SALAMANCA AND BURGOS.
After the fall of Badajoz, Lord Wellington decided on marching
northward, and carrying the war into Spain. In the meantime, however, he
directed General Hill to storm the forts at Almaraz, a great French
depôt,--and so weaken the chance of union between the armies of the
North and [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 6 May, 1812.] South.
Colonel Dickson[34] was detailed as commanding officer of the Artillery
for this service, which consisted of a brigade of 24-pounder howitzers,
horsed by the mules of one of the Portuguese Field Brigades, and manned
by Captain Glubb’s company of the Royal Artillery, and a Portuguese
company. The ammunition, which was carried in Spanish mule carts,
comprised 600 24-pounder round shot, 300 5½-inch common shells, 240
5½-inch spherical, and 60 [Sidenote: General Sir R. Hill to Lord
Wellington, dated 21 May, 1812.] 5½-inch common,--case shot. Six
pontoons accompanied the guns on this expedition, which was perfectly
successful; and in which General Hill was pleased to say that he found
the exertions of Colonel Dickson, and his officers and men, to be
unwearied.
Before turning to Lord Wellington’s movements in the north, which
culminated in the battle of Salamanca, and the temporary occupation of
Madrid, a statement of the strength of the Artillery force of England
during this eventful year may possibly be found interesting. Two dates
have been chosen, and it will be seen that the numbers--already large in
the beginning of the year--continued to increase; more especially in the
item of drivers for the brigades in the Peninsula. These tables give
one an idea of the strain on the resources of England [Sidenote: MS.
‘Wear and Tear Return’ of the Regiment for 1811.] which was caused by
the Peninsular War. No fewer than 1811 recruits joined the Artillery
alone, and over 1200 became non-effective from various causes during the
same period.
RETURN of the ARTILLERY FORCES OF ENGLAND on the 25th June, 1812,
distinguishing the ROYAL ARTILLERY from the ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY, and
specifying the Numbers serving at home and abroad.
+-------------------------+---------+--------+---------+--------+---------+--------+
| | AT HOME. | ABROAD. | TOTAL. |
| +---------+--------+---------+--------+---------+--------+
| | | N.-C. | | N.-C. | | N.-C. |
| |Officers.|Officers|Officers.|Officers|Officers.|Officers|
| | |and Men.| |and Men.| |and Men.|
+-------------------------+---------+--------+---------+--------+---------+--------+
|Royal Horse Artillery | 49| 1,417| 21| 696| 70| 2,113|
|Royal Artillery | 391| 8,812| 331| 6,599| 722| 15,411|
|R. A. Drivers | 63| 3,521| 24| 1,950| 87| 5,471|
|King’s German Artillery | 21| 430| 28| 587| 49| 1,017|
|Royal Foreign Artillery | 6| 158| 15| 327| 21| 485|
+-------------------------+---------+--------+---------+--------+---------+--------+
| General Total | | | | | 949| 24,497|
+-------------------------+---------+--------+---------+--------+---------+--------+
| RETURN of the ARTILLERY FORCES of ENGLAND on 25th Dec. 1812, &c. |
+-------------------------+---------+---------+---------+--------+---------+-------+
|Royal Horse Artillery | 51| 1,452| 19| 733| 70| 2,185|
|Royal Artillery | 405| 8,723| 333| 6,817| 738| 15,540|
|R. A. Drivers | 70| 3,554| 25| 2,305| 95| 5,859|
|King’s German Artillery | 21| 392| 27| 638| 48| 1,030|
|Royal Foreign Artillery | 7| 123| 15| 348| 22| 471|
+-------------------------+---------+---------+---------+-------+---------+--------+
| General Total | | | | | 973| 25,085|
+-------------------------+---------+---------+---------+-------+---------+--------+
The year 1812 was the most eventful in the Peninsular War. Already
marked by the successful sieges described in the last chapter, it was to
be distinguished by events, both in Spain and elsewhere, which were to
have a great effect on subsequent hostilities. The English General--who
opened the year with an unexpected attack on Ciudad Rodrigo--was
destined, ere it should be much more than half over, to defeat his enemy
in a pitched battle, drive him ignominiously before him, and enter the
capital of Spain in triumph. These successes were to be further
heightened by Soult raising the long-continued siege of Cadiz, in alarm
at the intelligence of the French disasters in the north. Scarcely,
however, were these advantages to be realised, ere the whole picture
should change. The conqueror at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz should find
himself fretting hopelessly before the castle of Burgos; and the
General, who entered Madrid in triumph at the head of a victorious army,
should lead that same army--in disorder and semi-mutiny--from Salamanca
to Portugal, in retreat. The light and shade in the military operations
of the Peninsula were also to be intensified by news from without, which
should mightily affect the powers whose armies had faced one another for
so many years. Another war should be thrust upon England’s preoccupied
people;--her own children in America should seize the opportunity of
gratifying a seemingly undying jealousy;--while, away in the colds of
Russia, the greatest army that even Napoleon had ever commanded, should
dissolve, as utterly as the snows amid which they died should melt
before the strengthening sun.
It was, indeed, a year of great events: but of these the two with which
this history has most interest were the battle of Salamanca and the
siege of Burgos.
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Orbada, 30 June, 1812.]
Colonel Dickson, with the brigade of howitzers which he had commanded at
Almaraz, left Elvas on the 5th June to join Lord Wellington’s army in
the north. Passing the Tagus at Alcantara, he joined the army at
Salamanca by way of Zarza, Fuente Guinalda, and Ciudad Rodrigo.
Wellington was engaged at this time, with very limited means, in
endeavouring to reduce the French Fort St. Vincent at Salamanca, a
strongly entrenched work, having a large convent as its stronghold, and
mounted with 36 pieces of ordnance. The Allied siege
Artillery--previous to Colonel Dickson’s arrival--consisted of only 4
18-pounder guns, and a battery of long 6-pounders, under Lieut.-Colonel
May.[35] That officer had performed his duty, with inadequate means, in
a manner which called forth universal admiration; and Colonel Dickson
when he arrived with his howitzers to assist him, expressed the great
satisfaction it afforded him to be able now to repay, in a small degree,
the many acts of kindness and co-operation, which he had enjoyed at
Colonel May’s hands. Several points of the defence were breached by the
fire of the Allied Artillery, but the whole work was so strong, and the
defences so connected, that no assault could be attempted on the body of
the work. An assault made on two outworks failed at first, but the gorge
of one of them having been subsequently breached, they were carried with
little or no loss a few hours before the surrender of the chief fort.
The means at their disposal being very small, Colonels May and Dickson
employed hot shot from the howitzers against the Convent, and succeeded,
after firing 260 rounds, in setting fire to it, and destroying the whole
of the enemy’s provisions. The surrender followed almost [Sidenote:
Despatch dated Fuente la Pena, 30 June, 1812.] immediately. These
operations had been mainly conducted by General Clinton, under the
supervision of Lord Wellington; and, in his despatch, Lord Wellington
reported that that officer had mentioned in strong terms Lieut.-Colonel
May, who commanded the Royal Artillery under the direction of Colonel
Framingham, and the officers and men under his command. The capture of
the forts was delayed until the 27th June, it having been necessary to
send to the rear for more ammunition, a step which caused a delay of six
days. As soon as they fell, the French army commenced to retire, pursued
by the Allies.
The loss of the Royal Artillery at the siege of these forts was as
follows:--
Killed: Captain Eligé, and 9 rank and file.
Wounded: 1 lieutenant (Love), and 25 rank and file.
In the various movements of both armies between the 27th June and the
22nd July, 1812, on which day the great engagement known as the battle
of Salamanca was fought, no use appears to have been made of the
Artillery, with the exception of the Horse Artillery attached to the
Cavalry division. In one affair, on the 18th July, at Castrejou, when
the troops under Sir Stapleton Cotton were attacked, Lieutenant Belson,
an officer in the Chestnut Troop, was wounded. For honest, conscientious
hard work, and staunch performance of his duty, this officer was
unsurpassed by any in the Regiment. On reference to his record of
service, it appears that between the 3rd August, 1809, and 14th April,
1814, Lieutenant Belson was present in no fewer than thirty-three
engagements. Beside such services, which received but little official
recognition, those of men in more recent campaigns, who have received
lavish, although merited, rewards, sink into insignificance.
It is impossible, without exceeding the limits of this work, to describe
in detail the services of the Horse Artillery in the Peninsula,--the
branch of the regiment to which young Belson belonged. The tables at the
end of the preceding volume give some idea of what these services were,
but are totally inadequate. The history of some of the individual troops
would alone fill a volume; and the writing of such a history will
doubtless be undertaken by some officer, who may find himself in the
proud position of commanding one. Their active duties were incessant;
even during the sieges, when they ostensibly formed part of the armies
of investment or observation, they were ready to volunteer at all times
to do additional duty in the trenches. At San Sebastian, as will be seen
shortly, their services in the sieges, as siege artillerymen, were
invaluable. The details of their services in the great battle now to be
described are, unfortunately, not given in any of the documents in the
Record Office. The fact of the presence of three troops, Ross’s, Bull’s,
and Macdonald’s, is known, but little more. They were included in the
general mention of the Corps, by Lord Wellington, after the battle, when
he [Sidenote: Despatch dated Flores de Avila, 24 July, 1812.] said that
“The Royal and German Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Framingham
distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire;” but no further
details are given. From another pen we learn that the whole of the
[Sidenote: Browne.] troops and batteries were more or less engaged
during the eventful day; but this general statement is neither
satisfying, nor quite exact. In a letter from Colonel Dickson, written
three days after the battle, he mentions that one of his heavy brigades
was not ordered up, but was kept in the rear, ready to move in case of
retreat. Possibly this brigade may have been manned by Portuguese, and
the howitzer brigade, which he commanded during the battle, may have
been manned by Captain Glubb’s company, which was under his orders;--in
which case the author referred to would be right; but it is extremely
rare in Colonel Dickson’s correspondence to find him alluding to any
action, in which he commanded men of his own Corps, without
particularizing some by name. On the other hand, it must be admitted
that Napier describes Colonel Dickson’s howitzers as being manned by
British and Portuguese brigaded together.
Lord Wellington’s letters show that he was by no means anxious for a
general action at this time, if it could have been avoided; and this
fact was apparent to those around him. When it was inevitable, he found
that the enemy had a better position than himself; and but for the
unexpected [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 25 July, 1812.] opening given by
Marmont, in the over extension of his left, it would have been a very
doubtful issue. “I really believe,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “that Lord
Wellington fought against his inclination, and that if Marmont by his
manœuvres had not pushed him so hard, he would quietly have fallen back,
and relinquished Salamanca to the French. The audacity of the enemy was
such, however, that British honour required it should be checked; and
most severely Marshal Marmont has been punished for playing tricks with
such a leader as Lord Wellington. When at last his Lordship determined
to attack the attacker, his dispositions were splendid, and his
operations rapid and overpowering. I can compare the close-fighting
part of the battle more to one of those battles between the French and
Spaniards, of which there have been so many, with always the same
result, than to a contest between armies equally powerful. It was a
rapid succession of overthrows, with some failures, but none that for a
moment impeded the grand result.”
There were two hills on the left of the Allied line, called Dos Arapiles
or Los Hermanitos, situated within easy artillery range of one another.
The French had obtained possession of the loftier of these, and by this
means had acquired an undoubted advantage. But this advantage was
modified by the artillery fire on the left of Lord Wellington’s line,
which was very effective. It was here that Colonel Dickson’s howitzer
brigade was in action, taking part in an Artillery duel, which is
mentioned in the correspondence of [Sidenote: To Colonel Shrapnel, dated
9 May, 1813.] several Artillery officers who took part in it. Major
Macdonald, who commanded a troop of Horse Artillery on the occasion,
said that the French artillerymen were driven from their guns on the
hill opposite, and prevented from returning, by the destructive fire of
Shrapnel shell from the [Sidenote: Lieut. Sinclair, R.A., to Colonel
Shrapnel, dated 22 Oct. 1814.] English guns. In another letter, from an
officer who was also present, the same statement is endorsed; and the
reader learns that the brigades of Artillery chiefly engaged were
Ross’s, Bull’s, and Macdonald’s troops, Colonel Dickson’s and Captain
Douglas’s brigades, and Major Sympher’s of the King’s German Artillery.
From the same sources it is ascertained that in the staunch final
advance of the enemy against the village of the Arapiles, the fire of
Shrapnel shell from the howitzers of the English Artillery produced
great effect; and that, on another important occasion during the battle,
a battery of the enemy’s guns was disabled by the same means. It will be
in the recollection of the military student that Marmont’s extension and
weakening of his left sprang from a desire to cut off the retreat of the
Allies on Ciudad Rodrigo, while he should yet retain the strong position
on his right, afforded by the possession of the hill already mentioned.
The division Thomières was selected for the flank movement, and against
it Pakenham’s division was despatched by Lord Wellington, accompanied
by 12 guns. The service performed by these guns was most valuable. Being
placed in a commanding position, they suddenly took the French troops in
flank, and aided materially in ensuring a victory, which Lord
Wellington’s quick judgment and military skill had placed in the way of
his troops. Then followed the stern battle all along the line, which
resulted in the “beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes;” the
French seeing General after General fall, and fighting at times in
bewilderment, for want of orders;--the English fighting with all the
courage of their race, and all the confidence which a General like
Wellington inspired,--who seemed to be always at the right place at the
right time:--then the French falling back from their first position only
to make a new effort; and then the utter rout and confusion, redeemed
but by the coolness and skill of the brave Foy, who with his rear-guard
strove to cover the headlong flight of the others.
The strength of the Allied army at Salamanca was 46,000, that of the
French 42,000; but the superiority in point of numbers on the side of
the Allies was caused by the presence of some utterly useless Spanish
troops. The French had 74 guns on the field, the Allies only 60. These,
according to Napier, were as follows:-
Royal Horse Artillery. Three troops 18 guns.
Royal Foot Artillery. Two 9-pounder brigades 12 ”
Royal Foot Artillery. Two 12-pounder ” 12 ”
King’s German Artillery. One 9-pounder ” 6 ”
Portuguese and British brigaded together 6 24-pr. howitzers.
One Spanish battery 6 guns.
--
Total 60 pieces.
--
There would certainly appear to be an error in this statement. In none
of Colonel Dickson’s manuscripts can it be traced that there were more
than five 24-pounder howitzers with his brigades; it would therefore
seem that the strength of the Allied Artillery at Salamanca was even
more disproportionate than that given, and that Lord Wellington had only
59 guns against Marmont’s 74.
The losses on both sides at Salamanca were very heavy. The Allies lost 1
General, 24 officers, and 686 men killed; and 5 Generals, 182 officers,
and 4270 men wounded. The loss of the French has never been exactly
stated. They lost 7000 prisoners alone, besides 11 guns and other
[Sidenote: Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’] trophies. An approximation to
their real loss has been obtained by taking General Clausel’s statement
of the army on the 18th of the following month. He had succeeded Marshal
Marmont in the command, on the latter being wounded; and on the 18th
August he reported that the army, which had been 42,000 strong on the
22nd July, had fallen to 21,800, with 50 instead of 74 guns. Much of the
loss may have occurred during the pursuit after the battle, but the
whole was virtually attributable to the contest of the 22nd.
Important as the results of the victory were, they would have been more
so, had not the retreat of the French across the Tormes been facilitated
by a blunder of the Spanish General, Espana, who left the bridge of Alba
open to them. This enabled Clausel to get as far as Peneranda with far
less punishment than an army so beaten as his was should have received
from his pursuers.[36] Wellington followed him to Valladolid, but failed
to overtake him; so, while Clausel continued his flight to Burgos,
Wellington, after a pause of some days, turned towards Madrid, to free
the capital from the presence of Joseph Buonaparte and his army.[37] He
entered it in state on the 12th August, Joseph having quitted it without
waiting for the Allies; and he remained there until the 1st September,
receiving from the Spaniards a perpetual ovation, and learning from
England how valuable his services were deemed, by their further
recognition in the form of a Marquisate.
Affairs in the Peninsula forbade longer repose, nor was Wellington the
man to risk his army finding a Capua in Madrid. Soult, alarmed at the
news from the north, raised the siege of Cadiz, and let Seville fall
into the hands of the Allies, while he moved northward himself. An
expedition from Sicily landed in the east of Spain, to co-operate with
Lord Wellington, of which it must suffice here to say that the Royal
Artillery accompanying it was commanded by Captain--then Brevet
Lieut.-Colonel--Holcombe, the same officer whose company had been at the
sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. And, lastly, the French General,
Clausel, had reorganized his army, and was taking the offensive against
the Allied troops left in the north. Of the operations of Wellington to
check this General, and to defeat him again before Soult’s army could
join him from the south, it is proposed to select one, as being a
specially Artillery subject--the siege of the Castle of Burgos.
[Sidenote: Dickson’s MSS.]
After the fall of the forts at Salamanca, the heavy Artillery employed
there continued to be attached to the reserve Artillery under Colonel
Dickson, and followed the movements of the army during the campaign. It
consisted of three 18-pounder guns on travelling carriages, and five
24-pounder howitzers, to which were attached Captain Glubb’s company of
the Royal Artillery, commanded by Captain Power, and a company of
Portuguese Artillery, commanded by Major Arriaga, with some additional
detachments of the Artillery of both nations. After the battle of
Salamanca, the whole eight pieces were brought forward to the
neighbourhood of Madrid, preparatory to the attack of Fort la Chine,
which was still occupied by the French, but which ultimately surrendered
without a contest. On the 1st September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid,
to proceed to Arevalo, where the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions were
ordered to assemble preparatory to a movement to the northward; and
Colonel Dickson, with his 18-pounders and howitzers, was ordered to
accompany this corps.
Previous to this movement, measures had been taken to bring forward from
Ciudad Rodrigo the following proportion of ammunition, viz.--
24-pr. round shot 600
18-pr. ” 800
with powder, and all necessary small stores.
On the 9th September, this small siege-train arrived at Valladolid, and
on the following day continued its march towards Burgos. On the 19th,
the Castle of Burgos was invested, the Artillery park being formed near
Villa Toro.
That Lord Wellington undertook this siege with wholly inadequate means
has been well known; but how inadequate these means were will appear
from the following statement. First, as regards _personnel_: how many
Artillerymen had he to carry on the duties in the batteries against a
place which held a commanding situation, and was powerfully armed? He
had merely
No. of men.
Capt. Glubb’s company, under Capt. Power 45
Lieut.-Col. May’s company under Lieut. Elgee 45
Major Arriaga’s company of Portuguese Artillery 57
---
Total 147
---
As mentioned above, he had only eight guns; and the following was the
total ammunition of all sorts, including the additional supply from
Ciudad Rodrigo.
24-pr. round shot 900
24-pr. common shell 208
24-pr. spherical case 236
18-pr. round shot 1306
18-pr. spherical case 100
To swell this amount, Colonel Dickson offered a reward for bringing in
any shot fired by the enemy. He found that the enemy’s 16-pounder shot
fitted his own 18-pounder guns, and that his 8-pounder shot would fit
the 9-pounders of the English field brigades. Before the end of
September, about 1400 shot were brought in, in this way. Colonel Dickson
also obtained detachments from the Horse and Field Brigades
occasionally, to give his siege artillerymen relief; but the duties of
the Field Artillery were so active at this time round Burgos that men
could with difficulty be spared.
The names of the officers of the Royal Artillery engaged in the siege
were as follows:--
Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, commanding.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, in immediate charge of the operation.
Captain Power }
Lieutenant Robe } Present during
Lieutenant Pascoe} the whole
Lieutenant Elgee } operation.
Lieutenant Hough }
Captain Greene } Belonging to
Captain Dansey } Field Brigades,
Captain Gardiner } but
Lieutenant Monro } occasionally
Lieut. Johnstone } employed.
Captain Blachley, joined 1st October.
Of the Royal Artillery, small in numbers, the casualties were very great
in proportion. Fifteen men were killed, and forty wounded, during the
siege, and in the operations immediately attending or succeeding it. The
officers who were wounded were Colonel Robe, Captains Dansey and Power,
Lieutenants Elgee and Johnstone.
After severe loss, a hornwork in front of the castle had been carried by
assault on the night of the 19th September, and on the following night a
battery for five guns was commenced. This battery was armed on the night
of the 22nd with two 18-pounders and three 24-pounder howitzers, in
readiness to open on the inner lines, in the event of an assault, which
had been determined on for that evening on the outer line, proving
successful. At the same time, a second battery for six guns was
commenced to fire against the keep of the castle. The assault, which was
premature, failed; and its leader was killed. On the night of the 24th,
the two 18-pounders were taken out of No. 1 Battery, and drawn along a
trench, part of the way towards No. 2, being replaced in the former by
howitzers. On the 25th, the five howitzers in No. 1 Battery opened a
fire to destroy some palisades, which were used to flank the works of
the castle. The fire was not successful; the howitzers were found to be
very deficient in precision when firing round shot; and the result was
inadequate to the expenditure of ammunition,--141 rounds,--a
consideration of some importance under the existing circumstances.[38]
Lord Wellington, conscious of the deficiency of his guns, worked now by
means of mining; and on the night of the 29th September, a mine was
sprung which threw down part of the outer wall. An assault was
immediately ordered; but from the darkness of the night the detachment
missed its way, and those who were leading--having gained the top of the
breach--were driven down again for want of support. The whole,
therefore, returned to the trenches.
On the 30th September, the howitzers in No. 1 Battery were of essential
service. About 10 A.M. they opened fire, with the addition of a French
6-pounder gun, taken in the hornwork, to demolish a stockade upon the
top of a tower in the outer line a little to the enemy’s right of the
breach, from which the French with musketry annoyed the English in the
sap,--the fire being so close that every man, who exposed himself in the
slightest degree, was sure to be hit. The stockade was strengthened by
sand-bags, &c., but, after three hours’ firing, it was utterly
destroyed. The ammunition expended for this purpose was 136 rounds;--90
24-pounder shot, 40 6-pounder French shot, and 6 5½-inch common shell.
It was on this day that Captain Dansey, who had volunteered for service
in the trenches, was wounded.
The next episode in the Artillery portion of the siege was the moving
the three 18-pounders into a breaching battery so close to the outer
wall, that the guns of the upper work could not bear on them. The French
commander, Dubreton, lost no time, however, in bringing down a howitzer
and a light gun from the upper work, followed by others as quickly as he
could; and as the breaching battery was very slight, [Sidenote: Napier,
and ‘Memoir of Sir Hew Ross.’] the result was serious. “The defences of
the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were
disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the 18-pounders, and the
muzzle of another was split.” A second, stronger, breaching battery was
then formed, but the plunging fire from the castle was too severe; the
guns which were yet serviceable were therefore removed back to No. 1
Battery, on the hill of San Michael. From this position, on the morning
of the 4th October, they opened again on the old breach; and a mine
having been exploded with great effect in the same evening, another
assault took place,--the fourth during the siege. This was more
successful, and a lodgment was effected; but on the following evening, a
large body of the enemy charged down upon the guards and workmen, and
got possession of the old breach, besides killing and wounding 150
[Sidenote: Napier.] men, and destroying their works. On the 7th, the
besiegers, who had continued their advance, and were now close to the
wall, were again charged with fatal effect by the garrison; and the guns
from San Michael, although effecting a great breach in the second line,
suffered severely from the artillery fire of the enemy,--another
18-pounder losing a trunnion. Guns were, however, too few and too
valuable to be considered unserviceable, even after so serious an injury
as this; and the ingenuity of Colonel Dickson produced a species of
carriage, from which the damaged ordnance could fire with reduced
charges. Between the 7th and the 10th October, the San Michael guns
continued to make breaches in the works; on the 10th, some ammunition
arrived from Santander; on the 18th, another breach was pronounced
practicable, and Wellington ordered a fifth assault. This also was
unsuccessful; the Allies lost 200 men killed and wounded; and the siege
was at length raised--on the 20th--by Lord Wellington, who had received
alarming intelligence of the approach of a French army to relieve
Burgos, and of the movements of Soult.
The siege of Burgos is a blot on the military reputation of the Duke of
Wellington; and revealed an ignorance of what artillery could and could
not do, which every now and then [Sidenote: Sir Hew Ross to Sir Hew
Dalrymple, dated Madrid, 18 Oct. 1812.] manifested itself in his
military operations. If Sir Hew Ross was correctly informed, the error
made by Lord Wellington was almost criminal, as there was no necessity
for attempting such a siege with so inadequate a siege-train. “Why he
should have undertaken the siege of such a place,” wrote Major Ross from
Madrid, “with means so very inadequate appears very extraordinary,
_especially as there was little or no difficulty in augmenting it to any
extent_, either from the guns and ammunition found here, or the ships at
St. Andero.” That Sir Hew wrote with reason seems all the more probable
from the fact that, while the last assault was actually taking place,
two 24-pounders sent from Santander by Sir Home Popham had passed
Reynosa on [Sidenote: Napier.] their way to Burgos. But it may be urged
that the responsibility of undertaking a siege with insufficient
Artillery lay not with the General, but with the Artillery commander.
Those who are familiar with the character of the Duke of Wellington, as
shown in the various narratives of the Peninsular War, will not make use
of this argument. It was not his wont to allow his plans to be altered
by the representations of his subordinates, nor was he addicted to the
habit of consulting them. Besides, in this particular instance, he
officially relieved the Artillery and Engineer officers of the
responsibility. “The officers,” he wrote, “at [Sidenote: To Lord
Bathurst dated Cabeçon, 26 Oct. 1812.] the head of the Artillery and
Engineer departments, Lieut.-Colonel Robe and Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne,
and Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve Artillery, rendered
me every assistance; and the failure of success is not to be attributed
to them.” The Duke of Wellington believed in the bayonet beyond any
other weapon; and if a legitimate belief became occasionally credulity,
it is hardly to be wondered at, when one reflects on the gallantry of
the Infantry which it was the Duke’s good fortune to command. What
seemed to be impossibilities, when ordered by him, were proved possible
in the result; and the consequently increased belief in the power of the
bayonet seems but natural. But his creed was supported at a terrible
cost. When we find Napier himself,--Wellington’s idolater,--pronouncing
his sieges a succession of butcheries, the criticism of a more temperate
student may be excused. Doubtless, the want of adequate ordnance was
often severely felt by the Duke of Wellington, and compelled him to an
exaggerated use of the other arms; but this fact was hardly an excuse
for neglecting its employment, when available in sufficient quantities,
and obtainable with moderate exertions.
Nor was the fact that he--as he justly complained--_never_ had a proper
amount of Artillery with his armies any excuse for his making
occasionally but an indifferent use of that which he had. Fortunately,
the Duke of Wellington had merely to encounter Napoleon’s Marshals in
Spain: had he had to meet their master, it is probable that the creed
which he believed and practised might have received some rude assaults.
If one could free oneself of all but purely professional considerations,
one would wish, for the sake of the student in the art of war, that
Napoleon, instead of Marmont and Clausel, had faced Wellington in the
campaign of 1812. The result would, doubtless, have been the same; but
the ways and means would have been very different. As it happened,
Wellington’s sole encounter with Napoleon took place on ground chosen by
himself, and under circumstances which yet further assisted his military
creed, by testing yet again that which he had so often extravagantly
proved, the marvellous endurance, discipline, and courage of the British
Infantry.
The results of the mistaken siege of Burgos are curtly described by Sir
J. T. Jones, in his ‘Journal of the Sieges in the Peninsula.’ “By its
means,” he writes, “a beaten enemy gained time to recruit his forces,
concentrate his scattered armies, and regain the ascendancy.” The same
author writes, with regard to the service of the Royal Artillery during
the siege: “It is a pleasing act of justice to the Artillery officers,
employed in this attack, to state that they vied with each other in
their exertions and expedients to meet the hourly difficulties they
encountered, and that no set of men could possibly have drawn more
service than they did from the limited means at their command.”