CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.
The enemy approaching in force, after the raising of the second siege of
Badajoz, the Allies crossed the river on the 17th June, 1811, and on the
19th encamped between Elvas and Campo Maior. Elvas had been put in a
state of siege, and a position had been marked out behind Campo Maior,
in case the French should show any inclination to attack. The bold front
which Lord Wellington here showed deceived the two French Marshals,
Marmont and Soult, who had now united their armies, and entered Badajoz
in triumph, [Sidenote: Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 26 June, 1811.]
congratulating its gallant governor, Philippon. They concluded that he
must have received great reinforcements; and although they crossed the
Guadiana with a great body of cavalry supported with infantry, and one
or two small affairs with the outposts took place,--they declined a
general engagement. A want of _entente cordiale_ between Marmont and
Soult led soon to a separation,--the latter moving towards Seville,
whither Wellington despatched Blake’s Spanish troops,--and the former
marching away by the valley of the [Sidenote: Cust.] Tagus towards
Almaraz. Thus relieved of their presence, Lord Wellington took up his
quarters at Pontalegre, and allowed his army to have some repose after
its recent exertions.
This seems a favourable moment for placing before the reader a tabular
return (_see next page_) which shows the gradual increase in the
Artillery element of Lord Wellington’s army in the Peninsula. Prepared
from the monthly returns, it shows the numbers at different periods,
distinguishing between the Royal and Foreign Artilleries. The point
which will doubtless strike the reader most is the steady increase in
the force of Horse Artillery and Artillery drivers, which took
place; marking the growing recognition of that which had hitherto been
overlooked to a great extent,--the value of mobility in Field Artillery.
RETURN of the ROYAL BRITISH and GERMAN ARTILLERY attached to the ARMY
under the Command of the DUKE of WELLINGTON in the PENINSULA and FRANCE
at the undermentioned periods.
(_Extracted from the Monthly Returns._)
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| | 1811. | 1812. | 1813. | 1814. |
+ +------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| |March.| May.|January.|April.| May.|July.|December.|January.|April.|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
|1. General, Field, and Staff Officers, not } | 8| 8| 9| 10| 11| 11| 9| 10| 8|
| included on Company Rolls } | | | | | | | | | |
|2. Royal Horse Artillery | 495| 499| 699| 728| 926| 988| 1,016| 1,007| 1,021|
|3. Royal Foot Artillery | 884|1,111| 996| 1,327|1,876|1,862| 1,950| 1,985| 1,966|
|4. Royal Artillery Drivers | 777| 858| 1,040| 1,159|2,154|2,150| 2,683| 2,719| 2,734|
|5. Ordnance Medical Staff | 9| 10| 18| 18| 27| 26| 29| 29| 29|
|6. Field Train or Commissariat Department } | 84| 86| 129| 121| 130| 128| 153| 154| 148|
| of the Ordnance } | | | | | | | | | |
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
| General Total of Royal British Artillery | 2,257|2,572| 2,891| 3,363|5,124|5,165| 5,840| 5,904| 5,897|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
|King’s German Artillery | 421| 412| 449| 434| 450| 446| 430| 439| 412|
+----------------------------------------------+------+-----+--------+------+-----+-----+---------+--------+------+
N.B.--The Field Train Department attached to the Engineers is not
included, as it did not appear in the Monthly Returns of the Artillery.
General Howorth vacated the command of the Artillery in the Peninsula in
July 1811, being obliged to return to England on account of
ill-health,--and was shortly afterwards succeeded by General Borthwick.
This officer was wounded at Ciudad Rodrigo, and returned to England,--a
coolness having sprung up between him and Lord Wellington, which
recurred with one of his successors, and continued until the command of
the Artillery devolved upon his favourite, then _Colonel_ Dickson, a few
months after the siege of Burgos.
[Sidenote: Major Dickson D.-A.-G. dated Castel Branco, 23 Jul. 1811.]
On the 19th July, 1811, Lord Wellington sent for Colonel Fletcher,
Colonel Framingham, and Major Dickson, and informed them that it was his
intention to attempt the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; and after a little
conversation as to the means of transport, &c., he desired Major Dickson
to proceed to Oporto, to superintend the conveyance of the English
battering train up the Douro to Lamego, and thence by land to Francoso,
whence it would also be conveyed by land to its final destination. This
battering train had arrived in Lisbon in the first instance, and had
been carried secretly to Oporto, with a view to the proposed siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo, its ostensible destination being Cadiz.[28] Two new
companies of Artillery which had arrived in Lisbon were now ordered to
Oporto to assist Major Dickson. In all these arrangements Lord
Wellington underrated the strength of the French army in the north of
the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated Oporto, 27 Aug. 1811.]
Major Dickson reached Almeida, on his way to Oporto, on the 28th July,
and arrived at the latter place on the 3rd August, where he found
Captain Bredin’s and Captain Glubb’s companies--now H Battery, 1st
Brigade, and 5 Battery 5th Brigade--waiting his orders. Before the 13th
the whole of the train had been embarked in boats, about 160 in number,
and despatched to Lamego; but the work and the climate proved too much
for Major Dickson, and before he could follow the train he was struck
down with a violent fever, accompanied by delirium. When first attacked,
he requested Lord Wellington to send some one to take up his duties,
and, accordingly, his friend Captain May was sent, and superintended the
movement of the train until the 5th September, when the gallant Dickson,
only half recovered, and travelling in a litter, arrived at Lamego. Here
he found that all the guns and stores had marched for Villa da Ponte,
and that Captain May was on the point of following [Sidenote: Major
Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated Villa da Ponte, 13 Sept. 1811.] them. On the
8th Major Dickson left Lamego, and reached Villa da Ponte on the 10th,
where he fell an immediate victim to a relapse of fever, which lasted
acutely several days. Captain Bredin’s company had, in the meantime,
been recalled to the head-quarters of the army, to take over the brigade
of guns from Captain Thompson’s, which was almost _hors de combat_ from
sickness.[29] The troops left with the battering train were therefore
reduced to Captain Glubb’s company of Royal Artillery, about 250
Portuguese Artillery, and from 1200 to 1400 Portuguese Militia, intended
to assist on the march. Captain Holcombe’s company of Royal Artillery
was hourly expected. That company is now No. 4 Battery 2nd Brigade.
[Sidenote: Ibid. 20 Sept. 1811.]
On the march, the battering train had been arranged by Captain May as
follows. It was divided, as far as the ordnance was concerned, into five
divisions; each gun marched with 350 rounds, and each howitzer and
mortar with 160 rounds. An officer was placed in charge of each
division, and each division marched separately. The remaining stores and
ammunition requisite to furnish a total of 800 rounds per gun, and 400
for each howitzer and mortar, were under the charge of the Commissary
and other officers, and marched in rear.
While at Villa da Ponte, awaiting orders from Lord Wellington for a
further advance, Major Dickson’s correspondence was of a nature which
reveals to the reader more of the personal element than his letters, as
a rule, allow to become visible. The alternate hoping and despairing as
to orders for advance,--the _ennui_ produced by enforced idleness,--the
impetuous way in which he would fling himself into professional
discussions with General Macleod, merely to occupy his leisure,--the
spasmodic fits of zeal in improving the arrangement of the immense
train,--all unite to present to the reader a very vivid picture of him
whose hand, so long still, penned these faded letters. His recurring
attacks of fever--followed by apologies like the following: “The fact
is, when I am well I forget all, take violent exercise at all times and
seasons, and knock myself up; but I am determined to be more careful in
future”--followed by an inevitable relapse, in proof of the failure of
his good resolutions,--combine to bring before the reader a very lovable
picture of a very earnest man. It is by such study alone that the
Artilleryman can realise the characters of the great among his
predecessors in the Corps, and by such links that he can bind them to
himself with that almost family tie, of which the Regimental union is
but an expansion.
[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 27 Sept. 1811.]
The extent of the battering train under Major Dickson’s command was as
follows:--34 24-pounders, 4 18-pounders, 16 iron 5½-inch howitzers, 2
8-inch howitzers, and 8 10-inch mortars; and much of his leisure at
Villa da Ponte was devoted to improving and renewing the somewhat
shattered [Sidenote: Ibid. 22 Nov, 1811.] carriages of this ordnance. On
the 16th November he received an order from Lord Wellington to commence
moving the battering train to Almeida; and by the 21st the last
[Sidenote: Ibid. 4 Dec. 1811.] division, spare carriages, &c., had left.
The march was most successful. No fewer than 1100 bullocks were employed
for the divisions alone, apart from the reserve of stores; and in no
case did the march occupy more than six days, although the country was
very mountainous; nor did a single accident occur. The bringing up the
reserve of ammunition and stores was delayed by want of means of
conveyance; and pending its arrival, Lord Wellington requested Major
Dickson to superintend the unspiking of the ordnance in Almeida, and the
placing the batteries in a state of defence. In this occupation the
reader is requested to leave him while he returns to the movements of
Lord Wellington, which were now assuming an active form.
The English General had moved northward, with the view of besieging
Ciudad Rodrigo; and a summary of his movements may be given from some
admirable MS. letters, written by Captain May on his return to the
head-quarters of the army. On the 23rd September the enemy’s advanced
guard was near Ciudad Rodrigo. The French army was under Marmont and
Dorsenne, and numbered 60,000 men, including 6000 cavalry. On the 24th,
the whole of this cavalry had crossed the Agueda, about 10,000 infantry
remaining on the other side. On the 25th the enemy advanced, and
Wellington disputed the ground, retiring gradually to the position at
Fuente de Guinaldo. In this advance the enemy’s cavalry and artillery
were principally engaged; and on the side of the Allies, the Cavalry,
Portuguese Artillery, and Cole’s and Picton’s divisions of Infantry.
During this forward movement the enemy, by a charge of cavalry, gained
possession of five Portuguese guns, which, however, were speedily
recaptured by the 5th Regiment of Foot, in a most gallant and intrepid
manner. On the 26th, the Allies remained all day in the position of
Guinaldo, which extended from the right and front of the town for four
miles towards Ituero, the woods being occupied by two Infantry brigades
from the right down to the Agueda. Thus posted, they witnessed the
arrival of the whole French army, the last of which did not arrive until
sunset. On satisfying himself as to their numbers, and bearing in mind
the great extent of country to be watched, Lord Wellington determined to
retire in the evening to a more favourable position for concentration
and battle. The army, therefore, began its march to the rear at 10 P.M.,
and next day, the 27th, everything was in the neighbourhood of the new
position, which occupied a length of about six miles. The left was near
Reudon, on the Coa, and the right in the rear of Çouta, resting on the
mountains. When daylight revealed to the enemy the masterly retreat
which had taken place, some cavalry and infantry were pressed forward,
and the Allied piquets were driven in; but Wellington, suddenly assuming
the offensive, drove them back from Alfaites to Aldea da Ponte, his
troops occupying the latter village. After sunset, however, the enemy
advanced in such force, in front and also on the flanks of the village,
that the officer commanding there wisely withdrew his troops to
Alfaites. This final advance of the French was made to cover a retreat
which had now been determined on. On the morning of the 28th nothing
could be seen of them; and on the 29th it was learnt that they were
moving back on Ciudad Rodrigo. After they had thrown provisions into
that city, they continued to retire, and went into cantonments in the
neighbourhood of Salamanca. The British army did the same between the
Coa and the Agueda, Lord Wellington, with his head-quarters at Freneda,
keeping watch on the city which he had determined to take.
The only brilliant affair which took place between this time and the
successful sieges, which will now have to be mentioned, was the surprise
of Girard’s division by General Hill, at Arroyo de Molinos. As, however,
the Artillery with Hill’s force was Portuguese,--Major Hawker’s
9-pounder brigade of Royal Artillery having been unable to get up on
account of the state of the roads,--its further notice in this work will
be unnecessary.
Taking advantage of the French troops being scattered in their
cantonments, and having ascertained that large reinforcements from
Marmont’s army had been detached to Valencia, Lord Wellington resolved
on a short, sharp siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the end of December he
sent for [Sidenote: Major Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. 1 Jan. 1812.] Major
Dickson, and directed him to move forward the battering train and stores
from Almeida, Galegos being made the intermediate depôt. To the latter
place the army head-quarters were moved on the 7th July.
The main interest to the military reader in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo
and Badajoz, in 1812, attaches to the gallantry of the Infantry. The
monotonous, albeit shortlived, work in the batteries is drowned in the
recollection of the scenes of valour at the final assault. In these
pages, therefore, the Artillery share in the sieges will assume, of
necessity, the form of a few dry statistics.
The Artillery present at the siege included 185 of the Royal Artillery
and 370 of the Portuguese. The names of the officers of the Royal
Artillery who were present were General Borthwick, Major Dickson,
Captains Holcombe, Thompson, Power, Dundas, and Dyneley; Lieutenants
Bourchier, Love, Johnstone, Ingilby, Smith, and Grimes; and Captain May,
Brigade-Major.
The batteries opened in the afternoon of the 14th January, 1812, the
guns having narrowly escaped being spiked in the morning of that day. On
the night of the 19th, the breaches were pronounced practicable, and
Wellington announced in orders, “Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this
evening.” Except on the 16th and part of the 17th, the weather was clear
and admirably suited for artillery practice, and the batteries were in
action daily for an average of eight and a half hours.
The guns employed were as follows:--On January 14th, 20 24-pounders and
2 18-pounders; on January 15th, 23 24-pounders and 2 18-pounders; on
January 16th and 17th, the same; on January 18th, 30 24-pounders and 2
18-pounders; and on January 19, 30 24-pounders.[30]
The expenditure of ammunition during this short siege was as
follows,--the total number of guns in battery having been 34
24-pounders, and 4 18-pounders:--
24-pr. guns: Round shot, 8950. Rounds expended per gun, 263.
18-pr. guns: Round shot, 565. Rounds expended per gun, 141.
The absence of mortars and howitzers from this siege was explained by
the increased amount of transport required for shell, compared with
shot, and by the fact that Lord Wellington had resolved on an assault
the moment a breach was practicable, without any other siege operations.
Shot were, therefore, all that was necessary, except for keeping the
enemy from working at the breach.
[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 29 Jan. 1812.]
The following extract from a letter written by Major Dickson after the
siege, is interesting:--“Lord Wellington has certainly made a most
brilliant _coup_, and, I am convinced, astonished the enemy by the
rapidity of his operations. They intended to relieve the place and raise
the siege about this day (29th January). We were certainly favoured by
the most delightful weather--excessively cold, but perfectly dry. It was
not even necessary to put the powder under the laboratory tents, which I
was enabled to spare to keep the poor fellows from the pinching frost;
for we were nearly without cover.... I am hard pressed for time, but I
must say a word in favour of our fine fellows of the Corps. They were
(Portuguese and all) at relief and relief, off and on; but nothing could
exceed their zeal and activity, and their work speaks for itself. _Never
was better practice made._ I had only 430 Artillerymen of both
nations,--about 130 British, and the rest Portuguese. We had somewhere
more than 50 Artillerymen killed and wounded, but no officer materially
hurt. The latter days, to make it up, I had some help from our own field
Artillery:--part of Lawson’s company was one day in the trenches, and
part of Sympher’s German company another.”
[Sidenote: MS. Return dated 26 Jan. 1812.]
The actual number of killed and wounded between the 14th and 19th
January,--while the siege lasted,--was as follows (excluding Portuguese
Artillery):--[31]
Captains Dyneley and Power, wounded.
Captain Glubb’s company, now 5 Battery, 5th Brigade; 2 gunners
died of their wounds; 2 gunners wounded slightly.
Captain Holcombe’s company, now 4 Battery, 2nd Brigade; 1 gunner
killed; 17 non-commissioned officers and men wounded.
Captain Lawson’s company, now H Battery, 8th Brigade; 1 gunner
died of his wounds; 2 gunners wounded.
Captain Sympher’s company (K.G.A.); 1 gunner killed; 3 gunners
wounded.
The ammunition expended was:--8950 rounds from 24-pounders, and 565 from
18-pounders.
[Sidenote: To Lord Liverpool, dated 20 Jan. 1812.]
In Lord Wellington’s despatch, announcing the successful termination of
the siege, he--after extolling Major Dickson’s conduct of the Artillery
operations--proceeded to say: “The rapid execution produced by the
well-directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of
the merits of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and of the
Portuguese Artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly
mention Brigade-Major May, and Captains Holcombe, Power, Dyneley, and
Dundas, of the Royal Artillery.”
General Borthwick’s name is not mentioned, either in the despatch or
among the wounded; but he appears in Kane’s list--generally most
accurate in its details--as having been in command of the Artillery, and
also as having been wounded, during the siege.
Ciudad Rodrigo had hardly fallen, before Lord Wellington resolved to
attempt a third siege of Badajoz,--now that he had suitable ordnance. He
ordered Major Dickson to proceed on the 30th January to Setubal, calling
at Elvas to make some necessary arrangements. From Setubal he was
directed to send 16 24-pounders of a new battering train, which had
arrived, to Elvas,--as well as 20 guns of the same calibre, which were
to be furnished from the navy. The whole of these guns were to travel on
block carriages. The difficulty of sending the heavy guns of the train
at Almeida to Elvas led to this arrangement: but it was decided to send
the 24-pounder howitzers, as being much lighter, and also a number of
24-pounder carriages, which were stored at Almeida. By this means it was
hoped to have speedily equipped at Elvas a new battering train of 36
iron 24-pounder guns, and 16 24-pounder howitzers,--an armament very
different from the brass Portuguese guns which had assailed the
stronghold of Philippon twice before.
So incessant was the work which now devolved on Major Dickson that he
had no time for correspondence, and there is a great blank, where the
student had hoped to find much that was interesting. From other sources,
therefore, the Artillery details of a siege, which can never be
forgotten, must be procured. As at Ciudad Rodrigo, the Infantry share in
the operations dwarfs all other;--but it dwarfs it to even a greater
extent. The story of the storming of Badajoz is one which will thrill
the heart of every Briton for all time; which will bind together by
sacred memories the regiments which were so nobly represented on that
day; and which will impress on all, who study it, the truth of Napier’s
words, that “a British army bears with it an awful power.” The scene on
the night of the 6th April, 1812, was one before which the energy, zeal,
and proficiency of the Artillery on the preceding days pale away into
nothingness; and the chronicling of their humble statistics seems almost
an impertinence. For, the night of the 6th [Sidenote: Napier.] was,
indeed, one in which “many died, and there was much glory;” it was one
in which death took many and hideous forms,--“the slain dying not all
suddenly, nor by one manner of death; some perishing by steel, some by
shot, some by water, some crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some
trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by fiery explosions;” and yet it was
a night in which the most cruel death was fair to look on,--because
hallowed by marvellous courage and rare devotion.
[Sidenote: Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.]
The breaches, which were rendered famous by this combat “so fiercely
fought, so terribly won,” were virtually made between the 30th March and
the 6th April. On the 30th March 8 18-pounders were in action for purely
breaching purposes; on the following day, this number was increased, by
12 24-pounders, and 6 18-pounders, to 26 guns; and these remained in
action, for 13 hours a day, until the storming of the place. Of round
shot, alone, no fewer than 18,832 24-pr., and 13,029 18-pr., were
expended during the short siege; besides 1163 24-pounder grape shot,
and 496 of the same from the 18-pounders. Of the round shot, 23,896 were
employed in forming the three breaches. Besides the breaching guns,
there were 10 24-pounder and 18-pounder guns, and 16 5½-inch howitzers,
employed for enfilading and other fire. From the last mentioned, 507
common shell and 1319 spherical case were fired during the siege.
[Sidenote: Tables published by an officer of Artillery in 1819.]
The three breaches were rendered practicable from a distance of between
600 and 700 yards; and the curtain breach was made in one day, the day
of the assault. To the rapidity of the making of this breach was much of
the success in the final storming due; because, had several days been
required, measures would have been adopted by the defenders during the
intervening nights to render it wholly impracticable. In making this
curtain breach, 14 guns were employed, with an expenditure of 3514
rounds.
Colonel Framingham commanded the Allied Artillery during the siege, but
Major Dickson virtually directed the operations. From a rough MS. diary
in the Record Office, in the handwriting of the latter officer, it would
appear that the strength of the Artillery was as follows:--
N.-C. officers
and men.
Captain Holcombe’s company 110
Captain Gardiner’s ditto[32] 110
Captain Glubb’s (commanded by Captain Power) company 78
Captain Rettberg’s (King’s German Artillery) ditto 30
There were also 377 of the 3rd Regiment, and 249 of the 2nd Regiment, of
Portuguese Artillery.
[Sidenote: To Lord Liverpool, 7 April, 1812.]
In his despatch, after the storming of the city, Lord Wellington said:
“Major Dickson conducted the details of the Artillery service during
this siege, as well as upon former occasions, under the general
superintendence of Lieut.-Colonel Framingham, who, since the absence of
Major-General Borthwick, has commanded the Artillery with this army. I
cannot sufficiently applaud the officers and soldiers of the British and
Portuguese Artillery during this siege, particularly Lieut.-Colonel
Robe, who opened the breaching batteries, Majors May and Holcombe,
Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Royal Artillery;
Captain de Rettberg, of the King’s German Artillery; and Major Tulloh,
of the Portuguese. Adverting to the extent of the details of the
Ordnance Department during this siege, to the difficulty of weather,
&c., with which Major Dickson had to contend, I must mention him most
particularly to your Lordship.” Besides the officers named in the
despatch, there were present in the batteries Captains Power, Latham,
Dundas, and Dansey; and Lieutenants Weston, Connel, Grimes, and Love.
The loss of the Royal Artillery during the siege was as follows:--
Killed: Captain Latham, Lieutenant Connel, and 23 non-commissioned
officers and men.
Wounded: Captain Dundas, Lieutenants Grimes and Love, and 48
non-commissioned officers and men.[33]
Major Tulloh, an officer of the Royal Artillery attached to the
Portuguese, was also wounded.
The troops of Horse Artillery commanded by Majors Bull and Ross were
present at the investment and siege of Badajoz; and although not
included in the detail made [Sidenote: Major Ross to Sir H. Dalrymple, 8
April, 1812.] out by Major Dickson for duty in the trenches, it is
evident that they must have taken part in the operations, for Major Ross
was severely wounded by a grape-shot. But his name does not appear in
Lord Wellington’s lists.
The losses in the other arms of the service employed in the siege were
very great. No fewer than 5000 officers and men fell during the siege,
and of that number 3500 fell on the night of the 6th April. Sixty
officers and upwards of seven hundred men were slain on the spot.
[Sidenote: Napier.]
No wonder that, “when the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to
Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and
the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the
loss of his gallant soldiers.”
The recollections of such a night are among the greatest treasures which
an army can cherish. Even the reaction after success, the irregularities
and licence displayed by the troops in the captured city, while
certainly dimming, could not permanently injure the glory of the
marvellous assault. Such traditions are a weapon for discipline, which
only a soldier can estimate. Inspired by them, men will feed the lamp of
their present lives with the oil of past glory, and strain every nerve
to make the flame burn pure and clear.
Perhaps one of the highest motives, which can influence a soldier, is
the desire to be worthy of his predecessors, and true to the reputation
which they have earned for their corps. It carries him at once out of
himself, and introduces an unselfish element even into his own ambition
and aims. Only those who have served long in a regiment which they love
can understand the fond jealousy for its honour, which will inspire its
members. Its history never dies; the deeds of the years that are gone
are the living possession of all; the valour which may have been
exhibited in former days lives again in the breasts of those, who hunger
for an opportunity of similar display; and the men who, by their courage
and skill, may have earned honour for their corps, still haunt in no
shadowy form the dreams of the young aspirant, and the memories of the
old.
* * * * *
NOTE.--In alluding to the services of the two scientific corps at
this siege of Badajoz, Sir J. Jones wrote that “as an engineer and
artillery operation, it succeeded to the utmost letter.”