[Sidenote: 1814.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
_Portugal._—It has been shewn that marshal Beresford’s arrival at
Lisbon put a momentary check upon the intrigues of the regency
relative to the command of the troops, when he rejoined the army
the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater
violence, and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents,
whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned
without regard to justice or international law. The supply and
reinforcing of the army were the pretences for these exactions, yet
the army was neither supplied nor recruited, for though the new
regulations had produced nine thousand trained soldiers, they were,
in contempt of the subsidizing treaty, retained in the depôts. At
first this was attributed to the want of transport to enable them
to march through Spain, but though lord Wellington obtained in the
beginning of 1814 shipping to convey them to the army, the Portuguese
government still withheld the greatest number, alleging in excuse
the ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military convention
established between the two countries.
This convention had been concluded in 1812 to enable the Portuguese
troops to establish hospitals and to draw certain resources from
Spain upon fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies
might be purchased, half with ready money half with bills on the
Portuguese treasury; nevertheless in December 1813 the Spanish envoy
at Lisbon informed the Portuguese government, that to give up the
shells of certain public buildings for hospitals was the only effect
they would give to the convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor
horses could march through Spain, and the supply of those already
with the army became nearly impossible, the regency detained the
reinforcements. Lord Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish
government for this foul conduct, yet observed with great force to
the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by which a certain number of
soldiers were to be constantly in the field was made with England,
not with Spain; and as the government of the former country continued
to pay the subsidy and provided ships for the transport of the troops
there was no excuse for retaining them in Portugal.
His remonstrances, Beresford’s orders, and Mr. Stuart’s exertions
although backed by the menaces of lord Castlereagh, were however
alike powerless; the regency embarked only three thousand men out
of nine thousand, and those not until the month of March when the
war was on the point of terminating. Thus instead of thirty thousand
Portuguese under arms lord Wellington had less than twenty thousand,
and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that by doing away with the militia and
introducing the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one hundred
thousand troops of the line might have been furnished and supported
by Portugal, without pressing more severely on the finances of
the country than the actual system which supplied these twenty
thousand. The regency were now more than usually importunate to
have the subsidy paid in specie in which case their army would have
disappeared altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing the
money would be misapplied if it fell into their hands, and thinking
their importunity peculiarly ill-timed when their quota of troops was
withheld, and when lord Wellington, forced to pay ready money for
his supplies in France, wanted all the specie that could be procured
for the military chest. Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal
towards England in return for the independence which the latter had
secured for her; and it is obvious that if the war had not terminated
immediately afterwards the alliance could not have continued. The
British army deserted by Portugal and treated hostilely, as we shall
find, by the Spaniards, must then have abandoned the Peninsula.
_Spain._—The malice evinced towards lord Wellington by the Spanish
government, the libels upon him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army,
the vices of the system by which the Spanish troops were supplied,
and their own evil propensities fostered by long and cruel neglect
and suffering, the activity of those intriguing politicians who were
inimical to the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of the
minister of war, the growing enmity between Spain and Portugal, the
virulence of all parties and the absolute hostility of the local
authorities towards the British army, the officers and soldiers of
which were on all occasions treated as if they were invaders rather
than friends, drove lord Wellington in the latter end of November to
extremity. He judged the general disposition of the Spanish people to
be still favourable to the English alliance, and with the aid of the
serviles hoped to put down the liberals; but an open rupture with
the government he thought inevitable, and if the liberal influence
should prove most powerful with the people he might be unable to
effect a retreat into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the British
ministers to take measures with a view to a war against Spain! And
this at the very moment when, victorious in every battle, he seemed
to have placed the cause he supported beyond the power of fortune.
Who when Napoleon was defeated at Leipsic, when all Europe and even
part of Asia were pouring their armed hordes into the northern
and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable to defend the
western frontier; who then looking only on the surface could have
supposed that Wellington, the long-enduring general, whose profound
calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought the affairs of
the Peninsula to their apparently prosperous state, that he the
victorious commander could with truth thus describe his own uneasy
situation to his government?
“Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards that I
think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject.
You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I know
were written and published by an officer of the war department
and I believe under the direction of the minister at war Don Juan
O’Donoju. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these
libels to circulate others in which the old stories are repeated
about the outrages committed by sir John Moore’s army in Gallicia,
and endeavours are made to irritate the public mind about our still
keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, and particularly in Ceuta.
They exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and
every little concern of a master of a ship who may behave ill in a
Spanish port is represented as an attack upon the sovereignty of the
Spanish nation. I believe these libels all proceed from the same
source, the government and their immediate servants and officers;
and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made
any impression on the nation at large they certainly have upon the
officers of the government, and even upon the principal officers of
the army. These persons must see that if the libels are not written
or encouraged by the government they are at least not discouraged,
they know that we are odious to the government and they treat us
accordingly. The Spanish troops plunder every thing they approach,
neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently there
was some semblance of inquiry and of a desire to punish offenders,
lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed,
unless when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief
of the Spanish army. The civil magistrates in the country have
not only refused us assistance but have particularly ordered the
inhabitants not to give it for payment, and when robberies have been
discovered and the property proved to belong to the commissariat the
law has been violated and possession withheld. This was the case
lately at Tolosa.
“Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult to understand is
a transaction which occurred lately at Fuenterabia. It was settled
that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town.
There is a building there which has been a Spanish hospital, and the
Spanish authority who gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to
burn as fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have the
use of them; and these are people to whom we have given medicines
instruments and other aids, who when wounded and sick we have taken
into our hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every service in our
power after having recovered their country from the enemy! These are
not the people of Spain but the officers of government, who would not
dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that
their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not
checked, if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to
our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such
proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave
towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friend or
none who will dare to avow him as such in Spain. Consider what will
be the consequence of this state of affairs if any reverse should
happen, or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or any other
cause should cause the English army to be withdrawn. I think I should
experience great difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in
retiring through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar nature of
our equipments, and I think I might be able to embark the army at
Passages in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I
should be much more certain of getting clear off as we ought if we
had possession of San Sebastian, and this view of the subject is the
motive for the advice I am about to give you as the remedy for the
evils with which I have made you acquainted.
“First then I recommend to you to alter the nature of your political
relations with Spain and to have nothing there but a “_chargé
d’affaires_.” Secondly to complain seriously of the conduct of the
government and their servants, to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena,
and I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their
earnest request, and that the troops were not sent to the two former
till the government agreed to certain conditions. If we had not
garrisoned the last it would before now have fallen into the hands
of the Moors. Thirdly to demand, as security for the safety of the
king’s troops against the criminal disposition of the government and
of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should
be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that unless this
demand was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. Fourthly.
To withdraw the troops if this demand be not complied with, be the
consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may
rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided line and shew your
determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation
with you, and will bring the government to their senses, and you
will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action
existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the
necessity of bringing matters to extremities; if you take any other
than a decided line and one which in its consequences will involve
them in ruin you may depend upon it you will gain nothing and will
only make matters worse. I recommend these measures whatever may be
the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably
the more necessary if I should keep my command. The truth is that
a crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain and if you do
not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go
too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might
expect from services rendered to them.”
Thus it appears that lord Wellington at the end of the war described
the Spaniards precisely as sir John Moore described them at the
beginning. But the seat of government was now transferred to Madrid
and the new Cortez, as I have already noticed, decided, against
the wishes of the regency, that the English general should keep
the command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed with great
diligence had previously sought to establish a system of controul
over the Cortez by means of the populace of Madrid as they had done
at Cadiz, and they were so active and created so much alarm by their
apparent success, that the serviles, backed by the Americans, were
ready to make the princess Carlotta sole regent as the only resource
for stemming the progress of democracy. However when they had proved
their strength upon the question of lord Wellington’s command,
they deferred the princess’s affair and resolved to oppose their
adversaries more vigorously in the assembly. They were encouraged
also by a tumult which happened at Madrid, where the populace
instigated by their agents, or disliking the new constitution, for
the measures of the democratic party were generally considered evil
in the great towns beyond the Isla, rose and forced the authorities
to imprison a number of obnoxious persons; the new Cortez then
arrived, the serviles got the upper hand and being resolved to change
the regency took as their ground of attack its conduct towards the
English general. Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour they
caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and were ready to attack
the regency itself, expecting full success, when to their amazement
and extreme anger lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his
personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed his earnest
desire to keep them in their stations.
To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or principle, and
whose only rule of action was the momentary impulse of passion,
such a proceeding was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and
well-considered political change on his part, shewing that private
feelings were never the guides of his conduct in public matters, and
that he ever seemed to bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has
put into the mouth of Ajax, “_carrying himself towards his friends
as if they might one day become enemies and treating his foes as men
who might become friends_.” The new spirit had given him no hopes of
any general alteration of the system, nor was he less convinced that
sooner or later he must come to extremities with the Spaniards; but
he was averse to any appearance of disunion becoming public at the
moment he was invading France, lest it should check his projects of
raising an anti-Napoleon party in that country. He therefore advised
the British government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance,
leaving it to him and to his brother to put them in execution or not
as events might dictate. Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz
and Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in the Spanish
government, observing that “the minister of war being dismissed, the
most obnoxious opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the
mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press in the hands of
the same people who had made the mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would
become as bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest
would not have so much power in the capital they would not want
partizans when desirous of carrying a question by violence. The
grandees were too poor to retain their former natural influence, and
the constitution gave them no political power. The only chance which
the serviles had was to conduct themselves with prudence, and when in
the right with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and the
mob; but this was what no person in Spain ever did and the smaller
party being wiser bolder and more active would soon govern the Cortez
at Madrid as they did that at Cadiz.”
No permanent change for the better could be expected, and meanwhile
the actual government, alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by
the strength of the serviles in the Cortez, by the rebukes and
remonstrances of the English general and ministers, and by the
evident danger of an open rupture with England, displayed, according
to lord Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a most
important affair which occurred at this time. That is to say,
their own views and interests coinciding with those of the English
commander and government there was a momentary agreement, and
Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation to the more
dangerous mode he had before recommended.
The event which called forth his approval of their conduct was the
secret arrival of the duke of San Carlos at Madrid in December.
He brought with him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and
accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay. It acknowledged
Ferdinand as king of Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of
the Spanish empire was recognized. He was in return to make the
English evacuate Spain, and the French troops were to abandon the
country at the same time. The contracting powers were to maintain
their respective maritime rights as they had been stipulated by the
treaty of Utrecht and observed until 1792. The sales of the national
domains made by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards who
had attached themselves to the French cause were to be reinstated in
their dignities and property, those who chose to quit Spain were to
have ten years to dispose of their possessions. Prisoners, including
all those delivered up by Spain to the English, were to be sent home
on both sides. The king was to pay annually thirty millions of reals
to his father Charles IV., and two millions to his widow; a treaty of
commerce was to be arranged.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Ferdinand being entirely devoid of principle acted with that cunning
which marked his infamous career through life. He gave the duke of
San Carlos secret instructions to tell the serviles, if he found
them all-powerful in the Cortez, to ratify this treaty with a secret
resolution to break it when time served; but if the Jacobins were
strongest San Carlos was merely to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand
in that case reserving to himself the task of violating it on his
own authority. These instructions were made known to the English
ministers and the English general, but they, putting no trust in
such a negociator, and thinking his intention was rather to deceive
the allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they could, and
in this they were joined by the Portuguese government. The British
authorities were naturally little pleased with the prospect of being
forced to abandon Spain under a treaty, which would necessarily
give Napoleon great influence over that country in after times, and
for the present enable him to concentrate all the old troops on the
eastern frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical Spanish
government more content to have a master. Wherefore, all parties
being agreed, the regency, keeping the matter secret, dismissed San
Carlos on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree passed by the
Cortez, which rendered null and void all acts of Ferdinand while
a prisoner, and forbad negociation for peace while a French army
remained in the Peninsula. And that the king might fully understand
them, they told him “_the monster despotism had been driven from the
throne of Spain_.” Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner
ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French emperor first
sent to Valençay, after which he was to follow San Carlos and he
arrived at Madrid four days after the latter’s departure. But his
negociations were equally fruitless with the regency, and in the
secret sittings of the Cortez measures were discussed for watching
the king’s movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution and
to the Cortez before he passed the frontier.
Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of Valençay. He had, he
said, long suspected Napoleon would adopt such an expedient and if he
had shewn less pride and more common sense it would have succeeded.
This sarcasm was perhaps well applied to the measure as it appeared
at the time, but the emperor’s real proceedings he was unacquainted
with, and this splenetic ebullition only indicated his own vexation
at approaching mischief, for he was forced to acknowledge that the
project was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the misery
of Spain was so great and so clearly to be traced to the views of
the government and of the new constitution, that many persons must
have been desirous to put an end to the general suffering under the
sanction of this treaty. “If Napoleon,” he said, “had withdrawn the
garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand who must
be _as useless a person in France as he would probably be in Spain_
at once to the frontier, or into the Peninsula, peace would have
been made or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be almost
impracticable and without hope of great success.” Now this was
precisely what Napoleon had designed, and it seems nearly certain
that he contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration of
Ferdinand as early as the period of the battle of Vittoria, if not
before.
The scheme was one which demanded the utmost secrecy, that it might
be too sudden for the English influence to defeat it; the emperor
had therefore arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in
November, that is at the very moment when it would have been most
injurious to the English interest, because then the disputes in the
Cortez between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous, and the
hostility of the regencies both in Portugal and Spain towards the
English general and English influence undisguised. Suchet had then
also proved his superiority to the allies in Catalonia, and Soult’s
gigantic lines being unessayed seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon’s
council were persons seeking only to betray him. It was the great
misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to
suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery
has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even to approach
his court. Mischief of this kind, however, necessarily awaits men
who like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell have the courage to attempt
after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding of the social
edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence
by their cruelty, or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands,
Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and
never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest
and resolute men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the times
see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which prevents anarchy.
The treaty of Valençay was too important a measure to escape the
sagacity of the traitors around Napoleon, and when their opposition
in the council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing to
dissuade him from it, they divulged the secret to the partizans
of the Bourbons. Taking advantage of the troubled state of public
affairs which occupied the emperor’s time and distracted his
attention, they contrived that Ferdinand’s emissaries should precede
him to Madrid, and delayed his own departure until March when the
struggle was at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for this
scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were so many and so alarming
that lord Wellington’s sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm
support of the regency, when he found it resolute and frank in its
rejection of the treaty, although it created so much surprize and
anger at the moment, cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise
and prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. Nor did he fail
to point out to his own government the more distant as well as the
immediate danger to England and Spain involved in this singularly
complicated and important affair.
The evils as affecting the war and English alliance with Spain
were obvious, but the two articles relating to the provision for
Ferdinand’s father and mother, and to the future state of the
Spaniards who had joined the French involved great interests. It was
essential, he said, that the Spanish government should explicitly
declare its intentions. Negociations for a general peace were said
to be commenced, of that he knew nothing, but he supposed such being
the case that a basis would be embodied in a preliminary treaty
which all the belligerents would ratify, each power then to arrange
its own peculiar treaty with France under protection of the general
confederation. Napoleon would necessarily put forward his treaty with
Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the statement that the latter
was a prisoner when negociating; but new articles would then have
to be framed and therefore the Spanish government should be called
upon previously to declare what their intentions were as to the two
articles in the treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were that
the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the financial means of Spain,
and were it not so, Napoleon should not be allowed to stipulate for
any provision for him. Neither should he be suffered to embody or
establish a permanent French party in Spain, under protection of
a treaty, an article of which provided for the restoration of the
Spaniards who had taken part with the French. It would give him
the right, which he would not fail to exercise, of interfering in
their favour in every question of property, or other interest, and
the Spanish government would be involved in perpetual disputes with
France. It was probable the allied sovereigns would be desirous of
getting rid of this question and would think it desirable that Spain
should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this reason he had before
advised the Spanish government to publish a general amnesty, with
the view of removing the difficulty when a general peace should come
to be negociated, and this difficulty and danger be enhanced, if not
before provided for, by the desire which each of the allied powers
would feel, when negociating on their separate grounds, to save their
finances by disbanding their armies.
This suggestion of an amnesty, made ten days before the battle of
Vittoria, illustrates Wellington’s sagacity, his long and provident
reach of mind, his discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing
the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it be remembered that
in the full tide of success, after having passed the Douro, and when
Joseph surprised and bewildered was flying before him, that he who
had been called the iron duke in the midst of his bivouac fires,
found time to consider, and had sufficient humanity and grandeur of
mind thus to address the Spanish government on this subject.
“A large number of Spaniards who have taken the side of the French
are now with the enemy’s army, many of these are highly meritorious
and have rendered most essential service to the cause even during
the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy.
It is also a known fact that fear, the misery and distress which
they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result,
were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons
to take the part which they have taken, and I would suggest for
consideration whether it is expedient to involve the country in all
the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law in order to
punish such persons. I am the last man who will be found to diminish
the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the
country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly
of those, who, having remained amongst the enemy without entering
their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives.
But at the same time that I can appreciate the merits of these
individuals and of the nation at large I can forgive the weakness of
those who have been induced by terror by distress or by despair to
pursue a different line of conduct.
“I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the
commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest,
and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined
that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although
aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they
were assailed and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness
of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous
and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and
disorganization that followed, and let them decide whether those
who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could
not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not
guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed guilty in the eye of
the law as having served the pretended king have by that very act
acquired the means of serving and have rendered important services to
their country. It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead
the government and the Cortez to grant a general amnesty with certain
exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of
failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors.
If the effort fail the enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the
principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which
his armies will be stationed; he will see clearly that he can place
no reliance on any partizans in Spain, and he will not have even a
pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the
effort succeed the object of the government should be to pacify the
country and to heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably
occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this object while there
exists a great body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the
largest property in the country and others endowed with considerable
talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest,
conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have
above adverted. These persons their friends and relations will if
persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the
country in the hope at some time to take advantage of them, and
adverting to their number and to that power which they must derive
from their property and connections it must be feared that they will
be too successful.
“But there are other important views of this question. First should
the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed, at some
time or other approaches to peace must be made between the two
nations and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove
the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement. Secondly,
should even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription
against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a
perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power to disturb
the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of the
war, which will be their wish and object, they will be the most
mischievous and most inveterate enemies of their country, of that
country which with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes by
casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects. On every
ground then it is desirable that the measure should be adopted and
the present moment should be seized for adopting it.”
Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice those who should be
exempted from an amnesty he thus terminated this record of his own
true greatness, and of the littleness of the people to whom it was
fruitlessly addressed.
“In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government I
am perhaps intruding my opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I
have no concern, but having had an advantage enjoyed by few of being
acquainted with the concerns of the country since the commencement
of the contest, and having been sensible both in the last and
present campaign of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the
want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper as
a well-wisher to the cause to bring it under the consideration of
the government assuring them at the same time that I have never had
the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my
country, nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention
to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions to which I may
attribute more weight than they merit but they are founded upon a
sincere devotion to the interests of the country.”
Such was the general political state of the Peninsula as bearing
upon the military operations at the close of the year 1813, and the
state of England and France shall be shewn in the next chapters.
But however hateful and injurious to England the conduct of the
Peninsular government appears, and however just and well-founded were
the greatest part of lord Wellingtons complaints, it is not to be
assumed that the Spanish government and Cortez were totally without
excuse for their hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon
military grounds that they were obnoxious to the English general. He
united heartily with the English government in hatred of democratic
institutions as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain with the
former seemed scarcely worth saving from France, and in a letter
written about that period to the Conde de la Bispal, who it would
appear proposed some immediate stroke of violence against the
regency, he openly avows that he was inimical to the constitution,
because it admitted a free press and refused to property any
political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is,
it refused to heap undue honours privileges and power upon those
who already possessed all the luxury and happiness which riches
can bestow; it refused to admit the principle that those who have
much should have more, that the indolence corruption and insolence
naturally attendant upon wealth should be supported and increased
by irresponsible power; that those who laboured and produced all
things should enjoy nothing, that the rich should be tyrants and
the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic
government have never yet been, and never will be quietly received
and submitted to by any thinking people: where they prevail there is
no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors,
and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges it
should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by
raising the poorer classes to political importance: the influence and
insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being
inflated and excited by political institutions. This was the guiding
principle of the most celebrated Greek legislators, the opposite
principle produced the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was
the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the French revolution.
But after many years of darkness, the light of reason is now breaking
forth again, and that ancient principle of justice which places the
right of man in himself, above the right of property, is beginning
to be understood. A clear perception of it has produced the American
republic. France and Spain have admitted it and England ripens for
its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful and healthful as the
light of freedom is in itself, it fell at this time on such foul and
stagnant pools, such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned
at first from its radiance with disgust and wished for darkness
again.