NOBUNAGA, HIDEYOSHI, AND IEYASU
ODA NOBUNAGA
WHEN the Taira sept was shattered finally at Dan-no-ura, a baby
grandson of Kiyomori was carried by its mother to the hamlet of
Tsuda, in Omi province. Subsequently this child, Chikazane, was
adopted by a Shinto official of Oda, in Echizen, and thus acquired
the name of Oda. For generations the family served uneventfully at
the shrine in Omi, but in the disturbed days of the Ashikaga shoguns,
the representative of the eighth generation from Chikazane emerged
from the obscurity of Shinto services and was appointed steward
(karo) of the Shiba family, which appointment involved removal of his
residence to Owari. From that time the fortunes of the family became
brighter. Nobuhide, its representative at the beginning of the
sixteenth century, acquired sufficient power to dispute the Imagawa's
sway over the province of Mikawa, and sufficient wealth to contribute
funds to the exhausted coffers of the Court in Kyoto.
This man's son was Nobunaga. Born in 1534, and destined to bequeath
to his country a name that will never die, Nobunaga, as a boy, showed
much of the eccentricity of genius. He totally despised the canons of
the time as to costume and etiquette. One of his peculiarities was a
love of long swords, and it is related that on a visit to Kyoto in
his youth he carried in his girdle a sword which trailed on the
ground as he walked. Rough and careless, without any apparent
dignity, he caused so much solicitude to his tutor and guardian,
Hirate Masahide, and showed so much indifference to the latter's
remonstrances, that finally Masahide had recourse to the faithful
vassal's last expedient--he committed suicide, leaving a letter in
which the explanation of his act was accompanied by a stirring appeal
to the better instincts of his pupil and ward. This proved the
turning-point in Nobunaga's career. He became as circumspect as he
had previously been careless, and he subsequently erected to the
memory of his brave monitor a temple which may be seen to this day by
visitors to Nagoya.
It is frequently said of Nobunaga that his indifference to detail and
his lack of patience were glaring defects in his moral endowment. But
that accusation can scarcely be reconciled with facts. Thus, when
still a young man, it is related of him that he summoned one of his
vassals to his presence but, giving no order, allowed the man to
retire. This was repeated with two others, when the third, believing
that there must be something in need of care, looked about
attentively before retiring, and observing a piece of torn paper on
the mats, took it up and carried it away. Nobunaga recalled him,
eulogized his intelligence, and declared that men who waited
scrupulously for instructions would never accomplish much. The
faculties of observation and initiation were not more valued by
Nobunaga than those of honesty and modesty. It is recorded that on
one occasion he summoned all the officers of his staff, and showing
them a sword by a famous maker, promised to bestow it upon the man
who should guess most correctly the number of threads in the silk
frapping of the hilt. All the officers wrote down their guesses with
one exception, that of Mori Rammaru. Asked for the reason of his
abstention, Mori replied that he happened to know the exact number of
threads, having counted them on a previous occasion when admiring the
sword. Nubunaga at once placed the weapon in his hands, thus
recognizing his honesty. Again, after the construction of the famous
castle at Azuchi, to which reference will be made hereafter,
Nobunaga, desiring to have a record compiled in commemoration of the
event, asked a celebrated priest, Sakugen, to undertake the
composition and penning of the document. Sakugen declared the task to
be beyond his literary ability, and recommended that it should be
entrusted to his rival, Nankwa. Nobunaga had no recourse but to adopt
this counsel, and Nankwa performed the task admirably, as the
document, which is still in existence, shows. In recognition of this
success, Nobunaga gave the compiler one hundred pieces of silver, but
at the same time bestowed two hundred on Sakugen for his magnanimity
in recommending a rival.
Nobunaga unquestionably had the gift of endearing himself to his
retainers, though there are records which show that he was subject to
outbursts of fierce anger. Even his most trusted generals were not
exempt from bitter words or even blows, and we shall presently see
that to this fault in his character was approximately due his tragic
end. Nevertheless, he did not lack the faculty of pity. On the
occasion of a dispute between two of his vassals about the boundaries
of a manor, the defeated litigant bribed one of Nobunaga's principal
staff-officers to appeal for reversal of the judgment. This officer
adduced reasons of a sufficiently specious character, but Nobunaga
detected their fallacy, and appeared about to take some precipitate
action when he happened to observe the wrinkles which time had
written on the suppliant's face. He recovered his sang-froid and
contented himself with sending the officer from his presence and
subsequently causing to be handed to him a couplet setting forth the
evils of bribery and corruption. He forgave the guilty man in
consideration of his advanced age, and the incident is said to have
closed with the suicide of the old officer. Frugality was another
trait of Nobunaga's character. But he did not save money for money's
sake. He spent with lavish hand when the occasion called for
munificence; as when he contributed a great sum for the rebuilding of
the Ise shrines. Perhaps nothing constitutes a better clue to his
disposition than the verses he habitually quoted:
Life is short; the world is a mere dream to the idle.
Only the fool fears death, for what is there of life that does
Not die once, sooner or later?
Man has to die once and once only;
He should make his death glorious.
It is recorded that Nobunaga's demeanour in battle truly reflected
the spirit of these verses.
ENGRAVING: TOYOTOMI HIDEYOSHI
HIDEYOSHI
Nobunaga certainly deserved the success he achieved, but that he
achieved it must be attributed in part to accident. That accident was
his association with Hideyoshi.* It has been sometimes said that
circumstances beget the men to deal with them. Fallacious as such a
doctrine is, it almost compels belief when we observe that the second
half of the sixteenth century in Japan produced three of the greatest
men the world has ever seen, and that they joined hands to accomplish
the stupendous task of restoring peace and order to an empire which
had been almost continuously torn by war throughout five consecutive
centuries. These three men were born within an interval of eight
years: Nobunaga, in 1534; Hideyoshi, in 1536, and Ieyasu, in 1542.
*To avoid needless difficulty the name "Hideyoshi" is used solely
throughout this history. But, as a matter of fact, the great
statesman and general was called in his childhood Nakamura Hiyoshi;
his adult name was Tokichi; afterwards he changed this to Hashiba and
ultimately, he was known as Toyotomi Hideyoshi.
There are many stories about Hideyoshi's early days, but the details
are obscured by a record called the Taikoki, which undoubtedly makes
many excursions into the region of romance. The plain facts appear to
be that Hideyoshi was the son of a humble farmer named Kinoshita
Yaemon, who lived in the Aichi district of Owari province, and who
preferred the life of a foot-soldier (ashigaru) to the pursuit of
agriculture. Yaemon served the Oda family, and died when Hideyoshi
was still a youth. In Owari province, at a homestead called Icho-mura
from the name of the tree (maiden-hair tree) that flourishes there in
abundance, there stands a temple built in the year 1616 on the site
of the house where Hideyoshi was born. This temple is known as
Taiko-zan--"Taiko" having been the title of Hideyoshi in the latter
years of his life--and in the grounds of the temple may be seen the
well from which water was drawn to wash the newly born baby. The
child grew up to be a youth of dimunitive stature, monkey-like face,
extraordinary precocity, and boundless ambition. Everything was
against him--personal appearance, obscurity of lineage, and absence
of scholarship. Yet he never seems to have doubted that a great
future lay before him.
Many curious legends are grouped about his childhood. They are for
the most part clumsily constructed and unconvincing, though probably
we shall be justified in accepting the evidence they bear of a mind
singularly well ordered and resourceful. At the age of sixteen he was
employed by a Buddhist priest to assist in distributing amulets, and
by the agency of this priest he obtained an introduction to
Matsushita Yukitsuna, commandant of the castle of Kuno at Hamamatsu,
in Totomi province. This Matsushita was a vassal of Imagawa
Yoshimoto. He controlled the provinces of Mikawa, Totomi, and Suruga,
which lie along the coast eastward of Owari, and he represented one
of the most powerful families in the country. Hideyoshi served in the
castle of Kuno for a period variously reckoned at from one year to
five. Tradition says that he abused the trust placed in him by his
employer, and absconded with the sum of six ryo wherewith he had been
commissioned to purchase a new kind of armour which had recently come
into vogue in Owari province. But though this alleged theft becomes
in certain annals the basis of a picturesque story as to Hideyoshi
repaying Matsushita a thousandfold in later years, the unadorned
truth seems to be that Hideyoshi was obliged to leave Kuno on account
of the jealousy of his fellow retainers, who slandered him to
Yukitsuna and procured his dismissal.
Returning to Owari, he obtained admission to the ranks of Oda
Nobunaga in the humble capacity of sandal-bearer. He deliberately
chose Nobunaga through faith in the greatness of his destiny, and
again the reader of Japanese history is confronted by ingenious tales
as to Hideyoshi's devices for obtaining admission to Nobunaga's
house. But the most credible explanation is, at the same time, the
simplest, namely, that Hideyoshi's father, having been borne on the
military roll of Nobunaga's father, little difficulty offered in
obtaining a similar favour for Hideyoshi.
Nobunaga was then on the threshold of his brilliant career. In those
days of perpetual war and tumult, the supreme ambition of each great
territorial baron in Japan was to fight his way to the capital, there
to obtain from the sovereign and the Muromachi Bakufu a commission to
subdue the whole country and to administer it as their lieutenant.
Nobunaga seems to have cherished that hope from his early years,
though several much more powerful military magnates would surely
oppose anything like his pre-eminence. Moreover, in addition to
comparative weakness, he was hampered by local inconvenience. The
province of Owari was guarded on the south by sea, but on the east it
was menaced directly by the Imagawa family and indirectly by the
celebrated Takeda Shingen, while on the north it was threatened by
the Saito and on the west by the Asai, the Sasaki, and the
Kitabatake. Any one of these puissant feudatories would have been
more than a match for the Owari chieftain, and that Imagawa Yoshimoto
harboured designs against Owari was well known to Nobunaga, for in
those days spying, slander, forgery, and deceit of every kind had the
approval of the Chinese writers on military ethics whose books were
regarded as classics by the Japanese. Hideyoshi himself figures at
this very time as the instigator and director of a series of acts of
extreme treachery, by which the death of one of the principal Imagawa
vassals was compassed; and the same Hideyoshi was the means of
discovering a plot by Imagawa emissaries to delay the repair of the
castle of Kiyosu, Nobunaga's headquarters, where a heavy fall of rain
had caused a landslide. Nobunaga did not venture to assume the
offensive against the Imagawa chief. He chose as a matter of
necessity to stand on the defensive, and when it became certain that
Imagawa Yoshimoto had taken the field, a general impression prevailed
that the destruction of the Oda family was unavoidable.
BATTLE OF OKEHAZAMA
In the month of June, 1560, Imagawa Yoshimoto crossed the border into
Owari at the head of a force stated by the annals to have been
forty-six thousand strong. Just two years had elapsed since
Hideyoshi's admission to the service of the Owari baron in the office
of sandal-bearer. Nevertheless, some generally credible records do
not hesitate to represent Hideyoshi as taking a prominent part in the
great battle against the Imagawa, and as openly advising Nobunaga
with regard to the strategy best adapted to the situation. It is
incredible that a private soldier, and a mere youth of twenty-two at
that, should have risen in such a short time to occupy a place of
equality with the great generals of Nobunaga's army. But that
Hideyoshi contributed more or less to the result of the fight may be
confidently asserted.
The battle itself, though the forces engaged were not large, must be
counted one of the great combats of the world, for had not Nobunaga
emerged victorious the whole course of Japanese history might have
been changed. At the outset, no definite programme seems to have been
conceived on Nobunaga's side. He had no allies, and the numerical
inferiority of his troops was overwhelming. The latter defect was
remedied in a very partial degree by the resourcefulness of
Hideyoshi. In his boyhood he had served for some time under a
celebrated chief of freebooters, by name Hachisuka Koroku,* and he
persuaded that chieftain with his fifteen hundred followers to march
to the aid of the Owari army, armour and weapons having been
furnished by Sasaki Shotei, of Omi province. Sasaki regarded
Nobunaga's plight as too hopeless to warrant direct aid, but he was
willing to equip Hachisuka's men for the purpose, although the
addition of fifteen hundred soldiers could make very little
difference in the face of such a disparity as existed between the
combatants.
*Ancestor of the present Marquis Hachisuka.
Shortly before these events, Owari had been invaded from the west by
the Kitabatake baron, whose domain lay in Ise, and the invaders had
been beaten back by a bold offensive movement on Nobunaga's part. The
ultimate result had not been conclusive, as Nobunaga advisedly
refrained from carrying the war into Ise and thus leaving his own
territory unguarded. But the affair had taught the superiority of
offensive tactics, and thus Nobunaga's impulse was to attack the army
of Imagawa, instead of waiting to be crushed by preponderate force.
His most trusted generals, Shibata Katsuiye, Sakuma Nobumori, and
Hayashi Mitsukatsu, strenuously opposed this plan. They saw no
prospect whatever of success in assuming the offensive against
strength so superior, and they urged the advisability of yielding
temporarily and awaiting an opportunity to recover independence.
Here, Hideyoshi is reputed to have shown conspicuous wisdom at the
council-table. He pointed out that there could be no such thing as
temporary surrender. The Imagawa would certainly insist on hostages
sufficiently valuable to insure permanent good faith, and he further
declared that it was a mistake to credit the Imagawa with possessing
the good-will of any of the other great feudatories, since they were
all equally jealous of one another.
Finally, it was resolved that seven forts should be built and
garrisoned, and that five of them should be allowed to fall into the
enemy's hands if resistance proved hopeless. In the remaining two
forts the garrisons were to be composed of the best troops in the
Owari army, and over these strongholds were to be flown the flags of
Nobunaga himself and of his chief general. It was hoped that by their
success in five of the forts the Imagawa army would be at once
physically wearied and morally encouraged to concentrate their entire
strength and attention on the capture of the last two fortresses.
Meanwhile, Nobunaga himself, with a select body of troops, was to
march by mountain roads to the rear of the invading forces and
deliver a furious attack when such a manoeuvre was least expected.
The brave men who engaged in this perilous enterprise were
strengthened by worshipping at the shrine of Hachiman in the village
of Atsuta, and their prayers evoked appearances which were
interpreted as manifestations of divine assistance. Most fortunately
for the Owari troops, their movements were shrouded by a heavy
rainfall, and they succeeded in inflicting serious loss on the
invading army, driving it pele-mele across the border and killing its
chief, Yoshimoto. No attempt was made to pursue the fugitives into
Mikawa. Nobunaga was prudently content with his signal victory. It
raised him at once to a level with the greatest provincial barons in
the empire, and placed him in the foremost rank of the aspirants for
an Imperial commission.
ENGRAVING: TOKUGAWA IEYASU
TOKUGAWA IEYASU
The battle of Okehazama led to another incident of prime importance
in Japanese history. It brought about an alliance between Oda
Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu. Among the small barons subject to the
Imagawa there was one called Matsudaira Motoyasu. He had taken the
name, Motoyasu, by adopting one of the ideographs of Yoshimoto's
appellation. His family, long in alliance with the Imagawa, were at a
variance with the Oda, and in the battle of Okehazama this Motoyasu
had captured one of the Owari forts. But on the defeat and death of
Yoshimoto, the Matsudaira chieftain retired at once to his own castle
of Okazaki, in the province of Mikawa. He had then to consider his
position, for by the death of Yoshimoto, the headship of the Imagawa
family had fallen to his eldest son, Ujizane, a man altogether
inferior in intellect to his gifted father. Nobunaga himself
appreciated the character of the new ruler, and saw that the wisest
plan would be to cement a union with Matsudaira Motoyasu. Accordingly
he despatched an envoy to Okazaki Castle to consult the wishes of
Motoyasu. The latter agreed to the Owari chief's proposals, and in
February, 1562, proceeded to the castle of Kiyosu, where he
contracted with Oda Nobunaga an alliance which endured throughout the
latter's lifetime. In the following year, Motoyasu changed his name
to Ieyasu, and subsequently he took the uji of Tokugawa. The alliance
was strengthened by intermarriage, Nobuyasu, the eldest son of
Ieyasu, being betrothed to a daughter of Nobunaga.
NOBUNAGA'S POSITION
It was at this time, according to Japanese annalists, that Nobunaga
seriously conceived the ambition of making Kyoto his goal. The
situation offered inducements. In the presence of a practically
acknowledged conviction that no territorial baron of that era might
venture to engage in an enterprise which denuded his territory of a
protecting army, it was necessary to look around carefully before
embarking upon the Kyoto project. Nobunaga had crushed the Imagawa,
for though his victory had not been conclusive from a military point
of view, it had placed the Imagawa under incompetent leadership and
had thus freed Owari from all menace from the littoral provinces on
the east. Again, in the direction of Echigo and Shinano, the great
captain, Uesugi Kenshin, dared not strike at Nobunaga's province
without exposing himself to attack from Takeda Shingen. But Shingen
was not reciprocally hampered. His potentialities were always an
unknown quality. He was universally recognized as the greatest
strategist of his time, and if Nobunaga ventured to move westward,
the Kai baron would probably seize the occasion to lay hands upon
Owari. It is true that the alliance with Tokugawa Ieyasu constituted
some protection. But Ieyasu was no match for Shingen in the field.
Some other check must be devised, and Nobunaga found it in the
marriage of his adopted daughter to Shingen's son, Katsuyori.
THE COURT APPEALS TO NOBUNAGA
In Kyoto, at this time, a state of great confusion existed. The
Emperor Okimachi had ascended the throne in 1557. But in the presence
of the violent usurpations of the Miyoshi and others, neither the
sovereign nor the shogun could exercise any authority, and, as has
been shown already, the Throne was constantly in pecuniarily
embarassed circumstances. Nobunaga's father, Nobuhide, had
distinguished himself by subscribing liberally to aid the Court
financially, and this fact being now recalled in the context of
Nobunaga's rapidly rising power, the Emperor, in the year 1562,
despatched Tachiri Munetsugu nominally to worship at the shrine of
Atsuta, but in reality to convey to Nobunaga an Imperial message
directing him to restore order in the capital. The Owari baron
received this envoy with marked respect. It is recorded that he
solemnly performed the ceremony of lustration and clothed himself in
hitherto unworn garments on the occasion of his interview with the
envoy. It was not in his power, however, to make any definite
arrangement as to time. He could only profess his humble
determination to obey the Imperial behest, and promise the utmost
expedition. But there can be no doubt that the arrival of this envoy
decided the question of a march to Kyoto, though some years were
destined to elapse before the project could be carried out.
Two things were necessary, however, namely, a feasible route and a
plausible pretext. Even in those times, when wars were often
undertaken merely for the purpose of deciding personal supremacy,
there remained sufficient public morality to condemn any baron who
suffered himself to be guided openly by ambition alone. Some
reasonably decent cause had to be found. Now the Emperor, though, as
above stated, communicating his will verbally to Nobunaga, had not
sent him any written commission. The necessary pretext was furnished,
however, by the relations between the members of the Saito family of
Mino province, which lay upon the immediate north of Owari, and
constituted the most convenient road to Kyoto. Hidetatsu, the head of
that family, had fought against Nobunaga's father, Nobuhide, and one
of the conditions of peace had been that the daughter of Hidetatsu
should become the wife of Nobunaga.
Subsequently, the Saito household was disturbed by one of the family
feuds so common during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in
Japan. Hidetatsu, desiring to disinherit his eldest son, Yoshitatsu,
had been attacked and killed by the latter, and Nobunaga announced
his intention of avenging the death of his father-in-law. But before
this intention could be carried out, Yoshitatsu died (1561), and his
son, Tatsuoki, a man of little resource or ability, had to bear the
onset from Owari. Nobunaga, at the head of a large force, crossed the
Kiso River into Mino. But he found that, even under the leadership of
Tatsuoki, the Mino men were too strong for him, and he was ultimately
compelled to adopt the device of erecting on the Mino side of the
river a fortress which should serve at once as a basis of military
operations and as a place for establishing relations with the minor
families in the province. The building of this fort proved a very
difficult task, but it was finally accomplished by a clever device on
the part of Hideyoshi, who, a master of intrigue as well as of
military strategy, subsequently won over to Nobunaga's cause many of
the principal vassals of the Saito family, among them being Takenaka
Shigeharu, who afterwards proved a most capable lieutenant to
Hideyoshi.
These preliminaries arranged, Nobunaga once more crossed the Kiso
(1564) at the head of a large army, and after many days of severe
fighting, captured the castle of Inaba-yama, which had been strongly
fortified by Yoshitatsu, and was deemed impregnable. Nobunaga
established his headquarters at this castle, changing its name to
Gifu, and thus extending his dominion over the province of Mino as
well as Owari. He had now to consider whether he would push on at
once into the province of Omi, which alone lay between him and Kyoto,
or whether he would first provide against the danger of a possible
attack on the western littoral of Owari from the direction of Ise. He
chose the latter course, and invaded Ise at the head of a
considerable force. But he here met with a repulse at the hands of
Kusunoki Masatomo, who to the courage and loyalty of his immortal
ancestor, Masashige, added no small measure of strategical ability.
He succeeded in defending his castle of Yada against Nobunaga's
attacks, and finally the Owari general, deceived by a rumour to the
effect that Takeda Shingen had reached the neighbourhood of Gifu with
a strong army, retired hurriedly from Ise.
It may here be mentioned that three years later, in 1568, Hideyoshi
succeeded in inducing all the territorial nobles of northern Ise,
except Kusunoki Masatomo, to place themselves peacefully under
Nobunaga's sway. Hideyoshi's history shows him to have been a
constant believer in the theory that a conquered foe generally
remains an enemy, whereas a conciliated enemy often becomes a friend.
Acting on this conviction and aided by an extraordinary gift of
persuasive eloquence, he often won great victories without any
bloodshed. Thus he succeeded in convincing the Ise barons that
Nobunaga was not swayed by personal ambition, but that his ruling
desire was to put an end to the wars which had devastated Japan
continuously for more than a century. It is right to record that the
failures made by Nobunaga himself in his Ise campaign were in the
sequel of measures taken in opposition to Hideyoshi's advice, and
indeed the annals show that this was true of nearly all the disasters
that overtook Nobunaga throughout his career, whereas his many and
brilliant successes were generally the outcome of Hideyoshi's
counsels.
ANOTHER SUMMONS FROM THE EMPEROR
In November, 1567, the Emperor again sent Tachiri Munetsugu to invite
Nobunaga's presence in Kyoto. His Majesty still refrained from the
dangerous step of giving a written commission to Nobunaga, but he
instructed Munetsugu to carry to the Owari chieftain a suit of armour
and a sword. Two years previously to this event, the tumult in Kyoto
had culminated in an attack on the palace of the shogun Yoshiteru,
the conflagration of the building, and the suicide of the shogun amid
the blazing ruins. Yoshiteru's younger brother, Yoshiaki, effected
his escape from the capital, and wandered about the country during
three years, supplicating one baron after another to take up his
cause. This was in 1568, just nine months after the Emperor's second
message to Nobunaga, and the latter, acting upon Hideyoshi's advice,
determined to become Yoshiaki's champion, since by so doing he would
represent not only the sovereign but also the shogun in the eyes of
the nation. Meanwhile--and this step also was undertaken under
Hideyoshi's advice--a friendly contract had been concluded with Asai
Nagamasa, the most powerful baron in Omi, and the agreement had been
cemented by the marriage of Nobunaga's sister to Nagamasa.
NOBUNAGA PROCEEDS TO KYOTO
In October, 1568, Nobunaga set out for Kyoto at the head of an army
said to have numbered thirty thousand. He did not encounter any
serious resistance on the way, but the coming of his troops threw the
city into consternation, the general apprehension being that the
advent of these provincial warriors would preface a series of
depredations such as the people were only too well accustomed to. But
Nobunaga lost no time in issuing reassuring proclamations, which, in
the sequel, his officers proved themselves thoroughly capable of
enforcing, and before the year closed peace and order were restored
in the capital, Yoshiaki being nominated shogun and all the
ceremonies of Court life being restored. Subsequently, the forces of
the Miyoshi sept made armed attempts to recover the control of the
city, and the shogun asked Nobunaga to appoint one of his most
trusted generals and ablest administrators to maintain peace. It was
fully expected that Nobunaga would respond to this appeal by
nominating Shibata, Sakuma, or Niwa, who had served under his banners
from the outset, and in whose eyes Hideyoshi was a mere upstart. But
Nobunaga selected Hideyoshi, and the result justified his choice, for
during Hideyoshi's sway Kyoto enjoyed such tranquillity as it had not
known for a century.
Nobunaga omitted nothing that could make for the dignity and comfort
of the new shogun. He caused a palace to be erected for him on the
site of the former Nijo Castle, contributions being levied for the
purpose on the five provinces of the Kinai as well as on six others;
and Nobunaga himself personally supervised the work, which was
completed in May, 1569. But it may fairly be doubted whether Nobunaga
acted in all this matter with sincerity. At the outset his attitude
towards the shogun was so respectful and so considerate that Yoshiaki
learned to regard and speak of him as a father. But presently
Nobunaga presented a memorial, charging the shogun with faults which
were set forth in seventeen articles. In this impeachment, Yoshiaki
was accused of neglecting his duties at Court; of failing to
propitiate the territorial nobles; of partiality in meting out
rewards and punishments; of arbitrarily confiscating private
property; of squandering money on needless enterprises; of listening
to flatterers; of going abroad in the disguise of a private person,
and so forth. It is claimed by some of Nobunaga's biographers that he
was perfectly honest in presenting this memorial, but others, whose
judgment appears to be more perspicacious, consider that his chief
object was to discredit Yoshiaki and thus make room for his own
subsequent succession to the shogunate.
At all events Yoshiaki interpreted the memorial in that sense. He
became openly hostile to Nobunaga, and ultimately took up arms.
Nobunaga made many attempts to conciliate him. He even sent Hideyoshi
to solicit Yoshiaki's return to Kyoto from Kawachi whither the shogun
had fled. But Yoshiaki, declining to be placated, placed himself
under the protection of the Mori family, and thus from the year 1573,
Nobunaga became actual wielder of the shogun's authority. Ten years
later, Yoshiaki returned to the capital, took the tonsure and changed
his name to Shozan. At the suggestion of Hideyoshi a title and a
yearly income of ten thousand koku were conferred on him. He died in
Osaka and thus ended the Ashikaga shogunate.
SAKAI
One of the incidents connected with Hideyoshi's administration in
Kyoto illustrates the customs of his time. Within eight miles of the
city of Osaka lies Sakai, a great manufacturing mart. This latter
town, though originally forming part of the Ashikaga domain,
nevertheless assisted the Miyoshi in their attack upon the shogunate.
Nobunaga, much enraged at such action, proposed to sack the town, but
Hideyoshi asked to have the matter left in his hands. This request
being granted, he sent messengers to Sakai, who informed the citizens
that Nobunaga contemplated the destruction of the town by fire.
Thereupon the citizens, preferring to die sword in hand rather than
to be cremated, built forts and made preparations for resistance.
This was just what Hideyoshi designed. Disguising himself, he
repaired to Sakai and asked to be informed as to the object of these
military preparations. Learning the apprehensions of the people, he
ridiculed their fears; declared that Nobunaga had for prime object
the safety and peace of the realm, and that by giving ear to such
wild rumours and assuming a defiant attitude, they had committed a
fault not to be lightly condoned. Delegates were then sent from Sakai
at Hideyoshi's suggestion to explain the facts to Nobunaga, who acted
his part in the drama by ordering the deputies to be thrown into
prison and promising to execute them as well as their fellow
townsmen. In this strait the people of Sakai appealed to a celebrated
Buddhist priest named Kennyo, and through his intercession Hideyoshi
agreed to ransom the town for a payment of twenty thousand ryo. The
funds thus obtained were devoted to the repair of the palaces of the
Emperor and the shogun, a measure which won for Nobunaga the applause
of the whole of Kyoto.
NOBUNAGA'S SITUATION
Oda Nobunaga was now in fact shogun. So far as concerned legalized
power he had no equal in the empire, but his military strength was by
no means proportionate. In the north, in the east, in the west, and
in the south, there were great territorial nobles who could put into
the field armies much larger than all the Owari chief's troops.
Takeda Shingen, in the Kwanto, was the most formidable of these
opponents. In the year 1570, when the events now to be related
occurred, the Hojo sept was under the rule of Ujimasa, and with him
Shingen had concluded an alliance which rendered the latter secure
against attack on the rear in the event of movement against Kyoto.
The better to ensure himself against Hojo designs, Shingen joined
hands with the Satomi family in Awa, and the Satake family in
Hitachi; while to provide against irruptions by the Uesugi family he
enlisted the co-operation of the priests in Kaga, Echizen, and Noto.
Shingen further established relations of friendship with Matsunaga
Hisahide in the far west. It was this baron that had attacked the
palace of Nijo when Yoshiteru, the shogun, had to commit suicide, and
Shingen's object in approaching him was to sow seeds of discord
between the shogunate and Nobunaga. Most imminent of all perils,
however, was the menace of the Asai family in Omi, and the Asakura
family in Echizen. A glance at the map shows that the Asai were in a
position to sever Nobunaga's communications with his base in Mino,
and that the Asakura were in a position to cut off his communications
with Kyoto. In this perilous situation Nobunaga's sole resource lay
in Tokugawa Ieyasu and in the latter's alliance with the Uesugi,
which compact the Owari chief spared no pains to solidify. But from a
military point of view Ieyasu was incomparably weaker than Shingen.
THE STRUGGLE WITH THE ASAKURA AND THE ASAI
In 1570, Nobunaga determined to put his fortunes to a final test.
Having concentrated a large body of troops in Kyoto, he declared war
against Asakura Yoshikage, who had refused to recognize the new
shogun. Success crowned the early efforts of the Owari forces in this
war, but the whole situation was changed by Asai Nagamasa, who
suddenly marched out of Omi and threatened to attack Nobunaga's rear.
It is true that before setting out for Kyoto originally, Nobunaga had
given his sister in marriage to Nagamasa, and had thus invited the
latter's friendship. But Nagamasa had always been on terms of close
amity with Yoshikage, and, indeed, had stipulated from the outset
that Nobunaga should not make war against the latter. It cannot be
said, therefore, that Nagamasa's move constituted a surprise.
Nobunaga should have been well prepared for such contingencies. He
was not prepared, however, and the result was that he found himself
menaced by Yoshikage's army in front and by Nagamasa's in rear.
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had associated himself by invitation with this
expedition into Echizen, advised Nobunaga to countermarch with all
rapidity for Kyoto, and it was so determined. Hideyoshi was left with
three thousand men to hold Yoshikage's forces in some degree of
check.
The situation at that moment was well-nigh desperate. There seemed to
be no hope for either Nobunaga or Hideyoshi. But Nobunaga was saved
by the slowness of Nagamasa, who, had he moved with any rapidity,
must have reached Kyoto in advance of Nobunaga's forces; and
Hideyoshi was saved by an exercise of the wonderful resourcefulness
which peril always awoke in this great man. Calculating that
Yoshikage's army would reach Kanagasaki Castle at nightfall,
Hideyoshi, by means of thousands of lanterns and banners gave to a
few scores of men a semblance of a numerous army. Yoshikage, who
believed that Nobunaga had retired, was visited by doubts at the
aspect of this great array, and instead of advancing to attack at
once, he decided to await the morning. Meanwhile, Hideyoshi with his
little band of troops, moved round Yoshikage's flank, and delivering
a fierce attack at midnight, completely defeated the Echizen forces.*
*See A New Life of Toyolomi Hideyoshi, by W. Dening.
This episode was, of course, not conclusive. It merely showed that so
long as Nagamasa and Yoshikage worked in combination, Nobunaga's
position in Kyoto and his communications with his base in Mino must
remain insecure. He himself would have directed his forces at once
against Nagamasa, but Hideyoshi contended that the wiser plan would
be to endeavour to win over some of the minor barons whose
strongholds lay on the confines of Omi and Mino. This was gradually
accomplished, and after an unsuccessful attempt upon the part of
Sasaki Shotei of Omi to capture a castle (Choko-ji) which was under
the command of Nobunaga's chief general, Katsuiye, the Owari forces
were put in motion against Nagamasa's principal strongholds, Otani
and Yoko-yama. The former was attacked first, Nobunaga being assisted
by a contingent of five thousand men under the command of Ieyasu.
Three days of repeated assaults failed to reduce the castle, and
during that interval Nagamasa and Yoshikage were able to enter the
field at the head of a force which greatly outnumbered the Owari
army.
In midsummer, 1570, there was fought, on the banks of the Ane-gawa,
one of the great battles of Japanese history. It resulted in the
complete discomfiture of the Echizen chieftains. The records say that
three thousand of their followers were killed and that among them
were ten general officers. The castle of Otani, however, remained in
Nagamasa's hands. Nobunaga now retired to his headquarters in Gifu to
rest his forces.
But he was quickly summoned again to the field by a revolt on the
part of the Buddhist priests in the province of Settsu, under the
banner of Miyoshi Yoshitsugu and Saito Tatsuoki. Nobunaga's attempt
to quell this insurrection was unsuccessful, and immediately Nagamasa
and Yoshikage seized the occasion to march upon Kyoto. The priests of
Hiei-zan received them with open arms, and they occupied on the
monastery's commanding site, a position well-nigh impregnable, from
which they constantly menaced the capital. It was now the
commencement of winter. For the invading troops to hold their own
upon Hiei-zan throughout the winter would have been even more
difficult than for Nobunaga's army to cut off their avenues of
retreat and supply.
In these circumstances peace presented itself to both sides as the
most feasible plan, and the forces of Nagamasa and Yoshikage were
allowed to march away unmolested to Omi and Echizen, respectively.
This result was intensely mortifying to Hideyoshi, who had devoted
his whole energies to the destruction of these dangerous enemies. But
the final issue was only postponed. By contrivances, which need not
be related in detail, Nagamasa was again induced to take the field,
and, in 1573, the Owari forces found themselves once more confronted
by the allied armies of Echizen and Omi. By clever strategy the
Echizen baron was induced to take the fatal step of separating
himself from his Omi colleague, and at Tone-yama he sustained a
crushing defeat, leaving two thousand of his men and twenty-three of
his captains dead upon the field. He himself fled and for a time
remained concealed, but ultimately, being closely menaced with
capture, he committed suicide. Meanwhile, Nagamasa had withdrawn to
his stronghold of Otani, where he was besieged by Nobunaga. The
castle ultimately fell, Nagamasa and his son dying by their own
hands.
This year witnessed also the death of Takeda Shingen, and thus
Nobunaga not only established his sway over the whole of the
provinces of Omi and Echizen but also was relieved from the constant
menace of a formidable attack by a captain to whom public opinion
justly attributed the leading place among Japanese strategists. The
whole of Nagamasa's estates, yielding an annual return of 180,000
koku, was given to Hideyoshi, and he was ordered to assume the
command of Otani Castle, whence, however, he moved shortly afterwards
to Nagahama.
HIEI-ZAN
It was now possible for Nobunaga to devote his entire attention to
the soldier-priests who had allied themselves with his enemies. It
has been shown that the monastery of Hiei-zan had afforded shelter
and sustenance to the forces of Echizen and Omi during the winter of
1570-1571, and it has been shown also that Nobunaga, underrating the
strength of the priests in the province of Settsu, sustained defeat
at their hands. He now (1574) sent an army to hold the soldier-monks
of Settsu in check while he himself dealt with Hiei-zan. This great
monastery, as already shown, was erected in the ninth century in
obedience to the Buddhist superstition that the northeastern quarter
of the heavens is the "Demon's Gate," and that a temple must be
erected there to afford security against evil influences. The temple
on Hiei-zan had received the munificent patronage of monarch after
monarch, and had grown to be a huge monastery, containing some three
thousand priests. This miniature city completely commanded Kyoto, and
was guarded in front by a great lake. But, above all, it was
sanctified by the superstition of the people, and when Nobunaga
invested it, he found the greatest reluctance on the part of his
generals to proceed to extremities. Nevertheless, he overcame these
scruples, and drawing a cordon of troops round the great monastery,
he applied the torch to the buildings, burnt to death nearly all its
inmates, including women, confiscated its estates, and built, for
purposes of future prevention, a castle at Sakamoto, which was placed
under the command of Akechi Mitsuhide. When, in after years, this
same Mitsuhide treacherously compassed Nobunaga's death, men said
that the opening of the Demon's Gate had entailed its due penalty.
OTHER PRIESTLY DISTURBANCES
It was not in Settsu and at Hiei-zan only that the Buddhist soldiers
turned their weapons against Nobunaga. The Asai sept received
assistance from no less than ten temples in Omi; the Asakura family
had the ranks of its soldiers recruited from monasteries in Echizen
and Kaga; the Saito clan received aid from the bonzes in Izumi and
Iga, and the priests of the great temple Hongwan-ji in Osaka were in
friendly communication with the Mori sept in the west, with the
Takeda in Kai, and with the Hojo in Sagami. In fact, the difficulties
encountered by Nobunaga in his attempts to bring the whole empire
under the affective sway of the Throne were incalculably accentuated
by the hostility of the great Shin sect of Buddhism. He dealt
effectually with all except the monastery at Ishi-yama in Osaka. The
immense natural strength of the position and the strategical ability
of its lord-abbot, Kosa, enabled it to defy all the assaults of the
Owari chief, and it was not until 1588--six years after Nobunaga's
death--that, through the intervention of the Emperor, peace was
finally restored. After eleven years of almost incessant struggle,
his Majesty's envoy, Konoe Sakihisa, succeeded in inducing the Ikko
priests to lay down their arms. It will be presently seen that the
inveterate hostility shown by the Buddhists to Nobunaga was largely
responsible for his favourable attitude towards Christianity.
THE CASTLE OF AZUCHI
The lightness and flimsiness of construction in Japanese houses has
been noted already several times. Even though there was continual
warfare in the provinces of family against family, the character of
the fighting and of the weapons used was such that there was little
need for the building of elaborate defenses, and there was
practically nothing worthy the name of a castle. Watch-towers had
been built and roofs and walls were sometimes protected by putting
nails in the building points outward,--a sort of chevaux de frise.
But a system of outlying defenses, ditch, earthen wall and wooden
palisade, was all that was used so long as fighting was either
hand-to-hand or with missiles no more penetrating than arrows. But
when fire-arms were introduced in 1542, massively constructed castles
began to be built. These were in general patterned after Western
models, but with many minor modifications.
The first of these fortresses was built at Azuchi, in Omi, under the
auspices of Oda Nobunaga. Commenced in 1576, the work was completed
in 1579. In the centre of the castle rose a tower ninety feet high,
standing on a massive stone basement seventy-two feet in height, the
whole forming a structure absolutely without precedent in Japan. The
tower was of wood, and had, therefore, no capacity for resisting
cannon. But, as a matter of fact, artillery can scarcely be said to
have been used in Japan until modern days. Nobunaga's castle is
stated by some historians to have been partially attributable to
Christianity, but this theory seems to rest solely upon the fact that
the central tower was known as Tenshu-kaku, or the "tower of the lord
of Heaven." There were more numerous indications that the spirit of
Buddhism influenced the architect, for in one of the highest storeys
of the tower, the four "guardian kings" were placed, and in the lower
chamber stood an effigy of Tamon (Ananda). The cost of constructing
this colossal edifice was very heavy, and funds had to be collected
from the whole of the eleven provinces then under Nobunaga's sway.
NOBUNAGA AND IEYASU
It has already been noted that Ieyasu was Nobunaga's sole ally in the
east of Japan at the time of the fall of the Imagawa clan. It has
also been noted that Ujizane, the son of Imagawa Yoshimoto, was a
negligible quantity. During many years, however, Ieyasu had to stand
constantly on the defensive against Takeda Shingen. But, in 1572,
Shingen and Ieyasu made a compact against the Imagawa, and this was
followed by a successful campaign on the part of the Tokugawa leader
against Ujizane. The agreement between Shingen and Ieyasu lasted only
a short time. In November, 1572, Shingen led a large force and seized
two of the Tokugawa castles, menacing the third and most important at
Hamamatsu, where Ieyasu himself was in command. Nobunaga thereupon
despatched an army to succour his ally, and in January, 1573, a
series of bloody engagements took place outside Hamamatsu. One
of Nobunaga's generals fled; another died in battle, and Ieyasu
barely escaped into the castle, which he saved by a desperate
device--leaving the gates open and thus suggesting to the enemy that
they would be ambushed if they entered. This battle, known in history
as the War of Mikata-ga-hara, was the greatest calamity that ever
befell Ieyasu, and that he would have suffered worse things at the
hands of Takeda Shingen cannot be doubted, had not Shingen's death
taken place in May, 1573.
Various traditions have been handed down about the demise of this
celebrated captain, undoubtedly one of the greatest strategists Japan
ever possessed. Some say that he was shot by a soldier of Ieyasu;
others that he was hit by a stray bullet, but the best authorities
agree that he died of illness. His son, Katsuyori, inherited none of
his father's great qualities except his bravery. Immediately on
coming into power, he moved a large army against the castle of
Nagashino in the province of Mikawa, one of Ieyasu's strongholds.
This was in June, 1575, and on the news reaching Nobunaga, the latter
lost no time in setting out to succour his ally. On the way a samurai
named Torii Suneemon arrived from the garrison of Nagashino with news
that unless succour were speedily given the fortress could not hold
out. This message reached Ieyasu, who was awaiting the arrival of
Nobunaga before marching to the relief of the beleagured fortress.
Ieyasu assured the messenger that help would come on the morrow, and
urged Suneemon not to essay to re-enter the fortress. But the man
declared that he must carry the tidings to his hard-set comrades. He
was taken prisoner by the enemy and led into the presence of
Katsuyori, who assured him that his life would be spared if he
informed the inmates of the castle that no aid could be hoped for.
Suneemon simulated consent. Despatched under escort to the
neighbourhood of the fort, he was permitted to address the garrison,
and in a loud voice he shouted to his comrades that within a short
time they might look for succour. He was immediately killed by his
escort.
This dramatic episode became a household tradition in Japan. Side by
side with it may be set the fact that Hideyoshi, who accompanied
Nobunaga in this campaign, employed successfully against the enemy
one of the devices recommended by the Chinese strategists, whose
books on the method of conducting warfare were closely studied in
those days by the Japanese. Sakuma Nobumori, one of Nobunaga's
captains, was openly, and of set purpose, insulted and beaten by
orders of his general, and thereafter he escaped to the camp of the
Takeda army, pretending that the evil treatment he had undergone was
too much for his loyalty. Katsuyori, the Takeda commander, received
the fugitive with open arms, and acting in accordance with his
advice, disposed his troops in such a manner as to forfeit all the
advantages of the position. The battle that ensued is memorable as
the first historical instance of the use of firearms on any
considerable scale in a Japanese campaign. Nobunaga's men took
shelter themselves behind palisades and fusilladed the enemy so hotly
that the old-fashioned hand-to-hand fighting became almost
impossible. The losses of the Takeda men were enormous, and it may be
said that the tactics of the era underwent radical alteration from
that time, so that the fight at Takinosawa is memorable in Japanese
history. Hideyoshi urged the advisability of pushing on at once to
Katsuyori's capital, but Nobunaga hesitated to make such a call upon
the energies of his troops, and the final overthrow of the Takeda
chief was postponed.
MILITARY TACTICS
The Mongol invasion should have taught to the Japanese the great
advantages of co-operating military units, but individual prowess
continued to be the guiding factor of field tactics in Japan down to
the second half of the sixteenth century, when the introduction of
firearms inspired new methods. Japanese historians have not much to
say upon this subject. Indeed Rai Sanyo, in the Nihon-gwaishi, may
almost be said to be the sole authority. He writes as follows: "The
generalship of Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin was something quite
new in the country at their time. Prior to their day the art of
manoeuvring troops had been little studied. Armies met, but each
individual that composed them relied on his personal prowess and
strength for victory. These two barons, however, made a special study
of strategy and military tactics, with the result that they became
authorities on the various methods of handling troops. In reference
to the employment of cavalry, the Genji warriors and the first of the
Ashikaga shoguns made use of horses largely, but in later days the
Ashikaga did not move away from Kyoto and had no use for horses.
Nobunaga, being near Kyoto, and most of the wars in which he engaged
involving no very long marches, relied almost solely on infantry.
Both Takeda and Uesugi were well supplied with mounted troops, but
owing to the hilly nature of their territories, they made no special
study of cavalry exercises and, almost invariably, the soldiers
employed their horses solely for rapid movement from one place to
another; when a battle commenced they alighted and fought on foot. It
is therefore correct to say that at this time cavalry had gone out of
use. Bows and arrows were, of course, superseded when firearms came
into use.
"Thenceforth, the gun and the long spear were the chief weapons
relied on. Peasants did not rank as soldiers, but their services were
variously utilized in time of war. They were trained in the use of
muskets, and of bows and arrows on hunting expeditions, and thus,
when hostilities broke out, they were able to render considerable
assistance in the defense of their houses. Highwaymen were frequently
employed as spies and scouts. Both Takeda and Uesugi sanctioned this
practice. These two generals also agreed in approving the following
tactical arrangement: the van-guard, consisting of musketeers,
artillerymen, and archers, was followed by companies of infantry
armed with long spears. Then came the cavalry, and after them the
main body, attached to which were drummers and conch-blowers. The
whole army was divided into right and left wings, and a body of men
was kept in reserve. At the opening of the battle, the horsemen
dismounted and advanced on foot. This order was occasionally modified
to suit altered circumstances, but as a rule, it was strictly
followed."*
*Quoted by W. Dening in A New Life of Hideyoshi.
The artillery mentioned in the above quotation must be taken in a
strictly limited sense. Indeed, it would be more correct to speak of
heavy muskets, for cannon, properly so called, may scarcely be said
to have formed any part of the equipment of a Japanese army until
modern times. When the Portuguese discovered Japan, in 1542, they
introduced the musket to the Japanese, and the weapon was long known
as Tanegashima, that being the name of the island where the
Portuguese ship first touched. Thenceforth, the manufacture of
firearms was carried on with more or less success at various places,
especially Sakai in Izumi and Negoro in Kii. "Small guns" (kozutsu)
and "large guns" (ozutsu) are mentioned in the annals of the time,
but by ozutsuwe must understand muskets of large calibre rather than
cannon.
INVASION OF CHUGOKU.
At this time nearly the whole of central Japan (Chugoku) was under
the sway of Mori Terumoto, who succeeded his grandfather, Motonari,
head of the great Mori family and ancestor of the present Prince
Mori. One of these central provinces, namely, Harima, had just been
the scene of a revolt which Hideyoshi crushed by his wonted
combination of cajolery and conquest. The ease with which this feat
was accomplished and the expediency of maintaining the sequence of
successes induced Hideyoshi to propose that the subjugation of the
whole of central Japan should be entrusted to him and that he should
be allowed to adopt Nobunaga's second son, Hidekatsu, to whom the
rule of Chugoku should be entrusted, Hideyoshi keeping for himself
only the outlying portions. Nobunaga readily agreed, and, in 1577,
Hideyoshi set out on this important expedition, with a force of some
ten thousand men, all fully equipped and highly trained. It is
noteworthy that, before leaving Azuchi, Hideyoshi declared to
Nobunaga his intention of conquering Kyushu after the reduction of
Chugoku, and thereafter he announced his purpose of crossing to Korea
and making that country the basis of a campaign against China. "When
that is effected," Hideyoshi is quoted as saying, "the three
countries, China, Korea, and Japan, will be one. I shall do it all as
easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his
arm."
It is evident from these words that the project of invading Korea and
China was entertained by Hideyoshi nearly twenty years before--as
will presently be seen--he attempted to carry it into practice.
Hideyoshi marched in the first place to Harima, where his operations
were so vigorous and so successful that Ukita Naoiye, who held the
neighbouring provinces of Bizen and Mimasaka under the suzerainty of
Mori Terumoto, espoused Nobunaga's cause without fighting. It is
unnecessary to follow the details of the campaign that ensued. It
lasted for five years, and ended in the subjection of as many
provinces, namely, Harima, Tamba, Tango, Tajima, and Inaba. Hideyoshi
then returned to Azuchi and presented to Nobunaga an immense quantity
of spolia opima which are said to have exceeded five thousand in
number and to have covered all the ground around the castle.
DESTRUCTION OF THE TAKEDA
Shortly before Hideyoshi's triumphant return from his first brilliant
campaign in the central provinces, a memorable event occurred in Kai.
Nobunaga's eldest son, Nobutada, uniting his forces with those of
Ieyasu, completely destroyed the army of Takeda Katsuyori at
Temmoku-zan, in the province of Kai. So thorough was the victory that
Katsuyori and his son both committed suicide. Nobunaga then gave the
province of Suruga to Ieyasu, and divided Shinano and Kotsuke into
manors, which were distributed among the Owari generals as rewards.
Takigawa Kazumasu was nominated kwanryo of the Kwanto, chiefly in
order to watch and restrain the movements of the Hojo family, now the
only formidable enemy of Nobunaga in the east.
RESUMPTION OF THE CHUGOKU CAMPAIGN
After a brief rest, Hideyoshi again left Kyoto for the central
provinces. He commenced operations on this second occasion by
invading the island of Awaji, and having reduced it, he passed on to
Bitchu, where he invested the important castle of Takamatsu, then
under the command of Shimizu Muneharu. This stronghold was so well
planned and had such great natural advantages that Hideyoshi
abstained from any attempt to carry it by assault, and had recourse
to the device of damming and banking a river so as to flood the
fortress. About two miles and a half of embankment had to be made,
and during the progress of the work, Mori Terumoto, who had been
conducting a campaign elsewhere, found time to march a strong army to
the relief of Takamatsu. But Terumoto, acting on the advice of his
best generals, refrained from attacking Hideyoshi's army. He sought
rather to invite an onset from Hideyoshi, so that, during the
progress of the combat, the garrison might find an opportunity to
destroy the embankment. Hideyoshi, however, was much too astute to be
tempted by such tactics. He saw that the fate of the castle must be
sealed in a few days, and he refrained from any offensive movement.
But, in order to gratify Nobunaga by simulating need of his
assistance, a despatch was sent to Azuchi begging him to come and
personally direct the capture of the fort and the shattering of
Terumoto's army.
ASSASSINATION OF NOBUNAGA
Among Nobunaga's vassal barons at that time was Akechi Mitsuhide. A
scion of the illustrious family of Seiwa Genji, Mitsuhide had served
under several suzerains prior to 1566, when he repaired to Gifu and
offered his sword to Nobunaga. Five years afterwards he received a
fief of one hundred thousand koku and the title of Hyuga no Kami.
This rapid promotion made him Nobunaga's debtor, but a shocking
event, which occurred in 1577, seems to have inspired him with the
deepest resentment against his patron. Mitsuhide, besieging the
castle of Yakami in Tamba province, promised quarter to the brothers
Hatano, who commanded its defence, and gave his own mother as
hostage. But Nobunaga, disregarding this promise, put the Hatano
brothers to the sword, and the latter's adherents avenged themselves
by slaughtering Mitsuhide's mother. The best informed belief is that
this incident converted Mitsuhide into Nobunaga's bitter enemy, and
that the spirit of revenge was fostered by insults to which Nobunaga,
always passionate and rough, publicly subjected Mitsuhide. At all
events, when, as stated above, Hideyoshi's message of invitation
reached Nobunaga at Azuchi, the latter gave orders for the despatch
of a strong force to Takamatsu, one body, consisting of some thirty
thousand men, being placed under the command of Mitsuhide. Nobunaga
himself repaired to Kyoto and took up his quarters at the temple
Honno-ji, whence he intended to follow his armies to the central
provinces.
Mitsuhide concluded that his opportunity had now come. He determined
to kill Nobunaga, and then to join hands with Mori Terumoto. He made
known his design to a few of his retainers, and these attempted
fruitlessly to dissuade him, but, seeing that his resolution was
irrevocable, they agreed to assist him. The troops were duly
assembled and put in motion, but instead of taking the road westward,
they received an unexpected intimation, "The enemy is in Honno-ji,"
and their route was altered accordingly. Nobunaga defended himself
valiantly. But being at last severely wounded and recognizing the
hopelessness of resistance, he set fire to the temple and committed
suicide, his fourteen-year-old son, Katsunaga, perishing with him.
His eldest son, Nobutada, who had just returned from the campaign in
the east, followed his father to Kyoto, and was sojourning in the
temple Myogaku-ji when news reached him of Mitsuhide's treachery. He
attempted to succour his father, but arrived too late. Then he
repaired to the Nijo palace and, having entrusted his infant son to
the care of Maeda Gen-i with instructions to carry him to Kiyosu, he
made preparation for defence against Mitsuhide. Finally, overwhelmed
by numbers, he killed himself, and his example was followed by ninety
of his retainers. Mitsuhide then proceeded to Azuchi and having
pillaged the castle, returned to Kyoto, where he was received in
audience by the Emperor, and he then took the title of shogun.
AFTER THE ASSASSINATION