The small college town of Gettysburg, with 2,400 residents at the time
of the battle, lay in the heart of a fertile country, surrounded by
broad acres of crops and pastures. Substantial houses of industrious
Pennsylvania farmers dotted the countryside. South of the town and
hardly more than a musket shot from the houses on its outer edge,
Cemetery Hill rose somewhat abruptly from the lower ground. Extending
southward from the hill for nearly 2 miles was a long roll of land
called Cemetery Ridge. At its southern extremity a sharp incline
terminated in the wooded crest of Little Round Top and a half mile
beyond was the sugar-loaf peak of Big Round Top, the highest point in
the vicinity of Gettysburg. Paralleling Cemetery Ridge, at an average
distance of two-thirds of a mile to the west, lay Seminary Ridge, which
derived its name from the Lutheran Seminary that stood upon its crest a
half mile west of Gettysburg. In 1863, 10 roads radiated from
Gettysburg, the one leading to Emmitsburg extending diagonally across
the valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges.
[Illustration: _Lunettes, or artillery defense works, on the crest
of East Cemetery Hill. The entrance gateway to the public cemetery,
which is still in use, appears in the background on the Baltimore
Pike._ (Brady photograph.)]
[Illustration: _Jennie Wade House, located on Baltimore street
between the battle lines. Jennie Wade, the only civilian killed
during the battle, was accidentally struck by a bullet which passed
through a door of the house._]
[Illustration: _East Cemetery Hill, the objective of the Confederate
charge on the evening of July 2._]
By noon of July 2, the powerful forces of Meade and Lee were at hand,
and battle on a tremendous scale was imminent. That part of the Union
line extending from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top was strongly held.
Late in the forenoon, Sickles, commanding the Third Corps which lay
north of Little Round Top, sent Berdan’s sharpshooters and some of the
men of the 3rd Maine Regiment forward from the Emmitsburg Road to
Pitzer’s Woods, a half mile to the west. As they reached the woods, a
strong Confederate force fired upon them, and they hurriedly retired to
inform their commander. To Sickles, the extension of the Confederate
line southward meant that his left flank was endangered. He at once
began moving forward to the advantageous high ground at the Peach
Orchard, and by 3:30 p. m. his battle front extended from Devil’s Den
northwestward to the Orchard and northward on the Emmitsburg Road. In
this forward movement, the strong position on the crest of Little Round
Top was left unoccupied. This was the situation when Meade finally
turned his attention from his right flank at Culp’s Hill and Spangler’s
Spring—the cause of his great concern throughout the forenoon—to review
Sickles’ line.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
Lee planned to attack, despite the advice of Longstreet who continually
urged defensive battle. On July 2, Longstreet recommended that Lee swing
around the Union left at Little Round Top, select a good position, and
await attack. Lee observed that while the Union position was strong if
held in sufficient numbers to utilize the advantage of interior lines,
it presented grave difficulties to a weak defending force. A secure
lodgment on the shank of the hook might render it possible to sever the
Union Army and to deal with each unit separately. Not all of Meade’s
force had reached the field, and Lee thought he had the opportunity of
destroying his adversary in the process of concentration. He resolved to
send Longstreet against the Federal left flank which he believed was
then on lower Cemetery Ridge, while Ewell was to storm Cemetery Hill and
Culp’s Hill.
[Illustration: _Trostle farmhouse. Here the 9th Massachusetts
battery, taking position in the yard, lost 80 out of 88 horses
during the battle of July 2._ (Brady photograph.)]