THE INVASION OF KOREA
CAUSES
HAVING brought the whole of Japan under his control, Hideyoshi
conceived the project of conquering China. That appears to be the
simplest explanation of his action. His motive, however, has been
variously interpreted. Some historians maintain that his prime
purpose was to find occupation for the vast host of soldiers who had
been called into existence in Japan by four centuries of almost
continuous warfare. Others do not hesitate to allege that this
oversea campaign was designed for the purpose of assisting to
exterminate the Christian converts. Others, again, attempt to prove
that personal ambition was Hideyoshi's sole incentive. It does not
seem necessary to estimate the relative truth of these analyses,
especially as the evidence adduced by their several supporters is
more or less conjectural. As to the idea that Hideyoshi was
influenced by anti-Christian sentiment, it is sufficient to observe
that out of nearly a quarter of a million of Japanese soldiers who
landed in Korea during the course of the campaign, not so much as ten
per cent, were Christians, and with regard to the question of
personal ambition, it may be conceded at once that if Hideyoshi's
character lays him open to such a charge, his well-proven statecraft
exonerates him from any suspicion of having acted without thought for
his country's good.
One fact which does not seem to have been sufficiently considered by
annalists is that during the sixteenth century the taste for foreign
adventure had grown largely in Japan. Many persons had gone abroad in
quest of fortune and had found it. It is on record that emigrants
from the province of Hizen had established themselves in considerable
numbers in China, and that their success induced their feudal lord,
Nabeshima, to seek the Central Government's permission for returning
his province to the latter and taking, in lieu, the district near
Ningpo, where his vassals had settled. Hideyoshi doubtless shared the
general belief that in oversea countries Japanese enterprise could
find many profitable opportunities, and it is easy to believe that
the weakened condition of China towards the close of the Ming dynasty
led him to form a not very flattering estimate of that country's
power of resistance.
The conquest of Korea had not in itself any special temptation. He
regarded the peninsula simply as a basis for an attack upon China,
and he made it quite clear to the Korean sovereign that, if the
latter suffered his territories to be converted into a stepping-stone
for that purpose, friendship with Japan might be confidently
anticipated. Korea, at that time, was under the sway of a single
ruler, whose dynasty enjoyed the protection of the Chinese Court, and
between the two sovereigns embassies were regularly exchanged. It has
already been stated in these pages that towards the middle of the
fifteenth century Japanese settlers in Korea had been assigned three
places of residence, but owing to the exactions suffered at the hands
of the local authorities, these settlers had risen in revolt and had
finally been expelled from Korea until the year 1572, when a
concession was once more set apart for Japanese use at Fusan. No
longer, however, were envoys sent from Korea to Japan, and evidence
of the outrages committed from time to time by Japanese pirates is
furnished by a decree of the Korean Government that a Japanese
subject landing anywhere except at Fusan would be treated as a
corsair.
Such were the existing conditions when, in 1587, Hideyoshi called
upon the Korean monarch to explain the cessation of the old-time
custom of exchanging envoys. To this the King of Korea replied that
he would willingly renew the ancient relations provided that the
Japanese authorities seized and handed over a number of Korean
renegades, who had been acting as guides to Japanese pirates in
descents on the Korean coast. This stipulation having been complied
with, a Korean embassy was duly despatched by Kyoto, and after some
delay its members were received by Hideyoshi in the hall of audience.
What happened on this occasion is described in Korean annals,
translated as follows by Mr. Aston*:
*Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea, by Aston. "Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan," Vol. VI.
The ambassadors were allowed to enter the palace gate borne in their
palanquins. They were preceded the whole way by a band of music. They
ascended into the hall, where they performed their obeisances.
Hideyoshi is a mean and ignoble-looking man; his complexion is dark,
and his features are wanting in distinction. But his eyeballs send
out fire in flashes--enough to pierce one through. He sat upon a
threefold cushion with his face to the south. He wore a gauze hat and
a dark-coloured robe of State. His officers were ranged round him,
each in his proper place. When the ambassadors were introduced and
had taken their seats, the refreshments offered them were of the most
frugal description. A tray was set before each, on which was one dish
containing steamed mochi (rice-cake), and sake of an inferior quality
was handed round a few times in earthenware cups and in a very
unceremonious way. The civility of drinking to one another was not
observed.
After a short interval, Hideyoshi retired behind a curtain, but all
his officers remained in their places. Soon after, a man came out
dressed in ordinary clothes, with a baby in his arms, and strolled
about the hall. This was no other than Hideyoshi himself, and
everyone present bowed down his head to the ground. Looking out
between the pillars of the hall, Hideyoshi espied the Korean
musicians. He commanded them to strike up all together as loud as
they could, and was listening to their music when he was reminded
that babies could despise ceremonies as much as princes, and
laughingly called one of his attendants to take the child and bring
him a change of clothing. He seemed to do exactly as he pleased, and
was as unconcerned as if nobody else were present. The ambassadors,
having made their obeisance, retired, and this audience was the only
occasion on which they were admitted to Hideyoshi's presence.
After long delay Hideyoshi replied to the letter carried by the above
envoys, and his language is important as clearly indicating the part
which he designed for Korea in the pending war. The document is thus
translated by Mr. Aston:
This empire has of late years been brought to ruin by internal
dissensions which allowed no opportunity for laying aside armour.
This state of things roused me to indignation, and in a few years I
restored peace to the country. I am the only remaining scion of a
humble stock, but my mother once had a dream in which she saw the sun
enter her bosom, after which she gave birth to me. There was then a
soothsayer who said: "Wherever the sun shines, there will be no place
which shall not be subject to him. It may not be doubted that one day
his power will overspread the empire." It has therefore been my boast
to lose no favourable opportunity, and taking wings like a dragon, I
have subdued the east, chastised the west, punished the south, and
smitten the north. Speedy and great success has attended my career,
which has been like the rising sun illuminating the whole earth.
When I reflect that the life of man is less than one hundred years,
why should I spend my days in sorrow for one thing only? I will
assemble a mighty host, and, invading the country of the great Ming,
I will fill with the hoar-frost from my sword the whole sky over the
four hundred provinces. Should I carry out this purpose, I hope that
Korea will be my vanguard. Let her not fail to do so, for my
friendship with your honourable country depends solely on your
conduct when I lead my army against China.
The Korean envoys entrusted with the delivery of the above despatch
were accompanied by one of the chief vassals of the Tsushima baron,
and a monk, named Genso, who acted in the capacity of interpreter. By
these two Japanese the Korean Government was clearly informed that
nothing was required of Korea beyond throwing open the roads to
China, and that she would not be asked to give any other assistance
whatever in the war against her northern neighbour. In the context of
this explanation, the Seoul Government was reminded that, three
centuries previously, Korea had permitted her territory to be made a
basis of Mongolian operations against Japan, and therefore the
peninsula might well allow itself to be now used as a basis of
Japanese operations against China. From Korean annals we learn that
the following despatch was ultimately sent by the Korean sovereign to
Hideyoshi*:
*Hulbert's History of Korea.
Two letters have already passed between us, and the matter has been
sufficiently discussed. What talk is this of our joining you against
China? From the earliest times we have followed law and right. From
within and from without all lands are subject to China. If you have
desired to send your envoys to China, how much more should we? When
we have been unfortunate she has helped us. The relations which
subsist between us are those of parent and child. This you know well.
Can we desert both Emperor and parent and join with you? You
doubtless will be angry at this, and it is because you have not been
admitted to the Court of China. Why is it that you are not willing to
admit the suzerainty of the Emperor, instead of harbouring such
hostile intents against him? This truly passes our comprehension.
The bitterness of this language was intensified by a comment made to
the Japanese envoys when handing them the above despatch. His Majesty
said that Japan's programme of conquering China resembled an attempt
to bail out the ocean with a cockle-shell. From Korea's point of view
her attitude was perfectly justifiable. The dynasty by which the
peninsula was then ruled owed its very existence to China's aid, and
during two centuries the peninsula had enjoyed peace and a certain
measure of prosperity under that dynasty. On the other hand, Korea
was not in a position to think of resisting Japan on the
battle-field. The only army which the former could boast of
possessing consisted of men who were too indigent to purchase
exemption from service with the colours, and thus she may be said to
have been practically without any efficient military organization.
Moreover, her troops were not equipped with either artillery or
match-locks. The only advantage which she possessed may be said to
have been exceedingly difficult topographical features, which were
practically unknown to the Japanese. Japan had not at that time even
the elements of the organization which she was ultimately destined to
carry to such a high point of perfection. She had no secret-service
agents or any cartographers to furnish her generals with information
essential to the success of an invasion, and from the moment that her
troops landed in Korea, their environment would be absolutely
strange.
JAPAN'S PREPARATIONS
These considerations did not, however, deter Hideyoshi. Immediately
on receipt of the above despatch from the Korean Court, preparations
were commenced for an oversea expedition on a colossal scale. Nagoya,
in the province of Hizen, was chosen for the home-basis of
operations. It has been observed by several critics that if
Hideyoshi, instead of moving by Korea, had struck at China direct
oversea, he would in all probability have seen his flag waving over
Peking in a few months, and the whole history of the Orient would
have been altered. That may possibly be true. But we have to remember
that the Korean peninsula lies almost within sight of the shores of
Japan, whereas to reach China direct by water involves a voyage of
several hundred miles over seas proverbially tempestuous and
dangerous. Even in modern times, when maritime transport has been so
greatly developed, a general might well hesitate between the choice
of the Korean and the ocean routes to China from Japan, were he
required to make a choice. In the face of the certainty of Korean
hostility, however, Hideyoshi's selection was certainly open to
criticism. Nevertheless, the event showed that he did not err in his
calculations so far as the operations on shore were concerned.
He himself remained in Japan throughout the whole war. He went to
Nagoya towards the close of 1592 and stayed there until the beginning
of 1594, and it was generally understood that he intended ultimately
to assume direct command of the oversea armies. In fact, at a council
held to consider this matter, he proposed to cross the water at the
head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, handing over the
administration of affairs in Japan to Ieyasu. On that occasion, one
of his most trusted followers, Asano Nagamasa, provoked a violent
outburst of temper on Hideyoshi's part by declaring that such a
scheme would be an act of lunacy, since Hideyoshi's presence alone
secured the empire against recurrence of domestic strife. The annals
are not very clear at this point, but everything seems to indicate
that Hideyoshi's purpose of leading the armies in person would have
been carried into practice had it not become certain that the
invasion of China would have to be abandoned. The time and the manner
in which this failure became clear will be seen as we proceed.
CONDITIONS FROM THE INVADER'S POINT OF VIEW
The sea which separates Japan from the Korean peninsula narrows on
the south to a strait divided by the island of Tsushima into two
channels of nearly equal width. Tsushima had, for centuries, been the
Japanese outpost in this part of the empire. To reach the island from
the Japanese side was always an easy and safe task, but in the
fifty-six-mile channel that separates Tsushima from the peninsula of
Korea an invading flotilla had to run the risk of an attack by Korean
warships.* The army assembled at Nagoya totalled over three hundred
thousand men, whereof some seventy thousand constituted the first
fighting line and eighty-seven thousand the second, the remainder
forming a reserve to meet contingencies. The question of maritime
transport presented some difficulty, but was solved by the expedient
of ordering each maritime feudatory to furnish two large ships for
every hundred thousand koku of the fief's assessment, and their crews
were obtained by compelling each fishing village to furnish ten
sailors for every hundred houses it contained. These were not
fighting vessels but mere transports. Fighting men to the number of
ninety-two hundred were, however, distributed among the ships, and
were armed with match-locks, bows, and swords. The problem of
commissariat was very formidable. This part of the enterprise was
entrusted solely to Asano Nagamasa, minister of Justice, one of the
five bugyo,--that is to say, five officials called administrators, in
whose intelligence and competence Hideyoshi placed signal reliance.
In the records of the Asano family it is stated that an immense
quantity of rice was shipped at the outset, but that on landing in
Korea the army found ample supplies of grain in every castle
throughout the peninsula. Nevertheless, the problem of provisions
ultimately became exceedingly difficult, as might well have been
predicted.
*See the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by
Brinkley.
PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
As for the plan of campaign, it was precisely in accord with the
principles of modern strategy. The van, consisting of three army
corps, was to cross rapidly to Fusan on the south coast of the
peninsula, whence a movement northward, towards the capital, Seoul,
was to be immediately commenced, one corps marching by the eastern
coast-road, one by the central route, and one by the western.
"Thereafter the other four corps, which formed the first fighting
line, together with the corps under the direct orders of the
commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, were to cross for the purpose of
effectually subduing the regions through which the van had passed;
and, finally, the two remaining corps of the second line were to be
transported by sea up the west coast of the peninsula, to form a
junction with the van which, by that time, should be preparing to
pass into China over the northern boundary of Korea, namely, the Yalu
River. For the landing-place of these re-enforcements the town of
Pyong-yang was adopted, being easily accessible by the Tadong River
from the coast. In later ages, Japanese armies were destined to move
twice over these same regions, once to the invasion of China [in
1894], once to the attack of Russia [in 1904], and they adopted
almost the same strategical plan as that mapped out by Hideyoshi in
the year 1592. The forecast was that the Koreans would offer their
chief resistance, first, at the capital, Seoul; next at Pyong-yang,
and finally at the Yalu, as the approaches to all these places
constituted positions capable of being utilized to great advantage
for defensive purposes."*
*Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by
Brinkley.
THE MARCH TO SEOUL
On the 24th of May, 1592, the first army corps (18,700 men), under
the command of Konishi Yukinaga, crossed unmolested to the peninsula.
So little did the Koreans anticipate an invasion that the earliest
intelligence they had of the advent of the invaders was furnished by
the commandant of Fusan, who happened that day to be hunting on Deer
Island at the entrance to the harbour, and who sighted the approach
of the hostile flotilla. On the 25th, Konishi's troops carried the
castle of Fusan by storm, after a brave resistance by the garrison,
and, on the 27th, the same fate befell another and stronger fortress
lying three miles inland and garrisoned by twenty thousand picked
soldiers. Four days after the landing of Konishi's army, the second
corps (20,800 strong), under Kato Kiyomasa, reached Fusan, and
immediately took the east-coast road, according to the programme of
campaign.
Thenceforth, however, it was really a race between the two armies as
to which should form the van. At the pass of Cho-ryung a reunion was
effected. This position offered exceptional facilities for defence,
but owing to some unexplained reason no attempt was made by the
Koreans to hold it. A few miles further north stood a castle reckoned
the strongest fortress in the peninsula. Konishi and Kato continued
the combination of their forces as they approached this position,
but, contrary to expectation, the Koreans fought in the open and the
castle fell without difficulty. Thereafter, the two corps separated,
Kato taking the westerly road and Konishi the direct route to Seoul.
In short, although the two generals have been accused of crippling
themselves by jealous competition, the facts indicate that they
co-operated effectively as far as the river Imjin, where a strenuous
effort to check them was expected to be made by the Koreans.
From the landing place at Fusan to the gates of Seoul the distance is
267 miles. Konishi's corps covered that interval in nineteen days,
storming two forts, carrying two positions, and fighting one pitched
battle on the way. Kato's corps, travelling by a circuitous and more
arduous road but not meeting with so much resistance, traversed the
distance between Fusan and the capital in four days less. At Seoul,
with its thirty thousand battlements and three times as many
embrasures, requiring a garrison ninety thousand strong, only seven
thousand were available, and nothing offered except flight, a course
which the Royal Court adopted without hesitation, leaving the city to
be looted and partially destroyed, not by the Japanese invaders but
by the Korean inhabitants themselves.
The King did not halt until he had placed the Imjin River between
himself and the enemy. Moreover, as soon as he there received news of
the sack of the city, he renewed his flight northward and took up his
quarters at Pyong-yang. It was on the 12th of June that the Korean
capital fell, and by the 16th four army corps had assembled there,
while four others had effected a landing at Fusan. After a rest of
fifteen days, the northern advance was resumed from Seoul, with the
expectation that a great struggle would take place on the banks of
the Imjin. The conditions were eminently favourable for defence,
inasmuch as the approach to the river from the south was only by one
narrow gulch, whereas, on the northern side, lay a long, sandy
stretch where troops could easily be deployed. Moreover the Japanese
had no boats wherewith to negotiate a broad and swiftly flowing
river. During ten days the invaders remained helpless on the southern
bank. Then the Koreans allowed themselves to be betrayed by the
common device of a simulated retreat. They crossed in exultant
pursuit, only to find that they had been trapped into an ambush.
Konishi and Kato now again separated, the former continuing the
direct advance northward, and the latter taking the northeastern
route, which he ultimately followed along the whole of the coast as
far as Kyong-sang, whence he turned inland and finally reached
Hai-ryong, a place destined to acquire much importance in modern
times as the point of junction of the Kilin-Korean railways.
The distance from Seoul to Pyong-yang on the Tadong is 130 miles, and
it was traversed by the Japanese in eighteen days, ten of which had
been occupied in forcing the passage of the Imjin. On the southern
bank of the Tadong, the invaders found themselves in a position even
more difficult than that which had confronted them at the Imjin. They
had to pass a wide rapid river with a walled city of great strength
on its northern bank and with all the boats in the possession of the
Korean garrison, which was believed to be very numerous. Some
parleying took place, and the issue of the situation seemed very
doubtful when the Koreans lost patience and crossed the river, hoping
to destroy the Japanese by a night attack. They miscalculated the
time required for this operation, and daylight compelled them to
abandon the enterprise when its only result had been to disclose to
the invaders the whereabouts of the fords. Then ensued a disorderly
retreat on the part of the Koreans, and there being no time for the
latter to fire the town, storehouses full of grain fell into the
hands of the invaders. The Korean Court resumed its flight as far as
Wi-ju, a few miles south of the Yalu River, whence messengers were
sent to China to solicit succour.
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Thus far, everything had marched in perfect accord with the Japanese
programme. A force of nearly two hundred thousand men had been
carried over the sea and had overrun practically the whole of Korea.
"At this point, however, the invasion suffered a check owing to a
cause which in modern times has received much attention, though in
Hideyoshi's days it had been little considered; the Japanese lost the
command of the sea. The Japanese idea of sea fighting in those times
was to use open boats propelled chiefly by oars. They closed as
quickly as possible with the enemy and then fell on with the
trenchant swords which they used so skilfully. Now, during the
fifteenth century and part of the sixteenth, the Chinese had been so
harassed by Japanese piratical raids that their inventive genius,
quickened by suffering, suggested a device for coping with these
formidable adversaries. Once allow the Japanese swordsman to come to
close quarters and he carried all before him. To keep him at a
distance, then, was the great desideratum, and the Chinese compassed
this in maritime warfare by completely covering their boats with
roofs of solid timber, so that those within were protected against
missiles or other weapons, while loop-holes and ports enabled them to
pour bullets and arrows on a foe.
"The Koreans learned this device from the Chinese and were the first
to employ it in actual warfare. Their own history alleges that they
improved upon the Chinese model by nailing sheet iron over the roofs
and sides of the 'turtle-shell' craft and studding the whole surface
with chevaux de frise, but Japanese annals indicate that in the great
majority of cases timber alone was used. It seems strange that the
Japanese should have been without any clear perception of the immense
fighting superiority possessed by such protected war-vessels over
small open boats. But certainly they were either ignorant or
indifferent. The fleet which they provided to hold the command of
Korean waters did not include one vessel of any magnitude; it
consisted simply of some hundreds of row-boats manned by seven
thousand men. Hideyoshi himself was perhaps not without misgivings.
Six years previously, he had endeavoured to obtain two war-galleons
from the Portuguese, and had he succeeded, the history of the Far
East might have been radically different. Evidently, however, he
committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times have
conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully
investigated his adversary's resources.
"Just about the time when the van of the Japanese army was entering
Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin, at the head of a fleet of
eighty vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron which lay at anchor
near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set twenty-six of the vessels on
fire, and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in rapid
succession. The last and most important took place shortly after the
Japanese troops had seized Pyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking of
over seventy Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships
combined, which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying
reinforcements by sea to the van of the invading army. This despatch
of troops and supplies by water had been a leading feature of
Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and the destruction of the flotilla to
which the duty was entrusted may be said to have sealed the fate of
the war by isolating the army in Korea from its home base.
"It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the first division,
desired to continue his northward march from Pyong-yang without
delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared, and that the best
hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to collect her
forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, refused to endorse
this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces were
still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn from
them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed
for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the
consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the
despatch of re-enforcements and munitions by water to Pyong-yang. The
reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander
at Pyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force
suffered constant diminution from casualties, and the question of
commissariat became daily more difficult. . . . Japanese historians
themselves admit the fact that no wise effort was made to conciliate
the Korean people. They were treated so harshly that even the humble
peasant took up arms, and thus the peninsula, instead of serving as a
basis of supplies, had to be garrisoned perpetually by a strong
army."* Korean historians give long and minute accounts of the
development and exploits of guerilla bands, which, though they did
not obtain any signal victory over the invaders, harassed the latter
perpetually, and compelled them to devote a large part of their force
to guarding the lines of communication.
*Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.
CHINESE INTERFERENCE
Having suffered for their loyalty to China, the Koreans naturally
looked to her for succour. Peking should have understood the
situation thoroughly. Even without any direct communication from
Japan, the Peking Court had cognizance of Hideyoshi's intentions. A
letter addressed by him in the year 1591 to the King of Ryukyu stated
clearly his intention of extending Japanese sovereignty throughout
the whole Orient, and the ruler of Ryukyu had lost no time in making
this fact known to Peking.* Yet it does not appear that the Chinese
had any just appreciation of the situation. Their first response to
Korea's appeal was to mobilize a force of five thousand men in the
Liaotung peninsula, which force crossed the Yalu and moved against
Pyong-yang, where the Japanese van had been lying idle for over two
months. This occurred early in October, 1592. The incident
illustrated China's confidence in her own superiority. "The whole of
the Korean forces had been driven northward throughout the entire
length of the peninsula by Japanese armies, yet Peking considered
that five thousand Chinese braves would suffice to roll back this
tide of invasion."
*There is still extant a letter addressed by Hideypshi in June, 1592,
to Hidetsugu, his nephew, and then nominal successor. In this
document it is distinctly stated that the attention of the Emperor of
Japan should be directed to the Chinese capital, inasmuch as the
Japanese Court would pay a visit to Peking in 1594, on which occasion
the ten provinces surrounding the Chinese capital would be presented
to his Majesty, and out of this territory the Court nobles would
receive estates.
The result was a foregone conclusion. Three thousand of the Chinese
were killed, and the rest fled pele-mele across the Yalu. China now
began to be seriously alarmed. She despatched to Pyong-yang an envoy
named Chen Weiching--known in Japanese history as Chin Ikei--who was
instructed not to conclude peace but only to make such overtures as
might induce the Japanese to agree to an armistice, thus enabling the
Chinese authorities to mobilize a sufficient force. Konishi Yukinaga
fell into this trap. He agreed to an armistice of fifty days, during
which the Japanese pledged themselves not to advance more than three
miles northward of Pyong-yang while Chen proceeded to Peking to
arrange terms of peace. It is very evident that had the Japanese seen
any certain prospect of proceeding to the invasion of China, they
would not have agreed to such an arrangement as this--an arrangement
which guaranteed nothing except leisure for the mobilization of a
strong Chinese army. It had, indeed, become plain to the Japanese
commanders, after six months of operations in the peninsula, that the
wisest course for them was to arrange a satisfactory peace.
The second force put in the field by China is estimated by the
Jesuits and the Japanese at 200,000 men and at 51,000 by Korean
history. Probably the truth lies midway between the two extremes.
This powerful army moved across Manchuria in the dead of winter and
hurled itself against Pyong-yang during the first week of February,
1593. The Japanese garrison at that place cannot have greatly
exceeded twenty thousand men, for nearly one-half of its original
number had been detached to hold a line of forts guarding the
communications with Seoul. Neither Chinese nor Japanese history
comments on the instructive fact that the arrival of this army under
the walls of Pyong-yang was China's answer to her envoy's promise of
a satisfactory peace, nor does it appear that any discredit attached
to Chen Weiching for the deception he had practised; his competence
as a negotiator was subsequently admitted without cavil. The Chinese,
though their swords were much inferior to the Japanese weapon,
possessed great superiority in field artillery and cavalry, as well
as in the fact that their troopers wore iron mail which defied the
keenest blade. Thus, after a severe fight which cost the Japanese
twenty-three hundred men, they had to evacuate Pyong-yang and retreat
towards Seoul, the army under Kato Kiyomasa retiring at the same time
from the northeast and fighting its way back to the central route.
Orders were then issued by the commander-in-chief, Ukita, for the
whole of the Japanese forces in the north of the peninsula to
concentrate in Seoul, but Kohayakawa, one of Hideyoshi's most trusted
generals, whose name has occurred more than once in these annals,
conducted a splendid covering movement at a place a few miles
northward of Seoul, the result of which was that the Chinese fled in
haste over the Injin, losing ten thousand men in their retreat.
But, though the Japanese had thus shaken off the pursuit, it was
impossible for them to continue in occupation of Seoul. The
conditions existing there were shocking. Widespread famine menaced,
with its usual concomitant, pestilence. According to Korean history,
the streets of the city and the roads in the suburbs were piled with
corpses to a height of ten feet above the wall. The Japanese,
therefore, made proposals of peace, and the Chinese agreed, on
condition that the Japanese gave up two Korean princes held captive
by them, and retired to the south coast of the peninsula. These terms
were accepted, and on May 9, 1593, that is to say, 360 days after the
landing of the invaders' van at Fusan, the evacuation of the Korean
capital took place. The Chinese commanders showed great lack of
enterprise. They failed to utilize the situation, and in October of
the same year they withdrew from the peninsula all their troops
except ten thousand men. Negotiations for permanent peace now
commenced between the Governments of Japan and China, but while the
pourparlers were in progress the most sanguinary incident of the
whole war took place. During the early part of the campaign a
Japanese attack had been beaten back from Chinju, which was reckoned
the strongest fortress in Korea. Hideyoshi now ordered that the
Japanese troops, before sailing for home, should rehabilitate their
reputation by capturing this place, where the Koreans had mustered a
strong army. The order was obeyed. Continuous assaults were delivered
against the fortress during the space of nine days, and when it
passed into Japanese possession the Koreans are said to have lost
between sixty and seventy thousand men and the casualties on the
Japanese side must have been almost as numerous.
THE NEGOTIATIONS
After the fall of Chinju, all the Japanese troops, with the exception
of Konishi's corps, were withdrawn from Korea, and the Japanese
confined their operations to holding a cordon of twelve fortified
camps along the southern coast of the peninsula. These camps were
nothing more than bluffs overlooking the sea on the south, and
protected on the land side by moats and earthworks. The action at
Chinju had created some suspicion as to the integrity of Japan's
designs, but mainly through the persistence and tact of the Chinese
envoy, Chen Weiching, terms were agreed upon, and on October 21,
1596, a Chinese mission reached Japan and proceeded to Osaka. The
island had just then been visited by a series of uniquely disastrous
earthquakes, which had either overthrown or rendered uninhabitable
all the great edifices in and around Kyoto. One corner of Osaka
Castle alone remained intact, and there the mission was received.
Hideyoshi refused to give audience to the Korean members of the
mission, and welcomed the Chinese members only, from whom he expected
to receive a document placing him on a royal pinnacle at least as
high as that occupied by the Emperor of China. The document actually
transmitted to him was of a very different significance as the
following extract shows:
The Emperor, who respects and obeys heaven and is favoured by
Providence, commands that he be honoured and loved wherever the
heavens overhang and the earth upbears. The Imperial command is
universal; even as far as the bounds of ocean where the sun rises,
there are none who do not obey it. In ancient times our Imperial
ancestors bestowed their favours on many lands: the Tortoise Knots
and the Dragon Writing were sent to the limits of far Japan; the pure
alabaster and the great-seal character were granted to the monarchs
of the submissive country. Thereafter came billowy times when
communications were interrupted, but an auspicious opportunity has
now arrived when it has pleased us again to address you. You,
Toyotomi Taira Hideyoshi, having established an Island kingdom and
knowing the reverence due to the Central Land, sent to the west an
envoy, and with gladness and affection offered your allegiance. On
the north you knocked at the barrier of ten thousand li, and
earnestly requested to be admitted within our dominions. Your mind is
already confirmed in reverent submissiveness. How can we grudge our
favour to so great meekness? We do, therefore, specially invest you
with the dignity of "King of Japan," and to that intent issue this
our commission. Treasure it carefully. As a mark of our special
favour towards you, we send you over the sea a robe and crown
contained in a costly case, so that you may follow our ancient custom
as respects dress. Faithfully defend the frontier of our empire; let
it be your study to act worthily of your position as our minister;
practice moderation and self-restraint; cherish gratitude for the
Imperial favour so bountifully bestowed upon you; change not your
fidelity; be humbly guided by our admonitions; continue always to
follow our instructions.*
*Quoted by W. Dening in A New Life of Hideyoshi.
Hideyoshi had already donned the robe and crown mentioned in the
above despatch, his belief being that they represented his
investiture as sovereign of Ming. On learning the truth, he tore off
the insignia and flung them on the ground in a fit of ungovernable
wrath at the arrogance of the Chinese Emperor's tone. It had never
been distinctly explained how this extraordinary misunderstanding
arose, but the most credible solution of the problem is that Naito,
baron of Tamba, who had proceeded to Peking for the purpose of
negotiating peace, was so overawed by the majesty and magnificence of
the Chinese Court that, instead of demanding Hideyoshi's investiture
as monarch of China, he stated that nothing was needed except China's
formal acknowledgement of the kwampaku's real rank. Hideyoshi, in his
natural anger, ordered the Chinese ambassadors to be dismissed
without any written answer and without any of the gifts usual on such
occasions according to the diplomatic custom of the Orient.
He was, however, induced not to prosecute his quarrel with the Middle
Kingdom, and he turned his anger entirely against Korea. Accordingly,
on March 19, 1597, nine fresh corps were mobilized for oversea
service, and these being thrown into Korea, brought the Japanese
forces in that country to a total of 141,000 men. But the campaign
was not at first resumed with activity proportionate to this great
army. The Japanese commanders seem to have waited for some practical
assurances that the command of the sea would not be again wrested
from them; a natural precaution seeing that, after five years' war,
Korea herself was no longer in a position to make any contributions
to the commissariat of the invaders. It is a very interesting fact
that, on this occasion, the Japanese victories at sea were as signal
as their defeats had been in 1592. The Korean navy comprised the same
vessels which were supposed to have proved so formidable five years
previously, but the Japanese naval architects had risen to the level
of the occasion, and the Korean fleet was well-nigh annihilated.
Meanwhile, the Chinese had sent a powerful army to southern Korea,
and against these fresh forces the Japanese attacks were directed.
Everywhere the invaders were victorious, and very soon the three
southern provinces of the peninsula had been captured. No actual
reverse was met with throughout, but an indecisive victory near
Chiksan, in the north of the metropolitan province, rendered it
impossible for the Japanese to establish themselves in Seoul before
the advent of winter, and they therefore judged it advisable to
retire to their seaboard chain of entrenched camps. Early in 1598, a
fresh army of forty thousand men reached Seoul from China, and for a
moment the situation seemed to threaten disaster for the Japanese.
Their strategy and desperate valour proved invincible, however, and
the Kagoshima samurai won, on October 30, 1598, a victory so signal
that the ears and noses of thirty-seven thousand Chinese heads were
sent to Japan and buried under a tumulus near the temple of Daibutsu
in Kyoto, where this terrible record, called Mimizuka (Mound of
Ears), may be seen to-day.
Just about this time, intelligence of the death of Hideyoshi reached
the Japanese commanders in Korea, and immediately an armistice was
arranged. The withdrawal of the invading forces followed, not without
some serious difficulties, and thus the six years' campaign
terminated without any direct results except an immense loss of life
and treasure and the reduction of the Korean peninsula to a state of
desolation. It has been repeatedly pleaded for the wholly
unprogressive state into which Korea thenceforth fell. But to
conclude that a nation could be reduced by a six-years' war to three
centuries of hopelessness and helplessness is to credit that nation
with a very small measure of resilient capacity.
INDIRECT RESULTS
The war was not altogether without indirect results of some value to
Japan. Among these may be cited the fact that, a few decades later,
when the Tsing dynasty destroyed the Ming in China, subjugated Korea,
and assumed a position analogous to that previously held by the Yuan,
no attempt was made to defy Japan. The memory of her soldiers'
achievements on the Korean battle-fields sufficed to protect her
against foreign aggression. Another material result was that, in
compliance with Hideyoshi's orders, the returning Japanese generals
brought back many Korean art-artisans who contributed largely to the
development of the ceramic industry. On no less than seven different
kinds of now well-known porcelain and pottery in Japan did these
experts exercise marked influence, and their efforts were specially
timely in view of the great vogue then enjoyed by all utensils used
in connexion with the tea ceremonial. It is not to be supposed,
however, that these Korean artisans showed any superiority to the
Japanese as artists. The improvements they introduced were almost
entirely of a technical character. Another benefit derived by Japan
from her contact with Korea at this time was the introduction of
movable type. Up to this time the art of printing had been in a very
primitive condition in Japan, and the first book printed with movable
type made its appearance in the Bunroku era (1592-1595).
ENGRAVING: SIGNATURE OF TAKEDA SHINGEN
ENGRAVING: NAGOYA CASTLE