CHAPTER II.

[Sidenote: 1813. November.]

Soult having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part of his

forces in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take

a flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St.

Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the entrenched mountain of

Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head

of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He

could thus keep his troops together and restore their confidence,

while he confined the allies to a small sterile district of France

between the river and the sea, and rendered their situation very

uneasy during the winter if they did not retire. However he soon

modified this plan. The works of the Bayonne camp were not complete

and his presence was necessary to urge their progress. The camp on

the Ursouia mountain had been neglected contrary to his orders, and

the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. On the

left it was indeed complete but constructed on a bad trace. Moreover

he found that the Nive in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below

Cambo, and at many places above that point. Remaining therefore at

Bayonne himself with six divisions and Villatte’s reserve, he sent

D’Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet neither

D’Erlon’s divisions nor Soult’s whole army could have stopped lord

Wellington at this time if other circumstances had permitted the

latter to follow up his victory as he designed.

The hardships and privations endured on the mountains by the

Anglo-Portuguese troops had been beneficial to them as an army. The

fine air and the impossibility of the soldiers committing their

usual excesses in drink had rendered them unusually healthy, while

the facility of enforcing a strict discipline, and their natural

impatience to win the fair plains spread out before them, had raised

their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful degree. Danger

was their sport, and their experienced general in the prime and

vigour of life was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither

the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier of the Nive, suddenly

manned by a beaten and dispirited army, could have long withstood the

progress of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could have let their

strength and fury loose in the first days succeeding the battle of

the Nivelle France would have felt his conquering footsteps to her

centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees is a deep clay,

quite impassable after rain except by the royal road near the coast

and that of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in the power

of the French. On the bye-roads the infantry sunk to the mid leg,

the cavalry above the horses’ knees, and even to the saddle-girths

in some places. The artillery could not move at all. The rain had

commenced on the 11th, the mist in the early part of the 12th had

given Soult time to regain his camp and secure the high road to St.

Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily gained their proper

posts on the Nive, while his adversary fixed in the swamps could only

make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo already

noticed.

Wellington uneasy for his right flank while the French commanded

the Cambo passage across the Nive directed general Hill to menace

it again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to preserve the

bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstances, but he was

permitted to abandon the work on the left bank in the event of a

general attack; however at Hill’s approach the officer placed there

in command destroyed all the works and the bridge itself. This was a

great cross to Soult, and the allies’ flank being thus secured they

were put into cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily.

The bad weather was however not the only obstacle to the English

general’s operations. On the very day of the battle Freyre’s and

Longa’s soldiers entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered several

persons; the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued these

excesses in various places, and on the right Mina’s battalions,

some of whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a plundering

and murdering incursion from the mountains towards Hellette. The

Portuguese and British soldiers of the left wing had commenced

the like outrages and two French persons were killed in one town,

however the adjutant-general Pakenham arriving at the moment saw and

instantly put the perpetrators to death thus nipping this wickedness

in the bud, but at his own risk for legally he had not that power.

This general whose generosity humanity and chivalric spirit excited

the admiration of every honourable person who approached him, is the

man who afterwards fell at New Orleans and who has been so foully

traduced by American writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished

by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has been with astounding

falsehood represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous

excesses. But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings

in the most horrible slavery while they prate and vaunt of liberty

until all men turn with loathing from the sickening folly, what can

be expected?

Terrified by these excesses the French people fled even from the

larger towns, but Wellington quickly relieved their terror. On the

12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the Spanish

marauders he could take in the act, and then with many reproaches

and despite of the discontent of their generals, forced the whole

to withdraw into their own country. He disarmed the insubordinate

battalions under Mina, quartered Giron’s Andalusians in the Bastan

where O’Donnel resumed the command; sent Freyre’s Gallicians to the

district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa over the Ebro. Morillo’s

division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings

marking the lofty character of the man proved not less politic than

resolute. The French people immediately returned, and finding the

strictest discipline preserved and all things paid for adopted an

amicable intercourse with the invaders. However the loss of such a

mass of troops and the effects of weather on the roads reduced the

army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were

suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in

permanent cantonments with the following line of battle.

[Sidenote: Plan 7.]

The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both sides of the great road

beyond Bidart, the principal post being at a mansion belonging

to the mayor of Biaritz. The front was covered by a small stream

spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks between which the

road was conducted. The centre posted partly on the continuation of

this ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of San Barbe,

extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the right being thrown back to face

count D’Erlon’s position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From this

position which might stretch about six miles on the front and eight

miles on the flank, strong picquets were pushed forwards to several

points, and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns behind

as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa, San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain.

One regiment of Vandeleur’s cavalry was with the advanced post on the

left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne, Victor Alten’s

horsemen were about San Pé, and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.

In this state of affairs the establishment of the different posts

in front led to several skirmishes. In one on the 18th, general

John Wilson and general Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day

Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, near the

junction of the Ustaritz and San Pé roads, and though attacked in

force the next day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious

action occurred on the 23d in front of Arcangues. This village held

by the picquets of the light division was two or three miles in

front of Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned. It is built

on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, and the sentries of both

armies were so close that the reliefs and patroles actually passed

each other in their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it

suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington visited this post

and the field-officer on duty made known to him its disadvantages,

and the means of remedying them by taking entire possession of the

village, pushing picquets along the horns of the crescent, and

establishing a chain of posts across the valley between them. He

appeared satisfied with this project, and two days afterwards the

forty-third and some of the riflemen were employed to effect it, the

greatest part of the division being brought up in support. The French

after a few shots abandoned Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns

of the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large fortified

house situated at the mouth of the valley. The project suggested

by the field-officer was thus executed with the loss of only five

men wounded and the action should have ceased, but the picquets of

the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack the fortified

house, and the columns of support were shewn at several points of

the semicircle; the French then conceiving they were going to be

seriously assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish ensued and

the picquets were finally withdrawn to the ground they had originally

gained and beyond which they should never have been pushed. This

ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and officers of which eighty

were of the forty-third.

[Sidenote: December.]

[Sidenote: Original Morning States, MSS.]

Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and cavalry, the former

consisting of nearly one hundred field-pieces and the latter

furnishing more than eight thousand six hundred sabres, were

paralysed in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious to

pass the Nive, but the rain which continued to fall baffled him, and

meanwhile Mina’s Spaniards descending once more from the Alduides to

plunder Baigorry were beaten by the national guards of that valley.

However early in December the weather amended, forty or fifty pieces

of artillery were brought up, and other preparations made to surprize

or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Ustaritz. And as this

operation led to sanguinary battles it is fitting first to describe

the exact position of the French.

[Sidenote: Plans 7 and 8.]

Bayonne situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour

commands the passage of both. A weak fortress of the third order its

importance was in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly

strong and commanded by the fortress could not be safely attacked

in front, wherefore Soult kept only six divisions there. His right

composed of Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve touched

on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of gun-boats. It was

covered by a swamp and artificial inundation, through which the

royal road led to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well

entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on this causeway. His

left under Clauzel, composed of three divisions, extended from Anglet

to the Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly by the large

fortified house which the light division assailed on the 23d, partly

by an inundation spreading below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus

entrenched the fortified outposts may be called the front of battle,

the entrenched camp the second line, and the fortress the citadel.

The country in front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with

small wood and farm-houses, was very difficult to move in.

Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp stretching from that river to

the Adour was called the front of Mousseroles. It was in the keeping

of D’Erlon’s four divisions, which were also extended up the right

bank of the Nive; that is to say, D’Armagnac’s troops was in front

of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged the line to Cambo. The remainder of

D’Erlon’s corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights

about two miles in front of Mousseroles, the right at Villefranque

on the Nive, the left at Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D’Erlon’s

communications with the rest of the army were double, one circuitous

through Bayonne, the other direct by a bridge of boats thrown above

that place.

After the battle of the Nivelle Soult brought general Paris’s

division from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahoussoa close under the

Ursouia mountain, where it was in connection with Foy’s left,

communicating by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which ran in

a parallel direction to the river.

The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau which falls into the latter

many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable, the first as far as

Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and the

great French magazines were collected at the two latter places. But

the army was fed with difficulty, and hence to restrain Soult from

the country beyond the Nive, to intercept his communications with

St. Jean Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity,

and to obtain secret intelligence from the interior of Spain

were Wellington’s inducements to force a passage over the Nive.

Yet to place the troops on both sides of a navigable river with

communications bad at all times and subject to entire interruptions

from rain; to do this in face of an army possessing short

communications good roads and entrenched camps for retreat, was a

delicate and dangerous operation.

[Sidenote: Original States, MSS.]

On the 7th orders were issued for forcing the passage on the 9th.

On that day sir John Hope and Charles Alten, with the first,

fifth, and light divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry,

Vandeleur’s cavalry and twelve guns, in all about twenty-four

thousand combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts

along the whole front of the entrenched camp between the Nive and

the sea. This movement was partly to examine the course of the Lower

Adour with a view to subsequent operations, but principally to make

Soult discover his dispositions of defence on that side, and to

keep his troops in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive.

To support this double operation the fourth and seventh divisions

were secretly brought up from Ascain and Espelette on the 8th, the

latter to the hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one brigade

to relieve the posts of the third division. There remained the

second the third and the sixth divisions, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and

Morillo’s Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford leading the third

and sixth reinforced with six guns and a squadron of cavalry, was to

cross at Ustaritz with pontoons, Hill having the second division,

Hamilton’s Portuguese, Vivian’s and Victor Alten’s cavalry, and

fourteen guns, was to ford the river at Cambo and Larressore. Both

generals were then to repair the bridges at these respective points

with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover Hill’s movement on

the right and protect the valley of the Nive from Paris, who being

at Lahoussoa might have penetrated to the rear of the army during

the operations, Morillo’s Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this

time Foy’s division was extended from Halzou in front of Larressore,

to the fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between his left

and Paris. The rest of D’Erlon’s troops remained on the heights of

Moguerre in front of Mousserolles.

PASSAGE OF THE NIVE

AND

BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.

[Sidenote: Plans 7 and 8.]

At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges, but the island

connecting them was in possession of the British. Beresford laid his

pontoons down on the hither side in the night of the 8th and in the

morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights above Cambo gave

the signal of attack. The passage was immediately forced under the

fire of the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D’Armagnac’s

brigade was driven back by the sixth division; but the swampy

nature of the country between the river and the high road retarded

the allies’ march and gave the French time to retreat with little

loss. At the same time Hill’s troops, also covered by the fire of

artillery, forced the passage in three columns above and below Cambo

with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep that several

horsemen were drowned, and the French strongly posted, especially at

Halzou where there was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well

as the river.

Foy seeing, by the direction of Beresford’s fire, that his retreat

was endangered, retired hastily with his left leaving his right wing

under general Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when general

Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore, the sixth division was

already on the high road between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by

cross roads towards Hasparen, but did not rejoin his division until

two o’clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo crossed at Itzassu,

and Paris retired to Hellette where he was joined by a regiment of

light cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult who was then on the Bidouse

river. Morillo followed, and in one village near Hellette his troops

killed fifteen peasants, amongst them several women and children.

General Hill having won the passage, placed a brigade of infantry at

Urcurray to cover the bridge of Cambo, and to support the cavalry

which he despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussoa, St. Jean

Pied de Port, and Hasparen, and to observe Paris and Pierre Soult.

With the rest of his troops he marched to the heights of Lormenthoa

in front of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was there

joined by the sixth division, the third remaining to cover the

bridge of Ustaritz. It was now about one o’clock, and Soult, coming

hastily from Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by D’Erlon,

and offered battle, his line being extended so as to bar the high

road. D’Armagnac’s brigade which had retired from Ustaritz was now

in advance at Villefranque and a heavy cannonade and skirmish ensued

along the front, but no general attack was made because the deep

roads had retarded the rear of Hill’s columns. However the Portuguese

of the sixth division, descending from Lormenthoa about three

o’clock, drove D’Armagnac’s brigade with sharp fighting and after

one repulse out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second division

was then established in advance connecting Hill’s corps with the

troops in Villefranque. Thus three divisions of infantry, wanting

the brigade left at Urcurray, hemmed up four French divisions; and

as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, made no

advantage of the broken movements of the allies caused by the deep

roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a surprize. Wellington

thus far overreached his able adversary, yet he had not trusted to

this uncertain chance alone.

The French masses falling upon the heads of his columns at Lormenthoa

while the rear was still labouring in the deep roads, might have

caused some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill or

Beresford over the river again, because the third division was close

at hand to reinforce the sixth, and the brigade of the seventh, left

at San Barbe, could have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus

giving the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest danger

was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult’s cavalry, should have

returned and fallen either upon Morillo or the brigade left at

Urcurray in the rear, while Soult, reinforcing D’Erlon with fresh

divisions brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked Hill and

Beresford in front. It was to prevent this that Hope and Alten whose

operations are now to be related pressed the enemy on the left bank.

The first-named general having twelve miles to march from St. Jean de

Luz before he could reach the French works, put his troops in motion

during the night, and about eight o’clock passed between the tanks

in front of Barrouilhet with his right, while his left descended

from the platform of Bidart and crossed the valley towards Biaritz.

The French outposts retired fighting, and Hope sweeping with a half

circle to his right, and being preceded by the fire of his guns and

many skirmishers, arrived in front of the entrenched camp about one

o’clock. His left then rested on the Lower Adour, his centre menaced

a very strong advanced work on the ridge of Beyris beyond Anglet,

and his right was in communication with Alten. That general having

a shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary and Arcangues

until Hope’s fiery crescent was closing on the French camp, and then

he also advanced, but with the exception of a slight skirmish at

the fortified house there was no resistance. Three divisions, some

cavalry, and the unattached brigades, equal to a fourth division,

sufficed therefore to keep six French divisions in check on this side.

When evening closed the allies fell back towards their original

positions, but under heavy rain, and with great fatigue to Hope’s

wing, for even the royal road was knee-deep of mud and his troops

were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole day’s fighting cost

about eight hundred men for each side, the loss of the allies being

rather greater on the left bank of the Nive than on the right.

[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Original Morning States.]

Wellington’s wings being now divided by the Nive the French general

resolved to fall upon one of them with the whole of his forces

united; and misled by the prisoners who assured him that the third

and fourth divisions were both on the heights of Lormenthoa, he

resolved, being able to assemble his troops with greater facility on

the left of the Nive where also the allies’ front was most extended,

to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison of Bayonne

was eight thousand strong, partly troops of the line partly national

guards, with which he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched

camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats on the Upper

Adour to watch that river as high as the confluence of the Gave de

Pau, he made D’Erlon file his four divisions over the bridge of boats

between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him to gain the

camp of Marac and take post behind Clauzel’s corps on the other side

of the river. He thus concentrated nine divisions of infantry and

Villatte’s reserve, a brigade of cavalry and forty guns, furnishing

in all about sixty thousand combatants, including conscripts, to

assail a quarter where the allies, although stronger by one division

than the French general imagined, had yet only thirty thousand

infantry with twenty-four pieces of cannon.

[Sidenote: Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.]

The French marshal’s first design was to burst with his whole army

on the table-land of Bussussary and Arcangues, and then to act as

circumstances should dictate; and he judged so well of his position

that he desired the minister of war to expect good news for the next

day. Indeed the situation of the allies although better than he knew

of gave him some right to anticipate success. On no point was there

any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. Lord Wellington

was on the left of the Nive preparing to assault the heights where he

had last seen the French the evening before. Hope’s troops, with the

exception of Wilson’s Portuguese now commanded by general Campbell

and posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments; the

first division was at St. Jean de Luz and Ciboure more than six

miles distant from the outposts; the fifth division was between

those places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. The light

division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne a distance

of four miles, and part of the second brigade had already marched,

when fortunately general Kempt, somewhat suspicious of the enemy’s

movements, delayed obedience until he could see what was going on in

his front, he thus as the event proved saved the position.

The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country even for

single horsemen, the numerous enclosures and copses which denied

any distinct view, the easy success of the operation to cross the

Nive, and a certain haughty confidence the sure attendant of a long

course of victory, seems to have rendered the English general at

this time somewhat negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the

troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected. The general

position, composed of two distinct parts was indeed very strong; the

ridge of Barrouilhet could only be attacked along the royal road on

a narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed entrenchments

to be made; but there was only one brigade there, and a road made

with difficulty by the engineers supplied a bad flank communication

with the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged to

the platform of Bussussary, but in its winding bulged out too near

the enemy’s works in the centre to be safely occupied in force, and

behind it there was a deep valley or basin extending to Arbonne.

The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of this basin was the

position of battle for the centre. Three tongues of land shot out

from this part to the front, and the valleys between them as well as

their slopes were covered with copse-woods almost impenetrable. The

church of Arcangues, a gentleman’s house, and parts of the village,

furnished rallying points of defence for the picquets, which were

necessarily numerous because of the extent of front. At this time the

left-hand ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the fifty-second

regiment which had also posts in the great basin separating the

Arcangues position from that of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was

held by the picquets of the forty-third with supporting companies

placed in succession towards Bussussary, where was an open common

across which troops in retreat would have to pass to the church of

Arcangues. The third tongue was guarded, partly by the forty-third,

partly by the riflemen, but the valley between was not occupied, and

the picquets on the extreme right extended to an inundation, across a

narrow part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat, there was

a bridge: the facility for attack was there however small.

One brigade of the seventh division continued this line of posts to

the Nive, holding the bridge of Urdains, the rest of the division was

behind San Barbe and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to this front.

The fourth division was several miles behind the right of the light

division.

In this state of affairs if Soult had, as he first designed, burst

with his whole army upon Bussussary and Arcangues it would have been

impossible for the light division, scattered as it was over such an

extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and

there was no support within several miles, no superior officer to

direct the concentration of the different divisions. Lord Wellington

had indeed ordered all the line to be entrenched, but the works

were commenced on a great scale, and, as is common when danger does

not spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly that beyond a few

abbatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, and the opening of a

road of communication, the ground remained in its natural state. The

French general would therefore quickly have gained the broad open

hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and seventh divisions

from the light division, and cut them off from Hope. Soult however,

in the course of the night, for reasons which I do not find stated,

changed his project, and at day-break Reille marched with Boyer’s and

Maucune’s divisions, Sparre’s cavalry and from twenty to thirty guns

against Hope by the main road. He was followed by Foy and Villatte,

but Clauzel assembled his troops under cover of the ridges near

the fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of D’Erlon’s

divisions approached the bridge of Urdains.

_Combat of the 10th._—A heavy rain fell in the night yet the morning

broke fair, and soon after dawn the French infantry were observed by

the picquets of the forty-third pushing each other about as if at

gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest ditches; a general officer

was also seen behind a farm-house close to the sentinels, and at the

same time the heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. Thus

warned some companies of the forty-third were thrown on the right

into the basin to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way to the

small plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General Kempt was with

the picquets, and his foresight in delaying his march to Arbonne now

saved the position, for he immediately placed the reserves of his

brigade in the church and mansion-house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the

French breaking forth with loud cries, and a rattling musquetry, fell

at a running pace upon the picquets of the forty-third both on the

tongue and in the basin, and a cloud of skirmishers descending on

their left, penetrating between them and the fifty-second regiment,

sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed and

at the same time the picquets at the bridge near Garrat’s house were

driven back.

The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, and the

ground so extensive, that it would have been impossible to have

reached the small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the

church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had been attempted;

wherefore delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance the

picquets fell back in succession, and never were the steadiness and

intelligence of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; for though

it was necessary to run at full speed to gain the small plain before

the enemy, who was constantly outflanking the line of posts by the

basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow that no formation

could be preserved, though the fire of the French was thick and

close, and their cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the

instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained, the apparently

disordered crowd of fugitives became a compact and well-formed body

defying and deriding the fruitless efforts of their adversaries.

The fifty-second being about half a mile to the left, though only

slightly assailed fell back also to the main ridge, for though the

closeness of the country did not permit colonel Colborne to observe

the strength of the enemy he could see the rapid retreat of the

forty-third, and thence judging how serious the affair was, so well

did the regiments of the light division understand each other’s

qualities, withdrew his outposts to secure the main position. And in

good time he did so.

On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so fortunate, for

whether they delayed their retreat too long, or that the country was

more intricate, the enemy moving by the basin, reached Bussussary

before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the forty-third and

riflemen were thus intercepted. The French were in a hollow road and

careless, never doubting that the officer of the forty-third, ensign

Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age, would surrender;

but he with a shout broke into their column sword in hand, and though

the struggle was severe and twenty of the forty-third and thirty

of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners, reached the

church with the rest.

D’Armagnac’s division of D’Erlon’s corps now pushed close up to the

bridge of Urdains, and Clauzel assembled his three divisions by

degrees at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of musquetry.

The position was however safe. The mansion-house on the right,

covered by abbatis and not easily accessible, was defended by a

rifle battalion and the Portuguese. The church and church-yard

were occupied by the forty-third who were supported with two

mountain-guns, their front being covered by a declivity of thick

copse-wood, filled with riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow

hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On the left the

fifty-second now supported by the remainder of the division, spread

as far as the great basin which separated the right wing from the

ridge of Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were pushed, but

there was still a great interval between Alten’s and Hope’s positions.

The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clauzel brought up twelve guns to the

ridge of Bussussary, with which he threw shot and shells into the

church-yard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred infantry then made

a rush forwards, but a heavy fire from the forty-third sent them

back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice

of the latter, well directed at first, would have been murderous if

this musquetry from the church-yard had not made the French gunners

withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their

shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt thinking the distance too

great, was at first inclined to stop this fire, but the moment

it lulled the French gunners pushed their pieces forwards again

and their shells knocked down eight men in an instant. The small

arms then recommenced and the shells again flew high. The French

were in like manner kept at bay by the riflemen in the village and

mansion-house, and the action, hottest where the fifty-second fought,

continued all day. It was not very severe but it has been noticed

in detail because both French and English writers, misled perhaps

by an inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have represented it

as a desperate attack by which the light division was driven into

its entrenchments, whereas it was the picquets only that were forced

back, there were no entrenchments save those made on the spur of the

moment by the soldiers in the church-yard, and the French can hardly

be said to have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet.

On that side Reille advancing with two divisions about nine o’clock,

drove Campbell’s Portuguese from Anglet, and Sparre’s cavalry

charging during the fight cut down a great many men. The French

infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but moving along

a narrow ridge and confined on each flank by the tanks, only two

brigades could get into action by the main road, and the rain of

the preceding night had rendered all the bye-roads so deep that it

was mid-day before the French line of battle was filled. This delay

saved the allies, for the attack here also was so unexpected, that

the first division and lord Aylmer’s brigade were at rest in St.

Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced. The latter did not

reach the position before eleven o’clock; the foot-guards did not

march from St. Jean until after twelve, and only arrived at three

o’clock in the afternoon when the fight was done; all the troops

were exceedingly fatigued, only ten guns could be brought into play,

and from some negligence part of the infantry were at first without

ammunition.

Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division first arrived to support

Campbell’s Portuguese, and fight the battle. The French spread their

skirmishers along the whole valley in front of Biaritz, but their

principal effort was directed by the great road and against the

platform of Barrouilhet about the mayor’s house, where the ground

was so thick of hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight

took place. The assailants cutting ways through the hedges poured

on in smaller or larger bodies as the openings allowed, and were

immediately engaged with the defenders; at some points they were

successful at others beaten back, and few knew what was going on to

the right or left of where they stood. By degrees Reille engaged both

his divisions, and some of Villatte’s reserve also entered the fight,

and then Bradford’s Portuguese and lord Aylmer’s brigade arrived on

the allies’ side, which enabled colonel Greville’s brigade of the

fifth division, hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson’s;

that general was however dangerously wounded and his troops suffered

severely.

[Sidenote: Manuscript note by lieutenant-general sir John Cameron.]

And now a very notable action was performed by the ninth regiment

under colonel Cameron. This officer was on the extreme left of

Greville’s brigade, Robinson’s being then shifted in second line

and towards the right, Bradford’s brigade was at the mayor’s house

some distance to the left of the ninth regiment, and the space

between was occupied by a Portuguese battalion. There was in front of

Greville’s brigade a thick hedge, but immediately opposite the ninth

was a coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were

continually gathering in masses and rushing out as if to assail the

line, they were as often driven back, yet the ground was so broken

that nothing could be seen beyond the flanks and when some time had

passed in this manner, Cameron, who had received no orders, heard a

sudden firing along the main road close to his left. His adjutant

was sent to look out and returned immediately with intelligence

that there was little fighting on the road, but a French regiment,

which must have passed unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese

between the ninth and the mayor’s house, was rapidly filing into line

on the rear. The fourth British regiment was then in close column at

a short distance, and its commander colonel Piper was directed by

Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and then bring up his left

shoulder when he would infallibly fall in with the French regiment.

Piper marched, but whether he misunderstood the order, took a wrong

direction, or mistook the enemy for Portuguese, he passed them.

No firing was heard, the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and

returned with intelligence that the fourth regiment was not to be

seen, but the enemy’s line was nearly formed. Cameron leaving fifty

men to answer the skirmishing fire which now increased from the

copse, immediately faced about and marched in line against the new

enemy, who was about his own strength, as fast as the rough nature of

the ground would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased

vehemently as the distance lessened, but when the ninth, coming

close up, sprung forwards to the charge the adverse line broke and

fled to the flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for their

own right brushed the left of Greville’s brigade, and even carried

off an officer of the royals in their rush, yet the greatest number

were made prisoners, and the ninth having lost about eighty men and

officers resumed their old ground.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]

The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was the repulse of

Reille’s divisions, but Villatte still menaced the right flank, and

Foy, taking possession of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with

the platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into the great

basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting his right with Reille’s left

menaced Hope’s flank at Barrouilhet. This was about two o’clock,

Soult, whose columns were now all in hand gave orders to renew the

battle, and his masses were beginning to move when Clauzel reported

that a large body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the other

side of the Nive, was menacing D’Armagnac’s division from the

heights above Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult, who saw

the guards and Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz and all

the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated, suspended his

own attack, and ordered D’Erlon, who had two divisions in reserve,

to detach one to the support of D’Armagnac: before this disposition

could be completed the night fell.

The fresh troops seen by Clauzel were the third fourth sixth and

seventh divisions, whose movements during the battle it is time

to notice. When lord Wellington, who remained on the right of the

Nive during the night of the 9th, discovered at daybreak, that the

French had abandoned the heights in Hill’s front, he directed that

officer to occupy them, and push parties close up to the entrenched

camp of Mousseroles while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparen and up

the Adour. Meanwhile, the cannonade on the left bank of the Nive

being heard, he repaired in person to that side, first making the

third and sixth divisions repass the river, and directing Beresford

to lay another bridge of communication lower down the Nive, near

Villefranque, to shorten the line of movement. When he reached the

left of the Nive and saw how the battle stood, he made the seventh

division close to the left from the hill of San Barbe, placed the

third division at Urdains, and brought up the fourth division to

an open heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the church of

Arcangues. From this point general Cole sent Ross’s brigade down into

the basin on the left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared

himself to march with his whole division if the enemy attempted to

penetrate in force between Hope and Alten. These dispositions were

for the most part completed about two o’clock, and thus Clauzel was

held in check at Bussussary, and the renewed attack by Foy, Villatte,

and Reille’s divisions on Barrouilhet prevented.

This day’s battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more than twelve hundred

men killed and wounded, two generals were amongst the latter and

about three hundred men were made prisoners. The French had one

general, Villatte, wounded, and lost about two thousand men, but when

the action terminated two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfort,

the whole under the command of a colonel Kruse, came over to the

allies. These men were not deserters. Their prince having abandoned

Napoleon in Germany sent secret instructions to his troops to do so

likewise, and in good time, for orders to disarm them reached Soult

the next morning. The generals on each side, the one hoping to profit

the other to prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of

the event to Catalonia where several regiments of the same nations

were serving. Lord Wellington failed for reasons to be hereafter

mentioned, but Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance thinking

they could be trusted, and the Nassau troops at Bayonne were perhaps

less influenced by patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when

belonging to the army of the centre they had forcibly foraged Soult’s

district early in the year, and carried off the spoil in defiance of

his authority, which gave rise to bitter disputes at the time and was

probably not forgotten by him.

_Combat of the 11th._—In the night of the 10th Reille withdrew

behind the tanks as far as Pucho, Foy and Villatte likewise drew

back along the connecting ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting

with Clauzel’s left and D’Erlon’s reserve, so that on the morning

of the 11th the French army, with the exception of D’Armagnac’s

division which remained in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for

Soult feared a counter-attack. The French deserters indeed declared

that Clauzel had formed a body of two thousand choice grenadiers

to assault the village and church of Arcangues, but the day passed

without any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish in which a

few men were wounded. Not so on the side of Barrouilhet. There was a

thick fog, and lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the French

were about, directed the ninth regiment about ten o’clock to open a

skirmish beyond the tanks towards Pucho, and to push the action if

the French augmented their force. Cameron did so and the fight was

becoming warm, when colonel Delancy, a staff-officer, rashly directed

the ninth to enter the village. The error was soon and sharply

corrected, for the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four

thousand men at that point, observing the ninth unsupported, ordered

a counter-attack which was so strong and sudden that Cameron only

saved his regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops hastily

brought up by sir John Hope. The fighting then ceased and lord

Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope with orders to push back

the French picquets and re-establish his former outposts on the

connecting ridge towards Bussussary.

Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused by this second

insult, he ordered Darricau’s division to attack Barrouilhet along

the connecting ridge, while Boyer’s division fell on by the main

road between the tanks. This was about two o’clock and the allies

expecting no battle had dispersed to gather fuel, for the time was

wet and cold. In an instant the French penetrated in all directions,

they outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized the

out-buildings of the mayor’s house, and occupied the coppice in

front of it; they were indeed quickly driven from the out-buildings

by the royals, but the tumult was great and the coppice was filled

with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in a perilous manner.

Robinson’s brigade was very hardly handled, the officer commanding

it was wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly cut down some

of the Portuguese near the wood, and on the right the colonel of the

eighty-fourth having unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road

where the French possessed the high bank, was killed with a great

number of men. However the ninth regiment posted on the main road

plied Boyer’s flank with fire, the eighty-fifth regiment of lord

Aylmer’s brigade came into action, and sir John Hope conspicuous from

his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever danger

pressed rallying and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in

the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets, and

he received a severe wound in the ankle, yet he would not quit the

field and by his great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored

the battle. The French were finally beaten back from the position

of Barrouilhet yet they had recovered their original posts, and

continued to gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the

fall of night. The total loss in this fight was about six hundred men

of a side, and as the fifth division was now considerably reduced

in numbers the first division took its place on the front line.

Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over the Nive to Mousseroles to

check the incursions of Hill’s horsemen.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Despatches, MSS.]

_Combat of the 12th._—The rain fell heavily in the night, and though

the morning broke fair neither side seemed inclined to recommence

hostilities. The advanced posts were however very close to each

other and about ten o’clock a misunderstanding arose. The French

general observing the fresh regiments of the first division close

to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him and

immediately reinforced his front; this movement causing an English

battery to fall into a like error it opened upon the advancing French

troops, and in an instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult

then brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without an

object for many hours, and three or four hundred men of a side

were killed and wounded, but the great body of the French army

remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet and

Bussussary.

Lord Wellington as early as the 10th had expected Soult would abandon

this attack to fall upon Hill, and therefore had given Beresford

orders to carry the sixth division to that general’s assistance by

the new bridge and the seventh division by Ustaritz, without waiting

for further instructions, if Hill was assailed; now observing Soult’s

tenacity at Barrouilhet he drew the seventh division towards Arbonne.

Beresford had however made a movement towards the Nive, and this with

the march of the seventh division and some changes in the position

of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were

gathering with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the

13th; and it is remarkable that the deserters at this early period

told him the Spaniards had re-entered France although orders to that

effect were not as we shall find given until the next day. Convinced

then that his bolt was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two

divisions and Villatte’s reserve in the entrenched camp, and marched

with the other seven to Mousseroles intending to fall upon Hill.

That general had pushed his scouting parties to the Gambouri, and

when general Sparre’s horsemen arrived at Mousseroles on the 12th,

Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry.

He was supported by the infantry of general Paris and drove the

allies’ posts from Hasparen. Colonel Vivian, who commanded there,

immediately ordered major Brotherton to charge with the fourteenth

dragoons across the bridge, but it was an ill-judged order, and

the impossibility of succeeding so manifest, that when Brotherton,

noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, only

two men and one subaltern, lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow

bridge with him, and they were all taken. Vivian then seeing his

error charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain, he

was forced to fall back upon Urcuray where Morillo’s Spaniards had

relieved the British infantry brigade on the 11th. This threatening

movement induced general Hill to put the British brigade in march

again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at sunset, having

then discovered Soult’s columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge

above Bayonne.

Lord Wellington now feeling the want of numbers, brought forward a

division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians

from the Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent their plundering fed them

from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the

Andalusians to watch the upper valley of the Nive and protect the

rear of the army from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be

reinforced with a strong body of national guards. Meanwhile Hill had

taken a position of battle on a front of two miles.

His left, composed of the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth, and

thirty-ninth regiments under general Pringle, occupied a wooded and

broken range crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered the

new pontoon bridge of communication, which was a mile and a half

higher up the river, but it was separated from the centre by a small

stream forming a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy valley.

[Sidenote: Plan 8.]

The centre placed on both sides of the high road near the hamlet of

St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and

close brushwood on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed

with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering, at the distance

of a hundred yards, part of the line, was nearly impassable. Here

Ashworth’s Portuguese and Barnes’s British brigade of the second

division were posted. The seventy-first regiment was on the left, the

fiftieth in the centre, the ninety-second on the right. Ashworth’s

Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre,

and their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering their right.

Twelve guns under the colonels Ross and Tullock were concentrated in

front of the centre, looking down the great road, and half a mile in

rear of this point Lecor’s Portuguese division was stationed with two

guns as a reserve.

The right under Byng was composed of the third, fifty-seventh,

thirty-first, and sixty-sixth. One of these regiments, the third,

was posted on a height running nearly parallel with the Adour called

the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because a village of

that name was situated upon the summit. This regiment was pushed in

advance to a point where it could only be approached by crossing the

lower part of a narrow swampy valley which separated Moguerre from

the heights of St. Pierre. The upper part of this valley was held by

Byng with the remainder of his brigade, and his post was well covered

by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy and nearly filling all the

valley.

One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of counter heights

belonging to the French, but the basin between was broad open and

commanded in every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts

the country was too heavy and too much enclosed for the action of

cavalry. Nor could the enemy approach in force, except on a narrow

front of battle and by the high road, until within cannon-shot, when

two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the right and left, and

crossing the swampy valleys on each side, led, the one to the height

where the third regiment was posted on the extreme right of the

allies, the other to general Pringle’s position on the left.

[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sect. 4.]

In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive and carried away

the allies’ bridge of communication. It was soon restored, but on the

morning of the 13th general Hill was completely cut off from the rest

of the army; and while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing

at least thirty-five thousand combatants, approached him in front, an

eighth under general Paris and the cavalry division of Pierre Soult

menaced him in rear. To meet the French in his front he had less than

fourteen thousand, men and officers with fourteen guns in position;

and there were only four thousand Spaniards with Vivian’s cavalry at

Urcuray.

[Sidenote: See Plan 8.]

_Battle of St. Pierre._—The morning broke with a heavy mist under

cover of which Soult formed his order of battle. D’Erlon, having

D’Armagnac’s Abbé’s and Daricau’s divisions of infantry, Sparre’s

cavalry and twenty-two guns, marched in front; he was followed

by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder of the French army was in

reserve, for the roads would not allow of any other order. The mist

hung heavily and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in

vapour, at another dimly seen or looming sudden and large and dark at

different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the

storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back the British picquets in

the centre, the sun burst out at that moment, the sparkling fire of

the light troops spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills

on either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery

shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. Darricau marching on the

French right was directed against general Pringle. D’Armagnac, moving

on their left and taking Old Moguerre as the point of direction,

was ordered to force Byng’s right. Abbé assailed the centre at St.

Pierre, where general Stewart commanded, for sir Rowland Hill had

taken his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he

could see the whole battle and direct the movements.

Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great violence

and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops, on the left of

Ashworth’s Portuguese, that Stewart sent the seventy-first regiment

and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter’s aid; the French

skirmishers likewise won the small wood on Ashworth’s right, and

half of the fiftieth regiment was also detached from St. Pierre to

that quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart’s

position secured, but his centre was very much weakened, and the

fire of the French artillery was concentrated against it. Abbé then

pushed on a column of attack there with such a power that in despite

of the play of musquetry on his flanks and a crashing cannonade in

his front, he gained the top of the position, and drove back the

remainder of Ashworth’s Portuguese and the other half of the fiftieth

regiment which had remained in reserve.

General Barnes who had still the ninety-second regiment in hand

behind St. Pierre, immediately brought it on with a strong

counter-attack. The French skirmishers fell back on each side

leaving two regiments composing the column to meet the charge of the

ninety-second; it was rough and pushed home, the French mass wavered

and gave way. Abbé immediately replaced it and Soult redoubling the

heavy play of his guns from the height he occupied, sent forward

a battery of horse artillery which galloping down into the valley

opened its fire close to the allies with most destructive activity.

The cannonade and musquetry rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder,

and the second French column, regardless of Ross’s guns, though

they tore the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily

up the high road that the ninety-second yielding to the tempest

slowly regained its old position behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese

guns, their British commanding officer having fallen wounded,

then limbered up to retire and the French skirmishers reached the

impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth’s right. General Barnes now

seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, made the

Portuguese guns resume their fire, and the wing of the fiftieth and

the Caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the right; but Barnes

was soon wounded, the greatest part of his and general Stewart’s

staff were hurt, and the matter seemed desperate. For the light

troops overpowered by numbers were all driven in except those in the

wood, the artillerymen were falling at the guns, Ashworth’s line of

Portuguese crumbled away rapidly before the musquetry and cannonade,

the ground was strewed with the dead in front, and the wounded

crawling to the rear were many.

If the French light troops could then have penetrated through the

thick hedge in front of the Portuguese, defeat would have been

inevitable on this point, for the main column of attack still

steadily advanced up the main road, and a second column launched

on its right was already victorious, because the colonel of the

seventy-first had shamefully withdrawn that gallant regiment

out of action and abandoned the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed

fighting strongly against Daricau’s superior numbers on the hill

of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the colonel of the third

regiment had also abandoned his strong post to D’Armagnac, whose

leading brigade was thus rapidly turning Byng’s other regiments

on that side. And now Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions, hitherto

retarded by the deep roads, were coming into line ready to support

Abbé, and this at the moment when the troops opposed to him were

deprived of their reserve. For when general Hill beheld the retreat

of the third and seventy-first regiments he descended in haste from

his mount, met, and turned the latter back to renew the fight, and

then in person leading one brigade of Le Cor’s reserve division

to the same quarter sent the other against D’Armagnac on the hill

of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive moment of the battle the

French reserve was augmented and that of the allies thrown as a last

resource into action. However the right wing of the fiftieth and

Ashworth’s Caçadores, both spread as skirmishers, never lost the

small wood in front, upholding the fight there and towards the high

road with such unflinching courage that the ninety-second regiment

had time to reform behind the hamlet of St. Pierre. Then its gallant

colonel Cameron once more led it down the road with colours flying

and music playing resolved to give the shock to whatever stood in the

way. At this sight the British skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly

changing from retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of

the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed hopeless for

Ashworth was badly wounded, his line was shattered to atoms, and

Barnes who had not quitted the field for his former hurt was now shot

through the body.

[Sidenote: Published Memoir on the battle by captain Pringle,

engineers.]

The ninety-second was but a small body compared with the heavy mass

in its front, and the French soldiers seemed willing enough to close

with the bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly

turned his horse waved his sword and appeared to order a retreat,

then they faced about and immediately retired across the valley to

their original position, in good order however and scarcely pursued

by the allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde

movement, for there was no panic or disorder, was produced partly by

the gallant advance of the ninety-second and the returning rush of

the skirmishers, partly by the state of affairs immediately on the

right of the French column. For the seventy-first indignant at their

colonel’s conduct had returned to the fight with such alacrity, and

were so well aided by Le Cor’s Portuguese, generals Hill and Stewart

each in person leading an attack, that the hitherto victorious French

were overthrown there also in the very moment when the ninety-second

came with such a brave shew down the main road: Le Cor was however

wounded.

This double action in the centre being seen from the hill of

Villefranque, Daricau’s division, already roughly handled by

Pringle, fell back in confusion; and meantime on the right, Buchan’s

Portuguese, detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria

ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending under a heavy flank fire

from Soult’s guns rallied the third regiment; in happy time, for

D’Armagnac’s first brigade having already passed the flank of Byng’s

regiments at the mill-pond was actually in rear of the allies’ lines.

It was now twelve o’clock, and while the fire of the light troops in

the front and the cannonade in the centre continued the contending

generals restored their respective orders of battle. Soult’s right

wing had been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving way

before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbad his sending immediate

succour to either; moreover in the exigency of the moment he had

called D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to sustain Abbé’s retiring

columns. However that brigade and Foy’s and Maransin’s divisions were

in hand to renew the fight in the centre, and the allies could not,

unsuccoured, have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks were

wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been killed or wounded,

and three generals had quitted the field badly hurt.

In this crisis general Hill seeing that Buchan was now well and

successfully engaged on the Partouhiria ridge, and that Byng’s

regiments were quite masters of their ground in the valley of the

mill-pond, drew the fifty-seventh regiment from the latter place to

reinforce his centre. At the same time the bridge above Villefranque

having been restored, the sixth division, which had been marching

since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on the mount from

whence Hill had descended to rally the seventy-first. It was soon

followed by the fourth division, and that again by the brigades

of the third division; two other brigades of the seventh division

were likewise in march. With the first of these troops came lord

Wellington who had hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of

the cannon reached him, yet he arrived only to witness the close of

the battle, the crisis was past, Hill’s day of glory was complete.

Soult had, according to the French method, made indeed another

attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre, to cover his

new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed, but at the same moment

Buchan drove D’Armagnac headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth

division then appeared on the commanding mount in the rear of St.

Pierre, and though the French masses still maintained a menacing

position on the high road, and on a hillock rising between the road

and the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For the English

general being now supported by the sixth division, sent Byng with

two battalions against the hillock, and some troops from the centre

against those on the high road. At this last point the generals

and staff had been so cut down that colonel Currie, the aid-de-camp

who brought the order, could find no superior officer to deliver it

to and led the troops himself to the attack, but both charges were

successful; and two guns of the light battery sent down in the early

part of the fight by Soult, and which had played without ceasing up

to this moment, were taken.

The battle now abated to a skirmish of light troops, under cover of

which the French endeavoured to carry off their wounded and rally

their stragglers, but at two o’clock lord Wellington commanded

a general advance of the whole line. Then the French retreated

fighting, and the allies following close on the side of the Nive

plied them with musquetry until dark. Yet they maintained their line

towards the Adour, for Sparre’s cavalry passing out that way rejoined

Pierre Soult on the side of Hasparen. This last-named general and

Paris had during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian’s cavalry at

Urcuray, however not more than thirty men of a side were hurt, and

when Soult’s ill success became known the French retired to Bonloc.

[Sidenote: Lapene.]

In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven divisions of

infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the front, and one brigade

of infantry with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state

of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to move upon did

not permit more than five divisions to act at St. Pierre, and only

half of those were seriously engaged. His loss was certainly three

thousand, making a total on the five days’ fighting of six thousand

men with two generals, Villatte and Maucomble, wounded. The estimate

made by the British at the time far exceeded this number, and one

French writer makes their loss ten thousand including probably the

Nassau and Frankfort regiments. The same writer however estimates the

loss of the allies at sixteen thousand! Whereas Hill had only three

generals and about fifteen hundred men killed and wounded on the 13th

and Morillo lost but twenty-six men at Urcuray. The real loss of the

allies in the whole five days’ fighting was only five thousand and

nineteen, including however five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes,

Lecor, and Ashworth. Of this number five hundred were prisoners.

The duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected result of the battle

of St. Pierre, left D’Erlon’s three divisions in front of the camp of

Mousseroles, sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and passing the

Adour himself during the night with Foy’s division, spread it along

the right bank of that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de

Pau.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The French general’s plan was conceived with genius but the

execution offers a great contrast to the conception. What a

difference between the sudden concentration of his whole army on the

platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where there were only a few

picquets to withstand him, and from whence he could have fallen with

the roll of an avalanche upon any point of the allies’ line! what

a difference between that and the petty attack of Clauzel, which a

thousand men of the light division sufficed to arrest at the village

and church of Arcangues. There beyond question was the weak part

of the English general’s cuirass. The spear pushed home there would

have drawn blood. For the disposition and movements of the third

fourth and seventh divisions, were made more with reference to the

support of Hill than to sustain an attack from Soult’s army, and it

is evident that Wellington, trusting to the effect of his victory on

the 10th of November, had treated the French general and his troops,

more contemptuously than he could have justified by arms without

the aid of fortune. I know not what induced marshal Soult to direct

his main attack by Anglet and the connecting ridge of Bussussary,

against Barrouilhet, instead of assailing Arcangues as he at first

proposed; but this is certain, that for three hours after Clauzel

first attacked the picquets at the latter place, there were not

troops enough to stop three French divisions, much less a whole army.

And this point being nearer to the bridge by which D’Erlon passed the

Nive, the concentration of the French troops could have been made

sooner than at Barrouilhet, where the want of unity in the attack

caused by the difficulty of the roads ruined the French combinations.

The allies were so unexpectant of an attack, that the battle at

Barrouilhet which might have been fought with seventeen thousand men,

was actually fought by ten thousand. And those were not brought into

action at once, for Robinson’s brigade and Campbell’s Portuguese,

favoured by the narrow opening between the tanks, resisted Reille’s

divisions for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the fifth

division and Bradford’s brigade to arrive. But if Foy’s division

and Villatte’s reserve had been able to assail the flank at the

same time, by the ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would

have been won by the French; and meanwhile three divisions under

Clauzel and two under D’Erlon remained hesitating before Urdains and

Arcangues, for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter place were

the very marks and signs of indecision.

2º. On the 11th the inactivity of the French during the morning may

be easily accounted for. The defection of the German regiments, the

necessity of disarming and removing those that remained, the care of

the wounded, and the time required to re-examine the allies’ position

and ascertain what changes had taken place during the night, must

have given ample employment to the French general. His attack in the

afternoon also was well judged because already he must have seen from

the increase of troops in his front, from the intrenched battery and

other works rapidly constructed at the church of Arcangues, that no

decisive success could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that

his best chance was to change his line of attack again to the right

bank. To do this with effect, it was necessary, not only to draw

all lord Wellington’s reserves from the right of the Nive but to be

certain that they had come, and this could only be done by repeating

the attacks at Barrouilhet. The same cause operated on the 12th,

for it was not until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by

him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wile had succeeded. Yet

again the execution was below the conception, for first, the bivouac

fires on the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the evening,

and then others were lighted on the side of Mousseroles, thus plainly

indicating the march, which was also begun too early, because the

leading division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of boats before

sun-set.

These were serious errors yet the duke of Dalmatia’s generalship

cannot be thus fairly tested. There are many circumstances which

combine to prove, that when he complained to the emperor of the

contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter he alluded to

military as well as to political and financial difficulties. It

is a part of human nature to dislike any disturbance of previous

habits, and soldiers are never pleased at first with a general, who

introduces and rigorously exacts a system of discipline differing

from what they have been accustomed to. Its utility must be proved

and confirmed by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes. Now

Soult suddenly assumed the command of troops, who had been long

serving under various generals and were used to much license in

Spain. They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at being

suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute command of one who,

from natural character as well as the exigency of the times, the war

being now in his own country, demanded a ready and exact obedience,

and a regularity which long habits of a different kind rendered

onerous. Hence we find in all the French writers, and in Soult’s own

reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently thwarted or

disregarded by his subordinates when circumstances promised impunity.

His greatest and ablest military combinations were certainly rendered

abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in the first operations to

relieve Pampeluna, and on the 31st of August a manifest negligence

of his earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious danger

and loss at the passage of the Lower Bidassoa. Complaint and

recrimination were rife in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th

of November, and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo was destroyed

contrary to the spirit of his instructions. These things, joined to

the acknowledged jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French

generals employed in Spain, would indicate that the discrepancy

between the conception and execution of the operations in front of

Bayonne was not the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps king

Joseph’s faction, so inimical to the duke of Dalmatia, was still

powerful in the army and difficult to deal with.

3º. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting his troops in a

false position, and no doubt he under-valued, it was not the first

time, the military genius and resources of his able adversary, when

he exposed Hill’s troops on the left of the Nive to a species of

surprize. But the passage of the Nive itself, the rapidity with

which he moved his divisions from bank to bank, and the confidence

with which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so far from

justifying the censures which have been passed upon him by French

writers, emphatically mark his mastery in the art. The stern justice

of sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the battle of the

Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity of that measure can only be

understood by considering lord Wellington’s military situation at the

time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered on political grounds,

but of what avail would his gaining it have been if he had remained

enclosed as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea, Bayonne

and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications with the disaffected

in France, and having the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to

forage or even to look beyond the river on his right. The invasion

of France was not his own operation, it was the project of the

English cabinet and the allied sovereigns; both were naturally

urging him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free his flanks

was indispensable if he would draw any profit from his victory of

the 10th of November. But he could not pass it with his whole army

unless he resigned the sea-coast and his communications with Spain.

He was therefore to operate with a portion only of his force and

consequently required all the men he could gather to ensure success.

Yet at that crisis he divested himself of twenty-five thousand

Spanish soldiers!

Was this done in ignorance of the military glory awaiting him beyond

the spot where he stood?

“_If I had twenty thousand Spaniards paid and fed_,” he wrote to lord

Bathurst, “_I should have Bayonne. If I had forty thousand I do not

know where I should stop. Now I have both the twenty thousand and

the forty thousand, but I have not the means of paying and supplying

them, and if they plunder they will ruin all._”

Requisitions which the French expected as a part of war would

have enabled him to run this career, but he looked further; he

had promised the people protection and his greatness of mind was

disclosed in a single sentence. “_I must tell your lordship that our

success and every thing depends upon our moderation and justice._”

Rather than infringe on either, he sent the Spaniards to the rear

and passed the Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus

violating the military rule which forbids a general to disseminate

his troops before an enemy who remains in mass lest he should

be beaten in detail. But genius begins where rules end. A great

general always seeks moral power in preference to physical force.

Wellington’s choice here was between a shameful inactivity or a

dangerous enterprise. Trusting to the influence of his reputation,

to his previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his troops in

the field, he chose the latter, and the result, though he committed

some errors of execution, justified his boldness. He surprised the

passage of the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and but for

the rain of the night before, which ruined the roads and retarded the

march of Hill’s columns, he would have won the heights of St. Pierre

the same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn his divisions from

the right bank without being observed. Still it was an error to have

the troops on the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the

10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied the valley

or basin between Hope and Alten, and surely it was negligence not to

entrench Hill’s position on the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Yet with all

this so brave so hardy so unconquerable were his soldiers that he

was successful at every point, and that is the justification of his

generalship. Hannibal crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not

in madness but because he knew himself and his troops.

[Sidenote: Appendix 7, Sect. 4.]

4º. It is agreed by French and English that the battle of St. Pierre

was one of the most desperate of the whole war. Lord Wellington

declared that he had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead,

nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied where five

thousand men were killed or wounded in three hours upon a space of

one mile square. How then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous

on both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades, furnishing

less than fourteen thousand men and officers with fourteen guns, were

enabled to withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing

thirty-five thousand men and officers with twenty-two guns? The

analysis of this fact shows upon what nice calculations and accidents

war depends.

If Hill had not observed the French passing their bridge on the

evening of the 12th, and their bivouac fires in the night, Barnes’s

brigade, with which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray,

and Soult could not have been stopped. But the French general could

only bring five divisions into action, and those only in succession,

so that in fact three divisions or about sixteen thousand men with

twenty-two guns actually fought the battle. Foy’s and Maransin’s

troops did not engage until after the crisis had passed. On the

other hand the proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first,

and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they were both obliged

to quit the service, forced general Hill to carry his reserve away

from the decisive point at that critical period which always occurs

in a well-disputed field and which every great general watches for

with the utmost anxiety. This was no error, it was a necessity, and

the superior military quality of the British troops rendered it

successful.

[Sidenote: Published Memoir by Captain Pringle of the Royal

Engineers.]

The French officer who rode at the head of the second attacking

column might be a brave man, doubtless he was; he might be an able

man, but he had not the instinct of a general. On his right flank

indeed Hill’s vigorous counter-attack was successful, but the battle

was to be won in the centre; his column was heavy, undismayed, and

only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was before it; a short

exhortation, a decided gesture, a daring example, and it would have

overborne the small body in its front, Foy’s, Maransin’s, and the

half of D’Armagnac’s divisions would then have followed in the path

thus marked out. Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated.

How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom

and nearly all their staff fell at this point, resolute not to yield

a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the fiftieth

and Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second to rally and

reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth

again to charge with their colours flying and their national music

playing as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man

who in that moment and immediately after a repulse thought of such

military pomp was by nature a soldier.

I have said that sir Rowland Hill’s employment of his reserve was

no error, it was indeed worthy of all praise. From the commanding

mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the

two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than

any direct attack upon it, and with a promptness and decision truly

military he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as

well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and leading the

reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed

confidence to the courage of the ninety-second and the fiftieth

to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth

division was then close at hand and that the battle might be fought

over again, but like a thorough soldier he was resolved to win his

own fight with his own troops if he could. And he did so after a

manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero

of a nation.