While the initial test of strength was being determined west of
Gettysburg by advance units, the main bulk of the two armies was
pounding over the roads from the north and south, converging upon the
ground chosen by Buford. Rodes’ Confederates, hurrying southward from
Carlisle to meet Lee at Cashtown, received orders at Biglerville to
march to Gettysburg. Early, returning from York with Cashtown as his
objective, learned at Heidlersburg of the action at Gettysburg and was
ordered to approach by way of the Harrisburg Road.
[Illustration: _Chambersburg Pike, looking westward from the Federal
position toward Herr Ridge, where the Confederate attack began._]
Employing the wooded ridge as a screen from Union cavalry north of
Gettysburg, Rodes brought his guns into position on Oak Ridge about 1
o’clock and opened fire on the flank of Gen. Abner Doubleday, Reynolds’
successor, on McPherson Ridge. The Union commander shifted his lines
northeastward to Oak Ridge and the Mummasburg Road to meet the new
attack. Rodes’ Confederates struck the Union positions at the stone wall
on the ridge, but the attack was not well coordinated and resulted in
failure. Iverson’s brigade was nearly annihilated as it made a left
wheel to strike from the west. In the meantime, more Union troops had
arrived on the field by way of the Taneytown Road. Two divisions of
Howard’s Eleventh corps were now taking position in the plain north of
the town, intending to make contact with Doubleday’s troops on Oak
Ridge.
Doles’ Confederate brigade charged across the plain and was able to
force Howard’s troops back temporarily, but it was the opportune
approach of Early’s division from the northeast on the Harrisburg Road
which rendered the Union position north of Gettysburg indefensible.
Arriving in the early afternoon as the Union men were establishing their
position, Early struck with tremendous force, first with his artillery
and then with his infantry, against General Barlow. Soon he had
shattered the entire Union force. The remnants broke and turned
southward through Gettysburg in the direction of Cemetery Hill. In this
headlong and disorganized flight General Schimmelfenning was lost from
his command, and, finding refuge in a shed, he lay 2 days concealed
within the Confederate lines. In the path of Early’s onslaught lay the
youthful Brigadier Barlow severely wounded, and the gallant Lieut.
Bayard Wilkeson, whose battery had long stood against overwhelming odds,
mortally wounded.
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
The Union men on Oak Ridge, faced with the danger that Doles would cut
off their line of retreat, gave way and retired through Gettysburg to
Cemetery Hill. The withdrawal of the Union troops from the north and
northwest left the Union position on McPherson Ridge untenable. Early in
the afternoon, when Rodes opened fire from Oak Hill, Heth had renewed
his thrust along the Chambersburg Pike. His troops were soon relieved
and Pender’s division, striking north and south of the road, broke the
Union line. The Union troops first withdrew to Seminary Ridge, then
across the fields to Cemetery Hill. Here was advantageous ground which
had been selected as a rallying point if the men were forced to
relinquish the ground west and north of the town. Thus, by 5 o’clock,
the remnants of the Union forces (some 6,000 out of the 18,000 engaged
in the first day’s struggle) were on the hills south of Gettysburg.
Ewell was now in possession of the town, and he extended his line from
the streets eastward to Rock Creek. Studiously observing the hills in
his front, he came within range of a Union sharpshooter, for suddenly he
heard the thud of a minie ball. Calmly riding on, he remarked to General
Gordon at his side, “You see how much better fixed for a fight I am than
you are. It don’t hurt at all to be shot in a wooden leg.”
A momentous decision now had to be made. Lee had reached the field at 3
p. m., and had witnessed the retreat of the disorganized Union troops
through the streets of Gettysburg. Through his glasses he had watched
their attempt to reestablish their lines on Cemetery Hill. Sensing his
advantage and a great opportunity, he sent orders to Ewell by a staff
officer to “press those people” and secure the hill (Cemetery Hill) if
possible. However, two of Ewell’s divisions, those of Rodes and Early,
had been heavily engaged throughout the afternoon and were not well in
hand. Johnson’s division could not reach the field until late in the
evening, and the reconnaissance service of Stuart’s cavalry was not yet
available. General Ewell, uninformed of the Union strength in the rear
of the hills south of Gettysburg, decided to await the arrival of
Johnson’s division. Cemetery Hill was not attacked, and Johnson, coming
up late in the evening, stopped at the base of Culp’s Hill. Thus passed
Lee’s opportunity of July 1.
[Illustration: _Scene north of Gettysburg from Oak Ridge. The
Federal position may be seen near the edge of the open fields in the
middle distance._]
When the Union troops retreated from the battleground north and west of
the town on the evening of July 1, they hastily occupied defense
positions on Cemetery Hill, Culp’s Hill, and a part of Cemetery Ridge.
Upon the arrival of Slocum by the Baltimore Pike and Sickles by way of
the Emmitsburg Road, the Union right flank at Culp’s Hill and Spangler’s
Spring and the important position at Little Round Top on the left were
consolidated. Thus was developed a strong defensive battle line in the
shape of a fish hook, about 3 miles long, with the advantage of high
ground and of interior lines. Opposite, in a semicircle about 6 miles
long, extending down Seminary Ridge and into the streets of Gettysburg,
stood the Confederates who, during the night, had closed in from the
north and west.
The greater part of the citizenry of Gettysburg, despite the prospect of
battle in their own yards, chose to remain in their homes. Both army
commanders respected noncombatant rights to a marked degree. Thus, in
contrast with the fields of carnage all about the village, life and
property of the civilian population remained unharmed, while the doors
of churches, schools, and homes were opened for the care of the wounded.
General Meade, at Taneytown, had learned early in the afternoon of July
1 that a battle was developing and that Reynolds had been killed. A
large part of his army was within 5 miles of Gettysburg. Meade then sent
General Hancock to study and report on the situation. Hancock reached
the field just as the Union troops were falling back to Cemetery Hill.
He helped to rally the troops and left at 6 o’clock to report to Meade
that in his opinion the battle should be fought at Gettysburg. Meade
acted on this recommendation and immediately ordered the concentration
of the Union forces at that place. Meade himself arrived near midnight
on July 1.
[Illustration: _Spangler’s Spring, the right of the Federal battle
line of July 2 and 3. This view, made in 1870, shows the wartime
appearance of the spring._ (Tipton photograph.)]
[Illustration: _View of Culp’s Hill, taken about 1890, showing
earthworks on the crest of the hill. Gettysburg, one-half mile
northwest, may be seen through the vista._ (Tipton photograph.)]
_The Second Day_