[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER NINE_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System,
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents
_GETTYSBURG_
NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
Pennsylvania
_by Frederick Tilberg_
[Illustration: Drum]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 9
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1954
(Reprint 1961)
_The National Park System, of which Gettysburg National Military Park is
a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic
heritage of the United States for the benefit and inspiration of its
people._
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
_Contents_
Page
THE SITUATION, SPRING 1863 1
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 4
THE FIRST DAY 6
The Two Armies Converge on Gettysburg 6
The Battle of Oak Ridge 8
THE SECOND DAY 12
Preliminary Movements and Plans 12
Longstreet Attacks on the Right 15
Warren Saves Little Round Top 15
Culp’s Hill 17
THE THIRD DAY 19
Cannonade at Dawn: Culp’s Hill and Spangler’s Spring 19
Lee Plans a Final Thrust 21
Lee and Meade Set the Stage 22
Artillery Duel at One O’clock 27
Climax at Gettysburg 29
Cavalry Action 31
END OF INVASION 33
LINCOLN AND GETTYSBURG 35
Establishment of a Burial Ground 35
Dedication of the Cemetery 37
Genesis of the Gettysburg Address 42
The Five Autograph Copies of the Gettysburg Address 43
Soldiers’ National Monument 43
The Lincoln Address Memorial 44
GUIDE TOUR OF THE PARK 45
THE PARK 50
ANNIVERSARY REUNIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR VETERANS 50
HOW TO REACH THE PARK 50
ADMINISTRATION 51
RELATED AREAS 51
VISITOR FACILITIES 51
[Illustration: _The field of Pickett’s Charge, with his attack on
the Union position at The Angle in the foreground._ From the
Philippoteaux painting in the Gettysburg Cyclorama.]
[Illustration: Cannon]
On the gently rolling farm lands surrounding the little town of
Gettysburg, Pa., was fought one of the great decisive battles of
American history. For 3 days, from July 1 to 3, 1863, a gigantic
struggle between 75,000 Confederates and 88,000 Union troops raged about
the town and left 51,000 casualties in its wake. Heroic deeds were
numerous on both sides, climaxed by the famed Confederate assault on
July 3 which has become known throughout the world as Pickett’s Charge.
The Union victory gained on these fields ended the last Confederate
invasion of the North and marked the beginning of a gradual decline in
Southern military power.
Here also, a few months after the battle, Abraham Lincoln delivered his
classic Gettysburg Address at the dedication of the national cemetery
set apart as a burial ground for the soldiers who died in the conflict.
_The Situation, Spring 1863_
The situation in which the Confederacy found itself in the late spring
of 1863 called for decisive action. The Union and Confederate armies had
faced each other on the Rappahannock River, near Fredericksburg, Va.,
for 6 months. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by
Gen. R. E. Lee, had defeated the Union forces at Fredericksburg in
December 1862 and again at Chancellorsville in May 1863, but the nature
of the ground gave Lee little opportunity to follow up his advantage.
When he began moving his army westward, on June 3, he hoped, at least,
to draw his opponent away from the river to a more advantageous
battleground. At most, he might carry the war into northern territory,
where supplies could be taken from the enemy and a victory could be
fully exploited. Even a fairly narrow margin of victory might enable Lee
to capture one or more key cities and perhaps increase northern demands
for a negotiated peace.
[Illustration: THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, Commander of the
Union Forces at Gettysburg._ Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Gen. Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Confederate
Army at Gettysburg._ Courtesy National Archives.]
Confederate strategists had considered sending aid from Lee’s army to
Vicksburg, which Grant was then besieging, or dispatching help to
General Bragg for his campaign against Rosecrans in Tennessee. They
concluded, however, that Vicksburg could hold out until climatic
conditions would force Grant to withdraw, and they reasoned that the
eastern campaign was more important than that of Tennessee.
Both Union and Confederate governments had bitter opponents at home.
Southern generals, reading in Northern newspapers the clamors for peace,
had reason to believe that their foe’s morale was fast weakening. They
felt that the Army of Northern Virginia would continue to demonstrate
its superiority over the Union Army of the Potomac and that the relief
from constant campaigning on their own soil would have a happy effect on
Southern spirit. Events were to prove, however, that the chief result of
the intense alarm created by the invasion was to rally the populace to
better support of the Union government.
[Illustration: _Statue of General Meade, located on Cemetery
Ridge._]
[Illustration: _The Virginia Memorial, surmounted by the statue of
General Lee, on Seminary Ridge._]
[Illustration: _Gettysburg, as it appeared from Seminary Ridge a
short time after the battle._ (Brady photograph.)]
_The Plan of Campaign_
Lee’s plan of campaign was undoubtedly similar to that of his invasion
which ended in the battle of Antietam in September 1862. He then called
attention to the need of destroying the bridge over the Susquehanna
River at Harrisburg and of disabling the Pennsylvania Railroad in order
to sever communication with the west. “After that,” he added, “I can
turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington as may seem
best for our interest.”
Lee had suffered an irreparable loss at Chancellorsville when
“Stonewall” Jackson was mortally wounded. Now reorganized into three
infantry corps under Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and R. S. Ewell, and a
cavalry division under J. E. B. Stuart, a changed Army of Northern
Virginia faced the great test that lay ahead. “Stonewall” Jackson, the
right hand of Lee, and in the words of the latter “the finest executive
officer the sun ever shone on,” was no longer present to lead his corps
in battle.
The long lines of gray started moving on June 3 from Fredericksburg,
Va., first northwestward across the Blue Ridge, then northward in the
Shenandoah Valley. On June 9, one of the greatest cavalry engagements of
the war occurred at Brandy Station. Union horsemen, for the first time,
held Stuart’s men on even terms. The Confederates then continued their
march northward, with the right flank constantly protected by Stuart’s
cavalry, which occupied the passes of the Blue Ridge. Stuart was ordered
to hold these mountain gaps until the advance into Pennsylvania had
drawn the Union Army north of the Potomac. On June 28, Hill and
Longstreet reached Chambersburg, 16 miles north of the Pennsylvania
boundary. Rodes’ division of Ewell’s corps reached Carlisle on June 27.
Early’s command of 8,000 men had passed through Gettysburg on June 26
and on the 28th had reached York. Early planned to take possession of
the bridge over the Susquehanna at Columbia, and to move on Harrisburg
from the east. Lee’s converging movement on Harrisburg seemed to be on
the eve of success.
An unforeseen shift of events between June 25 and 28, however,
threatened to deprive Lee of every advantage he had thus far gained in
his daring march up the Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys. The cavalry
engagement between Stuart and Pleasonton at Brandy Station convinced
Gen. Joseph Hooker, then in command of the Union Army, that the
Confederate Army was moving northward. President Lincoln and General in
Chief Halleck, informed of this movement, ordered Hooker to proceed
northward and to keep his command between the Confederate Army and
Washington. When he was refused permission to abandon Harpers Ferry, and
to add the garrison of 10,000 men to his army, Hooker asked to be
relieved of command. Gen. George G. Meade received orders to assume
command of the army at Frederick, Md., on June 28, and he at once
continued the march northward.
General Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry, had obtained
conditional approval from Lee to operate against the rear of the Union
Army as it marched northward and then to join Lee north of the Potomac.
As he passed between Hooker’s army and Washington, the unexpected speed
of the Union Army forced Stuart into detours and delays, so that on June
28 he was in eastern Maryland, wholly out of touch with the Confederate
force. The eyes and ears of Lee were thus closed at a time when their
efficient functioning was badly needed.
[Illustration: _“Old Dorm” of Pennsylvania_ (now Gettysburg)
_College. It was used as a shelter for wounded._
474-574 O-58—2]
In this state of affairs, a Confederate agent reported to Lee at
Chambersburg, Pa., on the night of June 28, that the Union forces had
crossed the Potomac and were in the vicinity of Frederick. With the
entire Union Army close at hand and with many miles between him and his
base, Lee decided to abandon his original plan and to concentrate for
battle. He moved his army at once across the mountains to Cashtown, 8
miles from Gettysburg. Here, in Cashtown Pass, he planned to establish
his battle position. Rodes, then at Carlisle, and Early, at York, were
at once ordered to this point.
_The First Day_
THE TWO ARMIES CONVERGE ON GETTYSBURG.
The men of Heth’s division, leading the Confederate advance across the
mountain, reached Cashtown on June 29. Pettigrew’s brigade was sent on
to Gettysburg the following day to obtain supplies, but upon reaching
the ridge a mile west of the town, they observed Union cavalry scouts
posted along the roads. Not having orders to bring on an engagement,
Pettigrew withdrew to Cashtown.
[Illustration: _Scene of the initial engagement on the morning of
July 1. 1. McPherson Ridge. 2. Oak Ridge._]
In the intervening 2 days since he had assumed command of the Union
forces, General Meade had moved his troops northward and instructed his
engineers to survey a defensive battle position at Pipe Creek, near
Taneytown, in northern Maryland. Buford’s cavalry, which had effectively
shadowed Lee’s advance from the mountaintops of the Blue Ridge was
ordered to make a reconnaissance in the Gettysburg area. It was these
troops that Pettigrew’s men saw posted on the roads leading into the
town. Neither Lee nor Meade yet foresaw Gettysburg as a field of battle.
Each expected to take a strong defensive position and force his
adversary to attack.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds._ (Courtesy National
Archives.)]
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill._ (Courtesy National
Archives.)]
A. P. Hill, in the absence of Lee, who was still beyond the mountains,
now took the initiative. At daybreak of July 1, he ordered the brigades
of Archer and Davis, of Heth’s division, to advance along the
Chambersburg Road to Gettysburg for the purpose of testing the strength
of the Union forces. As these troops reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from
Gettysburg, they were fired upon by Union cavalry pickets who hurriedly
retired to inform their commander of the enemy’s approach. In the
meantime, Buford’s division of cavalry had moved from their camp just
southwest of Gettysburg to McPherson Ridge, a mile west of the town.
Buford prepared to hold out against heavy odds until aid arrived. Thus,
subordinate field commanders had chosen the ground for battle.
It was 8 a. m., July 1, when the two brigades of Archer and Davis, the
former to the right and the latter to the left of the Chambersburg Road,
deployed on Herr Ridge. Supported by Pegram’s artillery, they charged
down the long slope and across Willoughby Run against Buford’s men. The
Union troopers had recently received an issue of Spencer repeating
carbines. Dismounted, and fighting as infantrymen, they held their
ground against the spirited attacks of Heth’s superior numbers. At 10
o’clock timely aid arrived as troops from Gen. John F. Reynolds’ First
Infantry corps began streaming over Seminary Ridge from the south and
relieved Buford’s exhausted fighters. Calef’s battery, one of whose guns
had fired the first shot at Gettysburg, was replaced by Hall’s Maine
artillery. But, in a few moments, Union joy at receiving aid was offset
by tragedy. Reynolds, close to the front lines, was killed instantly by
a sharpshooter’s bullet.
The struggle increased in scope as more forces reached the field. When
Archer’s Confederates renewed the attack across Willoughby Run, Union
troops of Meredith’s Iron Brigade, arriving opportunely, struck the
flank of the Confederates and captured the greater part of the force,
including General Archer. Relieved from the threat south of the
Chambersburg Pike, the 14th Brooklyn and 7th Wisconsin regiments shifted
to the north of the Pike where the Confederates had captured a part of
Cutler’s troops in the railroad cut. With renewed effort, these troops,
joined by Dawes’ 6th Wisconsin, drove the Confederates steadily back,
capturing two Mississippi regiments in the defile. The Confederates then
withdrew beyond striking distance. There was a lull in the fighting
during the noon hour. The first encounter had given Union men
confidence. They had held their ground against superior numbers and had
captured Archer, a brigadier general, the first Confederate general
officer taken since Lee assumed command.
[Illustration: _McPherson Ridge and Woods, the Federal position on
July 1. In the woods at the right, General Reynolds was killed. The
cupola of the Theological Seminary appears in the background._
(Brady photograph.)]