ditches which forbad the action of horsemen, wherefore he sent

his brother with five regiments of cavalry to the Trie road, with

orders to cover the right flank and observe the route to Auch, for

he feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat by that line.

At day-break the allies again advanced in two columns. The right

under Hill moved along the high road. The left under Wellington in

person was composed of the light division and hussars, Ponsonby’s

heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre’s Spaniards. It marched

by the road from Rabastens, and general Cole still making forced

marches with the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry, followed from

Beaumarchez and La Deveze, sending detachments through Marciac to

watch Pierre Soult on the side of Trie.

[Sidenote: Plan 10.]

_Combat of Tarbes._—The Adour separated Wellington’s columns, but

when the left approached Tarbes, the light division and the hussars

bringing up their right shoulders attacked the centre of Harispe’s

division, which occupied the heights of Orliex and commanded the

road from Rabastens with two guns. Under cover of this attack

general Clinton made a flank movement to his left through the

village of Dours, and opening a cannonade against Harispe’s right

endeavoured to get between that general and Soult’s main position

at Oleac. Meanwhile general Hill moving by the other bank of the

Adour assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by

Villatte’s division. These operations were designed to envelope and

crush Clauzel’s two divisions, which seemed the more easy because

there appeared to be only a fine plain, fit for the action of all

the cavalry, between him and Soult. The latter however, having sent

his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, saw the movement

without alarm, he was better acquainted with the nature of the plain

behind Harispe and had made roads to enable him to retreat upon the

second position without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clauzel

was in some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at Tarbes, the

light division supported with cavalry and guns fell upon his centre

at Orleix, and general Clinton opening a brisk cannonade passed

through the villages of Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between Harispe

and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from the army.

The action was begun about twelve o’clock. Hill’s artillery thundered

on the right, Clinton’s answered it on the left, and Alten threw

the light division in mass upon the centre where Harispe’s left

brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly assailed by the three

rifle battalions. Here the fight was short yet wonderfully fierce

and violent, for the French, probably thinking their opponents to

be Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great

hardiness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, they

fought muzzle to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who

would win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe’s centre being

thus suddenly overthrown he retired rapidly through the fields, by

the ways previously opened, before Clinton could get into his rear.

Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes and Villatte

also retreated along the high road to Tournay, but under a continued

cannonade. The flat country was now covered with confused masses

of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately with an eager

musquetry, the French guns also replying as they could to the allies’

artillery. The situation of the retreating troops seemed desperate,

but as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and

the small copses, villages, and farm-houses, prevented the British

cavalry from acting; Clauzel therefore extricating his troops with

great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main

position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle

and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit

was thus checked, and before lord Wellington could make arrangements

for a new attack darkness came on and the army halted on the banks

of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown,

that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, but of that

number twelve officers and eighty men were of the rifle battalions.

[Sidenote: Official Report, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Orders, MSS.]

During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main

road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on

different hills as points of direction. The next day he reached

St. Gaudens with D’Erlon’s and Reille’s corps, while Clauzel, who

had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean and was there

rejoined by Pierre Soult’s cavalry. This march of more than thirty

miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner.

For the French general, having now seen nearly all Wellington’s

infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother

that the fourth division and Vivian’s cavalry were pointing towards

Mielan on his right, feared that the allies would by Trie and

Castlenau suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept his retreat

upon Toulouse, which was his great depôt, the knot of all his future

combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a

successful stand with his small army.

The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, Galan, and Trie,

but their marches were short.

On the 21st Beresford who had assumed the command of the left column

was at Castlenau, Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at

Tournay.

The 22d Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington at Galan, Hill at

Monrejean, and Fane’s horsemen pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here

four squadrons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town.

Overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth dragoons at the first

shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on

the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many

being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the

veteran major Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between

his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.

On the 23d Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren,

Wellington at Boulogne.

The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at

Isle en Dodon.

The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and

Wellington was at Samatan.

The 26th Beresford entered St. Lys and marching in order of battle

by his left, while his cavalry skirmished on the right, took post on

the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army,

which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven

days to march what Soult had done in four.

This tardiness, idly characterized by French military writers as the

sign of timidity and indecision of character, has been by English

writers excused on the score of wet weather and the encumbrance

of a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the rain equally

affected the French, and the pontoons might have been as usefully

waited for on the Garonne after the French army had been pressed in

its retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that the English

general, not exactly informed of Soult’s real numbers nor of his

true line of retreat, nor perfectly acquainted with the country, was

cautious; because being then acrimoniously disputing with the duke of

Angoulême he was also uneasy as to the state of the country behind

him and on his flanks. The partizans were beginning to stir, his

reinforcements from England and Portugal were stopped, and admiral

Penrose had not yet entered the Garonne. On the other hand Ferdinand

had entered Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet about the

garrisons already mentioned. In fine, lord Wellington found himself

with about forty-five thousand men composed of different nations, the

Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful to him, opposed to an

able and obstinate enemy, and engaged on a line of operations running

more than a hundred and fifty miles along the French frontier. His

right flank was likely to be vexed by the partizans forming in the

Pyrenees, his left flank by those behind the Garonne on the right

bank of which a considerable regular force was also collecting, while

the generals commanding the military districts beyond Toulouse were

forming corps of volunteers national guards and old soldiers of the

regular depôts: and ever he expected Suchet to arrive on his front

and overmatch him in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his

troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that the hospitals

might not increase. In battle their bravery would he knew bring

him through any crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by forced

marches he should cover the country with small posts and hospital

stations, the French people would be tempted to rise against him. So

little therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it was no

slight indication of daring to have advanced at all.

It does seem however that with an overwhelming cavalry, and great

superiority of artillery he should not have suffered the French

general so to escape his hands. It must be admitted also that Soult

proved himself a very able commander. His halting on the Adour, his

success in reviving the courage of his army, and the front he shewed

in hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching troops against

Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a firm unyielding temper but of

a clear and ready judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes,

lord Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it was not on

military grounds but because treason was there to aid him. Meanwhile

he was forced to keep his army for fifteen days passive within a few

miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting his adversary to

reorganize and restore the discipline and courage of the old troops,

to rally the dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a partizan

warfare, to send off all his encumbrances and sick to Toulouse, and

to begin fortifying that city as a final and secure retreat: for the

works there were commenced on the 3d or 4th of March, and at this

time the entrenchments covering the bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien

were nearly completed. The French general was even the first to

retake the offensive after Orthes, too late indeed, and he struck no

important blow, and twice placed his army in dangerous situations;

but his delay was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of his

magazines, and if he got into difficulties they were inseparable from

his operations and he extricated himself again.

That he gained no advantages in fight is rather argument for lord

Wellington than against Soult. The latter sought but did not find

a favourable opportunity to strike, and it would have been unwise,

because his adversary gave him no opening, to have fallen desperately

upon superior numbers in a strong position with an army so recently

defeated, and whose restored confidence it was so essential not to

shake again by a repulse. He increased that confidence by appearing

to insult the allied army with an inferior force, and in combination

with his energetic proclamation encouraged the Napoleonists and

alarmed the Bourbonists; lastly, by his rapid retreat from Tarbes

he gained two days to establish and strengthen himself on his grand

position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived his adversary, no

common general and at the head of no common army; for so little did

Wellington expect him to make a determined stand there, that in a

letter written on the 26th to sir John Hope, he says, “I fear the

Garonne is too full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in

that town (Toulouse) I hope immediately.”

[Sidenote: Choumara.]

The French general’s firmness and the extent of his views cannot

however be fairly judged by merely considering his movements in

the field. Having early proved the power of his adversary, he had

never deceived himself about the ultimate course of the campaign and

therefore struggled without hope, a hard and distressing task; yet

he showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always for delay

as thinking Suchet would finally cast personal feelings aside and

strike for his country. Nor did he forbear importuning that marshal

to do so. Notwithstanding his previous disappointments he wrote to

him again on the 9th of February, urging the danger of the crisis,

the certainty that the allies would make the greatest effort on the

western frontier, and praying him to abandon Catalonia and come with

the bulk of his troops to Bearn: in the same strain he wrote to the

minister of war, and his letters reached their destinations on the

13th. Suchet, having no orders to the contrary, could therefore have

joined him with thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthes;

but that marshal giving a deceptive statement of his forces in

reply, coldly observed, that if he marched anywhere it would be to

join the emperor and not the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued

notwithstanding to inform him of all his battles and his movements,

and his accumulating distresses, yet in vain, and Suchet’s apathy

would be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it furnished in

the work of the French engineer Choumara.

CHAPTER V.

[Sidenote: 1814. March.]

The two armies being now once more in presence of each other and with

an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar

calculations upon which the generals founded their respective

combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose

Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the

south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal

passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads

on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the

south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble

arm and discipline the conscripts, controul and urge the civil

authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented.

Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He

could retire upon Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. He

could take a new position behind the Tarn and prolong the contest

by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if

necessary upon Decaen’s army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the

allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them

up the left bank, being well assured that lord Wellington must follow

him, and with weakened forces as it would be necessary to leave

troops in observation of Suchet.

His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected

from the depôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban,

under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a

bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a

strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to

observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the

command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France,

consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain

himself as long as possible in Toulouse was however a great political

object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet

and with Decaen; and while he held it, both the latter general and

the partizans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on

their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained

by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the

same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment

through the Arriege department to the Upper Garonne, where general

Lafitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other

troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly

urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he

had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.

The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep

loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by

the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall

three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: these defences

Soult had improved and he added a line of exterior entrenchments.

[Sidenote: Plan 10.]

Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked

with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four pound

guns.

The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles

below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of

the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St.

Cyprien did on the west.

The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, built on both sides of

this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were entrenched

and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon,

also entrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above

and below these suburbs.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the

Mont Rave, run nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was

exceedingly rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through which the

Ers river flowed.

The south side of the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St.

Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished

another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of

heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne in a

direction nearly parallel to that river.

Such being the French general’s position, he calculated, that as

lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St.

Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn

the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to

blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on

that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above

its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river

also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march

higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an

operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had

rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne

below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he could from

the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and

that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column

while in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in this he

had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where

he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban.

For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would

lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it, but a passage

below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus

cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern

and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they

could only retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in

Roussillon, where having their backs to the mountains and the allies

between them and France they could not exist. Hence feeling certain

the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank

of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn,

and called up general Despeaux’s troops from Agen in the view of

confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne:

for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his

communication with Montauban.

On the other hand lord Wellington whether from error from necessity

or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the

French army to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes,

had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the

Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops should join him from the Bastan,

without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself

and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and

weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most

dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had

taken the offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety,

the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a

conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his

business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible,

and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the

whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or

below Toulouse.

[Sidenote: Manuscript notes by the duke of Wellington.]

[Sidenote: French Official Correspondence, MSS.]

It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage

should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side

of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved

to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing

to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the

Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left

he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With this object, at eight

o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades marched up

from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced,

the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass at midnight. But

when the river was measured the width was found too great for the

pontoons and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore

this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable

advantage would probably have been gained, since it does not appear

that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by

his emissaries, not by his scouts.

[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.]

Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he drove the enemy

from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his

left and centre about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry.

In the course of the operation a single squadron of the eighteenth

hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by colonel

Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came

upon a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act,

as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the

enemy thinking that a strong support must be at hand discharged their

carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of

both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit

of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was

pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.

[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]

During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn to St. Roques,

but in the night of the 30th a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel,

two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, that general passed

the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo’s Spaniards,

Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery, and Fane’s cavalry, in all

thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket

brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great

road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle,

fifteen miles up the Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a

ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops

followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at

Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on

the south while lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march

was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though

ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five

o’clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the

enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the

strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the

army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the

country on the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the suburbs

of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a

partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his

army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne

passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in

hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to

observe the march of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte,

who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of

the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van

of Suchet’s army. He was however somewhat disquieted, because the

baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the

Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported

to be a second column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand

men.

[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]

While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river

made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were

still collected there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the

bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there

also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger,

he put four divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the

head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill

came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs

of Toulouse and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the

right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was

however soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the

passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards

Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to

move in the deep country there, and as success and safety alike

depended on rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel,

recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying

bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank.

His retreat was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up a few

stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained

well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important

days.

[Sidenote: April.]

The French general was now sure the next attempt would be below

Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne

to fight between that river and the Tarn rather than lose his

communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence

for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the bridges over the

canal, he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances,

and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to

entrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking

he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which

side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid

that lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien

until the evening of the 3d; then the waters falling, the pontoons

were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse,

where the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns placed in battery

on the left bank to protect it. The third fourth and sixth divisions

of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford,

immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on

the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for

the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the

light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge

got damaged and the pontoons were taken up.

This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry

scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed, and as

Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken the

outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined Hill also had moved

to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over

the Garonne. Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his cavalry

he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his

resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th

that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge was again laid

down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and

lord Wellington taking the command in person advanced to the heights

of Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both

banks of the Ers his columns were separated by that river, which

was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure

as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his left

approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby,

Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers

towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended

towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was defended by Vial’s

dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly

menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of

the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties

stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of

some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same

moment, but the English horses were so quick the French were in an

instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and

the mass breaking away to the rear went off in disorder, leaving many

killed and wounded and above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the

victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, but

beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced

again, the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended

by the British infantry whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The

communication between the allied columns was thus secured.

The credit of this brilliant action was given to Colonel Vivian in

the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine

shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived

and conducted entirely by major Hughes of the eighteenth.

Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison, carefully examined

the French general’s position and resolved to attack on the 9th.

Meanwhile to shorten his communications with general Hill he directed

the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at

Seilh. The light division were to cross at the latter place at

daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and

the English general extremely incensed at the failure was forced to

defer his battle until the 10th.

Soult’s combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means

of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of

operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear

judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance,

reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own.

He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies

to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well

fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great

river from the rest, where they could derive no advantage from their

numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding

their previous superiority in that arm.

His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien

on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with

his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east.

His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the

urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the

artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to

his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had

short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of

Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under

Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve

miles.

The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was

still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest

in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left

of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making, under

cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front and thus

gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach

by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he was baffled by the

deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by

force, because all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix

d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the

pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack

from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and

easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet

impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which

were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts

of Toulouse, and for the most part within musquet-shot. Here then,

as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was

opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to

the Mont Rave or eastern front.

This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by

the Ers river, which as we have seen was not to be forded, presented

two distinct platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere on

which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where

the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman

were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at

the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a

species of horn-work, consisting of several open retrenchments and

small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked

the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abbatis was also

formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this

line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the

Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform.

On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the

extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to

the road of Caraman.

[Sidenote: Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.]

The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and

an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire,

advance through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered

almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault

of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants

should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their

flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of

Cambon and Saccarin. If these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St.

Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still

have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass

the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which had been seized

so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make

a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then

to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the

suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side

of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of

success.

[Sidenote: Plan 10.]

To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions had been

directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only

that of Croix d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers

and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending

half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the numerous streams

in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed

in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St.

Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division

lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to

the road of Alby, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux,

the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge

with his right. Harispe’s division was established in the works on

the Mont-Rave. His right at St. Sypiere looked towards the bridge of

Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial’s

horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby

towards the bridge of Croix d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence

within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St.

Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s division. The two remaining

divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind

the Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man the walls of

Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle

towards the Croix d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and

the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.

Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made

the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was

to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw

the enemy’s attention according to the progress of the battle on

the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third

and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the

left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of

Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s German cavalry were to

make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Daricau.

That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the

convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication

between him and Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery,

was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford’s

column of march. This last composed of the fourth and sixth division

with three batteries was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade,

to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground

between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass

the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line

and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail

that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons following close were to

connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord

Edward Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while

Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to

observe Berton’s cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of

Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to

the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford’s

troops while in march.

BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

[Sidenote: Memoir by general Berton, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Memoir by colonel Hughes, MSS.]