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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.
BY
W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.
_COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH
ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES._
VOL. VI.
PREFIXED TO WHICH ARE
SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES
IN REPLY TO
COLONEL GURWOOD, MR. ALISON, SIR WALTER SCOTT,
LORD BERESFORD, AND THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.
LONDON:
THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.
MDCCCXL.
LONDON:
MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Notice and Justification, &c., &c. Page i
BOOK XXI.
CHAPTER I.
Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges St.
Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio’s
misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Taragona—Colonel Prevot
takes St. Felippe de Balaguer—Second siege of Taragona—Suchet and
Maurice Mathieu endeavour to relieve the place—Sir John Murray
raises the siege—Embarks with the loss of his guns—Disembarks again
at St. Felippe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John
Murray’s trial—Observations Page 1
CHAP. II.
Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat’s secret defection from the
emperor—Lord William Bentinck re-embarks—His design of attacking
the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the
Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicant—Suchet prepares to
attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons
Valencia—Marches towards Zaragoza—Clauzel retreats to
France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Taragona—Mines
the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures the
Col de Balaguer—Invests Taragona—Partial insurrection in
Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salud—Del Parque joins lord William
Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet’s cantonments—Suchet
concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The allies
retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortoza—His rear-guard
attacked by the garrison while passing the Ebro—Suchet blows up the
walls of Taragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortoza—Hears
that Suchet has detached troops—Sends Del Parque’s army to join
lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies
retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck fights with the French general
Myers and wounds him—Lord William returns to Sicily—Observations 33
CHAP. III.
Siege of Sebastian—Convent of Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the
place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and the
guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally 65
CHAP. IV.
Soult appointed the emperor’s lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph
goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon’s political and military
situation—His greatness of mind—Soult’s activity—Theatre of
operations described—Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna—Relative
positions and numbers of the contending armies described 86
CHAP. V.
Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat
of Linzoain—Count D’Erlon attacks the allies’ right centre—Combat
of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irueta—General Picton
and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They turn at Huarte and
offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First
battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D’Erlon joins Soult who
attacks general Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off
from the main army—Night march of the light division—Soult
retreats—Combat of Doña Maria—Dangerous position of the
French at San Estevan—Soult marches down the Bidassoa—Forced
march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of
Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly—Narrow escape of lord
Wellington—Observations 109
BOOK XXII.
CHAP. I.
New positions of the armies—Lord Melville’s mismanagement of the
naval co-operation—Siege of St. Sebastian—Progress of the second
attack 179
CHAP. II.
Storming of St. Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers
from the first fourth and light divisions—The place is
assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded and
surrenders—Observations 197
CHAP. III.
Soult’s views and positions during the siege described—He
endeavours to succour the place—Attacks lord Wellington—Combats
of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that
San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a defensive
system—Observations 218
CHAP. IV.
The duke of Berri proposes to invade France promising the aid
of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington’s views on this
subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch’s
policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in
Catalonia—Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at
the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government
resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans
retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his
project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel
Colborne’s great presence of mind—Gallant action of lieutenant
Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre and abandon the
great Rhune—Observations 239
CHAP. V.
Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in
three great divisions under sir Rowland Hill, marshal Beresford,
and sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named
officer—Soult’s immense entrenchments described—His correspondence
with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive and unite their armies
in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his views and makes inaccurate
statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the
allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France—Blockade
and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under
lord Aylmer to besiege Santona, but afterwards changes his design 271
CHAP. VI.
Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude, and folly of
the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various
factions described, their violence, insolence, and folly—Scandalous
scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a revolution—Lord
Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates
the necessity of putting down the Cortez by force—Resigns his
command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to
remove him to Germany—The new Cortez reinstate him as generalissimo
on his own terms—He expresses his fears that the cause will finally
fail and advises the English ministers to withdraw the British army 295
BOOK XXIII.
CHAP. I.
War in the south of France—Soult’s political
difficulties—Privations of the allied troops—Lord Wellington
appeals to their military honour with effect—Averse to offensive
operations, but when Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became
known, again yields to the wishes of the allied sovereigns—His
dispositions of attack retarded—They are described—Battle of the
Nivelle—Observations—Deaths and characters of Mr. Edward Freer and
colonel Thomas Lloyd 326
CHAP. II.
Soult occupies the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and the line of
the Nive river—Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory
from the state of the roads—Bridge-head of Cambo abandoned by
the French—Excesses of the Spanish troops—Lord Wellington’s
indignation—He sends them back to Spain—Various skirmishes in front
of Bayonne—The generals J. Wilson and Vandeleur are wounded—Mina
plunders the Val de Baygorry—Is beaten by the national
guards—Passage of the Nive and battles in front of Bayonne—Combat
of the 10th—Combat of the 11th—Combat of the 12th—Battle of St.
Pierre—Observations 363
CHAP. III.
Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and
Soult—Partizan warfare—The Basques of the Val de Baygorry excited
to arms by the excesses of Mina’s troops—General Harispe takes
the command of the insurgents—Clauzel advances beyond the Bidouze
river—General movements—Partizan combats—Excesses committed by the
Spaniards—Lord Wellington reproaches their generals—His vigorous
and resolute conduct—He menaces the French insurgents of the
valleys with fire and sword and the insurrection subsides—Soult
hems the allies right closely—Partizan combats continued—Remarkable
instances of the habits established between the French and British
soldiers of the light division—Shipwrecks on the coast 410
CHAP. IV.
Political state of Portugal—Political state of Spain—Lord
Wellington advises the English government to prepare for a war with
Spain and to seize St. Sebastian as a security for the withdrawal
of the British and Portuguese troops—The seat of government and the
new Cortez are removed to Madrid—The duke of San Carlos arrives
secretly with the treaty of Valençay—It is rejected by the Spanish
regency and Cortez—Lord Wellington’s views on the subject 425
CHAP. V.
Political state of Napoleon—Guileful policy of the allied
sovereigns—M. de St. Aignan—General reflections—Unsettled policy of
the English ministers—They neglect lord Wellington—He remonstrates
and exposes the denuded state of his army 440
CHAP. VI.
Continuation of the war in the eastern provinces—Suchet’s erroneous
statements—Sir William Clinton repairs Taragona—Advances to
Villa Franca—Suchet endeavours to surprise him—Fails—The French
cavalry cut off an English detachment at Ordal—The duke of San
Carlos passes through the French posts—Copons favourable to his
mission—Clinton and Manso endeavour to cut off the French troops at
Molino del Rey—They fail through the misconduct of Copons—Napoleon
recalls a great body of Suchet’s troops—Whereupon he reinforces the
garrison of Barcelona and retires to Gerona—Van Halen—He endeavours
to beguile the governor of Tortoza—Fails—Succeeds at Lerida,
Mequinenza, and Monzon—Sketch of the siege of Monzon—It is defended
by the Italian soldier St. Jaques for one hundred and forty
days—Clinton and Copons invest Barcelona—The beguiled garrisons of
Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, arrive at Martorel—Are surrounded
and surrender on terms—Capitulation violated by Copons—King
Ferdinand returns to Spain—His character—Clinton breaks up his
army—His conduct eulogised—Lamentable sally from Barcelona—The
French garrisons beyond the Ebro return to France and Habert
evacuates Barcelona—Fate of the prince of Conti and the duchess of
Bourbon—Siege of Santona 475
BOOK XXIV.
CHAP. I.
Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from
Soult’s army—Embarrassments of that marshal—Mr. Batbedat a
banker of Bayonne offers to aid the allies secretly with money
and provisions—La Roche Jacquelin and other Bourbon partizans
arrive at the allies’ head-quarter—The duke of Angoulême arrives
there—Lord Wellington’s political views—General reflections—Soult
embarrassed by the hostility of the French people—Lord Wellington
embarrassed by the hostility of the Spaniards—Soult’s remarkable
project for the defence of France—Napoleon’s reasons for neglecting
it put hypothetically—Lord Wellington’s situation suddenly
ameliorated—His wise policy, foresight, and diligence—Resolves to
throw a bridge over the Adour below Bayonne, and to drive Soult
from that river—Soult’s system of defence—Numbers of the contending
armies—Passage of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Lord Wellington forces
the line of the Bidouze and Gave of Mauleon—Soult takes the line of
the Gave de Oleron and resolves to change his system of operation 505
CHAP. II.
Lord Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St.
Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour—Is prevented by bad
weather and returns to the Gave of Mauleon—Passage of the Adour
by sir John Hope—Difficulty of the operation—The flotilla passes
the bar and enters the river—The French sally from Bayonne but are
repulsed and the stupendous bridge is cast—Citadel invested after a
severe action—Lord Wellington passes the Gave of Oleron and invests
Navarrens—Soult concentrates his army at Orthes—Beresford passes
the Gave de Pau near Pereyhorade—Battle of Orthes—Soult changes his
line of operations—Combat of Aire—Observations 536
CHAP. III.
Soult’s perilous situation—He falls back to Tarbes—Napoleon
sends him a plan of operations—His reply and views stated—Lord
Wellington’s embarrassments—Soult’s proclamation—Observations
upon it—Lord Wellington calls up Freyre’s Gallicians and detaches
Beresford against Bordeaux—The mayor of that city revolts from
Napoleon—Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed by the duke
of Angoulême—Fears of a reaction—The mayor issues a false
proclamation—Lord Wellington expresses his indignation—Rebukes
the duke of Angoulême—Recalls Beresford but leaves lord Dalhousie
with the seventh division and some cavalry—Decaen commences the
organization of the army of the Gironde—Admiral Penrose enters the
Garonne—Remarkable exploit of the commissary Ogilvie—Lord Dalhousie
passes the Garonne and the Dordogne and defeats L’Huillier at
Etauliers—Admiral Penrose destroys the French flotilla—The French
set fire to their ships of war—The British seamen and marines land
and destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the
Garonne 580
CHAP. IV.
Wellington’s and Soult’s situations and forces described—Folly
of the English ministers—Freyre’s Gallicians and Ponsonby’s
heavy cavalry join lord Wellington—He orders Giron’s Andalusians
and Del Parque’s army to enter France—Soult suddenly takes the
offensive—Combats of cavalry—Partizan expedition of Captain
Dania—Wellington menaces the peasantry with fire and sword if they
take up arms—Soult retires—Lord Wellington advances—Combat of
Vic Bigorre—Death and character of colonel Henry Sturgeon—Daring
exploit of captain William Light[1]—Combat of Tarbes—Soult
retreats by forced marches to Toulouse—Wellington follows more
slowly—Cavalry combat at St. Gaudens—The allies arrive in front of
Toulouse—Reflections 603
CHAP. V.
Views of the commanders on each side—Wellington designs to throw
a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above Toulouse, but below
the confluence of the Arriege and Garonne—The river is found too
wide for the pontoons—He changes his design—Cavalry action at St.
Martyn de Touch—General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaguel above
the confluence of the Arriege—Marches upon Cintegabelle—Crosses
the Arriege—Finds the country too deep for his artillery and
returns to Pensaguel—Recrosses the Garonne—Soult fortifies
Toulouse and the Mont Rave—Lord Wellington sends his pontoons
down the Garonne—Passes that river at Grenade fifteen miles below
Toulouse with twenty thousand men—The river floods and his bridge
is taken up—The waters subside—The bridge is again laid—The
Spaniards pass—Lord Wellington advances up the right bank to
Fenouilhet—Combat of cavalry—The eighteenth hussars win the bridge
of Croix d’Orade—Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the
9th of April—Orders the pontoons to be taken up and relaid higher
up the Garonne at Seilth in the night of the 8th—Time is lost in
the execution and the attack is deferred—The light division cross
at Seilth on the morning of the 10th—Battle of Toulouse 624
CHAP. VI.
General observations and reflections 657
LIST OF APPENDIX.
No. I.
Lord William Bentinck’s correspondence with sir Edward Pellew and
lord Wellington about Sicily 691
No. II.
General Nugent’s and Mr. King’s correspondence with lord William
Bentinck about Italy 693
No. III.
Extracts from the correspondence of sir H. Wellesley, Mr. Vaughan,
and Mr. Stuart upon Spanish and Portuguese affairs 699
No. IV.
Justificatory pieces relating to the combats of Maya and
Roncesvalles 701
No. V.
Ditto ditto of Ordal 703
No. VI.
Official States of the allied army in Catalonia 704
No. VII.
Ditto of the Anglo-Portuguese at different epochs 705
No. VIII.
Ditto of the French armies at different epochs 707
No. IX.
Extract from lord Wellington’s order of movements for the battle
of Toulouse 709
No. X.
Note and morning state of the Anglo-Portuguese on the 10th of
April, 1814 710
PLATES.
No. 1. Explanatory of the Catalonian Operations and plan of Position
at Cape Salud.
2. Explanatory of Soult’s Operations to relieve Pampeluna.
3. Combats of Maya and Roncesvalles.
4. Explanatory Sketch of the Assault of St. Sebastian.
5. Explanatory Sketch of Soult’s and lord Wellington’s Passage
of the Bidassoa.
6. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nivelle.
7. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations round Bayonne, and of
the Battle.
8. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of the Nive, and Battle of
St. Pierre.
9. Explanatory Sketch of the Battle of Orthes, and the Retreat
of Soult to Aire.
10. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations against Tarbes, and the
Battle of Toulouse.
_To follow Page 689._
NOTICE.
This volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to a
passage in an article upon the duke of Wellington’s despatches,
published in the last number of the “British and Foreign Quarterly
Review.”
After describing colonel Gurwood’s proceedings to procure the
publication of the despatches the reviewer says,
“_We here distinctly state_, that no other person ever had access
to _any_ documents of the duke, by his grace’s permission, for any
historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions to
such privilege are not founded in fact.”
This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my history
certainly includes it with others, _I distinctly state to be untrue_.
For firstly, the duke of Wellington gave me access to the original
morning states of his army for the use of my history; he permitted me
to take them into my possession, and I still have possession of them.
Secondly. The duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to apply
to sir George Murray for the “_orders of movements_.” That is to
say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals
previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper, as
the reader will see in the justificatory pieces of this volume, to
deny all knowledge of these “_orders of movements_.” I have since
obtained some of them from others, but the permission to get them
all was given to me at Strathfieldsaye, in the presence of lord
Fitzroy Somerset, who was at the same time directed to give me the
morning states and he did do so. These were documents of no ordinary
importance for a history of the war.
Thirdly. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the duke of
Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph’s portfolio, taken at
Vittoria and containing that monarch’s correspondence with the
emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals and
generals who at different periods were employed in the Peninsula.
These also were documents of no slight importance for a history of
the war, and they are still in my possession.
When I first resolved to write this History, I applied verbally to
the duke of Wellington to give me papers in aid of my undertaking.
His answer in substance was, that he had arranged all his own
papers with a view to publication himself—that he had not decided
in what form they should be given to the world, or when, probably
not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan would be to “_write
a plain didactic history_” to be published after his death—that he
was resolved never to publish anything unless he could tell the
whole truth, but at that time he could not tell the whole truth
without wounding the feelings of many worthy men, without doing
mischief: adding in a laughing way “_I should do as much mischief as
Buonaparte_.” Then expatiating upon the subject he related to me many
anecdotes illustrative of this observation, shewing errors committed
by generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially at
Waterloo; errors so materially affecting his operations that he could
not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and yet by giving
them publicity he would ungraciously affect the fame of many worthy
men whose only fault was dulness.
For these reasons he would not, he said, give me his own private
papers, but he gave me the documents I have already noticed, and told
me he would then, and always, answer any questions as to facts which
I might in the course of my work think necessary to put. And he has
fulfilled that promise rigidly, for I did then put many questions to
him verbally and took notes of his answers, and many of the facts
in my History which have been most cavilled at and denied by my
critics have been related by me solely upon his authority. Moreover
I have since at various times sent to the duke a number of questions
in writing, and always they have been fully and carefully answered
without delay, though often put when his mind must have been harassed
and his attention deeply occupied by momentous affairs.
But though the duke of Wellington denied me access to his own
peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents existed in
duplicate; they were in other persons’ hands, and in two instances
were voluntarily transferred with other interesting papers to mine.
Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself by referring to
my five first volumes, some of which were published years before
colonel Gurwood’s compilation appeared. He will find in those
volumes frequent allusions to the substance of the duke’s private
communications with the governments he served; and in the Appendix
a number of his letters, printed precisely as they have since been
given by colonel Gurwood. I could have greatly augmented the number
if I had been disposed so to swell my work. Another proof will be
found in the Justificatory Pieces of this volume, where I have
restored the whole reading of a remarkable letter of the duke’s which
has been garbled in colonel Gurwood’s compilation, and this not from
any unworthy desire to promulgate what the duke of Wellington desired
to suppress, but that having long before attributed, on the strength
of that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound in
defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my authority.
W. F. P. NAPIER.
_March 28th, 1840._
JUSTIFICATORY NOTES.
Having in my former volumes printed several controversial papers
relating to this History, I now complete them, thus giving the
reader all that I think necessary to offer in the way of answer to
those who have assailed me. The Letter to marshal Beresford and the
continuation of my Reply to the Quarterly Review have been published
before, the first as a pamphlet, the second in the London and
Westminster Review. And the former is here reproduced, not with any
design to provoke the renewal of a controversy which has been at rest
for some years, but to complete the justification of a work which,
written honestly and in good faith from excellent materials, has cost
me sixteen years of incessant labour. The other papers being new
shall be placed first in order and must speak for themselves.
ALISON.
Some extracts from Alison’s History of the French Revolution
reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore have been shewn to me
by a friend. In one of them I find, in reference to the magazines at
Lugo, a false quotation from my own work, not from carelessness but
to sustain a miserable censure of that great man. This requires no
further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous writing
shall not pass with impunity.
Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was unable to succeed
in military operations on the continent, Mr. Alison says:—
“In sir John Moore’s case this universal and perhaps unavoidable
error was greatly enhanced by his connection with the opposition
party, by whom the military strength of England had been always
underrated, the system of continental operations uniformly decried,
and the power and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were,
unworthily magnified.”
Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies to sir
John Moore who draw upon their imaginations for facts and upon their
malice for conclusions.
Sir John Moore never had any connection with any political party,
but during the short time he was in parliament he voted with the
government. He may in society have met with some of the leading men
of opposition thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful
if he ever conversed with any of them, unless perhaps Mr. Wyndham,
with whom, when the latter was secretary at war, he had a dispute
upon a military subject. He was however the intimate friend of Mr.
Pitt and of Mr. Pitt’s family. It is untrue that sir John Moore
entertained or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of French
prowess; his experience and his natural spirit and greatness of mind
swayed him the other way. How indeed could the man who stormed the
forts of Fiorenza and the breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the
disembarkation at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th,
and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st of March, he
who had never been personally foiled in any military exploit feel
otherwise than confident in arms? Mr. Alison may calumniate but he
cannot hurt sir John Moore.
SIR WALTER SCOTT.
In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s life by Mr. Lockhart, page
143, the following passage from sir Walter’s diary occurs:—
“He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy in the case
of lord Strangford, _where_ his pointed affirmation has been as
pointedly repelled.”
This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, of logic,
and of fact.
[Sidenote: Vide Times, Morning Chronicle, Sun, &c. 1828.]
Of grammar because _where_, an adverb of place, has no proper
antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may be pointedly repelled
without ceasing to be a truth. Of fact because lord Strangford did
not repel but admitted the essential parts of my affirmation, namely,
that he had falsified the date and place of writing his dispatch, and
attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal emigration
from Lisbon. Lord Strangford indeed, published two pamphlets to
prove that the merit really attached to him, but the hollowness of
his pretensions was exposed in my reply to his _first pamphlet_;
the accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony of
disinterested persons, and moreover many writers, professing to know
the facts, did, at the time, in the newspapers, contradict lord
Strangford’s statements.
The chief point of his _second pamphlet_, was the reiterated
assertion that he accompanied the prince regent over the bar of
Lisbon.
To this I could have replied, 1º. That I had seen a letter, written
at the time by Mr. Smith the naval officer commanding the boat which
conveyed lord Strangford from Lisbon to the prince’s ship, and in
that letter it was distinctly stated, _that they did not reach that
vessel until after she had passed the bar_. 2º. That I possessed
letters from other persons present at the emigration of the same
tenor, and that between the writers of those letters and the writer
of the Bruton-street dispatch, to decide which were the better
testimony, offered no difficulty.
Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before published, namely,
that Mr. Justice Bailey had done it for me. Sir Walter takes no
notice of the judge’s answer, neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it
was the most important point of the case. Let the reader judge.
[Sidenote: Vide Sun newspaper 28th Nov. 1828.]
The editor of the Sun newspaper after quoting an article from the
Times upon the subject of my controversy with lord Strangford,
remarked, that his lordship “_would hardly be believed upon his oath,
certainly not upon his honour at the Old Bailey_.”
Lord Strangford obtained a rule to shew cause why a criminal
information should not be filed against the editor for a libel. The
present lord Brougham appeared for the defence and justified the
offensive passage by references to lord Strangford’s own admissions
in his controversy with me. The judges thinking the justification
good, discharged the rule by the mouth of lord Tenterden.
[Sidenote: Report in the Sun newspaper]
During the proceedings in court the attorney-general, on the part
of lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman’s dispatch which,
though purporting to be written on the 29th November from H.M.S.
Hibernia off the Tagus was really written the 29th of December in
Bruton-street, said, “Every body knew that in diplomacy there were
two copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister’s
inspection, No. 2 for the public.”
Mr. Justice Bayley shook his head in disapprobation.
Attorney-general—“Well, my lord, it is the practice of these
departments and may be justified by necessity.”
Mr. Justice Bayley—“_I like honesty in all places, Mr. Attorney_.”
And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller to Mr.
Lockhart when he publishes another edition of his father-in-law’s
life.
COLONEL GURWOOD.
In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington’s Despatches page 531,
colonel Gurwood has inserted the following note:—
“Lieutenant Gurwood fifty-second regiment led the “forlorn hope” of
the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards
took the French governor general Barrié in the citadel; and from
the hands of lord Wellington on the breach by which he had entered,
he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by
the duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one
of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service, and
lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a soldier of fortune in here
offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in
future wars.”—“The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the
lesser breach is of too little importance except to those who
served in it to become a matter of history. The compiler however
takes this opportunity of observing that colonel William Napier
has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the “forlorn hope,”
in the account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix of
the fourth volume of his History of the Peninsular War. A correct
statement and proofs of it have been since furnished to colonel
William Napier for any future edition of his book which will render
any further notice of it _here_ unnecessary.”
My account is not to be disposed of in this summary manner, and this
note, though put forth as it were with the weight of the duke of
Wellington’s name by being inserted amongst his Despatches, shall
have an answer.
Colonel Gurwood sent me what in the above note he calls “_a correct
statement and proofs of it_.” I know of no _proofs_, and the
correctness of his statement depends on his own recollections which
the wound he received in the head at this time seems to have rendered
extremely confused, at least the following recollections of other
officers are directly at variance with his. Colonel Gurwood in his
“_correct statement_” says, “When I first went up the breach there
were still some of the enemy in it, it was very steep and on my
arrival at the top of it under the gun I was knocked down either by
a shot or stone thrown at me. I can assure you that not a lock was
snapped as you describe, but finding it impossible that the breach
from its steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet I
ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of the storming
party, and having placed some of the men on each side of the breach
I went up the middle with the remainder, and when in the act of
climbing over the disabled gun at the top of the breach which you
describe, I was wounded in the head by a musquet shot fired so close
to me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over senseless
from the top to the bottom of the breach. When I recovered my senses
I found myself close to George,[2] who was sitting on a stone with
his arm broken, I asked him how the thing was going on, &c. &c.”
Now to the above statement I oppose the following letters from the
authors of the statements given in the Appendix to my fourth volume.
Major-General Sir GEORGE NAPIER to Colonel WILLIAM NAPIER.
“I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied with and
disputes the accuracy of your account of the assault of the lesser
breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed in your fourth volume. I can
only say, that account was principally, if not wholly taken from
colonel Fergusson’s, he being one of my storming captains, and my
own narrative of that transaction up to the period when we were each
of us wounded. _I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to you_,
and beg further to say that my friend colonel Mitchell, who was also
one of my captains in the storming party, told me the last time I
saw him at the commander-in-chief’s levee, that my statement was
“_perfectly correct_.” And both he and colonel Fergusson recollected
the circumstance of my not permitting the party to load, and also
that upon being checked, when nearly two-thirds up the breach, by
the enemy’s fire, the men forgetting their pieces were not loaded
snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded them of my orders
to force their way with the bayonet alone! It was at that moment I
was wounded and fell, and I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood
afterwards during that night, as he rushed on with the other officers
of the party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small
manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier, written
many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated in every
particular. Of course as colonel Gurwood tells you he was _twice_ at
the top of the breach, before any of the storming party entered it,
I cannot take upon myself to contradict him, but I certainly do not
conceive how it was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch
together, I saw him wounded, and spoke to him _after_ having mounted
the faussbraye with him, and _before_ we rushed up the breach in the
body of the place. I never saw him or spoke to him after I was struck
down, the whole affair did not last above twenty-five or thirty
minutes, but as I fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only
answer for the correctness of my account to that period, as soon
after I was assisted to get down the breach by the Prince of Orange
(who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered arm and which sash
is now in my possession) by the present duke of Richmond and lord
Fitzroy Somerset, all three of whom I believe were actively engaged
in the assault. Our friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and
active soldier, but I cannot admit of his having been _twice in the
breach before the other officers of the storming party and myself_!
“I believe yourself and every man in the army with whom I have the
honor to be acquainted will acquit me of any wish or intention to
deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer of the credit and honor
due to his bravery, more particularly one with whom I have long been
on terms of intimate friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much
as I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore this
statement can or ought only to be attributed to my sense _of what
is due_ to the other gallant officers and soldiers who were under
my command in the assault of the lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo,
and not to any _wish_ or _intention_ on my part to detract from the
distinguished services of, or the laurels gained by colonel Gurwood
on that occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if
necessary and to make what use you please of this letter privately or
publicly either now or at any future period, as _I steadily adhere to
all I have ever stated to you or any one else_ and I am &c. &c.
“GEORGE NAPIER.”
Extract of a letter from colonel JAMES FERGUSSON, fifty-second
regiment (formerly a captain of the forty-third and one of the
storming party.) Addressed to Sir GEORGE NAPIER.
“I send you a memorandum I made some time back from memory and in
consequence of having seen various accounts respecting our assault.
You are perfectly correct as to Gurwood and your description of the
way we carried the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your
memorandum I recollect the circumstance of the men’s arms not being
loaded and the snapping of the firelocks.”—“I was not certain when
you were wounded but your description of the scene on the breach and
the way in which it was carried is perfectly accurate.”
Extract of a letter from colonel FERGUSSON to colonel WILLIAM
NAPIER.
“I think the account you give in your fourth volume of the attack
of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as favorable to Gurwood
as he has any right to expect, and agrees perfectly both with your
brother George’s recollections of that attack and with mine. Our late
friend Alexander Steele who was one of my officers declared he was
with Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the storming
party of the forty-third joined Gurwood’s party who were placing the
ladders against the work, and it was the engineer officer calling out
that they were wrong and pointing out the way to the breach in the
fausse braye that directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld[3] of
the forty-third was the first man that run up the fausse braye, and
we made directly for the little breach which was defended _exactly
as you describe_. We were on the breach some little time and when we
collected about thirty men (some of the third battalion rifle brigade
in the number) we made a simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so
that positively no claim could be made as to the first who entered
the breach. I do not want to dispute with Gurwood but I again say
(in which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party were
_before_ the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood and some
of his party were among the number that rushed in at the breach,
but as to his having twice mounted the breach before us, _I cannot
understand it_, and Steele always _positively denied it_.”
Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing upon bad
information about the assault of the little breach I shall add
something about that of the great breach.
Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging example for the
subalterns of the British army in future wars; but the following
extract from a statement of the late major Mackie, so well known for
his bravery worth and modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn
hope at the great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies colonel Gurwood’s
claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined to found
his good fortune in after life.
Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late Major MACKIE to
Colonel NAPIER. October 1838.
“The troops being immediately ordered to advance were soon across the
ditch, and upon the breach at the same instant with the ninety-fourth
who had advanced along the ditch. To mount under the fire of the
defenders was the work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a
formidable nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep trench
was cut across the rampart isolating the breach, which was enfiladed
with cannon and musquetry, while in front, from the rampart into
the streets of the town, was a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve
feet; the whole preventing the soldiers from making that bold and
rapid onset so effective in facilitating the success of such an
enterprize. The great body of the fire of defence being from the
houses and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first
impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the town. Finding
myself here quite alone and no one following, I discovered that the
trench upon the right of the breach was cut across the whole length
of the rampart, thereby opening a free access to our troops and
rendering what was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the
reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of the breach
and led the men down into the town. The enemy’s fire which I have
stated had been, after we gained the summit of the wall, confined
to the houses and open space alluded to, now began to slacken, and
ultimately they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance
of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could collect
along the street, leading in a direct line from the great breach
into the centre of the town, by which street the great body of the
enemy were precipitately retiring. Having advanced considerably and
passed across a street running to the left, a body of the enemy came
suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. In
pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their course to the
right, I urged the party forwards in that direction until we reached
the citadel, where the governor and garrison had taken refuge. The
outer gate of the enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the
party composed of men of different regiments who by this time had
joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was hailed by a French
officer asking for an English general to whom they might surrender.
Pointing to my epaulets in token of their security, the door of the
keep or stronghold of the place was opened and a sword presented to
me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. This
I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid hold of me for
protection, one on each arm, and _it was while I was thus situated
that lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the
governor_.
“In this way, the governor, with lieutenant Gurwood and the two
officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party
moved towards the rampart. Having found when there, that in the
confusion incident to such a scene I had lost as it were by accident
that prize which was actually within my reach, and which I had justly
considered as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned upon my
heel and left the spot. The following day, in company with captain
Lindsay of the eighty-eighth regiment I waited upon colonel Pakenham,
then assistant adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my
name had been mentioned by general Picton as having led the advance
of the right brigade. He told me that it had and I therefore took no
further notice of the circumstance, feeling assured that I should be
mentioned in the way of which all officers in similar circumstances
must be so ambitious. My chagrin and disappointment may be easily
imagined when lord Wellington’s dispatches reached the army from
England to find my name altogether omitted, and the right brigade
deprived of their just meed of praise.”—“Sir, it is evident that
the tendency of this note” (colonel Gurwood’s note quoted from the
Despatches) “is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe
by no means intentionally upon colonel Gurwood’s part, to impress the
public with the belief that he was himself the first British officer
that entered the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo, consequently the one
to whom its garrison surrendered. This impression the language he
employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to his exertions
and good fortune in this particular instance he refers the whole
of his professional success, to which he points the attention of
the future aspirant as a pledge of the rewards to be expected from
similar efforts to deserve them. To obviate this impression and in
bare justice to the right brigade of the third division and, as a
member of it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that though I
do not claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the
defences of the great breach, the left brigade having joined in it
contrary to the intention of lord Wellington under the circumstances
stated, yet I do declare on the word of a man of honour, that _I was
the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach
into the streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the
body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and
that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party
before lieutenant Gurwood came up_. Referring to the inference which
colonel Gurwood has been pleased to draw from his own good fortune
as to the certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions
of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself to
say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on this occasion,
I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment consequently the first
for promotion. Having as such succeeded so immediately after to a
company, I could scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at
the time, but after many years of additional service, I did still
conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring forward
my services on that day as a ground for asking that step of rank
which every officer leading a forlorn hope had received with the
exception of myself.
“May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me your
aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward I had hitherto
enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that the services which
I am now compelled most reluctantly to bring in some way to the
notice of the public, had during the period that has since elapsed,
never once been called in question. It was certainly hard enough
that a service of this nature should have been productive of no
advantage to me in my military life. I feel it however infinitely
more annoying that I should now find myself in danger of being stript
of any credit to which it might entitle me, by the looseness of the
manner in which colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not
say that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement
appearing in a work which as being published under the auspices of
the duke of Wellington as well as of the Horse Guards, has at least
the appearance of coming in the guise of an official authority,”
“I agree most cordially with colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has
expressed in his note, that he is himself an instance where reward
and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled however, for the
reasons given to differ from him materially as to the precise ground
on which he considers the honours and advantages that have followed
his deserts to be not only the distinguished but the just and natural
consequences of his achievements on that day. _I allude to the claim
advanced by colonel Gurwood to be considered the individual by whom
the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo was made prisoner of war._ It could
scarcely be expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the
sword which I received was not the governor’s being in fact that of
one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat however that before lieutenant
Gurwood and his party came up, the enemy had expressed their wish to
surrender, that a sword was presented by them in token of submission
and received by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer,
that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible for
their safety as prisoners under the protection of the British arms.
Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards made and I appeal to every
impartial mind in the least degree acquainted with the rules of
modern warfare, if under these circumstances I am not justified in
asserting that before, and at the time lieutenant Gurwood arrived,
the whole of the enemy’s garrison within the walls of the citadel,
governor included, were both _de jure_ and _de facto_ prisoners to
myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the individual who made
its owner captive, could give either of us a claim to receive that
sword to which colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the
furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it
became _de facto_ his, it was _de jure_ mine.”
Something still remains to set colonel Gurwood right upon matters
which he has apparently touched upon without due consideration. In
a note appended to that part of the duke of Wellington’s Despatches
which relate to the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says that the late
captain Dobbs of the fifty-second at Sabugal “recovered the howitzer,
taken by the forty-third regiment but retaken by the enemy.” This
is totally incorrect. The howitzer was taken by the forty-third and
retained by the forty-third. The fifty-second regiment never even
knew of its capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a
brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was more likely to
keep his own just claims to distinction in the back-ground than to
appropriate the merit of others to himself. I am therefore quite
at a loss to know upon what authority colonel Gurwood has stated a
fact inaccurate itself and unsupported by the duke of Wellington’s
dispatch about the battle of Sabugal, which distinctly says the
howitzer was taken by the forty-third regiment, as in truth it was,
and it was kept by that regiment also.
While upon the subject of colonel Gurwood’s compilation I must
observe that in my fifth volume, when treating of general Hill’s
enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz I make lord Wellington
complain to the ministers that his generals were so fearful of
responsibility the slightest movements of the enemy deprived them
of their judgment. Trusting that the despatches then in progress of
publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority at large
in the Appendix; since then, the letter on which I relied has indeed
been published by colonel Gurwood in the Despatches, but purged of
the passage to which I allude and without any indication of its being
so garbled. This omission might hereafter give a handle to accuse me
of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter in full, the Italics
marking the restored passage:—
_From lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool._
_Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812._
MY DEAR LORD,
You will be as well pleased as I am at general Hill’s success, which
certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the
garrison of Mirabete; which he would have done if general Chowne had
got on a little better in the night of the 16th, and if sir William
Erskine had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him
that Soult’s whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir
Rowland therefore according to his instructions came back on the
21st, whereas if he had staid a day or two he would have brought
his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle and he would either have
stormed it under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered.
_But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail upon the
general officers to feel a little confidence in their situation. They
take alarm at the least movement of the enemy and then spread the
alarm, and interrupt every thing, and the extraordinary circumstance
is, that if they are not in command they are as stout as any private
soldiers in the army._ Your lordship will observe that I have marked
some passages in Hill’s report not to be published. My opinion is
that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete and indeed it is
useless to keep that post, unless they have another bridge which I
doubt. But if they see that we entertain a favourable opinion of the
strength of Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which
might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish
there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid Gazette in which you will
see a curious description of the state of king Joseph’s authority and
his affairs in general, from the most authentic sources.
Ever, my dear lord, &c. &c.
WELLINGTON.
VILLA MURIEL.
The following statement of the operations of the fifth division at
the combat of Muriel 25th October, 1812, is inserted at the desire
of sir John Oswald. It proves that I have erroneously attributed to
him the first and as it appeared to me unskilful disposition of the
troops; but with respect to the other portions of his statement,
without denying or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I
shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his
statement.
_Affair of Villa Muriel._
On the morning 25th of October 1812 major-general Oswald joined and
assumed the command of the fifth division at Villa Muriel on the
Carion. Major-general Pringle had already posted the troops, and the
greater portion of the division were admirably disposed of about the
village as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its rear, in
some places parallel to the Carion. Certain of the corps were formed
in columns of attack supported by reserves, ready to fall upon the
enemy if in consequence of the mine failing he should venture to push
a column along the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been
reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times difficult
and in the then rise of water as they proved hardly practicable.
As the enemy closed towards the bridge, he opened a heavy fire of
artillery on the village. At that moment lord Wellington entered
it and passed the formed columns well sheltered both from fire and
observation. His lordship approved of the manner the post was
occupied and of the advantage taken of the _canal and village_
to mask the troops. The French supported by a heavy and superior
fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the mine not exploding and
destroying the arch till the leading section had almost reached the
spot. Shortly after, the main body retired, leaving only a few light
troops. Immediately previous to this an orderly officer announced
to lord Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by the
foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately to ascend
the heights in its rear, and along the plateau to move towards
Palencia in order to meet an attack from that quarter. Whilst the
division was in the act of ascending, a report was made by major
Hill of the eighth caçadores that the ford had been won, passed by
a body of cavalry causing the caçadores to fall back on the broken
ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the first, acquainted with
these fords, for his push to them was nearly simultaneous with his
assault on the bridge. The division moved on the heights towards
Palencia, it had not however proceeded far, before an order came
directing it to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and
when collected to remain on the heights till further orders. About
this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had either infantry or
artillery passed by the ford to aid in the attack, but in consequence
of the troops being withdrawn from the village and canal a partial
repair was given to the bridge, and small bodies of infantry were
passed over skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights
was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack from that
quarter was to be apprehended until an advance from Palencia. It was
on that point therefore that attention was fixed. Day was closing
when lord Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet
at Palencia and that the enemy must now be driven from the right
bank. General Oswald enquired if after clearing the village the
division was to remain there for the night. His lordship replied, the
village was to be occupied in force and held by the division till it
was withdrawn, which would probably be very early in the morning.
He directed the first brigade under brigadier-general Barnes to
attack the enemy’s flank, the second under Pringle to advance in
support extending to the left so as to succour the Spaniards who
were unsuccessfully contending with the enemy in their front. The
casualties in the division were not numerous especially when the fire
it was exposed to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative
heavy loss. The troops were by a rapid advance of the first brigade
cut off from the bridge and forced into the river where many were
drowned. The allies fell back in the morning unmolested.
JOHN OSWALD, &c. &c. &c.
_Memoir on the combat of Muriel by captain Hopkins, fourth regiment._
As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country upon our left
flank as we were then retrograding appeared open, in our front ran
the river Carrion, and immediately on the opposite side of the river
and parallel to it there was a broad deep dry canal. On our passing
the bridge at Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the
margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into heights,
the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel was occupied by
the brigadier Pringle with a _small_ detachment of infantry but
at the time we considered that it required a larger force, as its
maintenance appeared of the utmost importance to the army, we were
aware that the enemy had passed the Carrion with cavalry and also
that Hill’s caçadores had given way at another part of the river.
Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of Villa Muriel, the
enemy attacked the village, at the time the brigadier and his staff
were there,[4] passing the ruins of the bridge by means of ladders,
&c. The enemy in driving the detachment from the village made some
prisoners. We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a fire of
musquetry and artillery, where we halted in close column; the enemy
strengthened the village.
Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau, and
immediately reconnoitred the enemy whose reinforcements had arrived
and were forming strong columns on the other side of the river. Lord
Wellington immediately ordered some artillery to be opened on the
enemy. I happened to be close to the head-quarter staff and heard
lord Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, “Tell Oswald I want him.” On
sir John Oswald arriving he said, “Oswald, you will get the division
under arms and drive the enemy from the village and retain possession
of it.” He replied, “My lord, if the village should be taken I do
not consider it as tenable.” Wellington then said, “It is my orders,
general.” Oswald replied, “My lord as it is your orders they shall
be obeyed.” Wellington then gave orders to him “that he should take
the second brigade of the division and attack in line, that the first
brigade should in column first descend the heights on the right of
the second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the enemy,”
and saying, “I will tell you what I will do, Oswald. I will give you
the Spaniards and Alava into the bargain, headed by a company of the
ninth regiment upon your left.” The attack was made accordingly, the
second battalion of the fourth regiment being left in reserve in
column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade which
for a short time caused them some confusion. The enemy were driven
from the canal and village, and the prisoners which they made in the
morning were retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but
general Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the company of
Brunswickers killed, and several of the division killed and wounded.
During the attack lord Wellington sent the prince of Orange under
a heavy fire for the purpose of preventing the troops exposing
themselves at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a
detachment just arrived from England. The possession of the village
proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde movement we made
that night could not have been effected with safety had the enemy
been on our side of the river, as it was we were enabled to pass
along the river with all arms in the most perfect security.
A LETTER
TO
GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,
BEING
_An Answer to his Lordships Assumed Refutation_
OF
COL. NAPIER’S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.
MY LORD,
You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you
done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble. I should
have paid more deference to your argument and would willingly
have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now having virtually
acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled
“_Strictures_” and “_Further Strictures_,” _&c._ I will not suffer
you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without
making you also feel their inconvenience. I will treat your present
publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then my
lord, how will you stand in this controversy?
Starting anonymously you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste
and mortified vanity could suggest to damage an opponent, because
in the fair exercise of his judgement he had ventured to deny your
claim to the title of a great commander: and you coupled this with
such fulsome adulation of yourself that even in a dependent’s mouth
it would have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat, when
all the errors misquotations and misrepresentations of your anonymous
publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your
own name as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared, and
you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and
arguments and fresh assertions, without the least reference to your
former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that deference
for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority
under other circumstances might have fairly claimed at my hands; that
I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that
I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition
of your production. My lord, you will be disappointed. I have neither
time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task;
and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not
gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will expose some
prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to those which I do not
notice I will refer to your former publications to show, that in this
controversy, I am now entitled to disregard any thing you may choose
to advance, and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of
producing any more proofs.
You have published above six hundred pages at three different
periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the
arguments and evidence contained in your present work; a few lines
will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labours is
to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an
excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great!
Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did not take
a much longer time to establish his European reputation by driving
the French from the Peninsula; and methinks if your exploits vouch
not for themselves your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all
events, a plain simple statement at first, having your name affixed,
would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly
have been more dignified than the anonymous publications with which
you endeavoured to feel your way. Why should not all the main points
contained in the laboured pleadings of your Further Strictures, and
the still more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been
condensed and published at once with your name? if indeed it was
necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your
opponent and anonymous praise of yourself you hoped to create a
favourable impression on the public before you appeared in person?
This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then
how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced
should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the
first defence of your generalship, for one short campaign, you should
have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second
defence of two hundred pages.
You tell us, that you disdained to notice my “_Reply to various
Opponents_,” because you knew the good sense of the public
would never be misled by a production containing such numerous
contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends’
advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were
nevertheless some things in that work which required an answer even
though the greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your
friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary
who has hit hard only makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended
to an anonymous attack it would have been wiser to refute the proofs
offered of your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur from
a contest which you had yourself provoked. My friends, my lord, gave
me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and
with more reason, because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs
of your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer, and
if you had been provided in the same manner you would like me have
neglected your friends’ advice.
My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner I have
before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for that refined
courtesy with which I could have wished to soften the asperities of
this controversy, but I must request of you to be assured, and I say
it in all sincerity, that I attribute the errors to which I must
revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression of facts,
but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of
a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity. I acknowledge that
it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction
suddenly disturbed,—
“Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,
If I forget thy worth, _victorious Beresford_.”
It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet
strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your
irritation when the muse of history awakened you with the solemn
clangour of her trumpet to the painful reality that you were only an
ordinary person. My lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved
your equanimity, there would have been some greatness in that.
In your first Strictures you began by asserting that I knew nothing
whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by
vulgar political rancour when I denied your talents as a general. To
this I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew
something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at
Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of
the first, if you desired it. To this I have received no answer.
You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language
was one of your principal claims to be commander of the Portuguese
army. In reply I quoted from your own letter to lord Wellington,
your confession, that, such was your ignorance of that language at
the time you could not even read the communication from the regency,
relative to your own appointment.
You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray, objected at the
first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer I published
sir John Sherbroke’s letter to sir J. Cradock complaining of it.
You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to
let you have in 1809) had not been formed by lord Wellington. In
reply I published lord Wellington’s declaration that they had been
formed by him.
You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of
Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively and
accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that
effect. You harped upon the new and surprising information I had
obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious
upon the subject. In answer I published your own letter to that
junta! So much for your first Strictures.
In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that colonel
Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in
your third publication (page 48) you show very clearly that he took
an active part in those operations.
You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida _two marches_, and
now you say it is _four marches_.
Again, in your first “_Strictures_,” you declared that the extent of
the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you
were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed,
or had the support and protection of the duke of Wellington while
in command of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes,
published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues
was: and I have still something in reserve to add when time shall
be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay your lordship’s appetite by two
extracts bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you
derived from the duke of Wellington.
1º. Mr. Stuart, writing to lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing
the violence of the Souza faction relative to the fall of Almeida,
says,—“I could have borne all this with patience if not accompanied
by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the
Tagus, and that the regency should send an order to marshal Beresford
to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary;
followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that
officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese
who are attached to lord Wellington.”
2º. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by marshal
Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However, as I mentioned,
I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period lord
Wellington retains his situation, or after active operations have
ceased in this country, even should things turn out favourably, of
which I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had
though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself, though
I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times
desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is
ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I
should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to
reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my
situation.”
For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures
of your two first publications, I must refer the reader to my
“_Reply_” and “_Justification_,” but the points above noticed it was
necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to
call upon the public to disregard your present work. And this right
I cannot relinquish. I happened fortunately to have the means of
repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned,
but I cannot always be provided with your own letters to disprove
your own assertions. The combat is not equal my lord, I cannot
contend with such odds and must therefore, although reluctantly, use
the advantages which by the detection of such errors I have already
obtained.
These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential
points, and they deprive your present work of all weight as an
authority in this controversy. Yet the strangest part of your new
book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call
the _generous principle_ which leads French authors to _misstate
facts for the honour of their country_; and not only you do this but
sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me, my
lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my
countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency
you condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have
indeed yet to learn that the _honour_ of my country either requires
to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods. Your
lordship’s personal experience in the field may perhaps have led
you to a different conclusion but I will not be your historian: and
coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on
the points which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to
laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo’s
ghost you rise, “with twenty mortal murthers on your crown to push us
from our stools.” You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of
arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed,
and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to be
discarded for your airy nothings.
Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking,
self-sufficient, ignorant officer.
The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor! He is nameless,
his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether
he charged or not.
Colonel Light! spunge him out, he was only a subaltern.
Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he
is too minute, and has no diffidence.
Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! Oh! very
honourable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all
their evidence put together is worth nothing! But, my lord, it is
very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr.
Long’s publication. Aye! aye! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears,
their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to
judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!
Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with
it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more
likely, my lord, but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody
who contradicts me: every body who coincides with me, nay, the same
person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or
opposes my assertion; even those French authors, whose generous
principles lead them to write falsehoods for the _honour of their
country_. Such, my lord, after a year’s labour of cogitation, is
nearly the extent of your “_Refutation_.”
In your first publication you said that I should have excluded all
hearsay evidence, and have confined myself to what could be proved
in a court of justice; and now when I bring you testimony which no
court of justice could refuse, with a lawyer’s coolness you tell the
jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses, being
generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded, that
they were not competent to judge. My lord, this is a little too much:
there would be some shew of reason if these subalterns’ opinions
had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but
they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal
observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears?
Hath he not understanding? You were once a subaltern yourself, and
you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such
overweening contempt for men’s capacity because they happen to be of
lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have
so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such
injurious feelings, yet, believe me it would be much more dignified
to avoid this indecent display of them.
I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such parts of your
new publication as I think necessary for the further support of my
history, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought
forward. For I am, as I have already shewn, exonerated by your former
inaccuracies from noticing any part of your “_Refutation_” save where
new evidence is brought forward; and that only in deference to those
gentlemen who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right
either to my acquiescence in the weight of their testimony, or my
reasons for declining to accept it. I have however on my hands a
much more important labour than contending with your lordship, and
I shall therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who
choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended Refutation with
my original Justification in combination with this letter, being
satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer nothing by their award.
1st. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor of Almeida,
you still harp upon my phrase that it was the _only_ evidence.
The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials;
it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person’s
evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but
that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been
condemned. Now you say that there was other evidence, yet you do
not venture to affirm that Cox’s letter was not _the testimony_
upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, while the extract
from lord Stuart’s letter, quoted by me, says it was. And, my lord,
his lordship’s letter to you, in answer to your enquiry, neither
contradicts nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does
it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed
were copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh.
Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing on the
question _which he can find_. Were there nothing more it would be
quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than fifty
large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter
of the 25th July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in
my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the
date of August, 1812, the following passage:—
“The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by Beresford’s
order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and the government none,
to interfere. Great interest was made to save him, but in vain.
The sentence and trial were published before being carried into
execution and were much criticized. Both the evidence and the
choice of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen was
one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca, and the place
Lisbon.”
This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being lord
Stuart’s words; it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of
the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with the former
passage, and with the facts that your lordship’s words are still very
vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the
evidence on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason to
doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition,
nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of
my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I
have there expunged the word “_only_,” and made the sentence exactly
to accord with the extract from lord Stuart’s letter. You will also
observe, my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple
fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far from
imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence I expressly
stated that the man richly deserved death.
Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese regiment, I
will first observe, that when I said the eighth Portuguese regiment
was broken to pieces I imputed no blame to it. No regiment in the
world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which
attacked the mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was
not broken by it, as sir James Douglas’s letter would seem to imply,
what was it doing while the enemy by their flank movement gained the
crest of the position in such numbers as to make it a most daring
exploit of the ninth British regiment to attack them there. It is a
strange thing that a heavy column of French who were resolute to gain
the crest of such a position should have made “_a flank movement_,”
to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. I should
rather imagine, with all deference, that it was the conscripts
who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had
taken place, like that which induces children while travelling
in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of
themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do, I have given my
authority, namely, the statement of major Waller, a staff-officer
present, and the statement of colonel Taylor (for he is my nameless
eye-witness) of the ninth, the very regiment to which sir James
Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are my authorities,
and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James
Douglas it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of
detail. I knew not of sir James Douglas’s negative testimony, but I
had two positive testimonies to my statement, and as I have still two
to one, I am within the rules of the courts of justice to which your
lordship would refer all matter of history; moreover, some grains of
allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer
for his own regiment. The following extract from sir James Leith’s
report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence in favour
of my side of the question.
“The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect,
for the enemy who had been the assailant, _having dispersed or
driven every thing there opposed to him_, was in possession of the
rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of major-general Picton’s
position _without a shot being fired at him_. Not a moment was to be
lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with
the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which
had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to
gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form
the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude accuracy and
coolness under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed
on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of
the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the
British brigade under him. Major general Leith had intended that the
thirty-eighth, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and
to the left of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond
the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of
the sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right
of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in
reserve; but the enemy _having driven every thing before them in that
quarter_, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky
ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the
British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment
had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that
purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without
halting and frequently in double quick time.”
Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese
conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that
_every thing in front was dispersed or driven away_—and that not even
a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese?
Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of
these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed
to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty.
Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and sir
James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth
drove away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese might have
been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill and
yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the ninth had broken
the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself
and the duke of Wellington _saw_ all the operations of the eighth
Portuguese on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from
colonel Taylor’s letter, wherein you will perceive something which
may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on
that head.
“No doubt general Leith’s letter to the duke was intended to describe
the aspect of affairs in so critical a situation, and where the duke
himself could not _possibly_ have made his observations; and also
Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not
done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made
light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I
know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or
a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very
foremost ranks of the ninth British.”—“General Leith’s correspondence
would be an interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing
considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and
Hill’s corps, a very considerable extent of position _which could not
of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field_.”
_Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese._ Your lordship has here gained
an advantage; I cannot indeed understand some of general M‘Bean’s
expressions, but it is impossible for me to doubt his positive
statement; I believe therefore that he was in front of the convent
wall and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is however
necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and
myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the
reputation of the Portuguese army, and you asked why I did not speak
of a particular charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment
at Busaco. This charge you described as being against one of _Ney’s
attacking columns_, which had, you said, _gained the ascent of the
position, and then forming advanced on the plain above_ before it was
charged by the nineteenth regiment. As this description was certainly
wrong I treated the whole as a magniloquent allusion to an advance
which I had observed to have been made by a Portuguese regiment
posted on the mountain to the right. (General M‘Bean is mistaken when
he quotes me as saying that his line was never nearer to the enemy’s
lines than a hundred yards. I spoke of _a Portuguese regiment, which
might possibly be the nineteenth_.) I never denied that any charge
had been made, but that a charge _such as described by you_ had taken
place, and in fact general M‘Bean’s letter while it confirms the
truth of your general description, by implication denies the accuracy
of the particulars. Certainly Ney’s columns never passed the front of
the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.
The difficulty I have to reconcile general M‘Bean’s statement with
my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light
division, may perhaps arise from the general’s meaning to use certain
terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was
posted in front of the convent-wall, and also on the right of the
light division; but the light division was half a mile in front
of the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean as his
words might imply immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the
light division as being to his left, but unless he speaks of the
line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the
light division was with respect to the enemy and the convent in
his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities,
his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of
the fifty-second and forty-third, which I suppose to be really the
case. Again he says that he charged and drove the French from _their
position_ down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy’s position,
properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine,
and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the eighth corps and the
reserves of the sixth corps, were in order of battle there, ten
regiments, much less one, dared not to have crossed the ravine which
was of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops at the
bottom. I conclude therefore, general M‘Bean here means by the word
position some accidental ground on which the enemy had formed. Taking
this to be so, I will now endeavour to reconcile general M‘Bean’s
statement with my own recollection; because certainly I do still hold
my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all
the main points.
The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the light division
stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex
of which the forty-third and fifty-second were drawn up in a line,
the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very
edges; the artillery was at the apex looking down the descent, and
far below the Caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on the
mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of
attack. The one came straight against the light division; the head
of it striking the right company of the fifty-second and the left
company of the forty-third was broken as against a wall; and at the
same time the wings of those regiments reinforced by the skirmishers
of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the right of the forty-third,
advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides. No other
troops fought with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken,
because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, we
followed the enemy down to the first village which was several
hundred yards below the edge, and we returned leisurely; the ground
was open to the view on the right and on the left, we saw no other
column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing.
When we returned from this pursuit the light division had been
reformed on the little plain above, and some time after several
German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through
our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney’s reserve in the woods
below.
General M‘Bean says he saw no German infantry, and hence it is clear
that it was not at this point his charge had place. But it is also
certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second, under the
command of general Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the great
mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a
pine-wood, which however was far below the height on which the light
division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack’s brigade which
was in his front. A part of Ross’s troops of artillery under the
direction of lieutenant, now colonel M‘Donald, played very sharply
upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing in company with
captain Loyd of my own regiment, close to the guns watching their
effect, and it was then I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment
to which I have alluded; but general M‘Bean again assures me that the
nineteenth regiment was not there. Two suppositions therefore present
themselves. The enemy’s skirmishers from this column were very
numerous. Some of them might have passed the left flank of Pack’s
skirmishers, and gathering in a body have reached the edge of the
hill on which the light division were posted, and then rising behind
it have been attacked by general M‘Bean; or, what is more likely, the
skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which
attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the
descent on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like
manner have risen under general M‘Bean’s line.
Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render
the matter clear to me in all points save that of attacking the
enemy’s position, which as I have before observed, may be only a
loose expression of the general’s to denote the ground which the
French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second
supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by general
M‘Bean, namely, that the enemy’s guns opened on him immediately
after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the
light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first
village, thus the time that the nineteenth charged seems marked,
and as I was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts
for my not seeing that charge. However considering all things, I
must admit that I was so far in error that I really did not, nor
do I now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the
nineteenth regiment; and in proof of the difficulty of attaining
strict accuracy on such occasions, I can here adduce the observation
of general M‘Bean viz. that he saw no Germans save the artillery;
yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the convent wall,
and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after
the charge of the nineteenth would appear to have taken place. Very
often also, things appear greater to those who perform them than
to the bye-standers, and I would therefore ask how many men the
nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how
many French were opposed to it? for I still maintain that neither by
the nineteenth Portuguese, nor by any other regiment, save those of
the light division, was any charge made which called for particular
notice on my part as a general historian. I am not bound to relate
all the minor occurrences of a great battle; “those things belong to
the history of regiments,” is the just observation of Napoleon. Yet
general M‘Bean may be assured that no desire to underrate either his
services or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated
me, and to prove it, if my third volume should ever come to a third
edition, I will take his letter as my ground for noticing this
charge, although I will not promise to make it appear so prominent as
your lordship would have me to do.
Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation. “As
colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of
a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which
regiment he does not profess to know,—but which movement took place
a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth regiment,
it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was
passing a mile to the left. Nor can he therefore negative what is
said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian
should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed
himself.” Now your lordship does not say that the two events occurred
at the _same time_, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned
Partridge calls a “_non sequitur_;” and as general M‘Bean expressly
affirms his charge to have taken place on the _right_ of the light
division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the
_left_ in order to see the said charge. Hence the predicament in
which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship’s
inability to reason upon your own materials.
Your next subject is captain Squire, but I will pass over that
matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed before, and
I am well assured that the memory of that very gallant and able
officer will never suffer from your lordship’s angry epithets.
Campo Mayor follows. In your “_Further Strictures_” you said that
colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in
detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he
was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his own report
explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard
just before the action, thus proving that he was marching in support
of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and
colonel Light; and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon the
evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was an actor
in the charge of that regiment, but with respect to him a few remarks
are necessary.
1º. The accuracy of that gentleman’s narrative concerns my
Justification very little, except in one part. I published it whole
as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw light upon the
subject. I think so still, and I see nothing in your lordship’s
observation to make me doubt its general correctness. But it was
only the part which I printed in italics that concerned me. I had
described a remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile
squadrons _had twice passed through each other_, and then the British
put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed this as a nursery
tale; you called my description of it a “_country dance_,” and you
still call it my “_scenic effect_.” Did the hostile masses meet
twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? These
were the real questions. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies
charging through each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic,
but is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated as an
“_eye-witness_,” was colonel Colborne; my second authority colonel
Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons, an _actor_; and when your
lordship so coolly says the latter’s statement does not afford “the
slightest support to my scenic description,” I must take the liberty
of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat
common sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty bears me out
even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same
violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed
through to their original position, the French must have fled towards
the allied army; but they fled towards Badajos. The English must
therefore have passed through and turned, and it was then that in the
personal conflict with the sabre which followed the second charge the
thirteenth dragoons defeated the French.
My lord, you will never by such special pleading, I know of no other
term by which I can properly designate your argument, you will never,
I say, by such special pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo
Mayor. The proofs of your errors there are too many and too clear;
the errors themselves too glaring too gross to leave you the least
hope; the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the
advantages then offered to you seems to prevail in your writing; and
yet while impeaching every person’s credit where their statements
militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence
in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. My
lord, you only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy
floundering, you are heavy and throw much mud about; like one of
those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you
prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces but you never get
on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the
enemy were taken by surprize, they were in a plain, their cavalry
were beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed
in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to
surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and to carry off their
captured artillery and then you blamed your gallant troops. The enemy
escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion
of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate
against you.
_The march by Merida._ If you had said at once that the duke of
Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an
end of all my arguments against your skill; yet it by no means
follows that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though
not applicable to you personally. New combinations were presented,
and the duke of Wellington might very probably have changed his
instructions had he been present on the spot. But, why was this your
justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so
decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is
it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added,
to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found
out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you
were pleased to style me in your former publication? Have you found
out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and
well supported statements? It is good however that you have at last
condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you
for it, and with the exception of two points I will leave you in the
full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may
procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that your
lordship’s memory with respect to the duke of Wellington’s negative,
may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the
junta of Badajos.
I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I have already used
in my Justification, and in my History, in favour of the march to
Merida; if I am wrong the world will so judge me. But the two points
I have reserved are, 1º. That you assert now, in direct contradiction
to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one
of _four_ days instead of _two_; and that the road by Albuquerque
was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part
I observe, that the French before, and the Spaniards then, marched
by the road of Montigo; and that a year after, when lord Hill’s
expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering
and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved
with great facility in three days from Elvas, by this very road
of Montigo, to Merida; and Elvas as your Lordship knows is rather
further than Campo Mayor from Merida.
The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy which I
have so often had occasion to expose in your former publications,
viz. mis-stating my arguments to suit your own reasoning. I never
said that you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a
“_coup de main_” against Badajos; I never even said you should have
commenced the siege immediately. What I did say was, that by the
march through Merida you could have placed your army at once between
Badajos and the French army, and so have thrown the former upon its
own resources at a most inconvenient time; that in this situation
you could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and
proceeded at your convenience.
Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect and expose
your new fallacies and contradictions; it requires too much time. You
have written upwards of six hundred pages, four hundred of them I
have before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and to me
at least much more important than yours; your lordship must therefore
spare me the other two hundred, or at least permit me to treat them
lightly. I will leave the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter
of opinion and I will not follow your example in overloading what
is already clear by superfluity of argument. I will only expose one
error into which you have been led by colonel La Marre’s work. On his
authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months’
provisions; but the following extract from a letter of marshal
Soult’s to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre is wrong:—
_“Seville, 18th April._
“From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to
the report of general Phillipon, for _two months and some days_ as to
subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder,” &c. &c.
Let us now come to the _battle of Albuera_.
You still doubt that the position as I explained it is four miles
long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of major Mitchell’s
plan, on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I
also am in possession of one of major Mitchell’s plans, and I find
by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the
Portuguese _infantry_ (without noticing Otway’s squadron of cavalry)
to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the
battle, is exactly four miles; and every body knows that a line over
the actual ground will from the latter’s rises and falls exceed the
line on paper. Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with
your lordship’s, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude that either
your compasses are too short or that mine are too long.
Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers of the armies
on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, to prove what
cannot be proved, namely, that my estimate is wrong and yours right;
and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there
are no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess upon
probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with
respect to the French.
Mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain number as the
nearest approximation I could make, and when my estimate was
questioned by you I explained as briefly as possible the foundation
of that estimate. You give in refutation thirty-eight pages of most
confused calculations, and what is the result? why that the numbers
of the allies on your own shewing still remain uncertain; and your
estimate of the French, as I will shew by the bye, is quite erroneous.
I said in my History, you had more than two thousand cavalry in the
field, and in my Justification I gave reasons for believing you
had nearly three thousand; you now acknowledge two thousand; my
history then is not far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to
know the composition of your own divisions. General Long’s morning
states, now before me, do not include general Madden’s cavalry. That
officer’s regiments were the fifth and eighth, and if I mistake not
the sixth and ninth also were under him; those in general Long’s
division are the first and seventh. I find from general Madden’s
own account of his services, given in the Military Calendar, that
a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment, under colonel
Windham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now taking the eighth to
be between two hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty-one
troopers, which were the respective strengths of the first and
seventh regiments in Long’s Division on the 29th of May, I have above
eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred and eighty-seven
in Long’s division, and two hundred and seventy-five in the eighth
regiment, and to these I add about two hundred and fifty officers and
sergeants, making in all more than two thousand sabres. In general
Long’s states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments
had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then six hundred
and eighty-nine men and forty-four serjeants and trumpeters were
on command, of which more than four hundred belonged to those two
Portuguese regiments. Many of these men must surely have joined
before the battle, because such an unusual number on command could
only be temporary. Again I find in the state of the 29th of May, one
hundred and fifteen serjeants trumpeters and troopers returned as
prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are
added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above
two thousand. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to have had seven
hundred and fifty; but I will for clearness place this in a tabular
form:
GENERAL LONG’S STATES.
8th May.
Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers.
Present under arms 1576
On command 733
Prisoners of war 115
————
2424
29th May.
Present 1739
Command 522
Prisoners of war 127
————
2388
————
Median estimate for the 16th of May.
Present 8th May 1576
Ditto 29th May 1739
————
2)3315
————
1657½
270 8th Portuguese regt.
————
1927
127 Prisoners of war.
————
2054
750 Spaniards.
————
2804
Deduct prisoners on
the 8th 115
————
Total 2689
————
To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the
Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.
Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification are both
borne out; for the numbers are above two thousand as set down in the
first, and nearly three thousand as stated in the last. Moreover,
a general historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies. If
he has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot be justly
censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction
between that which is stated in my History and that which is stated
in my controversial writings. All mistakes in the latter however
trifling are fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts
yourself. Now with respect to the artillery there is an example of
this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship’s mode of
raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there
were so many guns in the field, and that so many were nine-pounders;
you accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply
I shewed you that I took the _number_ on the report of colonel
Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the _calibre_ upon
the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general, sir
Benjamin D’Urban. The latter was wrong and there the matter should
have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of
ingenuousness, to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake
of sir Benjamin D’Urban, and you give a grand table, with the gross
number of pounds of iron as if the affair had been between two ships.
You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note
upon your Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves,
and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as
if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the
note is again your witness D’Urban, who thus shews himself incorrect
both as to number and weight; and the author of the Strictures is
yourself. This is not an _ingenuous_, though it is an _ingenious_
mode of multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also you
first called in sir B. D’Urban in person, you then used his original
memoir, you also caused him to write anonymously a running commentary
upon yours and his own statements, and now you comment in your own
name upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five testimonies
out of two.
The answer is simple and plain. When I took sir Benjamin D’Urban as
a guide he led me wrong; and you instead of visiting his error upon
his own head visit it upon mine, and require me and your readers
to follow him implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for
your defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B. D’Urban
I took the _calibre_ of the allies’ guns employed in the battle of
Albuera, and he was wrong! From him, if I had not possessed sir A.
Dickson’s official return, I should also have taken the _number_ of
guns, and I should have been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four
instead of thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your
Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six guns, whereas
Dickson says, they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned
there would have been forty pieces of artillery, which he however
reduced to thirty-four by another error, namely, leaving out a whole
brigade of German artillery. On sir Benjamin’s authority I called
major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this also was
wrong. From sir Benjamin D’Urban’s Memoir, I took the statement that
the fourth division arrived on the field of battle at _six o’clock
in the morning_, and yet I am assured that they did not arrive until
nine o’clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a
very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill to your
lordship’s combinations for battle and to sir Benjamin’s arrangements
for the execution, which they do not merit, if, as I now believe,
that division arrived at nine o’clock. But the latter hour would be
quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and
both together would confirm another report very current, namely,
that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May.
Setting this however aside, I know not why, in the face of all these
glaring errors and a multitude of smaller ones, I am to take sir
Benjamin D’Urban’s authority upon any disputed point.
I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph which you have
attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did
say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only twenty
days, and though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be
meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule and to laugh
at it. I have laughed at so many of your lordship’s oversights that
it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation,
which I also admit you have used moderately.
I have since I wrote my Justification procured some proofs about the
French numbers, you will find them in the following extracts from
the duke of Dalmatia’s correspondence of that time. They are worth
your attention. They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies,
and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate of the French
numbers was, as I have before said, too high instead of too low. I
give the translations to avoid the trouble and expense of printing in
two languages, and I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts
are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you
alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written
before the action and for the emperor’s information, and because it
was the then interest of the writer rather to exaggerate than to
lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his
activity and zeal.
Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE of WAGRAM.
_Seville, 22d April, 1811._
“General Latour Maubourg announces to me that general Beresford
commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish generals
Castaños and Ballesteros with the remains of the corps of their
nation are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their
forces is twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are
cavalry.”
“Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, who commands upon
the line of the Tinto and observes the movements on that side as far
as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake
disembarked ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between
the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from
Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part fifteen
thousand men.”
Ditto to Ditto.
“_May 4th, 1811._
“Cordova is menaced by a corps of English Portuguese and Spaniards,
many troops are concentrated in Estremadura, Badajos is invested,
Blake _has_ united on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen
thousand men.” “I depart in four days with _twenty thousand
men_, _three thousand horses_, _and thirty pieces of cannon_ to
drive across the Guadiana the enemy’s corps which are spread in
Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the arrival of
count D’Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite
with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and
centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time,
I shall have in Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men five thousand
horses and forty pieces of artillery.”
Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count D’Erlon
marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand men present under
arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th June. There remain
three thousand men as coming from the armies of the north and centre,
to make up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and I
find the following passage in his letter to the prince of Wagram,
dated the 9th of May.
“The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general Bron commands there,
he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of
the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition.”
Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the whole
number expected, we add one thousand five hundred men and five guns
to the twenty thousand, making a total for the battle of Albuera of
twenty-one thousand five hundred men of all arms, and thirty-five
guns. From these must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba,
stragglers on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on the
flanks, for I find in general Madden’s narrative of his services,
that he was watched by part of the enemy’s cavalry on the day of the
battle.
I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable testimony
that the French numbers were overrated instead of being underrated
by me, and I have given you corroborative evidence, that the number
of the allies was as great as I have stated it to be; for we find
in the above extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of
which, at least, seven hundred are cavalry, _before_ the battle, and
twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, to your
lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French general’s information,
taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the
Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley’s report
of the numbers of Blake’s army, namely twelve thousand, of which one
thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both in some manner
confirmed by lord Wellington’s repeated statements of the forces of
Blake’s army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable
allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley
also agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your
lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from seven to eleven hundred
cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in
addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my
Justification, was not less than five hundred.
In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly observe that it
is the first time you ever heard of a general’s being censured for
keeping one-third of his force in reserve and _beating the enemy with
the other two_. Aye—but this involves the very pith of the question.
At Albuera the _general_ did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have
bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera,
and far be it from me to endeavour to deprive you of any addition to
your reputation which you may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob
you of any well-earned laurels, my observations were directed against
what appeared to me your bad generalship; if I have not succeeded in
pointing that out to the satisfaction of the public I have nothing
further to offer in fairness and certainly will not by any vile
sophistry endeavour to damage your fame. But do not think that I
acknowledge the force of your present arguments. If I do not take the
trouble to dissect them for reasons before mentioned, be assured it
is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your
book is very weak, there are many failures in it, and a few more I
will touch upon that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper
value. I will begin with your observations on captain Gregory’s
testimony, not in defence of that gentleman’s credit, for in truth,
as his and the other officers’ evidence is given to facts of which
they were personally cognizant I cannot pay the slightest regard to
your confused arguments in opposition to their honour. I am aware
that you do not mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I
were to attempt to defend them from your observations it would appear
as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed captain Gregory,
but you have hit yourself very hard.
Behold the proof.
At page 167 you say, “I will now point out the gross and palpable
errors of captain Gregory’s narrative.”—“He says, that on receiving
the intelligence from an orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came
in from a picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was
crossing the river, general Long galloped off.” I conclude to the
right, “and found half the army across,” and to the right. _Why,
every other authority has stated that the enemy’s first movement was
from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left_;
and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above
our right and there make an attack, till after their first movement
was considerably advanced and the action had actually commenced with
Godinot’s corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It
is quite surprising that colonel Napier should have overlooked a
blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend’s
testimony.
Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the
italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own
despatch.
“The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at eight
o’clock” (the very time mentioned by captain Gregory,) “he was
observed to be in movement, and his cavalry were seen passing the
rivulet of Albuera considerably _above our right, and shortly after_,
he marched, out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry
and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our front, _as if
to attack the village and bridge of Albuera_. During this time he
was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river _beyond
our right_, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be
to turn us by that flank.” Your lordship has, indeed in another part
discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most necessary
in treating of this battle, but is rather hard measure to attack me
so fiercely for having had some faith in it.
With respect to sir Wm. Lumley’s letter I cannot but admire
his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British cavalry. A
recollection of twenty-three years, founded on a few hasty words
spoken on a field of battle is certainly a rare thing; yet I was
not quite unprepared for such precision, for if I do not greatly
mistake, sir William was the general, who at Santarem edified the
head-quarters by a report, that “_the enemy were certainly going to
move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to
their rear_.” One would suppose that so exact a person could never be
in error; and yet the following extract from general Harvey’s journal
would lead me to suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and
powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best
of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fuzileers
and Harvey’s brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they
then came under his eye; that as the rain and smoke cleared away he
saw them as one body moving to engage, and although they had become
so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that he could not
well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did
not appear any improper interval between them.
Now hear general Harvey!
“The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh fuzileers were in
line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square, at
every halt to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace.
_Major-general Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column
of half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, being too
weak to advance against the enemy’s cavalry._”
There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors differ. Sir
W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event, recollects seeing the
fuzileers and Harvey’s brigade at such a distance, and so obliquely,
that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another.
General Harvey writing the day after the event, says, sir William
Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in rear of these
very brigades, and was moving with them! This should convince your
lordship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in
the detail of a battle.
As to the term _gap_, I used the word without the mark of quotation,
because it was my own and it expressed mine and your meaning very
well. You feared that the cavalry of the French would overpower ours,
and break in on your rear and flank when the support of the fuzileers
was taken away. I told you that general Cole had placed Harvey’s
brigade in the _gap_, that is, in such a situation that the French
could not break in. I knew very well that Harvey’s brigade followed
in support of the attack of the fuzileers because he says so in his
journal; but he also says, that both ours and the enemy’s cavalry
made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the latter breaking
in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted,
formed, received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen.
But I have not yet done with sir W. Lumley’s numbers. How curious it
is that brigade-major Holmes’s verbal report on the field of battle,
as recollected by sir William, should give the third dragoon guards
and the fourth dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number
of five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major Holmes
in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the
battle, gives to those regiments seven hundred and fifty-two troopers
present under arms, and one hundred and eighty-three on command.
What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of
May, thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments
six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under arms, one hundred
and eighty-two on command, and thirty-two prisoners of war. In both
cases also the sergeants, trumpeters, &c. are to be added; and I
mark this circumstance, because in the French returns all persons
from the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included
in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished
regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were
full before and after, but empty on the day of battle. It is contrary
to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page
125) says that the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men
at this time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes
writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three hundred
and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and sixty-three on
command; and on the 29th of May, three hundred and forty-one present
seventy-nine on command, eighty-two prisoners-of-war. Staff-officers
are notoriously troublesome people.
One point more, and I have done.
You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a position where he
never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact.
You also deny the correctness of sir Julius Hartman’s statement, and
you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order
to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say that I place
Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair, because I only use sir
Julius Hartman’s words, and that in my Justification; whereas in my
History, I have placed colonel Dickson’s guns exactly in the position
where he himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work
you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin to
quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a bridge was not
at the bridge because its long range enabled it to effect its object
from a distance.
You tell me also that I had your quarter-master general’s evidence
to counteract sir Julius Hartman’s relative to this retreat. But sir
Benjamin D’Urban had already misled me more than once; and why, my
lord, did you garble sir A Dickson’s communication? I will answer for
you. It contained positive evidence that _a retreat was ordered_.
Your lordship may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also.
Sir Alexander Dickson at my request sent me the substance of his
communication to you at the same time. You are now I hope, convinced
that it is not weakness which induces me to neglect a complete
analysis of your work. I do assure you it is very weak in every part.
My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have
received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot, colonel
Colborne, &c. as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in
the cases of sir James Douglas and general M‘Bean, where they were
wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore,
seeing the gloss you have put upon lord Stuart’s communication, and
this garbling of sir A. Dickson’s letter, I have a right to suppose
that the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably they
contradict it on some points as sir Alexander Dickson’s does. I shall
now give the latter entire.
“The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve guns) attached to
general Hamilton’s division was posted on favourable ground about
750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of
the village of Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge
and the road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take
this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their
main attack at the bridge. At a certain period of the day, I should
judge it to have been about the time the fourth division moved to
attack, _I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de
Souza_ (now Conde de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford)
_to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not
sure which_; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then
rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for
falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to being at hand, I
continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice
previous to the receipt of this message and moved a little to improve
my position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left me,
seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode
across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly, but perceiving
that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had
received, and as soon as lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state
my guns were in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could
with my nine-pounders to the right, which I did in time to bring them
into action against the retiring masses of the enemy. The foregoing
is the substance of an explanation given to lord Beresford which he
lately requested.”
Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells
me) wrote to you; and here therefore I might stop, my lord, to
enjoy your confusion. I might harp upon this fact, as being so
formidable a bar to your lordship’s argument, that rather than give
it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent’s letter. But my
object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the
truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing what may
tend to serve your argument and weaken mine. It is of no consequence
to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not. I said in my
History that you did not do so, thinking the weight of testimony to
be on that side, and it was only when your anonymous publications
called forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness of my
first statement.[5] But if the following observation in sir Alexander
Dickson’s letter can serve your argument, you are welcome to it,
although it is not contained in the substance of what he wrote to
you; and here also I beg of you to remember that this letter of sir
Alexander’s was written to me _after my Justification_ was printed.
“I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with
whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from
the first induced to attribute Souza’s message to some mistake, as
neither in my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion
to it, nor did any thing occur to indicate to me that he was aware of
my having received such an order.”
Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of Villa Real had
any authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but then you
call upon me and others to accept this Count of Villa Real’s evidence
upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses,
because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of
Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo
Mayor. And behold, my lord, another difficulty you thus fall into.
Your publications are intended to prove your talent as a general, and
yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of
this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little
confidence in your ability, that sir Henry Hardinge took upon himself
to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa Real took upon himself to
lose it; the one ordering an advance, which gained the day; the other
ordering a retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured
that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders.
In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror
of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of
friends, the flattery of dependents, and their own human vanity
had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my
lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a
false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of
inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these
your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be
just, to let you know the judgment which others have formed of your
talents. The following character was sketched about two months after
the battle of Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used
to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to
you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities
of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not
be denied by those who have read your three publications in this
controversy.
“Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information
upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the
kingdom, the departments attached to the army, and the resources of
the country. But nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in
his head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject,
and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion
of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most of which relate to
himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased.
He appears to grasp at every thing for his own party, without
considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to
expect from the other party.”
I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has
passed, I take leave of you with respect, because I think you to
be a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army. I know
that you have served your country long, I firmly believe to the
utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very
considerable; but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and
you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far
above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it
well, yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera she will not
rank you amongst great commanders, and if she should ever cast her
penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not
class you amongst great writers.
REPLY
TO THE
_Third Article in the Quarterly Review_
ON
COL. NAPIER’S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.
‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called _Crawley_, and
the other is _Honest Iago_.’—OLD PLAY.
This article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors
is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation
of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the
imbecility and falseness.
The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valour which
belongs to the _incognito_ menaces me with his literary vengeance
for my former comments. His vengeance! Bah! The ass’ ears peep too
far beyond the lion’s hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt
my manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and though
his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable of taking an
enlarged view of any subject he shall feel that chastisement awaits
his malevolence. And first with respect to the small sketches in my
work which he pronounces to be the very worst _plans_ possible. It is
expressly stated on the face of each that they are only ‘_Explanatory
Sketches_,’ his observations therefore are a mere ebullition of
contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers why they are only
sketches and not accurate plans.
When I first commenced my work, amongst the many persons from whom
I sought information was sir George Murray, and this in consequence
of a message from him, delivered to me by sir John Colborne, to the
effect, that if I would call upon him he would answer any question I
put to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview took
place, but sir George Murray, far from giving me information seemed
intent upon persuading me to abandon my design; repeating continually
that it was his intention to write the History of the War himself.
He appeared also desirous of learning what sources of information
I had access to. I took occasion to tell him that the duke of
Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the ‘_Order of
Movements_,’ as essentially necessary to a right understanding of
the campaign and the saving of trouble; because otherwise I should
have to search out the different movements through a variety of
documents. Sir George replied that he knew of no such orders, that
he did not understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke
as the duke had desired me, and knew no more.[6] I then asked his
permission to have reduced plans made from captain Mitchell’s fine
drawings, informing him that officer was desirous so to assist me.
His reply was uncourteously vehement—‘No! certainly not!’ I proposed
to be allowed to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a
loss about ground. The answer was still ‘No!’ And as sir George then
intimated to me that my work could only be a momentary affair for the
booksellers and would not require plans I took my leave. I afterwards
discovered that he had immediately caused captain Mitchell’s drawings
to be locked up and sealed.
I afterwards waited on sir Willoughby Gordon, the
quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness, and
sent me to the chief of the plan department in his office with an
order to have access to everything which might be useful. From that
officer I received every attention; but he told me that sir George
Murray had been there the day before to borrow all the best plans
relating to the Peninsular War, and that consequently little help
could be given to me. Now Captain Mitchell’s drawings were made by
him after the war, by order of the government, and at the public
expense. He remained in the Peninsula for more than two years with
pay as a staff-officer, his extra expenses were also paid:[7] he
was attended constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection and
the whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid out, for
I believe no topographical drawings, whether they be considered for
accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution,
ever exceeded Mitchell’s. But those drawings belong to the public and
were merely placed in sir George Murray’s official keeping. I believe
they are still in his possession and it would be well if some member
of parliament were to ask why they are thus made the property of a
private man?[8]
Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course of my
labours, I have asked information of many persons of various nations,
even of Spaniards, after my first volume was published, and when
the unfavourable view I took of their exertions was known. And from
Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of high
or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest kindness, and
found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George Murray only has thrown
obstacles in my way; and if I am rightly informed of the following
circumstance, his opposition has not been confined to what I have
stated above. Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume
with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the latter was
nearly ready a friend informed me that he did not think Murray would
purchase, because he had heard him say that sir George Murray had
declared it was not ‘_The Book_.’ He did not point out any particular
error; but it was not ‘_The Book_;’ meaning doubtless that his own
production, when it appeared, would be ‘_The Book_.’ My friend’s
prognostic was good. I was offered just half of the sum given for
the first volume. I declined it, and published on my own account;
and certainly I have had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited
for ‘_The Book_:’ indeed he has since told me very frankly that
he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three articles in
‘The Quarterly,’ and a promise of more,[9] be a tribute paid to the
importance of ‘_My Book_,’ or whether they be the puff preliminary
to ‘_The Book_,’ I know not; but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor
Lockhart for the distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a
stumbling sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this digression,
I return to the Review.
My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the writer, and
he mentions three remarkable examples on the present occasion:—1.
That I have said Oporto is built in a hollow; 2. That I have placed
the Barca de Avintas only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead
of nine miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near Medellin
where no such ridge exists.
These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they will pass
current with those who know no better, and will be unnoticed by those
who do. But first a town may be _on_ a hill and yet _in_ a hollow. If
the reader will look at lieutenant Godwin’s Atlas,[10] or at Gage’s
Plan of Oporto, or at Avlis’ Plan of that city—all three published by
Mr. Wylde of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto, which by the way
is situated very much like the hot-wells at Bristol, is built partly
on the slopes of certain heights partly on the banks of the river;
that it is surrounded on every side by superior heights; and that
consequently my description of it, having relation to the Bishop’s
lines of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily
correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and any or all
of the three maps above-mentioned, he will find that the Barca de
Avintas is, as I have said, just three miles from the Serra Convent,
and not nine miles as the reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington’s
despatch called it four miles _from Oporto_, but there is a bend in
the river which makes the distance greater on that side.
Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical critic
upon two or three examples, let us see how he stands with respect to
the third.
_Extracts from marshal Victors Official Report and Register of the
Battle of Medellin._
‘Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive
there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of the town
is a very high hill (_mamelon tres elévé_), which commands all the
plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (_rideau_), which _forms
the basin of the Guadiana_. Two roads or openings (_débouchés_)
present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to
Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain,
bounded by a ridge (_rideau_), which, from the right of the
Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa
Neuva de la Serena.’... ‘The ridge which confines the plain of
Medellin has many rises and falls (_movemens de terrain_) more or
less apparent. _It completely commands (domine parfaitement) the
valley of the Guadiana_; and it was at the foot of this ridge the
enemy’s cavalry was posted. Not an infantry man was to be seen;
but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy’s
army was _masked behind this ridge_ of Don Benito.’... ‘Favoured by
_this ridge_, _he could manœuvre his troops_, and carry them upon
any point of the line he pleased _without being seen by us_.’
Now ‘_rideau_’ can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a
_steppe_ or a _ridge_; but, in this case, it could not mean a
_steppe_, since the Spanish army was hidden _behind it_, and on a
steppe it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a _high
ridge_, because it not only _perfectly commanded the basin_ of the
Guadiana, overlooking the _steppe_ which formed that basin, but was
itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin.
What is my description of the ground?—‘The plain on the side of Don
Benito was bounded by _a high ridge of land_, mark, reader, not
a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry
concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance.’ Here then
we have another measure of value for the reviewer’s topographical
pretensions.
The reference to French military reports and registers has not been
so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the
main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got
hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register
was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto,
he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over
it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession
the general report and register of Soult’s army, which enables me to
show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he
accuses _me_ of painting the wretched state of Soult’s army at St.
Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of
giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult’s own
account, and the account of _Le Noble_, historian of the campaign,
and _ordonnateur en chef_ or comptroller of the civil administration
of the army.
_Extract from Soult’s Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal,
dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809._
‘Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most
difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be
surmounted, the _shattered and exhausted state_ (“delabrement et
epuisement”) of the “_corps d’armée_,” and the insufficiency of the
means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it
was necessary to obey.’... ‘The march was directed upon St. Jago,
where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give
them since they quitted the Carion River in Castile.’... ‘Marshal
Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some
shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod;
the parc which since the Carion had not been seen now came up,
and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña),
together with various detachments that the previous hardships and
the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would
have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could
not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of
it; but his operations were connected with the duke of Belluno’s,
&c. &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time
or difficulties.’
_Extract from Le Noble’s History._
‘The army was without money, without provision, without clothing,
without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter,
not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to
profit from the feeble resources of the country.’
Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a
writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the
reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have
_celebrated marshal Soult_ for the reduction of two fortresses,
Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole
passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and
without one word of praise towards the French marshal.
To return to general Heudelet’s register. The first notable discovery
from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action
described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia;
and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I
have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spaniards’
position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty
priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he
contradicts. Now this is only the old story of ‘_the big book which
contains all that sir George does not know_.’ For, first, Heudelet’s
register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course,
take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged,
and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action
did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February,
the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the
reviewer’s other objections. And I request the reader, both now and
always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work
itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he
will have a very false notion of my meaning.
_Extract from Soult’s General Report._
‘The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and
the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach
of La Romana’s corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.
‘The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks
and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended
itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra. _It
was said the corps of Romana was at Orense_ (on disait le corps de
Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia.
‘The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon
Ribadavia.
‘The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route
intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and
Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight
hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night,
overthrew them _in the morning of the 17th_, and pursued them to
the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body
_far more numerous_. General Heudelet having come up with the rest
of his division, and being sustained by Maransin’s brigade of
dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. _Twenty monks at the
least perished, and the town was entered fighting._
‘The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia,
where _three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves_,
Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was
before him.’
The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to
dates, I have concentrated all Soult’s division at Orense on the
20th. But Soult himself says, ‘The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet
marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. _The 20th, the other
divisions followed the movement upon Orense._’ Here then, besides
increasing the bulk of the book, containing what sir George _does not
know_, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth.
In the above extracts nothing is said of the ‘_eight or ten thousand_
Spaniards;’ nothing of the ‘_strong rugged hill_’ on which they
were posted; nothing of ‘_Soult’s presence in the action_.’ But
the reader will find all these particulars in the Appendix to the
‘Victoires et Conquêtes des Français,’ and in ‘Le Noble’s History of
Soult’s Campaign.’ The writers in each work were present, and the
latter, notwithstanding the reviewer’s sneers, and what is of more
consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects
and numbers of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen,
and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side
which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000
insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes
that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having
marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this
estimate was not borne out by Soult’s report, I set the Spaniards
down at 8,000 or 10,000, grounding my estimate on the following
data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body _far more
numerous_. 2d. It required a considerable body of troops and several
combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3d. _‘Three
or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.’_ Finally, the
expression _eight or ten thousand_ showed that I had doubts.
Let us proceed with Heudelet’s register. In my history it is said
that Soult softened the people’s feelings by kindness and by
enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes,
from Heudelet’s register, statements of certain excesses, committed
principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the
enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that count Heudelet blamed
and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement
instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him.
Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer.
I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded
in soothing the people’s feelings, begging the reader to observe
that both Heudelet and my history speak of Soult’s stay at Orense
immediately after the action at Ribadavia.
_Extract from Soult’s General Report._
‘At this period the _prisoners of Romana’s corps_ (note, the
reviewer says none of Romana’s corps were there) had all demanded
to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph. The Spanish
general himself was far off (_fort éloigné_). The inhabitants of
the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking
their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana
had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and
offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances appeared
favourable for the invasion of Portugal.’
Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished
the Quarterly Review to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by
making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this
critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do
injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of
some outrages, committed by Soult’s cavalry, the ground of a false
and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation.
Those outrages he admits himself were vigorously repressed, and they
were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were
in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by
torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day
to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this
sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the Reviewer’s patriots
to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from lord
Wellington’s despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching
the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula,
where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured,
and assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated.
_Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers._
_Extract, May 1, 1809._—‘I have long been of opinion that a British
army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had
manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its
branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They
have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have plundered
the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason
I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their
practice, to sell them to the people again.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809._
‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear
success more than sir John Moore’s army could bear failure. I am
endeavouring to tame them but if I should not succeed I shall make
an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in
disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809._
‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded;
it is probable that all three have been put to death by the
peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of
the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants
may have had some provocation for their animosity against the
soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that
these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even
punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the
peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to colonel Donkin, June, 1809._
‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest
pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the
disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the —— and
—— regiments.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June, 1809._
‘It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and
outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight
of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the
commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of
the army, that outrages are not committed.’... ‘Not a post or a
courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the
army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by
the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. _There is
not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on
a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers
who never yet for one moment_ suffered the slightest want or the
smallest privation.’... ‘It is most difficult to convict any
prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to
say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered
to them; and the officers who are sworn, “well and truly to try
and determine _according to evidence_, the matter before them,”
have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered
to them.’... ‘There ought to be in the British army a regular
provost establishment.’... ‘All the foreign armies have such an
establishment. The French _gendarmerie nationale_ to the amount of
forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police
militia to a still larger amount. _While we who require such an aid
more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe_, have
nothing of the kind.’
‘We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must
depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly
subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute
what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect
that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.’... ‘I believe I
should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this
description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to
be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence,’... ‘We
are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, _but
we are worse than an enemy in a country_, and take my word for it
that either defeat or success would dissolve us.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809._
‘We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal
outrages of British officers and soldiers.’... ‘As matters are now
conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting each other
while no notice is taken of the murderer.’
_Sir Arthur to lord Wellesley, August, 1809._
‘But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose
their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of
their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad
as the men.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809._
‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of
detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive
every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only
lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our
law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government
even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having
been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military
discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our
proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear
to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we
have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the
witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose
conduct this tribunal was constituted to controul; _the consequence
is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and
plunder_.’
_Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, January, 1810._
‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken
by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the
soldiers is infamous.’... ‘At this moment there are three general
courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty
of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by
them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts, robbing
convoys under their charge, &c. &c. Perjury is as common as robbery
and murder.’
_Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810._
‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion
is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been
guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches,
particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer
(which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway robbery, or some
act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing
it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to
Portugal.’
_Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810._
‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general
court-martial and have been executed.’... ‘I am still apprehensive
of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the
enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is
within reach.’
_Lord Wellington to sir S. Cotton, 1810._
‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct of
the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.’... ‘It has
gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they
might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of
the French.’
_Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May, 1812._
‘The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so
_enormous_, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the
people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be
so injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship’s
early attention to the subject.’
Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the
conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate
prisoners:—
_Lord Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810._
‘Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always
treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made
prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous
instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have
had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers
and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must do
the French the justice to say that they have been universally well
treated, and in recent instances _the wounded prisoners of the
British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the
French army_.’
_Lord Wellington to admiral Berkeley, October, 1810._
‘I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners
whom they take from us and the Portuguese treat their prisoners
exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an
arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands
of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling
under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.’
Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described
by its own general through a series of years; and having also from
the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers
and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced
from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour,
truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is
not at once knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by
British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the
outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged
upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute
relentless ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French army,
and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad
soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and
the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of
Wellington’s testimony to the kindness with which they treated our
men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to
Lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the French
soldiers were ‘_sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in
some degree educated_.’ But what intolerable injustice it would be
to stigmatise either nation for military excesses which are common
to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general
characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity,
bravery, humanity, and honour.
And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards
because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do
not express my admiration of their honour in assassinating men whom
they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their humanity
for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have
indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who, after
the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a
Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman’s brains out with a stone, and
even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my
informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such
cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the
disparagement of the Spaniards in my history without sustaining it by
irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted
the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English,
who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my
opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought
forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple, of sir John Moore, of sir
John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of
lord William Bentinck, of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of
sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers
of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the duke
of Wellington; and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the
Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my history.
_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809._
‘I come now to another topic, which is one of serious
consideration.’... ‘That is the frequent, I ought to say constant
and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy:
we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have
heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions
of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.’... ‘In the
battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling
exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms
and ran off _in my presence_ when they were neither attacked nor
threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own
fire.’... ‘I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the
instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so
numerous and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I
must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon.’
‘The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without
discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred,
and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good
condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance
they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an
enemy.’... ‘In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the
infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards
is.’... ‘It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I
acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill.’...
‘Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and
it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war,
as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two
years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the
military profession by any individual.’... ‘I cannot say that they
do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running
away and assembling again in a state of nature.’
‘The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline,
bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.’
_Extracts, 1810._
‘The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are
of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only
success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no
measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened
contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had anything to do
with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments.’
‘Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with
Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can
be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for
everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have
I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.’
‘The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the
war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan,
or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy
by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading
people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders;
and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation,
and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which
were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with
idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of
offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration
know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of
driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good.
The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every
misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become
fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common
prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.’
_Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810._
‘In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I
enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received from
general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese
cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word
in this letter that is not true. _Yet these are the soldiers who
are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!_
‘There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of
government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised
to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be
established. _It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French,
or of carrying on the war in any other manner._ Indeed, if the
destruction occasioned by the Guerillas and by the Spanish armies,
and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are
calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the
country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.
‘But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to
produce an effect at a future period. _Their courage, and even
their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them
by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of
choice nor of foresight._’
_Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810._
‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either
amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as,
indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It
has in my opinion been the cause of the _dastardly conduct_ which
we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and _they have
become odious to the country_. _The peaceable inhabitants, much
as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the
establishment of Joseph’s government to be protected from the
outrages of their own troops._’
_Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810._
‘I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It
is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been
more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained
no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be
depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon
having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after
having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the
works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated
remonstrances of general Graham and the British officers on the
danger of omitting them.
‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as
great a degree as the other authorities—_that is, boasting of the
strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously
convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and
indulging their national indolence_.’
_Wellington to general Graham, 1811._
‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barrosa)
_is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be_. They
march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and
abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to
the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such
a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any
plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment
of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they
stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them
because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human
nature is not equal.’[11]
So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers and
statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—
1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is _proné_ by many,
amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out.
I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the
Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is
certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’
Now reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my
history; compare it with the above:—
‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but
disqualified by nature for military command.’ And again, speaking of
his death, I say, ‘He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although
deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the
expressions are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because this
was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was more positive
afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after
circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The
following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my
former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of
his letters, says, ‘_I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler_.’
And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to
general Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, ‘_I
know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have
done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported
it with a tolerably efficient force_.’
In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing lord
Wellington’s opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had
never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had
found several, proceeds thus—
‘It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the
present state of Spain, that _the Spaniards are incapable of
forming either a good government or a good army_.’... ‘With respect
to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for
good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate
skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarzfield, but
assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castaños,
Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del
Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O’Donnel.’... ‘_You cannot
make good officers in Spain._’
If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my history
about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and
that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving.
In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of ‘_Romana’s cormorants
flying into Portugal_,’ and says, ‘that _foolish fellow the Duque
del Parque_ has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed on the
frontier.’ Again—
‘The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the
consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance
when their front is clear of an enemy.’
‘There never was anything like the _madness_, the _imprudence_,
and the _presumption_ of the _Spanish officers_ in the way they
risk their corps, knowing that the _national vanity_ will prevent
them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if
attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only
chance of safety for the Duque del Parque’s corps; but instead
of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.’... ‘I have ordered
magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in
providing _these vagabonds_ if they should retire into Portugal,
which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.’
Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation, made by the
Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, ‘the
misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to _Blake’s ignorance of
his profession and to Mahy’s cowardice and treachery_.’
Now if any passage in my history can be pointed out more disparaging
to the Spaniards than the expressions of lord Wellington and the
other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an
‘unnatural bias’ against that people. But if this cannot be done, it
is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the
French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful
aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my second volume which
he was then reviewing, was the following passage; and there are many
of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards which he
leaves unnoticed.
‘Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry could
be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not
active supporters of their country’s cause; but _with a wonderful
constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness,
nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their
actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful
national character_. _This constancy and the iniquity of the
usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity and
merits respect_, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the
leading men rendered the effects nugatory.’—_History_, vol. ii.
chap. 1.
I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and
the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose
this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon
Soult’s government of Oporto and the intrigue of the _Anti-Braganza_
party. Let him however look first at the whole statement of these
matters in _my book_, and not trust the garbled extracts made by
the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet’s expedition to Tuy is by
this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place
_after_ Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for
a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had
been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and
of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time
this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening _before_ the
arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that
Soult had laboured to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from
denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in
my history, namely, that Soult was _unprepared_ for one effect of his
own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose of deceit;
and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the
reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from
Heudelet’s and Riccard’s Registers, not only do not contradict but
absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement.
Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the
Portuguese to the French arms because it was the object and bent of
his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference
between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the
proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a _new
and independent dynasty_; a still greater difference between that and
_offering the crown to Soult himself_; and it was this last which the
word _unprepared_ referred to in my history. So far from thinking or
saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses,
I have expressly said, that he ‘_encouraged the design_,’ that he
‘_acted with great dexterity_,’ and I called the whole affair an
‘_intrigue_.’ But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole
affair it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to
accede to the extent of the _Anti-Braganza_ party’s views. He had
only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not
to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince
upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for himself.
These were dangerous matters to meddle with under such a monarch
as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult’s military position made it
absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a
proof that the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited
for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such
a powerful auxiliary to his military operations: wisely, therefore,
and even magnanimously did he encourage the _Anti-Braganza_ party,
drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to
Napoleon’s sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor
was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this
must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers and parasites, whose
knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the
sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves
incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it.
The facts then stand thus. Heudelet’s expedition through the _Entre
Minho e Douro_ took place between the 5th of April and the 27th
of that month, and the country people being then in a state of
exasperation opposed him vehemently; in my history the combats
he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that previous to the
_Anti-Braganza_ intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had
been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the
malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good
effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May,
consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of
April. In my history the difference of time in these two affairs is
expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue
I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr.
Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism Mr. Murray
should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts.
I shall now give two extracts from Soult’s general report, before
quoted, in confimation of my statements:—
‘Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the
malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he
arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself
strong enough in the province of _Entre Minho e Douro_, to
propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the
deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the
French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in
Portugal. In a political view, marshal Soult could not without
express authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask
for such authority having lost his own communication with France,
and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps
which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of
view the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there
saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized
them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his
proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’
‘These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity
was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the
province (Entre Minho e Douro) all the inhabitants returned to
their labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves
with the idea of an approaching change.’... ‘Marshal Soult received
numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions
he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before this
no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed.
The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God
to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the
most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their
hands.’
It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue
thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his
farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to
show how I am wrong in my statement, that, in a _strategic point of
view it was better to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances_
led sir Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place sir
Arthur’s own statement before the reader and leave him to compare it
with mine.
‘_Lisbon, April 24, 1809._
‘I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able
to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes which can
give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence
to the northward.
‘I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more
good to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in
an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the
last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country
very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to
concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might
be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it
probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when
I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. _If he
should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous
for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in
the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with
Cuesta against Victor._
‘An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if
successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in
case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the King’s
ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the
corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a
distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation
impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort
made by a combined and concentrated force.’
The assertion of the reviewer that I have underrated Cuesta’s force,
inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, instead
of 30,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, as I have stated it to be,
and that consequently the greatest numbers could not be brought
to bear on Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate
misrepresentation in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting
that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, sir Arthur would have brought
24,000 to aid him, and Victor had only 30,000. The allies would then
have had double the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the
misrepresentation lies in this, that the reviewer has taken Cuesta’s
account of his actual force on the 23d of April, and suppresses the
facts, that reinforcements were continually pouring into him at that
time, and that he actually did advance against Victor with rather
greater numbers than those stated by me.
PROOFS.
_Sir Arthur to lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809._
‘Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said
will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.’
_To general Mackenzie, May 1, 1809._
‘They (Victor’s troops) have in their front a Spanish army with
general Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month
of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of _twenty
thousand men_.’... ‘They will be attacked by Cuesta, who is
_receiving reinforcements_.’
_Mr. Frere to sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4._
‘We have here 3,000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of
Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4,000 cavalry.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809._
‘We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of
about 27,000, of which 7,000 were cavalry; and the combined British
and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should have enabled to
march upon this expedition would have amounted to about 24,000 men.’
_To lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809._
‘The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus _thirty-six or
thirty-eight thousand strong_, does not now consist of 30,000.’
_Extract from a Memoir by sir A. Wellesley, 1809._
‘The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been _reinforced with
cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary
celerity after the action of Medellin_.’
All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and about
the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of
misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me
in my controversy with marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted
to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will
again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more
conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the Tagus is
only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there is a few
days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable
in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally,
that my expression, ‘_a river fordable at almost every season_,’
is strictly correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s
expression. To proceed with the rest:—
Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer
charges me with having _exaggerated the importance of D’Argenton’s
conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult’s remissness in
guarding the Douro_. But my account of that conspiracy was compiled
from the duke of Wellington’s letters—some public, some private
addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written
expressly for my guidance by major-general sir James Douglas, who
was the officer employed to meet and conduct D’Argenton to and from
the English army;—from Soult’s own official report; from Le Noble’s
history; and from secret information which I received from a French
officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that
particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto
was but a branch.
Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult
thought Hill’s division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he
expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that
considering that river secure above the town his personal attention
was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer
this.
_Extract from Soult’s General Report._
‘In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a _considerable
disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar_. The 10th, at
daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi,
while the _column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra_ attacked him in
front.’
_Extract from Le Noble._
‘The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond
the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, and from
thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent
to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank
of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the
position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage
would take place above Oporto; _he believed that the enemy, master
of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the
Douro_.’
Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic’s observations
on this point; and I shall now demolish his other misstatements about
the passage of the Douro.
1st. The poor barber’s share in the transaction is quite true; my
authority is major-general sir John Waters who was the companion
of the barber in the daring exploit of bringing over the boats.
And if Waters had recollected his name, it is not the despicable
aristocratic sneer of the reviewer about the ‘_Plebeian_’ that would
have prevented me from giving it. 2d. _The Barca de Avintas_, where
sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference to the
maps and to lord Wellington’s despatch, to be not nine miles from the
Serra Convent as the reviewer says, but three miles as I have stated:
moreover, two Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles.
But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, ‘_Why colonel
Napier departed from the account of the events given in the despatch
of sir Arthur Wellesley?_’ This is the only decent passage in the
whole review, and it shall have a satisfactory answer.
Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, immediately
after the events and before accurate information can be obtained,
are very subject to errors of detail, and are certainly not what a
judicious historian would rely upon for details without endeavouring
to obtain other information. In this case I discovered several
discrepancies between the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses
and actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew also,
that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a very rash action
and little considered in England, was a very remarkable exploit,
prudent skilful and daring. Anxious to know the true secret of the
success, I wrote to the duke of Wellington, putting a variety of
questions relative to the whole expeditions. In return I received
from him distinct answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and
ground about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put in
possession of all the leading points relative to the passage of the
Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had before got Soult’s,
I turned to the written and printed statements of several officers
engaged in the action for those details which the generals had not
touched upon.
Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my statement
are,—1st. That I have given too many troops to sir John Murray. 2d.
That I have unjustly accused him of want of military hardihood. 3d.
That I have erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by
the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In reply I
quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers with Murray.
_Extract from lord Wellington’s answers to colonel Napier’s
questions._
‘_The right_ of the troops which passed over to the seminary, which
in fact made an admirable _tête de pont_, was protected by the
passage of the Douro higher up by lieut.-general _sir John Murray
and the king’s German legion, supported by other troops_.’
Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, because,
though it said that Murray was _sent_ with a battalion and a
squadron, it _did not say_ that he was not followed by others. And in
lord Londonderry’s narrative I found the following passage:—
‘General Murray, too, who had been detached with _his division_
to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of
as many boats as enabled him to pass over with _two battalions of
Germans and two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons_.’
And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself charged several
times and with advantage at the head of those squadrons. His
expression is ‘_the dragoons from Murray’s corps_.’
With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by having to fight
their way back again, I find the following account in the narrative
of sir James Douglas, written, as I have before said, expressly for
my guidance:—
‘Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their prey;
while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. Here
_two squadrons_ actually rode over the _whole rear French guard_,
which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own terms,
_passé sur le ventre_: but no support to the dragoons being at hand
no great execution was done; and the _two squadrons themselves
suffered severely in getting back again through the infantry_.’
Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not right. And now
with the above facts fixed I shall proceed to rebut the charge of
having calumniated sir John Murray.
First, the reviewers assertion, that Murray’s troops were never
within several miles of the seminary, and that they would have been
crushed by Soult if they had attacked the enemy, is evidently false
from the following facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his
answer to my questions quoted before,—That the _right_ of the troops
in the seminary _was protected_ by the troops under Murray; which
could not be if the latter were several miles off. Again, if the
dragoons of Murray’s corps could charge repeatedly with advantage,
the infantry and guns of that corps might have followed up the attack
without danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of men
who had been surprised and were at the same time taken both in flank
and rear. But if Murray dared not with any prudence even approach
the enemy,—if it were absolutely necessary for him to retire as he
did,—what brought him there at all? Is the duke of Wellington a
general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation,—and on
ground which his elevated post at the Serra Convent enabled him to
command perfectly, and where the men and movements of both sides were
as much beneath his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board?
Bah!
But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray, aye!—a
very small part! did actually engage the enemy with success. Major
Beamish, in his ‘History of the German Legion,’ on the authority of
one of the German officers’ journals, writes thus:—
‘The skirmishers of the first line under lieutenant Von Hölle, and
two companies of the same regiment under ensign Hodenberg, were
alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several prisoners,
and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to capture a French
lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were wounded.’
Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say lord Wellington
did not take notice of his conduct. A commander-in-chief is guided
by many circumstances distinct from the mere military facts, and it
might be, that, on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or
harshly a man, who had other good qualities, for an error into which,
perhaps, a very bold and able man might have fallen by accident.
And neither would I have thus judged sir John Murray from this fact
alone, although the whole army were disgusted at the time by his
want of daring and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his
military vigour. But when I find that the same want of hardihood
was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I have shown in my fifth
volume, and still more glaringly displayed by him at Taragona, as I
shall show in my sixth volume, the matter became quite different, and
the duty of the historian is to speak the truth even of a general,
strange as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.
Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down some passages
evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit of the critic, and
beneath them my authorities, whereby it will appear that the big book
containing all sir George does not know is increasing in bulk:—
‘Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the
instructions of the English Cabinet nor by his own want of
generalship, _but simply by the want of provisions_.’—_Review._
Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and answer from the
duke of Wellington.
_Question to the duke of Wellington by colonel Napier._
Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage of the Douro?
_Answer._—‘The halt was made next day,—first, because the whole
army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies and
baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great exertion
and fatigue of the preceding days particularly the last. Thirdly,
because we had no account of lord Beresford being in possession of
Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in fact, out-marched
everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals required a day’s rest
as well as the men.’
And, in the answer to another question, the following observation
occurs:—‘The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must
be considered in all these things; _and this fact moreover, that
excepting to attain a very great object we could not risk the loss of
a corps_.’
I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description of Soult’s
retreat, because a simple reference to my work will at once show
their folly and falseness; but I beg to inform this acute and
profound historical critic that the first field-marshal captured
by an English general was marshal Tallard, and that the English
general who captured him was called John, duke of Marlborough. And,
with respect to his sneers about the ‘_little river of Ruivaens_;’
‘_Soult’s theatrical speech_;’ ‘_the use of the twenty-five
horsemen_;’ ‘_the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova_;’ and the ‘_Romance
composed by colonel Napier and Le Noble_;’ I shall, in answer, only
offer the following authorities, none of which, the reader will
observe, are taken from Le Noble.
_Extract from Soult’s General Report._
‘The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league from
Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain came down
in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching Salamanca
we learned that _the bridge of Ruivaens, over the little river_
(ruisseau) _of that name was cut, and the passage guarded by 1,200
men with cannon_. It was known also that the _Ponte Nova on the
route of Montelegre_, which they had begun to destroy, was feebly
guarded; and the marshal gave to major Dulong the command of 100
brave men, of his own choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under
cover of the night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding
the cuts in it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who
could not escape. _In four hours the bridge was repaired_; general
Loison passed it and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near
Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese _well retrenched_ defended the
passage. _A battalion and some brave men, again led by the intrepid
Dulong, forced the abbatis entered the entrenchments and seized the
bridge._’
_Extract from the ‘Victoires et Conquêtes des Français’._
‘The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called major
Dulong. It was nine o’clock in the evening. “I have selected you
from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize the bridge
of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting: you must endeavour
to surprise them. The time is favourable. Attack, vigorously with
the bayonet you will succeed or you will die. I want no news save
that of your success, send me no other report, your silence will
be sufficient in a contrary case. Take a hundred men at your
choice; they will be sufficient; add _twenty-five dragoons_, _and
kill their horses to make a rampart, if it be necessary, on the
middle of the bridge to sustain yourself and remain master of the
passage_.”’
‘The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese guide
who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. Arrived within
pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy _cutting the last beam_.
It was then one o’clock the rain fell heavily and the enemy’s
labourers being fatigued thought they might take some repose
before they finished their work. The torrents descending from the
mountains and the cavado itself made such a noise that the march
of the French was not heard, the sentinel at the bridge was killed
without giving any alarm, and _Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers
passed crawling on the beam, one of them fell into the cavado but
happily his fall produced no effect_. The enemy’s advanced post of
twenty-four men was destroyed, &c. &c. The marshal, informed of
this happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could
find _to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army_;
_but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to
prevent many brave soldiers perishing_. The marshal embraced major
Dulong, saying to him, “I thank you in the name of France brave
major; you have saved the army.”’
Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, or
Saltador, and its abbatis and other obstacles; of Dulong’s attack;
of his being twice repulsed; and of his carrying of the bridge, the
Leaper as it was called, at the third assault, falling dreadfully
wounded at the moment of victory; finally, of the care and devotion
with which his soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the
rest of the retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is
not a mere description in the body of the work, but a separate paper
in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently well acquainted
with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself, and for the express
purpose of correcting the errors of detail in the body of that work.
Theatrical to the critic, and even ridiculous it may likely enough
appear. The noble courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as
Dulong is a subject which no person will ever expect a Quarterly
viewer to understand.
In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream of my own
thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer’s criticisms; I
must therefore retrace my steps to notice some points which have
been passed over. His observations about Zaragoza have been already
disposed of in my reply to his first articles published in my fifth
volume, but his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed.
The assertion that lord Collingwood was incapable of judging of the
efforts of the Catalans, although he was in daily intercourse with
their chiefs, co-operating with their armies and supplying them with
arms and stores, _because he was a seaman_, is certainly ingenious.
It has just so much of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the
Melville school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of
official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary
interest exposed them to the mortification of having intercourse with
him. And it has just so much of cunning wisdom as to place it upon
a par with that which dictated the inquiry which we have heard was
sent out to sir John Warren during the late American war, namely,
“whether _light_—_very light_ frigates, could not sail up the St.
Lawrence to Lake Ontario?” And with that surprising providence, which
did send out birch-brooms and tanks to hold _fresh water_ for the use
of the ships on the said lake of Ontario. But quitting these matters,
the reviewer insinuates what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I
have only quoted lord Collingwood as authority for my statements
about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I have adduced in
testimony the Spanish generals themselves, namely, Contreras, Lacy,
and Rovira; the testimony of sir Edward Codrington, of sir Edward
Pellew, of colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have
referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French writers; that
I have quoted Vacani and Cabane’s Histories, the first an Italian
serving with the French army in Catalonia, the last a Spaniard and
chief of the staff to the Catalan army: and now, to complete the
reviewer’s discomfiture, I will add the duke of Wellington, who is
a landsman and therefore according to this reviewer’s doctrine,
entitled to judge:—
_Letter to lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809._
‘In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but still
the people are of a description with which your armies could not
co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see
what Burghersh says of the Somatenes; _and it is notorious that the
Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least
to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards_.’
So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water tanks, and
Collingwood’s incapacity to judge of the Catalans, _because he was a
seaman_; and as for Reding’s complaints of the Spaniards when dying,
they must go to sir George’s big book with this marginal note, that
St. Cyr is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat
to prove at another time, ‘_from Wellington’s despatches_,’ that the
Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made _no false reports_,
let the reader take the following testimony in anticipation:—
_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence, 1809._
‘At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense
I receive occasionally from ——; _as the Spaniards have defeated all
my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom I sent out to make
inquiries_.’
‘I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed
8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted
with the exact extent of it, _because_, the Duque del Albuquerque,
who is appointed to command it, _is interested in making known the
truth_; but they have _lied_ about the cavalry ordered to the Duque
del Parque.’
‘It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at
Seville _with their own false intelligence_.’
‘It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads,
or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the
decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops.’
1810. ‘We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the
efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we
know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it
is made.’
‘I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he tells me
that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23d, _which cannot be
true_.’
‘I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at
Madrid.’
‘There is so far a foundation for the report of O’Donnel’s action,
as that it appears that Suchet’s advanced guard was at Lerida
on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, _according to my
experience of Spanish reports_, whether O’Donnel was beaten or
gained a victory.’
‘I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in
respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la
Romana, _and all the Spanish officers_. It is obvious there is
nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their
operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis
himself, and from the _false reports_ made to lieutenant Heathcote
of the firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.’
_Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartaxo._
‘The circumstances which I have related above will show your
Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not
much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate
operations with a corps so ill-organised, _in possession of so
little intelligence_, and upon whose actions no reliance can be
placed. It will scarcely be credited that _the first intelligence
which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy’s
troops at Seville was from hence_.’
_Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810._
‘Mendizabal, &c. &c., have sent us so many _false reports_ that I
cannot make out what the French are doing.’
‘This is a part of the system on which _all the Spanish authorities
have been acting_, to induce us to take a part in the desultory
operations which they are carrying on. _False reports and
deceptions of every description are tried_, and then popular
insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct.’
‘The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so
little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the
blow has been struck.’
‘It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no
intelligence of the enemy’s movements near his garrison, of which
we have received so many accounts.’
‘We hear also a great deal of Blake’s army in the Alpujarras, and
of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy’s communications
with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation
for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection of
Ronda.’
‘I enclose a letter from General Carrera, in which I have requested
him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that
very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you
_by any Spanish general at the head of a body of troops_. They
generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and _make no scruple
of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to
whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct_.’
The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let us
therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer’s observations about
light troops,—of which he seems indeed to know as much as the wise
gentleman of the Admiralty did about the facility of sailing up the
St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did
not know much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of
another kind of craft, namely misrepresentation. Thus he quotes a
passage from captain Kincaid’s amusing and clever work as if it
told in his favour; whereas it in no manner supports his foolish
insinuation—namely, that the 43d and 52d regiments of the light
division were not light troops, never acted as such, and never
skirmished! Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these
corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that is to
say, laugh in his face.
‘There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world’ said Napoleon,
‘the good and the bad.’
Now, the light division were not only good but, I will say it
fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three British
regiments composing it had been formed by sir John Moore precisely
upon the same system. There was no difference save in the colour of
the riflemen’s jackets and the weapons which they carried. Captain
Kincaid’s observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what
is quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order more
frequently than the 43d and 52d did. Certainly they did, and for this
very sufficient reason—their arms, the rifle and sword, did not suit
any other formation; it is a defect in the weapon, which is inferior
to the musket and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order.
Napoleon knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army,
strange as it may appear to those persons who have read so much about
French riflemen. The riflemen of the light division could form line,
columns, and squares—could move as a heavy body—could do, and did do
everything that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and in
like manner the 52d and 43d regiments skirmished and performed all
the duties of light troops with the same facility as the riflemen;
but the difference of the weapon made it advisable to use the latter
nearly always in open order: I do not, indeed, remember ever to have
seen them act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain
Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too honest a
man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, who dogmatizes
in defiance of facts and with a plenitude of pompous absurdity that
would raise the bile of an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work
the numbers of the French army, he thus proceeds:—
‘Notwithstanding that this enormous force was _pressing_ upon the
_now unaided_ Spanish people with _all its weight_, and acting
against them with its _utmost energy_, it proved wholly unable to
put down resistance.’—_Review_, page 497.
Now this relates to the period following sir John Moore’s death,
which was on the 16th of January. That general’s fine movement upon
Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, had drawn the great bulk of the
French forces towards Gallicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The
war with Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial guards
away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing his court at Madrid;
Victor remained very inactive in Estremadura; Soult marched into
Portugal;—in fine, this was precisely the period of the whole war in
which the French army were most insert. Napoleon has fixed upon the
four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, as the period
in which the King let the Peninsula slip from his feeble hands.
Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that time. And first
it is false to say that they were unaided. They were aided against
Victor by the vicinity of sir John Craddock’s troops; they were aided
on the Gallician coast by an English squadron; they were aided on
the Beira frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under
sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian coast by lord
Collingwood’s fleet; they were aided at Cadiz by the presence of
general M‘Kenzie’s troops, sent from Lisbon; and they were aided
everywhere by enormous supplies of money arms and ammunition sent
from England. Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by
sir John Moore’s generalship, which had enabled them to rally and
keep several considerable armies on foot in the southern parts of
the country. What did these armies—these invincible Spaniards—do?
They lost Zaragoza, Monzon, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses
of Ferrol and Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost
Estremadura, La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Gallicia; they lost
the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of Monterrey, that of
Ciudid Real, and the battle of Medellin. They won nothing! they did
not save themselves, it was the _British army and the indolence and
errors of the French that saved them_.
_Extract from Napoleon’s Memoirs._
‘After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain did
nothing; _he lost four months_; he ought to have marched upon
Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would have done
the rest.’
_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence. 1809._
‘It is obvious that the longer, and the more intimately we become
acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do they
hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of
the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy,
and the enmity of the people towards the French may spin out the
war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to
establish a government in the country; but there is no prospect of
a glorious termination to the contest.’
‘After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letters, can
any one doubt that the evacuation of Gallicia was occasioned by the
operations of the British troops in Portugal?’
‘The fact is, that the British army _has saved Spain and Portugal_
during this year.’
The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great general also.
He has discovered that there are no positions in the mountains of
Portugal; nay, he will scarcely allow that there are mountains at
all; and he insists that they offer no defence against an invader,
but that the rivers do—that the Douro defends the _eastern_ frontier
of Beira, and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact
and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to fight
superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be turned and cut off
from Lisbon, and the strong army must invade in mass and by one line.
Now, first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military notion
of Portugal, that in Massena’s invasion lord Wellington stopped to
fight on the mountain of Busaco, and stopped Massena altogether at
the mountains of Alhandra, Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other
words at the lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to
stop him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, stopped
lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, attempted to stop him on
the mountains of Cazal Nova, Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted
to stop him by defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was
instantly beaten. Oh, certainly, ’tis a most noble general, and a
very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my own opinions about
the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity of invading this country
in one mass, and the unfordable nature of the Tagus, by the testimony
of two generals as distinguished as honest Iago.
_Extract of a letter from sir John Moore._
‘I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your
lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can
say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible
against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally
rugged, but all equally to be penetrated.’
_Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence._
‘In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably
make his attack by _two distinct lines_, the one north the other
south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be founded upon
this general basis. In the summer season, however, the _Tagus being
fordable_, &c. &c., care must be taken that the enemy does not by
his attack directed from the south of the Tagus and by the passage
of that river, _cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in
operations to the north of the Tagus_.’
‘The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the
extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains
separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is
so open in many parts, that it would be _impossible for an army
acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the
frontier without being cut off from the capital_.’
‘In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the
enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he
will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and
Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps, _south of the
Tagus_, to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on
the north of that river; _to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed
to him_; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the
same time. This can be avoided only _by the retreat of the right
centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a point, at
which from the state of the river they cannot be turned by the
passage of the Tagus by the enemy’s left_. The first point of
defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases
to be fordable, is the river Castenheira close to the lines.’
In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus has been
pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs upon that fact to
satiety.
_Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq._
‘The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the
defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily throws us
back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and
I believe lower, _the Tagus is fordable during the summer_; and we
should be liable to be turned or cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus
if we were to take our line of defence higher upon the river.’
_Lord Wellington to general Hill, August._
‘I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might _move
across the fords of the Tagus at Vilha Velha_ and thus turn your
right.’
_Lord Wellington to general Hill, October._
‘If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances)
_across the Tagus by the ford_ (at Santarem).’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Hill._
‘I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have,
_with some of the fords of the Tagus_ marked upon it, but I believe
_the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable_.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to marshal Beresford._
‘I enclose a letter which colonel Fletcher has given me, _which
affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus_. I think
that if captain Chapman’s facts are true his arguments are
unanswerable, and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy
ordnance should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.’
_Sir Arthur Wellesley to admiral Berkeley._
‘But if the invasion should be made in summer, _when the Tagus is
fordable in many places_.’... ‘In the event of the attack being
made _between the months of June and November_, when the _Tagus is
fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra_ (near the lines).’
_Sir John Craddock to lord Castlereagh, April._
‘There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up
the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtejo, _where there is also a
ford_, and the river may be easily passed.’
_Extract from a Memoir by sir B. D’Urban, quarter-master-general
to Beresford’s army_:—‘_The Tagus_, between Golegao and Rio
Moinhos was _known to offer several fords after a few days’ dry
weather_.’[12]
Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this unfordable
Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, and that in fact
it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. But to render this
still clearer I will here give one more and conclusive proof. In an
elaborate manuscript memoir upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up
by the celebrated general Dumourier for the duke of Wellington, that
officer argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and
a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington’s hand-writing
runs thus:—‘_He (Dumourier) does not seem to be aware of the real
state of the Tagus at any season_.’
What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but much upon others.
I can call upon the reader to trace the deceitful mode in which the
reviewer perverts or falsifies my expressions throughout. How he
represents the Spaniards at one moment so formidable as to resist
successfully the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the
next breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable of
making any resistance at all. How he quotes me as stating that the
ministers had unbounded confidence in the success of the struggle in
Spain; whereas my words are, that the ministers _professed_ unbounded
confidence. How he represents me as saying, the _Cabinet_ were too
much dazzled to analyse the real causes of the Spanish Revolution;
whereas it was the _nation_ not the _Cabinet_ of which I spoke. And
this could not be mistaken, because I had described the ministers
as only anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own
existence, and that they were actuated by a personal hatred of
Napoleon. Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to
_seize_ Cadiz, and speaks of a _mob_ in that city, when I have spoken
only of the _people_ (oh, true Tory!); and never proposed to seize
Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable authority of
Mr. Stuart, general M‘Kenzie, and sir George Smith, for my statement.
And here I will notice a fine specimen of this reviewer’s mode of
getting up a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in
Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed upon as
being an important line, he gives an extract of a letter from lord
Wellington to a general _Smith_, to the effect that, as the Zezere
might be _turned at that season_ in so many ways, he did not wish
to construct works to defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary
to inform the reader that there is no letter to general Smith. The
letter in question was to general Leith, and the _mistake_ was not
without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person from
discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—‘If, however,
this work can be performed, either by the peasantry or by the troops,
without any great inconvenience, _the line of the Zezere may,
hereafter, become of very great importance_.’
All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness in the
reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts my statements
about the Austrian war surpasses all his other efforts in that line,
and deserves a more elaborate exposure.
In my history it is stated, that some obscure intrigues of
the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on
the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited the
sympathy, and nourished certain _distempered feelings_ in the
English ministers, _which feeling_ made them see only weakness and
disaffection in France. This I stated, because I knew that those
intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy concocted, with Talleyrand’s
connivance, for the dethronement of Napoleon; and the English
ministers neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign
affairs for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish scheme
and so sanguine of success. These facts are not known to many, but
they are true.
In the same paragraph of my history it is said, the _warlike
preparations of Austria_, and the reputation of the archduke Charles,
whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon’s, _had awakened
the dormant spirit of coalitions_; meaning, as would be evident to
any persons not wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in
the English ministers.
Now reader, mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer. He says
that I condemned these ministers, ‘for nourishing their distempered
feelings _by combining the efforts of a German monarch in favour of
national independence_.’ As if it were the _Austrian war_, and not
the _obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon_ that the expression
of _distempered feelings_ applied to. As if the awakening the
_dormant spirit of coalitions_, instead of being a reference to the
sentiments of the English ministers, meant the exciting the Austrians
and other nations to war, and the forming of a vast plan of action by
those ministers! And for fear any mistake on that head should arise,
it is so asserted in another part of the review in the following
terms:—
‘_To have “awakened the dormant spirit”_ of _coalitions_, is
another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged
with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained
from _forming a combination of those states of Europe which still
retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist a
conqueror_,’ &c. &c.—_Review._
The Quarterly’s attention to Spanish affairs seems to have rendered
it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto. But since
it has thus claimed the Austrian war as the work of its former
patrons, the ministers of 1809, I will throw some new light upon
the history of that period, which, though they should prove little
satisfactory to the Quarterly, may, as the details are really
curious, in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading
through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous
writer’s misrepresentations.
After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian count Stadion, a man
of ability and energy, either believing, or affecting to believe,
that Napoleon was determined to destroy Austria and only waited until
Spain was conquered, resolved to employ the whole force of the German
empire against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one
or other of the contending states. With this view his first efforts
were directed to change the opinions of the archduke Charles and
those immediately about him who were averse to a war; and though he
was long and vigorously resisted by general Grün, an able man and
the archduke’s confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time before
this France had insisted upon a reduction of the Austrian forces,
and being asked if she would do the same for the sake of peace,
replied that she would maintain no more troops in Germany than should
be found necessary; but the army of the Confederation must be kept
up as a constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war
with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. To this
succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by which the territories
of Austria, Russia, and France, were to be mutually guaranteed.
Champagny and Romanzow suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister
did not conceive Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against
France. Stadion’s project was more agreeable, and a note of a
declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at Paris, to deliver
to the French government. The archduke Charles set off for the army,
and was followed by the emperor.
When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to settle whether
it should be carried on for the sole benefit of Austria, or in such
a manner as to interest other nations. Contrary to her usual policy
Austria decided for the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony
she was extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was
determined that the war should be one of restitution, and in that
view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were said to have made
great progress in exciting the people; officers had been also sent
to Sicily and Sardinia to urge those courts to attempt their own
restoration to the continental thrones. The complete restoration of
Naples, of Tuscany, and the Pope’s dominions, and large additions to
the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and Austria herself only
demanded a secure frontier, namely, the Tyrol, the river Po, and the
Chiusa, which was not much more than the peace of Campo Formio had
left her.
Such were her views in the south where kings were to be her
coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a different plan.
There she expected help from the people, who were discontented at
being parcelled out by Napoleon. Treaties were entered into with
the elector of Hesse, the dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was
understood that the people there and in the provinces taken from
Prussia, were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian
soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but Austria was so
discontented with the Prussian king, that the restoration of the
Prussian provinces, especially the duchy of Warsaw, was to depend
upon his conduct in the war.
The means of effecting this mighty project were the great resources
which Stadion had found or created; they were greater than Austria
had ever before produced and the enthusiasm of her people was in
proportion. The landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150
battalions; it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian
insurrection. The regular army was complete in everything, and the
cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in former wars.
There were nine ‘_corps d’armée_.’ The archduke Ferdinand with one
was to strike a blow in the duchy of Warsaw. The archduke Charles
commanded in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000
regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he was to
cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed to be only
40,000. That is to say, the first corps, under Belgarde and Klenau,
were to march by Peterwalde and Dresden against Bernadotte who was
in that quarter. The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were
to march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent the union of
Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, under prince Rosenberg, was
to move by Waldmunchen, in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating
Wrede at Straubingen, to join the archduke Charles near Munich. The
archduke himself was to proceed against that city with the reserves
of prince John of Lichtenstein, Hiller’s corps, Stipchitz, and those
of Hohenzollern’s, and the archduke Louis’. The archduke John was
to attack Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr,
amounted to not less than 260,000 men.
The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and though the
quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice of the military plan,
resigned his situation, and that Meerfelt quarrelled with the
archduke Charles, the general feeling was high and sanguine; and
the princes of the empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg
and Westphalia, thought to be rather favourable towards the
Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; Austria had only
a depreciated paper currency which would not serve her beyond her
own frontiers; wherefore England, at that time the paymaster of
all Europe, was looked to. England, however, had no ambassador,
no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty armament
and plan were carried on without her aid, almost without her
knowledge; and a despatch from the Foreign Office, dated the 8th of
December, but which only arrived the 10th of March, _refused all
aid whatsoever! and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could
not want, and England was not in a situation to grant_. Yet this
was the period in which such lavish grants had been made to Spain
without any condition—so lavish, that, in Cadiz, nearly four hundred
thousand pounds, received from England, was lying untouched by the
Spaniards. They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they had, at
that moment, of their own money, and lying idle in their treasury,
_fourteen millions of dollars_, and _ten millions more were on the
way from Vera Cruz and Buenes Ayres_. Such was the wisdom, such
the providence of the English ministers! heaping money upon money
at Cadiz, where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill
bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the explosion of the
enormous mine prepared against Napoleon in Germany and Italy. Their
agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely refused even to ask for a loan of some
of this money from the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully
perverting my expression, namely, ‘_awakened the dormant spirit of
coalitions_,’ calls ‘_the forming a combination of the states of
Europe_!’ The English ministers were treated as mere purse-bearers,
to be bullied or cajoled as the case might be; and in these two
instances, not without reason, for they neither know how to give nor
how to refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military
dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.
To proceed with our narrative. Stadion, to prevent the mischief
which this despatch from England might have produced, by encouraging
the peace-party at the court, and discouraging the others, only
imparted it to the emperor and his secret council, but hid it from
those members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this was like
to have cost him his place; and some members of the council actually
proposed to reduce one-third of the army. In fine, a cry was arising
against the war, but the emperor declared himself on Stadion’s side,
and the cabinet awaited the result of count Walmoden’s mission
to London. That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to
conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, and to learn
the feeling of the English cabinet upon an extraordinary measure
which Austria had resorted to; for being utterly unable to pay her
way at the outset, and trusting to the importance of the crisis, and
not a little to the known facility with which the English ministers
lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through the
principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by making drafts
through Holland upon their correspondents in London, _to be repaid
from the subsidy_ TO BE granted by England! Prince Staremberg was
sent at the same time with a special mission to London, to arrange
a definite treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future
object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because
Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct offensive to the
English cabinet; but he was well acquainted with London, and the
emperor wished to get him away lest he should put himself at the head
of the peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued so
to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave their money to Spain
and their advice to Austria, and both unprofitably, they only excited
the contempt of both countries.
From the conference of Erfurth, France had been earnest with Russia
to take an active part, according to treaty, against Austria;
and Romanzow, who was an enemy of England, increased Alexander’s
asperity toward that country, but nothing was done against Austria;
and when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, became
clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the Austrian ambassador
Swartzenberg to task for the measures of his court, but really gave
him encouragement, by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland
without inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note,
from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms to render the
intention of Alexander apparently doubtful, but this was only a
blind for Napoleon. There was no doubt of the favourable wishes and
feelings of the court, the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and
Stadion, far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their
assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. The emperor
Alexander was, however, far from inattentive to his own interests,
for he sent general Hitroff at this time to Turkey to demand Moldavia
and Wallachia as the price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these
countries during the general commotion. He was foiled by the Austrian
cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent to meet Hitroff, to
assume a high tone and agree to no negociation in which England was
not a party: hence, when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr.
Adair from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away.
While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the present king of
Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to offer his services either
as heir to the stadtholdership, as a prince of the German empire, or
as a near and confidential connection of the house of Brandenberg;
but it was only in the latter view he could be useful, and it was
evident he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in
the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He said the
secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg had exposed them
to mortifications and slights which had changed the sentiments of
both the king and queen towards France, and the queen, bowed down
by misfortune, dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of the
king. They stood alone in their court, ministers and officers alike
openly maintained opinions diametrically opposed to the sovereign,
and at a grand council held in Koningsberg every minister had voted
for war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day the queen
induced him to retract. However, the voice of the people and of the
army was for war, and any order to join the troops to those of the
Rhenish confederation was sure to produce an explosion. There were
between 30,000 and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was
assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier, the
Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, despite of king or
queen.
In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between
Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country
were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large
English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered
around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly
Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England
had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the
army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under sir John
Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000
men disposable; and yet so contriving were the ministers, that they
kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily;
and instead of acting in the north of Germany where such a great
combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to
perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they
caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from
the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls ‘_the
forming a combination of those states in Europe which still retained
some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of
a conqueror_.’ What a profound, modest, and, to use a Morning Post
compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious writer this reviewer is.
Well, notwithstanding this grand ‘_combination_,’ things did not
turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in
several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at
the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed
principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards
him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man’s genius and
bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in
skill by any movement known in military records, broke through the
Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before
him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor
accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the archduke Charles to
escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this
gigantic contest in ten days. The failure there led to the battle
of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him
and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his
hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it
was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and
the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was
a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done
with the review. Had all the objections contained in it been true,
it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more
than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being,
as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I
justly stigmatise it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and
systematic violation of truth.
* * * * *
The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy’s history the
charge against lord Melville of saying “the worst men made the best
soldiers,” I replied that I drew for it on my own clear recollection
of the fact.
Since then a friend has sent me the report of lord Melville’s speech,
extracted from the Annual Register (Baldwin’s) 1808, p. 112, and the
following passage extracted from his lordship’s speech bears out my
assertion and proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny
facts.
“What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they should be
taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be intelligible,
but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto formed the
British armies were men of stout hearts and habits; men of spirit
and courage; lovers of bold enterprize. These were the materials of
which an army must be composed. Give him such men though not of the
better description. _The worse men were the fittest for soldiers._
Keep the better sort at home.”
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK XXI.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: 1813. June.]
The fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on the fields of
Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon’s genius restored the general balance,
and the negociations which followed those victories affected the war
in the Peninsula.
Lord Wellington’s first intention was to reduce Pampeluna by force,
and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great
Madrid road was a favourable event; but Portugal being relinquished
as a place of arms, a new base of operations was required, lest a
change of fortune should force the allies to return to that country
when all the great military establishments were broken up, when
the opposition of the native government to British influence was
become rancorous, and the public sentiment quite averse to English
supremacy. The Western Pyrenees, in conjunction with the ocean,
offered such a base, yet the harbours were few, and the English
general desired to secure a convenient one, near the new positions
of the army; wherefore to reduce San Sebastian was of more immediate
importance than to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect
this during the fine season because the coast was iron-bound and very
dangerous in winter.
[Sidenote: July.]
Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required three weeks for the
bringing up of ordnance and stores, five or six weeks more for the
attack, and from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men, because
British soldiers were wanted for the assault; but an investment could
be maintained by fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese,
and the enemy’s magazines were likely to fail under blockade sooner
than his ramparts would crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern
coast misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English arms. Sir
John Murray had failed at Taragona. He had lost the honoured
battering-train intrusted to his charge, and his artillery equipage
was supposed to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia and
Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian army could neither
undertake an important siege, nor seriously menace the enemy without
obtaining some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore free to
march on Zaragoza, and uniting with Clauzel and Paris, to operate
with a powerful mass against the right flank of the allies. For
these reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade Pampeluna and
besiege San Sebastian, and the troops, as they returned from the
pursuit of Clauzel, marched to form a covering army in the mountains.
The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed on the works of the
blockade which was ultimately intrusted to O’Donnel’s Andalusian
reserve.
Confidently did the English general expect the immediate fall of
San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negociations
for the armistice in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains
and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of, the
progress of the war in other parts, during his victorious march from
Portugal to the Pyrenees, must be treated of.
CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN COAST.
[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 512.]
It will be remembered that the duke Del Parque was to move from
the Sierra Morena, by Almanza, to join Elio, whose army had been
reinforced from Minorca; the united troops were then to act against
Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray sailed to attack
Taragona. Del Parque received his orders the 24th of April, he had
long known of the project and the march was one of twelve days, yet
he did not reach his destination until the end of May. This delay
resulted, partly from the bad state of his army, partly from the
usual procrastination of Spaniards, partly from the conduct of Elio,
whose proceedings, though probably springing from a dislike to serve
under Del Parque, created doubts of his own fidelity.
[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 460.]
It has been already shewn, how, contrary to his agreement with
Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry when Mijares was at Yecla, whence
sprung that general’s misfortune; how he placed the regiment of
Velez Malaga in Villena, a helpless prey for Suchet; how he left the
Anglo-Sicilian army to fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now
persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel instead of Almanza, and
to send a detachment under Mijares to Requeña, thereby threatening
Suchet’s right, but exposing the Spanish army to a sudden blow, and
disobeying his instructions which prescribed a march by Almanza.
[Sidenote: May.]
This false movement Elio represented as Del Parque’s own, but the
latter, when Murray remonstrated, quickly approached Castalla by
Jumilla, declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington’s orders.
The divergence of his former march had, however, already placed him
in danger; his left flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla,
that Murray postponed his own embarkation to concert with Elio a
combined operation, from Biar and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera
where Suchet’s troops were lying in wait. Previous to this epoch Elio
had earnestly urged the English general, to disregard Del Parque
altogether and embark at once for Taragona, undertaking himself
to secure the junction with his fellow-commander. And now, after
agreeing to co-operate with Murray he secretly withdrew his cavalry
from Sax, sent Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche without
support at Alcoy, retired himself to the city of Murcia, and at
the same time one of his regiments quartered at Alicant fired upon
a British guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and Del
Parque’s flank was menaced from Fuente de la Higuera, but the British
cavalry, assembling at Biar, secured his communication with Murray
on the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke up from their
quarters to embark at Alicant.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
The French were now very strong. Suchet unmolested for forty days
after the battle of Castalla, had improved his defensive works,
chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements,
rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared for new operations,
without losing the advantage of foraging the fertile districts
immediately in front of the Xucar. On the other hand lord William
Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily,
had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham’s cavalry,
and Roche’s division, were left at Alicant, the force actually
embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh English regiment from
Carthagena, scarcely exceeded fourteen thousand present under arms.
Of these, less than eight thousand were British or German, and the
horsemen were only seven hundred. Yet the armament was formidable,
for the battering train was complete and powerful, the materials for
gabions and fascines previously collected at Ivica, and the naval
squadron, under admiral Hallowel, consisted of several line-of-battle
ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports.
There was however no cordiality between general Clinton and Murray,
nor between the latter and his quarter-master-general Donkin, nor
between Donkin and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both
services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from
hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the
chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine hopes
of success even at the moment of embarkation, and there was in no
quarter a clear understanding of lord Wellington’s able plan for the
operations.
[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 495.]
While Del Parque’s army was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no
secret understanding with Elio or any of his officers, must have
been doubtful of the allies’ intentions, although the strength of
the battering-train at Alicant indicated some siege of importance.
He however recalled Pannetier’s brigade from the frontier of Aragon,
and placed it on the road to Tortoza; and at the same time, knowing
Clauzel was then warring down the partidas in Navarre, he judged
Aragon safe, and drew Severoli’s Italian brigade from thence, leaving
only the garrisons, and a few thousand men under general Paris as
a reserve at Zaragoza: and this was the reason the army of Aragon
did not co-operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel in the
valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some reinforcements, wherefore,
after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts
required by Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into the
field. He was however very unquiet, and notwithstanding Clauzel’s
operations, in fear for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been
attacked by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for the first
time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in
Valencia.
[Sidenote: June.]
On the 31st of May Murray sailed from Alicant. Suchet immediately
ordered Pannetier’s brigade to close towards Tortoza, but kept his
own positions in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass
the Grāo with a fair wind. Then feeling assured the expedition aimed
at Catalonia, he prepared to aid that principality; but the column of
succour being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, forty miles
from Valencia, he could not quit the latter before the 7th of June.
He took with him nine thousand men of all arms, leaving Harispe on
the Xucar, with seven thousand infantry and cavalry, exclusive of
Severoli’s troops which were in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile sir
John Murray’s armament, having very favourable weather, anchored on
the evening of the 2d in the bay of Taragona, whence five ships of
war under captain Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns
under colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San Felippe de Balaguer.
The strength and value of this fort arose from its peculiar position.
The works, garrisoned by a hundred men, were only sixty feet square,
but the site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the very gorge of
a pass, and blocking the only carriageway from Tortoza to Taragona.
The mountains on either hand, although commanding the fort, were
nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to form
the batteries.
Prevot, landing on the 3d, was joined by a Spanish brigade of
Copons’ army, and in concert with the navy immediately commenced
operations by placing two six-pounders on the heights south of the
pass, from whence at six or seven hundred yards distance they threw
shrapnel-shells; but this projectile is, when used with guns of small
calibre, insignificant save as a round shot.
On the 4th two twelve-pounders, and a howitzer, being brought to the
same point by the sailors, opened their fire, and at night the seamen
with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders
and their stores. The troops then constructed one battery, for two
howitzers, on the slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the
pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the rock where the fort
stood at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. To form these
batteries earth was carried from below, and every thing else, even
water, brought from the ships, though the landing place was more
than a mile and a half off. Hence, as time was valuable, favourable
terms were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused. The
5th the fire was continued, but with slight success, the howitzer
battery on the great ridge was relinquished, and at night a very
violent storm retarded the construction of the breaching batteries.
Previous to this colonel Prevot had warned Murray, that his means
were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him. Yet
the breaching batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, so severe
was the labour of carrying up the guns, and out of three, already
mounted, one was disabled by a shot from the fort.
[Sidenote: Notes by sir Henry Peyton, R.N. MSS.]
Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza, had ordered the
governor of that place to succour San Felippe. He tried, and would
undoubtedly have succeeded, if captain Peyton, of the Thames frigate,
had not previously obtained from admiral Hallowel two eight-inch
mortars, which, being placed just under the fort and worked by Mr.
James of the marine artillery, commencing at day-break on the 7th,
soon exploded a small magazine in the fort, whereupon the garrison
surrendered. The besiegers who had lost about fifty men and officers
then occupied the place, and meanwhile sir John Murray had commenced
the
SECOND SIEGE OF TARAGONA.
Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the evening of the
2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation of the troops until the
next day. The rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by
Suchet, but Fort Royal remained and though in bad condition served,
together with the ruins of the San Carlos bastion, to cover the
western front which was the weakest line of defence. The governor
Bertoletti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to be disaffected, but
he proved himself a loyal and energetic officer; and his garrison
sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and
Franco-Spaniards, served him well.
The Olivo, and Loretto heights were occupied the first day by
Clinton’s and Whittingham’s divisions, the other troops remaining on
the low ground about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded
during the night by the navy, but the fire was sharply returned and
the flotilla suffered the most. The next day two batteries were
commenced six hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred yards
from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but being too distant to
produce much effect, a third was commenced six hundred yards from
Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork,
yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from
the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired
the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent
proceedings cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of the
relative positions of the French and allied armies.
[Sidenote: Plan, No. 1.]
Taragona though situated on one of a cluster of heights, which
terminate a range descending from the northward to the sea, is, with
the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called
the _Campo de Taragona_, which is again environed by very rugged
mountains, through which the several roads descend into the plain.
Westward there were only two carriage ways, one direct, by the Col de
Balaguer to Taragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet,
Momblanch and Reus. The first was blocked by the taking of San
Felippe; the second, although used by Suchet for his convoys during
the French siege of Taragona, was now in bad order, and at best only
available for small mountain-guns.
Northward there was a carriage way, leading from Lerida, which united
with that from Falcet at Momblanch.
Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming from Barcelona, through
Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills, and Torredembarra; this road after
passing Villa Franca sends off two branches to the right, one passing
through the Col de Cristina, the other through Masarbones and Col de
Leibra, leading upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter branch
that M‘Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he had, however, no guns or
carriages, and his whole army laboured to make the way practicable.
Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit
any direct cross communications; and troops, coming from different
sides, could only unite in the Campo de Taragona now occupied by the
allies. Wherefore, as Murray had, including sergeants, above fifteen
thousand fighting men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments sent
by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six thousand regulars besides
the irregular division of Manso, twenty-five thousand combatants were
in possession of the French point of junction.
The Catalans, after Lacy’s departure, had, with the aid of captain
Adam’s ship, destroyed two small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and
Eroles had blockaded San Felippe de Balaguer for thirty-six days, but
it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu; and the success at Perillo
was more than balanced by a check which Sarzfield received on the 3d
of April from some of Pannetier’s troops. The partida warfare had,
however, been more active in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two
considerable victories, one gained by himself on the 17th of May, at
La Bispal near the Col de Cristina, where he boasted to have beaten
six thousand French with half their numbers, destroying six hundred,
as they returned from succouring San Felippe de Balaguer. In the
other, won by colonel Lander near Olot on the 7th of May, it was
said twelve hundred of Lamarque’s men fell. These exploits are by
French writers called skirmishes, and the following description of
the Catalan army, given to sir John Murray by Cabanes, the chief of
Copons’ staff, renders the French version the most credible.
“_We do not_,” said that officer, “_exceed nine or ten thousand men,
extended on different points of a line running from the neighbourhood
of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The
soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without subordination,
without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without
magazines, without money, and without means of transport!_”
Copons himself, when he came down to the Campo, very frankly told
Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position, he would
not join in any operation which endangered his retreat into the high
mountains. However, with the exception of twelve hundred men left
at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain,
were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the
communications of the different French corps, and to harass their
marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could also
calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him
in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore;
and he expected three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir
Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised
to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward
of Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a
like diversion westward of Tortoza. Finally, a general rising of the
Somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all
at Murray’s disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice
of the enemy’s approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the
roads.
On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet
had marched with nine thousand men from Valencia, and what with
Pannetier’s brigade and some spare troops from Tortoza, eleven or
twelve thousand men with artillery, might have come to the succour
of Taragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felippe de
Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A
movement by Mora, Falcet, and Momblanch, remained open, yet it would
have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To
the eastward therefore the garrison looked for the first succour.
Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia,
could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona, and
Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number, hence
twenty-five thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.
But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than one hundred and
sixty miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from
various places and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked;
nor could he stir at all, until Taragona was actually besieged,
lest the allies should reimbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had
in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdam, and he was
one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore, however active the
French generals might be, the English general could calculate upon
ten days’ clear operations, after investment, before even the heads
of the enemy’s columns, coming from different quarters, could issue
from the hills bordering the Campo.
Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavour to
cripple Del Parque, before he marched to the succour of Taragona;
and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, the royal
causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The
experience of captain Codrington during the first siege of Taragona,
had proved indeed, that an army could not be stopped by this fire,
yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation.
Thus, the advantage of a central position, the possession of the
enemy’s point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of
the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions, belonged to
Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French, since the
allies, brave, and formidable to fight in a position, were not well
constituted for general operations.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded,
was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick,
without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two
outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best,
were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and
the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed
with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary
rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted. Lord
Wellington had judged ten thousand men sufficient to take Taragona.
Murray brought seventeen thousand, of which fourteen thousand were
effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments,
stores, and means of land transport, that his army could not move
from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort
Royal was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer was unprepared
to profit from a successful assault.
This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was not however borne
out by facts. The equipments left behind, were only draft animals
and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the
general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons, like all
regular Spanish officers, was averse to calling out the Somatenes,
and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felippe de
Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, and without sufficient
means; for if captain Peyton had not brought up the mortars, which
was an afterthought, extraneous to the general’s arrangements,
the fort could not have been reduced before succour arrived from
Tortoza. Indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French
commandant, for his works were uninjured, and only a small part of
his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe truly, that one
of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his
pocket, an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking
the guns! At Taragona, the troops on the low ground, did not approach
so near, by three hundred yards, as they might have done; and the
outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed
Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco was a good
outwork and complete. The outworks of Taragona were incomplete,
ill-flanked, without palisades or casements, and their fall would
have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of
the place as Suchet had done in the former siege; a few hours’
firing would then have brought down the wall and a general assault
might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach
in that front, although defended by eight thousand Spanish troops,
and the allies opposed by only sixteen hundred French and Italians,
soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour to follow
that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the former siege, refused
to commit twelve hundred British troops in the place, on the special
ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned.
Murray’s troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly
a year; and after the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that
an Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go over bodily
to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal.
This confidence was not shared by their general. Even at the moment
of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a second time, to
relinquish the position of Castalla and retire to Alicant!
It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray’s proceedings were
ill-judged, and his after operations, were more injudicious.
As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza,
and had put two thousand French in movement from Lerida. Murray then
openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet he
proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo,
sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and
desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona.
On the 9th his emissaries said the French were coming from the east,
and from the west; and would, when united, exceed twenty thousand.
Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring
his intention to raise the siege; his views were changed during the
conference but he was discontented; and the two commanders were now
evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused to join in a summons to
the governor, and his flotilla again bombarded the place.
The 10th the spies in Barcelona gave notice that eight or ten
thousand French with fourteen guns, would march from that city the
next day. Copons immediately joined Manso, and Murray, as if he now
disdained his enemy, continued to disembark stores, landed several
mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened
their fire, in concert with that from the ships of war.
This was the first serious attack, and the English general,
professing a wish to fight the column coming from Barcelona, sent the
cavalry under lord Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person
sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left orders to storm
the outworks that night, but returned, before the hour appointed,
extremely disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at
Villa Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet closing upon
the Col de Balaguer. The infirmity of his mind was now apparent to
the whole army. At eight o’clock he repeated his order to assault the
outworks; at ten o’clock the storming party was in the dry bed of
the Francoli, awaiting the signal, when a countermand arrived; the
siege was then to be raised and the guns removed immediately from the
Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated, and the general
then promised to hold the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile
the detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla were called in,
without any notice to general Copons, though he depended on their
support.
The parc and all the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds
were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th,
and at twelve o’clock lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafalla
with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses,
but refused to obey, and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The
detachment from Valls arrived next, and the infantry marched to Cape
Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed lord Frederick, and were
themselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved
independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and
dishonorable to the British arms.
While the seamen were embarking the guns, the quarter-master-general
came down to the beach, with orders to abandon that business and
collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being supposed
close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray’s promise to hold the
Olivo until nightfall, fresh directions were given to spike the guns
there, and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose on every
side, and from both services; army and navy were alike indignant,
and so excited, that it is said personal insult was offered to
the general. Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray’s
quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral who it would
appear did not object to raising the siege but to the manner of
doing it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation
of artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column coming from
Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo,
offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the
night.
[Sidenote: Admiral Hallowel’s evidence on the trial.]
Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying that he had ordered the
battering pieces to be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed
a part of Clinton’s troops to advance towards the Gaya river. Yet
a few hours afterwards he reverted to his former resolution, and
peremptorily renewed the order for the artillery to spike the guns on
the Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this unhappy action
performed without confusion. The different orders received by Clinton
in the course of the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation
of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself, forgetful of his own
arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to salute an
enemy’s battery which had fired upon him; but this waving of his hat
from that particular spot was also the conventional signal for the
artillery to spike the guns, and they were thus spiked prematurely.
The troops were however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and
many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th without the
slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen
battering pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, with all the
platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of the
fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress. Sir J. Murray
meanwhile seemingly unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on
the evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed.
[Sidenote: Laffaille Campagne de Catalonia.]
While the English general was thus precipitately abandoning the
siege, the French generals, unable to surmount the obstacles opposed
to their junction, unable even to communicate by their emissaries,
were despairing of the safety of Taragona. Suchet did not reach
Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison, had on
the 8th attempted to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured the
naval captain Adam, colonel Prevot, and other officers, who were
examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having
gathered troops from various places, reached Villa Franca early on
the 10th, and deceiving even his own people as to his numbers, gave
out that Decaen, who he really expected, was close behind with a
powerful force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons from
Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties entered Vendrills, as
if he was resolved singly to attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had
however landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested Decaen’s march;
and Maurice Mathieu alarmed at the cessation of fire about Taragona,
knowing nothing of Suchet’s movements, and too weak to fight the
allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to the Llobregat,
his main body never having passed Villa Franca.
Suchet’s operations to the westward were even less decisive. His
advanced guard under Panettier, reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th
not hearing from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his left
over the mountains through Valdillos to some heights which terminate
abruptly on the Campo, above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached
the extreme verge of the hills, being then about twenty-five miles
from Taragona. His patroles descending into the plains, met with
lord Frederick Bentinck’s troopers reported that Murray’s whole army
was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the Campo, but at night
he kindled large fires to encourage the garrison of Taragona. These
signals were however unobserved, the country people had disappeared,
no intelligence could be procured, and Suchet could not follow him
with a large force into those wild desert hills, where there was no
water. Thus on both sides of Taragona the succouring armies were
quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for flight.
Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still
anxious for Taragona, he pushed, on the 14th, along the coast-road
towards San Felippe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevôt’s division
alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded by the
Thames frigate, and he was wonderfully surprised to see the whole
British fleet anchored off San Felippe, and disembarking troops.
Murray’s operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partizan,
yet without partizan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th,
from colonel Prevôt, of Panettier’s march to Monroig, and to protect
the cavalry and guns under lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie’s
division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the whole
army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts on both sides
of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then
commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Taragona had fallen, moved
towards Valdillos to bring off Panettier.
[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.]
At this precise period, Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu’s column,
which he always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired
to the Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that Taragona
had not been reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved
various projects in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon
Suchet, at another to cut off Panettier, now resolving to march upon
Cambrills, and even to menace Taragona again by land; then he was
for sending a detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally
he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and being ignorant of
Suchet’s last movement decided to strike at Panettier. In this view,
he detached Mackenzie, by a rugged valley leading from the eastward
to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on the 16th, but Suchet
had already carried off Panettier’s brigade, and the next day the
British detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only thought of
re-embarking.
This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward,
for Maurice Mathieu, whose whole proceedings evinced both skill
and vigour, hearing that the siege of Taragona was raised, and the
allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and
boldly entered Cambrills the 17th. On that day, however, Mackenzie
returned, and Murray’s whole army was thus concentrated in the
pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at Reus, having come
there at Murray’s desire to attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter
would have suffered, if the English general had been capable of a
vigorous stroke. On the other hand it was fortunate for Mackenzie,
that Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, disregarded his movement
upon Valdillos; but, taught by the disembarkation of the whole
English army that the fate of Taragona, whether for good or evil,
was decided, he had sent an emissary to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th,
and then retired to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter place
the 17th, attentive only to the movement of the fleet, and meanwhile
Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprize the Catalans at Reus.
Copons was led into this danger by sir John Murray, who had desired
him to harass Maurice Mathieu’s rear, with a view to a general
attack, and then changed his plan without giving the Spanish general
any notice. However he escaped. The French moved upon Taragona, and
Murray was left free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer.
He called a council of war, and it was concluded to re-embark, but at
that moment, the great Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing,
and admiral Hallowel, observing a signal announcing lord William
Bentinck’s arrival, answered with more promptitude than propriety,
“_we are all delighted_.”
Sir John Murray’s command having thus terminated, the general
discontent rendered it impossible to avoid a public investigation,
yet the difficulty of holding a court in Spain, and some disposition
at home to shield him, caused great delay. He was at last tried in
England. Acquitted of two charges, on the third he was declared
guilty of an error in judgement, and sentenced to be admonished; but
even that slight mortification was not inflicted.
This decision does not preclude the judgement of history, nor will
it sway that of posterity. The court-martial was assembled twenty
months after the event, when the war being happily terminated, men’s
minds were little disposed to treat past failures with severity.
There were two distinct prosecutors, having different views; the
proceedings were conducted at a distance from the scene of action,
defects of memory could not be remedied by references to localities,
and a door was opened for contradiction and doubt upon important
points. There was no indication that the members of the court were
unanimous in their verdict; they were confined to specific charges,
restricted by legal rules of evidence, and deprived of the testimony
of all the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented with
Murray’s conduct, and whose absence caused the serious charge of
abandoning Copons’ army to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of
temper displayed by the principal prosecutor, admiral Hallowel,
together with his signal on lord William Bentinck’s arrival, whereby,
to the detriment of discipline, he manifested his contempt for the
general with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage which he
improved skilfully, for he was a man sufficiently acute and prompt
when not at the head of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit,
factious dealings, and disregard of the service; described him as
a man of a passionate overweening, busy disposition, troubled with
excess of vanity, meddling with everything, and thinking himself
competent to manage both troops and ships.
Nevertheless sir John Murray had signally failed, both as an
independent general, and as a lieutenant acting under superior
orders. On his trial, blending these different capacities together,
with expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in excuse for
his errors as a free commander, and his discretionary power in
mitigation of his disobedience as a lieutenant; but his operations
were indefensible in both capacities. Lord Wellington’s instructions,
precise, and founded upon the advantages offered by a command of the
sea, prescribed an attack upon Taragona, with a definite object,
namely, to deliver Valencia.
“_You tell me_,” said he, “_that the line of the Xucar, which covers
Valencia, is too strong to force; turn it then by the ocean, assail
the rear of the enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect
his communication; or, he will give you an opportunity to establish a
new base of operations behind him._”
This plan however demanded promptness and energy, and Murray
professed neither. The weather was so favourable, that a voyage
which might have consumed nine or ten days was performed in two,
the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial
operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from
all sides to the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was
weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th the
bulk of Murray’s army was again afloat, a few hours would have
sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and the whole
might have sailed for the city of Valencia, while Suchet’s advanced
guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain
as to the fate of Taragona, one hundred and fifty miles from the
Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed
out by Wellington’s instructions, but the second was within his
reach; instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de Balaguer,
and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time to reach Valencia again.
[Sidenote: Defence of sir J. Murray in Phillipart’s Military
Calendar.]
[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 1.]
Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington’s instructions
be considered, there was here a manifest dereliction on the part of
Murray. What was that officer’s defence? That no specific period
being named for his return to Valencia, he was entitled to exercise
his discretion! Did he then as an independent general perform any
useful or brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale was one
of loss and dishonour! The improvident arrangements for the siege of
San Felippe de Balaguer, and the unexpected fortune which saved him
from the shame of abandoning his guns there also have been noted;
and it has been shown, that when the gain of time was the great
element of success, he neither urged Copons to break up the roads,
nor pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The feeble formality of
this latter operation has indeed been imputed to the engineer major
Thackary, yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to form a
plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, it might be a bold or a
cautious plan, and many persons did think Taragona was treated by him
with too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief,
to decide, if the general scheme of operations required a deviation
from the regular course. The untrammelled engineer could then have
displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made no sign. His instructions
and his ultimate views were withheld alike, from his naval colleague,
from his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general;
and while the last-named functionary was quite shut out from the
confidence of his commander, the admiral, and many others, both
of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the
proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray
however declared on his trial, that he had rejected general Donkin’s
advice, an avowal consonant to facts, since that officer urged him to
raise the siege on the 9th and had even told him where four hundred
draught bullocks were to be had, to transport his heavy artillery.
On the 12th he opposed the spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to
drag them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given as early as the
third day of the siege, a military plan, marking a position, strong
in itself, covering several landing places, and capable of being
flanked on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback save a
scarcity of water, yet there were some springs, and the fleet would
have supplied the deficiency.
[Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 512.]
It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington’s instructions,
and having at Castalla seen no reason to rely on sir John Murray’s
military vigour, was averse to the enterprize against Taragona. He
thought the allies should have worked Suchet out of Valencia by
operating on his right flank. And so Wellington would have thought,
if he had only looked at their numbers and not at their quality; he
had even sketched such a plan for Murray, if the attack upon Taragona
should be found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards too well,
to like such combinations for an army, two-thirds of which were of
that nation, and not even under one head; an army ill-equipped, and
with the exception of Del Parque’s troops, unused to active field
operations. Wherefore, calculating their power with remarkable
nicety, he preferred the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet.
Here it may be observed, that Napoleon’s plan of invasion did not
embrace the coast-lines where they could be avoided. It was an
obvious disadvantage to give the British navy opportunities of acting
against his communications. The French indeed, seized Santona and
Santander in the Bay of Biscay, because, these being the only good
ports on that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner shut out
from the north of Spain. They likewise worked their invasion by the
Catalonian and Valencian coast, because the only roads practicable
for artillery run along that sea-line; but their general scheme was
to hold, with large masses, the interior of the country, and keep
their communications aloof from the danger of combined operations by
sea and land. The providence of the plan was proved by Suchet’s peril
on this occasion.
Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the
following points. 1º. That he did not know with any certainty until
the night of the 11th that Suchet was near. 2º. That the fall of
Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing of the French
from Valencia the accessary, he persisted in the siege, because he
expected reinforcements from Sicily, and desired to profit from
the accidents of war. 3º. That looking only to the second object,
the diversion would have been incomplete, if the siege had been
raised sooner, or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores
after he despaired of success. 4º. That he dared not risk a battle
to save his battering train, because Wellington would not pardon
a defeat. Now had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until
the danger of losing his army was apparent, and then made a quick
return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible, though
inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression,
discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be
regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate.
The fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as in the
manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For first,
however numerous the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour
do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. The arrival
of reinforcements from Sicily was too uncertain for reasonable
calculation, and it was scarcely possible for the governor of
Taragona, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores
or guns were being landed; still less could he judge so timeously of
Murray’s final intention by that fact, as to advertize Suchet that
Taragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the
allies’ camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that
sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first
week. And the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when
the feeble operations of the general, and the universal discontent,
furnished surer guides for their reports.
Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th and only
deferred it, after seeing the admiral, from his natural vacillation.
It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained
certain information of Suchet’s advance on the night of the 11th. On
the 8th and 10th through various channels he knew the French marshal
was in march for Tortoza, and that his advanced guard menaced the
Col de Balaguer. The approach of Maurice Mathieu on the other side
was also known; he should therefore have been prepared to raise the
siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. Why were they lost
at all? They could not be saved, he said, without risking a battle
in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a
defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted
by Wellington’s instructions, which on that head, referred only to
the duke Del Parque and Elio.
But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad position to save
the guns? All persons admitted that they could have been embarked
before mid-day on the 13th. Panettier was then at Monroig, Suchet
still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu falling back from Villa Franca.
The French on each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and
thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th, and their point
of junction was Reus. Yet how form that junction? The road from Villa
Franca by the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by Copons, the
road from Perillo to Reus was always impracticable for artillery,
and from the latter place to Taragona was six miles of very rugged
country. The allies were in possession of the point of junction,
Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. And if the French could
have marched thirty-four and thirty-six miles, through the mountains
in one night, and been disposed to attack in the morning without
artillery, they must still have ascertained the situation of Murray’s
army; they must have made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and
Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and flanks; they must
have formed an order of battle and decided upon the mode of attack
before they advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus would
have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation to fight; but not, as
he said, in a bad position, with his back to the beach, where the
ships’ guns could not aid him, and where he might expect a dangerous
surf for days. The naval officers denied the danger from surf at
that season of the year; and it was not right to destroy the guns
and stores when the enemy was not even in march for Reus. Coolness
and consideration would have enabled Murray to see that there was no
danger. In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and the enemy
had no spies in the camp, since no communication took place between
the French columns until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing of
the fate of Taragona.
[Sidenote: Naval evidence on the trial.]
The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of profiting from
a central position to fall with superior forces upon one of the
French columns. It supposes however that accurate information was
possessed by the French generals; that Maurice Mathieu was as strong
as he pretended to be, Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction
with him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do after the fall
of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu had less than seven thousand men
of all arms, he was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the
allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of the Catalans.
Besides which the position at Cape Salou was only six miles distant,
and Murray might with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by
Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there, still maintaining the
investment; he might have shipped his battery train, and when the
enemy approached Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, where he
could, as he afterwards did, embark or disembark in the presence of
the enemy. The danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, could
not have deterred him, because he did send his cavalry and field
artillery by that very road on the 12th, when the French advanced
guard was at Monroig and actually skirmished with lord Frederick
Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked his main body, leaving a
small corps with some cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring
off his guns. Such a detachment, together with the heavy guns, would
have been afloat in a couple of hours and on board the ships in four
hours; it could have embarked on the open beach, or, if fearful of
being molested by the garrison, might have marched to Cape Salou,
or to the Col de Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the
necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour lessened. It
is clear therefore that there was no military need to sacrifice
the battery pieces. And those were the guns that shook the bloody
ramparts of Badajos!
Wellington felt their loss keenly, sir John Murray spoke of them
lightly. “_They were of small value, old iron! he attached little
importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle, he
had approved of colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also
desired colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering train
before the Fort of Balaguer._” “_Such doctrine might appear strange
to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies
and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it._”
Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked their own lives, and
sacrificed their bravest men, charging desperately in person, to
retrieve even a single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the
value of moral force in war, and that of all the various springs and
levers on which it depends military honour is the most powerful.
No! it was not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the French
owed their great successes. It was to the care with which Napoleon
fostered and cherished a contrary feeling. Sir John Murray’s argument
would have been more pungent, more complete, if he had lost his
colours, and pleaded that they were only wooden staves, bearing old
pieces of silk!
CHAPTER II.
[Sidenote: 1813. June.]
Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for, having removed the
queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension and Napoleon had
directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the
Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted
that the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his
fleet, and lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would
suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened a secret negociation, and
thus, that monarch, Bernadotte, and the emperor Francis endeavoured
to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage and to whom they
all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency!
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1.]
This early defection of Murat is certain, and his declaration that
he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumour,
rife in the French camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the
Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually made. Nevertheless
there is some obscurity about the matter. The negociation was never
completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon’s cavalry and at
the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day.
Now it is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the
grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget
everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon’s orders as to
the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately
after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to
alarm lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would seem from the
short observation of the latter in answer to lord William Bentinck’s
detailed communication on this subject, namely “_Sicily is in no
danger_,” that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat
to give more value to his defection. However it sufficed to hinder
reinforcements going to Murray.
Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed that Suchet was at
Tortoza with from eight to twelve thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with
seven thousand at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and re-invest
Taragona was easy, and the place would have fallen because the
garrison had exhausted all their powder in the first siege; but this
lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was
impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had
been lost, and the animals and general equipment of the army were too
much deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations,
to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to
Alicant, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington’s instructions
by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The re-embarkation
was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment
of Whittingham’s division, destined to reinforce Copons’ army, being
detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put
to sea; but misfortune continued to pursue this unhappy armament.
A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen sail of transports
struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was
not entirely disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile
marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail and taught by the
destruction of the fort of Balaguer, that the allies had relinquished
operations in Lower Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary
diligence as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours after quitting
Tortoza, thus frustrating lord William’s project of landing at
Valencia.
During his absence Harispe had again proved the weakness of the
Spanish armies, and demonstrated the sagacity and prudence of lord
Wellington. That great man’s warning about defeat was distinctly
addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the
operations was not to defeat Suchet but to keep him from aiding the
French armies in the north. Pitched battles were therefore to be
avoided their issue being always doubtful, and the presence of a
numerous and increasing force on the front and flank of the French
was more sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish generals
desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by
attributing defeats to want of cavalry. It was at first doubtful
if Murray could transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left
behind they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those
officers would have been encouraged to fight. Hence the English
general’s menacing intimation. And he also considered that as the
army of Del Parque had been for three years in continued activity
under Ballesteros without being actually dispersed, it must be more
capable than Elio’s in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards.
Moreover Elio was best acquainted with the country between the Xucar
and Alicant. Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the enemy’s
right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace the front, which, adverting
to the support and protection furnished by Alicant and the mountains
behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.
But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and the clouds.
General Elio persuaded the duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack,
took the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares to fall
upon Requeña. And though Suchet had weakened his line on the 2d of
June, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French
a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the arrival of Severoli at
Liria.
At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men of all arms in
front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, including Roche’s and Mijares’
divisions and Whittingham’s cavalry, were twenty-five thousand
strong; and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle, Nebot,
waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains to operate on the French
rear. Notwithstanding this disproportion, the contest was short,
and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced in three columns.
Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la
Higuera menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona from Alcoy,
by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felippe de Xativa
and turning Moxente.
Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, and took the line of
the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments in front of his bridges at
Alcira and Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde
movement general Mesclop, commanding the rear-guard, being pressed
by the Spanish horsemen, wheeled round and drove them in great
confusion upon the infantry.
On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requeña, thus turning the line
of the Xucar, and securing the defiles of Cabrillas through which the
Cuenca road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately joined him
thereby preventing Severoli from uniting with Harispe, and meanwhile
Del Parque, after razing the French works at Moxente and San Felippe,
advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the one moving by the road of
Cargagente, the other by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew
the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners, and marched
to attack the other, but it was already routed by general Gudin.
After this contest Del Parque and Harispe maintained their respective
positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña. Villa Campa then
descended to Chiva, and Harispe’s position was becoming critical,
when on the 23d the head of Suchet’s column coming from the Ebro
entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del Parque resumed the position of
Castalla.
Thus in despite of Wellington’s precautions every thing turned
contrary to his designs. Elio had operated by the flank, Del Parque
by the front, and the latter was defeated because he attacked the
enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had failed entirely. His
precipitancy at Taragona and his delays at Balaguer were alike
hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the
Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria. For Suchet, having
first detached general Musnier to recover the fort of Requeña and
drive back Villa Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his
old positions, of San Felippe and Moxente, before the return of the
Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had
then returned towards his former quarters, the French marshal was
upon the point of striking a fatal blow against him, or Del Parque,
or both, when the news of Wellington’s victory averted the danger.
Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of Suchet, may be
contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in
attack, precipitate in retreat, the English commander always mistimed
his movements; the French marshal doubled his force by rapidity.
The latter was isolated by the operations of lord Wellington; his
communication with Aragon was interrupted, and that province placed
in imminent danger; the communication between Valencia and Catalonia
was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet;
nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front;
Villa Campa, the Frayle and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand
men on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave Harispe with
only seven or eight thousand men to oppose the Spaniards, while with
the remainder of his army he relieved Taragona and yet returned in
time to save Valencia.
Such was the state of affairs when lord William Bentinck brought
the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicant. His first care was
to re-organize the means of transport for the commissariat and
artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray,
with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of
Wellington’s instructions, which proscribed active field operations
in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had
discharged six hundred mules, and two hundred country carts, that
is to say five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed
for Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered
strong in front, and Musnier’s division retaking Requeña forced the
Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque
to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying
even one day’s biscuit, and at the same time Elio pressed by famine
went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the
Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy.
[Sidenote: July.]
Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish armies as well as his
own, and letters passed between him and lord Wellington relative
to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views,
advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza, if the ordnance
still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but
supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to
seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the
sea and in constant communication with the fleet.
Lord William’s views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers
robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their
organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against
even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at
Alcira. The generals however pleased him at first, especially Del
Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command,
and lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely their deeds,
thought he could safely undertake a grand stragetic operation in
conjunction with them.
[Sidenote: Lord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS.]
To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable, inasmuch as
there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet’s
entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s
bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force
dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical
movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore,
relinquishing an attack in front, lord William proposed to move the
allied armies in one mass and turn the enemy’s right flank either
by Utiel and Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca and
from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with
Wellington’s army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was
necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and there were no carriage
roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel
were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line
would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet which was to be
avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being
in the harvest season provisions he said would not fail. The allies
would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen
position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in
the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army.
Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of
Spanish co-operation, told him, provisions would fail on the march to
Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing;
moreover by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to
return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to
any imminent danger.
While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians marched
towards Villena on Del Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to
attack when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both
parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general
instantly abandoned Valencia, and lord William entered that city.
Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza, and desirous of maintaining
himself there to secure a point of junction for the army of Aragon
with the king’s army, if the latter should re-enter Spain. It was
possible therefore, by abandoning all the fortresses in Valencia and
some of those in Catalonia, to have concentrated more than thirty
thousand men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter having
carried off several small garrisons during his retreat, had fifteen
thousand. Lord Wellington’s position would then have been critical,
since forty-five thousand good troops, having many supporting
fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at the moment when
his front was assailed by a new general and a powerful army. But if
this junction with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the
other, with a view of influencing the general negociations during the
armistice in Germany, it was important to appear strong in Spain. On
such occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both objects and
obtain neither. Suchet resolved to march upon Zaragoza and at the
same time retain his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons
in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a great error, it
was so proved by the result. But if the war in the north of Spain and
in Germany had taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence
would have been applauded.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand effective men.
Four thousand were in Zaragoza, two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque,
Monzons, Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six thousand
remained. Of these one hundred and ten were left in Denia, with
provisions for eight months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum,
where there were immense stores, eight months’ provisions for the
garrison, and two months’ subsistence for the whole army; four
hundred with provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in Morella
one hundred and twenty with magazines for six months. Into Tortoza,
where there was a large artillery parc, Suchet threw a garrison of
nearly five thousand men and then destroying the bridges on the
Xucar, marched from Valencia on the 5th of July, taking the coast
road for Tortoza.
The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he had maintained,
were even friendly, and while the main body thus moved, Musnier
retreated from Requeña across the mountains towards Caspe, the point
of concentration for the whole army: but ere it could reach that
point, Clauzel’s flight to Jaca, unnecessary for he was only pursued
from Tudela by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal. All the
Partidas immediately united and menaced Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet
ordered Paris to retire upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself
to Favara. Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, having on
the march picked up Severoli’s brigade and the garrisons of Teruel
and Alcanitz. Thus on the 12th the whole army was in military
communication but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza to Caspe. Mina
had, however, seized the Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris
evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving five hundred men
in the castle with much ordnance. Encumbered with a great train of
carriages he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and being
attacked lost many men and all his baggage and artillery. Instead of
joining Suchet he fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of
Ayerbe and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at the moment
when Clauzel, after another ineffectual attempt to join the king, had
returned to that place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza,
and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on the 30th, but Daroca
did not fall until the 11th of August.
This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet think it no longer
possible to fix a base in that province, nor to rally Clauzel’s
troops on his own. He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro,
neither could he feed his army permanently in the sterile country
about Tortoza while Aragon was in possession of the enemy. Moreover,
the allies having the command of the sea, might land troops, and
seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore fixing upon the
fertile country about Taragona for his position, he passed the Ebro
at Tortoza, Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, detaching
Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes,
Pina, and Bujarola, and bring the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk
of the army moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona, although
cannonaded by the English fleet, reached Taragona with little hurt
and the walls were mined for destruction, but the place was still
held with a view to field operations.
The general state of the war seems to have been too little considered
by Suchet at this time, or he would have made a more vigorous effort
to establish himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on Zaragoza
he would have raised the siege of the castle, perchance have given a
blow to Mina whose orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington
designed to offer battle; but Suchet might have avoided this, and to
have appeared upon Wellington’s flank were it only for a fortnight,
would, as shall be hereafter shewn, have changed the aspect of the
campaign. Suchet’s previous rapidity and excellent arrangements had
left the allies in Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered
in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their pursuit now to be
described, was not so cautiously conducted but that he might have
turned and defeated them.
The 9th of July, four days after the French abandoned Valencia,
lord William Bentinck entered that city and made it his place of
arms instead of Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road,
in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola, a fortress
now of little importance, he followed the enemy; but Suchet had on
that day completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have been close
to Zaragoza, and Del Parque’s army was still near Alicant in a very
disorderly condition. And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the
occupation of that town, and the blockades of Denia and Murviedro,
proved more than a sufficient task for them: the garrison of the
latter place received provisions continually, and were so confident
as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis when the allies
marched past.
The 20th lord William entered Vinaros and remained there until the
26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it
shall be shewn that Wellington could not have met him at the former
place as he designed.
During this period various reports were received. “_The French had
vainly endeavoured to regain France by Zaragoza._” “_Taragona was
destroyed._” “_The evacuation of Spain was certain._” “_A large
detachment had already quitted Catalonia._” The English general,
who had little time to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs,
became eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge over the Ebro at
Amposta, and having before embarked Clinton’s division with a view
to seize the Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with the
remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham’s cavalry.
A detachment from Tortoza menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the
troops were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed on the
27th. The next day Villa Campa arrived with four thousand men and
meanwhile the Col de Balaguer was secured.
On the 29th the cavalry being in march was threatened by infantry
from Tortoza, near the Col de Alba, but the movements generally were
unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the
Ebro.
Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of Lerida and
Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily large because Copons
was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his
position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Taragona and
Tortoza covered the front; Barcelona, the rear; the communication
with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to
which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts.
The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham’s cavalry did
not exceed ten thousand effective men, of which one division was on
board ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia
in a destitute condition. Del Parque’s army thirteen thousand strong,
including Whittingham’s infantry, was several marches in the rear,
it was paid from the British subsidy but very ill-provided and the
duke himself disinclined to obedience. Villa Campa did not join
until the 28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord
William therefore remained with ten thousand men and a large train
of carriages, for ten days without any position of battle behind him
nearer than the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the Ebro was
thrown within ten miles of Tortoza where there was a garrison of
five thousand men, detachments from which could approach unperceived
through the rugged mountains near the fortress; and Suchet’s
well-organised experienced army was within two marches. That marshal
however, expecting a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in
person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were
unprepared to strike a sudden blow; moreover, judging his enemy’s
strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was,
he awaited the arrival of Decaen’s force from Upper Catalonia before
he offered battle.
But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English fleet menacing
Rosas and Palamos had encouraged a partial insurrection of the
Somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso,
and Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the side of
Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though beaten there
in a sharp action by Lamarque on the 23d of June the insurrection
spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation from the side
of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally the Catalan head-quarters.
Designing to attack by the south himself, he sent Maximilian
Lamarque, with fifteen hundred French troops and some Miguelets,
by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the
8th of July that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the
road from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda and Manlieu,
in the expectation of seeing Decaen attacking from the other side.
He perceived below him a heavy body in march, and at the same time
heard the sound of cannon and musquetry about Vich. Concluding this
was Decaen he advanced confidently against the troops in his front,
although very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but they
fought him until dark without advantage on either side.
In the night an officer came with intelligence, that Decaen’s attack
had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet’s orders to move to
the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had
been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force to the amount of six
or seven thousand combatants was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the
firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories
in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at
daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near
Salud was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours,
all his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men and was
upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his
succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally
defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action Decaen marched
to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate
divisions, approached lord William Bentinck.
The allies having thus passed the Ebro several officers of both
nations conceived the siege of Tortoza would be the best operation.
Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’,
Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s forces and the
Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of
the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to
resist Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side, and force
him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned
towards this operation, but lord William Bentinck resolved to push
at once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona;
certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach
with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to
besiege Tortoza would have been advisable, for though the battering
train, much larger than Murray’s losses gave reason at first to
expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of
such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy
and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They
were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not
sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a
difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon.
[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls.]
It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this time misled,
partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by lord Wellington’s
great successes, into a belief that the French were going to
abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs, and he
did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted and able to draw
reinforcements from Decaen was in fact much stronger than all the
allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numbered
sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven thousand,
including Paris’ division then at Jaca, were in garrison, five
thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the
allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to
keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre
and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was
this lord Wellington’s view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to
make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself
or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William after passing the
Ebro could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own
and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say, with twenty thousand men
including Whittingham’s division. He could have insulted the garrison
of Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which
would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while
he awaited the junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of
Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry
and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still
leaving a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then came to the
succour of Taragona the allies superior in numbers could have fought
in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all
these corps would, or could have kept together.
Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong. He had prepared
platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on
the 30th quitting the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with less
than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to
the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented
the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they
had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because
of Suchet’s vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st
the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks
were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s army, being on the left
of the Ebro, fell back a day’s march. However Whittingham’s division
and the cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being restored,
Del Parque also joined the investing army. Copons then promised to
bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s division now belonging to the
second army arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with
three additional battalions while Villa Campa observed Tortoza.
Meanwhile lord William seeing that Suchet’s troops were scattered
and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his
posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent
no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the
English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned
the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly returned from
Barcelona and concentrated his army.
Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but false information
to lord William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a
series of faults on both sides balancing each other, a circumstance
not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest
minds. The Englishman thinking his enemy retreating had pressed
rashly forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s boldness the
whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and
awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have
seen by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English
fleet.
[Sidenote: August.]
In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new and important successes
gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions
was at the same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and lord
William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left,
composed of Whittingham’s division, occupied Braffin, the Col de
Liebra, and Col de Christina, his right covered the great coast-road.
These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach,
but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham
thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when
Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets,
finally advanced, lord William who had landed neither guns nor stores
decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer, this must have
been a painful decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting
men, including a thousand marines which had been landed to join the
advanced guard at Altafalla; he had assumed the offensive, invested
Taragona where the military honour of England had suffered twice
before, in fine provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet
had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were
rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have
been left to the general officers at different points; Del Parque’s
was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line
would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however
manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th he did not send
his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day
on which Decaen reached Villa Franca.
The French general dreading the fire of the fleet endeavoured by
false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles
beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and
those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state because
of these demonstrations, but because lord William had previously
determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded,
he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus turning the allies,
but he had lost time and the latter were in full retreat towards
the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills.
The march of the former was covered by lord Frederick Bentinck who
leading the British and German cavalry defeated the fourth French
hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that either
general Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the confusion.
The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division now entrenched
themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his
own and Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell
upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained.
Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by
his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British
troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army he
returned to Taragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the
extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult
matter: then resuming his old positions about Villa Franca and on
the Llobregat he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated
lord William Bentinck’s first effort and the general result was
favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds, yet his enemy
made no profit and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was
invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.
[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.]
It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large
force to be thus paralyzed at such a crisis. Above twenty-seven
thousand of his soldiers if we include the isolated division of Paris
were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand remained with which
he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided
in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon before the end
of July lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be
feared? That lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his
fortresses? If the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a
fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain
that any would have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the
coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia;
but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military
reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of
Valencia and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage roads was
chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea
pass as a partizan descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s
troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington
and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall however be
treated more largely in another place, it is sufficient to observe
here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man without genius or
attachment to the emperor’s cause, discouraged any great combined
plan of action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations
did not interpose.
Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza wished lord
Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army; but
this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit
of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was an undertaking
beyond his own means. Elio when desired to gather provisions and
assist in the operations demanded three weeks for preparation;
all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division, blockading
Murviedro, although so close to Valencia was on half rations; and the
siege of Tortoza was necessarily relinquished, because no great or
sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals
and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them was an illustration of
Napoleon’s maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more
essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies.
It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to apply his mind
vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes
injurious to the British policy in Sicily called him to that island,
and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of Italy; but as the
Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported
that Suchet had marched with twelve thousand men to join Soult, he
once more fixed his head-quarters at Taragona, and, following lord
Wellington’s instructions, detached Del Parque’s troops by forced
marches upon Tudela.
[Sidenote: September.]
On the 5th of September the army entered Villa Franca, and the 12th,
detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German, and British infantry, a
squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve hundred
men under colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this
place, ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by
three of Sarzfield’s battalions and a Spanish squadron they took
a position; but it now appeared that very few French troops had
been detached; that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the
Llobregat; and that his army was very superior in numbers, because
the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque’s troops, had also left
Whittingham’s division at Reus and Valls to procure food. Sarzfield’s
division was feeding on the British supplies, and lord William again
looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined to advance
desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible.
He had only two lines of operation to watch. The one menacing his
front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam
blocked by his position at Ordal; the other from Martorel, by San
Sadurni, menacing his left; but on this route, a difficult one, he
had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso reinforcing them with
some Calabrese; there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his
right, but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed
to place his main body close up to the Ordal on the evening of the
12th, yet from some slight cause delayed it until the next day.
Meanwhile he viewed the country in advance of that defile without
discovering an enemy. His confidential emissaries assured him the
French were not going to advance, and he returned, satisfied that
Adam’s detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer.
A report of a contrary tendency was indeed made by colonel Reeves
of the twenty-seventh, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had
before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy; she was now however
disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus
braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the
side of Martorel, was already in march to attack Ordal with the army
of Aragon, while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army
of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni, turned the left of the
allies.
COMBAT OF ORDAL.
The heights occupied by colonel Adam although rugged rose gradually
from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over
a very deep and impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the
twenty-seventh British regiment was posted on the right, the Germans
and De Roll’s Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort
commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre, the
Calabrese on the left; and the cavalry were in reserve. A bright
moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little
before midnight, their leading column under general Mesclop passing
the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a
rapid pace and driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The
allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were ready
instantly and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the
twenty-seventh, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were
vigorously assailed in succession as the French columns got free of
the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a
share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe who
commanded the French constantly outflanked the right of the allies,
and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought
gallantly.
Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the command devolved upon
colonel Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men
falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army
on a position of which colonel Adam had lost the key by neglecting
the bridge, resolved to retreat. In this view he first ordered the
guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of
the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road, but he was
severely wounded in this attack and there was no recognized commander
on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For
though the order to retreat was given the Spaniards were fighting
desperately, and the twenty-seventh thought it shame to abandon
them; wherefore the Germans and De Roll’s regiment still held the
old fort and the guns came back. The action was thus continued with
great fury. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from
the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too
late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the centre were broken, the right
was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy’s skirmishers
got into the allies’ rear, and at three o’clock the whole dispersed,
the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on
the main road by the French hussars and four guns were taken in the
tumult.
Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh reduced to eighty men, and
captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss,
breaking through several small parties of the enemy effected their
retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel
Carey endeavoured at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left,
but meeting with Decaen’s people on that side he retraced his steps,
and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet’s columns made
for Villa Nueva de Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss,
save a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion
of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas
and Avionet. The overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at
first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many to escape, and two
thousand men reached Manso and Eroles.
Suchet pursuing his march came up with lord William about eight
o’clock. The latter retired skirmishing and with excellent order
beyond Villa Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of which
assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure
the communication with Decaen. The latter was looked for by both
parties with great anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance
of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San
Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry and artillery continued however to infest
the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco,
near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and
the French horseman importunate, that brave and honest soldier,
lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand
to hand with the enemy’s general Myers wounded him and overthrew
his light cavalry; they rallied upon their dragoons and advanced
again, endeavouring to turn the flank, but were stopped by the fire
of two guns which general Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile the
cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick hussars and menaced
the infantry yet they were finally checked by the fire of the tenth
regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, the twentieth and the
Germans although few in numbers lost more than ninety men. The
baranco was however safely passed and about three o’clock the army
having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The Catalans meanwhile
had retreated towards Igualada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to
Taragona.
It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the
garrisons of Lerida and Tortoza, but this did not happen, and lord
William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to sir
William Clinton.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, yet he has been censured
without discrimination. “_He advanced rashly._” “_He was undecided._”
“_He exposed his advanced guard without support._” Such were the
opinions expressed at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His
first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his
second, to profit from Suchet’s weakness if he detached largely. He
could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind
Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of
provisions and the siege of Tortoza was found to be impracticable.
It was therefore the part of a bold and skilful general to menace
his enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again without danger or
dishonour. The position at Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It
was strong in itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew’s fleet was
in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the
emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though
falsely, that the French general had detached twelve thousand men.
It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general to detect
false intelligence, yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all
must act, if they act at all, upon what appears at the time to be
true. Lord William’s advance was founded on erroneous data, but his
position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to
feed Whittingham’s division in the fertile country about Reus and
Valls, and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca
to the sea-coast. The army could only be seriously assailed on two
lines. In front, by the main road, which though broad was from Molino
del Rey to the heights of Ordal one continued defile. On the left by
San Sardurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other.
And the Catalans were launched on this side as their natural line of
operations, because, without losing their hold of the mountains they
protected the left of the allies, menacing at the same time the right
of the enemy and his communications with Lerida. Half a march to the
rear would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which the enemy could
not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could
he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina
defiles, because the Catalans falling back on Whittingham’s division
could hold him in check.
2º. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the position. The last
was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error of
Lord William Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced guard
of three thousand five hundred men, with cavalry and artillery, to a
distance of ten miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the
commander of such a force would maintain his post until supported, or
at least retreat without disaster. An officer of capacity would have
done so. But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick Adam
either in peace or war will be disappointed.
In 1810 lord Wellington detached general Robert Craufurd with two or
three thousand men to a much greater distance, not for one night but
for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena’s
immense army the very cavalry of which was double his whole numbers;
though he had the long line of the Agueda a fordable river to guard;
though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never
lost so much as a patrole and always remained master of his movements
for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no
fault therefore to push colonel Adam’s detachment to Ordal, but it
was a fault that lord William, having determined to follow with his
whole force, should have delayed doing so for one night, or that
delaying he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a
fault not to do so because there was good reason to do so, and to
delay was to tempt fortune. There was good reason to do so as well to
profit of the advantage of the position as to support Adam. Had lord
William Bentinck been at hand with his main body when the attack on
Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet’s force which was kept at bay for
three hours by a detachment so ill commanded would have been driven
into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have
had time to march against Decaen by the road along which colonel
Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine, Suchet’s dispositions were
vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated
on two distinct lines having no cross communications, and before an
enemy in possession of a central position with good communications.
3º. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck disregarded the
Spanish woman’s report to colonel Reeves; his observations made in
front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th accorded
indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side
should always be the rule of precaution. He also, although on the
spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel Adam on the
heights of Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior
numbers with a small corps, and that officer had nevertheless
extended the Calabrese so far on the left that they could take
no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great
difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have
blocked up the bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by
a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in
succession on the heights behind, but keeping his main body always
in hand, ready either to fall on the head of the enemy’s column of
attack, or to rally the advanced detachments and retreat in order.
There were plenty of trees and stones to block the bridge, its own
parapet would have supplied materials, and the ravine was so deep and
rugged, that the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the
dark.
It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took his ground in the
evening after a march; that he expected the main body up the next
morning and that lord William assured him he was safe from attack.
Every officer is responsible for the security of his own troops,
and the precautions prescribed by the rules of war should never be
dispensed with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does not appear that
colonel Adam ever placed an infantry picquet on the bridge, or sent
a cavalry patrole beyond it; and I have been informed by a French
soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they
reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned
safely, whereupon Mesclop’s brigade instantly crossed the bridge and
attacked.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.]
4º. Ordal might be called a surprize with respect to the
general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged were not surprised; they
were beaten and dispersed because colonel Adam was unskilful. The
French general’s victory was complete; but he has in his Memoirs
exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success,
his private report to the emperor was more accurate. The Memoirs
state that the English grenadiers defended certain works which
commanded the ascent of the main road, and in the accompanying atlas
a perspective view of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying,
is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts
of a fresh construction defended by select troops; but in the private
report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments, being
in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works and of no more
advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again
in the Memoirs the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is
represented as quite successful; but the private report only says the
rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover
those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was
about three hundred men, that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was
lightened by escape of prisoners during the night and ultimately did
not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: 1813. June.]
Turning from the war in Catalonia to the operations in Navarre
and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord Wellington’s indomitable energy
overcoming every difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing
his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese divisions to cover
the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same
time attacking with the Spanish divisions Santona on the coast, and
the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and the forts of Pancorbo
in the interior. These operations required many men, but the early
fall of Pancorbo enabled O’Donnel’s reserve to blockade Pampeluna,
and Don Carlos D’España’s division, four thousand strong, which had
remained at Miranda del Castanar to improve its organization when
lord Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching to reinforce
him.
The harbour of Passages was the only port near the scene of
operations suited for the supply of the army. Yet it had this defect,
that being situated between the covering and the besieging army,
the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement
of the enemy. The Deba river, between San Sebastian and Bilbaō,
was unfit for large vessels, and hence no permanent depôt could be
established nearer than Bilbaō. At that port therefore, and at St.
Ander and Coruña, the great depôts of the army were fixed, the stores
being transported to them from the establishments in Portugal;
but the French held Santona, and their privateers interrupted the
communication along the coast of Spain while American privateers did
the same between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand the intercourse
between San Sebastian and the ports of France was scarcely molested,
and the most urgent remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient
naval force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances
Wellington commenced
THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.
This place was built on a low sandy isthmus formed by the harbour on
one side and the river Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte
Orgullo, a rugged cone nearly four hundred feet high, washed by the
ocean and crowned with the small castle of La Mota. Its southern face
overlooking the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of defensive
works and covered with batteries; but La Mota itself was commanded,
at a distance of thirteen hundred yards, by the Monte Olia on the
other side of the Urumea.
The land front of San Sebastian was three hundred and fifty yards
wide, stretching quite across the isthmus. It consisted of a high
curtain or rampart, very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated
flat bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half bastions
at either end. A regular horn-work was pushed out from this front,
and six hundred yards beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by
the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which stood the suburb of
San Martin.
On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called
the _Chofres_, through which the road from Passages passed to the
wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa
Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a _fausse braye_
for the horn-work.
The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts. The one
was washed by the water of the harbour, the other by the Urumea
which at high tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised
in its elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, for though
covered by the river there was only a single wall ill-flanked by two
old towers, and by the half bastion of San Elmo which was situated
at the extremity of the rampart close under the Monte Orgullo. There
was no ditch, no counter-scarp, or glacis, the wall could be seen to
its base from the Chofre hills at distances varying from five hundred
to a thousand yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a dry
strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. However the guns from
the batteries at Monte Orgullo especially that called the Mirador,
could see this strand.
The other flank of the town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth
of which was a rocky island, called Santa Clara, where the French had
established a post of twenty-five men.
[Sidenote: Bellas’ Journal of French Sieges in Spain.]
When the battle of Vittoria happened San Sebastian was nearly
dismantled; many of the guns had been removed to form battering
trains or to arm smaller ports on the coast, there were no
bomb-proofs nor pallisades nor outworks, the wells were foul and the
place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct. Joseph’s defeat
restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey entered
it the 22d of June, bringing with him the escort of the convoy
which had quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was
thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and
other persons attached to the court; the population ordinarily eight
thousand was increased to sixteen thousand and disorder and confusion
were predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all
persons not residents to march at once to France granting them only
a guard of one hundred men; the people of quality went by sea, the
others by land, and fortunately all arrived safely for the Partidas
would have given them no quarter.
On the 27th general Foy while retreating before sir Thomas Graham
threw a reinforcement into the place. The next day Mendizabal’s
Spaniards appeared on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo
and on the Chofres, whereupon general Rey burned the wooden bridge
and both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San
Bartolomeo. The 29th the Spaniards slightly attacked San Bartolomeo,
and were repulsed.
[Sidenote: July.]
[Sidenote: Sir G. Collier’s Despatch.]
The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that place, and
with detestable ferocity secretly left a lighted train which exploded
the magazine and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops three
hundred in number entered San Sebastian, and at the same time a
vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoneers and
some workmen; the garrison was thus increased to three thousand men
and all persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves in
advance were ordered to quit the place. Meanwhile Mendizabal, having
cut off the aqueduct, made some approaches towards the head of the
burned bridge on the right of the Urumea and molested the workmen on
the heights of Bartolomeo.
On the 3d, the Surveillante frigate and a sloop with some small craft
arrived to blockade the harbour, yet the French vessels from St. Jean
de Luz continued to enter by night. The same day the governor made a
sally with eleven hundred men in three columns to obtain news, and
after some hours’ skirmishing returned with a few prisoners.
The 6th some French vessels with a detachment of troops and a
considerable convoy of provisions came from St. Jean de Luz.
The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent
of San Bartolomeo.
On the 9th sir Thomas Graham arrived with a corps of British and
Portuguese troops, and on the 13th the Spaniards marched, some to
reinforce the force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin the
fourth army on the Bidassoa.
At this time general Reille held the entrances to the Bastan by
Vera and Echallar, but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and
established the seventh and light divisions there, thus covering
the passes over the Peña de Haya by which the siege might have been
interrupted.
Before general Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on
the heights of San Bartolomeo, and connected it with the convent of
that name which they also fortified. These outworks were supported by
posts in the ruined houses of the suburb of San Martin behind, and by
a low circular redoubt, formed of casks on the main road, half-way
between the convent and the horn-work. Hence to reduce the place,
working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in succession
three lines of defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot
of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be assailed.
Seventy-six pieces of artillery were mounted upon these works and
others were afterwards obtained from France by sea.
[Sidenote: Jones’s Journal of British Sieges.]
The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under general
Oswald, and the independent Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and
Bradford reinforced by detachments from the first division. Thus,
including the artillery-men some seamen commanded by lieutenant
O’Reilly of the Surveillante and one hundred regular sappers and
miners, now for the first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula,
nearly ten thousand men were employed. The guns available for
the attack, in the first instance, were a new battering train
originally prepared for the siege of Burgos, consisting of fourteen
iron twenty-four pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four
sixty-eight-pound iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch mortars.
To these were added six twenty-four pounders lent by the ships
of war, and six eighteen pounders which had moved with the army
from Portugal, making altogether forty pieces commanded by colonel
Dickson. The distance from the depôt of siege at Passages to the
Chofre sand-hills was one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon
bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the Chofres, but from
thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more than five miles of very
bad road.
Early in July the fortress had been twice closely examined by Major
Smith, the engineer who had so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed
a plan of siege founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre
hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front and form a
breach with the same batteries, the works being at the same time
secured, except at low water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to
be constructed on the left of that river, were to rake the line
of defence in which the breach was to be formed; and against the
castle and its outworks he relied principally upon vertical fire,
instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in proof
of its efficacy. This plan would probably have reduced San Sebastian
in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men, and lord
Wellington approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy of the
vertical fire, ordered the siege to be commenced. He renewed his
approval afterwards when he had examined the works in person, and
all his orders were in the same spirit; but neither the plan nor his
orders were followed, the siege, which should have been an ordinary
event of war has obtained a mournful celebrity, and lord Wellington
has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the maxims of the
great masters of the art. Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet
he did not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules. _Take the
place in the quickest manner, yet do not from over speed fail to
take it_, was the sense of his instructions; but sir Thomas Graham,
one of England’s best soldiers, appears to have been endowed with a
genius for war intuitive rather than reflective; and this joined to
his natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, caused him at
times to abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less judicious
counsels of those about him who advised deviations from the original
plan.
Active operations were commenced on the night of the 10th by the
construction of two batteries against the convent and redoubt of San
Bartolomeo. And on the night of the 13th four batteries to contain
twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers, were
marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from six
hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the
town. The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore no parallel
of support was made, yet good trenches of communications, and
subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus
established. One on the right bank of the Urumea entrusted to the
unattached Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank to the fifth
division; but most of the troops were at first encamped on the right
bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in the event of
a general battle.
On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the
batteries of the left attack, under the direction of the German major
Hartman, opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into that
building. The besieged responded with musquetry from the redoubt,
with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece which they had
mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.
The 15th of July sir Richard Fletcher took the chief command of the
engineers, but major Smith retained the direction of the attack from
the Chofre Hills and lord Wellington’s orders continued to pass
through his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, aided
by some howitzers from the right of the Urumea, set the convent on
fire, silenced the musquetry of the besieged, and so damaged the
defences that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division
were ordered to feel the enemy’s post. They were however repulsed
with great loss, the French sallied, and the firing did not cease
until nightfall.
A battery for seven additional guns to play against Bartolomeo
was now commenced on the right of the Urumea, and the original
batteries set fire to the convent several times, but the flames were
extinguished by the garrison.
In the night of the 16th general Rey sounded the Urumea as high as
Santa Catalina, designing to pass over and storm the batteries on the
Chofres; but the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty
of execution deterred him from this project.
The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the assault was ordered
without waiting for the effect of the new battery raised on the other
side of the Urumea. The storming party was formed in two columns.
Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, supported by the light company
of the ninth British regiment and three companies of the royals,
composed the right, which under the direction of general Hay was
destined to assail the redoubt. General Bradford directed the left
which being composed of Portuguese, supported by three companies of
the ninth British regiment under colonel Cameron, was ordered to
assail the convent.
ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.
At ten o’clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders opened against
the redoubt; and a sharp fire of musquetry in return from the French,
who had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of San Martin,
announced their resolution to fight. The allied troops were assembled
behind the crest of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first
signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks,
and the supporting companies of the ninth regiment on each side,
passing through them fell upon the enemy with the usual impetuosity
of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron while leading his grenadiers
down the face of the hill was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the
horn-work, but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty yards from
the convent and there awaited the second signal. However his rapid
advance, which threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb,
joined to the fire of the two six-pounders and that of some other
field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French
to abandon the redoubt. Seeing this, Cameron jumped over the wall
and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the
latter a fierce struggle ensued and captain Woodman of the ninth was
killed in the upper room of a house after fighting his way up from
below; but the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that
the French, unable to explode some small mines they had prepared,
hastily joined the troops in the suburb. There however the fighting
continued and colonel Cameron’s force being very much reduced the
affair was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies of his
regiment, which he had sent for after the attack commenced, arrived,
and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won. At the right
attack the company of the ninth, although retarded by a ravine by a
thick hedge by the slowness of the Portuguese and by a heavy fire,
entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops
were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary to general
Oswald’s orders, and were beaten back by the enemy.
[Sidenote: Bellas Journaux des Sièges.]
The loss of the French was two hundred and forty men, that of the
allies considerable; the companies of the ninth under colonel
Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded,
and the operation although successful was an error. The battery
erected on the right bank of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore,
either the assault was precipitated or the battery not necessary; but
the loss justified the conception of the battery.
When the action ceased the engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt,
and commenced two batteries for eight pieces to rake the horn-work
and the eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries to contain
four sixty-eight-pound carronades and four ten-inch mortars were also
commenced on the right bank of the Urumea.
The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet
the raking fire of the besiegers, and the latter dragged four pieces
up the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other batteries on
the Monte Orgullo. In the night a lodgement was made on the ruins of
San Martin, the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two
additional mortars dragged up the Monte Olia.
The 19th all the batteries at both attacks were armed, and in the
night two approaches being commenced from the suburb of San Martin
towards the cask redoubt the French were driven from that small work.
On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened their fire, the
greatest part being directed to form the breach.
[Sidenote: Notes of the Siege by sir C. Smith, MSS.]
Major Smith’s plan was similar to that followed by marshal Berwick a
century before. He proposed a lodgement on the horn-work before the
breach should be assailed, but he had not then read the description
of that siege and therefore unknowingly fixed the breaching-point
precisely where the wall had been most strongly rebuilt after
Berwick’s attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one because
the wall did not resist the batteries very long, but it was a serious
matter that sir Thomas Graham at the suggestion of the commander
of the artillery began his operations by breaching. Major Smith
objected to it, and sir R. Fletcher acquiesced reluctantly on the
understanding that the ruining of the defences was only postponed, an
understanding afterwards unhappily forgotten.
The result of the first day’s attack was not satisfactory, the
weather proved bad, the guns mounted on ship carriages failed, one
twenty-four pounder was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another
became useless from an accident, a captain of engineers was killed,
and the besiegers’ shot had little effect upon the solid wall. In the
night however the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a
parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part of
the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of San
Martin and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed.
The 21st the besiegers’ batteries ceased firing to allow of a
summons, but the governor refused to receive the letter and the
firing was resumed. The main wall still resisted yet the parapets
and embrazures crumbled away fast, and the batteries on Monte Olia
plunged into the horn-work, although at sixteen hundred yards
distance, with such effect, that the besieged having no bomb-proofs
were forced to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire
directed solely against the breaching batteries was feeble, but
at midnight a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the
signal for a sally, and during the firing which ensued several
French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This night also
the besieged isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other
defences. On the other hand the besiegers’ parallel across the
isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth of a
drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing the pipe of the
aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening
lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept
even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, and finding the passage
there closed by a door returned without an accident. Thirty barrels
of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with
sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as
through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill
the narrow ditch of the horn-work.
[Sidenote: Plan 3.]
On the 22d the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its
rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in
the eastern flank wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las
Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now slackened, but the
descent into the town behind the breach was more than twelve feet
perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently
working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added
also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador
battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers
had placed four sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on
the defences of the breach, but the fire on both sides slackened
because the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with constant
practice.
On the 23d the sea blockade being null the French vessels returned
to France with the badly wounded men. This day the besiegers judging
the breach between the towers quite practicable turned the guns, at
the suggestion of general Oswald, to break the wall on the right of
the main breach. Major Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage
would be gained by making a second opening to get at which the troops
must first pass the great breach; that time would be thus uselessly
lost to the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection on
account of the tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His
counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall being
thin the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty feet wide was
rendered practicable.
The defensive fire of the besieged being now much diminished, the
ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight pound carronades were turned
upon the defences of the great breach, and upon a stockade which
separated the high curtain on the land front, from the lower works
of the flank against which the attack was conducted. The houses
near the breach were soon in flames which spread rapidly, destroyed
some of the defences of the besieged and menacing the whole town
with destruction. The assault was ordered for the next morning.
But when the troops assembled in the trenches the burning houses
appeared so formidable that the attack was deferred and the batteries
again opened, partly against the second breach, partly against the
defences, partly to break the wall in a third place between the half
bastion of St. John on the land front and the main breach.
[Sidenote: Bellas, &c.]
During the night the vigilant governor expecting the assault mounted
two field-pieces on the cavalier, in the centre of the land front,
which being fifteen feet above the other defences commanded the high
curtain, and they still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two
casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces
were mounted on an entrenchment which crossing the ditch of the
land front bore on the approaches to the main breach; a twenty-four
pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, between the main
breach and where the third opening was being made and consequently
flanking both; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; two
heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on
the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches from within
the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces were still
available for defence, the retaining sea-wall or _fausse braye_ which
strengthened the flank of the horn-work, and between which and the
river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered
with live shells to roll over on the columns, and behind the flaming
houses near the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled with
musqueteers. However the fire extending rapidly and fiercely greatly
injured the defences, the French to save their guns withdrew them
until the moment of attack, and the British artillery officers were
confident that in daylight they could silence the enemy’s guns and
keep the parapet clear of men; wherefore sir Thomas Graham renewed
the order for
THE ASSAULT.
In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth division filed
into the trenches on the isthmus. This force was composed of the
third battalion of the royals under major Frazer, destined to storm
the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment under colonel Greville,
designed to assail the lesser and most distant breach; the ninth
regiment under colonel Cameron, appointed to support the royals;
finally a detachment, selected from the light companies of all those
battalions, was placed in the centre of the royals under the command
of lieutenant Campbell of the ninth regiment. This chosen detachment,
accompanied by the engineer Machel with a ladder party, was intended
to sweep the high curtain after the breach should be won.
The distance from the trenches to the points of attack was more than
three hundred yards along the contracted space lying between the
retaining wall of the horn-work and the river; the ground was strewed
with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds; the tide had left large
and deep pools of water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire
as well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other works and
the two towers, which closely flanked the breach, although injured
were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished
with musqueteers. The difficulties of the attack were obvious, and
a detachment of Portuguese placed in a trench opened beyond the
parallel on the isthmus, within sixty yards of the ramparts, was
ordered to quell if possible the fire of the horn-work.
While it was still dark the storming columns moved out of the
trenches, and the globe of compression in the drain was exploded with
great effect against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work.
The garrison astonished by the unlooked-for event abandoned the
flanking parapet, and the troops rushed onwards, the stormers for
the main breach leading and suffering more from the fire of their
own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from the enemy. Major
Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones first reached the breach. The
enemy had fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the still
burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up expecting that
their troops would follow, but not many followed, for it was
extremely dark, the natural difficulties of the way had contracted
the front and disordered the column in its whole length, and the
soldiers, straggling and out of wind, arrived in small disconnected
parties at the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their
gallant leaders, but the depth of the descent into the town and the
volumes of flames and smoke which still issued from the burning
houses behind awed the stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the
storming column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken
off at the demi-bastion to commence a musquetry battle with the enemy
on the rampart. Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell
rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied and with a smashing
musquetry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of the
column, while the men in the towers smote them on the flanks; and
from every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing
the ranks in a dreadful manner.
Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones
stood there awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for
aid, but none came and he and those with him were struck down. The
engineer Machel had been killed early and the men bearing ladders
fell or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column was in absolute
confusion before the head was beaten. It was in vain that colonel
Greville of the thirty-eighth, colonel Cameron of the ninth, captain
Archimbeau of the royals, and many other regimental officers
exerted themselves to rally their discomfited troops and refill the
breach; it was in vain that lieutenant Campbell, breaking through
the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment,
mounted the ruins; twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all
around him died. The royals endeavouring to retire got intermixed
with the thirty-eighth, and with some companies of the ninth which
had unsuccessfully endeavoured to pass them and get to the lesser
breach. Then swayed by different impulses and pent up in the narrow
way between the horn-work and the river, the mass reeling to and fro
could neither advance nor go back until the shells and musquetry,
constantly plied both in front and flank, had thinned the concourse
and the trenches were regained in confusion. At daylight a truce
was agreed to for an hour, during which the French, who had already
humanely removed the gallant Jones and the other wounded men from the
breach, now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they should
be drowned by the rising of the tide.
Five officers of engineers including sir Richard Fletcher, and
forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and twenty men, had
been killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault the failure
of which was signal, yet the causes were obvious and may be classed
thus.
1º. Deviation from the original project of siege and from lord
Wellington’s instructions.
2º. Bad arrangements of detail.
3º. Want of vigour in the execution.
In respect of the first, lord Wellington having visited the Chofre
trenches on the 22d confirmed his former approval of Smith’s plan,
and gave that officer final directions for the attack finishing thus,
“_Fair daylight must be taken for the assault_.” These instructions
and their emphatic termination were repeated by major Smith in the
proper quarter, but they were not followed, no lodgement was made
on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire both in front and
flank, and the assault was made in darkness. Major Smith had also,
by calculation and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained
that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at day-break on the 24th;
but the assault was made the 25th, and then before daylight, when the
water being too high contracted the ground, increased the obstacles,
and forced the assaulting column to march on a narrow front and a
long line, making an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead
of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. In fine the rules
of art being neglected and no extraordinary resource substituted the
operation failed.
[Sidenote: Notes on the siege, by sir C. Smith, MSS.]
The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches in the night, a
tedious operation, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape
from their own batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to
keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased when the globe of
compression was sprung in the drain, but owing to the darkness and
the noise the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The effect
of it however drove the enemy from the horn-work, the Portuguese
on that side advanced to the ditch, and a vigorous escalade would
probably have succeeded but they had no ladders. Again the stormers
of the great breach marched first, filling up the way and rendering
the second breach, as major Smith had foretold, useless, and the
ladder-bearers never got to their destination. The attack was
certainly ill-digested, and there was a neglect of moral influence
followed by its natural consequence want of vigour in execution.
The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the 25th expressly
because the breach was too difficult rendered the troops uneasy,
they suspected some hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from
the trenches they were struck by the fire of their own batteries;
then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark
over slippery rocks, and close under the enemy’s flanking works
whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest
their natural conquering energy? It is possible that a second and
more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected
by a recognized leader, but no general or staff officer went out
of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of the
regimental officers were unavailing. Nor were there wanting other
sinister influences. General Oswald had in the councils earnestly and
justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack,
but this anticipation of ill success, in which other officers of rank
joined, was freely expressed out of council, and it said even in the
hearing of the troops abating that daring confidence which victory
loves.
Lord Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian. The causes
of the failure were apparent and he would have renewed the attack,
but wanting ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional
ordnance which he had written for to England as early as the 26th of
June should arrive. The next day other events caused him to resort
to a blockade and the battering train was transported to Passages,
two guns and two howitzers only being retained on the Chofres and
the Monte Olia. This operation was completed in the night of the
26th, but at day-break the garrison made a sally from the horn-work,
surprised the trenches and swept off two hundred Portuguese and
thirty British soldiers. To avoid a repetition of this disaster the
guards of the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, and
patroles only were sent out, yet one of those also was cut off on
the 1st of August. Thus terminated the first part of the siege of
San Sebastian in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers and
seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabal’s blockade.
CHAPTER IV.
The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of June.
[Sidenote: 1813. July.]
The 1st of July marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden,
succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor, who thus shewed how
little his mind had been affected by his brother’s accusations.
The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed
the command of the armies of the “_north_,” the “_centre_” and the
“_south_” now reorganised in one body, called “_the army of Spain_.”
And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary,
but that monarch voluntarily retired from the army.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
At this period general Paris remained at Jaca, as belonging to
Suchet’s command, but Clauzel had entered France, and the “_army of
Spain_,” reinforced from the interior, was composed of nine divisions
of infantry, a reserve, and two regular divisions of cavalry besides
the light horsemen attached to the infantry. Following the imperial
muster-rolls this army, including the garrisons and thirteen German
Italian and Spanish battalions not belonging to the organisation,
amounted to one hundred and fourteen thousand men; and as the armies
of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered at the same period above
sixty-six thousand, the whole force still employed against Spain
exceeded one hundred and eighty thousand men with twenty thousand
horses; and of this number one hundred and fifty-six thousand were
present under arms, while in Germany and Poland above seven hundred
thousand French soldiers were in activity.
Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed sufficient to defy the
world, but moral power which he has himself described as constituting
three-fourths of military strength, that power which puny essayists
declaiming for their hour against the genius of warriors, are unable
to comprehend although by far the most important part of the art
which they decry, was wanting. One half of this force, organized
in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning of a war,
would have enabled Napoleon to conquer; but now, near the close
of a terrible struggle, with a declining fate and the national
confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although that genius
was never more surpassingly displayed, his military power was a
vast but unsound machine. The public mind was bewildered by the
intricacy and greatness of combinations the full scope of which he
alone could see clearly, and generals and ministers doubted and
feared when they should have supported him, neglecting their duty or
coldly executing his orders when their zeal should have redoubled.
The unity of impulse so essential to success was thus lost, and his
numerous armies carried not with them proportionate strength. To have
struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely
to be expected from the greatest minds, but like the emperor, to
calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and
accuracy, to seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity,
to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy, never urged to
rashness by despair yet enterprizing to the utmost verge of daring
consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so
surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called,
in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of
mankind.
The suddenness, as well as the completeness, of the destruction
caused by the snows of Russia, had shattered the emperor’s military
and political system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered
widely, were useless until he could again bind them together. To
effect this he rushed with a raw army into the midst of Germany, for
his hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for his veterans,
who having survived the Russian winter and the succeeding pestilence
were widely dispersed. His first effort was successful, but without
good cavalry victory cannot be pushed far, and the practised horsemen
of France had nearly disappeared; their successors badly mounted
and less skilful were too few and too weak, and thus extraordinary
exertion was required from soldiers, whose youth and inexperience
rendered them unfit even for the ordinary hardships of war.
The measure of value for Wellington’s campaign is thus attained, for
if Joseph had opposed him with only moderate ability and had avoided
a great battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could have
been drawn off to reinforce and give stability to the young soldiers
in Germany. On the side of Spain those veterans were indeed still
numerous, but the spirit of the French people behind them almost
worn out by victory, was now abashed by defeat, and even the military
men who had acquired grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were
with few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon’s astonishing
firmness of mind was understood by few in high stations, shared by
fewer; and many were the traitors to him and to France and to the
glories of both. However his power was still enormous, and wherever
he led in person his brave and faithful soldiers, fighting with the
true instinct of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their iron
hardihood abated.
Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose indefatigable energy
rendered them worthy lieutenants of the emperor; and with singular
zeal, vigour and ability he now served. His troops, nominally above
one hundred thousand men ninety-seven thousand being present under
arms with eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available
for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna, San Sebastian,
Santona, and Bayonne, together with the foreign battalions, absorbed
seventeen thousand; and most of the latter had orders to regain their
own countries with a view to form the new levies. The permanent
“_army of Spain_” furnished therefore only seventy-seven thousand
five hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of which were
cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory. The people on the
frontier were flying from the allies, the military administration was
disorganized, and the recent disasters had discouraged the soldiers
and deteriorated their discipline. Under these circumstances Soult
was desirous of some delay to secure his base and restore order ere
he attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions on that
point were imperative.
Napoleon’s system was perfectly adapted for great efforts, civil
or military; but so rapid had been lord Wellington’s advance from
Portugal, so decisive his operations that the resources of France
were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army still reeled and
rocked from the blows it had received. Bayonne, a fortress of no
great strength in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the
arming and provisioning that and other places was indispensible.
The restoration of an entrenched camp originally traced by Vauban
to cover Bayonne followed, and the enforcement of discipline,
the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, civil
administrators, and other wasteful followers of Joseph’s court, the
arrangement of a general system for supply of money and provisions,
aided by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and
excite the national spirit, were amongst the first indications that
a great commander was in the field. The soldiers’ confidence soon
revived and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the
general; but the people of the south were generally more inclined to
avoid the burthen of defending their country than to answer appeals
to their patriotism.
On the 14th Soult examined the line of military positions, and
ordered Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar,
to prepare pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at
Biriatou. That general as we have seen was driven from those passes
the next day, but he prepared his bridges; and such was Soult’s
activity that on the 16th all the combinations for a gigantic
offensive movement were digested, the means of executing it rapidly
advancing, and orders were issued for the preliminary dispositions.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
At this time the French army was divided into three corps of battle,
and a reserve. Clauzel commanding the left wing was at St. Jean Pied
de Port and in communication, by the French frontier, with general
Paris at Jaca. Drouet, count D’Erlon, commanding the centre, occupied
the heights near Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advanced guard behind
Urdax. General Reille commanding the right wing was in position on
the mountains overlooking Vera from the side of France. The reserve
under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light horsemen and the
foreign battalions, guarded the banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth
upwards to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. The
division of heavy cavalry under Trielhard, and that of light cavalry
under Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, were on the banks of the
Nive and the Adour.
The counter-disposition of the allies was as follows.
Byng’s brigade of British infantry, detached from the second division
and reinforced by Morillo’s Spaniards, was on the extreme right.
These troops had early in June driven the French from the village
of Valcarlos in the valley of that name, and had foraged the French
territory, but finding no good permanent position, retreated again to
the rocks in front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta.
On the left of Byng, Campbell’s brigade detached from Hamilton’s
Portuguese division, was posted in the Alduides and supported by
general Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret in the
valley of Urroz.
On the left of Campbell general Hill defended the Bastan with the
remainder of the second division, and with Hamilton’s Portuguese,
now commanded by Sylveira, Conde D’Amarante. Picton, with the third
division, was stationed at Olague as a reserve to those troops and to
Cole.
On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions occupied a chain
of mountains running by Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town
of San Estevan was posted the sixth division.
Longa’s Spaniards continued the line of defence from Vera to general
Giron’s position, which extending along the mountains bordering the
Bidassoa to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun. Behind Giron was
the besieging army under sir Thomas Graham.
Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments of British
and Portuguese cavalry, were with the right wing and centre, but the
bulk of the horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the mountains,
chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals were in Vittoria, the
commissariat depôts were principally on the coast, and to supply the
troops in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and onerous.
Henry O’Donnel, Conde de la Bispal, blockaded Pampeluna with the
Andalusian army of reserve, and Carlos D’España’s division was on the
march to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, Goyan and
some smaller bands, were on the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting
the communication between Soult and Suchet, and the latter, thinking
Aragon lost, was, as we have seen, falling back upon Catalonia.
[Sidenote: Appendix, 7.]
[Sidenote: Notes by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.]
The whole force under lord Wellington’s immediate command, that is
to say in Navarre and Guipuscoa, was certainly above one hundred
thousand men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty-seven
thousand present under arms, seven thousand being cavalry; but the
Spanish regulars under Giron, Labispal and Carlos D’España, including
Longa’s division and some of Mendizabal’s army, scarcely amounted
to twenty-five thousand. According to the respective muster-rolls,
the troops in line actually under arms and facing each other, were,
of the allies, about eighty-two thousand, of the French about
seventy-eight thousand; but as the rolls of the latter include every
man and officer of all arms belonging to the organization, and the
British and Portuguese rolls so quoted, would furnish between ten
and twelve thousand additional combatants, the French force must be
reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. This surplus
was however now compensated by the foreign battalions temporarily
attached to Soult’s army, and by the numerous national guards, all
mountaineers, fierce warlike and very useful as guides. In other
respects lord Wellington stood at a disadvantage.
The theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with sides from forty to
sixty miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port,
St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the
French at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented by dreadful
mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep water-courses, precipices and
forests, would at first sight appear a wilderness which no military
combinations could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular and
partizan operations. But the great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees
furnishes a clue to the labyrinth of hills and valleys. Running
diagonally across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne St. Jean
Pied de Port and San Sebastian from Pampeluna, and thus the portion
of the allied army which more especially belonged to the blockade
of Pampeluna, was in a manner cut off from that which belonged to
the siege of San Sebastian. They were distinct armies, each having
its particular object, and the only direct communication between
them was the great road running behind the mountains from Toloza, by
Irurzun, to Pampeluna. The centre of the allies was indeed an army
of succour and connection, but of necessity very much scattered, and
with lateral communications so few, difficult and indirect as to
prevent any unity of movement; nor could general Hill’s corps move
at all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against one of the
extremities, lest the most direct gun-road to Pampeluna which it
covered should be unwarily opened to the enemy. In short the French
general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads concentrate
against any part of the English general’s line, which, necessarily
a passively defensive one, followed an irregular trace of more than
fifty miles of mountains.
Wellington having his battering train and stores about San
Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessible to the enemy
than Pampeluna, made his army lean towards that side. His left
wing, including the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand strong
with singularly strong positions of defence, and the centre, about
twenty-four thousand strong, could in two marches unite with the left
wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of an enemy advancing
by the high road of Irun; but three days or more were required by
those troops to concentrate for the security of the blockade on the
right. Soult however judged that no decisive result would attend a
direct movement upon San Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted
of provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on his flank
before he reached Ernani, which, his attack in front failing, would
place him in a dangerous position. Moreover by means of his sea
communication he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity; but he
had no communication with Pampeluna and feared its fall. Wherefore he
resolved to operate by his left.
Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, and covering
his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers and by the positions of
his centre, he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right quicker than
that general could gather to oppose him, and thus compensating by
numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions force a way
to Pampeluna. That fortress once succoured, he designed to seize the
road of Irurzun, and keeping in mass either fall upon the separated
divisions of the centre in detail as they descended from the hills,
or operate on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, while
a corps of observation, which he proposed to leave on the Lower
Bidassoa, menaced it in front and followed it in retreat. The siege
of San Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna and probably that of
Santona, would be thus raised, and the French army united in an
abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured, would
be free either to co-operate with that marshal or to press its own
attack.
In this view, and to mislead lord Wellington by vexing his right
simultaneously with the construction of the bridges against his
left, Soult wrote to general Paris, desiring him to march when time
suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards Aviz or Sanguessa,
to drive the partizans from that side and join the left of the army
when it should have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clauzel was directed
to repair the roads in his own front, to push the heads of his
columns towards the passes of Roncesvalles, and by sending a strong
detachment into the Val de Baygorry, towards the lateral pass of
Yspegui, to menace Hill’s flank which was at that pass, and the front
of Campbell’s brigade in the Alduides.
On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights above Vera and Sarre,
being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched through Cambo towards
St. Jean Pied de Port. They were to reach the latter early on the
22d, and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and the park
of artillery were to be concentrated at the same place. D’Erlon with
the centre meanwhile still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoüe
or Ainhoa, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the great movements
taking place behind.
Villatte who including the foreign battalions had eighteen thousand
troops on the rolls, furnishing about fifteen thousand sabres and
bayonets, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened
by superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass upon the
entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne, yet halting successively on
the positions of Bordegain in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the
heights of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially directed
to shew only French troops at the advanced posts, and if the
assailants made a point with a small corps, to drive them vigorously
over the Bidassoa again. But if the allies should in consequence
of Soult’s operations against their right retire, Villatte was to
relieve San Sebastian and to follow them briskly by Tolosa.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Rapidity was of vital importance to the French general, but heavy
and continued rains swelled the streams, and ruined the roads in
the deep country between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters,
which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th,
only reached Olhonce, a few miles short of that place, the 21st;
and Reille’s troops unable to make way at all by Cambo took the
longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded in like manner,
and the whole army, men and horses, were worn down by the severity
of the marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th more than
sixty thousand fighting men including cavalry national guards and
gensd’armes, with sixty-six pieces of artillery, were assembled to
force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The main road leading to
the former was repaired, three hundred sets of bullocks were provided
to draw the guns up the mountain, and the national guards of the
frontier on the left were ordered to assemble in the night on the
heights of Yropil, to be reinforced on the morning of the 25th by
detachments of regular troops with a view to vex and turn the right
of the allies which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta.
Such were Soult’s first dispositions, but as mountain warfare is
complicated in the extreme, it will be well to consider more in
detail the relative positions and objects of the hostile forces and
the nature of the country.
It has been already stated that the great spine of the hills,
trending westward, run diagonally across the theatre of operations.
From this spine huge ridges shot out on either hand, and the
communications between the valleys thus formed on both sides of
the main chain passed over certain comparatively low places called
“_cols_” by the French, and _puertos_ by the Spaniards. The Bastan,
the Val Carlos, and the Val de Baygorry the upper part of which is
divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, were on the French
side of the great chain; on the Spanish side were the valleys of
Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley of Iscua or Roncesvalles, the valley
of Urros, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, the two latter
leading down directly upon Pampeluna which stands within two miles
of the junction of their waters. Such being the relative situations
of the valleys, the disposition, and force, of the armies, shall now
be traced from left to right of the French, and from right to left
of the allies. But first it must be observed that the main chain,
throwing as it were a shoulder forward from Roncesvalles towards
St. Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish valley of
Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, in the power of Soult, who could thus by Yropil
turn the extreme right of his adversary with detachments, although
not with an army.
_Val Carlos._—Two issues led from this valley over the main chain,
namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri passes; and there was also the
lateral pass of Atalosti leading into the Alduides, all comprised
within a space of two or three miles.
The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, ascending
the left-hand ridge or boundary of Val Carlos, runs along the crest
until it joins the superior chain of mountains, and then along the
summit of that also until it reaches the pass of Ibañeta, whence it
descends to Roncesvalles. Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish
end of the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a narrow
road, leading through Arnegui and the village of Val Carlos, ascends
directly to Ibañeta and falls into the main road behind it.
Clauzel’s three divisions of infantry, all the artillery and the
cavalry were formed in two columns in front of St. Jean Pied de
Port. The head of one was placed on some heights above Arnegui about
two miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head of the other at
the Venta de Orrisson, on the main road and within two miles of the
remarkable rocks of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow
way descended on the right to the village of Val Carlos, and another
on the left to the foundry of Orbaiceta.
On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near the rock of Ayrola,
Reille’s divisions were concentrated, with orders to ascend that rock
at daylight, and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant
point of the great chain called the Lindouz, which gained, Reille
was to push detachments through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri
to the villages of Roncesvalles and Espinal. He was, at the same
time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga immediately on
his right, and even approach the more distant passes of Renecabal
and Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides, and menacing
those from the Bastan.
[Sidenote: Plan, No. 2.]
_Val de Ayra._ _The Alduides._ _Val de Baygorry._ The ridge of
Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille’s troops were posted, separates
Val Carlos from these valleys which must be designated by the general
name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the Val de Baygorry for
the lower. The issues from the Alduides over the great chain towards
Spain were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there was also a
road running from the village of Alduides through the Atalosti pass
to Ibañeta a distance of eight miles, by which general Campbell’s
brigade communicated with and could join Byng and Morillo.
_Bastan._ This district, including the valley of Lerins and the Cinco
Villas, is separated from the Alduides and Val de Baygorry by the
lofty mountain of La Houssa, on which the national guards of the Val
de Baygorry and the Alduides were ordered to assemble on the night
of the 24th, and to light fires so as to make it appear a great body
was menacing the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan however does not
belong to the same geographical system as the other valleys. Instead
of opening to the French territory it is entirely enclosed with high
mountains, and while the waters of the Val Carlos, the Alduides, and
Val de Baygorry run off northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan
run off westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are separated by
the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola
and other mountains.
The entrances to the Bastan with reference to the position of the
French army, were by the passes of Vera and Echallar on its right;
by the Col de Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the left
by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and Berderez, which
lead from the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides. The issues over
the principal chain of the Pyrenees in the direct line from the
Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and Bellate; the first
leading into the valley of Zubiri, the second into the valley of
Lanz. There was also the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de
Zubiri, but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads through
the Bastan were crossed by strong positions dangerous to assail.
The Col de Maya comprised several passages in a space of four miles,
all of which were menaced by D’Erlon from Espelete and Urdax; and
he had twenty-one thousand men, furnishing about eighteen thousand
bayonets. His communications with Soult were maintained by cavalry
posts through the Val de Baygorry, and his orders were to attack the
allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and on the Houssa
mountain should cause them to abandon the passes at Maya; but he
was especially directed to operate by his left, so as to secure the
passes leading towards Reille with a view to the concentration of the
whole army. Thus if Hill retreated by the pass of Bellate D’Erlon was
to move by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired upon San
Estevan D’Erlon was to move by the pass of Bellate. Such being the
dispositions of the French general, those of the allies shall now be
traced.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.]
General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes in front of Roncesvalles.
Their combined force consisted of sixteen hundred British and from
three to four thousand Spaniards. Byng’s brigade and two Spanish
battalions occupied the rocks of Altobiscar on the high road facing
Chateau Piñon; one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the
valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the remainder of
the Spaniards occupied the heights of Iroulepe, on the left of the
road leading to the village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest
houses of that straggling place.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.]
These positions, distant only four and five miles from the French
columns assembled at Venta de Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure.
The ground was indeed steep and difficult of access but too
extensive; moreover, although the passes led into the Roncesvalles
that valley did not lead direct to Pampeluna; the high road after
descending a few miles turned to the right, and crossing two ridges
and the intervening valley of Urros entered the valley of Zubiri,
down which it was conducted to Pampeluna: wherefore after passing
Ibañeta in retreat the allied troops could not avoid lending their
right flank to Reille’s divisions as far as Viscayret in the valley
of Urroz. It was partly to obviate this danger, partly to support
O’Donnel while Clauzel’s force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the
fourth division, about six thousand strong, occupied Viscayret, six
miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten miles from Morillo’s position,
and twelve miles from Byng’s position. But when Clauzel retired to
France, general Cole was directed to observe the roads leading over
the main chain from the Alduides district, and to form a rallying
point and reserve for Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions
being to maintain the Roncesvalles passes against a front attack, but
not to commit his troops in a desperate battle if the flanks were
insecure.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell’s Portuguese, about two
thousand strong, were encamped above the village of Alduides on a
mountain called Mizpira. They observed the national guards of the
Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication between Byng and Hill,
and in some measure covered the right flank of the latter. From
the Alduides Campbell could retreat through the pass of Sahorgain
upon Viscayret in the valley of Urroz, and through the passes of
Urtiaga and Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally by the
lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng and the fourth division.
The communication between all these posts was maintained by Long’s
cavalry.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s States.]
Continuing the line of positions to the left, general Hill occupied
the Bastan with the second British division, Sylveira’s Portuguese,
and some squadrons of horse, but Byng’s and Campbell’s brigades being
detached, he had not more than nine thousand sabres and bayonets.
His two British brigades under general William Stewart guarded the
Col de Maya; Sylveira’s Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of
Stewart, observing the passes of Arrieta, Yspegui and Elliorita; of
which the two former were occupied by Major Brotherton’s cavalry
and by the sixth Caçadores. The direct line of retreat and point of
concentration for all these troops was Elizondo.
From Elizondo the route of Pampeluna over the great chain was by
the pass of Bellate and the valley of Lanz. The latter running
nearly parallel with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by
a wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there were but three
communications: the one high up, leading from Lanz to Eugui, and
prolonged from thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urros; the other
two lower down, leading from Ostiz and Olague to the village of
Zubiri. At Olague the third division, furnishing four thousand three
hundred bayonets under Picton, was posted ready to support Cole or
Hill as occasion required.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Morning States.]
Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart’s position at
the Col de Maya, the trace run along the mountains forming the
French boundary of the Bastan. It comprized the passes of Echallar
and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under lord Dalhousie,
and by the light division under general Charles Alten. The former
furnishing four thousand seven hundred bayonets communicated with
general Stewart by a narrow road over the Atchiola mountain, and the
eighty-second regiment was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo
road, about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The light division,
four thousand strong, was at Vera, guarding the roads which led
behind the mountains through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
These two divisions being only observed by the left wing of
Villatte’s reserve were available for the succour of either wing,
and behind them, at the town of San Estevan, was the sixth division
of six thousand bayonets, now under general Pack. Placed at equal
distances from Vera and Maya, having free communication with both
and a direct line of march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the
Pyrenees by the _Puerto de Arraiz_, sometimes called the pass of
_Doña Maria_, this division was available for any object and could
not have been better posted.
Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the lines of march
converged, the Spanish troops under O’Donnel maintained the blockade,
and they were afterwards joined by Carlos D’España’s division at
a very critical moment. Thus reinforced they amounted to eleven
thousand, of which seven thousand could be brought into action
without abandoning the works of blockade.
Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of correspondence with
the left wing was over the Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by
San Estevan, Elizondo and the Alduides. The line of correspondence
between sir Thomas Graham and Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high
road of Irurzun.
As the French were almost in contact with the allies’ positions
at Roncesvalles, which was also the point of defence nearest to
Pampeluna, it followed that on the rapidity or slowness with which
Soult overcame resistance in that quarter depended his success; and a
comparative estimate of numbers and distances will give the measure
of his chances.
Clauzel’s three divisions furnished about sixteen thousand bayonets,
besides the cavalry, the artillery, and the national guards menacing
the valley of Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore with five
thousand infantry, to sustain the assault of sixteen thousand until
Cole could reinforce them; but Cole being twelve miles distant could
not come up in fighting order under four or five hours. And as
Reille’s divisions, of equal strength with Clauzel’s, could before
that time seize the Lindouz and turn the left, it was clear the
allied troops, although increased to eleven thousand by the junction
of the fourth division, must finally abandon their ground to seek a
new field of battle where the third division could join them from
the valley of Lanz, and Campbell’s brigade from the Alduides. Thus
raised to seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets with some guns,
they might on strong ground oppose Clauzel and Reille’s thirty
thousand; but as Picton’s position at Olague was more than a day’s
march from Byng’s position at Altobiscar, their junction could
only be made in the valley of the Zubiri and not very distant from
Pampeluna. And when seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and
two or three thousand cavalry from the side of the Ebro are added, we
have the full measure of the allies’ strength in this quarter.
General Hill, menaced by D’Erlon with a very superior force, and
having the pass of Maya, half a day’s march further from Pampeluna
than the passes of Roncesvalles, to defend, could not give ready
help. If he retreated rapidly D’Erlon could follow as rapidly, and
though Picton and Cole would thus be reinforced with ten thousand
men Soult would gain eighteen thousand. Hill could not however move
until he knew that Byng and Cole were driven from the Roncesvalles
passes; in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he maintained
the passes at Maya and affairs went wrong near Pampeluna, his own
situation would be imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irrueta,
his next position, the same danger was to be dreaded; and the passes
of Maya once abandoned, D’Erlon, moving by his own left towards the
Alduides, could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri before Hill could
join Cole and Picton by the valley of Lanz. But if Hill did not
maintain the position of Irrueta D’Erlon could follow and cut the
sixth and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. The extent
and power of Soult’s combinations are thus evinced. Hill forced to
await orders and hampered by the operations of D’Erlon, required,
it might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna; but D’Erlon
after gaining Maya could in one day and a half, by the passes of
Berderez and Urtiaga, join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile
Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would be exposed to the
operations of double their own numbers; and however firm and able
individually those generals might be, they could not when suddenly
brought together be expected to seize the whole system of operations
and act with that decision and nicety of judgment which the occasion
demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill’s force must be in some
measure paralyzed at first, and finally thrown with the sixth,
seventh, and light divisions, upon an external line of operations
while the French moved upon internal lines.
On the other hand it is also clear that the corps of Byng, Morillo,
Campbell, Cole, Picton, and Hill were only pieces of resistance on
Lord Wellington’s board, and that the sixth, seventh, and light
divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was
however a great difference in their value. The light division and the
seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest distance from
Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and certain points to guard,
were, the seventh division a day, the light division two days, behind
the sixth division, which was quite free to move at an instant’s
notice and was, the drag of D’Erlon’s corps considered, a day nearer
to Pampeluna than Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this
well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. If it arrived in
time, nearly thirty thousand infantry with sufficient cavalry and
artillery would be established, under the immediate command of the
general-in-chief, on a position of strength to check the enemy until
the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the
troops were there gathered and fought shall now be shown.
CHAPTER V.
BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.
[Sidenote: 1813. July.]
[Sidenote: Plan 3.]
_Combat of Roncesvalles._—On the 23d Soult issued an order of the day
remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the
leading events of the past campaign, he shewed that the disasters
sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the
soldiers whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty
courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been, by
writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of
a courageous enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his ultimate
operations at this time, but the calumny is refuted by the following
passage from his dispatch to the minister at war.
“_I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if I succeed in relieving
it I will operate towards my right to embarrass the enemy’s troops in
Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join me,
which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen I
will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack
or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be
temerity._”
It is true that conscious of superior abilities he did not suppress
the sentiment of his own worth as a commander, but he was too proud
to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle.
“_Let us not_,” he said, “_defraud the enemy of the praise which
is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt,
skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his troops
have been praiseworthy_.”
Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops he put himself at the
head of Clauzel’s divisions, and on the 25th at daylight led them up
against the rocks of Altobiscar.
General Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and
jealous of some hostile indications towards the village of Val
Carlos, had sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there but kept the
rest of his men well in hand and gave notice to general Cole who
had made a new disposition of his troops. Ross’s brigade was now at
Espinal two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from the pass
of Ibañeta, and eleven from Byng’s position, but somewhat nearer to
Morillo. Anson’s brigade was close behind Ross, Stubbs’ Portuguese
behind Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoain.
Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult, throwing out a
multitude of skirmishers and pushing forward his supporting columns
and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature
of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force Byng’s position;
but the British general, undismayed at the multitude of assailants,
fought strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their
rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of
battle elevated five thousand feet above the level of the plains.
Their numbers however continually increased in front, and the
national guards from Yropil, reinforced by Clauzel’s detachments,
skirmished with the Spanish battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta
and threatened to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the same time
menaced from Arnegui, and Reille’s divisions ascending the rock of
Airola turned Morillo’s left.
About mid-day general Cole arrived at Altobiscar, but his brigades
were still distant, and the French renewing their attack neglected
the Val Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng. He
resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress along the
summit of the Airola ridge. Morillo then fell back towards Ibañeta,
and the French were already nearer to that pass than the troops
at Altobiscar were, when Ross’s brigade, coming up the pass of
Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the Lindouz, at the instant when the
head of Reille’s column being close to Atalosti was upon the point
of cutting the communication with Campbell. This officer’s picquets
had been attacked early in the morning by the national guards of the
Val de Baygorry, but he soon discovered that it was only a feint
and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti when he heard
the firing on that side. His march was secured by the Val d’Ayra
which separated him from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was
advancing, but noting that general’s strength, and at the same time
seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up the steep ridge of Mendichuri,
Campbell judged that the latter was ignorant of what was going on
above. Wherefore sending advice of the enemy’s proximity and strength
to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti and join in the battle if he
could be furnished with transport for his sick, and provisions on
the new line of operations.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.]
Before this message could reach Cole, the head of Ross’s column,
composed of a wing of the twentieth regiment and a company of
Brunswickers, was on the summit of the Lindouz, where most
unexpectedly it encountered Reille’s advanced guard. The moment was
critical, but Ross an eager hardy soldier called aloud to charge,
and captain Tovey of the twentieth running forward with his company
crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the front of the
sixth French light infantry dashed with the bayonet. Brave men fell
by that weapon on both sides, but numbers prevailing these daring
soldiers were pushed back again by the French, Ross however gained
his object, the remainder of his brigade had come up and the pass of
Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and forty men of
the twentieth regiment and forty-one of the Brunswickers.
Previous to this vigorous action general Cole seeing the French in
the Val Carlos and in the valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say on both
flanks of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had ordered
Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the foundry, and Stubbs to enter
the Val Carlos in support of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson
to assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from Campbell how
strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to
relinquish his advanced position at Altobiscar and take a second
nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the road leading down to
the foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentrated all the troops, and
at the same time general Campbell, although he could not enter the
line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply his demands, made
so skilful a display of his Portuguese as to impress Reille with the
notion that their numbers were considerable.
During these movements the skirmishing of the light troops continued,
but a thick fog coming up the valley prevented Soult from making
dispositions for a general attack with his six divisions, and when
night fell general Cole still held the great chain of the mountains
with a loss of only three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded.
His right was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had but ten or eleven
thousand bayonets to oppose to thirty thousand, and his line of
retreat being for four or five miles down hill and flanked all the
way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. Wherefore putting
the troops silently in march after dark, he threaded the passes
and gained the valley of Urros. His rear-guard composed of Anson’s
brigade followed in the morning, general Campbell retired from the
Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to Eugui in the valley of Zubiri,
and the Spanish battalion retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta
by the narrow way of Navala rejoined Morillo near Espinal. The great
chain was thus abandoned, but the result of the day’s operation was
unsatisfactory to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of four
hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and from the passes now
abandoned, to Pampeluna, the distance was not less than twenty-two
miles, with strong defensive positions in the way where increasing
numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected.
[Sidenote: Pellot, Mémoires des Campagnes des Pyrennées.]
Soult’s combinations, contrived for greater success, had been
thwarted, partly by fortune, partly by errors of execution the like
of which all generals must expect, and the most experienced are the
most resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The interference
of fortune was felt in the fog which rose at the moment when he
was ready to thrust forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The
failure in execution was Reille’s tardy movement. His orders were to
gain with all expedition the Lindouz, that is to say the knot tying
the heads of the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncesvalles, and
the valley of Urroz. From that position he would have commanded the
Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta and Sahorgain passes, and by moving
along the crest of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal,
and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell’s and Hill’s lines of
retreat. But when he should have ascended the rocks of Airola he
halted to incorporate two newly arrived conscript battalions and
to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would have sufficed
to seize the Lindouz before general Ross got through the pass of
Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of the French
columns to the extent designed by Soult, but fifteen or sixteen
thousand men, placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would
have separated them from the fourth division, and forced the latter
to retreat beyond Viscayret.
[Sidenote: Official Despatch to the Minister of war, MSS.]
Soult however overrated the force opposed to him, supposing it
to consist of two British divisions, besides Byng’s brigade and
Morillo’s Spaniards. He was probably deceived by the wounded men, who
hastily questioned on the field would declare they belonged to the
second and fourth divisions, because Byng’s brigade was part of the
former; but that general and the Spaniards had without aid sustained
Soult’s first efforts, and even when the fourth division came up,
less than eleven thousand men, exclusive of sergeants and officers,
were present in the fight. Campbell’s Portuguese never entered the
line at all, the remainder of the second division was in the Bastan,
and the third division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.
On the 26th the French general put Clauzel’s wing on the track
of Cole, and ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains
and seize the passes leading from the Bastan in Hill’s rear while
D’Erlon pressed him in front. That general would thus, Soult hoped,
be crushed or thrown on the side of San Estevan; D’Erlon could then
reach his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the right
descended the valley of Lanz and prevented Picton quitting it to aid
Cole. A retreat by those generals and on separate lines would thus be
inevitable, and the French army could issue forth in a compact order
of battle from the mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna.
COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.
All the columns were in movement at day-break, but every hour brought
its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille’s
guides, bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, and
at ten o’clock having no other resource he marched down the pass of
Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and
artillery following Clauzel’s divisions. Meanwhile Soult, although
retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook
Cole’s rear-guard in front of Viscayret. The leading troops struck
hotly upon some British light companies incorporated under the
command of colonel Wilson of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron
passing round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson facing about,
drove off these horsemen and thus fighting, Cole, about two o’clock,
reached the heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where
general Picton met him with intelligence that Campbell had reached
Eugui from the Alduides, and that the third division having crossed
the hills from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all these troops
was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and
neither wounded men nor baggage had been left behind. However the
French gathered in front and at four o’clock seized some heights on
the allies’ left which endangered their position, wherefore again
falling back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge separating the
valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. During this skirmish Campbell
coming from Eugui shewed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right
flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton’s troops were
still at Zubiri, and there was light for an action. Soult however
disturbed with intelligence received from D’Erlon, and perhaps
doubtful what Campbell’s troops might be, put off the attack until
next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was
effected.
[Sidenote: Edouard de LaPene Campagne 1813, 1814.]
This delay on the part of the French general seems injudicious. Cole
was alone for five hours. Every action, by increasing the number of
wounded men and creating confusion in the rear, would have augmented
the difficulties of the retreat; and the troops were fatigued with
incessant fighting and marching for two days and one night. Moreover
the alteration of Reille’s march, occasioned by the fog, had reduced
the chances dependant on the primary combinations to the operations
of D’Erlon’s corps, but the evening reports brought the mortifying
conviction that he also had gone wrong, and by rough fighting only
could Soult now attain his object. It is said that his expressions
discovered a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper was
too stedfast to yield for he gave the signal to march the next day,
and more strongly renewed his orders to D’Erlon whose operations must
now be noticed.
That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing twenty-one
thousand men of which about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early
on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of them behind some
heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards
of Baygorry to make previous demonstrations towards the passes of
Arriette, Yspeguy, and Lorietta. No change had been made in the
disposition of general Hill’s force, but general Stewart, deceived by
the movements of the national guards, looked towards Sylveira’s posts
on the right rather than to his own front; his division, consisting
of two British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should
be nor otherwise prepared for an attack. The ground to be defended
was indeed very strong, but however rugged a mountain position may
be, if it is too extensive for the troops or those troops are not
disposed with judgment, the very inequalities constituting its
defensive strength become advantageous to an assailant.
There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa
in the centre, Maya on the left, and from these entrances two ways
led to Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the valley through
the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road; the other
along the Atchiola mountain. General Pringle’s brigade was charged
to defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron’s brigade the Maya and
Lessessa passes. The Col itself was broad on the summit, about three
miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above
another; those on the right blending with the Goramendi mountains,
those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the
eighty-second regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted.
Cameron’s brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops
coming from Urdax; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one mile
in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette.
This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime save by some
Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the next guard was an infantry
piquet posted on that slope of the Col which fronted the great hill.
Behind this piquet of eighty men there was no immediate support, but
four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope
which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the
enemy. The rest of general Pringle’s brigade was disposed at various
distances from two to three miles in the rear, and the signal for
assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns
from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments
furnishing more than three thousand fighting men, half only were in
line of battle, and those chiefly massed on the left of a position,
wide open and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and their
general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was
at Elisondo when about mid-day D’Erlon commenced the battle.
COMBAT OF MAYA.
[Sidenote: Plan 3.]
Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding the picquet at the
Aretesque pass, was told by his predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse
had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills
in front, some peasants also announced the approach of the French,
and at nine o’clock major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled
round the great hill in front of the pass discovered sufficient to
make him order up the light companies to support the picquet. These
companies had just formed on the ridge with their left at the rock of
Aretesque, when D’Armagnac’s division coming from Espelette mounted
the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and general Maransin with a
third division advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass,
meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola
mountain.
D’Armagnac’s men pushed forwards at once in several columns, and
forced the picquet back with great loss upon the light companies, who
sustained his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The alarm
guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and general Pringle hastened
to the front, but his regiments moving hurriedly from different
camps were necessarily brought into action one after the other. The
thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace, yet by companies not
in mass and breathless from the length and ruggedness of the ascent;
the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth followed, but not immediately
nor together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac, closely supported by
Abbé, with domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the
desperate fighting of the picquet of the light companies and of the
thirty-fourth, had established his columns on the broad ridge of the
position.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3.]
Colonel Cameron then sent the fiftieth from the left to the
assistance of the overmatched troops, and that fierce and formidable
old regiment charging the head of an advancing column drove it clear
out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the French were so
many that, checked at one point, they assembled with increased
force at another; nor could general Pringle restore the battle
with the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, which, cut off
from the others were though fighting desperately forced back to a
second and lower ridge crossing the main road to Elizondo. They were
followed by D’Armagnac, but Abbé continued to press the fiftieth
and thirty-fourth whose natural line of retreat was towards the
Atchiola road on the left, because the position trended backward
from Aretesque towards that point, and because Cameron’s brigade was
there. And that officer, still holding the pass of Maya with the left
wings of the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, brought their
right wings and the Portuguese guns into action and thus maintained
the fight; but so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the
ninety-second, that it is said the advancing enemy was actually
stopped by the heaped mass of dead and dying; and then the left wing
of that noble regiment coming down from the higher ground smote
wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together they
stood or crawled before its fire.
It was in this state of affairs that general Stewart, returning
from Elizondo by the mountain road, reached the field of battle.
The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was
still held by the left wing of the seventy-first, but Stewart seeing
Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side and Abbé’s men on the
other, abandoned it to take a new position on the first rocky
ridge covering the road over the Atchiola; and he called down the
eighty-second regiment from the highest part of that mountain and
sent messengers to demand further aid from the seventh division.
Meanwhile although wounded himself he made a strenuous resistance,
for he was a very gallant man; but during the retrograde movement,
Maransin no longer seeking to turn the position, suddenly thrust
the head of his division across the front of the British line and
connected his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive
fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second, which even then
sullenly gave way, for the men fell until two-thirds of the whole had
gone to the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the left wing of
the seventy-first came into action, but, one after the other all the
regiments were forced back, and the first position was lost together
with the Portuguese guns.
[Sidenote: French official report, MSS.]
[Sidenote: British official return.]
Abbé’s division now followed D’Armagnac on the road to the town
of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart’s new position,
and notwithstanding its extreme strength the French gained ground
until six o’clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, also wanted
ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second under major Fitzgerald
were forced to roll down stones to defend the rocks on which they
were posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point
of abandoning the mountain entirely, when a brigade of the seventh
division, commanded by general Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and
that officer charging at the head of the sixth regiment drove the
French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart thus remained master of
the Atchiola, and the count D’Erlon who probably thought greater
reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from the
Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the _Col_. He had lost
fifteen hundred men and a general; but he took four guns, and
fourteen hundred British soldiers were killed or wounded.
[Sidenote: Southey.]
[Sidenote: General Stewart’s Official Report.]
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.]
Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one much exaggerated
by French writers, and by an English author misrepresented as a
surprise caused by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart
was surprised, his troops were not, and never did soldiers fight
better, seldom so well. The stern valour of the ninety-second,
principally composed of Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The
Portuguese cavalry patroles, if any went out which is uncertain,
might have neglected their duty, and doubtless the front should have
been scoured in a more military manner; but the infantry picquets,
and the light companies so happily ordered up by major Thorne, were
ready, and no man wondered to see the French columns crown the great
hill in front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at Maya, had
gone to Elisondo leaving orders for the soldiers to cook; from his
erroneous views therefore the misfortune sprung and from no other
source. Having deceived himself as to the true point of attack he did
not take proper military precautions on his own front; his position
was only half occupied, his troops brought into action wildly, and
finally he caused the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the
road. General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous, indefatigable
man and of a magnanimous spirit, but he possessed neither the calm
reflective judgment nor the intuitive genius which belongs to
nature’s generals.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Despatch, MSS.]
It is difficult to understand count D’Erlon’s operations. Why, when
he had carried the right of the position, did he follow two weak
regiments with two divisions, and leave only one division to attack
five regiments, posted on the strongest ground and having hopes of
succour from Echallar? Certainly if Abbé’s division had acted with
Maransin’s, Stewart who was so hardly pressed by the latter alone,
must have passed the road from Echallar in retreat before general
Barnes’s brigade arrived. On the other hand, Soult’s orders directed
D’Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of connecting the whole
army on the summit of the great chain of the Pyrenees. He should
therefore either have used his whole force to crush the troops on the
Atchiola before they could be succoured from Echallar; or, leaving
Maransin there, have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to cut
Sylveira’s line of retreat; instead of this he remained inactive upon
the Col de Maya for twenty hours after the battle! And general Hill
concentrating his whole force, now augmented by Barnes’s brigade,
would probably have fallen upon him from the commanding rocks of
Atchiola the next day, if intelligence of Cole’s retreat from the
Roncesvalles passes had not come through the Alduides. This rendered
the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, and Hill withdrawing all
his troops during the night, posted the British brigades which had
been engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of infantry and a
Portuguese battery, on the heights in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles
from the scene of action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in
front of Elizondo, thus covering the road of San Estevan on his left,
that of Berderez on his right, and the pass of Vellate in his rear.
Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations to restore the
fortunes of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same
day had each been favourable. At St. Sebastian the allies were
repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they
were defeated; but the decisive blow had not yet been struck.
Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from St.
Sebastian, but with the false addition that D’Erlon was beaten.
As early as the 22d he had known that Soult was preparing a great
offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of the French centre,
the skilful disposition of their reserve which was twice as strong as
he at first supposed, together with the preparations made to throw
bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou, were all calculated to mislead
and did mislead him.
Soult’s complicated combinations to bring D’Erlon’s divisions finally
into line on the crest of the great chain were impenetrable, and the
English general could not believe his adversary would throw himself
with only thirty thousand men into the valley of the Ebro unless
sure of aid from Suchet, and that general’s movements indicated
a determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover Wellington, in
contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and
before the failure of the assault thought that San Sebastian was.
Hence the operations against his right, their full extent not known,
appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to throw
bridges over the Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian.
But in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and Roncesvalles
affairs arrived, Soult’s object was then scarcely doubtful, and sir
T. Graham was ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark
his guns and stores, and hold all his spare troops in hand to join
Giron, on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. General
Cotton was ordered to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O’Donnel
was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops ready to act in
advance. This done Wellington arranged his lines of correspondence
and proceeded to San Estevan, which he reached early in the morning.
[Sidenote: Manuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington.]
While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was
essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s
object was not pronounced, and an enemy in possession of those places
could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Pena de
Haya, a rocky mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta
leading round that mountain from the valley of Lerins. Wherefore in
passing through Estevan on the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely
directed general Pack to guard the bridges over the Bidassoa. But
when he reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart’s division,
and heard that Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all the
troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and to prevent mistakes
indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of
Picton’s exact position or of his intentions nothing positive was
known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed
he had, Wellington judged that their combined forces would be
sufficient to check the enemy until assistance could reach them from
the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening
of the 26th.
In consequence of these orders the seventh division abandoned
Echallar in the night of the 26th, the sixth division quitted San
Estevan at daylight on the 27th, and general Hill concentrating his
own troops and Barnes’s brigade on the heights of Irueta, halted
until the evening of the 27th but marched during the night through
the pass of Vellate upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light
division quitting Vera also on the 27th retired by Lesaca to the
summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, overlooking the valley of Lerins,
and there halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubieta until
Longa’s Spaniards should take post to block the roads leading over
the Pena de Haya and protect the embarkation of the guns on that
flank. That object being effected it was to thread the passes and
descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun, thus securing
sir Thomas Graham’s communication with the army round Pampeluna.
These various movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All
the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat
stores, artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming
nature were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really
happened to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes
related might be true; none knew what to expect or where they were
to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions
through which the French army was now working its fiery path towards
Pampeluna.
D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult, who repeated
the order to push forward by his left whatever might be the force
opposed, and thus stimulated he advanced to Elizondo on the 27th, but
thinking the sixth division was still at San Estevan, again halted,
and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when general Hill’s
retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of
Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations arising
from Soult’s direct operations which are now to be continued.
General Picton, having assumed the command of all the troops in
the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, recommenced the
retreat before dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention
of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in the morning, having first
sent scouts towards the ridges where Campbell’s troops had appeared
the evening before. Reille marched by the left bank of the Guy
river, Clauzel by the right bank, the cavalry and artillery closed
the rear and as the whole moved in compact order the narrow valley
was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of musketry alone marking
the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile the garrison of
Pampeluna made a sally and O’Donnel in great alarm spiked some of his
guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster,
if Carlos D’España had not fortunately arrived with his division
and checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was imminent, for
general Cole, first emerging from the valley of Zubiri, had passed
Villalba, only three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton,
following close, was at Huarte, and O’Donnel’s Spaniards were in
confusion; in fine Soult was all but successful when Picton, feeling
the importance of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges,
which, stretching under the names of San Miguel Mont Escava and San
Cristoval quite across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys,
screen Pampeluna.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Posting the third division on the right of Huarte he prolonged his
line to the left with Morillo’s Spaniards, called upon O’Donnel to
support him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain
and Arletta. But that general having with a surer eye observed a
salient hill near Zabaldica, one mile in advance and commanding the
road to Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy it instead
of the heights first appointed. Two Spanish regiments belonging to
the blockading troops were still posted there, and towards them
Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked this hill, a French
detachment issuing from the mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full
career to seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching
the summit on either side when the Spaniards, seeing the British so
close, vindicated their own post by a sudden charge. This was for
Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just then emerging,
exultant, from the narrow valley, were arrested at the sight of ten
thousand men which under Cole crowned the summit of the mountain in
opposition; and two miles further back stood Picton with a greater
number, for O’Donnel had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance
by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand still was dangerous,
because the French army contracted to a span in front was cleft in
its whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by
the mountains which in that part narrowed the valley to a quarter
of a mile. Soult however, like a great and ready commander, at once
shot the head of Clauzel’s columns to his right across the mountain
which separated the Val de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz, and at the
same time threw one of Reille’s divisions of infantry and a body of
cavalry across the mountains on his left, beyond the Guy river, as
far as the village of Elcano, to menace the front and right flank of
Picton’s position at Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry he
established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close
under Cole’s right, and meanwhile Clauzel seized the village of
Sauroren close under that general’s left.
[Sidenote: Notes by Lord Wellington, MSS.]
While the French general thus formed his line of battle, lord
Wellington who had quitted sir Rowland Hill’s quarters in the
Bastan very early on the 27th, crossed the main ridge and descended
the valley of Lanz without having been able to learn any thing of
Picton’s movements or position, and in this state of uncertainty
reached Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren, where he found general
Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had furnished the
posts of correspondence in the mountains. Here learning that Picton
having abandoned the heights of Linzoain was moving on Huarte, he
left his quarter-master-general with instructions to stop all the
troops coming down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs
at Huarte should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he made for
Sauroren. As he entered that village he saw Clauzel’s divisions
moving from Zabaldica along the crest of the mountain, and it was
clear that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were intercepted,
wherefore pulling up his horse he wrote on the parapet of the bridge
of Sauroren fresh instructions to turn every thing from that valley
to the right, by a road which led through Lizasso and Marcalain
behind the hills to the village of Oricain, that is to say, in rear
of the position now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the
only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped with these
orders out of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed
in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain
to reach his troops. One of Campbell’s Portuguese battalions first
descried him and raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught
up by the next regiments swelled as it run along the line into that
stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give
upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved.
Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place, he desired
that both armies should know he was there, and a double spy who was
present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features could be
plainly distinguished. The English general, it is said, fixed his
eyes attentively upon this formidable man, and speaking as if to
himself, said, “_Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious
one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers;
that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat
him._” And certain it is that the French general made no serious
attack that day.
The position adopted by Cole was the summit of a mountain mass which
filled all the space between the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back
as Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre, and boldly
defined towards the enemy, but the trace was irregular, the right
being thrown back towards the village of Arletta so as to flank the
high road to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns placed on
a lower range, or neck, connecting the right of Cole with Picton and
Morillo.
Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was the bulging hill
vindicated by the Spaniards; it was a distinct point on the right of
the fourth division, dependent upon the centre of the position but
considerably lower. The left of the position also abating in height
was yet extremely rugged and steep overlooking the Lanz river and
the road to Villalba. General Ross’s brigade of the fourth division
was posted on that side, having a Portuguese battalion, whose flank
rested on a small chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on
the right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest ground, partly
behind, and partly on the right of Campbell. General Byng’s brigade
was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill was
reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment.
The front of battle being less than two miles was well filled, and
the Lanz and Guy river washed the flanks. Those torrents continuing
their course break by narrow passages through the steep ridges of
San Miguel and Cristoval, and then flowing past Huarte and Villalba
meet behind those places to form the Arga river. On the ridges thus
cleft by the waters the second line was posted, that is to say, at
the distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first
position, but on a more extended front. Picton’s left was at Huarte,
his right strengthened with a battery stretched to the village of
Goraitz, covering more than a mile of ground on that flank. Morillo
prolonged Picton’s left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba,
and O’Donnel continued the line to San Cristoval; Carlos D’España’s
division maintained the blockade behind these ridges, and the British
cavalry under General Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, took
post, the heavy brigades on some open ground behind Picton, the
hussar brigade on his right. This second line being on a wider trace
than the first and equally well filled with troops, entirely barred
the openings of the two valleys leading down to Pampeluna.
Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the space between the
two rivers. It was even more rugged than the allies’ mountain and
they were only separated by a deep narrow valley. Clauzel’s three
divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which
was quite down in the valley of Lanz and close under the chapel
height where the left of the fourth division was posted. His left
was prolonged by two of Reille’s divisions, which also occupied
the village of Zabaldica quite down in the valley of Zubiri under
the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and a
division of cavalry, were, as I have before stated, thrown forward
on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river, menacing
Picton and seeking for an opportunity to communicate with the
garrison of Pampeluna. Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica,
but the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered their
fire ineffectual and the greatest part of the artillery remained
therefore in the narrow valley of Zubiri.
_Combat of the 27th._ Soult’s first effort was to gain the Spaniards’
hill and establish himself near the centre of the allies’ line
of battle. The attack was vigorous but the French were valiantly
repulsed about the time lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately
reinforced that post with the fortieth British regiment. There was
then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult
carefully examined the whole position, and the firing continued on
the mountain side until evening, when a terrible storm, the usual
precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature
darkness and terminated the dispute. This was the state of affairs
at day-break on the 28th, but a signal alteration had place before
the great battle of that day commenced, and the movements of the
wandering divisions by which this change was effected must now be
traced.
It has been shewn that the Lanz covered the left of the allies
and the right of the French. Nevertheless the heights occupied by
either army were prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of
the allies’ ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of
Sauroren, while the continuation of the French heights fell back in a
direction nearly parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing
ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower and less rugged
than the heights on which the armies stood opposed, for the latter
were mountains where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles,
difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail that the hardened
veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial. Now the
road by which the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing
the pass of Doña Maria, sends one branch to Lanz, another to Ostiz, a
third through Lizasso and Marcalain; the first and second fall into
the road from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to Sauroren;
the third passing behind the ridges, just described as prolonging
the positions of the armies, also falls into the valley of Lanz, but
at the village of Oricain, that is to say one mile behind the ground
occupied by general Cole’s left.
It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington now expected the
sixth and seventh divisions, but the rapidity with which Soult seized
Sauroren caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth division,
having reached Olague in the valley of Lanz about one o’clock on the
27th, halted there until four, and then following the orders brought
by lord Fitzroy Somerset marched by Lizasso to gain the Marcalain
road; but the great length of these mountain marches, and the heavy
storm which had terminated the action at Zabaldica sweeping with
equal violence in this direction, prevented the division from passing
Lizasso that night. However the march was renewed at daylight on the
28th, and meanwhile general Hill, having quitted the Bastan on the
evening of the 27th, reached the town of Lanz on the morning of the
28th, and rallying general Long’s cavalry and his own artillery,
which were in that valley, moved likewise upon Lizasso. At that place
he met the seventh division coming from San Estevan, and having
restored general Barnes’s brigade to lord Dalhousie, took a position
on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. The seventh division being
on his right, was in military communication with the sixth division,
and thus lord Wellington’s left was prolonged, and covered the great
road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun to Tolosa. And during these
important movements, which were not completed until the evening of
the 28th, which brought six thousand men into the allies’ line of
battle, and fifteen thousand more into military communication with
their left, D’Erlon remained planted in his position of observation
near Elizondo!
[Sidenote: Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The near approach of the sixth division early on the morning of
the 28th and the certainty of Hill’s junction, made Wellington
imagine that Soult would not venture an attack, and certainly that
marshal, disquieted about D’Erlon of whom he only knew that he had
not followed his instructions, viewed the strong position of his
adversary with uneasy anticipations. Again with anxious eyes he
took cognizance of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious and
distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate with advantage by
his own left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were
rough, and Wellington having shorter lines of movement could meet him
with all arms combined; and meanwhile the French artillery, unable
to emerge from the Val de Zubiri except by the Huarte road, would
have been exposed to a counter-attack. He crossed the Lanz river and
ascended the prolongation of the allies’ ridge, which, as he had
possession of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own
ground. From this height he could see all the left and rear of Cole’s
position, looking down the valley of Lanz as far as Villalba, but
the country beyond the ridge towards Marcalain was so broken that he
could not discern the march of the sixth division; he knew however
from the deserters, that Wellington expected four fresh divisions
from that side, that is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh
British, and Sylviera’s Portuguese division which always marched with
Hill. This information and the nature of the ground decided the plan
of attack. The valley of Lanz growing wider as it descended, offered
the means of assailing the allies’ left in front and rear at one
moment, and the same combination would cut off the reinforcements
expected from the side of Marcalain.
One of Clauzel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other
two coming from the mountain took post upon each side of that
village. The division on the right hand was ordered to throw some
flankers on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his observations,
and upon a signal given to move in one body to a convenient distance
down the valley and then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of
the allies’ left flank while the other two divisions advancing from
their respective positions near Sauroren assailed the front. Cole’s
left, which did not exceed five thousand men, would thus be enveloped
by sixteen thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding
the strength of the ground. Meanwhile Reille’s two divisions
advancing from the mountain on the side of Zabaldica, were each to
send a brigade against the hill occupied by the fortieth regiment;
the right of this attack was to be connected with the left of
Clauzel, the remaining brigades were closely to support the assailing
masses, the divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in check,
and Soult who had no time to lose ordered his lieutenants to throw
their troops frankly and at once into action.
_First battle of Sauroren._—It was fought on the fourth anniversary
of the battle of Talavera.
About mid-day the French gathered at the foot of the position and
their skirmishers rushing forward spread over the face of the
mountain, working upward like a conflagration; but the columns of
attack were not all prepared when Clauzel’s division in the valley
of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of battle, threw
out its flankers on the ridge beyond the river and pushed down the
valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s left and was
preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade of the
sixth division, suddenly appearing on the crest of the ridge beyond
the river, drove the French flankers back and instantly descended
with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column in the
valley. And almost at the same instant, the main body of the sixth
division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of
Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the
counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French, striving to encompass the
left of the allies were themselves encompassed, for two brigades
of the fourth division turned and smote them from the left, the
Portuguese smote them from the right; and while thus scathed on both
flanks with fire, they were violently shocked and pushed back with a
mighty force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but fighting
fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies’ bodies as well
as with their own.
Clauzel’s second division, seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried
movement assailed the chapel height to draw off the fire from the
troops in the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng
up the craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was ruined;
neither their third division nor Reille’s brigades had yet received
the signal, and their attacks instead of being simultaneous were
made in succession, running from right to left as the necessity of
aiding the others became apparent. It was however a terrible battle
and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren,
silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel
under a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks without
abating the speed and power of the mass. The seventh Caçadores
shrunk abashed and that part of the position was won. Soon however
they rallied upon general Ross’s British brigade, and the whole
running forward charged the French with a loud shout and dashed
them down the hill. Heavily stricken they were, yet undismayed,
and recovering their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner
to be again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack
were now bearing upwards through the smoke and flame with which the
skirmishers had covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth
Portuguese regiment fighting on the right of Ross’s brigade yielded
to their fury; a heavy body crowned the heights and wheeling against
the exposed flank of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go
back. His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he
had been engaged in front, and the fight raged close and desperate
on the crest of the position, charge succeeded charge and each
side yielded and recovered by turns; yet this astounding effort of
French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington brought Byng’s
brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and
forty-eighth British regiments belonging to Anson’s brigade down from
the higher ground in the centre against the crowded masses, rolling
them backward in disorder and throwing them one after the other
violently down the mountain side; and with no child’s play; the two
British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the
bayonet and lost more than half their own numbers.
During this battle on the mountain-top, the British brigades of the
sixth division strengthened by a battery of guns, gained ground in
the valley of Lanz and arrived on the same front with the left of the
victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington then seeing the
momentary disorder of the enemy ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade,
which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the French
column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the rear, but the
state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the troops
soon induced him to countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille’s
brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clauzel’s third
division, had environed the Spanish hill, ascended it unchecked,
and at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly pressed
made the regiment of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth.
A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered the flank of that
invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence until the French
set their feet upon the broad summit; but when their glittering arms
appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging cry was heard,
the crowded mass was broken to pieces and a tempest of bullets
followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed, and the
French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so
fierce and resolute they were to win. It was however the labour of
Sysiphus. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always
prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts
fainting, and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed
that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.
While the battle was thus being fought on the height the French
cavalry beyond the Guy river, passed a rivulet, and with a fire of
carbines forced the tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on
Picton’s right, but the eighteenth hussars having better firearms
than the tenth renewed the combat, killed two officers, and finally
drove the French over the rivulet again.
Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which
lord Wellington fresh from the fight with homely emphasis called
“_bludgeon work_.” Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been
killed or wounded on the French side, following their official
reports, a number far below the estimate made at the time by the
allies whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These
discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and there
is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the
numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five thousand, of
the allies twelve thousand, and if the strength of the latter’s
position did not save them from the greater loss their stedfast
courage is to be the more admired.
The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the
wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.
General Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery and wounded men
to Berioplano behind the Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong
ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and
Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in
rear of Soult’s right. His communication with Oricain was maintained
by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching
his left. Thus on Wellington’s side the crisis was over. He had
vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand combatants, and
now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had
fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British, in close military
combination. Thirty thousand flushed with recent success were in
hand, and Hill’s troops were well-placed for retaking the offensive.
Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Finding that he could
not force the allies’ position in front, he had sent his artillery
part of his cavalry and his wounded men back to France immediately
after the battle, ordering the two former to join Villatte on the
Lower Bidassoa and there await further instructions. Having shaken
off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s arrival by the valley of Lanz,
and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day
on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his
march, that general Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte
had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first
movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived
a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed yet conformable to the
critical state of his affairs.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not
at the moment of being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire
by the road he came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where
he was, because his supplies of provisions and ammunition derived
from distant magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal to the
consumption. Two-thirds of the British troops, the greatest part of
the Portuguese, and all the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled
in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill,
and it was probable that other reinforcements were on the march;
wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D’Erlon’s corps,
and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself
between the allies and the Bastan, in military connection with his
reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to
combine all his troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San
Sebastian entirely and profit from the new state of affairs.
[Sidenote: Plan 2.]
In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which
was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over the position to the valley
of Lanz, and joined D’Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the
30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting parties
to his left on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna, and also
towards Letassa and Irurzun. During the night the first division of
cavalry and La Martiniere’s division of infantry, both at Elcano on
the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by
Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper part of the valley of the Zubiri,
having orders to cross the separating ridge enter the valley of Lanz
and join D’Erlon. The remainder of Reille’s wing was at the same time
to march by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village
of Sauroren, and gradually relieve Clauzel’s troops which were then
to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to say towards Ostiz, and thus
following the march of D’Erlon were to be themselves followed in like
manner by Reille’s troops. To cover these last movements Clauzel
detached two regiments to occupy the French heights beyond the Lanz
river, and they were also to maintain his connection with D’Erlon
whose line of operations was just beyond those heights. He was
however to hold by Reille rather than by D’Erlon until the former had
perfected his dangerous march across Wellington’s front.
In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the deserters that three
divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on
the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke
truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren he discerned certain
columns descending the ridge of Cristoval and the heights above
Oricain, while others were in march on a wide sweep apparently to
turn Clauzel’s right flank. These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards,
Campbell’s Portuguese, and the seventh division, the former rejoining
Hill to whose corps they properly belonged, the others adapting
themselves to a new disposition of Wellington’s line of battle which
shall be presently explained.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
At six o’clock in the morning Foy’s division of Reille’s wing was
in march along the crest of the mountain from Zabaldica towards
Sauroren, where Maucune’s division had already relieved Conroux’s;
the latter, belonging to Clauzel’s wing, was moving up the valley
of Lanz to rejoin that general, who had, with exception of the two
flanking regiments before mentioned, concentrated his remaining
divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs
Wellington opening his batteries from the chapel height sent
skirmishers against Sauroren, and the fire spreading to the allies’
right became brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however at
Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of the position, ordered
Reille to maintain it until nightfall unless hardly pressed, and went
off himself at a gallop to join D’Erlon, for his design was to fall
upon the division attempting to turn his right and crush them with
superior numbers: a daring project, well and quickly conceived, but
he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke
rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The marshal overtook D’Erlon at
the moment when that general, having entered the valley of Ulzema
with three divisions of infantry and two divisions of heavy cavalry,
was making dispositions to assail Hill who was between Buenza and
Arestegui.
_Combat of Buenza._ The allies who were about ten thousand fighting
men, including Long’s brigade of light cavalry, occupied a very
extensive mountain ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged
ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza was insecure, and
D’Erlon who including his two divisions of heavy cavalry had not
less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La
Martiniere’s division of infantry now coming from Lanz. Soult’s
combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were
already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both sides
who had so strenuously combated at Maya on the 25th were again
opposed to each other.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official despatch, MS.]
D’Armagnac’s division was directed to make a false attack upon Hill’s
right; Abbé’s division, emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn
the allies’ left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction
of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and the divisions of cavalry
entering the line supported and connected the two attacks. The action
was brisk at both points, but D’Armagnac pushing his feint too far
became seriously engaged, and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth’s
Portuguese aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. Nor
were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being
repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, turning that wing gained the summit
of the mountain and rendered the position untenable. General Hill
who had lost about four hundred men then retired to the heights of
Equaros behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain
with his right and throwing back his left. Here being joined by
Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle, but Soult whose
principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division had now gained his main
object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line of retreat, a
shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Donna Maria, and
withal, the great Irurzun road to Toloza distant only one league and
a half was in his power. His first thought was to seize it and march
through Lecumberri either upon Toloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There
was nothing to oppose except the light division whose movements shall
be noticed hereafter, but neither the French marshal nor general Hill
knew of its presence, and the former thought himself strong enough to
force his way to San Sebastian and there unite with Villatte, and his
artillery which following his previous orders was now on the Lower
Bidassoa.
This project was feasible. Lamartiniere’s division, of Reille’s
wing, coming from Lanz, was not far off. Clauzel’s three divisions
were momentarily expected, and Reille’s during the night. On the
31st therefore, Soult with at least fifty thousand men would have
broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in his
march, and menacing sir Thomas Graham’s position in reverse while
Villatte’s reserve attacked it in front. The country about Lecumberri
was however very strong for defence and lord Wellington would have
followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his views
and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s force, to be
originally two divisions of infantry and now only reinforced with a
third division, whereas that general had three divisions originally
and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of
cavalry. This error however did not prevent him from seizing with
the rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point of operation,
and giving a counter-stroke which Soult trusting to the strength of
Reille’s position little expected.
When Wellington saw that La Martiniere’s divisions and the cavalry
had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was
evacuated, he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of
cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and
turn the French left; the seventh division was directed to sweep over
the hills beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the march of
Campbell and Morillo insured the communication with Hill; and that
general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening the
French rear, but meeting as we have seen with D’Erlon was forced
back to Eguaros. The fourth division was to assail Foy’s position,
but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured
according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng’s
brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns
and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sauroren.
La Bispal’s Spaniards followed the sixth division. Fane’s horsemen
were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, the
heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos D’España maintained
the blockade.
_Second battle of Sauroren._—These movements began at daylight.
Picton’s advance was rapid. He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw
his skirmishers at once on Foy’s flank, and about the same time
general Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of
promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of
the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments
covering Clauzel’s right, and drove them down into the valley
of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly
spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent,
opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux’s division, which was
then moving up the valley from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered
by this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of the mountain
into the midst of the column.
Foy’s division, marching to support Conroux and Maucune, was on the
crest of the mountains between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment
of attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light troops
were engaged with the skirmishers of the fourth division; and Inglis
had been so sudden and vigorous, that before the evil could be well
perceived it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly pushed the
sixth division, now commanded by general Pakenham Pack having been
wounded on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved Byng’s
brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village,
which was defended by Maucune’s division. Byng’s vigorous assault
was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden’s
Portuguese of the sixth division, and at the same time the battery
near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, and
booming up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which Inglis never
ceased to vex and he was closely supported by the remainder of the
seventh division.
The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were now
covered with a pall of smoke, the musquetry pealed frequent and
loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain
filled all the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried the village
of Sauroren, and fourteen hundred prisoners were made, for the two
French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the front and flank
were entirely broken. Part retreated along the valley towards
Clauzel’s other divisions which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up
the mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had remained on
the summit a helpless spectator of this rout; but though he rallied
the fugitives in great numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for
by this time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain by
those of the fourth division, and his left was infested by Picton’s
detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position, and fell
back along the summit of the mountain between the valley of Zubiri
and valley of Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat
without much loss; but he dared not descend into either valley, and
thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to
Soult and then retired into the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga.
Meanwhile Wellington pressing up the valley of Lanz drove Clauzel as
far as Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere’s division
took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lanz and
Lizasso. The English general whose pursuit had been damped by hearing
of Hill’s action also halted near Ostiz.
The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and wounded, or taken,
in the two battles of this day, and of these nearly twelve hundred
were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt
of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux’s
and Maucune’s divisions were completely disorganized; Foy with
eight thousand men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was
entirely separated from the main body; two thousand men at the lowest
computation had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the
woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were taken. This blow
joined to former losses reduced Soult’s fighting men to thirty-five
thousand, of which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille were
dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical
situation. Hill’s force now increased to fifteen thousand men by the
junction of Morillo and Campbell was in front, and thirty thousand
were on the rear in the valley of Lanz, or on the hills at each
side; for the third division finding no more enemies in the valley
of Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with the fourth
division.
Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal’s Spaniards to
Marcalain when he heard of Hill’s action, but he was not yet aware of
the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded
upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan. He
designed to follow closely pushing his own left forward to support
sir Thomas Graham on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D’Erlon’s
troops he thought La Martiniere’s division had retreated by the
Roncesvalles road; and as Foy’s column was numerous and two divisions
had been broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under
Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth
division and the thirteenth light dragoons were to march by Eugui
to join the third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and
Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend into the valley of
Lanz. General Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to
press Soult closely, always turning his right but directing his own
march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell’s brigade to the
Alduides. The seventh division which had halted on the ridges between
Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and
then march for the pass of Doña Maria.
It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington expecting Soult
would rejoin Clauzel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate,
intended to confine and press him closely in that district. But the
French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined,
being too far advanced towards Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine
he was between two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of
Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling in Clauzel, and giving
D’Erlon whose divisions, hitherto successful were in good order
and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march soon after
midnight towards the pass. But mischief was thickening around him.
Sir Thomas Graham having only the blockade of San Sebastian to
maintain was at the head of twenty thousand men, ready to make a
forward movement, and there remained besides the light division under
Charles Alten of whose operations it is time to speak. That general,
as we have seen, took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th.
From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched to gain Lecumberri
on the great road of Irurzun; but whether by orders from sir Thomas
Graham or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being
extreme in those wild regions, I know not, he commenced his descent
into the valley of Lerins very late. His leading brigade, getting
down with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the great chain by
the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but darkness caught the other brigade
and the troops dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and
precipices. Many made faggot torches waving them as signals, and thus
moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried
them but misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance.
The heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small
fires, and the soldiers calling to each other for directions filled
the whole region with their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and
shout until morning shewed the face of the mountain covered with
tired and scattered men and animals who had not gained half a league
of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours, ere
they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza.
General Alten, who had now been separated for three days from the
army, sent mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings,
and at six o’clock in the evening renewed his march. At Areysa he
halted for some time without suffering fires to be lighted, for
he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful of discovering his
situation, but at night he again moved and finally established his
bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. The noise of Hill’s
battle at Buenza was clearly heard in the course of the day, and the
light division was thus again comprized in the immediate system of
operations directed by Wellington in person. Had Soult continued his
march upon Guipuscoa Alten would have been in great danger, but the
French general being forced to retreat, the light division was a new
power thrown into his opponent’s hands, the value of which will be
seen by a reference to the peculiarity of the country through which
the French general was now to move.
It has been shewn that Foy cut off from the main army was driven
towards the Alduides; that the French artillery and part of the
cavalry were again on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to
the intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, though he had
skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter however in possession of
heights above Lesaca. The troops under Soult’s immediate command
were therefore completely isolated, and had no resources save what
his ability and their own courage could supply. His single line of
retreat by the pass of Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan,
and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to Elizondo and so
gain France by the Col de Maya, or down the same river towards Vera
by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching
off to the right lead over the mountains to the passes of Echallar.
There was also a third mountain-road leading direct from Estevan
to Zagaramurdi and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged for his
wounded men and baggage.
The road to Elizondo was very good, but that down the Bidassoa was
a long and terrible defile, and so contracted about the bridges of
Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. This then
Soult had to dread; that Wellington who by the pass of Vellate could
reach Elizondo before him would block his passage on that side; that
Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, blocking the passage there
and by detachments cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then,
confined to the narrow mountain-way from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi,
he would be followed hard by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear
and flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by the
allied troops moving through Vellate Elizondo and the Col de Maya. In
this state, his first object being to get through the pass of Doña
Maria, he commenced his retreat as we have seen in the night of the
30th, and Wellington still deceived as to the real state of affairs
did not take the most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to
say, he continued in his first design, halting in the valley of Lanz
while Hill passed his front to enter the Bastan, into which district
he sent Byng’s brigade as belonging to the second division. But early
on the 31st, when Soult’s real strength became known, he directed
the seventh division to aid Hill, followed Byng through the pass of
Vellate with the remainder of his forces, and thinking the light
division might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins, sent Alten
orders to head the French if possible at San Estevan, or at Sumbilla,
in fine to cut in upon their line of march somewhere; Longa also was
ordered to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding the light
division to block the way on that side, and sir Thomas Graham was
advertised to hold his army in readiness to move in the same view,
and it would appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions
were also changed for a time.
_Combat of Doña Maria._—At ten o’clock in the morning of the 31st,
general Hill overtook Soult’s rear-guard between Lizasso and the
Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague,
was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only
gained a wood on the summit of the pass under the fire of Hill’s
guns. There, however, they turned and throwing out their skirmishers
made strong battle. General Stewart, leading the attack of the second
division, now for the third time engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was
again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed, but general Pringle
who succeeded to the command, renewed the attack with the second
brigade, and the thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at
the moment that the seventh division did the same on the right. Some
prisoners were taken, but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, and
the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than
that of the allies which was something short of four hundred men.
[Sidenote: Notes by the duke of Wellington, MSS.]
The seventh division remained on the mountain, but Hill fell back
to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short but
rugged way, leading between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over
the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, who had during the
combat descended into the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile
Byng reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of provisions
and ammunition left there under guard of a battalion by D’Erlon
on the 29th; he made several hundred prisoners also after a sharp
skirmish and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. Wellington
now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elizondo
to San Estevan, and full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow;
for Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria, had halted
in San Estevan, although by his scouts he knew that the convoy had
been taken at Elizondo. He was in a deep narrow valley, and three
British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains
overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of
Doña Maria; the light division and sir Thomas Graham’s Spaniards were
marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng
was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind
Wellington’s own position. A few hours gained and the French must
surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the
lighting of fires the straggling of soldiers or any other indication
of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks
at a commanding point from whence he could observe every movement of
the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his “_gensd’armes_”
were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the
staff proposed to cut them off; the English general whose object
was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it, but the next
moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were
instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the
French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of San
Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering
knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate
commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the
most terrible disaster.
The captives walked from their prison but their chains hung upon
them. The way was narrow, the multitude great, and the baggage, and
wounded men borne on their comrades’ shoulders, filed with such long
procession, that Clauzel’s divisions forming the rear-guard were
still about San Estevan on the morning of the 1st of August, and
scarcely had they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers of
the fourth division and the Spaniards thronging along the heights on
the right flank opened a fire to which little reply could be made.
The troops and baggage then got mixed with an extreme disorder,
numbers of the former fled up the hills, and the commanding energy
of Soult whose personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely
prevent a general dispersion. However prisoners and baggage fell at
every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed
at the peril, and worse would have awaited them in front, if
Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate
generals.
The head of the French column instead of taking the first road
leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, had passed onward towards that
leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere
cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left,
and there was a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge of which was
defended by a battalion of Spanish Caçadores detached to that point
from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas. The front was now as
much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the
Caçadores, those only of the French who being near Sumbilla could
take the road from that place to Echallar would have escaped; but
the Spanish generals kept aloof and D’Erlon won the defile. However
Reille’s divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new
enemy had appeared.
[Sidenote: August.]
It will be remembered that the light division was directed to head
the French army at San Estevan, or Sumbilla. This order was received
on the evening of the 31st, and the division, repassing the defiles
of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley of Lerins and reached
Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then marched
twenty-four miles and being little more than a league from Estevan
and about the same distance from Sumbilla. The movement of the French
along the Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead
of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left, clambered up the great
mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather
was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and hard to overcome,
many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while
others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled,
leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they
yielded for the first time.
Towards evening, after marching for nineteen consecutive hours over
forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted column
reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below,
within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were seen hurrying forward
along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, and a fire of
musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more
vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the
riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood. The scene which
followed is thus described by an eye-witness.
[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs.]
“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from the summit of a
tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were
wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the
river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the
wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry
drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar,
but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were
precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded
called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as
they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats
clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different
habitations to aid the sufferers.”
On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so
piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful
aim they shot at the others, although the latter rapidly plied
their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even
dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was
a soldier-like but a vain effort! the night found the British in
possession of the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy
escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and fell,
together with many prisoners, into the hands of the light troops
which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.
The loss of the French this day was very great, that of the allies
about a hundred men, of which sixty-five were British, principally
of the fourth division. Nevertheless lord Wellington was justly
discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor general Alten
had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being
too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; but the
rocks were so precipitous that the French could not have reached
him, and the resistance made by the Spanish caçadores was Longa’s
condemnation. A lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If
Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the
small torrent could not have been forced by D’Erlon; and if Longa
had been near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered,
for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape
by dispersion. Finally if the light division instead of marching
down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa
Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, it would have
arrived much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa
and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten’s instructions indeed
prescribed Sumbilla and San Estevan as the first points to head the
French army, but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched as
we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and
seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied
the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have
struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers had made such a
prodigious exertion, yet the prize was thrown away.
During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on
the morning of the 2d occupied the “_Puerto_” of that name. His left
was placed at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock of
Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte’s reserve, which
was in position on the ridges between Soult’s right and the head
of the great Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel’s three divisions,
now reduced to six thousand men, took post on a strong hill between
the “_Puerto_” and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily
adopted by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and to make
Wellington discover his final object, but that general would not
suffer the affront. He had sent the third and sixth divisions to
reoccupy the passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides; Hill had
reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; the fourth, seventh,
and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to
fall upon Clauzel whose position was dangerously advanced.
_Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly._—The light division held the
road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by
the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara,
thus turning Clauzel’s right. The fourth division marched from
Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front, and the seventh moved from
Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes’s brigade, contrary to lord
Wellington’s intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and
light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the
arrival of more troops assailed Clauzel’s strong position. The fire
became vehement, but neither the steepness of the mountain nor the
overshadowing multitude of the enemy clustering above in support of
their skirmishers could arrest the assailants, and then was seen
the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred men driving, by sheer
valour and force of arms, six thousand good troops from a position,
so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the
numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. It is true that
the fourth division arrived towards the end of the action, that the
French had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they were
worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted
all their reserve stores during the retreat, but the real cause of
their inferiority belongs to the highest part of war.
The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the
remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by
the pride of success; and the French divisions were those which had
failed in the attack on the 28th, which had been utterly defeated on
the 30th, and which had suffered so severely the day before about
Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who
had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren, with a force and
energy that all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely
sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, although
posted so strongly, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of
their own numbers. And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the
comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit,
having wandered to plunder surrendered to some French peasants,
who lord Wellington truly observed, “_they would under other
circumstances have eat up!_” What gross ignorance of human nature
then do those writers display who assert, that the employing of brute
force is the highest qualification of a general!
Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell back fighting to a
strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered
by the Ivantelly mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile
the light division emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of
the Bidassoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara without
opposition, and halted there until the operations of the fourth and
seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable
to attack the Ivantelly. This lofty mountain lifted its head on
the right, rising as it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and
separating them from the ridges through which the French troops
beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick
mist capped the crowning rocks which contained a strong French
regiment, the British soldiers besides their long and terrible march
the previous day had been for two days without sustenance, and were
leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, when the advancing fire of
Barnes’s action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging
the enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard instantly led five
companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the
forty-third followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and
the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the sharp clang of their
weapons heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry
of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the echoes
rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies
of the forty-third could find no trace of an enemy save the killed
and wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check
to the summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their
victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night
shewed the long ridges of the mountains beyond sparkling with the
last musket-flashes from Clauzel’s troops retiring in disorder from
Echallar.
This day’s fighting cost the British four hundred men, and lord
Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He had carried with
him towards Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort,
and placed a serjeant named Blood with a party to watch in front
while he examined his maps. The French who were close at hand sent
a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the
ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have
fallen unawares upon lord Wellington, if Blood a young intelligent
man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping
rather than running down the precipitous rocks he was posted on,
given the general notice, and as it was the French arrived in time to
send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.
Soult now caused count D’Erlon to re-occupy the hills about Ainhoa,
Clauzel to take post on the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille
to carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in second line behind
Villatte’s reserve. Foy, who had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de
Port by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and reinforce
his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and
detachments.
Wellington had on the 1st directed general Graham to collect his
forces and bring up pontoons for crossing the Bidassoa, but he
finally abandoned this design, and the two armies therefore rested
quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual
movement during which they had fought ten serious actions. Of the
allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred
officers and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken, and many were
dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was
terrible and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate.
Nevertheless a close approximation may be made. Lord Wellington at
first called it twelve thousand, but hearing that the French officers
admitted more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The
engineer, _Belmas_, in his Journals of Sieges, compiled from official
documents by order of the French government, sets down above thirteen
thousand. Soult in his dispatches at the time, stated fifteen hundred
as the loss at Maya, four hundred at Roncesvalles, two hundred on
the 27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after which he speaks
no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added
the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the
double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th, the combats of the
31st, and those of the 1st and 2d of August; finally, four thousand
unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound
the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The allies’ line of defence was weak. Was it therefore
injudiciously adopted?
The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized and retreated without
artillery or baggage on excentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel
by Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by Pampeluna. There was
no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne
and St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly in a very
neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any
operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed
good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese
beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the
fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the
difference between the practice and the theory of war.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches.]
“_The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves
after the battle dispersed in the night to plunder, and were so
fatigued that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable
of marching and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen
days after the victory twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly
British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains._”
Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack
pursuit after the battle of Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army
for six years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification
of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops, or was
the English military system defective? It is certain that he always
exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so
certain that he ever gained their affections. The barbarity of the
English military code excited public horror, the inequality of
promotion created public discontent; yet the general complained he
had no adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned alike the
system and the soldiers it produced. The latter “_were detestable
for every thing but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the
men_.” The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his
celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, “that he thought
he could go any where and do any thing with the army that fought on
the Pyrenees,” and although it cannot be denied that his complaints
were generally too well-founded, there were thousands of true and
noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country
honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been
since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt
aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of.
2º. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect
of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France
assumed a new aspect. Wellington’s system of warfare had never varied
after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprize, it
rested on profound calculation both as to time and resources for the
accomplishment of a particular object, namely, the gradual liberation
of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible
to attain that object suddenly, and his battles in India, the
passage of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature
he was inclined to daring operations; but such efforts, however
glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the
loss of a brigade lest the government he served should put an end to
the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with
the Portuguese and Spaniards; their ignorance jealousy and passionate
pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would
have enhanced every danger.
No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the
French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before
the end of the campaign, and his battering train was prepared for
the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of
France her military reputation considered, was therefore quite out
of the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded
upon political as well as military considerations; and of the most
complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the
personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the great
state interests of three distinct nations two of which abhorred each
other. At this moment also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany
strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a
separate peace excluding England, would have brought Napoleon’s whole
force to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the military
and political proceedings of the coalesced powers. “_I would not
move a corporal’s guard in reliance upon such a system_,” was the
significant phrase he employed to express his contempt.
These considerations justified his caution as to invading France,
but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1º. He could
not dispense with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still
in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna,
and St. Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior
of Spain; hence the siege of the latter place. 2º. He had to guard
against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on his right flank; hence his
efforts to cut off the last-named general; hence also the blockade of
Pampeluna in preference to siege and the launching of Mina and the
bands on the side of Zaragoza.
3º. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign depended upon
Suchet’s operations, which were rendered more important by Murray’s
misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly
organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we have seen until
the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast, whereas Suchet
had assembled more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the
Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he continued his march
upon Zaragoza he would have saved the castle of that place with
its stores. Then rallying Paris’ division, he could have menaced
Wellington’s flank with twenty-five thousand men exclusive of
Clauzel’s force, and if that general joined him with forty thousand.
On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet
might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and
Soult’s preparations originally made as we have seen to attack on
the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened.
How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain
themselves beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold a
forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of
this nature is clear from his instructions to lord William Bentinck
and to Mina; and because Picton’s and Cole’s divisions instead of
occupying the passes were kept behind the mountains solely to watch
Clauzel; when the latter had regained the frontier of France Cole was
permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations
after the battle of Vittoria were well considered and consonant to
lord Wellington’s general system. Their wisdom would have been proved
if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach.
4º. A general’s capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a
victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia
excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest
a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole
force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing
exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous
examination of the whole mass of the Western Pyrenees, and concluded
that if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as
strong as that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than could be
found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those
places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task
than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San
Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege
could not be foreseen, and also for gain of time he counted upon the
disorganized state of the French army, upon Joseph’s want of military
capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy which his own troops had
acquired over the enemy by their victories. He could not anticipate
the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid
reorganization of the French army, and whose vigorous operations
contrasted with Joseph’s abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old
Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous
than a herd of lions led by a deer.
5º. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to fortune at the
commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad
weather, which breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of
his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; all officers know
the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigour
and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had
commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th the surprise would have been
more complete his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions
would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably have
been more ready in his attack, and might possibly have escaped the
fog which on the 26th stopped his march along the superior crest of
the mountain towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would
have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian, and the
pass of Maya might have been better furnished with troops. However
Soult’s combinations were so well knit that more than one error in
execution, and more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to
baffle him. Had count D’Erlon followed his instructions even on the
26th general Hill would probably have been shouldered off the valley
of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty thousand additional troops
in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures however generally
attend extensively combined movements, and it is by no means certain
that the count would have been able to carry the position of the Col
de Maya on the 25th, if all general Stewart’s forces had been posted
there. It would therefore perhaps have been more strictly within
the rules of art, if D’Erlon had been directed to leave one of his
three divisions to menace the Col de Maya while he marched with the
other two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. This movement,
covered by the national guards who occupied the mountain of La
Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell’s Portuguese brigade,
and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan while it secured the
junction of D’Erlon with Soult on the crest of the superior chain.
[Sidenote: Original Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.]
6º. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and Ross defended their
several positions on the 25th, the able and clean retreat made by
general Cole as far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to
the errors of Reille and D’Erlon, and would probably have baffled
Soult at an early period if general Picton had truly comprehended
the importance of his position. Lord Wellington says that the
concentration of the army would have been effected on the 27th
if that officer and general Cole had not agreed in thinking it
impossible to make a stand behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity
of retreating on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with ten
thousand men maintained the position in front of Altobiscar, Ibañeta,
and Atalosti, Picton might have maintained the more contracted one
behind Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that number he
could have assembled, because Campbell’s Portuguese reached Eugui
long before the evening of the 26th, and lord Wellington had directed
O’Donnel to keep three thousand five hundred of the blockading
troops in readiness to act in advance, of which Picton could not have
been ignorant. It was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz
that line being too rugged for the march of an army and not leading
directly upon Pampeluna. The only roads into the Val de Zubiri were
by Erro and Linzoain, lying close together and both leading upon the
village of Zubiri over the ridges which Picton occupied, and the
strength of which was evident from Soult’s declining an attack on the
evening of the 26th when Cole only was before him. To abandon this
ground so hastily when the concentration of the army depended upon
keeping it, appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect
of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief, for lord
Wellington did not know of the retreat until the morning of the 27th
and then only from general Long. It might be that Picton’s messenger
failed, but many should have been sent when a retrograde movement
involving the fate of Pampeluna was contemplated.
[Sidenote: Note by General Cole, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
It has been said that general Cole was the adviser of this retreat
which if completed would have ruined lord Wellington’s campaign.
This is incorrect, Picton was not a man to be guided by others.
General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up by colonel Bell
one of the ablest staff-officers of the army, which stated that no
position suitable for a very inferior force existed between Zubiri
and Pampeluna, and this was true in the sense of the report, which
had reference only to a division not to an army; moreover, although
the actual battle of Sauroren was fought by inferior numbers, the
whole position, including the ridges of the second line occupied by
Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained by equal numbers;
and if Soult had made the attack of the 28th on the evening of the
27th before the sixth division arrived, the position would have
been carried. However there is no doubt that colonel Bell’s report
influenced Picton, and it was only when his troops had reached Huarte
and Villalba that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was a military
resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not the less worthy of praise
that he so readily adopted Cole’s saving proposition to regain the
more forward heights above Zabaldica.
7º. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack on the evenings of the
26th and 27th. Yet success depended upon forestalling the allies at
their point of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable that
on the 28th, having possession of the ridge beyond the Lanz river
and plenty of cavalry, he should have known so little of the sixth
division’s movements. The general conception of his scheme on the
30th has also been blamed by some of his own countrymen, apparently
from ignorance of the facts and because it failed. Crowned with
success it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the art of
war. To have retired at once by the two valleys of Zubiri and Lanz
after being reinforced with twenty thousand men would have given
great importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation as a
general capable of restoring the French affairs would have vanished,
and mischief only have accrued, even though he should have effected
his retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness of the
valleys the position of general Hill on his right and the boldness
of his adversary, was not certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri
and secure that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of
retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush general Hill with superior
numbers, and thus gaining the Irurzun road to succour San Sebastian,
or failing of that, to secure the union of the whole army and give
to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive movement; to
combine all these chances by one operation immediately after a severe
check was Soult’s plan, it was not impracticable and was surely the
conception of a great commander.
To succeed however it was essential either to beat general Hill
off-hand and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of
Marcalain, or to secure the defence of the French left in such
a solid manner that no efforts against it should prevail to the
detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither was
effected. The French general indeed brought an overwhelming force to
bear upon Hill, and drove him from the road of Irurzun, but he did
not crush him, because that general fought so strongly and retired
with such good order, that beyond the loss of the position no injury
was sustained. Meanwhile the left wing of the French was completely
beaten, and thus the advantage gained on the right was more than
nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the
ground occupied by his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was
nearly impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both flanks at the
same time, but neither Picton’s advance into the valley of Zubiri
on Foy’s left, nor Cole’s front attack on that general, nor Byng’s
assault upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously damaged
the French without the sudden and complete success of general Inglis
beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the
French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet
they could have held together in mass secure of their junction with
Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of
the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh
division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack
became decisive. It is clear therefore that the key of the defence
was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments
Clauzel should have placed two divisions there.
8º. Lord Wellington’s quick perception and vigorous stroke on the
30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he
certainly was not master of all the bearings of the French general’s
operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill’s danger nor the
difficulties of Soult, otherwise it is probable that he would have
put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the
pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence
his march that day until 8 o’clock, and it has been shewn that even
with the help of the seventh division he was too weak against the
heavy mass of the retreating French army. The faults and accidents
which baffled Wellington’s after operations have been sufficiently
touched upon in the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his
victorious career, when Soult’s army was broken and flying, when
Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and all things seemed favourable
for the invasion of France.
His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany
had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to
expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would
have lent his right to the enemy who pivotted upon St. Jean Pied de
Port could operate against his flank. His arrangements for supply,
and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would have been more
difficult and complicated, and as the enemy possessed all the French
and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain
one, at least, before the season closed, was absolute if he would
not resign his communications with the interior of Spain. Then long
marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops destroyed their
shoes and used up their musquet ammunition; and the loss of men had
been great, especially of British in the second division where their
proportion to foreign troops was become too small. The difficulty
of re-equipping the troops would have been increased by entering an
enemy’s state, because the English system did not make war support
war and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally it
was France that was to be invaded, France in which every person was
a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organised under
men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war but who had all
served more or less. Beyond the Adour the army could not advance,
and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any
misfortune befel the allies in Catalonia so as to leave Suchet at
liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or if Soult profiting from
the possession of San Jean Pied de Port should turn the right flank
of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary,
and however short would be dangerous from the hostility and warlike
disposition of the people directed in a military manner.
These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward position, although
offering better communications from right to left, would have given
the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which must
until the fortresses fell hold a defensive and somewhat extended
line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do
not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after
the action of the 2d of August. The questions were distinct. The one
was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions,
the other was simply whether Wellington should profit of his own
victory and the enemy’s distresses; and in this view the objections
above-mentioned, save the want of shoes the scarcity of ammunition
and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last
particulars the allies were not so badly off as the enemy, and in
the first not so deficient as to cripple the army, wherefore if the
advantage to be gained was worth the effort it was an error to halt.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, 4.]
The solution of this problem is to be found in the comparative
condition of the armies. Soult had recovered his reserve his cavalry
and artillery, but Wellington was reinforced by general Graham’s
corps which was more numerous and powerful than Villate’s reserve.
The new chances then were for the allies, and the action of the 2d
of August demonstrated that their opponents however strongly posted
could not stand before them; one more victory would have gone nigh
to destroy the French force altogether; for such was the disorder
that Maucune’s division had on the 2d only one thousand men left out
of more than five thousand, and on the 6th it had still a thousand
stragglers besides killed and wounded: Conroux’s and La Martinière’s
divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the losses of the
other divisions although less remarkable were great. It must also
be remembered that general Foy with eight thousand men was cut off
from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sources of which were in
the allies’ power, was behind the French. With their left pressed
from the pass of Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the
main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept together, since
more than twenty-one thousand men exclusive of Foy’s troops were then
absent from their colours. And as late as the 12th of August Soult
warned the minister of war that he was indeed preparing to assail his
enemy again, but he had not the means of resisting a counter-attack,
although he held a different language to his army and to the people
of the country.
Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were fatigued, Pharsalia would
have been but a common battle.
BOOK XXII.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: 1813. August.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
After the combat of Echallar Soult adopted a permanent position and
reorganized his army. The left wing under D’Erlon occupied the hills
of Ainhoa, with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking Urdax
and Zuguramurdi. The centre under Clauzel was in advance of Sarre
guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the
greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing under Reille composed
of Maucune’s and La Martinière’s divisions extended along the Lower
Bidassoa to the sea; Villatte’s reserve was encamped behind the
Nivelle near Serres, and Reille’s third division, under Foy, covered
in conjunction with the national guards, St. Jean Pied de Port and
the roads leading into France on that side. The cavalry for the
convenience of forage were quartered, one division between the Nive
and the Nivelle rivers, the other as far back as Dax.
Lord Wellington occupied his old positions from the pass of
Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, but the disposition of his
troops was different. Sir Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held
the Roncesvalles and Alduides throwing up field-works at the former.
The third and sixth divisions were in the Bastan guarding the Puerto
de Maya, and the seventh division, reinforced by O’Donnel’s army of
reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugaramurdi. The light
division was posted on the Santa Barbara heights having picquets in
the town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa, their right on
the Ivantelly rock, round which a bridle communication with Echallar
was now made by the labour of the soldiers. Longa’s troops were
beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; the fourth
division was in reserve behind him, near Lesaca; the fourth Spanish
army, now commanded by general Freyre, prolonged the line from the
left of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway occupied
Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the Jaizquibel mountain. The first
division was in reserve behind these Spaniards; the fifth division
was destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the blockade of
Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos D’España’s troops.
This disposition, made with increased means, was more powerful for
defence than the former occupation of the same ground. A strong corps
under a single command was well entrenched at Roncesvalles; and in
the Bastan two British divisions admonished by Stewart’s error were
more than sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The Echallar
mountains were with the aid of O’Donnel’s Spaniards equally secure,
and the reserve instead of occupying San Estevan was posted near
Lesaca in support of the left, now become the most important part of
the line.
The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, the Empecinado was
directed upon Alcanitz and he maintained the communication between
the Catalan army, and Mina. The latter now joined by Duran was
gathering near Jaca from whence his line of retreat was by Sanguessa
upon Pampeluna; in this position he menaced general Paris, who
marched after a slight engagement on the 11th into France, leaving
eight hundred men in the town and castle. At this time lord William
Bentinck having crossed the Ebro was investing Taragona, and thus
the allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military
communication from the Mediteranean to the Bay of Biscay, while
Suchet though holding the fortresses could only communicate with
Soult through France.
This last-named marshal, being strongly posted, did not much expect
a front attack, but the augmentation of the allies on the side of
Roncesvalles and Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force him
to abandon his position by operating along the Nive river. To meet
this danger general Paris took post at Oleron in second line to Foy,
and the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were put in
a state of defence as pivots of operation on that side, while Bayonne
served a like purpose on the other flank of the army. But with great
diligence the French general fortified his line from the mouth of the
Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain and the Nive.
Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading France at this period
have been already noticed, and who had now little to fear from any
renewal of the French operations against his right wing, turned his
whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian. In this object he
was however crossed in a manner to prove that the English ministers
were the very counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen.
Lord Melville was at the head of the board of admiralty; under his
rule the navy of England for the first time met with disasters in
battle, and his neglect of the general’s demands for maritime aid
went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes upon the army. This neglect
combined with the cabinet scheme of employing lord Wellington in
Germany, would seem to prove that experience had taught the English
ministers nothing as to the nature of the Peninsular war, or that
elated with the array of sovereigns against Napoleon they were now
careless of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still it would be
incredible that lord Melville, a man of ordinary capacity, should
have been suffered to retard the great designs and endanger the final
success of a general, whose sure judgement and extraordinary merit
were authenticated by exploits unparalleled in English warfare, if
lord Wellington’s correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not
establish the following facts.
1º. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly because the
Admiralty, of which lord Melville was the head, refused to let the
ships of war carry deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus
heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated by the Portuguese
government, which checked all desire in the French troops to come
over.
2º. When the disputes with America commenced, Mr. Stuart’s efforts to
obtain flour for the army were most vexatiously thwarted by the board
of admiralty, which permitted if it did not encourage the English
ships of war to capture American vessels trading under the secret
licenses.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1.]
3º. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain cruisers along
the coast, as recommended by lord Wellington, caused the loss of many
store-ships and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the army
before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken off Oporto, and one
close to the bar of Lisbon in May. And afterwards, the Mediterranean
packet bearing despatches from lord William Bentinck was captured,
which led to lamentable consequences; for the papers were not in
cypher, and contained detailed accounts of plots against the French
in Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches, MSS.]
4º. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships containing
money, shoes, and other indispensable stores to delay in port, or
risk the being taken on the passage by cruizers issuing from Santona,
Bayonne, and Bordeaux. And while the communications of the allies
were thus intercepted, the French coasting vessels supplied their
army and fortresses without difficulty.
5º. After the battle of Vittoria lord Wellington was forced to
use French ammunition, though too small for the English muskets,
because the ordnance store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to
Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When the troops were
in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of five thousand men was kept at
Gibraltar and Lisbon waiting for ships of war, and the transports
employed to convey them were thus withdrawn from the service of
carrying home wounded men, at a time when the Spanish authorities
at Bilbao refused even for payment to concede public buildings for
hospitals.
6º. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the soldiers were without
proper clothing, because the ship containing their great coats,
though ready to sail in August, was detained at Oporto until
November waiting for convoy. When the victories of July were to
be turned to profit ere the fitting season for the siege of San
Sebastian should pass away, the attack of that fortress was retarded
sixteen days because a battering train and ammunition, demanded
several months before by lord Wellington, had not yet arrived from
England.
7º. During the siege the sea communication with Bayonne was free.
“Any thing in the shape of a naval force,” said lord Wellington,
“would drive away sir George Collier’s squadron.” The garrison
received reinforcements artillery ammunition and all necessary stores
for its defence, sending away the sick and wounded men in empty
vessels. The Spanish general blockading Santona complained at the
same time that the exertions of his troops were useless, because the
French succoured the place by sea when they pleased; and after the
battle of Vittoria not less than five vessels laden with stores and
provisions, and one transport having British soldiers and clothing
on board, were taken by cruizers issuing out of that port. The great
advantage of attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by land was
foregone for want of naval means, and from the same cause British
soldiers were withdrawn from their own service to unload store-ships;
the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish vessels manned by
Spanish soldiers withdrawn from the army, and the store-boats were
navigated by Spanish women.
8º. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and Bayonne being quite free,
the French, whose military means of transport had been so crippled
by their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have collected
magazines with land carriage only, received their supplies by
water, and were thus saved trouble and expense and the unpopularity
attending forced requisitions.
Between April and August, more than twenty applications and
remonstrances, were addressed by lord Wellington to the government
upon these points without producing the slightest attention to his
demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the Admiralty, of whose
conduct he particularly complained, was indeed permitted to write an
offensive official letter to him, but his demands and the dangers
to be apprehended from neglecting them were disregarded, and to
use his own words, “_since Great Britain had been a naval power a
British army had never before been left in such a situation at a most
important moment_.”
Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence and incapacity
or a grovelling sense of national honour prevailed most in the
cabinet, when we find this renowned general complaining that the
government, ignorant even to ridicule of military operations, seemed
to know nothing of the nature of the element with which England was
surrounded, and lord Melville so insensible to the glorious toils of
the Peninsula as to tell him that his army was the last thing to be
attended to.
RENEWED SIEGE OF SEBASTIAN.
Villatte’s demonstration against Longa on the 28th of July had caused
the ships laden with the battering train to put to sea, but on the
5th of August the guns were re-landed and the works against the
fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion having spread that the enemy
was mining under the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion
to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a shaft and driving
a gallery. The men soon acquired expertness, and as the water rose in
the shaft at twelve feet, the work was discontinued when the gallery
had attained eighty feet. Meanwhile the old trenches were repaired,
the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of
Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights, was fortified
and armed with two guns to scour the open beach and sweep the bay.
The siege however languished for want of ammunition; and during this
forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and reinforcements
by sea, their damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed,
the magazines filled, and sixty-seven pieces of artillery put in a
condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and
wounded since the commencement of the attack in July, but as fresh
men came by sea, more than two thousand six hundred good soldiers
were still present under arms. And to show that their confidence
was unabated they celebrated the Emperor’s birthday by crowning the
castle with a splendid illumination; encircling it with a fiery
legend to his honour in characters so large as to be distinctly read
by the besiegers.
On the 19th of August, that is to say after a delay of sixteen
days, the battering train arrived from England, and in the night of
the 22d fifteen heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the
right attack and seven at the left. A second battering train came
on the 23d, augmenting the number of pieces of various kinds to a
hundred and seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but with
characteristic negligence this enormous armament had been sent out
from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one
day’s consumption!
In the night of the 23d the batteries on the Chofre sand-hills
were reinforced with four long pieces and four sixty-eight pound
carronades, and the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety
sappers and miners had come with the train from England, the seamen
under Mr. O’Reilly were again attached to the batteries, and part of
the field artillerymen were brought to the siege.
On the 24th the attack was recommenced with activity. The Chofre
batteries were enlarged to contain forty-eight pieces, and two
batteries for thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of
Bartolomeo, designed to breach at seven hundred yards distance the
faces of the left demi-bastion of the horn-work, that of St. John
on the main front, and the end of the high curtain, for these works
rising in gradation one above another were in the same line of shot.
The approaches on the isthmus were now also pushed forward by the
sap, but the old trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight
on the 25th the French coming from the horn-work swept the left of
the parallel, injured the sap, and made some prisoners before they
were repulsed.
On the night of the 25th the batteries were all armed on both sides
of the Urumea, and on the 26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a
general salvo, and continued to play with astounding noise and
rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre hills destroyed
the revêtement of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined the
towers near the old breach together with the wall connecting them;
but at the isthmus, the batteries although they injured the horn-work
made little impression on the main front from which they were too
distant.
Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented with the
operation, now ordered a battery for six guns to be constructed
amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, only three
hundred yards from the main front, and two shafts were sunk with
a view to drive galleries for the protection of this new battery
against the enemy’s mines, but the work was slow because of the sandy
nature of the soil.
At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 27th the boats of the squadron,
commanded by lieut. Arbuthnot of the Surveillante and carrying a
hundred soldiers of the ninth regiment under captain Cameron, pulled
to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire was opened on them,
and the troops landed with some difficulty, but the island was then
easily taken and a lodgement made with the loss of only twenty-eight
men and officers, of which eighteen were seamen.
In the night of the 27th, about 3 o’clock, the French sallied against
the new battery on the isthmus, but as colonel Cameron of the ninth
regiment met them on the very edge of the trenches with the bayonet
the attempt failed, yet it delayed the arming of the battery. At
day-break the renewed fire of the besiegers, especially that from
the Chofres sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel shells
were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless the practice with
that missile was very uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst
the guards in the parallel and one struck the field-officer. In the
course of the day another sally was commenced, but the enemy being
discovered and fired upon did not persist. The trenches were now
furnished with banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of
gabions and fascines would permit, yet the work was slow, because the
Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa, like those in every other part of
Spain, neglected to provide carts to convey the materials from the
woods, and this hard labour was performed by the Portuguese soldiers.
It would seem however an error not to have prepared all the materials
of this nature during the blockade.
Lord Wellington again visited the works this day, and in the night
the advanced battery, which, at the desire of sir Richard Fletcher
had been constructed for only four guns, was armed. The 29th it
opened, but an accident had prevented the arrival of one gun, and the
fire of the enemy soon dismounted another, so that only two instead
of six guns as lord Wellington had designed, smote at short range
the face of the demi-bastion of St. John and the end of the high
curtain; however the general firing was severe both upon the castle
and the town-works and great damage was done to the defences. By this
time the French guns were nearly silenced and as additional mortars
were mounted on the Chofre batteries, making in all sixty-three
pieces of which twenty-nine threw shells or spherical case-shot, the
superiority of the besiegers was established.
The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable. Captain Alexander
Macdonald of the artillery, without orders, waded across in the night
passed close under the works to the breach and returned safely.
Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the
Chofre batteries, to save the guns from being spiked their vents
were covered with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also
done at the advanced battery on the isthmus.
This day the materials and ordnance for a battery of six pieces,
to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse, were sent to
the island of Santa Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries
were turned upon the retaining wall of the horn-work, in the hope
of shaking down any mines the enemy might have prepared there,
without destroying the wall itself which offered cover for the troops
advancing to the assault.
The trenches leading from the parallel on the isthmus were now
very wide and good, the sap was pushed on the right close to the
demi-bastion of the horn-work, and the sea-wall supporting the high
road into the town, which had increased the march and cramped the
formation of the columns in the first assault, was broken through to
give access to the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches.
The crisis was at hand and in the night of the 29th a false attack
was ordered to make the enemy spring his mines; a desperate service
and bravely executed by lieutenant Macadam of the ninth regiment. The
order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no
means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of
British soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the nearest at
hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what
seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries
playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach
unperceived, and then mounted in extended order shouting and firing;
but the French were too steady to be imposed upon and their musquetry
laid the whole party low with the exception of their commander, who
returned alone to the trenches.
On the 30th the sea-flank of the place being opened from the
half-bastion of St. John on the right to the most distant of the
old breaches, that is to say, for five hundred feet, the batteries
on the Chofres were turned against the castle and other defences of
the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced battery on the isthmus, now
containing three guns, demolished, in conjunction with the fire from
the Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John’s and the end
of the high curtain above it. The whole of that quarter was in ruins,
and at the same time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face
of the demi-bastion of the horn-work and cut away the palisades.
The 30th the batteries continued their fire, and about three o’clock
lord Wellington after examining the enemy’s defence resolved to make
a lodgement on the breach, and in that view ordered the assault to be
made the next day at eleven o’clock when the ebb of tide would leave
full space between the horn-work and the water.
The galleries in front of the advanced battery on the isthmus were
now pushed close up to the sea wall, under which three mines were
formed with the double view of opening a short and easy way for the
troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean
works the enemy might have made in that part. At two o’clock in the
morning of the 31st they were sprung, and opened three wide passages
which were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabions, six feet
high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the left, to
screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. Everything was
now ready for the assault, but before describing that terrible event
it will be fitting to shew the exact state of the besieged in defence.
Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place for fifty-two days,
during thirty of which the attack was suspended. All this time the
garrison had laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of the
besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined the defences of the
enormous breach in the sea flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall
behind of more than twenty feet barred progress, and beyond that,
amongst the ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter-wall
fifteen feet high, loopholed for musquetry, and extending in a
parallel direction with the breaches, which were also cut off from
the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the extremities. The
only really practicable road into the town was by the narrow end of
the high curtain above the half bastion of St. John.
In front of the counter-wall, about the middle of the great breach,
stood the tower of Los Hornos still capable of some defence, and
beneath it a mine charged with twelve hundred weight of powder.
The streets were all trenched, and furnished with traverses to
dispute the passage and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; but
before the assailants could reach the main breach it was necessary
either to form a lodgment in the horn-work, or to pass as in the
former assault under a flanking fire of musquetry for a distance of
nearly two hundred yards. And the first step was close under the
sea-wall covering the salient angle of the covered way, where two
mines charged with eight hundred pounds of powder were prepared to
overwhelm the advancing columns.
[Sidenote: Belmas.]
To support this system of retrenchments and mines the French had
still some artillery in reserve. One sixteen-pounder mounted at St.
Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve
and an eight-pounder preserved in the casemates of the Cavalier were
ready to flank the land face of the half-bastion of St. John; many
guns from the Monte Orgullo especially those of the Mirador could
play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the
horn-work to be brought into action when the assault commenced.
Neither the resolution of the governor nor the courage of the
garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire of the last few days
had reduced the number of fighting men; General Rey had only two
hundred and fifty men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult whether
his brave garrison should be exposed to another assault. “The army
would endeavour to succour him” was the reply, and he abided his fate.
Napoleon’s ordinance, which forbade the surrender of a fortress
without having stood at least one assault, has been strongly censured
by English writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences
made by French governors in the Peninsula were the results, and to
condemn an enemy’s system from which we have ourselves suffered
will scarcely bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs, that
the besiegers working by the rules of art must make a way into the
place, and to risk an assault for the sake of military glory or to
augment the loss of the enemy is to sacrifice brave men uselessly;
that capitulation always followed a certain advance of the besiegers
in Louis the Fourteenth’s time, and to suppose Napoleon’s upstart
generals possessed of superior courage or sense of military honour
to the high-minded nobility of that age was quite inadmissible; and
it has been rather whimsically added that obedience to the emperor’s
orders might suit a predestinarian Turk but could not be tolerated by
a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem, that certain nice
distinctions as to the extent and manner reconcile human slaughter
with Christianity, and that the true standard of military honour
was fixed by the intriguing, depraved and insolent court of Louis
the Fourteenth. It may however be reasonably supposed, that as the
achievements of Napoleon’s soldiers far exceeded the exploits of
Louis’s cringing courtiers they possessed greater military virtues.
But the whole argument seems to rest upon false grounds. To inflict
loss upon an enemy is the very essence of war, and as the bravest men
and officers will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus
occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To resist when nothing
can be gained or saved is an act of barbarous courage which reason
spurns at; but how seldom does that crisis happen in war? Napoleon
wisely insisted upon a resistance which should make it dangerous for
the besiegers to hasten a siege beyond the rules of art, he would
not have a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not really
existing; he desired that military honour should rest upon the
courage and resources of men rather than upon the strength of walls:
in fine he made a practical application of the proverb that necessity
is the mother of invention.
Granted that a siege artfully conducted and with sufficient means
must reduce the fortress attacked; still there will be some
opportunity for a governor to display his resources of mind. Vauban
admits of one assault and several retrenchments, after a lodgment
is made on the body of the place; Napoleon only insisted that every
effort which courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted
before a surrender, and those efforts can never be defined or bounded
before-hand. Tarifa is a happy example. To be consistent, any
attack which deviates from the rules of art must also be denounced
as barbarous; yet how seldom has a general all the necessary means
at his disposal. In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the
British army according to the rules. And there is a manifest weakness
in praising the Spanish defence of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon
because he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar to that
displayed by peasants and artizans. What governor was ever in a more
desperate situation than general Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when sir
Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring which would alone place
him amongst the foremost men of enterprize which Europe can boast of,
threw more than two thousand men upon the ramparts of that almost
impregnable fortress. The young soldiers of the garrison frightened
by a surprise in the night, were dispersed, were flying. The
assailants had possession of the walls for several hours, yet some
cool and brave officers rallying the men towards morning, charged
up the narrow ramps and drove the assailants over the parapets into
the ditch. They who could not at first defend their works were now
able to retake them, and so completely successful and illustrative
of Napoleon’s principle was this counter-attack that the number
of prisoners equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules to
limit energy and genius, and no man knew better than Napoleon how to
call those qualities forth; he possessed them himself in the utmost
perfection and created them in others.
CHAPTER II.
STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.
[Sidenote: 1813. August.]
To assault the breaches without having destroyed the enemy’s defences
or established a lodgment on the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the
increased fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously a
repetition of the former fatal error. And the same generals who had
before so indiscreetly made their disapproval of such operations
public, now even more freely and imprudently dealt out censures,
which not ill-founded in themselves were most ill-timed, since there
is much danger when doubts come down from the commanders to the
soldiers. Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been thus
discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded fifty volunteers
from each of the fifteen regiments composing the first, fourth, and
light divisions, “_men who could shew other troops how to mount a
breach_.” This was the phrase employed, and seven hundred and fifty
gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in answer to the
appeal. Colonel Cooke and major Robertson led the guards and Germans
of the first division, major Rose commanded the men of the fourth
division, and colonel Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his
promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged
veterans of the light division, yet there were good officers and
brave soldiers in the fifth division.
It being at first supposed that lord Wellington merely designed
a simple lodgment on the great breach, the volunteers and one
brigade of the fifth division only were ordered to be ready; but
in a council held at night major Smith maintained that the orders
were misunderstood, as no lodgment could be formed unless the high
curtain was gained. General Oswald being called to the council was
of the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the fifth division
was brought to the trenches, and general Bradford having offered the
services of his Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the Urumea
and assail the farthest breach if he judged it advisable.
Sir James Leith had resumed the command of the fifth division,
and being assisted by general Oswald directed the attack from the
isthmus. He was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers
and would not suffer them to lead the assault; some he spread along
the trenches to keep down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder
were held as a reserve along with general Hay’s British and Sprye’s
Portuguese brigades of the fifth division. To general Robinson’s
brigade the assault was confided. It was formed in two columns, one
to assault the old breach between the towers, the other to storm the
bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain. The small breach
on the extreme right was left for general Bradford’s Portuguese who
were drawn up on the Chofre hills; some large boats filled with
troops, were directed to make a demonstration against the sea-line
of the Monte Orgullo, and sir Thomas Graham overlooked the whole
operations from the right bank of the river.
[Sidenote: Memoirs of Captain Cooke.]
The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog hid every object,
and the besiegers’ batteries could not open until eight o’clock. From
that hour a constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon the
besieged until eleven, when Robinson’s brigade getting out of the
trenches passed through the openings in the sea-wall and was launched
bodily against the breaches. While the head of the column was still
gathering on the strand, about thirty yards from the salient angle of
the horn-work, twelve men, commanded by a serjeant whose heroic death
has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward
leaped upon the covered way with intent to cut the sausage of the
enemy’s mines. The French startled by this sudden assault fired the
train prematurely, and though the serjeant and his brave followers
were all destroyed and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful
crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than forty men
were crushed by the ruins and the rush of the troops was scarcely
checked. The forlorn hope had already passed beyond the play of the
mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape
and shells, the leader lieutenant Macguire of the fourth regiment,
conspicuous from his long white plume his fine figure and his
swiftness, bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful
strength and courage, but at the foot of the great breach he fell
dead, and the stormers went sweeping like a dark surge over his body;
many died however with him and the trickling of wounded men to the
rear was incessant.
This time there was a broad strand left by the retreating tide
and the sun had dried the rocks, yet they disturbed the order and
closeness of the formation, the distance to the main breach was still
nearly two hundred yards, and the French, seeing the first mass of
assailants pass the horn-work regardless of its broken bastion,
immediately abandoned the front and crowding on the river face
of that work, poured their musketry into the flank of the second
column as it rushed along a few yards below them; but the soldiers
still running forward towards the breach returned this fire without
slackening their speed. The batteries of the Monte Orgullo and the
St. Elmo now sent their showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on
the cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion of St. John,
and the four-pounder in the horn-work being suddenly mounted on the
broken bastion poured grape-shot into their rear.
Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the stormers, their array
broken alike by the shot and by the rocks they passed over, reached
their destinations, and the head of the first column gained the top
of the great breach; but the unexpected gulf below could only be
passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses
were still attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the
French musquets from the loop-holed wall beyond soon strewed the
narrow crest of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude
covered the ascent seeking an entrance at every part; to advance
was impossible and the mass of assailants, slowly sinking downwards
remained stubborn and immoveable on the lower part of the breach.
Here they were covered from the musquetry in front, but from several
isolated points, especially the tower of Las Hornos under which the
great mine was placed, the French still smote them with small arms,
and the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells and grape
without intermission.
Such was the state of affairs at the great breach, and at the half
bastion of St. John it was even worse. The access to the top of the
high curtain being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way were
more persevering and constant, and the slaughter was in proportion;
for the traverse on the flank, cutting it off from the cavalier, was
defended by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two pieces
on the cavalier itself swept along the front face of the opening,
and the four-pounder and the musquetry from the horn-work, swept in
like manner along the river face. In the midst of this destruction
some sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting columns
endeavoured to form a lodgement, but no artificial materials had been
provided, and most of the labourers were killed before they could
raise the loose rocky fragments into a cover.
During this time the besiegers’ artillery kept up a constant
counter-fire which killed many of the French, and the reserve
brigades of the fifth division were pushed on by degrees to feed
the attack until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained
in the trenches. The volunteers also who had been with difficulty
restrained in the trenches, “calling out to know, why they had been
brought there if they were not to lead the assault,” these men, whose
presence had given such offence to general Leith that he would have
kept them altogether from the assault, being now let loose went like
a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded masses swarmed up
the face of the ruins, but reaching the crest line they came down
like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter,
and to sink, the deadly French fire was unabated, the smoke floated
away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man.
[Sidenote: Manuscript Memoir by colonel Hunt.]
Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries,
beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win
at any cost; and he was a man to have put himself at the head of
the last company and died sword in hand upon the breach rather
than sustain a second defeat, but neither his confidence nor his
resources were yet exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on
the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries and one on the
Isthmus, that is to say the concentrated fire of fifty heavy pieces
upon the high curtain. The shot ranged over the heads of the troops
who now were gathered at the foot of the breach, and the stream of
missiles thus poured along the upper surface of the high curtain
broke down the traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all
things strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders.
When this flight of bullets first swept over the heads of the
soldiers a cry arose, from some inexperienced people, “to retire
because the batteries were firing on the stormers;” but the veterans
of the light division under Hunt being at that point were not to be
so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury of the cannonade effected
a solid lodgement in some ruins of houses actually within the rampart
on the right of the great breach.
For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon the works and the
houses behind, and then suddenly ceasing the small clatter of the
French musquets shewed that the assailants were again in activity;
and at the same time the thirteenth Portuguese regiment led by Major
Snodgrass and followed by a detachment of the twenty-fourth under
colonel Macbean entered the river from the Chofres. The ford was
deep the water rose above the waist, and when the soldiers reached
the middle of the stream which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy
gun struck on the head of the column with a shower of grape; the
havoc was fearful but the survivors closed and moved on. A second
discharge from the same piece tore the ranks from front to rear,
still the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire of musquetry
from the ramparts, and of artillery from St. Elmo, from the castle,
and from the Mirador, landed on the left bank and rushed against the
third breach. Macbean’s men who had followed with equal bravery then
reinforced the great breach, about eighty yards to the left of the
other although the line of ruins seemed to extend the whole way. The
fighting now became fierce and obstinate again at all the breaches,
but the French musquetry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps
of slain increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to
the foot of the ruins unable to win; the living sheltered themselves
as they could, but the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly
could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were most numerous.
It was now evident that the assault must fail unless some accident
intervened, for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and
no greater effort could be expected from men whose courage had
been already pushed to the verge of madness. In this crisis fortune
interfered. A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible
materials which the French had accumulated behind the traverses for
their defence caught fire, a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole
of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard,
hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were
thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved
with suffocating eddies of smoke the British soldiers broke in at the
first traverse. The defenders bewildered by this terrible disaster
yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate
struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain, but the
fury of the stormers whose numbers increased every moment could not
be stemmed. The French colours on the cavalier were torn away by
lieutenant Gethin of the eleventh regiment. The horn-work and the
land front below the curtain, and the loop-holed wall behind the
great breach were all abandoned; the light division soldiers who
had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left,
immediately penetrated to the streets, and at the same moment the
Portuguese at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered
to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.
Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the walls and now the
stream of war went pouring into the town. The undaunted governor
still disputed the victory for a short time with the aid of his
barricades, but several hundreds of his men being cut off and taken
in the horn-work, his garrison was so reduced that even to effect a
retreat behind the line of defences which separated the town from
the Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops flying from the
horn-work along the harbour flank of the town broke through a body of
the British who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent of
Santa Téresa before them, and this post was the only one retained by
the French in the town. It was thought by some distinguished officers
engaged in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been carried on
this day, if a commander of sufficient rank to direct the troops had
been at hand; but whether from wounds or accident no general entered
the place until long after the breach had been won, the commanders of
battalions were embarrassed for want of orders, and a thunder-storm,
which came down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately
after the place was carried, added to the confusion of the fight.
This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the perpetration of
villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of
antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the
principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine
and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting
cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity of which a
girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous,
incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order was at first
maintained, but the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline
was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a
volley of small arms and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook
him for the provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese
adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, was put to death
in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian,
but deliberately by a number of English soldiers. Many officers
exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were well conducted,
but the rapine and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the
camp-followers crowded into the place, and the disorder continued
until the flames following the steps of the plunderer put an end to
his ferocity by destroying the whole town.
Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been hurt in the
trenches, sir Richard Fletcher the chief engineer, a brave man who
had served his country honorably was killed, and colonel Burgoyne the
next in command of that arm was wounded.
The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The volunteers, although
brought late into the action, had nearly half their number struck
down, most of the regiments of the fifth division suffered in the
same proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of the siege
exceeded two thousand five hundred men and officers.
The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo was to be attacked,
but it was very steep and difficult to assail. The castle served as
a citadel and just below it four batteries connected with masonry
stretched across the face of the hill. From the Mirador and Queen’s
batteries at the extremities of this line, ramps, protected by
redans, led to the convent of Santa Teresa which was the most salient
part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara and behind the
mountain were some sea batteries, and if all these works had been
of good construction, the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege
would have been long and difficult; but the garrison was shattered
by the recent assault, most of the engineers and leaders killed,
the governor and many others wounded, five hundred men were sick or
hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred,
and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The castle was small,
the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed to protect the ammunition and
provisions, and only ten guns remained in a condition for service,
three of which were on the sea line. There was very little water and
the troops were forced to lie out on the naked rock exposed to the
fire of the besiegers, or only covered by the asperities of ground.
General Rey and his brave garrison were however still resolute to
fight, and they received nightly by sea supplies of ammunition though
in small quantities.
[Sidenote: September.]
Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault. Regular approaches
could not be carried up the steep naked rock, he doubted the power
of vertical fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured
works of the town, intending to breach the enemy’s remaining lines
of defence and then storm the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa
Teresa would enable the French to sally by the rampart on the left
of the allies’ position in the town, he composed his first line
with a few troops strongly barricaded, placing a supporting body in
the market-place, and strong reserves on the high curtain and flank
ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which being actually in the
town might have been easily taken at first, the enemy killed many of
the besiegers, and when after several days it was assaulted, they
set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication made from
the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this time the flames were
destroying the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with shells shot
upward from the besiegers’ batteries.
[Sidenote: Jones’ Sieges.]
[Sidenote: Bellas’ Sieges.]
On the 3d of September, the governor being summoned to surrender
demanded terms inadmissible, his resolution was not to be shaken,
and the vertical fire was therefore continued day and night, though
the British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for the officer
commanding in the castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison
cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make trenches to
cover themselves. The French on the other hand complain that their
wounded and sick men, although placed in an empty magazine with a
black flag flying, were fired upon by the besiegers, although the
English prisoners in their red uniforms were placed around it to
strengthen the claim of humanity.
The new breaching batteries were now commenced, one for three pieces
on the isthmus, the other for seventeen pieces on the land front
of the horn-work. These guns were brought from the Chofres at low
water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but the difficulty
of labouring in the water during darkness induced the artillery
officers to transport the remainder in daylight, and within reach of
the enemy’s batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the town the
besiegers’ labours were impeded by the flaming houses, but near the
foot of the hill the ruins furnished shelter for the musqueteers
employed to gall the garrison, and the guns on the island of Santa
Clara being reinforced were actively worked by the seamen. The
besieged replied but little, their ammunition was scarce and the
horrible vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner the
action was prolonged until the 8th of September when fifty-nine heavy
battering pieces opened at once from the island the isthmus the
horn-work and the Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the
Queen’s battery were broken, the fire of the besieged was entirely
extinguished, and the summit and face of the hill torn and furrowed
in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine
exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid
with the descending shells. Then the governor proudly bending to
his fate surrendered. On the 9th this brave man and his heroic
garrison, reduced to one-third of their original number and leaving
five hundred wounded behind them in the hospital, marched out with
the honours of war. The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of
twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after sixty-three days
open trenches, precisely when the tempestuous season, beginning to
vex the coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade
impossible.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. San Sebastian a third-rate fortress and in bad condition when
first invested, resisted a besieging army, possessing an enormous
battering train, for sixty-three days. This is to be attributed
partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions
extraneous to the military operations. Amongst the last are to be
reckoned the misconduct of the Admiralty, and the negligence of the
government relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition;
the latter retarded the second siege for sixteen days; the former
enabled the garrison to keep up and even increase its means as the
siege proceeded.
Next, in order and importance, was the failure of the Spanish
authorities, who neglected to supply carts and boats from the
country, and even refused the use of their public buildings for
hospitals. Thus between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from
neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation of war which
more than any other depends for success upon labour and provident
care. It was probably the first time that an important siege was
maintained by women’s exertions; the stores of the besiegers were
landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls!
Another impediment was Soult’s advance towards Pampeluna, but the
positive effect of this was slight since the want of ammunition would
have equally delayed the attack. The true measure of the English
government’s negligence is thus obtained. It was more mischievous
than the operations of sixty thousand men under a great general.
2º. The errors of execution having been before touched upon need no
further illustration. The greatest difference between the first and
second part of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the
latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried further on and
openings made in the sea-wall, the troops more easily and rapidly
extricated themselves from the trenches, the distance to the breach
was shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts of attack
was somewhat less powerful. These advantages were considerable, but
not proportionate to the enormous increase of the besiegers’ means;
and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the cannonade
during the assault, that the whole of the defences might have been
ruined, even those of the castle, if this overwhelming fire had in
compliance with the rules of art been first employed to silence the
enemy’s fire. A lodgement in the horn-work could then have been made
with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger.
3º. As the faults leading to failure in the first part of the
siege were repeated in the second, while the enemy’s resources
had increased by the gain of time, and because his intercourse
with France by sea never was cut off, it follows that there was no
reasonable security for success; not even to make a lodgement on the
breach, since no artificial materials were prepared and the workmen
failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement and the
change adopted in the council of war, the option given to general
Bradford, the remarkable fact, that the simultaneous attack on the
horn-work was only thought of when the first efforts against the
breach had failed, all prove, that the enemy’s defensive means were
underrated, and the extent of the success exceeded the preparations
to obtain it.
The place was won by accident. For first the explosion of the great
mine under the tower of Los Hornos, was only prevented by a happy
shot which cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and this
was followed by the ignition of the French powder-barrels and shells
along the high curtain, which alone opened the way into the town. Sir
Thomas Graham’s firmness and perseverance in the assault, and the
judicious usage of his artillery against the high curtain during the
action, an operation however which only belonged to daylight, were
no mean helps to the victory. It was on such sudden occasions that
his prompt genius shone conspicuously, yet it was nothing wonderful
that heavy guns at short distances, the range being perfectly known,
should strike with certainty along a line of rampart more than
twenty-seven feet above the heads of the troops. Such practice was
to be expected from British artillery, and Graham’s genius was more
evinced by the promptness of the thought and the trust he put in
the valour of his soldiers. It was far more extraordinary that the
stormers did not relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their
own guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred; a
serjeant of the ninth regiment was killed by the batteries close to
his commanding officer, and it is probable that other casualties also
had place.
[Sidenote: Captain Cooke, forty-third regiment. Vide his Memoirs.]
[Sidenote: Bellas.]
4º. The explosion on the ramparts is generally supposed to have
been caused by the cannonade from the Chofre batteries, yet a cool
and careful observer, whose account I have adopted, because he was
a spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by having to give or
receive orders, affirms that the cannonade ceased before colonel
Snodgrass forded the river, whereas the great explosion did not
happen until half an hour after that event. By some persons that
intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought one of the principal
causes of success, and it appears certain that an entrance was made
at the small breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, many
of the former having wandered from the great breach and got mixed
with the latter, before the explosion happened on the high curtain.
Whether those men would have been followed by greater numbers is
doubtful, but the lodgement made by the light division volunteers
within the great breach was solid and could have been maintained.
The French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir Thomas Graham
certainly did not found much upon it. He gave general Bradford the
option to attack or remain tranquil, and colonel M‘Bean actually
received counter-orders when his column was already in the river and
too far advanced to be withdrawn.
5º. When the destruction of San Sebastian became known, it was used
by the anti-British party at Cadiz to excite the people against
England. The political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused sir Thomas
Graham, “that he sacked and burned the place because it had formerly
traded entirely with France,” his generals were said to have excited
the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior officers
to have boasted of it afterwards. A newspaper, edited by an agent of
the Spanish government, repeating these accusations, called upon the
people to avenge the injury upon the British army, and the Spanish
minister of war, designated by lord Wellington as the abettor and
even the writer of this and other malignant libels published at
Cadiz, officially demanded explanations.
Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant denial and
remonstrance to sir Henry Wellesley. “It was absurd,” he said, “to
suppose the officers of the army would have risked the loss of all
their labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion of the
men while the enemy still held the castle. To him the town was of
the utmost value as a secure place for magazines and hospitals.
He had refused to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had
previously refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, because
the injury would fall on the inhabitants and not upon the enemy;
yet nothing could have been more easy, or less suspicious than this
method of destroying the town if he had been so minded. It was the
enemy who set fire to the houses, it was part of the defence; the
British officers strove to extinguish the flames, some in doing
so lost their lives by the French musquetry from the castle, and
the difficulty of communicating and working through the fire was
so great, that he had been on the point of withdrawing the troops
altogether. He admitted the plunder, observing, that he knew not
whether that or the libels made him most angry; he had taken measures
to stop it, but when two-thirds of the officers had been killed or
wounded in the action, and when many of the inhabitants taking part
with the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was impossible.
Moreover he was for several days unable from other circumstances to
send fresh men to replace the stormers.”
This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels circulated, but the
broad facts remained. San Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and
atrocities degrading to human nature had been perpetrated by the
troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and ecclesiastic bodies the
consuls and principal persons of San Sebastian, afterwards published
a detailed statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case;
and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not to be heeded,
four-fifths of the excesses attributed to the French armies must be
effaced as resting on a like foundation. That the town was first
set on fire behind the breaches during the operations, and that it
spread in the tumult following the assault is undoubted; yet it is
not improbable that plunderers, to forward their own views increased
it, and certainly the great destruction did not befall until long
after the town was in possession of the allies. I have been assured
by a surgeon, that he was lodged the third day after the assault
at a house well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire
or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards plundered and
burned. The inhabitants could only have fired upon the allies the
first day, and it might well have been in self-defence for they were
barbarously treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was notorious, so
were many others. I have myself heard around the picquet fires, when
soldiers as every experienced officer knows, speak without reserve
of their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions mentioned
by the municipality related with little variation long before that
narrative was published; told however with sorrow for the sufferers
and indignation against the perpetrators, for these last were not so
numerous as might be supposed from the extent of the calamities they
inflicted.
[Sidenote: Colonel Cadell’s Memoirs.]
It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain
makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite
for plunder supplies the place of honour; as if the compatability of
vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary
in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian there
was not a man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered
the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all
rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline however has its root in
patriotism, or how could armed men be controuled at all, and it would
be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity
upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the
stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was, there is as much
difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher;
the ancient warrior, fighting with the sword and reaping his harvest
of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the
act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees
not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as
proofs of personal prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings,
his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs
not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns,
where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of
discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier
can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least
of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honor! Shame on
such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other
soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations receive pay.
At the period of this assault, a serjeant of the twenty-eighth
regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from
Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. He placed the
money he was entrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a
commissary and having secured a receipt persuaded his party to join
in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases,
and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the
spirits who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is
precisely fear to which they are most insensible.
Undoubtedly if soldiers hear and read, that it is impossible to
restrain their violence they will not be restrained. But let the
plunder of a town after an assault, be expressly made criminal by the
articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly
impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to
military honour and discipline as it is to morality; let a select
permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army,
and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order,
and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be
necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valour should keep
pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it
would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance
of the service, should be insured to the successful troops and always
paid without delay. This money might be taken as ransom from enemies,
but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should
furnish the amount. With such regulations the storming of towns would
not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in
the field.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: 1813. August.]
While San Sebastian was being stormed Soult fought a battle with the
covering force, not willingly nor with much hope of success, but he
was averse to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and
thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided
however by the progress of the siege, which he knew perfectly through
his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving
meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of
the army and of the people. Of his dispersed soldiers eight thousand
had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, and he was
promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts; these last
were however yet to be enrolled, and neither the progress of the
siege, nor the general panic along the frontier which recurred with
increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to remain
inactive.
He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy’s superior strength of
position number and military confidence; but his former efforts on
the side of Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian,
and another offensive movement would necessarily produce a like
effect; wherefore he hoped by repeating the disturbance, as long as
a free intercourse by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply the
garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation for the allies. To
renew the movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it
required fifty thousand infantry for the attack, and twenty thousand
as a corps of observation on the Lower Bidassoa, and he had not
such numbers to dispose of. The subsistence of his troops also was
uncertain, because the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria
was still felt, and the resources of the country were reluctantly
yielded by the people. To act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port
was therefore impracticable. And to attack the allies’ centre, at
Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, seeing that two
mountain-chains were to be forced before the movement could seriously
affect lord Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable for
artillery, success if such should befall, would lead to no decisive
result. It only remained to attack the left of the allies by the
great road of Irun.
Against that quarter Soult could bring more than forty thousand
infantry, but the positions were of perilous strength. The Upper
Bidassoa was in Wellington’s power, because the light division,
occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank,
covered all the bridges; but the Lower Bidassoa flowing from Vera
with a bend to the left separated the hostile armies, and against
this front about nine miles wide Soult’s operations were necessarily
directed. On his right, that is to say, from the broken bridge of
Behobia in front of Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal,
offered no apparent facility for a passage; and between the fords
of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of three miles, there was
only the one passage of Andarlassa about two miles below Vera; along
this space also the banks of the river, steep craggy mountain ridges
without roads, forbade any great operations. Thus the points of
attack were restricted to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and the
broken bridge of Behobia.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
To raise the siege it was only necessary to force a way to Oyarzun,
a small town about seven or eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from
thence the assailants could march at once upon Passages and upon
the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore the object of the French
marshal’s combinations. The royal road led directly to it by the
broad valley which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel
mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, but the Peña de Haya,
commonly called the four-crowned mountain, filled with its dependent
ridges all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun. Its
staring head bound with a rocky diadem was impassable, but from the
bridges of Vera and Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely
impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun
at one side and to Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal
road at both places. Soult’s first design was to unite Clauzel’s
and D’Erlon’s troops, drive the light division from the heights of
Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges of Lesaca and Vera force
a passage over the Peña de Haya on the left of its summit, and push
the heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the Upper Urumea; meanwhile
Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to
fight their way also to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that
Wellington might during this time collect his right wing and seek to
envelope the French army, or march upon Bayonne; but he thought the
general state of his affairs required bold measures, and the progress
of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon drove him into action.
On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohoussoa, crossed the Nive
at Cambo and reached Espelette, leaving behind him six hundred men,
and the national guards who were very numerous, with orders to watch
the roads and valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed
by superior forces, this corps of observation was to fall back upon
that fortress, and it was supported with a brigade of light cavalry
stationed at St. Palais.
In the night two of D’Erlon’s divisions were secretly drawn from
Ainhoa, Foy continued his march through Espelette, by the bridges
of Amotz and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the reserve
moved forward, and thus in the morning of the 30th two strong French
columns of attack were assembled on the Lower Bidassoa.
The first, under Clauzel, consisted of four divisions, furnishing
twenty thousand men with twenty pieces of artillery. It was
concentrated in the woods behind the Commissary and Bayonette
mountains, above Vera.
The second, commanded by general Reille, was composed of two
divisions and Villatte’s reserve in all eighteen thousand men; but
Foy’s division and some light cavalry were in rear ready to augment
this column to about twenty-five thousand, and there were thirty-six
pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages collected behind the
camp of Urogne on the royal road.
Reille’s troops were secreted, partly behind the Croix des Bouquets
mountain, partly behind that of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of
the Mandale near Biriatu. Meanwhile D’Erlon, having Conroux’s and
Abbé’s divisions and twenty pieces of artillery under his command,
held the camps in advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his
front marched to reinforce their own left on the crowned mountain,
he was to vex and retard their movements, always however avoiding a
serious engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his connection
with Clauzel’s column; that is to say, he was with Abbé’s division,
moving from Ainhoa, to menace the allies towards Zagaramurdi and the
Puerto de Echallar; and with Conroux’s division, then in front of
Sarre, to menace the light division, to seize the rock of Ivantelly
if it was abandoned, and be ready to join Clauzel if occasion
offered. On the other hand, should the allies assemble a large force
and operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle rivers, D’Erlon,
without losing his connection with the main army, was to concentrate
on the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains towards San Pé.
Finally, if the attack on the Lower Bidassoa succeeded, he was to
join Clauzel, either by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the
bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support D’Erlon with the two
divisions of heavy cavalry, but forage could only be obtained for the
artillery horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six chosen troops
of dragoons and two or three hundred gensd’armes, which were all
assembled on the royal road behind Reille’s column.
It was the French marshal’s intention to attack at daybreak on the
30th, but his preparations being incomplete he deferred it until
the 31st, and took rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence
passing over to the allies’ camps. Nevertheless Wellington’s
emissaries advised him of the movements in the night of the 29th, the
augmentation of troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning
of the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage and the artillery
were descried on the royal road beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned he
prepared for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of English
foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign commenced, was now come
up; most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined;
and three regiments just arrived from England formed a new brigade
under lord Aylmer, making the total augmentation of British troops in
this quarter little less than five thousand men.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This narrow mountain ridge,
seventeen hundred feet high, runs along the coast, abutting at one
end upon the Passages harbour and at the other upon the navigable
mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for an attack it was only
guarded by a flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot the
small fort of Figueras commanding the entrance of the river was
garrisoned by seamen from the naval squadron. Fuenterabia a walled
place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low ground between
that town and Irun defended by a chain of eight large field redoubts,
which connected the position of Jaizquibel with the heights covering
the royal road to Oyarzun.
On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned bridge of
Behobia, there was a sudden bend in the river, the concave towards
the French, and their positions commanded the passage of the fords
below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly stiff and lofty
ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of
the Pena de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge,
confining the road leading from the bridge of Behobia to Irun, a
distance of one mile, to the narrow space between its channel and the
foot of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied and defended
by a field-work, blocked this way. It followed that the French, after
forcing the passage of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial
before their army could use the great road.
About six thousand men of the fourth Spanish army now under general
Freyre, were established on the crest of San Marcial, which was
strengthened by abbattis and temporary field-works.
Behind Irun the first British division, under general Howard, was
posted, and lord Aylmer’s brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of
Howard’s right to support the left of the Spaniards.
The right of San Marcial falling back from the river was, although
distinct as a position, connected with the Pena de Haya, and in some
degree exposed to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu, wherefore
Longa’s Spaniards were drawn off from those slopes of the Pena de
Haya which descended towards Vera, to be posted on those descending
towards Biriatu. In this situation he protected and supported the
right of San Marcial.
Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly opposed to the
progress of the enemy, and the fourth division quartered near Lesaca
was still disposable. From this body a Portuguese brigade had been
detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite Vera, and to cover
the roads leading from the bridge and fords of that place over the
flanks of the Pena de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades of the
division were stationed up the mountain, close under the foundry of
San Antonio and commanding the intersection of the roads coming from
Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade
to Longa and to Freyre, they tied the whole together. The Portuguese
brigade was however somewhat exposed, and too weak to guard the
enormous slopes on which it was placed, wherefore Wellington drew
general Inglis’s brigade of the seventh division from Echallar to
reinforce it, and even then the flanks of the Pena de Haya were
so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled here and there
with little coherence. The English general aware that his positions
were too extensive had commenced the construction of several large
redoubts on commanding points of the mountain, and had traced out a
second fortified camp on a strong range of heights, which immediately
in front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the Jaizquibel, but these
works were unfinished.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
During the night of the 30th Soult garnished with artillery all the
points commanding the fords of Biriatu, the descent to the broken
bridge and the banks below it, called the Bas de Behobia. This was
partly to cover the passage of the fords and the formation of his
bridges, partly to stop gun-boats coming up to molest the troops in
crossing, and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio’s brigade
of Joseph’s Spanish guards along the river as far down as Andaya,
fronting Fuenterabia.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
General Reille, commanding La Martiniere’s, Maucune’s, and Villatte’s
divisions, directed the attack. His orders were to storm the camp of
San Marcial, and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check any
reinforcement coming from the side of Vera or descending from the
Pena de Haya, to drive the allies with the remainder of his force
from ridge to ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain
which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal road being thus opened, Foy’s
division with the cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross
by bridges to be laid during the attack on San Marcial. And it was
Soult’s intention under any circumstances to retain this last-named
ridge, and to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent
operations.
To aid Reille’s progress and to provide for the concentration of the
whole army at Oyarzun, Clauzel was directed to make a simultaneous
attack from Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies
from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but leaving one division
and his guns on the ridges above Vera to keep the light division
in check, to cross the river by two fords just below the town of
Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that slope of the Pena
de Haya where the Portuguese brigade and the troops under general
Inglis were posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge of San
Antonio, which commanded the intersection of the roads leading round
the head of the mountain, he could aid Reille directly by falling on
the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun by turning the rocky
summit of the Pena de Haya.
[Sidenote: August.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
_Combat of San Marcial._ At daylight on the 31st, Reille, under
protection of the French guns, forded the river above Biriatu
with two divisions and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized
a detached ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial, and
leaving there one brigade as a reserve detached another to attack the
Spanish left by a slope which descended in that quarter to the river.
Meanwhile with La Martiniere’s division he assailed their right. But
the side of the mountain was covered with brushwood and remarkably
steep, the French troops being ill-managed preserved no order, the
supports and the skirmishers mixing in one mass got into confusion,
and when two-thirds of the height were gained the Spaniards charged
in columns and drove the assailants headlong down.
During this action two bridges were thrown, partly on trestles
partly on boats, below the fords, and the head of Villatte’s reserve
crossing ascended the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously;
one brigade even reached the chapel of San Marcial and the left of
the Spanish line was shaken, but the eighty-fifth regiment belonging
to lord Aylmer’s brigade advanced a little way to support it, and
at that moment lord Wellington rode up with his staff. Then the
Spaniards who cared so little for their own officers, with that
noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country
acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation, and shouting
aloud dashed their adversaries down with so much violence that many
were driven into the river, and some of the French pontoon boats
coming to their succour were overloaded and sunk. It was several
hours before the broken and confused masses could be rallied and
the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the
drowning men, repaired. When this was effected, Soult who overlooked
the action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV., sent the
remainder of Villatte’s reserve over the river, and calling up Foy’s
division prepared a more formidable and better arranged attack; and
he expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation from the side
of Vera, of which it is time to treat, was now making considerable
progress up the Pena de Haya on the allies’ right.
_Combat of Vera._ General Clauzel had descended the Bayonette and
Commissari mountains immediately after day-break, under cover of
a thick fog, but at seven o’clock the weather cleared, and three
divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by the troops on Santa
Barbara, making for the fords below Vera in the direction of two
hamlets called the Salinas and the Bario de Lesaca. A fourth division
and the guns remained stationary on the slopes of the mountain, and
the artillery opened now and then upon the little town of Vera, from
which the picquets of the light division were recalled with exception
of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Correspondence, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Manuscript Memoir by general Inglis.]
About eight o’clock the enemy’s columns began to pass the fords
covered by the fire of their artillery, but the first shells thrown
fell into the midst of their own ranks and the British troops on
Santa Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive shout. Their
march was however sure, and a battalion of chosen light troops,
without knapsacks, quickly commenced the battle on the left bank
of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by their extreme
activity and rapid fire forced the latter to retire up the slopes of
the mountain. General Inglis then reinforced the line of skirmishers
and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards engaged, but
Clauzel menaced his left flank from the lower ford, and the French
troops still forced their way upwards in front without a check,
until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of
the Pena de la Haya. Inglis lost two hundred and seventy men and
twenty-two officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding the
intersection of the roads leading from Vera and Lesaca to Irun and
Oyarzun. That is to say somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where
the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese brigade,
was, in conjunction with Longa’s Spaniards, so placed as to support
and protect equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre on San
Marcial.
These operations, from the great height and asperity of the mountain,
occupied many hours, and it was past two o’clock before even the
head of Clauzel’s columns reached this point. Meanwhile as the
French troops left in front of Santa Barbara made no movement,
and lord Wellington had before directed the light division to aid
general Inglis, a wing of the forty-third and three companies of
the riflemen from general Kempt’s brigade, with three weak Spanish
battalions drawn from O’Donnel’s Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the
Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower slopes
on the right of Inglis where they covered another knot of minor
communications coming from Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the
remainder of Kempt’s brigade which occupied Lesaca itself, and thus
the chain of connection and defence between Santa Barbara and the
positions of the fourth division on the Pena de la Haya was completed.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.]
Clauzel seeing these movements, and thinking the allies at Echallar
and Santa Barbara were only awaiting the proper moment to take him
in flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, if he engaged
further up the mountain, now abated his battle and sent notice of
his situation and views to Soult. This opinion was well-founded;
lord Wellington was not a general to let half his army be paralyzed
by D’Erlon’s divisions. On the 30th, when he observed Soult’s first
preparations in front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be
made upon D’Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar Zagaramurdi and Maya;
general Hill was also directed to shew the heads of columns towards
St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st when the force and direction
of Clauzel’s columns were known, he ordered lord Dalhousie to bring
the remainder of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.
Following these orders Giron, who commanded the Spaniards O’Donnel
being sick, slightly skirmished on the 30th with Conroux’s advanced
posts in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at day-break the whole of
the French line was assailed. That is to say, Giron again fought
with Conroux, feebly as before, but two Portuguese brigades of the
sixth and seventh divisions, directed by lord Dalhousie and general
Colville from the passes of Zagaramurdi and Maya, drove the French
from their camp behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé who commanded there
being thus pressed, collected his whole force in front of Ainhoa
on an entrenched position, and making strong battle repulsed the
allies with some loss of men by the sixth division. Thus five combats
were fought in one day at different points of the general line, and
D’Erlon, who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a fresh
column coming from Maya as if to turn his left, judged that a great
movement against Bayonne was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He
was mistaken. Lord Wellington being entirely on the defensive, only
sought by these demonstrations to disturb the plan of attack, and the
seventh division, following the second order sent to lord Dalhousie,
marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax having lasted until
mid-day the movement was not completed that evening.
D’Erlon’s despatch reached Soult at the same time that Clauzel’s
report arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San
Marcial were then completed, but these reports and the ominous
cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced
him to abandon this object and hold his army ready for a general
battle on the Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy’s division which
had not yet crossed the Bidassoa to the heights of Serres, behind
the Nivelle, as a support to D’Erlon, and caused six chosen troops
of dragoons to march upon San Pé higher up on that river. Clauzel
received orders to arrest his attack and repass the Bidassoa in
the night. He was to leave Maransin’s division upon the Bayonette
mountain and the Col de Bera, and with the other three divisions to
march by Ascain and join Foy on the heights of Serres.
Notwithstanding these movements Soult kept Reille’s troops beyond
the Bidassoa, and the battle went on sharply, for the Spaniards
continually detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive the
French from the lower positions into the river, until about four
o’clock when their hardihood abating they desired to be relieved; but
Wellington careful of their glory seeing the French attacks were
exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity to fix the military
spirit of his allies, refused to relieve or to aid them; yet it
would not be just to measure their valour by this fact. The English
general blushed while he called upon them to fight, knowing that
they had been previously famished by their vile government, and that
there were no hospitals to receive no care for them when wounded.
The battle was however arrested by a tempest which commencing in the
mountains about three o’clock, raged for several hours with wonderful
violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through
the air like feathers on the howling winds, while the thinnest
streams swelling into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling
innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst this
turmoil and under cover of night the French re-crossed the river, and
the head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]
Clauzel’s retreat was more unhappy. Having received the order to
retire early in the evening when the storm had already put an end to
all fighting, he repassed the fords in person and before dark at the
head of two brigades, ordering general Vandermaesen to follow with
the remainder of his divisions. It would appear that he expected no
difficulty, since he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera
nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently ignorant of
the state of his own troops on the other bank of the river occupied
himself with suggesting new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile
Vandermaesen’s situation became critical. Many of his soldiers
attempting to cross were drowned by the rising waters, and finally,
unable to effect a passage at the fords, that general marched up the
stream to seize the bridge of Vera. His advanced guard surprising
a corporal’s picquet rushed over, but was driven back by a rifle
company posted in the fortified house. This happened about three
o’clock in the morning and the riflemen defended the passage until
daylight when a second company and some Portuguese Caçadores came to
their aid. But the French reserve left at Vera seeing how matters
stood opened a fire of guns against the fortified house from a high
rock just above the town, and their skirmishers approached it on the
right bank while Vandermaesen plied his musquetry from the left bank.
The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and
the passage was forced, but Vandermaesen urging the attack in person
was killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt.
[Sidenote: September]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Soult now learning from D’Erlon that all offensive movements on the
side of Maya had ceased at twelve o’clock on the 31st, contemplated
another attack on San Marcial, but in the course of the day general
Rey’s report of the assault on San Sebastian reached him, and at the
same time he heard that general Hill was in movement on the side of
St. Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought reflection. San
Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt to carry off the wasted garrison
from the castle would cost five or six thousand good soldiers,
and the safety of the whole army would be endangered by pushing
headlong amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain.
For Wellington could throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass
of at least thirty-five thousand men, upon the French left during
the action, and he would be nearer to Bayonne than the French right
when once the battle was engaged beyond the Lower Bidassoa. The
army had lost in the recent actions three thousand six hundred men.
General Vandermaesen had been killed, and four others, La Martiniere,
Menne, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first mortally; all the superior
officers agreed that a fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and
serious losses might draw on an immediate invasion of France before
the necessary defensive measures were completed.
Yielding to these reasons he resolved to recover his former positions
and thenceforward remain entirely on the defensive, for which his
vast knowledge of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical
arrangement and his firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him.
Twelve battles or combats fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that
he had strived hard to regain the offensive for the French army, and
willing still to strive if it might be so, he had called upon Suchet
to aid him and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet
helped him not, and Napoleon’s answer indicated at once his own
difficulties and his reliance upon the duke of Dalmatia’s capacity
and fidelity.
“_I have given you my confidence and can add neither to your means
nor to your instructions._”
The loss of the allies was one thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and sixteen
hundred Spaniards. Wherefore the cost of men on this day, including
the storming of San Sebastian, exceeded five thousand, but the battle
in no manner disturbed the siege. The French army was powerless
against such strong positions. Soult had brought forty-five thousand
men to bear in two columns upon a square of less than five miles,
and the thirty thousand French actually engaged, were repulsed by ten
thousand, for that number only of the allies fought.
But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on Soult’s part.
Lord Wellington’s experience of French warfare, his determined
character, coolness and thorough acquaintance with the principles of
his art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of his army
to be kept in check by D’Erlon’s two divisions; and accordingly,
the moment D’Erlon was menaced Soult stopped his own attack to make
a counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on favourable
ground. Perhaps his secret hope was to draw his opponent to such a
conclusion, but if so, the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price
to pay for the chance.
A general who had made up his mind to force a way to San Sebastian,
would have organized his rear so that no serious embarrassment could
arise from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he would have
concentrated his whole army, and have calculated his attack so as
to be felt at San Sebastian before his adversary’s counter-movement
could be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D’Erlon’s two divisions
should have come in the night of the 30th to Vera, which without
weakening the reserve opposed to the light division would have
augmented Clauzel’s force by ten thousand men; and on the most
important line, because San Marcial offered no front for the action
of great numbers, and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise
or the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such commanding points
as shall force an enemy either to abandon his strong position, or
become the assailant to recover those he has thus lost. Now the
difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was evinced by the rapid
manner in which Clauzel at once gained the ridges as far as the
foundry of San Antonio; with ten thousand additional men he might
have gained a commanding position on the rear and left flank of San
Marcial, and forced the allies to abandon it. That lord Wellington
thought himself weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling up
the seventh division from Echallar, and by his orders to the light
division.
[Sidenote: Correspondence with the minister of war, MSS.]
Soult’s object was to raise the siege, but his plan involved the risk
of having thirty-five thousand of the allies interposed during his
attack between him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation
than the raising of the siege, therefore the enterprise may be
pronounced injudicious. He admitted indeed, that excited to the
enterprise, partly by insinuations, whether from the minister of
war or his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a generous
repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, he was too precipitate,
acting contrary to his judgment; but he was probably tempted by the
hope of obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a bridge-head,
and thus securing a favourable point for after combinations.
Lord Wellington having resolved not to invade France at this time,
was unprepared for so great an operation as throwing his right and
centre upon Soult’s left; and it is obvious also that on the 30th he
expected only a partial attack at San Marcial. The order he first
gave to assail D’Erlon’s position, and then the counter-order for the
seventh division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the latter
was issued after Clauzel’s numbers and the direction of his attack
were ascertained. The efforts of two Portuguese brigades against
D’Erlon sufficed therefore to render null the duke of Dalmatia’s
great combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their operations
marks the vice of his own. Here it may be observed, that the movement
of the forty-third the rifle companies and the Spaniards, to secure
the right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Dispatched by different
roads without knowing precisely the point they were to concentrate
at, each fell in with the enemy at different places; the Spaniards
got under fire and were forced to alter their route; the forty-third
companies stumbling on a French division had to fall back half a
mile; it was only by thus feeling the enemy at different points that
the destined position was at last found, and a disaster was scarcely
prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nevertheless those detachments
were finally well placed to have struck a blow the next morning,
because their post was only half an hour’s march from the high ground
behind Vandermaesen’s column when he forced the bridge at Vera, and
the firing would have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt’s
brigade could also have moved upon the same point from Lesaca. It is
however very difficult to seize such occasions in mountain warfare
where so little can be seen of the general state of affairs.
A more obvious advantage was neglected by general Skerrit. The
defence of the bridge at Vera by a single company of rifles lasted
more than an hour, and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a
tumultuous manner, could not have cleared the narrow passage after
it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington’s despatch erroneously
describes the French as passing under the fire of great part of
general Skerrit’s brigade, whereas that officer remained in order of
battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a mile distant, and
allowed the enemy to escape. It is true that a large mass of French
troops were on the counter slopes of the Bayonette mountain, beyond
Vera, but the seventh division, being then close to San Barbara,
would have prevented any serious disaster if the blow had failed. A
great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in rough mountains is
generally a series of errors.
CHAPTER IV.
[Sidenote: 1813. September.]
Soult, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack
along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think
he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double
misunderstanding did not however last long, and each army resumed its
former position.
The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and
point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depôt,
and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations;
the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the
allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately
invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental
sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from
Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors
were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by
their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the
partizans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a
conspiracy in the south, and the duke of Berri desired to join the
British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were already
armed and organized at the head of which he would place himself.
In fine all was exultation and extravagance. But lord Wellington,
well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises,
while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the
opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing,
“_that if he had done all that was expected he should have been
before that period in the moon_.”
With respect to the duke of Berri’s views, it was for the sovereigns
he said to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form
part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or
any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to
get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage
or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party without pledging
themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed
decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partizans in
rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon’s power
rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of
corruption ever established in any country, externally upon his
military force which was supported almost exclusively by foreign
contributions; once confined to the limits of France he would be
unable to bear the double expense of his government and army, the
reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the
Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not
concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must
declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the duke of Berri should
be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up
its mind upon the question.
This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the
English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a
decisive open line of policy. The ministers exulting at the progress
of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting
England’s substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies, taken
without gratitude by the continental powers who held themselves
no-ways bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly
designed to make available for peculiar interests. Moreover they all
still trembled before the conqueror and none would pledge themselves
to a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved with a firm
composure, the result of profound and well-understood calculations;
yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at
this time by personal hatred of Napoleon.
Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man’s system
of government being internally dependent upon “_the most extensive
corruption ever established in any country_”?
The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England,
and Napoleon rejected public loans which are the very life-blood of
state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the
public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged
class; the state servants were largely paid but they were made to
labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and
sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness
simplicity and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public
fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to corruption. Napoleon’s
power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as
a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the
poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore
towards him, and still bear for his memory because he cherished the
principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant
activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices,
and because his public works, wondrous for their number their utility
and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted
work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just
code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His
_Cadastre_, more extensive and perfect than the Doomsday Book, that
monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, was
alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under
his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man
the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities
public or private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and
secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation,
to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the
insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and
to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man’s home. The French
_Cadastre_, although not original, would from its comprehensiveness,
have been when completed the greatest boon ever conferred upon a
civilized nation by a statesman.
To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that
he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that
mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to
push her down, the conscription, without which she could never have
sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her
by the revolution; that energetic law, which he did not establish
but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and
endurable by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the
conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the
people. The troops idolized Napoleon, well they might, and to assert
that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to
acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned
hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never
was hated by the people of France; he was their own creation and
they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from
Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who
were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six
weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have
acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards
besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who
scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were
base enough to undertake but none so hardy as to execute the crime,
and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a
throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive
him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts
and hearts of men.
Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight of the continental
policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France
simply as a military operation, which might conduce to or militate
against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon’s power was
weakened by the war in Germany; and such was his inflexible probity
of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of
gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object, all the
renown of which he already enjoyed, the embarrassments mortifications
and difficulties, enormous, although to the surface-seeing public
there appeared none, alone remaining.
The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria’s accession to
the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian were favourable
circumstances; but he relied not much on the military skill of the
banded sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment dissolve
their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult and drive
the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the
fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga,
Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortoza,
Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William
Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error
in sending Del Parque’s army to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster
and subsequent retreat shewed that Suchet was strong enough, if it so
pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian army back even to the Xucar
and recover all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia
were in the same unsatisfactory state they had been in from the
first. It was not even certain that a British army would remain there
at all, for lord William assured of Murat’s defection was intent upon
invading Italy; and the ministers seemed to have leaned towards the
project, since Wellington now seriously desired to know whether the
Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches, MSS.]
Lord William himself had quitted that army, making the seventh change
in fifteen months; this alone was sufficient to account for its
misfortunes, and the Spanish generals, who had been placed under
the English commander, ridiculed the latter’s ill success and spoke
vauntingly of themselves. Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the
appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian troops who
would devote his whole attention to his business, observing that at
no period of the war would he have quitted his own army even for a
few days without danger to its interests. But the English minister’s
ignorance of every thing relating to war was profound, and at this
time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith,
lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and Skerrit, had gone or were going to
England on account of ill health wounds or private business; and
marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous intrigues to be
noticed hereafter menaced the existence of the Portuguese army.
Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their
commands, and O’Donnel, described as an able officer but of the most
impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio’s,
Copons’, and Del Parque’s troops, quitted the army under pretext that
his old wounds had broken out; whereupon, Giron was placed at the
head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia were however
so important, that lord Wellington thought of going there himself;
and he would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon in
Germany, had not rendered it impossible for that monarch to reinforce
his troops on the Spanish frontier.
These general reasons for desiring to operate on the side of
Catalonia were strengthened also by the consideration, that the
country, immediately beyond the Bidassoa, being sterile, the
difficulty of feeding the army in winter would be increased; and
the twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his army,
would certainly plunder for subsistence and incense the people of
France. Moreover Soult’s actual position was strong, his troops
still numerous, and his entrenched camp furnished a secure retreat.
Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed that no serious
invasion could be made until one or both were taken, or blockaded,
which, during the tempestuous season and while the admiralty refused
to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to
get at those fortresses would be a work of time difficult against
Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well might, came to the
other’s support. Towards Catalonia therefore lord Wellington desired
to turn when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured
by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he thought it not amiss meanwhile to
yield something to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public
feeling by occupying a menacing position within the French territory.
A simple thing this seemed but the English general made no slight
concession when he thus bent his military judgment to political
considerations.
The French position was the base of a triangle of which Bayonne
was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and
St. Jean Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains
intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys
and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at
St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched camp which
Foy occupied in front of that fortress. That general could, without
calling upon Paris who was at Oleron, bring fifteen thousand men
including the national guards into action, and serious dispositions
were necessary to dislodge him; but these could not be made secretly,
and Soult calculated upon having time to aid him and deliver a
general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy barred any movement
along the right bank of the Nive, and he could, either by the great
road leading to Bayonne or by shorter communications through Bidaray,
reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and so gain Espelette behind
the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges
at Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by
this route he moved to aid in the attack of San Marcial. However,
the allies marching from the Alduides and the Bastan could also
penetrate by St. Martin D’Arosa and the Gorospil mountain to Bidaray,
that is to say, between Foy’s and D’Erlon’s positions. Yet the roads
were very difficult, and as the French sent out frequent scouting
detachments and the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, Foy could
not be easily cut off from the rest of the army.
[Sidenote: Plans 5 and 6.]
D’Erlon’s advanced camps were near Urdax, and on the Mondarain and
Choupera mountains, but his main position was a broad ridge behind
Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that bridge
Clauzel’s position extended along a range of strong hills, trending
towards Ascain and Serres, and as the Nivelle swept with a curve
quite round his rear his right flank rested on that river also.
The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads
leading from Vera and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of
his left, and the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two
thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level overtopped all the
neighbouring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependants
the Commissary and Bayonette, a mask for his right.
From the Bayonette the French position run along the summit of the
Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, on a single line, but from thence
to the sea the ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of
defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second commencing near St.
Jean de Luz stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain,
having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille’s
divisions guarded these lines, and the second was connected with
Clauzel’s position by Villatte’s reserve which was posted at Ascain.
Finally the whole system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean
Pied de Port, by the double bridge-head at Cambo which secured the
junction of Foy with the rest of the army.
The French worked diligently on their entrenchments, yet they were
but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered,
and Wellington had even then matured a plan of attack as daring as
any undertaken during the whole war. This was to seize the great
Rhune mountain and its dependents, and at the same time to force
the passage of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left wing in
the French territory. He would thus bring the Rhune Commissary and
Bayonette mountains, forming a salient menacing point of great
altitude and strength towards the French centre, within his own
system, and shorten his communications by gaining the command of the
road running along the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would
obtain the port of Fuentarabia, which, though bad in winter, was some
advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who
with scanty means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse
negligence and even opposition of the Spanish authorities. Moreover
Passages, his nearest port, was restricted in its anchorage-ground,
hard to make from the sea and dangerous when full of vessels.
[Sidenote: October.]
[Sidenote: Foy’s report to Soult, 2d October, MSS.]
He designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately
after the castle of San Sebastian fell and before the French works
acquired strength, but some error retarded the arrival of his
pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended as
we shall find upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity
deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile to mislead Soult, to
ascertain Foy’s true position about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to
strengthen his own right, he brought part of Del Parque’s force up
from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian division which had remained
at the blockade after the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron
at Echallar, and at the same time Mina’s troops gathered in the
neighbourhood of Roncesvalles. Wellington himself repaired to that
quarter on the 1st of October, and in his way, passing through the
Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprize some isolated posts
on the rock of Airola, a French scouting detachment was also cut off
near the foundry of Baygorry, and two thousand sheep were swept from
the valley.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]
These affairs awaked Soult’s jealousy. He was in daily expectation
of an attack without being able to ascertain on what quarter the
blow would fall, and at first, deceived by false information that
the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought the march of
Mina’s troops and the Andalusians was intended to mask an offensive
movement by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry in the
Bastan, lord Wellington’s presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of
the post at Airola seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons
were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that the real object of
the allies was to gain the great Rhune. On the other hand a French
commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining
twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that nothing at Wellington’s
head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke
of one and there were many movements of troops; and this weighed
much with the French general, because the slow march of the pontoons
and the wet weather had caused a delay contradictory to the reports
of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that
Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing
into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in
Germany, and as the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by
his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his
operations.
The true reason of the procrastination, namely the state of the tides
and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden from Soult,
who finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only designed
to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from interruption by menacing
the French and impeding their labours, the results of which were
now becoming visible. However, as all the deserters and spies came
with the same story he recommended increased vigilance along the
whole line. And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of his
opponent’s project, that on the 6th he reviewed D’Erlon’s divisions
at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any
attack was intended and no way suspecting that it would be against
his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side
of Roncesvalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light
cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to
raise the blockade of Pampeluna; the troops at Maya were already
posted offensively, menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle,
and it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and
against the French right that he could act.
Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers
arrived from England. Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of
general Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell’s Portuguese
in the Alduides; and the latter marching to Maya replaced the third
division, which, shifting to its left occupied the heights above
Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron’s
Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.
These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the great
Rhune and its dependents, the arrangements for which shall now be
described.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the Ivantelly, was to assail
a lofty ridge or saddle, uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune.
A battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank,
was to seize the rocky head of the last-named mountain, and after
placing detachments there in observation of the roads leading round
it from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the saddle and menace
the rear of the enemy’s position at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile
the principal attack was to be made in two columns, but to protect
the right and rear against a counter-attack from Sarre, the Spanish
general was to leave one brigade in the narrow pass leading from
Vera, between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that place.
On the left of Giron the light division was to assail the Bayonette
mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron’s
left by skirmishers.
Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca,
was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa. One passing by the
ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the light division in its
attack on the Bayonette; the other passing by the bridge of Vera, was
to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette from
the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the two attacks of the light
division. During these operations Longa was also to send some men
over the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which the French
used to communicate between the left and centre of their line.
Behind the light division general Cole was to take post with the
fourth division on Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to
secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops in front.
The sixth division was meanwhile to make a demonstration on the right
by Urdax and Zagaramurdi, against D’Erlon’s advanced posts. Thus
without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar lord
Wellington put nearly twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune
mountain and its dependents, and he had still twenty-four thousand
disposable to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa.
It has been already shewn that between Andarlasa and Biriatu, a
distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor
bridges. The French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and
to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had
collected their troops principally, where the Bildox or green
mountain, and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords.
Against these points Wellington directed general Freyre’s Spaniards,
who were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of
Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left
of that part of the enemy’s line which being prolonged from Biriatu
crossed the royal road and passed behind the town of Andaya.
Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the
mountain of _Louis_ XIV., the ridge called the _Caffé Republicain_,
and the town of Andaya. Behind these the _Calvaire d’Urogne_, the
_Croix des Bouquets_, and the camp of the _Sans Culottes_, served as
rallying posts.
For the assault on these positions Wellington designed to employ
the first and fifth divisions and the unattached brigades of Wilson
and lord Aylmer, in all about fifteen thousand men. By the help
of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered three fords,
practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea,
and his intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, and
at the new fords below the bridge, and this though the tides rose
sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half
a mile broad. The left bank of the river also was completely exposed
to observation from the enemy’s hills, which though low in comparison
of the mountains above the bridge, were nevertheless strong ridges of
defence; but relying on his previous measures to deceive the enemy
the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations
were not belied by the result.
The unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of
operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth,
deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were
negligent. Of Reille’s two divisions La Martiniere’s, now commanded
by general Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of
the seventh was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte’s
reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand men composing
Maucune’s division were indeed on the first line but unexpectant of
an attack, and though the works on the Mandale were finished and
those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they
were scarcely commenced.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
_Passage of the Bidassoa._ The night set in heavily. A sullen
thunder-storm gathering about the craggy summit of the Pena de Haya
came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over the
Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions.
During this turmoil Wellington whose pontoons and artillery were
close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along
the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective
stations along the banks of the river. Freyre’s Spaniards one brigade
of the guards and Wilson’s Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu
fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced
behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in the
attack of the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the Germans of
the first division were concealed near Irun, close to a ford below
the bridge of Behobia called the great Jonco. The British brigades of
the fifth division covered themselves behind a large river embankment
opposite Andaya; Sprye’s Portuguese and lord Aylmer’s brigade were
posted in the ditch of Fuenterabia.
As all the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, the
enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th, but at
seven o’clock, the fifth division and lord Aylmer’s brigade emerging
from their concealment took the sands in two columns, that on the
left pointing against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on
the right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was fired, but when
they had passed the fords of the low-water channel a rocket was sent
up from the steeple of Fuenterabia as a signal. Then the guns and
howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered
by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage
above the bridge also commenced. From the crest of San Marcial seven
columns could be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles,
those above the bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest,
those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes
winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missing the Jonco ford got
into deep water but quickly recovered the true line, and the French,
completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth
division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile
musket flashed.
The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette,
and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax
and Zagaramurdi, made a false attack on D’Erlon’s positions; the
Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas, were however pushed too
far and repulsed with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and the
French marshal instantly detecting the true nature of this attack
hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before
he arrived.
When the British artillery first opened, Maucune’s troops had
assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns,
established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the
Caffé Republicain, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer’s
marched from the second line behind Urogne to support Maucune without
waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades
moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came
into action, Sprye’s Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the
allies, menaced the camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore
one of Boyer’s regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by
the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. But Andaya, guarded
only by a piquet, was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of
the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer’s men reached it, sent
a battalion there from the centre, thus weakening his force at
the chief point of attack; for the British brigades of the fifth
division, were now advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing
under a sharp fire of artillery and musquetry towards the Croix des
Bouquets.
By this time the columns of the first division had passed the river,
one above the bridge, preceded by Wilson’s Portuguese, one below,
preceded by Colin Halkett’s German light troops, who aided by the
fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy’s advanced
posts, won the Caffé Republicain, the mountain of Louis XIV. and
drove the French from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this
was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were
now hastening from every side. The Germans who had lost many men in
the previous attacks were here brought to a check, for the heights
were very strong, and Boyer’s leading battalions were now close at
hand; but at this critical moment colonel Cameron arrived with the
ninth regiment of the fifth division, and passing through the German
skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first
height. The French infantry instantly opened their ranks to let their
guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second
ridge, somewhat lower but where they could only be approached on a
narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column
and bore against this new position, which curving inwards enabled the
French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his
violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards,
when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they gave
way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the
royal road. The British regiment however lost many men and officers,
and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops,
coming from different points and rallying on Boyer’s battalions, were
gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road.
The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the Bildox, had been meanwhile
defended with success in front, but Freyre turned them with his right
wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion soon won the
Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the
Calvaire d’Urogne and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des
Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards on the
Mandale, the right by the allies along the sea-coast, retreated in
great disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne.
He passed through the village of Urogne and the British skirmishers
at first entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out again by the
second brigade of Boyer’s division, for Soult now arrived with part
of Villatte’s reserve and many guns, and by his presence and activity
restored order and revived the courage of the troops at the moment
when the retreat was degenerating into a flight.
Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four hundred men,
the allies did not lose more than six hundred of which half were
Spaniards, so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered
this stupendous operation. But if the French commander penetrating
Wellington’s design, and avoiding the surprize, had opposed all his
troops, amounting with what Villatte could spare to sixteen thousand,
instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could
scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to
a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have
come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.
Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful were the French on the
side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and
constant.
At day-break Giron had descended from the Ivantelly rocks and general
Alten from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading
from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined
by half of Longa’s force.
One brigade, consisting of the forty-third the seventeenth Portuguese
regiment of the line and the first and third battalions of riflemen,
drew up in column on an open space to the right of Vera. The other
brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of the fifty-second two
battalions of Caçadores and a battalion of British riflemen, was
disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa’s division was between
these brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of Salinas
drew up on Colborne’s left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was
thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general
Cole displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa
Barbara presented a formidable reserve.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
Taupin’s division guarded the enormous positions in front of the
allies. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope
descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain. From
this platform three distinct tongues shot into the valley below, each
was defended by an advanced post, and the platform itself secured by
a star redoubt, behind which, about half-way up the single slope,
there was a second retrenchment with abbatis. Another large redoubt
and an unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the
system of defence for the Bayonette.
The Commissari, which is a continuation of the Bayonette towards
the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf thickly wooded and
defended with skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of the
same nature the main road, leading from Vera over the Puerto, pierced
the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short
abrupt turns this road was blocked at every uncovered point with
abbatis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded, at
half musquet shot, by small detachments placed on all the projecting
parts overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched above on the
Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette
and Commissari with those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron’s
attack was directed.
But between Alten’s right and Giron’s left was an isolated ridge
called by the soldiers the _Boar’s back_, the summit of which, about
half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French
companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to
cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in
comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the
few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the
allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying
force of a musquet-ball. It was essential to take the Boar’s back
before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British
riflemen, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, were
ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron’s
Spaniards preceded by a detached company of the forty-third attacked
it on the other.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report, MSS.]
At four o’clock in the morning Clauzel had received intelligence that
the Bayonette was to be assaulted that day or the next, and at seven
o’clock he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron’s
camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh division were
still standing; at the same time the sound of musquetry was heard on
the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then came
Taupin’s report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To
this last quarter Clauzel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven
Conroux’s outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment
was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune. He
immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux’s division to occupy
the summit the front and the flanks of that mountain, and he formed a
reserve of two other regiments behind. With these troops he designed
to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach
their destination that general’s fate was decided.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
_Second Combat of Vera._—Soon after seven o’clock a few cannon-shot
from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were
followed by the Spanish musquetry on the right, and the next moment
the “_Boars back_” was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The
riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of
the way up and there rested, but soon resuming their movement with a
scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to
use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show
that they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the
general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese followed the victorious
sharp-shooters, the forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers
and by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged
into the rugged pass, Longa’s troops entered the gloomy wood of the
ravine on the left, and beyond them Colborne’s brigade moving by
narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed the Bayonette, the
fifty-second took the middle tongue, the Caçadores and riflemen the
two outermost and all bore with a concentric movement against the
star redoubt on the platform above. Longa’s second brigade should
have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement,
but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare,
and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve.
Soon the open slopes of the mountains were covered with men and
with fire, a heavy confused sound of mingled shouts and musquetry
filled the deep hollows between, and the white smoke came curling up
above the dark forest trees which covered their gloomy recesses. The
French compared with their assailants seemed few and scattered on
the mountain side, and Kempt’s brigade soon forced its way without a
check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, his skirmishers
spreading wider and breaking into small detachments of support as the
depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher
ridges. When about half-way up an open platform gave a clear view
over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa’s
right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and
overmatched, but beyond, on the broad open space in front of the star
fort, the Caçadores and riflemen of Colborne’s brigade, were seen
coming out, in small bodies, from a forest which covered the three
tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp,
their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt
in a mass as if resolved to storm it. The fifty-second were not then
in sight, and the French thinking from the dark clothing that all
were Portuguese rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they
were numerous and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched
by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered
assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill
cries the French followed, but just then the fifty-second appeared,
partly in line partly in column, on the platform, and raising their
shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this
regiment startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped
short, wavered, and then turning fled to their entrenchment; the
fifty-second following hard entered the works with them, the riflemen
and Caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on both flanks,
and for a few moments every thing was hidden by a dense volume of
smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again and the whole
mass emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying
the others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the
parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand.
The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt’s brigade now echoed
along the mountain side, and with renewed vigour the men continued
to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top
of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne after having carried the second
entrenchment above the star fort, was brought to a check by the works
on the very crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only
plied his troops with musquetry at a great advantage, but rolled huge
stones down the steep.
[Sidenote: Plan 5.]
These works were extensive well lined with men and strengthened
by a large redoubt on the right, but the defenders soon faltered,
for their left flank was turned by Kempt and the effects of lord
Wellington’s skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter.
Freyre’s Spaniards after carrying the Mandale mountain, between
Biriatu and the Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the
latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this was the line of
retreat from the crest of the Bayonette for Taupin’s right wing; but
Freyre’s Spaniards got there first, and if Longa’s brigade instead
of slowly following Colborne had spread out widely on the left, a
military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still
Taupin’s right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file
it under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto
de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre. He effected this
but lost his mountain battery and three hundred men. These last,
apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the
Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner.
Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he
crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind
and intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which
they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed. Meanwhile the
French skirmishers in the deep ravine, between the two lines of
attack, being feebly pushed by Longa’s troops, retreated too slowly
and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape
surrendered to Kempt’s brigade.
The right and centre of Taupin’s division being now completely beaten
fled down the side of the mountain towards Olette, they were pursued
by a part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte’s reserve,
which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge
of Olette between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonette and Commissari,
with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours’ incessant
fighting and toiling up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle
was still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.
Giron after driving Conroux’s advanced post from the gorge leading
from Vera to Sarre had, following his orders, pushed a battalion from
that side towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve
in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack which Conroux
might make. And when his left wing was rendered free to move by the
capture of the “_Boar’s back_” he fought his way up abreast with
the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to his own
right of the Puerto. There however he was arrested by a strong line
of abbattis from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy
fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a
Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice and they kept their
ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There happened to
be present an officer of the forty-third regiment named Havelock,
who being attached to general Alten’s staff was sent to ascertain
Giron’s progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He
took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and
putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abbattis and
went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for “_El
chico bianco_” “_the fair boy_” so they called him, for he was very
young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French,
and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the
fire of Kempt’s skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.
The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards retired by their
left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune, so that
Clauzel had now eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain.
Two occupied the crest including the highest rock called the
Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one
hand, and towards Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied
a lower and parallel crest behind called the small Rhune. In this
situation they were attacked at four o’clock by Giron’s right wing.
The Spaniards first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of
crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald
staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time
to turn it by their right. In both objects they were defeated with
loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French rolled down stones
large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards
resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. This day’s
fighting cost Taupin’s division two generals and four hundred men
killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the
allies was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred were
Spaniards, and the success was not complete, for while the French
kept possession of the summit of the Rhune the allies’ new position
was insecure.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
The front and the right flank of that great mountain were
impregnable, but lord Wellington observing that the left flank,
descending towards Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the
Spaniards on that side on the 8th, designing a combined attack
against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three
o’clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded the lower parts
of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and at the same
time detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto
de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering
the advanced French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians soon won the
rocks and an entrenched height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel,
too easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made by the sixth
division towards the bridge of Amotz in rear of his left, thought he
should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned
not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced works in the
basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus
concentrated on the height behind Sarre still holding with their
right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon
made apparent. Wellington immediately established a strong body of
the Spanish troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and the
two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and the fort of
San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without
orders abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage and retired
in the night to the smaller Rhune. The next morning some of the
seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but they
were quickly repulsed and would have lost the camp and works taken
the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them.
The whole loss on the three days of fighting was about fourteen
hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being
Spaniards, but many of the wounded were not brought in until the
third day after the actions, and several perished miserably where
they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast
solitudes. Some men were also lost from want of discipline; having
descended into the French villages they got drunk and were taken
the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who
plundered in defiance of lord Wellington’s proclamation; for he
thought it necessary to arrest and send to England several officers,
and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he had five times as
many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was
prevented. It is remarkable that the French troops on the same day
acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner, but Soult also
checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some
reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to
plunder a house in Sarre during the action.
With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa,
the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and
surely the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous
positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the
French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month,
entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of
mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness
and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing
strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth
of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all
were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it
was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps
with far less fierceness than, when, striving against insurmountable
obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren.
Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the
defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a
general’s not a soldier’s battle. Wellington had with overmastering
combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin’s and Maucune’s
divisions were each less than five thousand strong, and they were
separately assailed, the first by eighteen the second by fifteen
thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and Clauzel able to
bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence with the Minister of War,
MSS.]
Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an
attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance; yet
they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the
guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th and again on
the night of the 6th. The passage of the river he said had commenced
at seven o’clock, long after daylight, the allies’ masses were then
clearly to be seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for
Boyer’s division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost.
The battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand men,
instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part
of Villatte’s reserve. To this negligence the generals added also
discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of
their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward
before the marshal’s arrival from Espelette, they would have entered
St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position and forced
the French army back upon the Nive and the Adour.
This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a stroke did not belong
to lord Wellington’s system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he
doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter
in the position he had already gained, and he was averse to the
experiment, while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an
undecided aspect.
CHAPTER V.
[Sidenote: 1813. October.]
[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]
Soult was apprehensive for some days that lord Wellington would
push his offensive operations further, but when he knew by Foy’s
reports, and by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right,
that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his
labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept
a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness
to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy masses in his
front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clauzel
to recover the fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on a
comparatively low ridge barring issue from the gorge leading out of
the vale of Vera to Sarre, and it defended the narrow ground between
the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason
by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of
the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish picquet of forty men.
Some battalions were also encamped in a small wood close behind; but
many officers and men slept in the fort, and on the night of the
12th, about eleven o’clock, three battalions of Conroux’s division
reached the platform on which the fort stood without being perceived.
The work was then escaladed, the troops behind it went off in
confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen
officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards ashamed of the surprize
made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, they were
repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel
brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood
which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the
whole of their old entrenchments and the Spaniards to recover the
fort. Neither succeeded and San Barbe, too near the enemy’s position
to be safely held, was resigned with a loss of two hundred men by the
French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated
action a French sloop freighted with stores for Santona attempted to
run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and
cut off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a few distant
shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire and escaped in their
boats to the Adour.
Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was
organized in three grand divisions. The right having Mina’s and
Morillo’s battalions attached to it was commanded by sir Rowland
Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre
occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and Bayonette mountains, was
given to marshal Beresford. The left extending from the Mandale
mountain to the sea was under sir John Hope. This officer succeeded
Graham who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña
after sir John Moore’s death, he was superior in rank to lord
Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war, but when the
latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a
patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie the friend
and comrade of Moore offered to serve as second in command, and lord
Wellington joyfully accepted him, observing that he was the “_ablest
officer in the army_.”
The positions of the right and centre were offensive and menacing,
but the left was still on the defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable
at high water below the bridge, was close behind. However the ridges
were strong, a powerful artillery was established on the right bank,
field-works were constructed, and although the fords below Behobia
furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, those above were
always available, and a pontoon bridge laid down for the passage of
the guns during the action was a sure resource. The front was along
the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing Urogne and the camp of
the Sans Culottes, and there was a reserve in an entrenched camp
above Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, and from
that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could descend upon the
flank of an attacking army.
[Sidenote: Appendix 7, sect. 2.]
Soult had however no intention of renewing the offensive. He had now
lost many thousand men in battle, and the old soldiers remaining
did not exceed seventy-nine thousand present under arms including
officers and artillery-men. Of this number the garrisons absorbed
about thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field,
whereas the allies, counting Mina’s and Del Parque’s troops, now
at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred
thousand, seventy-three thousand, including officers, sergeants, and
artillery-men, being British and Portuguese. And this was below the
calculation of the French general, for deceived by the exaggerated
reports which the Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought
Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men and that there were
one hundred and forty thousand combatants in his front. But it was
not so, and as conscripts of a good description were now joining the
French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were
many, it was in the number of soldiers rather than of men, that the
English general had the advantage.
In this state of affairs Soult’s policy was to maintain a strict
defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be
revived, the country in the rear organized, and the conscripts
disciplined and hardened to war. The loss of the Lower Bidassoa was
in a political view mischievous to him, it had an injurious effect
upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement
to the secret partizans of the Bourbons; but in a military view
it was a relief. The great development of the mountains bordering
the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult; while holding
them he had continual fear that his line would be pierced and his
army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. His position was now more
concentrated.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One across the royal road
on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes;
the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena,
covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olhette and
Jollimont.
The centre under Clauzel was posted on the ridges between Ascain and
Amotz holding the smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was
retained by Soult in the camp of Serres on the right of the Nivelle,
overhanging Ascain. To replace it one of D’Erlon’s divisions crossed
to the left of the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel’s left flank above
Sarre.
Villatte’s reserve was about St. Jean de Luz but having the Italian
brigade in the camp of Serres.
D’Erlon’s remaining divisions continued in their old position, the
right connected with Clauzel’s line by the bridge of Amotz; the left,
holding the Choupera and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive.
Behind Clauzel and D’Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of
entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank
of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head
of Cambo on the Nive, and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain,
covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He had
also called general Paris up from Oleron to the defence of the latter
fortress and its entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the Nive to
Bidarray half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. There
watching the issues from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy
the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, moving by Cambo,
to reinforce the great position on the left of that river according
to circumstances.
To complete these immense entrenchments, which between the Nive and
the sea were double and on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole
army laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the country
whether of materials or working men were called out by requisition.
Nevertheless this defensive warfare was justly regarded by the
duke of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of affairs.
Offensive operations were most consonant to the character of the
French soldiers, and to the exigencies of the time. Recent experience
had shown the impregnable nature of the allies’ positions against
a front attack, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre
of operations. But when he looked at the strength of the armies
appropriated by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought France
would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive
successfully. Suchet had just proved his power at Ordal against lord
William Bentinck, and that nobleman’s successor, with inferior rank
and power, with an army unpaid and feeding on salt meat from the
ships, with jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the Spanish
generals, none of whom were willing to act cordially with him upon
a fixed and well-considered plan, was in no condition to menace the
French seriously. And that he was permitted at this important crisis
to paralyze from fifty to sixty thousand excellent French troops
possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most
singular errors of the war.
[Sidenote: Appendix 8, sect. 2.]
Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed
along the whole frontier to guard the passes of the Pyrenees against
sudden marauding excursions, the French armies counted at this time
about one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand
horses. Of these one hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present
under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join
them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and
most of those in Aragon Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite
behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety. Lord Wellington
could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and all the Spaniards in
arms on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty
thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands, and to unite his
forces at any point required great dispositions to avoid an attack
during a flank march. Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable
men, he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing
some unimportant posts, his means in artillery were immense, and
distributed in all his strong places, so that he could furnish
himself from almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore to say
that two hundred pieces of artillery and ninety thousand old soldiers
might have united at this period upon the flank of lord Wellington,
still leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national guards
of the frontier, supported by the fortresses and entrenched camps
of Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and
Jaca on one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses in
Catalonia on the other, to cover France from invasion.
To make this great power bear in a right direction was the duke
of Dalmatia’s object, and his plans were large, and worthy of his
reputation. Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects,
and that marshal’s resistance would appear to have sprung from
personal dislike contracted during Soult’s sojourn near Valencia in
1812. It has been already shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon and
confined himself to Catalonia after quitting Valencia. He did not
indeed then know that Soult had assumed the command of the army of
Spain and was preparing for his great effort to relieve Pampeluna;
but he was aware that Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca,
and he was too good a general not to know that operating on the
allies’ flank was the best mode of palliating the defeat of Vittoria.
He might have saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; the
guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery equipment
were deposited there, and from thence, by Jaca, he could have opened
a sure and short communication with Soult, obtained information of
that general’s projects, and saved Pampeluna.
It may be asked why the duke of Dalmatia did not endeavour to
communicate with Suchet. The reason was simple. The former quitted
Dresden suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on
the 20th his troops were in full march towards St. Jean Pied de Port,
and it was during this very rapid journey that the other marshal
abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet’s plans nor
the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his actual position,
and there was no time to wait for accurate information. However
between the 6th and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately
after his own retreat from Sauroren, he earnestly prayed that the
army of Aragon should march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by
Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington’s forces facilitate
the efforts of the army of Spain to relieve San Sebastian. In this
communication he stated, that his recent operations had caused
troops actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia to be
recalled. This was an error. His emissaries were deceived by the
movements, and counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately
after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington’s plans
as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia,
but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, and the Conde de La
Bispal were all mentioned, in this correspondence between Soult and
Suchet, as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the three
first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that
quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.
Suchet treated Soult’s proposal as chimerical. His movable troops
he said did not exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza
with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, unless
he could fly into France by Venasque where he had a garrison. An
extraordinary view of affairs which he supported by statements still
more extraordinary!
“_General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck with twenty-four
thousand men._” “_La Bispal had arrived with fifteen thousand._”
“_There were more than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro._” “_The
Spanish insurrection was general and strongly organized._” “_He had
recovered the garrison of Taragona and destroyed the works, and he
must revictual Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona
and remain on the defensive_”!
[Sidenote: Appendix 8, Sect. 2.]
This letter was written on the 23d of August, when lord William
Bentinck had just retreated from the Gaya into the mountains above
Hospitalet. The imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of
Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command, exceeded sixty-five
thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms. Thirty
thousand were united in the field when he received Soult’s letter.
There was nothing to prevent him marching upon Tortoza, except
lord William Bentinck’s army which had just acknowledged by a
retreat its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to
prevent him marching to Lerida. The count of Bispal had thrown up
his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the
Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at Roncesvalles, and not
a man had moved from Wellington’s army. Elio and Roche were near
Valencia in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian troops only
fourteen thousand strong including Whittingham’s division, were on
the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could
remain; Del Parque’s troops and Sarzfield’s division had gone over
the Ebro, and Copons’ Catalans had taken refuge in the mountains of
Cervera. In fine not two hundred thousand but less than thirty-five
thousand men, half-organized ill-fed and scattered from Vich to
Vinaros were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different
views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians could
not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del
Parque’s troops soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use lord
Wellington’s phrase there was nothing to prevent Suchet “_tumbling
lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar_.” The true nature of
the great insurrection which the French general pretended to dread
shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.
Suchet’s errors respecting the allies were easily detected by
Soult, those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect
and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of
resource he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had
urged Joseph to adopt in 1812 after the battle of Salamanca, namely,
to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would he said,
inevitably fall before the allies in succession if the French armies
remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive
operations successful was a general concentration of means and
unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree,
issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction with the depôts of
the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men. Ten thousand
would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona. The
armies of Aragon and Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some
posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field. The imperial
muster-rolls prove that they could have produced forty thousand, but
Soult misled by Suchet’s erroneous statements assumed only twenty
thousand, and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five
or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point
of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen
thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to be directed on
that place, and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry all
the cavalry of both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly
assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca and descend upon Aragon.
Once in that kingdom they could attack the allied troops in Navarre
if the latter were dispersed, and if they were united retire upon
Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle
upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile the fifteen thousand
unappropriated conscripts might reinforce the twenty or twenty-five
thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.
An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would,
Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca,
Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now menaced by the bands, and
it was probable that Tortoza and even Saguntum would be relieved.
The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, yet he was
resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to
be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious
inconvenience from the union of the troops in France since Suchet had
already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the
Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched
line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it
could take a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting
upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at
Cambo and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia
with St. Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear for this
secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon. That which he
most dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected
after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.
This proposition written the 2d of September, immediately after the
battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th and was peremptorily
rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement, he said,
would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately
invaded by lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand
men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable and the power of man could
not open it for carriages under a year’s labour. His wish was to
act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely
necessary, he offered a counter-project; that is, he would first
make the English in his front re-embark at Taragona, or he would
drive them over the Ebro and then march with one hundred guns and
thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza.
Soult’s army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him,
and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect
this he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris’s
division and the artillery-men and draft horses of Soult’s army
sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for
the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on
the Gallego. Then touching upon the difficulties of the road from
Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared, that after forcing Wellington
across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his
fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far
less dangerous than Soult’s, yet he enlarged upon its difficulties
and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed.
In fine, he continued, “The French armies are entangled amongst
rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain, to act
between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of
Spain sixty thousand strong and that of Aragon thirty thousand strong
operate on the flanks. Thus _the reputation of the English army, too
easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated_.”
This illiberal remark combined with the defects of his project,
proves that the duke of Albufera was far below the duke of
Dalmatia’s standard both in magnanimity and in capacity. The one
giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied
by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other, with an
unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers.
Soult’s letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal,
and in pursuance of his own plan he should have driven lord William
Bentinck over the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the
Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his
former letters he had estimated the enemies in his front at two
hundred thousand fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable
force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could
not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections
and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable
troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as
madness when suggested by the duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of
his arguments relative to the general discouragement, the desertion
of his soldiers, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he
adopted Soult’s plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen
on the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, a notion
which would have effectually covered the real design until the great
movement in advance should change the public opinion. Soult’s plan
was surer better imagined and grander than his; it was less dangerous
in the event of failure and more conformable to military principles.
Suchet’s project involved double lines of operation without any
sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just
co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy’s power,
and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery. There was
no solidity in this design; a failure would have left no resource.
But in Soult’s project the armies were to be united at a point beyond
the enemy’s reach, and to operate afterwards in mass with all arms
complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet
indeed averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet
Soult’s counter-opinion claims more respect. Clauzel and Paris who
had lately passed with troops through that defile were in his camp,
he had besides made very exact inquiries of the country people, had
caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to
examine the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty to
be not insurmountable.
Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggerations of Suchet’s
statements, escaped Soult’s observation, but anxious to effect
something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted
operations in the mountains he frankly accepted the other’s
modification, and adopted every stipulation, save that of sending the
artillery-men and horses of his army to Catalonia which he considered
dangerous. Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by Jaca.
The preparations for this great movement were therefore immediately
commenced, and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest although he
complained of increasing difficulties, pretended that Longa’s and
Morillo’s divisions had arrived in Catalonia, that general Graham
was also in march with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss
of Fraga from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison.
This post commanded indeed a bridge over the Cinca a river lying in
his way and dangerous from its sudden and great floods but he still
possessed the bridge of Monzon.
During this correspondence between the French marshals, Napoleon
remained silent, yet at a later period he expressed his discontent
at Suchet’s inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult’s plans by
recommending a movement towards Zaragoza which Suchet however did
not execute. It would appear that the emperor having given all the
reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to
act as they judged fitting for his service, would not, at a distance
and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on
at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution
essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted
under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted
Suchet’s modification and it would have been unwise to substitute
a new plan which would have probably displeased both commanders.
Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet’s project was
annulled by the approach of winter and by the further operations of
the allies.
If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily
achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass
the Ebro or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly
constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory
would have profited him little, because his enemy strong in cavalry
could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he
received a check he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to
Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre, and
Valencia. It is not probable however that such a great operation
could have been conducted without being discovered in time by
Wellington. It has been already indicated in this History, that
besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed
by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph’s courtiers,
and even amongst French officers of rank; and it has been shown that
Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August when
the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat
of Suchet from Catalonia and his junction with Soult in France at
the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the
known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to
the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless
the secret must have been known to more than one person about each
marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little
suspected. Soult would however still have had the power of returning
to his old positions, and, with his numbers increased by Suchet’s
troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles.
It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal
in his operations, and being disappointed he was not very eager to
adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad
season, and the menacing position of Wellington, rendered each day
less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the
allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington’s profound acquaintance
with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the
wishes of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for
Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was
towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now however actually established
in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for
the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual
front awaiting only the
FALL OF PAMPELUNA.
[Sidenote: September.]
This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident
than the siege of San Sebastian yet very honourable to the firmness
of the governor general Cassan.
The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold
table-land on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great
roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella,
Vittoria, and Irurzun, were concentrated. The northern and eastern
fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences
there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank
of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with
ditches, covered way, and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks
were constructed on the south front, but the citadel which stood
on the south west was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and
magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system
of mines.
Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months
previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the
action, the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army
increased the garrison to something more than three thousand five
hundred men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies.
Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between
the king’s arrival and departure, and general Cassan, finding his
troops too few for action and yet too many for the food, abandoned
the two outworks on the south, demolished everything which could
interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he
deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover foreseeing that
the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns to
succour the garrison, he prepared a field-train of forty pieces to
meet the occasion.
[Sidenote: July.]
It has been already shown that Wellington, although at first inclined
to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade and ordered
works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan’s chief object
was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he
sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the
1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga,
and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders’
works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the
French always seeking to gather the grain, and vegetables which were
ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring
to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the
fortress.
On the 14th of July, O’Donnel’s Andalusians were permanently
established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison
made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This
operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th,
when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the
remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.
The 26th the sound of Soult’s artillery reached the place, and
Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour
Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he
was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with eleven
hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and
advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back
with the third and fourth divisions. Then O’Donnel, as I have before
related, evacuated some of the entrenchments, destroyed a great
deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely
arrival of Carlos D’España’s division, and the stand made by Picton
at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.
Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose
over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French
cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of
the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano
along the road of Irurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and
having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The bivouac
fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the
next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence,
a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several
deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came
over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner
of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope;
but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased and the silence
of the next day shewed that the battle was not to the advantage of
Soult. However the governor losing no time made another sally and
again obtained provisions from the south side.
The 30th the battle recommenced but the retreating fire of the French
told how the conflict was decided and the spirit of the soldiers
fell. Nevertheless their indefatigable officers led another sally on
the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition
which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks.
[Sidenote: September.]
On the 31st Carlos D’España’s troops and two thousand of O’Donnel’s
Andalusians, in all about seven thousand men, resumed the blockade,
and maintained it until the middle of September, when the Prince of
Anglona’s division of Del Parque’s army, relieved the Andalusians
who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies’ works of
contravallation were now augmented, and when Paris retired into
France from Jaca, part of Mina’s troops occupied the valleys leading
from the side of Sanguessa to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to bar
the escape of the garrison that way.
In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh,
four ounces to each, with some rice, and he turned more families out
of the town, but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen
and forced to re-enter.
On the 9th of September baron Maucune, who had conducted most of the
sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified
houses on the east side of the place; he was immediately assailed by
the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them and pursued the fugitives close
to Villalba. Carlos D’España then advanced to their aid in person
with a greater body and the French were driven in with the loss of
eighty men, yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, Carlos
D’España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn
which was their principal object.
[Sidenote: October.]
The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals;
seeking also for roots beyond the walls many in their hunger poisoned
themselves with hemlock, and a number of others unable to bear their
misery deserted. In this state Cassan made a general sally on the
10th of October, to ascertain the strength of the lines around him,
with a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, his troops
were driven in with the loss of seventy men and all hope of escape
vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner
in which he increased the mines under the citadel induced Wellington
to reinforce the blockade, and to bring up his cavalry into the
vicinity of Pampeluna.
The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand men were sick,
eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease
exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and
the governor moved by the great misery, offered on the 26th to
surrender if he was allowed to retire into France with his troops
and six pieces of cannon. This being refused he proposed to yield
on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which being also
denied, he broke off the negociation, giving out that he would blow
up the works of the fortress and break through the blockade. To deter
him a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and lord Wellington
being informed of his design denounced it as contrary to the laws of
war, and directed Carlos D’España to put him, all his officers and
non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the soldiers to death when
the place should be taken if any damage were done to the works.
Cassan’s object being merely to obtain better terms this order
remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have
borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna
and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida,
would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one for the French
army if Soult’s plan of changing the theatre of war by descending
into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing
contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature.
On the other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever of
success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great
fortress belonging to the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the
fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors
might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of
war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But lord Wellington’s letter to
D’España involved another question, namely the putting of prisoners
to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured,
and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter
of which they dared not judge. This would have been quite contrary
to the usages of civilized nations, and the threat must undoubtedly
be considered only as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to
avoid the odium of refusing quarter.
A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress
and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than four
months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became
prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep their arms and
baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that
they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This
compliment was honourable to both sides, but there was another
article, enforced by D’España without being accepted by the garrison,
for which it is difficult to assign any motive but the vindictive
ferocity of the Spanish character. No person of either sex was
permitted to follow the French troops, and women’s affections were
thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.
There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of
Spain except Santona, and as the blockade of that place had been
exceedingly tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications were
interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British
corps under lord Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being on
the opposite point of the harbour to Santona commanded the anchorage.
Accidental circumstances however prevented this body from proceeding
to its destination and Santona remained in the enemy’s possession.
With this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was
terminated and the south of France was now to be invaded; but it is
fitting first to show with what great political labour Wellington
brought the war to this state, what contemptible actions and
sentiments, what a faithless alliance, and what vile governments his
dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.
CHAPTER VI.
[Sidenote: 1813.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
_Political state of Portugal._ In this country the national jealousy
which had been compressed by the force of invasion expanded again
with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England
sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of
Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always
opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those
members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British
ascendancy because it sustained them against the Brazilian court
intrigues, now sought popularity by taking an opposite direction.
Each person of the regency had his own line of opposition marked out.
Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial
operations; the Principal Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently
at the council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and
in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious to command the national
troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters. The
return of the prince-regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto
company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of
paying the subsidy, the means of military transport, the convention
with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that
country, the recruiting, the organization, the command of the
national army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions
for factious proceedings, which were conducted with the ignoble
subtlety that invariably characterizes the politics of the Peninsula.
Moreover the expenditure of the British army had been immense, the
trade and commerce dependent upon it, now removed to the Spanish
ports, enormous. Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes
carelessly or partially enforced were vexatious to the people without
being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue
accrued from duties upon British trade, and the sudden cessation of
markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of
profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army
while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled
all classes, and the whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen
of gratitude.
In this state of feeling emissaries were employed to promulgate
in various directions tales, some true some false, of the
disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of
communication, adding that they were the result of secret orders from
Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! At the same
time discourses and writings against the British influence abounded
in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the
London newspapers, whose statements overflowing of falsehood could
be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted
that England intending to retain her power in Portugal opposed the
return of the prince-regent; that the war itself being removed to
the frontier of France was become wholly a Spanish cause; that it was
not for Portugal to levy troops, and exhaust her resources to help a
nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to
resist.
Mr. Stuart’s diplomatic intercourse with the government always
difficult was now a continual remonstrance and dispute; his
complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal
violence against the persons and property of British subjects was
pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no
suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months because he
had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English
factory were invaded, and the Oporto company which had been
established as its rival in violation of treaty was openly cherished.
Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed every
body, and the prince-regent promising either to reform or totally
abolish it ordered a preparatory investigation, but to use the words
of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted on the occasion no less unfairly by
their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.
Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another
cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain
taxes, and from billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks
domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These
pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle,
doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to
billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, and the
merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount.
The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property,
imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport
supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their
clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army.
Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy the amount of the
property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The regency
then commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of
commerce, and the prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed,
secretly permitted count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in
London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty
generally were arranged. Funchal who disliked to quit London took
care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always advising
delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in
other negociations then depending.
When the battle of Vittoria became known, the regency proposed to
entreat the return of the prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to
excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their
expectations, approved of the proposal they deferred the execution.
The British cabinet which had long neglected Wellington’s suggestions
on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal
who had been at first averse now urged it warmly, fearing that if
the prince remained he could no longer defer going to the Brazils.
However few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal
family, and when the thing was proposed to the regent he discovered
no inclination for the voyage.
But the most important subject of discord was the army. The
absence of the sovereign and the intrigues which ruled the court
of Rio Janeiro had virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an
oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed
for mischief. The whole course of this history has shewn that all
Wellington’s energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness
of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England’s power and riches,
were scarcely sufficient to meet the evils flowing from this foul
source. Even while the French armies were menacing the capital
the regency was split into factions, the financial resources were
neglected or wasted, the public servants were insolent incapable and
corrupt, the poorer people oppressed, and the military force for
want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the point of dissolving
together. The strenuous interference of the English general and
envoy, seconded by the extraordinary exertions of the British
officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency
of the army, and in the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops
was surpassing. Even the militia-men, who had been deprived of their
colours and drafted into the line to punish their bad conduct at
Guarda under general Trant in 1812, nobly regained their standards on
the Pyrenees.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]
But this state of affairs acting upon the naturally sanguine
temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated
notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid
sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General Picton had thrown
some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal
Beresford complained that full justice had not been done to their
merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament and in the
despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but
not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and the
remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood.
Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative
to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the
subsistence of the army altogether; and at the same time so many
obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that the depôts, which ought
to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained
in the campaign, only contained four thousand, who were also without
the means of taking the field. This matter became so serious that
Beresford quitting the army in October came to Lisbon, to propose a
new regulation which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the
nobles the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and
followers. On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent at the
political position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said,
generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by
British officers, and having no distinct recognized existence their
services were unnoticed and the glory of the country suffered. The
world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war.
It was known indeed that there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was
known that there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national
army nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only
went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards,
inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities,
were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the
English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British
parliament. He proposed therefore to have the Portuguese formed into
a distinct army acting under lord Wellington.
It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British
divisions were fed by the British commissariat the cost being
deducted from the subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the
Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that they could
feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money,
but Beresford referred him to his scanty means of transport, so
scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the
unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were
not forwarded. Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to
withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate
them with the unattached brigades of native troops and so form an
auxiliary corps; but the same objection of transport still applied
and this matter dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to
reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army,
but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly,
were exempt from their controul, and the governors supported by the
prince-regent refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions,
and even granted asylums to all those who wished to avoid the levy
in Portugal. In the islands also the persons so unjustly and cruelly
imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency
yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart and lord
Wellington had released those at Lisbon.
Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion
was seized by Forjas to renew his complaints and his proposition
for a separate army which he designed to command himself. General
Sylveira’s claim to that honour was however supported by the Souzas,
to whose faction he belonged, and the only matter in which all
agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Lord Wellington
became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief
by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their
omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter
complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing
could be more different from a debate within the house than the
representation of it in the newspapers. The latter seldom stated
an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they
absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their
observations branched out so far from the text, that they appeared
absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth
upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious
of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which
the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood
high and was rising daily. “Mr. Forjas is,” said lord Wellington,
“the ablest man of business I have met with in the Peninsula,
it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to
alter a successful military system. I understand something of the
organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that separated
from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in
a good state although their government were to incur ten times the
expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting
state for the field they can gain no honour, they must suffer
dishonour! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily,
and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes
of disagreement with the Portuguese _I will quit the Peninsula for
ever_”!
This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied
officially.
“The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy
campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its
means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which
was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations since
the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid
peace, she did not expect increase of territory, nor any advantage
save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry
of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which,
unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with
Spain. The English prince-regent his ministers and his generals,
had rendered full justice to her military services in the official
reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe.
Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the
public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could
do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford,
Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and
thanked accordingly for its exploits, and with as much form and
solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards
the Spanish army. The more so that the Portuguese had sacrificed
their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride
had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It
was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after
the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to
have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese
officers. Nevertheless such grave objections being advanced they were
willing, he said, to drop the matter altogether.”
The discontent however remained, for the argument had weight, and
if any native officers’ reputation had been sufficient to make the
proceeding plausible, the British officers would have been driven
from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and both ruined.
As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to
succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons who pretended to the
command were Forjas and Sylveira; but the English officers who were
as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the
former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter, having by
experience discovered that he was an incapable officer seeking a base
and pernicious popularity by encouraging the views of the soldiers.
Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and
the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the
Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked
in favour of the troops. But the most effectual check to the project
of the regency was the significant intimation of Mr. Stuart, that
England, being bound by no conditions in the payment of the subsidy,
had a right if it was not applied in the manner most agreeable to
her, to withdraw it altogether.
To have this subsidy in specie and to supply their own troops
continued to be the cry of the regency, until their inability to
effect the latter became at last so apparent that they gave the
matter up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man ever to have
supposed, that the badly organized administration of Portugal, was
capable of supporting an efficient army in the field five hundred
miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the
British influence if possible without losing the subsidy. For the
honour of the army or the welfare of the soldiers neither the regency
nor the prince himself had any care. While the former were thus
disputing for the command, they suffered their subordinates to ruin
an establishment at Ruña, the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated
soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the prince
while he lavished honours upon the dependents and creatures of his
court at Rio Janeiro, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard
fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the
list, amongst the menial servants of the palace who were decorated
with the same ribands! Honour, justice, humanity, were alike despised
by the ruling men and lord Wellington thus expressed his strong
disgust.
“_The British army which I have the honour to command has met with
nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in
Portugal for their services, every thing that could be done has been
done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and
soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in
their power. I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal_”!
Such were the relations of the Portuguese government with England,
and with Spain they were not more friendly. Seven envoys from that
country had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. The
Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic opinions which had obtained
ground in Spain, and the leading party in the Cortez were intent to
spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. The only bond of
sympathy between the two governments was hatred of the English who
had saved both. On all other points they differed. The exiled bishop
of Orense, from his asylum on the frontier of Portugal, excited the
Gallicians against the Cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from
Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern frontier, was
specially demanded by the Spanish minister; but though a long and
angry discussion followed the bishop was only civilly requested by
the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the
Spanish regency. The latter then demanded that he should be delivered
up as a delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a decree of the
Cortez which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen
and denaturalized him. However he was removed twenty leagues from
the frontier, nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free
from ecclesiastic troubles. The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines
which were offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was
confined but soon released and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced
against him, which only increased his followers and extended the
influence of his doctrines.
Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of
Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards
the end of 1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no good intent,
to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese regency, fearing that he would
rally round him other discontented persons, set agents to watch his
proceedings, and under pretence of putting down robbers who abounded
on that frontier, established a line of cavalry and called out the
militia, thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to
kindle a war between the two countries.
_Political state of Spain._ Lord Wellington’s victories had put an
end to the intercourse between Joseph and the Spaniards who desired
to make terms with the French; but those people not losing hope,
formed a strong anti-English party and watched to profit by the
disputes between the two great factions at Cadiz, which had now
become most rancorous and dangerous to the common cause. The serviles
extremely bigoted both in religion and politics had the whole body
of the clergy on their side. They were the most numerous in the
Cortez and their views were generally in accord with the feelings of
the people beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines were
comprised in two sentences—_An absolute king, An intolerant church_.
The liberals supported and instigated by all ardent innovators,
by the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partizans
beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the revolutionary writings
of the French philosophers were hastening onwards to a democracy,
without regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without practical
ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a
fourth faction in the Cortez, formed by the American deputies, who
were secretly labouring for the independence of the colonies; they
sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, as it suited
their purposes, and thus often produced anomalous results, because
they were numerous enough to turn the scale in favour of the side
which they espoused. Jealousy of England was however common to all,
and “_Inglesismo_” was used as a term of contempt. Posterity will
scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington was commencing the
campaign of 1813 the Cortez was with difficulty, and by threats
rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign
troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself
where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo,
Badajos, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money
had restored their broken walls and replenished their exhausted
magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their
ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed, were to
be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach, without
treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades who had sacrificed
their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power
to offer the insult.
The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Gallicia
openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition and excited the
people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an
active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. And this section
generally ruled the Cortez, because the Americanos leaned strongly
towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English,
or French party, was to produce dissensions which could be best
effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and
obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to
submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious
that lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on
his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would
take part with the French. This notion which gives his measure for
the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme
discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped
his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he
imagined, the clergy of Gallicia, meeting with no solid support,
submitted to the Cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to
Portugal.
Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring
of the English tories’ policy. Napoleon was warred against, not
as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was
neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because
he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges.
The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without
meaning in their state-papers and speeches, and their anger and
mortification were extreme when they found success against the
emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy.
They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity
of their general, from interfering with the internal government of
Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture
wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice,
must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who
desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and
he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the
Cortez, and that of the executive government which acted under its
controul, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations,
and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom
cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired,
when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution
exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a
considerable member of the Cortez and perfectly acquainted with the
subject.
[Sidenote: Original Letter, MSS.]
Speaking of the “_Afrancesados_” or French party, more numerous than
was supposed and active to increase their numbers, he says, “The
thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the
diminution of the English influence.” Amongst the serviles they
gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution
which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they
said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the
Spanish constitution having brought the king’s authority under that
of the Cortez was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and
aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers
of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not
stand. To the Americans they observed that lord Wellington opposed
them, because he did not help them and permitted expeditions to
be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the
colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as
fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they
did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest
patriots of all parties they said, that every concession to the
English general was an offence against the dignity and independence
of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to
subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in
preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he
was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design
was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he
desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it
was to gain the soldiers turn the army against the country and thus
render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations
were effectual because they flattered the national pride, as proving
that the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves without the
aid of foreigners. Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such
dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple
honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those
victories came and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but
many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with
their party.
The change of government which had place in the beginning of the
year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the Cortez would
decline under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that prince,
who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards,
because his father had married without the consent of the king,
was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new
regency became therefore more the slaves of the Cortez than their
predecessors, and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in
falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European
brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins directed the
populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles
yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes
had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the
commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their
spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step to use the terribly
significant expression of Wellington, “_The ghost of Solano was
staring them in the face_.”
The principal points of the Jacobins’ policy in support of their
crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation
from the Deity, were, 1º. The abolition of the Inquisition, the
arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent
warfare with the clergy. 2º. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta
to the regency. 3º. The appointment of captain-generals and other
officers to suit their factious purposes. 4º. The obtaining of money
for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of
the armies. 5º. The control of the elections for a new Cortez so as
to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent
its assembling at the legal period in October.
The matter of the bishops as we have seen nearly involved them in
a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Gallicia. The
affair of the princess was less serious, but she had never ceased
intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British
ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were,
although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather
favoured by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of
democracy. Lord Wellington however still held aloof, observing that
if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a
slave to the Cortez than her predecessors, and England would have the
discredit of giving power to the “worst woman in existence.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.]
To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz
populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party,
and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the
general Cortez in September, had apparently given the executive
government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable
opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The
regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to
Madrid, telling sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer
pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They
had secretly formed this resolution at night and proposed to commence
the journey next day, but a disturbance arose in the city and the
alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary Cortez; the ministers
were immediately called before it and bending in fear before their
masters, declared with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there
was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the Cortez.
Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any
fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently
to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port
St. Mary.
This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to
remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortez should be installed,
and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather
to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of
the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting
it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular
and eloquent member of the Cortez. The more moderate liberals thus
discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the
newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom,
though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was
involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington when he declared, that
wherever the Cortez and government should fix themselves the press
would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or
Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2.]
The composition of the new Cortez was naturally an object of hope and
fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing
assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was
expected two Cortez would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other
at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However the new
body after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, and the
Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the
assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid
spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the
resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the
Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For
the general belief being, that no person could take the sickness
twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from
former visitations, the merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring
that there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously
to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and
endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortez in the
city.
An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of
the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles
of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had
upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced,
form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the
subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish
revolution, and it is only the effect upon the military operations
which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was
one of unmitigated evil, but it must be observed that this did not
necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the
same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power,
called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases alike,
the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious
politicians.
It has been shewn in a former volume, that one Spanish regency
contracted an engagement with lord Wellington on the faith of which
he took the command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously
adhered to by him, but systematically violated by the new regency
and minister of war, almost as soon as it was concluded. His
recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders
were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were
made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without
his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo.
Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, captain-general of
Gallicia, Estremadura, and Castile, was disgracefully removed from
his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council
of state. His nephew general Giron was at the same time deprived of
his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños
had been largely commended for their conduct by lord Wellington.
General Frere, appointed captain-general of Castile and Estremadura,
succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy
replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter
tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in
that kingdom. Nor was the sagacity of that faction at fault, for
Castaños would, according to lord Wellington, have turned his arms
against the Cortez if an opportunity had offered. He and others were
now menaced with death, and the Cortez contemplated an attack upon
the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates
of the grandees. All except the last very fitting to do if the times
and circumstances had been favourable for a peaceful arrangement;
but most insane when the nation generally was averse, and there was
an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn. The
clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were
dissatisfied, and menacing in their communications with the superior
civil authorities, the soldiers were starving and the people tired
of their miseries only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to
avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English
cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery was totally
without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French
could have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain itself; and
the following passages, from Wellington’s letters to the ministers,
prove, that even he contemplated a forcible change in the government
and constitution.
“If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the
newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon
landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do
something more than discountenance them.”—“It is quite impossible
such a system can last. What I regret is that I am the person that
maintains it. If I was out of the way there are plenty of generals
who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am
much mistaken if O’Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others are
not equally ready. If the king should return he also will overturn
the whole fabric if he has any spirit.”—“I wish you would let me
know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at
the democracy the government would approve of my doing it.” And in
another letter he seriously treated the question of withdrawing from
the contest altogether. “The government were the best judges,” he
said, “of whether they could or ought to withdraw,” but he did not
believe that Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with
England, if the republican system was not put down. Meanwhile he
recommended to the English government and to his brother, to take no
part either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance
the democratical principles and measures of the Cortez, and if their
opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new regency, to
recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged
all power with the Cortez, and to give instead, some authority to the
executive government whether in the hands of king or regent. To fill
the latter office one of royal blood uniting the strongest claims of
birth with the best capacity should he thought be selected, but if
capacity was wanting in the royal race then to choose the Spaniard
who was most deserving in the public estimation! Thus necessity
teaches privilege to bend before merit.
[Sidenote: Letter to the Spanish minister of war, 30th Aug. 1813.]
The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period about one hundred
and sixty thousand men. Of this number not more than fifty thousand
were available for operations in the field, and those only because
they were paid clothed and armed by England, and kept together by the
ability and vigour of the English general. He had proposed when at
Cadiz an arrangement for the civil and political government of the
provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the
armies, but his plan was rejected and his repeated representations
of the misery the army and the people endured under the system
of the Spanish government were unheeded. Certain districts were
allotted for the support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear of
military domination, the government refused the captain-generals of
those districts the necessary powers to draw forth the resources
of the country, powers which lord Wellington recommended that they
should have, and wanting which the whole system was sure to become
a nullity. Each branch of administration was thus conducted by
chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each too restricted in
authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them
neglectful of their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was thus
described by the English general as early as August.
“More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a
year, and the whole of Spain excepting Catalonia and a small part
of Aragon since the months of May and June last. The most abundant
harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of
money spent by the contending armies are circulating every where,
and yet your armies however weak in numbers are literally starving.
The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have
been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon
the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned to inform your
excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which
has been given from the military chest of the British army and has
been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have
supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies in order
to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding
this assistance I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish
troops on the outposts, obliged to plunder the nut and apple-trees
for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in
the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an
allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were
at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system then is
insufficient to procure supplies for the army and at the same time I
assure your excellency that it is the most oppressive and injurious
to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the
country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary
for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant, and the
enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the
expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary
for its defence.”
These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants,
and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an
unprosperous state; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard
of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for
enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue cost in several
branches seventy and eighty per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers
capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an
efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of
military administration had been formed, and no shame for these
deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible.
From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn, 1º. that the
provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been
for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the
latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was
represented. 2º. That Spain, being now towards the end as helpless
as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite
unequal to her own deliverance either by arms or policy; that it was
English valour English steel, directed by the genius of an English
general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented
by his own or the peninsular governments or by the perversity
of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly
inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of
six years’ war, lord Wellington declared thirty thousand of their
troops could not be trusted to act separately; they were only useful
when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations. And yet
all men in authority to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous as
arrogant and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be rendered callous to
public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless
of the consequences of their actions and never suffered prudential
considerations or national honour to check the execution of any
project. The generals from repeated failures had become insensible to
misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring,
were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that
were a common matter instead of being the great event of war.
The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself was
as it had ever been tyrannical faithless mean and equivocating to
the lowest degree. In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active patriotism
thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces.
“Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor but she abhors still more
the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of
her administration since the beginning of the war.” In fine there
was no healthy action in any part of the body politic, every thing
was rotten except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz
Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane without
captain, pilot, compass, chart sails or rudder, and advised the crew
to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed.
When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his
engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency
did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government.
Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for they had
themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the
usages of civilized states with respect to national faith, had any
influence on their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge,
he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his
command. And seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in
political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him, and that
no Spanish army could possibly subsist as a military body under the
neglect and bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious
also that public opinion in Spain would, better than the menaces
of the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to
the democratic party, he tendered indeed his resignation if the
government engagement was not fulfilled, but earnestly endeavoured by
a due mixture of mildness argument and reproof to reduce the ruling
authorities to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told them, limits
to his forbearance to his submission under injury, and he had been
already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish
government.
From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the
utmost respect and honour. He was made a grandee of the first class,
and the estate of Soto de Roma in Grenada, of which the much-maligned
and miserable Prince of Peace had been despoiled, was settled upon
him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his
Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public
treasury during the war. The regents however, under the pressure of
the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, although
one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the
command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it;
and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious
writers as a topic for exciting the people not only to demand his
resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the
British soldiers. Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness,
they pretended amongst other absurdities that the nobility had
offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain.
This tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three
Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare that they were
not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was
accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command
only until the assembling of the new Cortez, but the attempt to
render him odious failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal
ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses
in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him
more than they did their own government, and the Spanish officers
had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes before he was
appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that
high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the
war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English
ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the
battle of Vittoria they entertained the design of removing him from
Spain to take part in the German operations. His answer was short and
modest, but full of wisdom.
“Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here
and in Germany, but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and
I should be no better than another in Germany.”
The egregious folly which dictated this proposition was thus
checked, and in December the new Cortez decided that he should
retain the command of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil
its predecessor’s engagements. Nevertheless so deeply had he been
offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian that a private
letter to his brother terminated thus:—“_It will rest with the king’s
government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all
the circumstances of the case, but if I was to decide I would not
keep the army in Spain for one hour._” And to many other persons at
different times he expressed his fears and conviction that the cause
was lost and that he should fail at last. It was under these, and
other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations. It
was with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than the foe in his
front that he invaded the south of France; and that is the answer to
those French writers who have described him as being at the head of
more than two hundred thousand well-furnished soldiers, supported by
a well-organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in
his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the
Peninsula and of England.
BOOK XXIII.
CHAPTER I.
WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.
[Sidenote: 1813. November.]
While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to complete his works of
defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port,
that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He
pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must
have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the
snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of
the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political
difficulties were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his efforts to
draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret
hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the
common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne
voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops,
but their means were limited and Soult vainly urged the merchants of
Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required
therefore all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and
if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the
coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must
have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the
field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for
forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops;
and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced
to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers
to the top of the mountains.
Soult was strongly affected. “_Tell the emperor_,” he wrote to the
minister of war, “_tell him when you make your next report that on
the very soil of France, this is the situation of the army destined
to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that
the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not
make me fail in my duty_.”
The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies
were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended,
more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to
their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed
gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at
Andarlassa which gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain,
yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and so scantily, that
lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and
invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the
unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud
in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers
knew that some commissaries leaguing with the speculators upon the
coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other
luxuries, to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion
was however great, more than twelve hundred men went over to the
enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen
or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours
invariably went back to their own country.
This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress
of the Spaniards and the certainty that they would plunder in France
and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of
the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered lord Wellington very
averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously
maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns.
It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of
France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor
means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted
such a measure. The nature of the country also forbad a decisive
victory, and hence an advance was attended with the risk of returning
to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous
and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the
governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord Fitzroy Somerset,
observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also
in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It
announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and
as intelligence of Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known at
the same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the
wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were
earnest that he should invade France.
His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp on the 29th,
thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he
was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the
passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The
preparations however continued and strict precautions were taken
to baffle the enemy’s emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly
informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the
delay; and he likewise obtained from a serjeant-major of artillery
who losing his road was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders
indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between
D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some French peasants also who
had been allowed to pass the allied outposts declared they had been
closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it.
The defences there were therefore augmented with new redoubts and
abbatis, and Soult having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided
for its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clauzel’s
position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his
attention towards Foy’s corps.
That general had been posted at Bidarray, half way between St.
Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading
to the Nive from Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the
Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for
his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of
Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at
first supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time designed, he
resolved to use Foy’s division offensively. In this view on the 3d of
November he instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only
slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare
from its defence to Bidarray, and when the allies assailed D’Erlon,
he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as
they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If on the other hand he was
himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached
troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the bridge of
Bidarray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open
a communication with Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of
cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthes.
On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed
to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port,
and so descend into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray as
a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he
gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive
upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce
D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the enemy.
Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed
the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national
guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port,
but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies penetrating
into the country should at once provoke and offer facilities for an
irregular warfare.
On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San Martin d’Arosa and
Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais
to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected storm
burst.
Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, lord
Wellington had moved sir Rowland Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles
to the Bastan with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the
position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had
also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the
8th, but general Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist
on the mountains he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a
scheme to obtain provisions from the English magazines, and it was
successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his
aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a formal intimation that if
he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain,
contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the
Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff
declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although
there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain
therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man
and yet her troops were starving!
[Sidenote: Appendix, 7, No. 3.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.]
When this difficulty was surmounted heavy rain caused the attack to
be again deferred, but on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all
arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese,
descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of
artillery, which under the command of colonel Dickson were all
with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action. Nor in
this host do I reckon four thousand five hundred cavalry, nor the
Spaniards of the blockading division which remained in reserve. On
the other hand the French numbers were now increased by the new
levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior,
and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including
the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and as Foy’s
operations were extraneous to the line of defence scarcely sixty
thousand infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies.
Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s line could not
be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while
he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the
Nivelle to San Pé. In this view the second and sixth British
division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards, four of Mina’s
battalions, and Grant’s brigade of light cavalry, in all twenty-six
thousand fighting men and officers with nine guns, were collected
under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon. The position of
Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina’s troops
supported by the blockading force under Carlos D’España.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Order of Movements, MSS.]
The third fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron’s Andalusians, the
whole under the command of marshal Beresford, were disposed about
Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those
slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left
of this body the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under
Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune
which led down towards Ascain. Victor Alten’s brigade of light
cavalry and three British batteries, were placed on the road to
Sarre, and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles Alten’s
troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting men and officers, with
twenty-four guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clauzel.
[Sidenote: Plan 6.]
General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand strong, with six
guns, were disposed on Alten’s left, at the fort of Calvary and
towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be
detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, to support
Clauzel.
General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson’s,
Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s
brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about
nineteen thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was opposed
to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope’s left
flank was to aid the land operations.
On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position
to defend. D’Erlon’s first line, its left resting on the fortified
rocks of Mondarin which could not be turned, run from thence along
the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the
Nivelle. This range was strongly entrenched and occupied by one of
Abbé’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being behind the
former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position
was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was
occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left
did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right
reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because
the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave
greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were
constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced
close to the bridge.
On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the
bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position extended to Ascain, also along
a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and
abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve
completely round the range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike
upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and
Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of San Pé
and Harastagui which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s
divisions reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin were
here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of St. Barbe and
Grenada covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the
right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified and occupied by a
brigade of Maransin’s division. A new redoubt with abbatis was also
commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.
On the right of this line beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s
division belonging to Clauzel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San
Pol drawn from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the entrenched
camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s position with Villatte’s,
which was as I have before said on a ridge crossing the gorges of
Olette and Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly
fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations,
was nearly impregnable.
Soult’s weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening
between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing
as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open,
the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that
bridge could not hamper the allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful
force acting in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line
and breaking in upon the main position, between the right of that
general’s second line and Clauzel’s left, turn both by the same
attack.
Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving
Minas four battalions on the Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of
Mondarin, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de
Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera
and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and
Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese were to assault
the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left
bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of
twenty-six thousand men was combined against D’Erlon’s position, and
on their left Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division
under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, was to move
against the unfinished redoubts and entrenchments covering the
approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle,
thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it was attacked
in front by Hill’s corps. On the left of the third division, the
seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to
storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre
assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the attack of the third
division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling
on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the
redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail
Clauzel’s main position abreast with the seventh division. On the
left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on
the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others
leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the
lower slopes of the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest
attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s
corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry were to
be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and
D’Erlon to break their line of battle.
Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards,
furnishing together about eight thousand men, was likewise to attack
Clauzel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians
approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements coming
from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clauzel’s right
the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain
outwork was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and
parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front,
which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; but
on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased, descending by a
long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way
down the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with an advanced
post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two
Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into the
plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh
scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to
move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to
their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until
they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their
way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the bristles of the
latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose
stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating
with each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one above another
until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this
ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every
side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy
had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from
behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the
edge of the ravine.
This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by
Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s division, and the line of retreat was
towards a low narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine
linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a reserve was placed
here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth French regiment posted
on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the
neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only
approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller
Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle, wherefore
Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage,
the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at
midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards
Ascain. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by
the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star
fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the
left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the forty-third
regiment supported by the seventeenth Portuguese was to assail
the hog’s-back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns
were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders
to assail the craggy post between the Rhunes and connect Alten’s
attack with that of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their
respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of
their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying
within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five
or six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the
sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet,
and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun when three guns
fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack.
BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.
The day broke with great splendour, and as the first ray of light
played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal-guns were fired
in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped
up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing
forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences
with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from
the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and at the
same moment two companies of the forty-third were detached to cross
the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the
lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced the
remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column
of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the
high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but
the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim,
and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly though the ground
was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and
were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that
obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the
lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had
passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful
speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of
the first stone castle from whence came a sharp and biting musketry.
When they had recovered breath they arose and with a stern shout
commenced the assault.
The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks
they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong
and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that
hour before the veterans of the forty-third. One French grenadier
officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high
wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his
hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men
shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks.
Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn,
but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the
intricate narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone walls,
the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried
the second castle, called by the French the place of arms, and the
magpie’s nest, because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above
it and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the
defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher
and larger than the others and covered by a natural ditch or cleft
in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the Donjon. Here they
made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look
into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below,
suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to
gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy
beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of
riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, and the seventeenth Portuguese.
This last regiment was to have followed the forty-third but seeing
how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved
at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very
soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front,
and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the
ridge above, seeing also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left
of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star
fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the forty-third
gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout
down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow
paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the
moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old
soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but
that the victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.
The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen
dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post
of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it with small loss;
but they were ill-seconded by Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly
handled by the thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining its
post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which
came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of
land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied
and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation
continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke
had been looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but the
officer entrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had
thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible
to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.
The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened
by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, was not very severe, but
general Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely
wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed
his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile
the fifty-second having turned the position by the ravine was
now approaching the enemy’s line of retreat, when general Alten,
following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine
itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and
during this action Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in
connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position with the enemy
now and then cannonading Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine,
Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns
there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the
movements.
The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division
against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in
movement against the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns
were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they
poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders
and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the
work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross’s battery of
horse artillery galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada
fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh
divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it and
advanced to the attack of Clauzel’s main position.
It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller Rhune a splendid
spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war
slowly sailing to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of
Socoa; Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground sent the
sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and
they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains.
On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted
by the rising sun, and fifty thousand men rushing down its enormous
slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows
into the deep valley. The plains of France so long overlooked from
the towering crags of the Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle,
and the half-famished soldiers in their fury, broke through the iron
barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.
The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the
skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations
failed. Far on the right general Hill after a long and difficult
night march had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven
o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops
on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second
division against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it back from the
forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the
sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him,
they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the
right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion
and Morillo’s division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the
three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance,
approached D’Erlon’s second position, but the country being very
rugged it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of
the French redoubts. Each of these contained five hundred men, and
they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which being thickly
clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was very difficult
to attack. However general Clinton, leading the sixth division on
the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the
works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which wheeling to
his right he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison
not daring to await the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese
division passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth
menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner
approached the third redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to
their hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind San Pé,
pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s second brigade forming the
French left was separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but
he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo,
where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the
Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him.
It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that
rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble. After the fall of the St.
Barbe and Grenada redoubts Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to
defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while the fourth and
seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth regiment detached from
the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third
division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards
the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division
the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps
were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new
unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides
of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spreading from Sarre to
Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general
indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself,
but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and
the third division seized the bridge and established itself on the
heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis the XIV.
which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened
about eleven o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from St. Pé
yielded as we have seen at once to the attack of the sixth division,
and at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back
in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh
divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the
third. Thus the communication between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut,
the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a
direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same
blow.
D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel stood firm with Taupin’s
and Maransin’s divisions. The latter now completed by the return of
Barbot’s brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of
Louis the XIV. and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to
cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. The guns opened briskly but
they were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery, the only one
which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing
Sarre, the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and
seventh divisions, in flank by the third division, the redoubt of
Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayonetted, Conroux’s men
continued to fly, Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong
into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was
taken but escaped in the confusion. Giron’s Spaniards now came up on
the left of the fourth division, somewhat late however, and after
having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller
Rhune.
On the French side Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts
forming Clauzel’s right wing still remained to fight. The left rested
on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery but
overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts
overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres,
and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by
the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing
the road to San Pé and along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten
divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called
the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel thinking he might still
dispute the victory, if his reserve division, posted in the camp of
Serres, could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French regiment
from Taupin, and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastaguia.
His object was to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so
form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the right on the signal
redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the eighty-eighth
regiment. In this position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain
he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed at the moment of
conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division
which was now again in full action.
[Sidenote: Clauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Taupin’s Official Report, MSS.]
About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the whole of the columns
on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the
enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first
passed by the fifty-second regiment with a rapid pace and a very
narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from
the entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite mountain;
a road coming from Ascain by the ravine led up the position, and as
the fifty-second pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned
his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works
above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of
Alten’s troops, and Taupin, though his division was weak from its
losses on the 7th of October and now still further diminished by the
absence of the thirty-first regiment, awaited the assault above,
being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this
time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascain, and
being joined by part of Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a
distant musketry against the works covering that bridge on Taupin’s
right; a panic immediately seized the French, the seventieth regiment
abandoned the two redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn.
Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this only added to the
disorder, the seventieth regiment instead of facing about disbanded
entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There remained
only four regiments unbroken, one, the eighty-eighth, was in the
signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of
the works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the fort of
Harastaguia now the only line of retreat.
In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off the eighty-eighth
regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt,
intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the
thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by
the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was
rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt.
Moreover Alten previous to this had directed the forty-third,
preceded by Barnard’s riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet
shot the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore Taupin instead
of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being
menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated,
closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell
dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke
the thirty-first, the rout was complete; the French fled to the
different bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt was left to
its fate.
This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it
was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were
abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second
regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the
fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was
as we have seen turning it on the left. Colborne whose military
judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical
hill on which the work was situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards
making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his
right were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer without
warrant, for general Alten on the spot assured the Author of this
History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to
advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance and his troops covered
by the steepness of the hill reached the flat top which was about
forty yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a
wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and pallisaded, stopped
them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost
men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was
always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment
under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the
French unawares made another rush, yet with the same result. At three
different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each
time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting
then to persuasion he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the
commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how
hopeless his defence, whereupon the garrison yielded having had only
one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell two hundred
soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first
borne by men.
During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed the Nivelle in
great disorder, Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the
thirty-first regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and
the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh
divisions, and the skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and
a bridge above San Pé entered that place while the French were in
the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o’clock,
Conroux’s troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position
on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin
and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied
Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above San
Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of
Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the
allies’ left flank by Ascain, and Wellington thereupon halted the
fourth and light divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse
slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the camp of Serres,
waiting until the sixth division, then following D’Armagnac’s
retreat on the right of the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he
was assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle with the
third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin from his new position
after a hard struggle, in which general Inglis was wounded and the
fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. This
ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the
troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division which had been
marching or fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions
were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right wing of whose
operations it is now time to treat.
In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced positions, the
camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the
centre covering Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried
early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the
inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure. The
second after a short cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and
the guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth regiment,
of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne.
The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of
Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering
this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy whose
musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile
Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on
the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against
the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by
Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain. The Spaniards were here
opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded the
remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during the fight general
Freyre’s skirmishers on the right united with Longa’s men. Thus a
kind of false battle was maintained along the whole line to the sea
until nightfall, with equal loss of men but great advantage to the
allies, because it entirely occupied Reille’s two divisions and
Villatte’s reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres
from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clauzel, who was thus
overpowered. When that event happened and lord Wellington had passed
the Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from
Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and
Longa entered the town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp
above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed
all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle; when that was effected the
whole retired and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on the
road to Bayonne.
During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained
in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood
completely separated the picquets towards Ascain from the main body,
and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a
blazing sign of war to France.
On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope on
the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry,
and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the centre moved by
the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his
right with Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his
left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre
took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The
time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Ciboure,
and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow,
and gave the duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third
line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right
resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the
left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but
the works were only slightly advanced and Soult dreading a second
battle on so wide a field drew back his centre and left to Arbonne
and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at
two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre,
closed the day’s proceedings. The next morning the French retired
to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and
their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this
movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared
sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied
Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, in the centre. General
Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of
Ustaritz and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo,
but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered
the fords impassable and both points were defended successfully by
Foy whose operations had been distinct from the rest.
In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his
own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidaray
to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time and on the
morning of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following Soult’s
previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil
mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him
also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle
was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off
retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men,
having however taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners.
Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on
the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé’s division at those posts,
and on the 12th defended them against general Hill. Such were the
principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult
was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for
three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men
and officers including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and
one general was killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and
Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces
of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in
the redoubts of the low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two
generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six
hundred and ninety-four men and officers.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by
extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the
troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines
may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the
assailants are the better soldiers. Cæsar at Alesia resisted the
Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey.
Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the
duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders.
If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps because his
lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that
example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan,
that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the
front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected
by inundations. But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to
complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy,
his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in
confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at
Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew
of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in
numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.
It is not meant by this to decry entrenched camps within compass,
and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or
avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies
only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are
taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to
their enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing himself at
important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage
his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the
combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering
to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions
they like, menace every point and select where to break through.
The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable
to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful,
knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of
strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat
and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on
the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and
left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no
resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about
their neighbours’ fighting than their own.
[Sidenote: Official Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS.]
All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the
Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat to the loss of the bridge
of Amotz by Conroux’s division, and to this cause also Maransin
traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s door,
but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it at once to want of
firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau’s
division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have
maintained his ground. Soult however traced Clauzel’s defeat to
injudicious measures. That general he said attempted to defend the
village of Sarre after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were
carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed in detail and
driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel should rather have assembled
his three divisions at once in the main position which was his
battleground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have
been victorious. It was scarcely credible he observed that such
entrenchments as Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried.
For his part he relied on their strength so confidently as to think
the allies must sacrifice twenty-five thousand men to force them and
perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began,
no reports came to him, he could judge of events only by the fire,
and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops
and artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival had however
paralyzed the march of three divisions. This was true, yet there
seems some foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he had
for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no
help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the
distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the
attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This then was Soult’s
error. He suffered sir John Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand
men in the low ground, while fifteen thousand under Clauzel lost the
battle on the hills.
2º. The French army was inferior in numbers and many of the works
were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s,
were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive
movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous
counter-attacks are no doubt essential to a good defence, and it was
in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position
behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, “if a river were
as broad and rapid as the Danube it would be nothing without secure
points for passing to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to
lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when
he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it
meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil
mountain. That general’s numbers were too few, and the direction of
the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive
moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point.
Foy’s retreat was inevitable if D’Erlon failed, and wanting the
other’s aid he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might
have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite
through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo and perhaps have
taken general Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed little
against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated
the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into
the Bastan by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although properly
rejected by Soult would probably have produced greater effects than
the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th,
Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides,
might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed
the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in
on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult
would thus have had time to complete his works.
3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the
drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the
redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error
and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report expressly states
that Maransin was directed to form in rear of the redoubts and charge
the allies when they were between the works and the abbatis. It is
however needless to pry closely into these matters when the true
cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior
numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this,
but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the
enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined they were
kept in masses behind and never engaged.
Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old soldiers, was posted
in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by
the position of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s
division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of
Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ twelve
thousand of Soult’s best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile
Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D’Armagnac’s
division to oppose him, that is to say, five thousand against twenty
thousand. And while the battle was secured on the right of the
Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust
twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand composing Conroux’s
and Maransin’s divisions. Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing,
the one from his left the other from his right, formed a wedge
towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four thousand men composing the
six divisions under those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand
composing the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and Maransin; and
these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux’s
troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s
corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main
position was attacked. Finally Alten with eight thousand men, having
first defeated Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only
three thousand while the rest of the French army was held in check
by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than fifty thousand troops full of
confidence from repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the
decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand dispirited by
previous reverses to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there
was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for
Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge
flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the
horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the
wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more
than ninety guns, these and the reputation of the French commander
furnish the everlasting reply.
And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right
escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at San Pé he had only
two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in
observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble
enough men to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had
closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained,
and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the
difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles, whether the
combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack
had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position. Carlos
D’España’s force and the remainder of Mina’s battalions could have
reinforced Morillo’s division with five thousand men to occupy
D’Erlon’s attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though
he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse that general did
not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat endangered his position. This
arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce
Beresford and have given lord Wellington three additional divisions
in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s
right wing could not then have escaped.
4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington from some oversight
did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone,
for Longa’s Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely fired a
shot, this division furnishing only four thousand seven hundred men
and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s
brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, thus
driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine being less
than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they
defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many brave men they lost,
and of two who fell in this battle I will speak.
The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour
for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen. But
he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So
slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that
the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing,
he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring
and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle,
and implicitly following where he led, would like children obey
his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education
was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest
and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and
every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future
greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the
forty-third one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all
died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that
strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men,
he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune
rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the
middle of the fight when they heard of his fate.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s Despatches.]
[Sidenote: The Eventful Life of a Sergeant.]
On the same day and at the same hour was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd.
He likewise had been a long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer
had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the
war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the ninety-fourth, and it
was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental
and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined
with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic
gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and
commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience
and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I
will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the latter without
offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom
he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious,
and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was
prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of
courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he
would not suffer himself to be moved but remained watching the battle
and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It
was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the brave the generous
Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by lord
Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and
by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let those who served
on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his
deserts.