according to Japanese reckoning. News of the event reached the camp
of the besiegers of Takamatsu almost immediately, but a messenger
sent by Mitsuhide to convey the intelligence to Mori and to solicit
his alliance was intercepted by Hideyoshi's men. A great deal of
historical confusion envelops immediately subsequent events, but the
facts seem simple enough. Hideyoshi found himself in a position of
great difficulty. His presence in Kyoto was almost a necessity, yet
he could not withdraw from Takamatsu without sacrificing all the
fruits of the campaign in the west and exposing himself to a probably
disastrous attack by Mori's army. In this emergency he acted with his
usual talent. Summoning a famous priest, Ekei, of a temple in Aki,
who enjoyed the confidence of all parties, he despatched him to
Mori's camp with proposals for peace and for the delimitation of the
frontiers of Mori and Nobunaga, on condition that the castle of
Takamatsu should be surrendered and the head of its commander,
Shimizu Muneharu, presented to his conquerer.
Mori was acting entirely by the advice of his two uncles, Kikkawa and
Kohayakawa, both men of profound insight. They fully admitted the
desirability of peace, since Hideyoshi's army effectually commanded
the communications between the eastern and western parts of Chugoku,
but they resolutely rejected the notion of sacrificing the life of
Shimizu on the altar of any compact. When the priest carried this
answer to Hideyoshi, the latter suggested, as the only recourse, that
Shimizu himself should be consulted. Ekei accordingly repaired to the
castle and explained the situation to its commandant. Shimizu had not
a moment's hesitation. He declared himself more than willing to die
for the sake of his liege-lord and his comrades, and he asked only
that fish and wine, to give the garrison the rare treat of a good
meal, should be furnished. On the 5th of the sixth month this
agreement was carried into effect. Shimizu committed suicide, the
compact between Mori and Hideyoshi was signed, and the latter,
striking his camp, prepared to set out for Kyoto. It was then for the
first time that Mori and his generals learned of the death of
Nobunaga. Immediately there was an outcry in favour of disregarding
the compact and falling upon the enemy in his retreat; but Kikkawa
and Kohayakawa stubbornly opposed anything of the kind. They declared
that such a course would disgrace the house of Mori, whereas, by
keeping faith, the friendship of Hideyoshi and his fellow barons
would be secured. Accordingly the withdrawal was allowed to take
place unmolested.
IEYASU
The life of the Tokugawa chieftain was placed in great jeopardy by
the Mitsuhide incident. After being brilliantly received by Nobunaga
at Azuchi, Ieyasu, at his host's suggestion, had made a sightseeing
excursion to Kyoto, whence he prolonged his journey to Osaka and
finally to Sakai. The news of the catastrophe reached him at the
last-named place, and his immediate impulse was to be avenged upon
the assassin. But it was pointed out to him that his following was
much too small for such an enterprise, and he therefore decided to
set out for the east immediately. Mitsuhide, well aware of the
Tokugawa baron's unfriendliness, made strenuous efforts to waylay
Ieyasu on the way, and with great difficulty the journey eastward was
accomplished by avoiding all the highroads.
NOBUNAGA
Nobunaga perished at the age of forty-nine. The great faults of his
character seem to have been want of discrimination in the treatment
of his allies and his retainers, and want of patience in the conduct
of affairs. In his eyes, a baron of high rank deserved no more
consideration than a humble retainer, and he often gave offence which
disturbed the achievement of his plans. As for his impetuousness, his
character has been well depicted side by side with that of Hideyoshi
and Ieyasu in three couplets familiar to all Japanese. These couplets
represent Nobunaga as saying:
Nakaneba korosu
Hototogisu.
(I'll kill the cuckoo
If if it won't sing)
By Hideyoshi the same idea is conveyed thus:--
Nakashite miyo
Hototogisu.
(I'll try to make the cuckoo sing.)
Whereas, Ieyasu puts the matter thus:--
Nakumade mato
Hototogisu.
(I'll wait till the cuckoo does sing.)
Nevertheless, whatever Nobunaga may have lost by these defects, the
fact remains that in the three decades of his military career he
brought under his sway thirty-three provinces, or one-half of the
whole country, and at the time of his death he contemplated the
further conquest of Shikoku, Chugoku, and Kyushu. To that end he had
appointed Hideyoshi to be Chikuzen no Kami; Kawajiri Shigeyoshi to be
Hizen no Kami, while his own son, Nobutaka, with Niwa Nagahide for
chief of staff, had been sent to subdue Shikoku. Even admitting that
his ambition was self-aggrandizement in the first place, it is
undeniable that he made the peace of the realm, the welfare of the
people, and the stability of the throne his second purposes, and that
he pursued them with ardour. Thus, one of his earliest acts when he
obtained the control in Kyoto was to appoint officials for
impartially administering justice, to reduce the citizens' taxes; to
succour widows and orphans, and to extend to all the blessings of
security and tranquillity. In 1572, we find him sending messengers to
the provinces with instructions to put in hand the making of roads
having a width of from twenty-one to twelve feet; to set up
milestones and plant trees along these roads; to build bridges; to
remove barriers, and generally to facilitate communications.
Towards the Throne he adopted a demeanour emphatically loyal. In this
respect, he followed the example of his father, Nobuhide, and
departed radically from that of his predecessors, whether Fujiwara,
Taira, or Ashikaga. As concrete examples may be cited the facts that
he restored the shrines of Ise, and reinstituted the custom of
renovating them every twenty years; that, in the year following his
entry into the capital, he undertook extensive repairs of the palace;
that he granted considerable estates for the support of the Imperial
household, and that he organized a commission to repurchase all the
properties which had been alienated from the Court. Finally, it is on
record that when, in recognition of all this, the sovereign proposed
to confer on him the rank of minister of the Left, he declined the
honour, and suggested that titles of lower grade should be given to
those of his subordinates who had shown conspicuous merit.
DEATH OF MITSUHIDE
It was plainly in Hideyoshi's interests that he should figure
publicly as the avenger of Nobunaga's murder, and to this end his
speedy arrival in Kyoto was essential. He therefore set out at once,
after the fall of Takamatsu, with only a small number of immediate
followers. Mitsuhide attempted to destroy him on the way, and the
details of this attempt have been magnified by tradition to
incredible dimensions. All that can be said with certainty is that
Hideyoshi was, for a moment, in extreme danger but that he escaped
scathless. Immediately on arriving in Kyoto, he issued an appeal to
all Nobunaga's vassal-barons, inviting them to join in exterminating
Mitsuhide, whose heinous crime "provoked both heaven and earth."
But it was no part of Hideyoshi's policy to await the arrival of
these barons. He had already at his command an army of some thirty
thousand men, and with this he moved out, challenging Mitsuhide to
fight on the plains of Yamazaki. Mitsuhide did not hesitate to put
his fortunes to the supreme test. He accepted Hideyoshi's challenge,
and, on the 12th of June, a great battle was fought, the issue of
which was decided by two things; first, the defection of Tsutsui
Junkei, who refrained from striking until the superior strength of
Hideyoshi had been manifested, and secondly, the able strategy of
Hideyoshi, who anticipated Mitsuhide's attempt to occupy the position
of Tenno-zan, which commanded the field. From the carnage that ensued
Mitsuhide himself escaped, but while passing through a wood he
received from a bamboo spear in the hands of a peasant a thrust which
disabled him, and he presently committed suicide. Thus, on the
thirteenth day after Nobunaga's death, the head of his assassin was
exposed in Kyoto in front of the temple of Honno-ji where the murder
had taken place, and Mitsuhide's name went down in history as the
"Three days' shogun" (Mikkakubo).
CONFERENCE AT KIYOSU
By this time the principal of Nobunaga's vassal-barons were on their
way at the head of contingents to attack Mitsuhide. On learning of
the assassin's death, these barons all directed their march to
Kiyosu, and in the castle from which Nobunaga had moved to his early
conquests thirty years previously, a momentous council was held for
the purpose of determining his successor. The choice would have
fallen naturally on Samboshi, eldest son of Nobunaga's first-born,
Nobutada, who, as already described, met his death in the Mitsuhide
affair. But Hideyoshi was well understood to favour Samboshi's
succession, and this sufficed to array in opposition several of the
barons habitually hostile to Hideyoshi. Thus, in spite of the fact
that both were illegitimate and had already been adopted into other
families, Nobunaga's two sons, Nobukatsu and Nobutaka, were put
forward as proper candidates, the former supported by Ikeda Nobuteru
and Gamo Katahide; the latter, by Shibata Katsuiye and Takigawa
Kazumasu.
At one moment it seemed as though this question would be solved by an
appeal to violence, but ultimately, at the suggestion of Tsutsui
Junkei, it was agreed that Samboshi should be nominated Nobunaga's
successor; that Nobukatsu and Nobutaka should be appointed his
guardians, and that the administrative duties should be entrusted to
a council consisting of Shibata Katsuiye, Niwa Nagahide, Ikeda
Nobuteru, and Hideyoshi, each taking it in turn to discharge these
functions and each residing for that purpose in Kyoto three months
during the year. An income of one hundred thousand koku in the
province of Omi was assigned to Samboshi pending the attainment of
his majority, when he should be placed in possession of much larger
estates, which were to be entrusted in the meanwhile to the keeping
of one of the four barons mentioned above. Nobukatsu received the
province of Owari, and Nobutaka that of Mino, the remainder of
Nobunaga's dominions being apportioned to his generals, with the
exception of Hideyoshi, to whom were assigned the provinces recently
overrun by him in the midlands--Tajima, Harima, Inaba, and Tamba.
Such an arrangement had no elements of stability. The four
councillors could not possibly be expected to work in harmony, and it
was certain that Katsuiye, Sakuma Morimasa, and Takigawa Kazumasu
would lose no opportunity of quarrelling with Hideyoshi. Indeed, that
result was averted solely by Hideyoshi's tact and long suffering, for
when, a few days later, the barons again met at Kiyosu for the
purpose of discussing territorial questions, every possible effort
was made to find a pretext for killing him. But Hideyoshi's
astuteness and patience led him successfully through this maze of
intrigues and complications. He even went so far as to hand over his
castle of Nagahama to Katsuiye, and to endure insults which in
ordinary circumstances must have been resented with the sword.
Tradition describes a grand memorial ceremony organized in Kyoto by
Hideyoshi in honour of Nobunaga, and, on that occasion, incidents are
said to have occurred which bear the impress of romance. It is, at
all events, certain that the immediate issue of this dangerous time
was a large increase of Hideyoshi's authority, and his nomination by
the Court to the second grade of the fourth rank as well as to the
position of major-general. Moreover, the three barons who had been
appointed with Hideyoshi to administer affairs in Kyoto in turn, saw
that Hideyoshi's power was too great to permit the peaceful working
of such a programme. They therefore abandoned their functions, and
Hideyoshi remained in sole charge of the Imperial Court and of the
administration in the capital.
DEATH OF SHIBATA KATSUIYE
It has been already stated that Nobunaga's sons, Nobutaka and
Nobukatsu, were bitter enemies and that Nobutaka had the support of
Takigawa Kazumasu as well as of Shibata Katsuiye. Thus, Hideyoshi was
virtually compelled to espouse the cause of Nobukatsu. In January,
1583, he took the field at the head of seventy-five thousand men, and
marched into Ise to attack Kazumasu, whom he besieged in his castle
at Kuwana. The castle fell, but Kazumasu managed to effect his
escape, and in the mean while Katsuiye entered Omi in command of a
great body of troops, said to number sixty-five thousand. At the last
moment, however, he had failed to secure the co-operation of Maeda
Toshiiye, an important ally, and his campaign therefore assumed a
defensive character. Hideyoshi himself, on reconnoitring the
position, concluded that he had neither numerical preponderance nor
strategical superiority sufficient to warrant immediate assumption of
the offensive along the whole front. He therefore distributed his
army on a line of thirteen redoubts, keeping a reserve of fifteen
thousand men under his own direct command, his object being to hold
the enemy's forces in check while he attacked Gifu, which place he
assaulted with such vigour that the garrison made urgent appeals to
Katsuiye for succour.
In this situation it was imperative that some attempt should be made
to break the line of redoubts, but it was equally imperative that
this attempt should not furnish to the enemy a point of
concentration. Accordingly, having ascertained that the weakest point
in the line was at Shizugatake, where only fifteen hundred men were
posted, Katsuiye instructed his principal general, Sakuma Morimasa,
to lead the reserve force of fifteen thousand men against that
position, but instructed him at the same time to be content with any
success, however partial, and not to be betrayed into pushing an
advantage, since by so doing he would certainly furnish a fatal
opportunity to the enemy. Morimasa neglected this caution. Having
successfully surprised the detachment at Shizugatake, and having
inflicted heavy carnage on the defenders of the redoubt, who lost
virtually all their officers, he not only sat down to besiege the
redoubt, whose decimated garrison held out bravely, but he also
allowed his movements to be hampered by a small body of only two
score men under Niwa Nagahide, who took up a position in the
immediate neighbourhood, and displaying their leader's flag, deceived
Morimasa into imagining that they had a powerful backing. These
things happened during the night of April 19, 1583. Katsuiye, on
receipt of the intelligence, sent repeated orders to Morimasa
requiring him to withdraw forthwith; but Morimasa, elated by his
partial victory, neglected these orders.
On the following day, the facts were communicated to Hideyoshi, at
Ogaki, distant about thirty miles from Shizugatake, who immediately
appreciated the opportunity thus furnished. He set out at the head of
his reserves, and in less than twenty-four hours his men crossed
swords with Morimasa's force. The result was the practical
extermination of the latter, including three thousand men under
Katsuiye's adopted son, Gonroku. The latter had been sent to insist
strenuously on Morimasa's retreat, but learning that Morimasa had
determined to die fighting, Gonroku announced a similar intention on
his own part. This incident was characteristic of samurai canons.
Hideyoshi's victory cost the enemy five thousand men, and demoralized
Katsuiye's army so completely that he subsequently found himself able
to muster a total force of three thousand only. Nothing remained but
flight, and in order to withdraw from the field, Katsuiye was obliged
to allow his chief retainer, Menju Shosuke, to impersonate him, a
feat which, of course, cost Shosuke's life.
Katsuiye's end is one of the most dramatic incidents in Japanese
history. He decided to retire to his castle of Kitano-sho, and, on
the way thither, he visited his old friend, Maeda Toshiiye, at the
latter's castle of Fuchu, in Echizen. Thanking Toshiiye for all the
assistance he had rendered, and urging him to cultivate friendship
with Hideyoshi, he obtained a remount from Toshiiye's stable, and,
followed by about a hundred samurai, pushed on to Kitano-sho. Arrived
there, he sent away all who might be suspected of sympathizing with
Hideyoshi, and would also have sent away his wife and her three
daughters. This lady was a sister of Nobunaga. She had been given, as
already stated, to Asai Nagamasa, and to him she bore three children.
But after Nagamasa's destruction she was married to Katsuiye, and was
living at the latter's castle of Kitano-sho when the above incidents
occurred. She declined to entertain the idea of leaving the castle,
declaring that, as a samurai's daughter, she should have shared her
first husband's fate, and that nothing would induce her to repeat
that error. Her three daughters were accordingly sent away, and she
herself joined in the night-long feast which Katsuiye and his
principal retainers held while Hideyoshi's forces were marching to
the attack. When the sun rose, the whole party, including the ladies,
committed suicide, having first set fire to the castle.
YODOGOMI
One of the three daughters of Asai Nagamasa afterwards became the
concubine of Hideyoshi and bore to him a son, Hideyori, who, by her
advice, subsequently acted in defiance of Ieyasu, thus involving the
fall of the house of Hideyoshi and unconsciously avenging the fate of
Nobunaga.
NOBUTAKA
Nobunaga's son, Nobutaka, who had been allied with Katsuiye, escaped,
at first, to Owari on the latter's downfall, but ultimately followed
Katsuiye's example by committing suicide. As for Samboshi, Nobunaga's
grandson and nominal heir, he attained his majority at this time, but
proving to be a man of marked incompetence, the eminent position for
which he had been destined was withheld. He took the name of Oda
Hidenobu, and with an income of three hundred thousand koku settled
down contentedly as Hideyoshi's vassal.
OSAKA CASTLE
Hideyoshi left behind him a striking monument of his greatness of
thought and power of execution. At Osaka where in 1532 the priests of
the Hongwan-ji temple had built a castle which Nobunaga captured in
1580 only after a long and severe siege, Hideyoshi built what is
called The Castle of Osaka. It is a colossal fortress, which is still
used as military headquarters for garrison and arsenal, and the
dimensions of which are still a wonder, though only a portion of the
building survives. Materials for the work were requisitioned from
thirty provinces, their principal components being immense granite
rocks, many of which measured fourteen feet in length and breadth,
and some were forty feet long and ten feet wide. These huge stones
had to be carried by water from a distance of several miles. The
outlying protection of this great castle consisted of triple moats
and escarpments. The moats were twenty feet deep, with six to ten
feet of water. The total enclosed space was about one hundred acres,
but only one-eighth of this was the hominaru, or keep, inside the
third moat.
It will be seen that the plan of the castle was to have it divided
into spaces separately defensible, so that an enemy had to establish
his footing by a series of repeated efforts.
And the second respect in which it was a novelty in Japanese
defensive warfare was that the castle donjon was heavily built and
armoured after a fashion. The three-storey donjon was framed in huge
timbers, quite unlike the flimsy structure of most Japanese
buildings, and the timbers were protected against fire by a heavy
coat of plaster. Roof and gates were covered with a sort of
armor-plate, for there was a copper covering to the roof and the
gates were faced with iron sheets and studs. In earlier "castles"
there had been a thin covering of plaster which a musket ball could
easily penetrate; and stone had been used only in building
foundations.
THE KOMAKI WAR
After the suicide of his brother, Nobutaka, and when he saw that his
nephew, Samboshi (Hidenobu), was relegated to the place of a vassal
of Hideyoshi, Nobukatsu seems to have concluded that the time had
come to strike a final blow in assertion of the administrative
supremacy of the Oda family. He began, therefore, to plot with that
object. Hideyoshi, who was well served by spies, soon learned of
these plots, and thinking to persuade Nobukatsu of their
hopelessness, he established close relations with the latter's three
most trusted retainers. No sooner did this come to the cognizance of
Nobukatsu than he caused these three retainers to be assassinated,
and applied to Ieyasu for assistance, Ieyasu consented. This action
on the part of the Tokugawa baron has been much commented on and
variously interpreted by historians, but it has always to be
remembered that Ieyasu had been Oda Nobunaga's ally; that the two had
fought more than once side by side, and that had the Tokugawa leader
rejected Nobukatsu's appeal, he would not only have suffered in
public estimation, but would also have virtually accepted a position
inferior to that evidently claimed by Hideyoshi.
The course of subsequent events seems to prove that Ieyasu, in taking
the field on this occasion, aimed simply at asserting his own
potentiality and had no thought of plunging the empire into a new
civil war. In March, 1584, he set out from Hamamatsu and joined
Nobukatsu at Kiyosu, in Owari. The scheme of campaign was extensive.
Ieyasu placed himself in communication with Sasa Narimasa, in
Echizen; with Chosokabe Motochika, in Shikoku, and with the military
monks in the province of Kii. The programme was that Narimasa should
raise his standard in Echizen and Kaga, and that Motochika, with the
monks of Kii, should move to the attack of Osaka, so that Hideyoshi
would be compelled to carry on three wars at the same time. Hideyoshi
met this combination with his usual astuteness. He commissioned
Uesugi Kagekatsu to attack the Sasa troops in rear while Maeda
Toshiiye menaced them from the front; he told off Hachisuka to oppose
the soldier-monks of Kii; he posted Sengoku Hidehisa in Awaji to hold
in check the forces of Chosokabe Motochika, and he stationed Ukita
Hideiye at Okayama to provide against the contingency of hostility on
the part of the Mori family. Fighting commenced in the province of
Ise, and success at the outset crowned the arms of Hideyoshi's
generals. They captured two castles, and Ieyasu thereupon pushed his
van to an isolated hill called Komaki-yama, nearly equidistant from
the castles of Inu-yama and Kiyosu, in Owari, which he entrenched
strongly, and there awaited the onset of the Osaka army. The war thus
came to be known as that of Komaki.
Hideyoshi himself would have set out for the field on the 19th of
March, but he was obliged to postpone his departure for some days,
until Kuroda and Hachisuka had broken the offensive strength of the
monks of Kii. It thus fell out that he did not reach the province of
Owari until the 27th of March. His army is said to have numbered one
hundred and twenty thousand men. It is commonly alleged that this was
the only war between Ieyasu and Hideyoshi, and that the latter
suffered defeat at the hands of the former. But the fact is that two
of Hideyoshi's generals, Ikeda Nobuteru and Mori Nagayoshi, acted in
direct contravention of his orders, and thus precipitated a
catastrophe for which Hideyoshi cannot justly be held responsible.
These two captains argued that as Ieyasu had massed a large force at
Komaki and at the Obata entrenchments in the same district, he had
probably left his base in Mikawa comparatively undefended. They
proposed, therefore, to lead a force against Mikawa. Hideyoshi showed
great reluctance to sanction this movement, but he allowed himself to
be at last persuaded, with the explicit reservation that no success
obtained in Mikawa province should be followed up, and that whatever
the achievement of Nobukatsu's troops, they should at once rejoin the
main army in Owari.
Unquestionably Hideyoshi had in vivid recollection the disaster which
had overtaken Katsuiye at Shizugatake. Ieyasu, fully cognizant of the
situation through the medium of a spy, knew the limitations set by
Hideyoshi. On April the 7th, Nobuteru attacked the fortress of
Iwasaki, in Mikawa, killed its commandant, and captured the castle.
But elated by this victory, he neglected Hideyoshi's caution, and the
generals of Ieyasu, closing in on him, inflicted a crushing defeat at
a place called Nagakude. It is thus evident that Hideyoshi's share in
the disaster was of a most indirect character. He immediately
hastened to Nagakude, but only to find that Ieyasu had retired to
Obata, and subsequently, when Hideyoshi returned to his headquarters,
Ieyasu placed a still longer interval between the two armies by
marching back to Komaki.
The war thenceforth may be said to have consisted of a series of
menaces and evasions. Each general sought to entice his opponent out
of an entrenched position, and each general showed an equal
determination not to be so enticed. At last, Hideyoshi pushed a force
into Mino and captured several castles in that province. But even
this failed to change Ieyasu's attitude. The Tokugawa leader entered
the fortress of Kiyosu, and Nobukatsu repaired to that of Nagashima,
in Ise. After eight months of this comparatively fruitless
manoeuvring, a treaty was concluded, on December the 11th, between
Hideyoshi and Nobukatsu, and subsequently between Hideyoshi and
Ieyasu, the latter giving his son Ogimaru to be adopted by Hideyoshi.
The boy was eleven years of age at the time. His name was changed to
Hashiba Hideyasu, and he received the appointment of governor of
Mikawa province.
The circumstances in which this treaty was concluded have provoked
much historical discussion. Did the overtures come originally from
Hideyoshi, or did they emanate from Ieyasu and Nobukatsu? Some
annalists have endeavoured to prove that Hideyoshi assumed the
attitude of a suppliant, while others have attributed that demeanour
to the Tokugawa chieftain. The situation, however, presents one
feature which is very significant. It was not until the month of
November, 1584, that Chosokabe Motochika effectually brought the
island of Shikoku under his sway, and thus became free to lead a
strong army, including the monks of Kii province, against Osaka. This
formidable danger could not but influence Hideyoshi in the direction
of clasping hands with his eastern foes, and it is therefore more
than probable that a statesman who had never previously allowed
considerations of personal dignity to interfere with the prosecution
of a vital policy, did not hesitate to bow his head to Nobukatsu, in
order to recover the free use of the great army assembled in Owari,
Mino, and Ise. Most fortunate was it for Japan that events took this
turn, for, had Ieyasu and Hideyoshi remained mutually hostile, the
country would probably have been plunged into a repetition of the
terrible struggle from which nothing enabled it to emerge except the
combined labours of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu. It was not,
however, until the early summer of 1586 that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu
established genuinely friendly relations. During a year and a half
subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty which ended the Komaki
War, Ieyasu held severely aloof and refrained from visiting Kyoto.
Finally, Hideyoshi despatched Asano Nagamasa to propose that Ieyasu
should take into his household Hideyoshi's younger sister, and that
Hideyoshi should send his mother as a hostage to Okazaki, to remain
there during a visit by Ieyasu to Kyoto. Four months were needed by
Ieyasu to consider this proposal, and in September, 1586, he repaired
to Osaka and thence accompanied Hideyoshi to Kyoto.
HIDEYOSHI BECOMES REGENT
In May, 1583, after the downfall of Katsuiye, the Emperor appointed
Hideyoshi to be a councillor of State, and conferred on him the
fourth order of rank. In November of the following year, he received
another step of rank and was nominated gon-dainagon. The Emperor
Okimachi at that time contemplated abdication, but the palace which
he would have occupied as ex-Emperor had fallen into such a state of
disrepair as to be virtually uninhabitable. Hideyoshi signalized his
loyalty on this occasion by spending a large sum on the renovation of
the palace, and in recognition of his services the Emperor raised him
to the high post of nai-daijin. It was confidently expected that he
would then become sa-daijin, but, owing to complications which need
not be related here, the outcome of the matter was that he received
the still higher post of kwampaku (regent). There can be no doubt
that he himself had contemplated becoming shogun. In fact, it is on
record that he made proposals in that sense to Yoshiaki, the last of
the Ashikaga shoguns. But it had come by that time to be recognized
that only a scion of the Minamoto family could be eligible for the
post of shogun, and thus Yoshiaki declined Hideyoshi's overtures,
though to accept them would have materially altered the fallen
fortunes of the Ashikaga sept. Hideyoshi ultimately became prime
minister of State (dajo daijiri) and took the family name of
Toyotomi. It is stated, but the evidence is not conclusive, that in
order to reach these high posts, he had to be adopted into the house
of a Fujiwara noble. He had been a Taira when he served under
Nobunaga, and to become a Fujiwara for courtly purposes was not
likely to cause him much compunction.
THE MONKS, SHIKOKU, AND ETCHU
Immediately on the termination of the Komaki War, Hideyoshi took
steps to deal effectually with the three enemies by whom his
movements had been so much hampered, namely, the Buddhist priests of
Kii, the Chosokabe clan in Shikoku, and the Sasa in Etchu. It has
already been stated that the priests of Kii had their headquarters at
Negoro, where there stood the great monastery of Dai-Dembo-In,
belonging to the Shingon sect and enjoying almost the repute of
Koya-san. Scarcely less important was the monastery of Sawaga in the
same province. These two centres of religion had long been in
possession of large bodies of trained soldiers whose ranks were from
time to time swelled by the accession of wandering samurai (ronin).
The army despatched from Osaka in the spring of 1585 to deal with
these warlike monks speedily captured the two monasteries, and, for
purposes of intimidation, crucified a number of the leaders. For a
time, Koya-san itself was in danger, several of the fugitive monks
having taken refuge there. But finally Koya-san was spared in
consideration of surrendering estates yielding twenty-one thousand
koku of rice, which properties had been violently seized by the
monasteries in former years.
Three months later, Hideyoshi turned his arms against the Chosokabe
sept in Shikoku. This being an enterprise of large dimensions, he
entrusted its conduct to five of his most competent generals, namely,
Ukita Hideiye, Hachisuka Iemasa, Kuroda Nagamasa, Kikkawa Motoharu,
and Kohayakawa Takakage. Hideyoshi himself would have assumed the
direct command, and had actually set out for that purpose from Osaka,
when couriers met him with intelligence that less than one month's
fighting had brought the whole of the Island of the Four Provinces
into subjection. He therefore turned eastward, and entering Etchu,
directed the operations, in progress there under the command of Maeda
Toshiiye against Sasa Narimasa. This campaign lasted seven days, and
ended in the surrender of Narimasa, to whom Hideyoshi showed
remarkable clemency, inasmuch as he suffered him to remain in
possession of considerable estates in Etchu.
THE UESUGI
At this time Hideyoshi cemented relations of friendship with the
Uesugi family of Echigo, whose potentialities had always been a
subject of apprehension to Nobunaga. The powerful sept was then ruled
by Kagekatsu, nephew of the celebrated Kenshin. This daimyo had given
evidence of good-will towards Hideyoshi during the Komaki War, but it
was naturally a matter of great importance to establish really
cordial relations with so powerful a baron. History relates that, on
this occasion, Hideyoshi adopted a course which might well have
involved him in serious peril. He entered Echigo with a mere handful
of followers, and placed himself practically at the mercy of
Kagekatsu, judging justly that such trustful fearlessness would win
the heart of the gallant Kagekatsu. Hideyoshi's insight was justified
by the sequel. Several of the principal retainers of Kagekatsu
advised that advantage should be taken of Hideyoshi's rashness, and
that his victorious career should be finally terminated in Echigo.
But this vindictive counsel was rejected by the Uesugi baron, and
relations of a warmly friendly character were established between the
two great captains.
INVASION OF KYUSHU
There now remained only three really formidable enemies of Hideyoshi.
These were Hojo Ujimasa, in the Kwanto; Date Masamime, in Dewa and
Mutsu, and Shimazu Yoshihisa, in Kyushu. Of these, the Shimazu sept
was probably the most powerful, and Hideyoshi determined that Kyushu
should be the scene of his next warlike enterprise. The Island of the
Nine Provinces was then under the rule of three great clans; the
Shimazu, in the south; the Otomo, in Bungo, and the Ryuzoji, in
Hizen. The most puissant of these had at one time been Ryuzoji
Takanobu, but his cruel methods had alienated the sympathy of many of
his vassals, among them being Arima Yoshizumi, who threw off his
allegiance to Takanobu and joined hands with Shimazu Yoshihisa.
Takanobu sent an army against Yoshizumi, but the Satsuma baron
despatched Shimazu Masahisa to Yoshizumi's aid, and a sanguinary
engagement at Shimabara in 1585 resulted in the rout of Takanobu's
forces and his own death.
Takanobu's son and successor, who was named Masaiye, being still a
boy, advantage was taken of the fact by Otomo Yoshishige, who invaded
Hizen, so that Masaiye had to apply to the Shimazu family for
succour. The Satsuma chieftain suggested that the matter might be
settled by mutual withdrawal of forces, but Yoshishige declined this
overture, and the result was a battle in which the Otomo troops were
completely defeated. Otomo Yoshishige then (1586) had recourse to
Hideyoshi for assistance, thus furnishing the opportunity of which
Osaka was in search. Orders were immediately issued to Mori, Kikkawa,
Kohayakawa, and Chosokabe Motochika to assemble their forces for an
oversea expedition, and in the mean while, Sengoku Hidehisa was
despatched to Kyushu bearing a letter in which Hideyoshi, writing
over his title of kwampaku, censured the Shimazu baron for having
failed to pay his respects to the Imperial Court in Kyoto, and called
upon him to do so without delay. This mandate was treated with
contempt. Shimazu Yoshihisa threw the document on the ground,
declaring that his family had ruled in Satsuma for fourteen
generations; that only one man in Japan, namely Prince Konoe, had
competence to issue such an injunction, and that the head of the
house of Shimazu would never kneel to a monkey-faced upstart.
Hideyoshi had foreseen something of this kind, and had warned Sengoku
Hidehisa in the sense that whatever might be the action of the
Satsuma baron, no warlike measures were to be precipitately
commenced. Hidehisa neglected this warning. Yielding to the anger of
the moment, he directed the Otomo troops to attack the Satsuma
forces, and the result was disastrous. When the fighting ended, the
Satsuma baron had pushed into Bungo and taken sixteen forts there, so
that fully one-half of Kyushu was now under the sway of the Shimazu.
Hideyoshi, on receiving news of these disasters, confiscated the
estates of Sengoku Hidehisa, and issued orders to thirty-seven
provinces to provide commissariat for three hundred thousand men and
twenty thousand horses for a period of one year. Soon an army of one
hundred and fifty thousand men assembled at Osaka, and the van,
numbering sixty thousand, embarked there on the 7th of January, 1587,
and landed at Yunoshima in Bungo on the 19th of the same month--dates
which convey some idea of the very defective system of maritime
transport then existing. In Bungo, the invading army was swelled by
thirty thousand men under the leadership of Kohayakawa and Kikkawa,
and the whole force, under the command-in-chief of Hidenaga,
Hideyoshi's brother, moved to invest the castle of Takashiro.
It is unnecessary to follow the fighting in all its details. The
salient facts are that Hideyoshi left Osaka with the main army of one
hundred and thirty thousand men on the 22d of January, 1587, and,
travelling by land, reached the Strait of Akamagasaki--now called
Shimonoseki--on the 17th of February. He marched through Chikuzen,
making friends of the local chieftains by forbearance and diplomacy,
and fighting the first great battle of the campaign at Oguchi on the
Sendai-gawa. The Satsuma baron's younger brother, Iehisa, after a
gallant resistance, surrendered to Hideyoshi, and was employed by the
latter to communicate direct with his chief, Yoshihisa. It was
generally supposed that Iehisa would never return from this mission,
but would remain in the camp of Shimazu. He did return, however, his
word of honour being of more importance in his estimation than the
opportunity of recovering his liberty.
History states that Hideyoshi thereafter treated this noble man with
the greatest consideration, but it is difficult to reconcile that
account with the fact that Hideyoshi subsequently pressed Iehisa to
guide the Osaka army through the mountains and rivers which
constituted natural defences for the fief of Satsuma. Iehisa, of
course, refused, and to Hideyoshi's credit it stands on record that
he did not press the matter with any violence. This difficulty of
invading an unknown country without any maps or any guides, a country
celebrated for its topographical perplexities, was ultimately
overcome by sending Buddhist priests to act as spies in the dominions
of Shimazu. These spies were led by the abbot, Kennyo, with whose
name the reader is already familiar, and as the Shimazu family were
sincere believers in Buddhism, no obstacles were placed in the way of
the treacherous monks. They were able ultimately to guide the Osaka
army through the forests and mountains on the north of Kagoshima, and
Hideyoshi adopted the same strategy as that pursued in a similar case
three hundred years later, namely, sending a force of fifty thousand
men by sea with orders to advance against Kagoshima from the south.
The Satsuma troops were completely defeated, and only the castle of
Kagoshima remained in their hands.
At this stage of the campaign Hideyoshi behaved with remarkable
magnanimity and foresight. Contrary to the advice of some of his
principal retainers, he refused to proceed to extremities against the
Shimazu clan, and agreed to make peace, on the basis that the clan
should be left in possession of the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and
Hyuga, the only further stipulation being that the then head of the
house, Yoshihisa, should abdicate in favour of his younger brother,
Yoshihiro. As for the Buddhist priests who had sacrificed their
honour to their interests, those that had acted as guides to the
invading army were subsequently crucified by order of the Satsuma
baron, and the Shin sect, to which they belonged, was interdicted
throughout the whole of the Shimazu fief. Yoshihiro was summoned to
Kyoto by Hideyoshi to answer for this action, but he pleaded that
such treachery amply deserved such punishment, and that he was
prepared to bow to Hideyoshi's judgment in the matter. The defence
was admitted by Hideyoshi, but the abbot Kennyo received such large
rewards that he was able to erect the great temple Nishi Hongwan-ji,
"which became the wonder of after-generations of men and which has
often been erroneously referred to by foreign writers as a proof of
the deep religious feelings of Buddhist converts three hundred years
ago."*
*A New Life of Hideyoshi, by W. Dening.
THE HOJO
From end to end of Japan there were now only two powerful barons
whose allegiance had not been formally rendered to Hideyoshi and to
the Emperor under the new regime. These were Date Masamune and Hojo
Ujimasa. The origin and eminence of the Hojo family from the days of
its founder, Nagauji, have already been described in these pages, and
it need only be added here that Ujimasa enjoyed a reputation second
to none of his predecessors. That he should stand aloof from all his
brother barons seemed to the latter an intolerable evidence of pride,
and they urged Hideyoshi to resort at once to extreme measures. There
can be no doubt that this was the intention of Hideyoshi himself, but
with characteristic prudence he had recourse at the outset to pacific
devices. He therefore sent an envoy to the Hojo's stronghold at
Odawara, urging Ujimasa to lose no time in paying his respects to the
Court at Kyoto. The Hojo chief's reply was that Sanada Masayuki had
encroached upon the Hojo estates in Numata, and that if this
encroachment were rectified, the desired obeisance to the Throne
would be made.
Thereupon, Hideyoshi caused the restoration of Numata, but the Hojo
baron, instead of carrying out his part of the agreement, made this
restoration the pretext for an unwarrantable act of aggression.
Whatever sympathy might have been felt in Kyoto with the Hojo family
was forfeited by this procedure, and in March, 1590, an army of over
two hundred thousand men was set in motion for the Kwanto.
Hideyoshi's troops moved in three columns. One, commanded by Ieyasu,
marched by the seacoast road, the Tokaido; another, under Uesugi
Kagekatsu and Maeda Toshiiye, marched by the mountain road, the
Tosando, and the third attacked from the sea. None of these armies
encountered any very serious resistance. The first approached Odawara
by the Hakone range and the second by way of the Usui pass. The
castle at Odawara, however, was so strongly built and so stoutly held
that its capture by storm seemed impossible, and Hideyoshi's forces
were obliged to have recourse to a regular siege which lasted nearly
four months. During the latter part of that time, Hideyoshi
encouraged his soldiers to indulge in all sorts of amusements, and
thus the camp of the besiegers constantly echoed the notes of musical
performances and the shouts of dancers and sake drinkers. Finally, in
July, 1590, the great fortress surrendered, and the Hojo baron,
Ujimasa, was put to death, his head being sent to Kyoto for exposure,
but the life of his son, Ujinao, was spared on condition that he
enter a monastery.
HOJO UJINORI
One incident of this struggle is very characteristic of the ethics of
the era. During the interchange of messages that preceded recourse to
arms, the Hojo baron sent his brother, Ujinori, to Kyoto as an envoy
to discuss the situation with Hideyoshi. The latter received Ujinori
with all courtesy and endeavoured to impress upon him the imperative
necessity of his chief's acquiescence. Ujinori promised to contribute
to that end as far as lay in his power, but history describes him as
adding: "Should my brother fail to comply with your commands, and
should it be necessary for you to send an army against the Kwanto, it
must be clearly understood that this visit of mine to your Excellency
shall not in any way prejudice my loyalty to my brother. On the
contrary, if the peace be broken, I shall probably have to command
the van of my brother's forces, and in that event I may have to offer
to your Excellency a flight of my rusty arrows."
Hideyoshi is narrated to have laughingly replied that the peace was
in no danger of being broken and that he trusted Ujinori to use his
best endeavours to avert war. On his return to the Kwanto, Ujinori
was ordered to defend the castle of Nira-yama with seven thousand
men, and he soon found himself attacked by fifty thousand under seven
of Hideyoshi's generals. Ujinori reminded his comrades that Nira-yama
had been the birthplace of the founder of the Hojo family, and
therefore it would be an eternal shame if even one of the
entrenchments were lost. Not one was lost. Again and again assaults
were delivered, but they were unsuccessful, and throughout the whole
of the Kwanto, Nira-yama alone remained flying the Hojo flag to the
end. Ujinori surrendered in obedience to Ujimasa's instructions after
the fall of Odawara, but Hideyoshi, instead of punishing him for the
heavy losses he had inflicted on the Osaka army, lauded his fidelity
and bravery, and presented him with an estate of ten thousand koku.
DATE MASAMUNE
When news reached Date Masamune of the fall of all the Hojo's
outlying forts and of the final investment of Odawara, he recognized,
from his place in Mutsu and Dewa, that an attitude of aloofness could
no longer be maintained with safety. Accordingly, braving
considerable danger, he made his way with a small retinue to Odawara
and signified his willingness to comply with any terms imposed by
Hideyoshi. Thus, for the first time since the middle of the fifteenth
century, the whole of the empire was pacified.
YEDO
It is historically related that, during the siege of Odawara,
Hideyoshi invited Ieyasu to the former's headquarters on Ishigaki
Hill, whence an uninterrupted view of the interior of the castle
could be had. The Tokugawa baron was then asked whether, if the eight
provinces of the Kwanto were handed over to him, he would choose
Odawara for central stronghold. He replied in the affirmative.
Hideyoshi pointed out the superior advantages of Yedo from a
strategical and commercial point of view, and ultimately when he
conferred the Kwanto on Ieyasu, he chose Yedo for the latter's
capital, the accompanying revenue being about two and a half million
koku. Hideyoshi further proposed to appoint Oda Nobukatsu to the
lordship of the five provinces which had hitherto constituted the
domain of Ieyasu, namely, Suruga, Totomi, Mikawa, Kai, and Shinano.
Nobukatsu, however, alleging that he did not desire any large domain,
asked to be allowed to retain his old estates in Owari and Ise.
This attitude angered Hideyoshi for reasons which will presently be
apparent. He assigned to Nobukatsu a comparatively insignificant fief
at Akita, in the remote province of Dewa, and gave the estates in
Owari and Ise to Hidetsugu, the nephew and adopted successor of
Hideyoshi, while the five provinces hitherto under the sway of Ieyasu
were divided among Hideyoshi's generals and retainers. In September,
1590, Ieyasu entered Yedo, and subdivided his extensive domain among
his followers in order of merit, thus establishing the Tokugawa
system of hereditary daimyo and founding a new Bakufu. All this was
very significant. In such matters, Hideyoshi had repeatedly shown
himself to be a man of great magnanimity, and had allowed even his
enemies to retain possession of lands which would certainly have been
taken from them by other conquerors. Thus, in the case of the Mori
sept, fully half of the midland counties was left in their
occupation, and, in the case of the Shimazu family, they were
suffered to retain two and a half provinces.
With regard to Ieyasu, however, Hideyoshi behaved with marked
caution. By granting to the Tokugawa chieftain the whole of the
Kwanto, Hideyoshi made it appear as though he were conferring a
signal favour; but in reality his object was to remove Ieyasu out of
the zone of potential danger to Kyoto. Ieyasu fully recognized this
manoeuvre, but bowed to it as the less of two evils. As a further
measure of precaution, Hideyoshi interposed one of his own family,
Hidetsugu, between the Kwanto and Kyoto, and with the object of
menacing the rear of Ieyasu and restraining the movements of the
Date, he placed Gamo Ujisato at Aizu in Oshu. He further posted
Ishida Katsushige at Sawa-yama (now called Hikone) in the province of
Omi, to cover the principal route to Kyoto, and for similar reasons
with regard to the Yamato and Tamba roads he assigned to his brother,
Hidenaga, the castle of Kori-yama, which commanded Izumi and Kii, and
to his adopted son, Hidekatsu, the castle at Fukuchi-yama in Tamba.
This plan of distributing their domains, so that the daimyo should be
mutually repressive, was followed with still greater care by Ieyasu
when he, in turn, became supreme.
HIDEYOSHI AND BUDDHISM
There are evidences that, from his childhood, Hideyoshi had little
reverence for the Buddhist faith. When only twelve years of age he is
said to have beaten and smashed an image of Amida because it remained
always insensible to the offerings of food placed daily before it.
Again, when on his way to Kyoto to avenge the assassination of
Nobunaga, he saw an idol floating on a stream, and seizing the effigy
he cut it into two pieces, saying that the deity Daikoku, having
competence to succour one thousand persons only, could be of little
use to him at such a crisis as he was now required to meet. Finally,
on the occasion of his expedition against the Hojo of Odawara, when
the sailors of Mishima, in Sagami, objected to carrying war-horses in
their boats on the plea that the god of the sea, Ryujin, hated
everything equine, Hideyoshi did not hesitate to remove these
scruples by addressing a despatch to the deity with orders to watch
over the safety of the steeds.
Yet this same Hideyoshi evidently recognized that the Buddhist faith
had great potentialities in Japan, and that its encouragement made
for the peace and progress of the country. Buddhism suffered terribly
at the hands of Nobunaga. The great monastery of Enryaku-ji was a
mass of blackened ruins at the time of the Oda baron's death, and it
has been shown that the monasteries of Kii and Osaka fared almost
equally badly at the hands of Hideyoshi. Nevertheless the latter had
no sooner grasped the supreme administrative power than he showed
himself a protector and promotor of Buddhism. Scattered throughout
the empire and apparently crippled for all time, the monks of
Hiei-zan very soon gave evidence of the vitality of their faith by
commencing a vigorous propaganda for the restoration of the great
monastery. Many renowned priests, as Zenso, Gosei, and others, headed
this movement; Prince Takatomo, adopted son of the Emperor Okimachi,
agreed to become lord-abbot of the sect (Tendai), and the Imperial
Court issued a proclamation exhorting the people to subscribe for the
pious purpose. Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, and other great barons addressed
their vassals in a similar sense, and in Hideyoshi's proclamation the
imperative necessity of Enryaku-ji as a barrier at the "Demon's Gate"
was distinctly stated. Under such auspices the monastery quickly rose
from its ashes, though in point of size and magnificence it was
inferior to its predecessor. At the same time Hideyoshi steadily
pursued the policy of checking the military tendencies of the monks,
and it may be said that, from his era, the soldier-priest ceased to
be a factor in the political situation.
THE KYOTO DAIBUTSU
The erection of a colossal image of the Buddha at Nara, in the eighth
century, and at Kamakura, in the thirteenth century, marked the
consummation of great political programmes in which religious
influence acted a strong part. Hideyoshi determined to set up a still
more imposing effigy in Kyoto, and, in 1586, the work was commenced
under the superintendence of Maeda Gen-i. All the principal
idol-makers were summoned to the capital, and among them were said to
have been some Chinese experts. Hideyoshi declared that whereas the
Nara Daibutsu had taken twenty-seven years to build, the Kyoto image
should be finished in five. He kept his word. No less than twenty-one
provinces were placed under requisition for labour and materials. The
enclosure of the temple containing the image measured 260 yards by
274, and the great hall had dimensions of 110 yards by 74.
The original intention had been to make the idol of copper; but as
the statue was to have a height of 160 feet, the quantity of metal
required could not have been obtained within the time fixed, and
lacquered wood was therefore substituted for copper. It is related
that timbers of sufficient scantling could not be found anywhere
except in the forests at the base of Fuji-yama, and Ieyasu employed
fifty thousand labourers at a cost of a one thousand ryo in gold, for
the purpose of felling the trees and transporting them to Kyoto. The
operations furnished evidence of the curiously arbitrary methods
practised officially in that age. Thus, when the building was
interrupted owing to a lack of large stones for constructing the
pedestal, messengers were sent to appropriate rocks standing in
private gardens, without consulting the convenience of the owners,
and many beautiful parks were thus deprived of their most picturesque
elements. Moreover, on the plea of obtaining iron to make nails,
clamps, and so forth, a proclamation was issued calling upon the
civilian section of the population at large to throw their swords,
their spears, their muskets, and their armour into the melting-pot.
This proclamation, though couched in terms of simulated benevolence,
amounted in reality to a peremptory order. The people were told that
they only wasted their substance and were impeded in the payment of
their taxes by spending money upon weapons of war, whereas by giving
these for a religious purpose, they would invoke the blessings of
heaven and promote their own prosperity. But, at the foot of these
specious arguments, there was placed a brief command that the weapons
must be surrendered and that those concerned should take due note of
their duty in the matter. The import of such an injunction was not
lost on the people, and general disarming of the agricultural and the
artisan classes marked the success of Hideyoshi's policy. It is on
record that he himself actually joined in the manual labour of
dragging stones and timbers into position, and that, clad in hempen
garments, he led the labourers' chorus of "Kiyari."
THE JURAKU-TEI
In the year 1586, the Emperor Okimachi resigned the throne to his
grandson, Go-Yozei. Like Nobunaga, Hideyoshi was essentially loyal to
the Imperial Court. He not only provided for the renovation of the
shrines of Ise, but also built a palace for the retiring Emperor's
use. On the 11th of the seventh month of 1585, he was appointed
regant (kwampaku), and on the 13th of the same month he proceeded to
the Court to render thanks. He himself, however, was without a
residence in the capital, and to remedy that deficiency he built a
palace called Juraku-tei (Mansion of Pleasure) which, according to
the accounts transmitted by historians, was an edifice of exceptional
magnificence. Thus, the Taikoki (Annals of the Taiko) speak of "gates
guarded by iron pillars and copper doors; of high towers which shone
like stars in the sky; of roof-tiles which roared in the wind, and of
golden dragons which sang songs among the clouds." Nothing now
remains of all this grandeur except some of the gates and other
decorative parts of the structure, which were given to the builders
of the temples of Hongwan-ji after the destruction of the Juraku-tei
when Hidetsugu and his whole family died under the sword as traitors.
There can be no doubt, however, that the edifice represented every
possible feature of magnificence and refinement characteristic of the
era.
Hideyoshi took up his abode there in 1587, and at the ensuing New
Year's festival he prayed to be honoured by a visit from the Emperor.
This request was complied with during the month of May in the same
year. All the details of the ceremony were ordered in conformity with
precedents set in the times of the Ashikaga shoguns, Yoshimitsu and
Yoshimasa, but the greatly superior resources of Hideyoshi were
enlisted to give eclat to the fete. The ceremonies were spread over
five days. They included singing, dancing, couplet composing, and
present giving. The last was on a scale of unprecedented dimensions.
The presents to the Imperial household and to the Court Nobles Varied
from three hundred koku of rice to 5530 ryo of silver, and in the
case of the Court ladies, the lowest was fifty koku and the highest
three hundred.
The occasion was utilized by Hideyoshi for an important ceremony,
which amounted to a public recognition of his own supremacy. A
written oath was signed and sealed by six great barons, of whom the
first four represented the Toyotomi (Hideyoshi's) family and the last
two were Ieyasu and Nobukatsu. The signatories of this oath solemnly
bound themselves to respect eternally the estates and possessions of
the members of the Imperial house, of the Court nobles, and of the
Imperial princes, and further to obey faithfully all commands issued
by the regent. This obligation was guaranteed by invoking the curse
of all the guardian deities of the empire on the head of anyone
violating the engagement. A similar solemn pledge in writing was
signed by twenty-two of the great military barons.
THE KITANO FETE
The esoterics of the tea ceremonial and the vogue it obtained in the
days of the shogun Yoshimasa, have already been described. But note
must be taken here of the extraordinary zeal displayed by Hideyoshi
in this matter. Some claim that his motive was mainly political;
others that he was influenced by purely esthetic sentiments, and
others, again, that both feelings were responsible in an equal
degree. There is no material for an exact analysis. He doubtless
appreciated the point of view of the historian who wrote that
"between flogging a war-steed along the way to death and discussing
esthetic canons over a cup of tea in a little chamber nine feet
square, there was a radical difference." But it must also have
appealed keenly to his fancy that he, a veritable upstart, by birth a
plebeian and by habit a soldier, should ultimately set the lead in
artistic fashions to the greatest aristocrats in the empire in a cult
essentially pacific.
However these things may have been, the fact remains that on the 1st
of November, 1587, there was organized by his orders on the Pine
Plain (Matsubara) of Kitano a cha-no-yu fete of unprecedented
magnitude. The date of the fete was placarded in Kyoto, Nara, Osaka,
Sakai, and other towns of importance more than a month in advance;
all lovers of the tea cult were invited, whether plebeian or
patrician, whether rich or poor; frugality was enjoined, and the
proclamations promised that the choicest among the objects of art
collected by Hideyoshi during many decades should be exhibited. It is
recorded that over 360 persons attended the fete. Some erected simple
edifices under the pine trees; some set up a monster umbrella for a
roof, and some brought portable pavilions. These various edifices are
said to have occupied a space of six square miles. Three pavilions
were devoted to Hideyoshi's art-objects, and he himself served tea
and exhibited his esthetic treasures to Ieyasu, Nobukatsu, Toshiiye,
and other distinguished personages.
HIDEYOSHI'S LARGESSE
Hideyoshi's love of ostentation when political ends could be served
thereby was strikingly illustrated by a colossal distribution of gold
and silver. One morning in June, 1589, the space within the main gate
of the Juraku palace was seen to be occupied throughout a length of
nearly three hundred yards with gold and silver coins heaped up on
trays each containing one hundred and fifty pieces. Immediately
within the gate sat Hideyoshi, and beside him was the Emperor's
younger brother, Prince Roku. The mass of glittering treasure was
guarded by officials under the superintendence of Maeda Gen-i, and
presently the names of the personages who were to be recipients of
Hideyoshi's largesse were read aloud, whereupon each of those
indicated advanced and received a varying number of the precious
trays. The members of Hideyoshi's family were specially favoured in
this distribution. His mother received 3000 ryo of gold and 10,000
ryo of silver; his brother, Hidenaga, 3000 ryo of gold and 20,000 of
silver; and his nephew, Hidetsugu, 3000 of gold and 10,000 of silver.
To Nobukatsu, to Ieyasu, to Mori Terumoto, to Uesugi Kagekatsu, and
to Maeda Toshiiye, great sums were given, varying from 3000 ryo of
gold and 10,000 of silver to 1000 of gold and 10,000 of silver. It is
said that the total of the coins thus bestowed amounted to 365,000
ryo, a vast sum in that era. A history of the time observes that the
chief recipients of Hideyoshi's generosity were the members of his
own family, and that he would have shown better taste had he made
these donations privately. Perhaps the deepest impression produced by
this grand display was a sense of the vast treasure amassed by
Hideyoshi; and possibly he contemplated something of the kind.
ENGRAVING: SNOW IMAGE OF DHARMA
ENGRAVING: A FENCING OUTFIT