Before Mr. Sumner began, Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, read the
following interrogatories.
“It may be that the speech which the honorable Senator
intends to pronounce may cover the points which I have
embodied in some questions to him. If not, I should take
it very kindly, if the honorable Senator will answer the
questions. I will read them.
“1. Are slaves in the District of Columbia, and in the
slaveholding States, legally the subject of property?
“2. Has Congress the power to deprive the owners of lands
and houses and lots situated in the District of Columbia of
that property?
“3. What law or laws give the owners of real estate in the
District of Columbia their right to such property? Inform
us where such law or laws may be found and read.
“4. What law or laws give a different right and title to
slaves and to real estate? Where can such law or laws be
found?
“5. Is or not the Constitution, and the laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties
made under the authority of the United States, the supreme
law of the land, which all persons, without any exception
whatever, are bound to obey?
“6. Is or not the Supreme Court of the United States the
proper and final tribunal to judge and determine all
questions, whether in law or equity, under the Constitution
and laws of the United States?”
The answers to these interrogatories, so far as they bear on
the main question, will be found in the course of the speech.
MR. PRESIDENT,--With unspeakable delight I hail this measure and the
prospect of its speedy adoption. Though only a small instalment of
that great debt to an enslaved race which we all owe, yet will it be
recognized in history as a victory of humanity. At home, throughout
our own country, it will be welcomed with gratitude, while abroad it
will quicken the hopes of all who love Freedom. Liberal institutions
will gain everywhere by the abolition of Slavery at the national
capital. Nobody can read that slaves were once sold in the markets of
Rome, beneath the eyes of the Sovereign Pontiff, without confessing the
scandal to religion, even in a barbarous age; and nobody can hear that
slaves are now sold in the markets of Washington, beneath the eyes of
the President, without confessing the scandal to liberal institutions.
For the sake of the national name, if not for the sake of justice, let
the scandal cease.
In early discussions of this question many topics were introduced that
obtain little attention now. It was part of the tactics of Slavery to
claim absolute immunity. Indeed, without such immunity it had small
chance to exist. Such a wrong, so utterly outrageous, could find safety
only where protected from inquiry. Therefore Slave-Masters always
insisted that petitions against its maintenance at the national capital
were not to be received, that it was unconstitutional to touch it even
here within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and that, if it
were touched, it should be only under the auspices of the neighboring
States of Virginia and Maryland. On these points elaborate arguments
were constructed, useless to consider now. Whatever the opinions of
individual Senators, the judgment of the country is fixed. The right of
petition, first vindicated by the matchless perseverance of John Quincy
Adams, is now beyond question, and the constitutional power of Congress
is hardly less free from doubt. It is enough to say on this point,
that, if Congress cannot abolish Slavery here, then there is no power
anywhere to abolish it here, and this wrong will endure always, lasting
as the capital itself.
As the moment of justice approaches, we are called to meet a different
objection, inspired by generous sentiments. It is urged, that, since
there can be no such thing as property in man, especially within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, therefore all held as slaves at
the national capital are justly entitled to freedom without price or
compensation of any kind,--or, at least, that any money paid should be
distributed according to an account stated between master and slave.
If this question were determined according to divine justice, so far
as we may be permitted to contemplate such a judgment, it is obvious
that nothing can be due to the master, and that any money paid belongs
rather to the slave, who for generations has been despoiled of every
right and possession. If we undertake to audit this fearful account,
pray what sum shall be allowed for the prolonged torments of the lash?
what treasure shall be voted to the slave for wife ravished from his
side, for children stolen, for knowledge shut out, and for all the
fruits of labor wrested from him and his fathers? No such account can
be stated. It is impossible. Once begin the inquiry, and all must go to
the slave. It only remains for Congress, anxious to secure this great
boon, and unwilling to embarrass or jeopard it, to act practically,
according to its finite powers, in the light of existing usage, and
even existing prejudice, under which these odious relations have
assumed the form of law; nor can we hesitate at any forbearance or
sacrifice, provided Freedom is established without delay.
Testimony and eloquence have been accumulated against Slavery; but
on this occasion I shall confine myself precisely to the argument
for the ransom of slaves at the National Capital; although such is
Slavery that it is impossible to consider it in any single aspect
without confronting its whole many-sided wickedness, while the broad,
diversified field of remedy is naturally open to review. At some other
time the great question of emancipation in the States may be more fitly
considered, together with those other questions where the Senator
from Wisconsin [Mr. DOOLITTLE] has allowed himself to take sides so
earnestly,--whether there is an essential incompatibility between the
two races, so that they cannot live together except as master and
slave? and whether the freedmen shall be encouraged to exile themselves
to other lands, or rather continue their labor here at home? Enough
for the present to consider Slavery at the National Capital. And here
we are met by two inquiries, so frankly addressed to the Senate by the
clear-headed Senator from Kansas [Mr. POMEROY]: first, _Has Slavery
any constitutional existence at the national capital?_ and, secondly,
_Shall money be paid to secure its abolition?_ The answer to these two
inquiries will make our duty clear. If Slavery has no constitutional
existence here, then more than ever is Congress bound to interfere,
even with money; for the scandal must be peremptorily stopped, without
any postponement, or any consultation of the people on a point which is
not within their power.
* * * * *
It may be said, that, whether Slavery be constitutional or not,
nevertheless it exists, and therefore this inquiry is superfluous.
True, it exists as a MONSTROUS FACT; but it is none the less important
to consider its origin, that we may understand how, assuming the form
of law, it was able to shelter itself beneath the protecting shield of
the Constitution. When we see clearly that it is without any such just
protection, that the law which declares it is baseless, and that in all
its pretensions it is essentially and utterly brutal and unnatural,
we shall have less consideration for the Slave Tyranny, which, in
satisfied pride, has thus far--not without compunction at different
moments--ruled the national capital, reducing all things here, public
opinion, social life, and even the administration of justice, to its
own degraded standard, so as to fulfil the curious words of an old
English poet:--
“It serves, yet reigns as King;
It lives, yet ’s death; it pleases, full of paine.
Monster! ah, who, who can thy beeing faigne,
Thou shapelesse shape, live death, paine pleasing, servile raigne?”[214]
It is true, there can be no such thing as property in man: and here I
begin to answer the questions propounded by the Senator from Kentucky
[Mr. DAVIS]. If this pretension is recognized anywhere, it is only
another instance of custom, which is so powerful as to render the
idolater insensible to the wickedness of idolatry, and the cannibal
insensible to the brutality of cannibalism. To argue against such a
pretension seems to be vain; for the pretension exists in open defiance
of reason as well as of humanity. It will not yield to argument; nor
will it yield to persuasion. It must be encountered by authority. It
was not the planters in the British islands or in the French islands
who organized emancipation, but the distant governments across the
sea, far removed from local prejudice, which at last forbade the
outrage. Had these planters been left to themselves, they would
have clung to the pretension, as men among us still cling to it. In
making this declaration against the idea of property in man, I say
nothing new. An honored predecessor of the Senator from Maryland [Mr.
KENNEDY], whose fame as a statesman was eclipsed, perhaps, by his more
remarkable fame as a lawyer,--I mean William Pinkney, and it is among
the recollections of my youth that I heard Chief Justice Marshall call
him the undoubted head of the American bar,--in a speech before the
Maryland House of Delegates, spoke as statesman and lawyer, when he
said:--
“Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice no master in
the State has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single
hour.”[215]
And Henry Brougham spoke not only as statesman and lawyer, but as
orator also, when, in the British Parliament, he uttered these
memorable words:--
“Tell me not of rights, talk not of the property of the
planter in his slaves. I deny the right, I acknowledge not
the property. The principles, the feelings, of our common
nature rise in rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to
the understanding or to the heart, the sentence is the same
that rejects it. In vain you tell me of laws that sanction
such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments of human
codes,--the same throughout the world, the same in all times:
… it is the law written on the heart of man by the finger of
his Maker; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men
despise fraud and loathe rapine and abhor blood, they will
reject with indignation the wild and guilty fantasy that man
can hold property in man.”[216]
It has been sometimes said that the finest sentence of the English
language is that famous description of Law with which Hooker closes the
first book of his “Ecclesiastical Polity”; but I cannot doubt that this
wonderful denunciation of an irrational and inhuman pretension will be
remembered hereafter with higher praise; for it gathers into surpassing
eloquence the waking and immitigable instincts of Universal Man.
If I enter now into analysis of Slavery, and say familiar things, it is
because such exposition is an essential link in the present inquiry.
Looking carefully at Slavery as it is, we find that it is not merely a
single gross pretension, utterly inadmissible, but an aggregation of
gross pretensions, all and each utterly inadmissible. They are five
in number: first, the pretension of property in man; secondly, the
denial of the marriage relation,--for slaves are “coupled” only, and
not married; thirdly, the denial of the paternal relation; fourthly,
the denial of instruction; and, fifthly, the appropriation of all
the labor of the slave and its fruits by the master. Such are the
five essential elements which we find in Slavery; and this fivefold
barbarism, so utterly indefensible in every point, is maintained for
the single purpose of compelling labor without wages. Of course such
a pretension is founded in force, and nothing else. It begins with
the kidnapper in Guinea or Congo, traverses the sea with the pirate
slave-trader in his crowded hold, and is continued here by virtue of
laws representing and embodying the same brutal force that prevailed
in the kidnapper and the pirate slave-trader. Slavery, wherever it
exists, is the triumph of force, sometimes in the strong arm of an
individual, and sometimes in the strong arm of law, but in principle
always the same. Depending upon force, he is master who happens to be
stronger,--so that, if the slave were stronger, he would be master, and
the master would be slave. Beyond all doubt, according to reason and
justice, every slave possesses the same right to enslave his master
that his master possesses to enslave him. If this simple statement of
unquestionable principles needed confirmation, it would be found in the
solemn judgments of courts. Here, for instance, are the often quoted
words of Mr. Justice McLean, of the Supreme Court of the United States:
“Slavery is admitted by almost all who have examined the subject to
be founded in wrong, in oppression, in _power_ against _right_.”[217]
And here are the words of the Supreme Court of North Carolina: “Such
services [of a slave] can only be expected from one who has no will
of his own, who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that
of another. Such obedience is the consequence only of _uncontrolled
authority over the body_. There is nothing else which can operate to
produce the effect.”[218] And the Supreme Court of the United States,
by the lips of Chief Justice Marshall, has openly declared, in a famous
case, read the other day by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. DAVIS], that
“Slavery has its origin in _force_.”[219] Thus does it appear by most
authoritative words, that this monstrous Barbarism is derived not
from reason, or nature, or justice, or goodness, but from _force_, and
nothing else.
Here in the national capital, under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress, the FORCE which now maintains this unnatural system is
supplied by Congress. Without Congress the “uncontrolled authority”
of the master would cease. Without Congress the master would not be
master, nor would the slave be slave. Congress, then, in existing
legislation, is the power behind, which enslaves our fellow-men.
Therefore does it behoove Congress, by proper, instant action, to
relieve itself of this painful responsibility.
The responsibility becomes more painful, when it is considered that
Slavery exists at the national capital absolutely without support of
any kind in the Constitution: and here again I answer the Senator
from Kentucky [Mr. DAVIS]. Nor is this all. Situated within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution, where State rights cannot
prevail, it exists in open defiance of most cherished principles.
Let the Constitution be rightly interpreted by a just tribunal, and
Slavery must cease here at once. The decision of a court would be as
potent as an Act of Congress. And now, as I confidently assert this
conclusion, which bears so directly on the present question, pardon
me, if I express the satisfaction with which I recur to an earlier
period, shortly after I entered the Senate, when, vindicating the
principle now accepted, but then disowned, that _Freedom and not
Slavery is National_, I insisted upon its application to Slavery
everywhere within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitution, and
declared that Congress might as well undertake to make a king as to
make a slave.[220] That argument has never been answered; it cannot
be answered. Nor can I forget that this same conclusion, having such
important bearings, was maintained by Mr. Chase, while a member of
this body, in that masterly effort where he unfolded the relations of
the National Government to Slavery,[221] and also by the late Horace
Mann, in a most eloquent and exhaustive speech in the other House,
where no point is left untouched to show that Slavery in the national
capital is an _outlaw_.[222] Among all the speeches in the protracted
discussion of Slavery, I know none more worthy of profound study than
those two, so different in character and yet so harmonious in result.
If authority could add to irresistible argument, it would be found in
the well-known opinion of the late Mr. Justice McLean, in a published
letter, declaring the constitutional impossibility of Slavery in the
National Territories, because, in the absence of express power under
the Constitution to establish or recognize Slavery, there was nothing
for the breath of Slavery, as respiration could not exist where there
was no atmosphere. The learned judge was right, and his illustration
was felicitous. Although applied at the time only to the Territories,
it is of equal force everywhere within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress; for within such jurisdiction there is no atmosphere in which
Slavery can live.
If this question were less important, I should not occupy time with
its discussion. But we may learn to detest Slavery still more, when we
see how completely it instals itself here in utter disregard of the
Constitution, compelling Congress ignobly to do its bidding. The bare
existence of such a barbarous injustice in the metropolis of a Republic
gloriously declaring that “all men are entitled to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness,” is a mockery which may excite surprise; but
when we bring it to the touchstone of the Constitution, and consider
the action of Congress, surprise is deepened into indignation.
* * * * *
How, Sir, was this foothold secured? When and by what process did the
National Government, solemnly pledged to Freedom, undertake to maintain
the Slave-Master here in the exercise of that _force_, or “unrestrained
power” which swings the lash, fastens the chain, robs the wages, sells
the child, and tears the wife from the husband? A brief inquiry will
show historically how it occurred: and here again I answer the Senator
from Kentucky.
The sessions of the Revolutionary Congress were held, according to
the exigencies of war or the convenience of members, at Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Lancaster, York, Princeton, Annapolis, Trenton, and New
York. An insult at Philadelphia from a band of mutineers caused
an adjournment to Princeton, in 1783, which was followed by the
discussion, from time to time, of the question of a permanent seat
of government. On the 7th of October, 1783, a motion was made by Mr.
Gerry, of Massachusetts, “That buildings for the use of Congress be
erected on the banks of the Delaware, near Trenton, or of the Potomac,
near Georgetown, provided a suitable district can be procured on one
of the rivers as aforesaid for a federal town, and that the right of
soil, and an exclusive or such other jurisdiction as Congress may
direct, shall be vested in the United States.”[223] Thus did the first
proposition of a national capital within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress proceed from a representative of Massachusetts. The subject of
Slavery at that time attracted little attention; but at a later day,
in the Constitutional Convention, this same honored representative
showed the nature of the jurisdiction which he would claim, according
to the following record: “Mr. Gerry thought we had nothing to do with
the conduct of the States as to slaves, _but ought to be careful
not to give any sanction to it_.”[224] In these words will be found
our own cherished principle, _Freedom National, Slavery Sectional_,
expressed with homely and sententious simplicity. There is something
grateful and most suggestive in the language employed, “we ought to be
careful not to give any sanction to it.” In the first Congress under
the Constitution, the same representative, during the debate on the
Slave-Trade, gave further expression to this same conviction, when he
said that “he highly commended the part the Society of Friends had
taken; it was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves
in.”[225]
The proposition of Mr. Gerry in reference to a national capital, after
assuming various forms, subsided. But in 1785 three commissioners were
appointed “to lay out a district of not less than two nor exceeding
three miles square, on the banks of either side of the Delaware, not
more than eight miles above or below the lower falls thereof, for a
federal town.”[226] At the Congress which met at New York two years
later, unsuccessful efforts were made to substitute the Potomac for
the Delaware. The commissioners, though appointed, never entered
upon their business. At last, by the adoption of the Constitution,
the subject was presented in a new form, under the following clause:
“The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in
all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles
square, as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of
Congress, become the seat of government of the United States.” From
the records of the Convention it does not appear that this clause
occasioned debate. But it broke out in the earliest Congress. Virginia
and Maryland, each, by acts of their respective Legislatures, tendered
the ten miles square, while similar propositions were made by citizens
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. After long and animated discussion,
Germantown, in Pennsylvania, was on the point of being adopted, when
the subject was postponed till the next session. Havre de Grace and
Wright’s Ferry, both on the Susquehanna, Baltimore, on the Patapsco,
and Connogocheague, on the Potomac, divided opinions. In the course of
the debate, Mr. Gerry, who had first proposed the Potomac, now opposed
it. He pronounced it highly unreasonable to fix the seat of government
where nine States out of the thirteen would be to the northward, and
adverted to the sacrifice the Northern States were ready to make in
going as far south as Baltimore. An agreement seemed impossible, when
the South suddenly achieved one of those political triumphs by which
its predominance in the National Government was established.
Pending at this time was the great and trying proposition to assume
the State debts, which, being at first defeated through Southern votes,
was at last carried by a “compromise,” according to which the seat of
government was placed on the Potomac, thus settling the much vexed
question. Mr. Jefferson, in a familiar account, thus sketches the
“compromise.”
“It was observed that this pill [the assumption of the State
debts] would be peculiarly bitter to the Southern States, _and
that some concomitant measure should be adopted to sweeten
it a little to them_. There had before been propositions
to fix the seat of government either at Philadelphia or at
Georgetown on the Potomac, and it was thought that by giving it
to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently
afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the
ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone. So
two of the Potomac members (White and Lee, but White with a
revulsion of stomach almost convulsive) agreed to change their
votes, and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point.”[227]
Such was one of the earliest victories of Slavery in the name of
“Compromise.” It is difficult to estimate the evil consequences thus
entailed upon the country.
The bill establishing the seat of government, having already passed the
Senate, was adopted by the House of Representatives, after vehement
debate and many calls of the yeas and nays, by a vote of thirty-two to
twenty-nine, on the 9th of July, 1790. A district of territory, not
exceeding ten miles square, on the river Potomac, was accepted for the
permanent seat of the Government of the United States: “_Provided,
nevertheless_, that the operation of the laws of the State within such
district shall not be affected by this acceptance, until the time
fixed for the removal of the Government thereto, _and until Congress
shall otherwise by law provide_.”[228] Here, it will be seen, was a
positive saving of the laws of the States for a limited period, so far
as Congress had power to save them, within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Constitution; but there was also complete recognition of the
power of Congress to change these laws, and an implied promise to
assume the “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever” contemplated
by the Constitution.
In response to this Act of Congress, Maryland, by formal act, ceded
the territory now constituting the District of Columbia “in full and
absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of
persons residing or to reside thereon,”--provided that the jurisdiction
of Maryland “shall not cease or determine, _until Congress shall by law
provide for the government thereof_.”[229]
In pursuance of this contract between the United States of the one
part and Maryland of the other part, expressed in solemn statutes,
the present seat of government was occupied in November, 1800, when
Congress proceeded to assume that complete jurisdiction conferred in
the Constitution, by enacting, on the 27th of February, 1801, “that
the laws of the State of Maryland, _as they now exist_, shall be and
continue in force in that part of the said District which was ceded
by that State to the United States, and by them accepted for the
permanent seat of government.”[230] Thus at one stroke all existing
laws of Maryland were adopted by Congress in gross, and from that time
forward became the laws of the United States at the national capital.
Although known historically as laws of Maryland, they ceased at once
to be laws of that State, for they draw their vitality from Congress
alone, under the Constitution of the United States, as completely as if
every statute had been solemnly reënacted. And now we see precisely how
Slavery obtained its foothold.
Among the statutes of Maryland thus solemnly reënacted in gross was the
following, originally passed as early as 1715, in colonial days.
“All negroes and other slaves already imported or hereafter
to be imported into this province, and all children now born
or hereafter to be born of such negroes and slaves, shall be
slaves during their natural lives.”[231]
Slavery cannot exist without barbarous laws in its support. Maryland,
accordingly, in the spirit of Slavery, added other provisions, also
reënacted by Congress in the same general bundle, of which the
following is an example.
“_No negro or mulatto slave_, free negro or mulatto born of a
white woman, during his time of servitude by law, … _shall be
admitted and received as good and valid evidence in law, in
any matter_ or thing whatsoever depending before any court of
record or before any magistrate within this province, _wherein
any Christian white person is concerned_.”[232]
At a later day the following kindred provision was added, in season to
be reënacted by Congress in the same code.
“No slave manumitted agreeably to the laws of this State …
shall be entitled … to give evidence against any white person,
or shall be recorded as competent evidence to manumit any slave
petitioning for freedom.”[233]
And such is the law for Slavery at the national capital.
It will be observed that the original statute which undertakes to
create Slavery in Maryland does not attaint the blood beyond two
generations. It is confined to “all negroes and other slaves,” and
their “children,” “during their natural lives.” These are slaves, but
none others, unless a familiar rule of interpretation is reversed, and
such words are extended rather than restrained. And yet it is by virtue
of this colonial statute, with all its ancillary barbarism, adopted
by Congress, that slaves are still held at the national capital. It
is true that at the time of its adoption there were few slaves here
to whom it was applicable. For ten years previous, the present area
of Washington, according to received tradition, contained hardly
five hundred inhabitants, all told, and these were for the most part
laborers distributed in houses merely for temporary accommodation. But
all these musty, antediluvian, wicked statutes, of which you have seen
a specimen, took their place at once in the national legislation, and
under their supposed authority slaves multiplied, and Slavery became
a national institution. And it now continues only by virtue of this
Slave Code borrowed from early colonial days, which, though flagrantly
inconsistent with the Constitution, has never yet been repudiated by
Court or Congress.
I have said that this Slave Code, even assuming it applicable to
slaves beyond the “natural lives” of two generations, is flagrantly
inconsistent with the Constitution. On this point the argument is so
plain that it may be shown like a diagram.
Under the Constitution, Congress has “exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever” at the national capital. The cession by Maryland was
without condition, and the acceptance by Congress was also without
condition; so that the territory fell at once within this exclusive
jurisdiction. But Congress can exercise no power except in conformity
with the Constitution. Its exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
whatsoever is controlled and limited by the Constitution, out of which
it is derived. Now, looking at the Constitution, we find, first, that
there are no words authorizing Congress to establish or recognize
Slavery, and, secondly, that there are positive words which prohibit
Congress from the exercise of any such power. The argument, therefore,
is twofold: first, from the absence of authority, and, secondly, from
positive prohibition.
Of course, a barbarism like Slavery, having its origin in force and
nothing else, can have no legal or constitutional support except
from positive sanction. It can spring from no doubtful phrase. It
must be declared by unambiguous words, incapable of a double sense.
Here I repeat an argument which I have presented before, when on
other occasions arraigning the pretensions of Slavery under the
Constitution, but which, so long as Slavery claims immunity, cannot
be allowed to drop out of sight. It begins with the great words of
Lord Mansfield, who, in the memorable case of Somerset, said: “The
state of Slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by _positive
law_.… It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it
but POSITIVE LAW.”[234] This principle has been adopted by tribunals
even in slaveholding States.[235] But I do not stop to dwell on these
authorities. Even the language, “exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever,” cannot be made to sanction Slavery. It wants those
positive words, leaving nothing to implication, which are obviously
required, especially when we consider the professed object of the
Constitution, as declared in its Preamble, to “establish justice and
secure the blessings of liberty.” There is no power in the Constitution
to make a king, or, thank God, to make a slave; and the absence of all
such power is hardly more clear in one case than in the other. The word
_king_ nowhere occurs in the Constitution, nor does the word _slave_.
But if there be no such power, then all Acts of Congress sustaining
Slavery at the national capital must be unconstitutional and void. The
stream cannot rise higher than the fountain head; nay, more, _nothing
can come out of nothing_; and if there be nothing in the Constitution
authorizing Congress to make a slave, there can be nothing valid in
any subordinate legislation. It is a pretension which has thus far
prevailed simply because Slavery predominated over Congress and courts.
To all who insist that Congress may sustain Slavery in the national
capital I put the question, Where in the Constitution is the power
found? If you cannot show where, do not assert the power. So hideous
an effrontery must be authorized in unmistakable words. But where are
the words? In what article, clause, or line? They cannot be found. I
challenge their production. Insult not human nature by pretending
that its most cherished rights can be sacrificed without solemn
authority. Remember that every presumption and every leaning must be
in favor of Freedom and against Slavery. Remember, too, that no nice
interpretation, no strained construction, no fancied deduction, can
suffice to sanction the enslavement of our fellow-men. And do not
degrade the Constitution by foisting upon its blameless text the idea
of property in man. It is not there; and if you think you see it there,
it is simply because you make the Constitution a reflection of yourself.
A single illustration will show the absurdity of this pretension. If,
under the clause giving to Congress “exclusive legislation” at the
national capital, Slavery may be established, and under these words
Congress is empowered to create slaves instead of citizens, then, under
the same words, it may do the same thing in the “forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings” belonging to the
United States, wherever situated, for these are all placed within the
same “exclusive legislation.” The extensive navy-yard at Charlestown,
in the very shadow of Bunker Hill, may be filled with slaves, with
enforced toil to take the place of that cheerful, well-paid labor
whose busy hum is the best music of the place. Such an act, however
consistent with slaveholding tyranny, would not be regarded as
constitutional at Bunker Hill.
If there were any doubt on this point, and the absence of all authority
were not perfectly clear, the prohibitions of the Constitution
would settle the question. It is true that Congress has “exclusive
legislation” within the District; but the prohibitions to grant titles
of nobility, to pass _ex post facto_ laws, to pass bills of attainder,
and to establish religion, are unquestionable limitations of this
power. There is also another limitation, equally unquestionable.
It is found in an Amendment proposed by the First Congress, on the
recommendation of several States, as follows:--
“No PERSON shall be deprived of life, LIBERTY, or property,
without _due process of law_.”
This prohibition, according to the Supreme Court, is obligatory on
Congress.[236] It is also applicable to all claimed as slaves; for,
in the eye of the Constitution, every human being within its sphere,
whether Caucasian, Indian, or African, from the President to the
slave, is a _person_. Of this there is no question. But a remarkable
incident of history confirms the conclusion. As originally recommended
by Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, this proposition was
restricted to the _freeman_. Its language was,--
“No _freeman_ ought to be deprived of his life, _liberty_, or
property, but by the law of the land.”[237]
Of course, if the word _freeman_ had been adopted, this clause would
be restricted in its effective power. Deliberately rejecting this
limitation, the authors of the Amendment recorded their purpose that
no _person_, within the national jurisdiction, of whatever character,
shall be deprived of _liberty_ without due process of law. The latter
words are borrowed from Magna Charta, and they mean without due
presentment, indictment, or other judicial proceedings. But Congress,
undertaking to support Slavery at the national capital, enacts that
_persons_ may be deprived of liberty there without any presentment,
indictment, or other judicial proceedings. Therefore every _person_ now
detained as a slave in the national capital is detained in violation
of the Constitution. Not only is his liberty taken without due process
of law, but, since he is tyrannically despoiled of all the fruits
of his industry, his property also is taken without due process of
law. You talk sometimes of guaranties of the Constitution. Here is an
unmistakable guaranty, and I hold you to it.
Bringing the argument together, the conclusion may be briefly stated.
The five-headed barbarism of Slavery, beginning in violence, can have
no legal or constitutional existence, unless through positive words
expressly authorizing it. As no such positive words are found in the
Constitution, all legislation by Congress supporting Slavery must be
unconstitutional and void, while it is made still further impossible by
positive words of prohibition guarding the liberty of every _person_
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.
A court properly inspired, and ready to assume that just responsibility
which dignifies judicial tribunals, would at once declare Slavery
impossible at the national capital, and set every slave free,--as Lord
Mansfield declared Slavery impossible in England, and set every slave
free. The two cases are parallel; but, alas! the court is wanting
here. The legality of Slavery in England was affirmed in professional
opinions by the ablest lawyers; it was also affirmed on the bench.
England was a Slave State, and even its newspapers were disfigured with
advertisements for the sale of human beings, while the merchants of
London, backed by great names in the law, sustained the outrage. Then
appeared Granville Sharp, the philanthropist, who, pained by the sight
of Slavery, and especially shocked by the brutality of a slave-hunt in
the streets of London, was aroused to question its constitutionality
in England. For two years he devoted himself to anxious study of the
British Constitution in all its multifarious records. His conclusion
is expressed in these precise words: “The word _slaves_, or anything
that can justify the enslaving of others, is not to be found there,
God be thanked!”[238] Thus encouraged, he persevered. By his generous
exertions the negro Somerset, claimed as a slave by a Virginia
gentleman then in London, was defended, and the Court of King’s Bench
compelled to that immortal judgment by which Slavery was forever
expelled from England, and the early boast of the British Constitution
became a practical verity. More than fourteen thousand persons, held
as slaves on British soil--four times as many as are now found in the
national capital--became instantly free, without price or ransom.
The good work that our courts thus far decline remains to be done
by Congress. Slavery, which is a scandalous anomaly and anachronism
here, must be made to disappear from the national capital,--if not
in one way, then in another. A judgment of court would be simply on
the question of constitutional right, without regard to policy. But
there is no consideration of right or of policy, from the loftiest
principle to the humblest expediency, which may not properly enter into
the conclusion of Congress. The former might be the triumph of the
magistrate,--the latter must be that of the statesman. But whether from
magistrate or from statesman, it will constitute an epoch in history.
* * * * *
But the question is asked, Shall we vote money for this purpose? I
cannot hesitate. Two considerations are with me prevailing. First,
the relation of master and slave at the national capital has from the
beginning been established and maintained by Congress everywhere in
sight, and even directly under its own eyes. The master held the slave;
but Congress, with strong arm, stood behind the master, looking on and
sustaining. Not a dollar of wages has been taken, not a child stolen,
not a wife torn from her husband, without the hand of Congress. If
not partnership, there is complicity on the part of Congress, through
which the whole country has become responsible for the manifold
wrong. Though always protesting against its continuance, and laboring
earnestly for its removal, yet gladly do I accept my share of the
prospective burden. And, secondly, even if not all involved in the
manifold wrong, nothing is clearer than that the mode proposed is the
gentlest, quietest, and surest in which the beneficent change can be
accomplished. It is therefore the most practical. It recognizes Slavery
as an existing fact, and provides for its removal. And when I think of
the unquestionable good we seek, of all its great advantages, of the
national capital redeemed, of the national character elevated, and of
the righteous example we shall set, and when I think, still further,
that, according to a rule alike of jurisprudence and morals, _Liberty
is priceless_, I cannot hesitate at any appropriation within our
means by which all these things of incalculable value can be promptly
secured.
As I find no reason of policy adverse to such appropriation, so
do I find no objection in the Constitution. I am aware that it is
sometimes asked, Where in the Constitution is the power to make such
appropriation? But nothing is clearer than that, under the words
conferring “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,” Congress
may create freemen, although it may not create slaves. And of course
it may exercise all the powers necessary to this end, whether by a
simple act of emancipation or a vote of money. If there could be any
doubt on this point, it would be removed, when we reflect that the
abolition of Slavery, with all the natural incidents of such an act,
has been constantly recognized as within the sphere of legislation. It
was so regarded by Washington, who, in a generous letter to Lafayette,
dated May 10, 1786, said: “It certainly might and assuredly ought to
be effected, and that, too, by _legislative_ authority.”[239] Through
legislative authority Slavery has been abolished in State after State
of our Union, and also in foreign countries. I have yet to learn that
the power of Congress for this purpose at the national capital is
less complete than that of any other legislative body within its own
jurisdiction.
* * * * *
But, while not doubting the power of Congress in any of its incidents,
I prefer to consider the money we pay as in the nature of _ransom_
rather than _compensation_, so that Freedom shall be _acquired_ rather
than _purchased_; and I place it at once under the sanction of that
commanding charity proclaimed by prophets and enjoined by apostles,
which all history recognizes and the Constitution cannot impair.
From time immemorial every Government has undertaken to ransom from
captivity, and sometimes a whole people has felt the general resources
well bestowed in the ransom of its prince. Religion and humanity have
both concurred in this duty as more than usually sacred. “The ransom
of captives is a great and excellent office of justice,” exclaims one
of the early Fathers. And the pious St. Ambrose insisted upon breaking
up even the sacred vessels of the Church, saying: “The ornament of the
sacraments is the redemption of captives.”
Among the most beautiful incidents of the early Church is that of St.
Ambrose. There had been hesitation, but the divine Emancipationist
broke forth: “What! you will not sell the vessels of gold, and you
leave for sale the living vessels of the Lord! The ornament of the
sacraments is the redemption of captives. Let the cup ransom from the
enemy him whom the blood ransoms from sin.”[240] Happily, this spirit
prevailed. At the report of Christians compelled to wear out their
days as captives in Algiers, Tunis, or Morocco, or, it might be, among
the Moors of Spain or the merchants of Genoa and Venice, it assumed
practical form. Two Frenchmen, Jean de Matha and Pierre Nolasque, born
on the coast of the Mediterranean, conceived the idea of a special
order vowed to the redemption of Christian slaves. The first founded,
in 1199, the order of the Holy Trinity, known often as Mathurins; the
second, acting under the patronage of Spain, founded the order of
Our Lady of Mercy. Upon both these orders Bishops and Popes bestowed
approbation and encouragement, while, for more than six centuries, they
devoted themselves to this Christian charity, often, according to the
vow assumed, giving themselves as hostages for the ransomed captive. It
is related, that, in 1655, the Order of Mercy in Algiers alone ransomed
more than twelve thousand slaves, leaving in pledge a large number of
its members, faithful to the vow, “_In Saracenorum potestate in pignus,
si necesse fuerit ad redemptionem Christi fidelium, detentus manebo_.”
Thus did these pious fathers give not only money, but themselves.[241]
The duty thus commended has been exercised by the United States under
important circumstances, with the coöperation of the best names of
our history, so as to be beyond question. The instance may not be
familiar, but it is decisive, while, from beginning to end, it is full
of instruction.
Who has not heard of the Barbary States, and of the pretension put
forth by them to enslave white Christians? Algiers was the chief seat
of this enormity, which, through the insensibility or incapacity of
Christian States, was allowed to continue for generations. Good men
and great men were degraded to be captives, while many, neglected
by fortune, perished in barbarous Slavery. Even in our colonial
days, there were Americans whose fate, while in the hands of these
slave-masters, excited general sympathy. Only by ransom was their
freedom obtained. Perhaps no condition was more calculated to arouse
indignant rage. And yet the disposition so common to palliate Slavery
in the National Capital showed itself with regard to Slavery in
Algiers; and, indeed, the same arguments to soften public opinion have
been employed in the two instances. The parallel is so complete, that I
require all your trust to believe that what I read is not an apology
for Slavery here. Thus, a member of a diplomatic mission from England,
who visited Morocco in 1785, says of the Slavery which he saw: “It is
very slightly inflicted”; and “as to any labor undergone, it does not
deserve the name.”[242] And another earlier traveller, after describing
the comfortable condition of the white slaves, adds, in words to which
we are accustomed: “I am sure we saw several captives who lived much
better in Barbary than ever they did in their own country.… Whatever
money in charity was ever sent them by their friends in Europe was
their own.… And yet this is called insupportable slavery among Turks
and Moors! But we found this, as well as many other things in this
country, strangely misrepresented.”[243] A more recent French writer
asserts, with a vehemence to which we are habituated from the partisans
of Slavery among us, that the white slaves at Algiers were not exposed
to the miseries which they represented; that they were well clad and
well fed, _much better than the free Christians there_; that special
care was bestowed upon those who became ill; and that some were allowed
such privileges as to become indifferent to freedom, and even to prefer
Algiers to their own country.[244] Believe me, Sir, in stating these
things I simply follow history; and I refer to the volume and page or
chapter of the authorities which I quote, that the careful inquirer may
see that they relate to Slavery abroad, and not to Slavery at home.
If I continue to unfold this strange, eventful story, it will be to
exhibit _the direct and constant intervention of Congress for the
ransom of slaves_; but the story itself is an argument against Slavery,
pertinent to the present occasion, which I am not unwilling to adopt.
Scarcely was national independence established, when we were aroused
to fresh efforts for the protection of enslaved citizens. Within
three years no less than ten American vessels were seized. At one
time an apprehension prevailed that Dr. Franklin, on his way home
from France, had been captured. “We are waiting,” said one of his
French correspondents, “with the greatest impatience to hear from you.
The newspapers have given us anxiety on your account, for some of
them insist that you have been taken by the Algerines, while others
pretend that you are at Morocco, enduring your slavery with all the
patience of a philosopher.”[245] Though this apprehension happily
proved without foundation, it soon became known that other Americans,
less distinguished, but entitled to all the privileges of new-born
citizenship, were suffering in cruel captivity. At once the sentiments
of the people were enlisted in their behalf. Newspapers pleaded,
while the corsairs were denounced sometimes as “infernal crews,”
and sometimes as “human harpies.” But it was through the stories of
victims who had succeeded in escaping from bondage that the people
were most aroused. As these fugitive slaves touched our shores, they
were welcomed with outspoken sympathy. Glimpses opened through them
into the dread regions of Slavery gave a harrowing reality to all that
conjecture or imagination had pictured. True, indeed, it was that
our own white brethren, entitled like ourselves to all the rights of
manhood, were degraded in unquestioning obedience to an arbitrary
taskmaster, sold at the auction-block, worked like beasts of the field,
and galled by the manacle and lash. As the national power seemed yet
inadequate to compel their liberation, it was attempted by ransom.
Generous efforts at Algiers were organized under the direction of our
minister at Paris, and the famous _Society of Redemption_, having its
origin in the thirteenth century, offered aid. Our agents were blandly
entertained by the great slave-dealer, the Dey, who informed them that
he was familiar with the exploits of Washington, and, as he never
expected to set eyes on this hero of Freedom, expressed a hope, that,
through Congress, he might receive a full-length portrait of him, to
be displayed in the palace at Algiers. Amidst such professions the Dey
still clung to his American slaves, holding them at prices beyond the
means of the agents, who were not authorized to exceed two hundred
dollars a head,--being not unlike in amount that proposed in the
present bill; and I beg to call the attention of the Senator from Maine
[Mr. MORRILL], who has the bill in charge, to the parallel.
Their redemption engaged the attention of the National Government early
after the adoption of the Constitution. It was first brought before
Congress by petition, of which we find the following record.
“_Friday, May 14, 1790._--A petition from sundry citizens
of the United States, captured by the Algerines, and now
in slavery there, was presented, praying the interposition
of Congress in their behalf. Referred to the Secretary of
State.”[246]
An interesting report on the situation of these captives was made to
the President by the Secretary of State, December 28, 1790, where he
sets forth the efforts for their redemption at such prices as would
not “raise the market,”--it being regarded as important, that, in “the
first instance of a redemption by the United States, our price should
be fixed at the lowest point.”[247] I quote the precise words of this
document, which will be found in the State Papers of the country, and I
call special attention to them as applicable to the present moment. Our
price should be fixed at the lowest point, and we should do nothing to
raise the market. The parallel becomes more complete, when it is known
that the white slaves at Algiers were about the same in number with the
black slaves at Washington whose redemption is now proposed. The report
of Mr. Jefferson was laid before Congress, with the following brief
message from the President.
“UNITED STATES, December 30, 1790.
“_Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives_:--
“I lay before you a report of the Secretary of State on the
subject of the citizens of the United States in captivity at
Algiers, that you may provide on their behalf what to you shall
seem most expedient.
“GEO. WASHINGTON.”[248]
It does not appear that there was question in any quarter with regard
to the power of Congress. The broad recommendation of the President was
to provide on behalf of the slaves what should seem most expedient.
Another report from the Secretary of State, entitled “Mediterranean
Trade,” and communicated to Congress December 30, 1790, relates chiefly
to the same matter. In this document are different estimates with
regard to the price at which our fellow-citizens might be ransomed and
peace purchased. One person, who had long resided at Algiers, put the
price at sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling: this was the lowest
estimate. Another, also long, and still, a resident there, said that it
could not be less than a million dollars,--which is the sum proposed in
the present bill. Mr. Jefferson, after considering the subject at some
length, concludes as follows.
“Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war,
tribute, and ransom.… If war, they will consider how far our
own resources shall be called forth.… If tribute or ransom, it
will rest with them to limit and provide the amount, and with
the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to make
arrangements for employing it to the best advantage.”[249]
Among the papers accompanying the report is a letter from Mr. Adams,
minister at London, from which I take important words.
“It may be reasonably concluded that this great affair cannot
be finished for much less than two hundred thousand pounds
sterling.”[250]
This is the very sum now needed for our great affair.
In pursuance of these communications, the Senate tendered its advice to
the President in a resolution.
“_Resolved_, That the Senate advise and consent that the
President of the United States take such measures as he may
think necessary for the redemption of the citizens of the
United States now in captivity at Algiers: _Provided_, The
expense shall not exceed forty thousand dollars; and also that
measures be taken to confirm the treaty now existing between
the United States and the Emperor of Morocco.”[251]