[Sidenote: 1813. December.]
To understand all the importance of the battle of St. Pierre, the
nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing
generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne
although a mean fortress in itself was at this period truly
designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France.
Covered by its entrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep
country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it,
this place could not be assailed until that army was drawn away,
and it was obviously impossible to pass it and leave the enemy to
act upon the communications with Spain and the sea-coast. To force
the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore lord Wellington’s
object, and his first step was the passage of the Nive; he thus cut
Soult’s direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained
an intercourse with the malcontents in France, opened a large tract
of fertile country for his cavalry, and menaced the navigation of
the Adour so as to render it difficult for the French general to
receive supplies. This was however but a first step, because the
country beyond the Nive was still the same deep clayey soil with bad
roads; and it was traversed by many rivers more or less considerable,
which flooding with every shower in the mountains, formed in their
concentric courses towards the Adour a number of successive barriers,
behind which Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington’s right
and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. He could thus
still hem in the allies as before; upon a more extended scale however
and with less effect, for he was thrown more on the defensive, his
line was now the longest, and his adversary possessed the central
position.
On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that deep impracticable
country, carry on the wide operations necessary to pass the rivers
on his right, and render the French position at Bayonne untenable,
until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter of 1813 was
peculiarly wet and inclement.
From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish their own armies
and circumvent their adversaries in that respect were the objects
of both generals, Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain,
Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, or so reduce his
force in the entrenched camp that the works might be stormed. The
French general’s recent losses forbad him to maintain his extended
positions except during the wet season; three days’ fine weather made
him tremble; and the works of his camp were still too unfinished to
leave a small force there. The difficulty of the roads and want of
military transport threw his army almost entirely upon water-carriage
for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established
at Dax on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade on the Gave of Pau, the
latter being about twenty-four miles from Bayonne. These places
he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge
across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above its confluence
with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that
point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could
be interrupted by the allies who were now on the left bank. To
remedy this Soult ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt and construct
a bridge with a head of works, but the movement was foreseen by
Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, recrossed the
river. The navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or
guarded by the French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the
allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the supply would have been
quite unequal to the demand if the French coasting trade, now revived
between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy, but
lord Wellington’s representations on this head were still unheeded.
Soult was embarrassed by Foy’s failure at Urt. He reinforced him
with Boyer’s and D’Armagnac’s divisions, which were extended to the
Port de Lannes; then leaving Reille with four divisions to guard the
entrenched camp and to finish the works, he completed the garrison
of Bayonne and transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. Clauzel
with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry now took post
on the Bidouze, being supported with Trielhard’s heavy dragoons, and
having his left in communication with Paris and with St. Jean Pied
de Port where there was a garrison of eighteen hundred men besides
national guards. He soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse or
Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour
near Urt, and he also occupied Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the
Bastide de Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at Peyrehorade,
Hastingues was fortified on the Gave de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and
Came, on the Bidouze, and the works of Navarens were augmented. In
fine Soult with equal activity and intelligence profited from the
rain which stopped the allies’ operations in that deep country.
[Sidenote: 1814. January.]
Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. Having increased
his works at Barrouilhet he was enabled to shift some of Hope’s
troops towards Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the
heights of Villefranque, which permitted general Hill to extend
his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was posted near
Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel’s outposts,
and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive
by the hill of San Barbe to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre’s Gallicians were
placed in reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to Itzassu
where supported by the Andalusian division and by Freyre, he guarded
the valley of the Upper Nive and watched general Paris beyond the
Ursouia mountain. Such was the state of affairs in the beginning of
January, but some minor actions happened before these arrangements
were completed.
In December the allies seized the island of Holriague near La Honce
on the Adour, which gave them a better command of that river, but Foy
kept possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above Holriague.
The allies’ bridges of communication on the Nive were now carried
away by floods which occasioned some embarrassment, and meanwhile,
without any orders from lord Wellington, probably with a view to
plunder, for his troops were exceedingly licentious, Morillo obtained
from Victor Alten two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars, under
pretence of exploring the enemy’s position towards Mendionde and
Maccaye. Their commander, major Hughes, having with difficulty
ascertained that he was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded
country, demanded the aid of some Spanish Caçadores, and then moving
forwards drove in the picquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde
and commenced a skirmish. But during this action Morillo withdrew
his division without giving any notice, and at the same time the
Caçadores fled in a shameful manner from the left, the cavalry were
thus turned and escaped with difficulty, having had one captain
killed, two other captains and a lieutenant, and Hughes himself,
badly wounded. The unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed
at the time to the bad conduct of the eighteenth hussars, against
whom lord Wellington was by malicious misrepresentation previously
prejudiced; for at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more
licentious than others in plundering the captured property on the
field, whereas they had fought well and plundered less than many who
were praised for their orderly demeanour.
About the same time that this disaster occurred at Mendionde, Mina,
acting independently, and being pressed for provisions in the
mountains, invaded the Val de Baigorry and the Val des Osses, where
his men committed the greatest enormities, plundering and burning,
and murdering men women and children without distinction. The people
of these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for their
warlike qualities, immediately took arms under the command of one
of their principal men, named Etchevery, and being reinforced with
two hundred and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised one
of Mina’s battalions, and attacked the rest with great vigour. This
event gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques to commence such a war
as they had carried on at the commencement of the French revolution.
His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing, and he had for two
months been expecting the arrival of general Harispe an officer whose
courage and talents have been frequently noticed in this History,
and who being the head of an ancient Basque family had great local
influence, which was increased by his military reputation. It was
thought that if he had come when first expected, about November, lord
Wellington’s strict discipline being then unknown to the people, he
would have raised a formidable partizan war in the mountains. But now
the English general’s attention to all complaints, his proclamation,
and the proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards
back when they misconducted themselves, had, in conjunction with
the love of gain that master passion with all mountaineers, tamed
the Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange ease and profit
for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless this incursion by Mina and
the licentious conduct of Morillo’s troops, awakened the warlike
propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and Harispe was enabled
to make a levy with which he immediately commenced active operations,
and was supported by general Paris.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Reports and Orders MSS.]
[Sidenote: Plan 9.]
Soult with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his own cantonments, and
to restrict those of the allies, now resolved to drive the latter’s
detachments altogether from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and
fix Clauzel’s left at Hellette, the culminant point of the great
road to that fortress. To effect this, on the 3d of January, he
caused Clauzel to establish two divisions of infantry at the heights
of La Costa, near the Bastide de Clerence and beyond the Joyeuse
river. Buchan’s Portuguese brigade, placed in observation there,
was thus forced to retreat upon Briscons, and at the same time
Paris advancing to Bonloc connected his right with Clauzel’s left
at Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the allies’ line
of outposts. Informed of this movement by telegraph, Wellington,
thinking Soult was seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen,
made the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade relieve the light
division which marched to Arauntz; the fourth division then passed
the Nive at Ustaritz, and the sixth division made ready to march from
Villefranque, by the high road of St. Jean Pied de Port, towards
Hasparen, as a reserve to the third fourth and seventh divisions.
The latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the 4th, their left
in communication with Hill’s right at Briscons, and their right,
supported by Morillo, who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose.
The English general’s intent was to fall upon the enemy at once, but
the swelling of the small rivers prevented him. However on the 5th
having ascertained the true object and dispositions of the French
general, and having twenty-four thousand infantry in hand with a
division of cavalry and four or five brigades of artillery, he
resolved to attack Clauzel’s divisions on the heights of La Costa.
In this view Le Cor’s Portuguese marched against the French right,
the fourth division marched against their centre, the third division
supported by cavalry against their left; the remainder of the cavalry
and the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton Cotton, were
posted at Hasparen to watch Paris on the side of Bonloc. Soult was
in person at the Bastide de Clerence and a general battle seemed
inevitable, but the intention of the English general was merely
to drive back the enemy from the Joyeuse, and the French general,
thinking the whole allied army was in movement resolved to act on the
defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to retire fighting
upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated therefore with a slight
skirmish on the evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old
positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians were ordered back
to the Bastan, and Carlos D’España’s Gallicians were brought up to
Ascain in their place.
When Clauzel saw that nothing serious was designed he sent his
horsemen to drive away general Hill’s detachments, which had taken
advantage of the great movements to forage on the lower parts of the
Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult observing how sensitive
his adversary was to any demonstration beyond the Bidouze resolved
to maintain the line of those two rivers. In this view he reduced
his defence of the Adour to a line drawn from the confluence of the
Aran to Bayonne, which enabled him to reinforce Clauzel with Foy’s
division and all the light cavalry. Meantime general Harispe having
the division of Paris and the brigade of general Dauture placed
under his orders to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters at
Hellette and commenced an active partizan warfare. On the 8th he
fell upon Mina in the Val des Osses and drove him with loss into
Baygorry. On the 10th returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo’s
foragers with some English dragoons on the side of Maccaye, and
took a few prisoners. On the 12th he again attacked Mina and drove
him up into the Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts
lord Wellington might have stormed the entrenched camp in front
of Bayonne, but he could not hold it except under the fire of the
fortress, and not being prepared for a siege avoided that operation.
Nor would the weather, which was again become terrible, permit him
to make a general movement to drive Harispe from his position in the
upper country; wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet
possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare. He
endeavoured however to launch some armed boats on the Adour above
Bayonne, where Soult had increased the flotilla to twenty gun-boats
for the protection of his convoys, which were notwithstanding forced
to run past Urt under the fire of a battery constructed by general
Hill.
Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect which the excesses
committed by Mina’s and Morillo’s men were likely to produce, for
the Basques were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put forth
his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo for his unauthorized
and disastrous advance upon Mendionde, and for the excesses of his
troops, he ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms.
This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, and especially
by Morillo whose savage untractable and bloody disposition, since
so horribly displayed in South America, prompted him to encourage
violence. He asserted falsely that his troops were starving, declared
that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards existed, and that the
British soldiers were suffered to commit every crime with impunity.
The English general in reply explained himself both to Morillo, and
to Freyre, who had alluded to the libels about San Sebastian, with
a clearness and resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to
strive against him.
“He had not,” he said, “lost thousands of men to pillage and
ill-treat the French peasantry, he preferred a small army obedient
to a large one disobedient and undisciplined. If his measures to
enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish troops the fault would
rest with those who suffered their soldiers to commit disorders.
Professions without corresponding actions would not do, he was
determined to enforce obedience one way or another and would not
command insubordinate troops. The question between them was whether
they should or should not pillage the French peasants. His measures
were taken to prevent it and the conduct which called them forth was
more dishonouring to the Spaniards than the measures themselves. For
libels he cared not, he was used to them and he did not believe the
union of the two nations depended upon such things; but if it did he
desired no union founded upon such an infamous interest as pillage.
He had not lost twenty thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo
to plunder and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards were resolved
to do so let them march their great armies into France under their
own generals, he would meanwhile cover Spain itself and they would
find they could not remain in France for fifteen days. They had
neither money nor magazines, nothing to maintain an army in the
field, the country behind was incapable of supporting them and were
he scoundrel enough to permit pillage France rich as it was could
not sustain the burthen. Even with a view to living on the enemy by
contributions it would be essential to prevent plunder; and yet in
defiance of all these reasons he was called an enemy by the Spanish
generals because he opposed such conduct, and his measures to prevent
it were considered dishonouring!
“Something also he could say against it in a political point of view,
but it was unnecessary because careless whether he commanded a large
or a small army he was resolved that it should obey him and should
not pillage.
“General Morillo expressed doubts of his right to interfere with
the Spaniards. It was his right and his duty, and never before did
he hear that to put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a
measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina could tell by recent
experience what a warfare the French peasants could carry on, and
Morillo was openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain for
that general to palliate or deny the plundering of his division,
after having acknowledged to general Hill that it was impossible to
prevent it because the officers and soldiers received by every post
letters from their friends, congratulating them upon their good luck
in entering France and urging them to seize the opportunity of making
fortunes. General Morillo asserted that the British troops were
allowed to commit crimes with impunity. Neither he nor any other man
could produce an instance of injury done where proof being adduced
the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him enquire how many
soldiers had been hanged, how many stricken with minor chastisements
and made to pay for damages done. But had the English troops no
cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers and soldiers were
frequently shot and robbed on the high roads and a soldier had been
lately murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English stores and
convoys were plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British officer
had been put to death at Vittoria and others were ill-treated at
Santander.”
A sullen obedience followed this correspondence for the moment, but
the plundering system was soon renewed, and this with the mischief
already done was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidarray as
well as those of the Val de Baygorry into action. They commenced
and continued a partizan warfare until lord Wellington, incensed by
their activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms
openly and join Soult or stay peaceably at home, declaring that he
would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants.
Thus it appeared that notwithstanding all the outcries made against
the French for resorting to this system of repressing the warfare
of peasants in Spain, it was considered by the English general both
justifiable and necessary. However the threat was sufficient for this
occasion. The Basques set the pecuniary advantages to be derived from
the friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and the misery
of an avenging warfare against the evils of Spanish plunder, and
generally disregarded Harispe’s appeals to their patriotism.
Meanwhile Soult who expected reinforcements seeing that little was to
be gained by insurrection and being desirous to resume the offensive,
ordered Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary for
the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and its entrenched camp with
a few Basques as scouts in the valleys, and to concentrate the
remainder of his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa, thus
closely hemming in the right of the allies’ line with a view to
making incursions beyond the Upper Nive. This was on the 14th, on
the 23rd Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to forage
in force on the side of Bidarray, endeavoured to cut him off, the
supporting troops consisting of Spanish infantry and some English
hussars repulsed his first attack, but they were finally pushed back
with some loss in horses and mules. About the same time one of Hill’s
posts near the confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised
by some French companies who remained in advance until fresh troops
detached from Urt forced them to repass the river again. This affair
was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a few days before
by the sixth division, which was attended with some circumstances
repugnant to the friendly habits long established between the French
and British troops at the outposts. The value of such a generous
intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of
it at this period may be quoted.
On the 9th of December, the forty-third was assembled in column on
an open space within twenty yards of the enemy’s out-sentry, yet
the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour without concern,
relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his
knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When at last the order
to advance was given, one of the British soldiers stepping out
told him to go away and helped him to replace his pack, the firing
then commenced; the next morning the French in like manner warned
a forty-third sentry to retire. But the most remarkable instance
happened on the occasion of lord Wellington’s being desirous of
getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne. He
ordered the riflemen who escorted him to drive the French away, and
seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too close, called out to
commence firing; with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied
“_no firing!_” and then holding up the butt of his rifle towards the
French, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal
which meaned “_we must have the hill for a short time_,” the French
who though they could not maintain would not have relinquished the
post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired.
And this signal would never have been made if the post had been one
capable of a permanent defence, so well do veterans understand war
and its proprieties.
The English general now only waited until the roads were practicable,
to take the offensive with an army superior in every point of view to
Soult’s. That general’s numbers were also about to be reduced. His
conscripts were deserting fast, and the inclemency of the weather was
filling his hospitals, while the bronzed veterans of Wellington’s
army impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution,
were free from serious maladies, ready and able to plant their
colours wherever their general listed. At this time however the
country was a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions
or even orders could be conveyed to the different quarters, and
a Portuguese brigade on the right of the Nive, was several days
without food from the swelling of the rivulets which stopped the
commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops were better off, yet
with a horrible counterpoise, for on that iron-bound coast storms
and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but some
vessel, sometimes many together, were seen embayed and drifting
towards the reefs which shoot out like needles for several miles.
Once in this situation there was no human help! a faint cry might be
heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated slowly and solemnly
onwards until the first rock arrested her, a roaring surge then
dashed her to pieces and the shore was strewed with broken timbers
and dead bodies. December and January were thus passed by the
allies, but February saw Wellington break into France the successful
invader of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult’s military
operations can be understood without a previous description of
political affairs which shall be given in the next chapter.