VITTORIA AND SAN SEBASTIAN.
The threatening appearance of the various French armies in Spain, which
compelled Lord Wellington to raise the siege of Burgos, compelled him
ultimately to withdraw into [Sidenote: Despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated
26 Oct. 1812.] Portugal for winter quarters. In leaving Burgos he found
the activity of the commanding officers of Artillery very beneficial. It
enabled him to carry off all his serviceable guns and stores in a single
night; but the absence of cattle prevented his removing the few French
guns which he had captured in the storming of the hornwork. During the
retreat, the services of the Horse Artillery, under Major Downman, were
of a high order, and called forth the commendation of Lord Wellington.
The troop which most distinguished itself was Major Bull’s, commanded by
Captain Norman Ramsay, Major Bull having been twice wounded,--on one
occasion so severely,--when in advance with the Cavalry at Torquemada on
the night of the 12th September, 1812,--that he was obliged to be
invalided. He does not reappear in the story of his gallant troop until
the battle of Waterloo.
The retreat terminated on the 24th November, and the troops went into
cantonments, the head-quarters being stationed at Frenada, and the
Artillery at Malhada Sourda, three miles distant.
An old friend reappears, in the winter of 1812-13, to the burrower among
Artillery records. Captain--now Brevet-Major--Frazer, who last was
mentioned in this work in the account of the operations at Monte Video
and Buenos Ayres, arrived to take command of Major Bull’s troop during
that officer’s absence. His own troop being on home service, he more
easily obtained permission to assume this duty. He had not been many
weeks in the Peninsula before he received a more important
command,--that which had hitherto [Sidenote: Sir A. Frazer’s Letters,
page 89.] been held with such distinction by Major Downman,--the command
of the Royal Horse Artillery with Lord Wellington’s armies. Although a
reserved man in public, and fond of solitude, he was almost diffuse in
his correspondence. Happily for those who have succeeded him in the
Corps, his letters from the Peninsula have been collected and published
by one who served in his troop for seven years,--General Sir Edward
Sabine. These letters, and the unpublished letters of Sir A. Dickson,
give together a most graphic picture of the operations of 1813, 1814,
and 1815, which cannot but lose by the necessary condensation of the
historian.
In the beginning of 1813, Lord Wellington proceeded to Lisbon to make
the necessary arrangements for the coming campaign. The intelligence of
the French disasters in Russia had reached him; rumours also came that
Soult and many of the best troops in the French Peninsular armies had
gone to France; and, from his preparations at Lisbon, it is evident that
he had already resolved on offensive operations, which should, if
possible, have the effect of driving the French out of the Peninsula.
That he succeeded is well known to the reader; it remains to single out,
in this and the following chapter, some of the more salient points in
the campaign.
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson, to D.-A.-G. Lisbon, 16 Jan. 1813.]
Colonel Dickson had been ordered to Lisbon, to consult as to some means
of making the Portuguese Artillery more available for service than it
had as yet been; and while there, he was sent for by Lord Wellington,
who had also [Sidenote: Ibid. dated Lisbon, 30 Jan. 1813.] arrived, and
was directed to superintend the equipment of a pontoon train of
thirty-four large pontoons, which was to be sent by river to Abrantes,
and there handed over to the master-pontonier, for use in the coming
operations of the army. This train was destined to be a sore grievance
to the Artillery. It had always to be horsed _first_, even at the
expense of the Artillery brigades; and its possible wants in that
respect haunted, like a nightmare, the commanding officer of the Corps.
At this interview Lord Wellington also expressed considerable anxiety
about the brigade of 18-pounder guns, which, he said, he was determined
to have early in the field, as the French were understood to be
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 24 Feb. 1813.] fortifying
positions everywhere. Some new 18-pounders were expected daily from
England; and, on their arrival, he desired that they should be sent up
the Tagus to Abrantes. This was safely effected; and bullocks were
ordered to bring them thence to head-quarters, at Malhada Sourda.
They were ultimately manned by Captain Morrison’s and Captain Glubb’s
companies of the Royal Artillery; and the number of carriages in the
brigade was no less than 57, viz.:--
[Sidenote: Ibid. dated 18 April, 1813.]
6 18-pr. guns on travelling carriages.
2 spare carriages.
6 platform waggons.
2 forges.
18 ammunition (limber) waggons.
3 store waggons.
20 bullock carts.
N.B.--Ammunition was carried at the rate of 150 rounds per gun.
The guns, and nine of the ammunition waggons, had horses in addition to
their bullocks; the remaining carriages were drawn by bullocks only.
[Sidenote: Ibid. dated 24 Feb. 1813.]
About the same time as the 18-pounders arrived from England, another
troop of Horse Artillery, under the command of Captain Webber Smith,
also reached Lisbon. A change in the armament of the troop, from
6-pounders to 9-pounders, was immediately ordered by Lord Wellington,--a
change which, on more than one occasion, and in more than one campaign,
has been ordered in the armament of the Royal Horse Artillery. At this
time, also, a recognition was made by the Portuguese Government of the
services of the Artillery,--Colonels Robe and Dickson being made knights
of the Tower and Sword.
[Sidenote: Ibid. dated 28 March, 1813.]
The old difficulty as to horses reappeared in the beginning of 1813. The
sickness among these animals during the winter had been excessive; and
the difficulty of purchasing any in the country seemed daily to
increase. This led to many changes. Among others, Lord Wellington
reduced the whole of the Portuguese Artillery for service in the field
to three brigades,--one 9-pounder and one 6-pounder brigade to be with
Sir Rowland Hill’s force, and one 9-pounder brigade to be attached to
the general Artillery reserve of the army. These three were made very
efficient by this means, and the purchase of a considerable number of
horses avoided.
The campaign of 1813 was distinguished by a feature of considerable
importance. Lord Wellington was now Commander-in-Chief of all the
Spanish armies, and all necessary correspondence came direct to him,
instead of through Cadiz. The assistance of the _Spanish_ regular troops
was never of much value, even under the new system, except at the combat
of San Marcial and the Bidassoa; but the part taken by the Partidas, or
irregular forces, during the campaign was not unimportant, and increased
the difficulties of the French troops.
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated Corilhaa, 4 April, 1813.]
The French commenced to fall back from Salamanca towards Burgos, and in
the beginning of April had not above a thousand men in the former place.
At the same time, supplies were arriving from England weekly, and were
disembarked in the northern ports of the Peninsula, with a view to the
advance of the English army. An organization of the Allied troops was
taking place, superior to anything which had yet been witnessed; and the
Corps, whose history is treated in these pages, improved with the other
arms in this respect. It seems a suitable time to touch on the
improvement in the Field Brigades which had already taken place; and, at
the risk of wearying the reader, to place before him a specimen of these
in the spring of 1813.
The brigade, i.e. battery, which it is proposed to describe belonged to
the 10th Battalion, and was commanded by the 2nd Captain, R. M. Cairnes,
a gallant officer, who afterwards fell at Waterloo. It was pronounced by
various inspecting officers to be the best field brigade with the army;
but Captain Cairnes in his correspondence declined to accept this
honour, as he considered others equally efficient. It may, therefore, be
accepted as a fair type. From a letter written by Captain Cairnes
himself, the following particulars [Sidenote: Captain Cairnes to
Captain Bedingfield dated Penamacor, 4 April, 1813.] are obtained; and
they exhibit a startling contrast to the oxen-draught brigades of the
commencement of the Peninsular War. His system was based on that of the
Horse Artillery, now universal in field batteries, in which each officer
was wholly and solely responsible to the captain for his division,
whether in matters of men or _matériel_. He declined to allow the
officer of the Driver Corps, who commanded the drivers attached to the
brigade, to have any control over his men, except as far as their pay
and subsistence were concerned; and by thus giving his own officers
complete responsibility, he received the reward which such conduct
generally ensures, and was able to say, “My subalterns, Raynes, Bridges,
James, and Talbot, are all most excellent, full of zeal, activity, and
intelligence; they run before me in everything I can desire concerning
their respective charges, and are never more happy than when in
stables.” The chief difficulty in field brigades had always been in the
divided allegiance of the men of the Driver Corps. The solution of this
difficulty, which was adopted by Captain Cairnes, gradually obtained
favour, and ended in a most natural manner,--the abolition of the Driver
Corps and the absorption of the drivers into the Regiment. It took,
however, some years to educate the authorities up to this point; and not
until 1822 was the corps actually [Sidenote: Kane’s List.] abolished.
Another point in Captain Cairnes’s system to which he attached great
importance, and which he said had been generally adopted in the other
brigades, was that of having promotion among the non-commissioned
officers to go, not by _battalion_, but by _company_ seniority; and of
waiving even the question of seniority in the presence of undoubted
superiority. There were faces in Woolwich which grew very long, and
fossil old gentlemen whose remaining hairs stood on end, at such a
perversion of the old order of things; but Lord Wellington supported the
captains of companies in a measure which on service gave them a powerful
engine for discipline. So, time after time, does the reader find the
real Artillery unit asserting itself.
The artificers with a brigade were 2 wheelers, 2 collar-makers, 1
farrier, 1 jobbing smith, and 4 shoeing smiths. The non-commissioned
officers of the Driver Corps attached to a 9-pounder brigade were, 1
staff-sergeant, 2 sergeants, and 6 corporals, one of whom acted as
forage sergeant, under the acting storekeeper of the brigade (a
_company_, not _driver_ non-commissioned officer), who, again, was under
an assistant commissary-general attached to the brigade (under the
immediate orders of the Captain commanding). This officer was
responsible for the rations and the supply of corn, for which purpose he
had a number of forage mules, at the rate of one mule to two horses.
Sixteen round tents and two horsemen’s tents were carried; and, for the
convenience of the artificers, two store waggons accompanied the
brigade. The other extra carriages were the forge waggon, spare wheel
carriage, and the captain’s cart. The brigade itself consisted of 6 guns
and howitzers, 6 ammunition waggons, and 2 reserve ammunition waggons.
The proportion of ammunition carried was as follows:--
For each 9-pr. gun: 70 round shot, 34 spherical case, and 12
common case. Total 116 rounds.
For each 5½-in. howitzer: 44 spherical case, 8 common case, and 32
common shell. Total 84 rounds.
In each reserve ammunition waggon there were 57 round shot, 21
spherical case, and 6 common case. Total 84 rounds.
The number of drivers with a brigade was one hundred. Five of the spare
carriages were drawn by mules; those being selected which were the least
likely to go under fire.
This was altogether a most desirable command for a young 2nd Captain to
have on active service; and keenly did Captain Cairnes enjoy it. His
dismay may therefore be imagined, on receiving, on the 5th May, 1813, a
letter from Colonel Fisher, then commanding the Artillery in the
Peninsula, announcing that Lord Wellington had decided to take away the
horses of his brigade for the service of the pontoon train, leaving him
to the chance of any horses which might hereafter come from Lisbon. He
was not allowed any time to brood over his troubles, but was ordered to
meet the pontoons at Sabugal in three days’ time, and hand over to the
Engineer the whole of his stud. Colonel Fisher’s letter, which was a
private communication, sent a few hours in advance of the official
order, held out hopes of a speedy restoration (which fortunately took
place) of the equipment of his brigade for the field.[39] Captain
Cairnes’ reply to this letter was so soldierlike, that it is well worthy
[Sidenote: Dated 6 May, 1813.] of a place in the records of his Corps.
“I return you,” he wrote, “my dear Colonel, my sincere thanks for your
communication of yesterday’s date, anterior to the arrival of any
_order_, which would, I think, have set me perfectly _crazy_. As it is,
I have read your letter over twenty times, and am yet very unwilling to
understand it. Lord Wellington having fixed on this brigade, I trust we
shall be entitled to every consideration, when it is recollected that a
junior one in all respects is within a league of the same distance from
Sabugal as this place. The pain of urging anything prejudicial to my
valued friend Parker is superseded by the promise held out to us of a
speedy re-equipment.... I know, my dear Colonel, that you cannot avert
the blow from us, and that the necessity of the service has forced Lord
Wellington to this measure; therefore, however sorely affected and hurt
we may now feel, you will assure yourself that the whole shall be given
over to the pontoons in as complete and efficient a manner, as if they
were going to be put to our own carriages. I am full of dread and alarm
that our new equipment of horses and harness will not come up in time to
march with the army; and that (without being so extravagantly sanguine
or conceited as to _build on_ future successes and good fortune) we
shall be too late for the golden opportunity that a few days will
probably offer to other brigades.”
This allusion of Captain Cairnes to the other Artillery brigades with
Lord Wellington’s army suggests the propriety of placing before the
reader their distribution at the opening of the campaign of 1813. This
would appear to have been as follows:--
With 1st Infantry division: Captain Dubourdieu’s Brigade, R.A.
” 2nd ” ” Captain Maxwell’s ” ”
” 3rd ” ” Captain Douglas’s ” ”
” 4th ” ” Major Sympher’s K. G. Artillery.
” 5th ” ” Captain Brandreth’s Brigade, R.A.
” 6th ” ” Major Lawson’s ” ”
” 7th ” ” Major Gardiner’s Troop, R.H.A.
” Light Division: Major Ross’s ” ”
1st Division of Cavalry: Major Frazer’s (Bull’s) Troop, R.H.A.
2nd ” ” Captain Beane’s ” ”
{Captain Webber Smith’s Troop, R.H.A.[40]
Reserve {Captain Cairnes’ Brigade, R.A.
{Captain J. Parker’s ” ”
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 19 May, 1813.]
In the middle of May the plan of the campaign was arranged. The army was
ordered to move in two columns, the head-quarters to leave Frenada on
the 22nd May. One column was to cross the Douro at the mouth of the Coa,
and to advance by Miranda de Douro; the other was to go by Ciudad
Rodrigo. Lord Wellington was to accompany the latter column, which
consisted of Sir Rowland Hill’s corps, the Light Division, Cavalry, &c.
The other column, composed of the rest of the army, was under Sir T.
Graham; and with it went the pontoon train. It was decided to lay the
pontoon bridge across the Douro, near Miranda, and thus unite the two
columns; this operation to be followed by the siege of Zamora, which,
when concluded, would leave the [Sidenote: Ibid. dated Matilla, 25 May,
1813.] Allies masters of the Douro. Following the head-quarters, the
reader finds that they moved to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 22nd May, to
Tamames on the 23rd, and to Matilla, about six leagues from Salamanca,
on the 25th. On the way, Lord Wellington inspected the Portuguese
Division, commanded by General Silveira, and found the men better
equipped than they had ever yet been. The brigades of Artillery with
them were commanded by Colonel Tulloh, an officer of the Royal
Artillery, whose zeal and ability were repaid by the efficiency of the
men under his control. The whole of the reserve Artillery of Lord
Wellington’s army, with the exception of the brigade under Captain
Cairnes, which was now re-equipped, had gone with the main body, under
Sir T. Graham.
Colonel Dickson was now in command of the Artillery, although junior to
many in point of regimental rank; and as the way in which he obtained
the command is not so generally known in the Regiment as the fact, it
seems desirable to state it. While he was at Corilhaa, preparing the
reserve Artillery for the coming campaign, Colonel Fisher, who had
succeeded to the command of the Artillery after Colonel Robe was
disabled at Burgos, but who had not held the command as yet in the
field, wrote to him, requesting his attendance at head-quarters without
loss of time. On his arrival, he ascertained that a misunderstanding had
arisen between Lord Wellington and Colonel Fisher, which had ended in
the latter’s requesting permission to resign, and return to England.
Lord Wellington inquired of Colonel Dickson whether he was senior to
Colonel Waller, who had arrived in Lisbon, and on learning that he was
not, he said, “Colonel Dickson, then, will take the command of all the
Artillery in the field, both British and Portuguese; and Colonel Waller
and General Roza, as commandants of the Artillery of the two nations,
will remain at Lisbon for the purpose of forwarding supplies.” He then
desired Colonel Fisher to give such explanations of the state of affairs
as would enable Colonel Dickson to enter on his charge.
There would seem to have been considerable hastiness and injustice on
the part of Lord Wellington in this matter. Colonel Dickson himself,
while naturally flattered, could not [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 25
May, 1813.] but say, “I am convinced, if Lord Wellington had known
Colonel Fisher’s talents and abilities, he would never have allowed any
such circumstance to take from him such an officer; and I hope you will
forgive my thus presuming to discuss in so particular a manner the
merits of a superior, which I am only induced to do in order that you
may better know the merits of an officer I love and esteem; and I am
sure every man of sense or ability in the Corps of Artillery in the
Peninsula will subscribe to what I now state.”
The honour paid to Colonel Dickson was an embarrassing one. Although his
Portuguese rank placed him over all officers under the rank of Colonel,
many such were senior to him regimentally. This fact demanded great tact
from him in the execution of his duty. Fortunately, he met with ready,
soldierlike co-operation from all; and one, who had commanded him on
service before, in writing to his friends on the subject, expressed the
general feeling [Sidenote: Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page 101.] when he
said: “I shall get on very well with Dickson; he was second to me in the
South American Expedition, and then obeyed my orders with the implicit
readiness which I shall now transfer to his. He is a man of great
[Sidenote: Ibid. page 106.] abilities and quickness, and without fear of
any one.” And again: “Colonel Fisher left us the day before yesterday,
sincerely regretted by all. I hope Dickson’s reign may be long for the
sake of the service, but the times are [Sidenote: Ibid. page 110.]
slippery.” Yet once more: “Dickson showed me yesterday a very sensible,
plain letter, which he had written to Colonel Waller, and was just going
to send off. Dickson, too, feels himself awkwardly off, but will bear
his honours well. There is an open, manly simplicity about Dickson very
prepossessing. I hope and trust he will long enjoy the confidence of the
Marquis; and this I should desire for the sake of the service,
independently of any regard I might have (and I have a very sincere one)
for Dickson.”
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson. to D.-A.-G. dated 6 June, 1813.]
To return, however, to the movements of the army. On the 26th May the
head-quarters moved forward in the direction of Salamanca, on
approaching which place columns of the enemy’s infantry were observed,
halted at each side of the town, a part of their cavalry being, however,
on the left bank of the river to watch the movements of the Allies. As
the latter advanced, the cavalry retired across the bridge into
Salamanca, but the infantry for a considerable time remained unmoved.
In the meantime, Sir Rowland Hill’s Cavalry and Captain Beane’s troop of
Horse Artillery were ordered to push for the ford of Santa Martha, a
little above the town. As soon as the French saw these troops approach
the river, they moved off with their whole force, which included about
2500 infantry, two or three squadrons of cavalry, and three or four
guns. General Fane, who was in command of Sir R. Hill’s Cavalry, passed
the river in a moment, and came up with the French before they had gone
three miles from Salamanca. They were retiring _by squares_ along the
Arivalo road, which leads up the Tormes by Aldea Langua; and, on
overtaking them, the Horse Artillery opened upon their squares with
considerable execution. The pursuit was thus continued for five or six
miles, the Horse Artillery cannonading them from every available point.
The Artillery fire was interfered with by the repeated interposition of
the Cavalry between the guns and the enemy; but was nevertheless very
efficient. According to Colonel Dickson,--of 400 killed, wounded, and
prisoners, lost by the enemy,--100 were victims to the Artillery fire
alone; and the squares were so shaken by it, that, if the regiments
moving on the flank had pushed on, the whole force might have been
captured. Lord Wellington, however, seeing that the pursuing Cavalry
were somewhat exhausted, desisted from further pursuit. The
head-quarters halted at Salamanca on the 27th May, and orders were
issued for their transfer to the other army, north of the Douro. On the
28th, therefore, the head-quarter staff proceeded to Almeida, and on the
29th to Miranda, crossing the Douro at a ferry near the latter place.
Lord Wellington, himself, remained one day later at Salamanca; and on
the 29th proceeded the whole distance to Miranda. On the 30th the
head-quarters were moved to Carvajales, and on the same evening the Esla
was reconnoitred, and preparations made to cross it on the following
morning. Small parties of the enemy were seen on the opposite bank with
two guns. Early on the morning of the 31st, the Hussar Brigade,
Gardiner’s and Webber Smith’s troops of Horse Artillery, and two
regiments of Infantry crossed,--upon which the French parties
immediately retired. The Infantry found the greatest difficulty in
crossing,--the river being both deep and rapid,--and several men were
drowned. A pontoon bridge was therefore made in a couple of hours, over
which the rest of the army passed, with the exception of the Cavalry,
Artillery, and waggons, which forded the river. A special pontoon bridge
was made for the 18-pounder brigade, over which it passed with safety.
On the 1st June head-quarters proceeded to Zamora, and the army
completed the passage of the Esla,--the French evacuating Zamora as the
Allies approached.
“Thus,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “we succeeded in our manœuvre of turning
the Douro, and getting possession of that river without sustaining the
smallest loss. It has been a bold one; but, by his Lordship’s rapidity
in moving the army, and transferring himself from one point to the
other, I think the French did not succeed in discovering our real
intention until it was too late for them to hinder it. Otherwise, we
found the Esla such an obstacle, that if they only had had ten or twelve
thousand men on that river, the passage of it would have been a serious
operation to us, and could not have been effected without either great
loss of time or of men, and probably both.”
On the 2nd June, the French abandoned Toro, and Wellington’s
head-quarters proceeded there,--remaining over the 3rd, on which day,
and on the 4th, the force which had advanced by Salamanca, under Sir R.
Hill, crossed the Douro. On the 4th, the army moved forward in three
columns,--the right, under Sir R. Hill, in the direction of Valladolid;
the centre upon La Mota, and the left under Sir Thomas Graham towards
Rio Seco. The head-quarters proceeded to La Mota on the 4th, to Castro
Monte on the 5th, and to Ampudia on the 6th; the French abandoning
Valladolid, as the Allies advanced, and retiring upon Palencia and
Duenas. The armies continued to keep within a day’s march of one
another: indeed, when the Allies reached Palencia, on the 7th June, the
rear-guard of the enemy was clearly visible from the high ground. On the
12th (the pursuit still going on steadily, and Wellington continuing
this, his greatest, march in the most persevering, relentless manner)
the French army had reached Monasterio and the neighbourhood of
Burgos,--but indicated no sign of discontinuing its retreat. Warned by
past experience, Wellington had decided to take no active measures
against Burgos, but merely to blockade it with part of the Spanish army,
leaving the English troops undiminished. In the meantime, Sir Thomas
Graham, with the left column of the army, inclined to his left in the
direction of the upper part of the Ebro; with the view, it was believed,
of turning or crossing that river. The events of the next few days,
however, modified matters very much. On reaching Villa Diego, Lord
Wellington ascertained that the Castle of Burgos had been blown up by
the French, and was in utter ruins. Sir Richard Fletcher, of the
Engineers, accompanied by Colonels Dickson and May, and Major Frazer of
the Artillery, penetrated into the place, although the French rear-guard
was still close at hand, and brought back the report. Joseph Buonaparte
had meditated taking up a position at Burgos, but it having been
pronounced unwise, he continued to retire on Vittoria. His army--which
was known to be _en route_ for France--was embarrassed with huge convoys
of spoils,--and crowds of followers, male and female, who were unwilling
to be left in Spain, unprotected by the French troops. Lord Wellington
now executed a very brilliant [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G.
dated 19 June, 1813.] strategical manœuvre,--the crossing of the Ebro.
The route by which he abruptly moved his army was unfrequented and
considered impracticable. The descent to the river by the Puente de
Arenas was by a very narrow and steep pass, opening into a small but
fertile valley, entirely surrounded by high mountains, with the river
running through it. The _sortie_ from the valley of Puente de Arenas was
by a road running for a considerable distance close to the river, with
stupendous rocks overhanging on either side. Had this movement been
foreseen, a very small body of the enemy could have impeded the passage
of the army. The advantages of this manœuvre were many. The [Sidenote:
Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’] French communications with the coast were
cut off, and a new base was opened for the operations of the Allies. The
English fleet entered Santander, and commissariat communication was
opened with the coast. Wellington was also in a position to threaten the
communications between Vittoria and the Pyrenees, and the French found
the English already in rear of their right. An engagement took place
between Sir Thomas Graham and the French General, Reille, who had been
detached to protect the communications between the French army and their
own country; and the [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 19 June,
1813.] Light Division--with which Lord Wellington himself was--succeeded
in surprising General Mancune’s division on the march,--killing a good
many, dispersing one brigade, and capturing an immense quantity of
baggage, and 300 prisoners. But these were merely the preliminaries to a
battle, which, in its results, was unsurpassed in the whole narrative of
the Peninsular War. Writing on the evening of the 19th June, from
Subijana de Morillas, three leagues south-west of Vittoria, Colonel
Dickson said: “We can see the whole French army on their march to
Vittoria;--the column is not more than six or seven miles off. To-morrow
we expect to move forward upon Vittoria, which, I think, must lead to
something.”
In proceeding to discuss the share of the Royal Artillery at the battle
of Vittoria, it has unfortunately to be premised that the most valuable
letter on the subject has been mislaid, or lost. In writing to General
Macleod after the [Sidenote: Dated 23 June, 1813.] battle, Colonel
Dickson said: “I know Frazer has given you some account of it, so I will
not enter into further details at present, except on our own matters.”
And in two subsequent letters, he said: “Frazer’s letter will have
explained everything.” Now, in the published letters of Sir Augustus
Frazer, this letter is not to be found; nor is there much in his
allusions to the battle in his other letters to assist the Artilleryman
in tracing the services of his Corps. The loss of the letter is, to a
certain extent, compensated by details given in subsequent letters from
Colonel Dickson, but still remains irreparable.
It would be beyond the province of this work to describe the battle of
Vittoria, as a whole. In the pages of the _general_ military historian
such a description can be found. In these, the regimental statistics
alone need be reproduced. The general plan of the battle is, doubtless,
familiar to all:--the plain in front of Vittoria, into which--as into a
trap--Joseph Buonaparte poured all his troops and convoys;--the one road
available for the retreat of his forces to France, which was
menaced--but not with sufficient decision--by Wellington’s left;--the
confusion in the space between the French army and the town of Vittoria,
where mobs of terrified fugitives were mingled with heaps of vehicles
and stores;--the three-handed assault of the Allies, advancing with
steadfast purpose from three quarters at once;--the frequent Artillery
duels, in which the Artillery on both sides so greatly distinguished
themselves;--the grand final effort of the French artillery, [Sidenote:
Napier.] when “more than eighty guns, massed together, pealed with such
a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with
fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were
seen, bounding with a frantic energy;” and then the wild rout, the
headlong flight of an army leaving its guns and everything behind
it;--the shrieks of women, the terror of men, rising so vividly before
his mind as he wrote, that Napier exclaimed, “It was the wreck of a
nation!” But no such ambitious description is required in detail from
the mere regimental historian. What is demanded from him is the
narrative, from old records that have never seen the light, of the share
taken by his corps on this eventful day.
[Sidenote: Official Report to the Master-General, dated 23 June, 1813.]
Let the distribution of the various troops and brigades of Artillery at
Vittoria first be given. Colonel Dickson was in command, assisted by the
following field officers:--
Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., commanding the reserve Artillery.
Major Carncross, with Sir Rowland Hill’s column.
Major Buckner, with column of 3rd and 7th Divisions.
Major Frazer, commanding the Horse Artillery.
The troops of Royal Horse Artillery were distributed as follows:--
Captain Webber Smith’s, with the Reserve.
Major Ross’s, with Light Division.
Captain Beane’s, with General Fane’s Cavalry.
Major Gardiner’s, with the Hussars.
Captain Ramsay’s, with the Cavalry Division.
The Field Brigades were distributed as follows:--
Major Lawson’s, with 5th Division.
Captain Douglas’s, with 3rd Division.
Captain Maxwell’s, with 2nd Division.
Captain Dubourdieu’s, with 1st Division.
Major Sympher’s (K.G.A.), with 4th Division.
Captain Cairnes’, with 7th Division.
Captain Parker’s, with the Reserve.
Lieut.-Colonel Tulloh, R.A., commanded two Portuguese brigades with
Sir R. Hill’s corps, and Major Arriaga commanded the Portuguese
Reserve Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel May acted as Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Woodyear
acted as Brigade-Major. Lieutenants Ord, Harding, and Pascoe,
were employed as staff officers by Colonel Dickson.
The number of guns, exclusive of the Spanish, which were brought into
action by the Allies at Vittoria was ninety; but the French had
considerably more. There happened in this battle, on the 21st June,
1813, what rarely happens;--_every_ brigade of Artillery was brought
into action. In his official report, Colonel Dickson said that he had
reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and men of the
Royal Artillery on this occasion; that their skill and bravery were
highly conspicuous, as were their exertions in bringing forward the
Artillery through a difficult and intersected [Sidenote: Dated 23 June,
1813.] country, both during the attack and the pursuit. “In short,” he
added, “I can safely assert that artillery could not be better served;
and, to the credit of the officers, I have to add that from the
beginning of the day to the last moment of the pursuit, it was always to
be found where it was wanted.” In his private letter to General Macleod,
Colonel Dickson particularised some of the officers who had especially
distinguished themselves; and the following extract deserves
publication: “I cannot close this letter without mentioning the valuable
assistance my friend Frazer afforded during the whole business. I may
truly say he flew from one troop to another,--accompanying them into
action and attending to their supply, or looking out for roads for them
to move. You, who know Frazer so well, can easily anticipate what he
would be on such an occasion.”
The massing of the English Artillery was effected at Vittoria to an
unprecedented extent, and with most happy results. It might at first be
assumed that the admirable use made of this arm on that occasion is a
sufficient reply to any insinuations against Lord Wellington’s knowledge
of Artillery tactics. Unfortunately for him, a letter has survived which
proves, on the best authority, that to accident alone was this artillery
display due. “The nature of the country,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “and
want of roads, was the means of throwing a large proportion of our
Artillery together, away from their divisions, which I availed myself
of, and by employing them in masses it had a famous effect. This was
adjoining to the great road to Vittoria; and the French brought all the
artillery they could to oppose our advance, so that the cannonade on one
spot was very vigorous. In none of our Peninsular battles have we ever
brought so much cannon into play; and it was so well directed that the
French were generally obliged to retire ere the Infantry could get at
them. There were few or no instances of the bayonet being used during
the day.”
[Sidenote: MS. Official Return to D. A. Gen.]
Considering the duration of the battle, the casualties among the
Artillery were singularly few. They were as follows:--
Staff.--_Wounded_: Colonel May, and Brigade-Major Woodyear (died
of wounds).
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
Royal Horse Artillery 4 36 2
Royal Artillery 8 19 ..
Horses of R. H. A. 28 23 8
Horses of R. A. 15 2 ..
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The number of guns captured from the enemy was no less than 151, besides
415 caissons. Of gun ammunition 14,249 rounds were taken, besides
40,668 lbs. of gunpowder and 1,973,400 musket ball-cartridges. The other
spoils were countless; and it is difficult to conceive a more complete
defeat.
Lord Wellington’s account of the battle contains the following short,
but satisfactory, allusion to the services of the [Sidenote: To Lord
Bathurst dated 22 June, 1813.] Artillery:--“The Artillery was most
judiciously placed by Lieut.-Colonel Dickson, and was well served; and
the army is particularly indebted to that Corps.” During the pursuit of
the enemy after the battle, Colonel Dickson kept the Artillery well
up,--and was rewarded, as will be seen from [Sidenote: Extract from the
private Journal of F. S. Larpent, Esq., Judge-Advocate-General to the
British forces in the Peninsula. Published by Sir G. Larpent, page 142.]
the following anecdote:--“In the pursuit after Vittoria, in the bad
roads, Lord Wellington saw a French column making a stand, as if to halt
for the night. ‘Now Dickson,’ said he, ‘if we had but some Artillery
up!’ ‘They are close by, my Lord.’ And in ten minutes, from a hill on
the right, Lieut.-Colonel Ross’s Light Division guns began; and away
went the French two leagues farther off.” The same author from whom this
quotation is made says: “Dickson, though only a Captain in the Royal
Regiment of Artillery, now conducts the whole department here, _because
he makes no difficulties_.”
[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatch, dated 24 June, 1813.]
During the pursuit, the only remaining guns--two in number--taken away
by the French from the field, were captured,--one being disabled by the
fire of the Chestnut Troop, and the other being taken within a league of
Pampeluna, [Sidenote: ‘Memoirs of Sir Hew Ross,’ page 41.] in which
direction the French had retreated.
The results which followed the battle of Vittoria are summarised by
Napier in his description of the campaign, in which that battle was the
chief incident. “In this campaign of six weeks,” he wrote, “Wellington,
with 100,000 men, marched 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one
decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran
troops from Spain.” The fortresses referred to were Pampeluna and San
Sebastian; and it is now proposed to treat of the double siege of the
latter, as an episode of essential importance in the history of the
Regiment, and one concerning which Sir Alexander Dickson left much
valuable information, yet unpublished. Before doing so, however, there
are two incidents which deserve to be mentioned.
In the _brevet_ which followed Vittoria, Majors Frazer and Ross were
made Lieut.-Colonels, and 2nd Captain Jenkinson (of the Chestnut Troop)
was made Major. Captain Jenkinson’s brevet promotion was the first which
had been received by a 2nd Captain of Artillery. In the beginning of the
year 1813, the 2nd Captains serving in the Peninsula had memorialised
Lord Wellington on the subject. The [Sidenote: Sir Henry Torrens to Lord
Wellington, 3 March, 1813.] memorial having been referred to England, a
favourable reply was given, and Captain Jenkinson’s promotion was the
first fruits. In addition to the somewhat scanty recognition of the
Artillery in this _brevet_, a boon was granted, which is described in
the following extract from a letter written by the Master-General of the
Ordnance, Lord Mulgrave, to [Sidenote: Dated 16 July, 1813.] Colonel
Dickson:--“On receipt of your letter, addressed to Major-General
Macleod, I did not fail to bring under the consideration of the Prince
Regent the very striking and unexampled circumstance of the whole of the
British Artillery having been brought into action at the battle of
Vittoria, and the whole of the enemy’s Artillery having been captured in
the glorious victory which crowned the exertions of the Allies on that
ever-memorable occasion. His Royal Highness has been graciously
pleased--in consideration of the peculiar circumstances above stated--to
mark His Royal Highness’s approbation of the particular and successful
activity of the Corps of Royal Artillery under your orders, by granting
severally to the officers entrusted with the command of divisions or
brigades an allowance for good service in the following proportions:--To
the officers commanding divisions, each 10_s._ per diem; to the officers
commanding brigades, each 5_s._ per diem; and to yourself a similar
allowance for good service of 20_s._ per diem.”
Better, far better, that these words had never been penned, and that the
generous thought had died in its conception! For the day was to come
when a reference to this precedent after Vittoria should call forth
from him under whom the representatives of the Corps had so often and so
bravely fought, a letter as cruel and unjust to those of whom [Sidenote:
Vide Appendix A.] it treated, as it was unworthy of him who penned it.
The other incident is one which has become a household word in the
Regiment. If there is one name more familiar than another to the
Artilleryman, it is that of Norman Ramsay. From public orders and the
pages of history his gallantry and professional skill may be learnt; but
it is from the pages of private correspondence that one ascertains how
lovable he was. He joined the Regiment in 1798, and he fell at Waterloo;
and yet in that short space of seventeen years he had gained the love of
his brother officers without exception, the devotion of his men, and the
admiration of all. A man _sans peur et sans reproche_, he reminds one of
the knights of Arthur, whose pleasure was to
“Live pure, speak true, right wrong, follow the king.”
A thorough master of his profession, he earned the respect as well as
the love of those whom he commanded: and let all remember that the love
of men for their commander must have that element in it to make the gift
worth having. The personal qualities of an officer may attract the
affection of his men; but if he is deficient in knowledge of his
profession, there will be in their love an element approaching pity,
which will be fatal to their confidence in the hour of trial. It will be
like the love for a child,--pure, warm, and sincere,--but not such as
will demand from the soldier, in the day of battle, blind confidence and
unhesitating obedience. In Norman Ramsay were combined all the virtues
which compel affection, and all the skill which demands respect. But
there was more: he possessed that professional enthusiasm, which hallows
the dullest tasks, and gilds the severest hardship. His pride in his
troop made its men strive to be worthy of his good opinion; and it is in
this way that a commander can with certainty generate _esprit de corps_
among his men. Let him but place before them a standard of perfection,
even although unattainable, and, in their voluntary efforts to reach
it, they will rise far higher, than if driven by order, or goaded by
fear of punishment.
Successful in all his aims, Norman Ramsay was yet so fortunate as to
escape jealousy. The letters of his brother-officers,--written for
private eye alone, but subsequently published,--show this to a singular
extent. Sir Alexander Dickson, Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir Hew Ross, Major
Cairnes, and others,--all men of different characters and
disposition,--rarely wrote without a loving word or kind inquiry about
Ramsay. If his troop distinguished itself, they all rejoiced as if it
had been their own; if he met with any grief, they longed to share it;
and if sorrow came upon themselves, their first instinct was to confide
it to him. In October, 1813, a distinguished Artilleryman, Sir Howard
Douglas, lost in action a brother whom he deeply loved. Older than
Ramsay, one yet finds without surprise that it [Sidenote: Sir A.
Frazer’s Letters, page 314.] was to him he went, “bitterly lamenting his
loss.” So also when any of them came within his reach at any time, the
letters always speak alike,--as if every one would readily understand
the writers’ longings--“I _must_ go and see Ramsay.”
In these pages, later on, the story will have to be told how, in the
midst of the din of battle, there seemed to fall a silence like a pall,
as he, the brave and much-loved, met with a soldier’s death; but the
grief was then that of his friends. The incident now to be told tells of
a grief which was his own,--which never quitted him while he lived, and
which was said by many who knew him to have led him to court unnecessary
exposure on the day in which he died. At Vittoria, Bull’s troop,
commanded by Ramsay, had done special service. On the following day,
during the pursuit, [Sidenote: Published Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page
183.] “Lord Wellington spoke to Ramsay as he passed; desired him to take
his troop for the night to a village near, adding that if there were
orders for the troop in the course of the night, _he would send them_.”
No orders came; but at 6 A.M. an Assistant Quartermaster-General
arrived, and ordered him to join the brigade to which he belonged. The
troop at once marched, but was shortly afterwards overtaken by a written
order from General Murray, the Quartermaster-General [Sidenote:
Published Letters of Sir A. Frazer, page 186.] of the army, directing
“Captain Ramsay’s troop to rejoin General Anson’s brigade.” The troop
halted, while Ramsay rode on to discover the road; and at this moment
Lord Wellington rode up, and called repeatedly for him. “His Lordship,”
wrote Sir Augustus Frazer, “then called for Dickson, whose horse being
unable at the instant to clear a wide ditch over which we had just
passed, I rode up to mention the circumstance to Lord Wellington, who
ordered me to put Captain Ramsay in arrest, and to give the command of
the troop to Captain Cator. This I accordingly did.... It appears that
Lord Wellington had intended that Ramsay’s troop should not have moved
that morning till he himself sent orders, and his Lordship declared that
he had told Ramsay so. This Ramsay affirms he never heard or understood;
and his Lordship’s words, repeated by Ramsay, young Macleod, and a
sergeant and corporal, all at hand when his Lordship spoke to Ramsay,
are precisely the same, and do not convey such a meaning. I spoke
instantly to Lord Fitzroy Somerset on the subject, who, together with
every other individual about head-quarters, was, and is, much concerned
at the circumstance. Nay, two days afterwards, when the despatches were
making out, every friendly suggestion was used by several that Ramsay
might be mentioned as he deserved; but I have reason to believe that he
is not. There is not, among the many good and gallant officers who are
here, one of superior zeal or devotion to the service to Ramsay, who has
given repeated proofs of spirit and good conduct. Admitting, contrary to
all evidence, that he had mistaken the verbal orders he received, this
surely is a venial offence, and one for which long-tried and faithful
services should not be forgotten.... Few circumstances have engaged more
general attention, or occasioned more regret. It has naturally been
expected that after the first moment was over, a deserving officer
would, at least, have been released from a situation most galling to a
gallant spirit. ... I trust this will soon be the case; but ... I am at
a loss to account for the delay in a point so easily settled. In the
meanwhile, Ramsay bears up with great fortitude, although he deeply
feels.” Writing on the same [Sidenote: ‘Memoir of Sir Hew Ross,’ page
46.] subject, some weeks later, Sir Hew Ross said: “Norman Ramsay is at
present with his troop in this neighbourhood, and we are much together.
He is quite well, and bears his unjust treatment, and consequent
disappointment, in the manly and proper way that might be expected of
him.” For a considerable time he was kept under arrest; and the numerous
applications on his behalf, including a very urgent one from Sir Thomas
Graham, seemed to have the effect of irritating Lord Wellington. The
consciousness of having done an unjust act is rendered more difficult to
bear, when the victim has been one for whom affection has been
entertained; and it was believed in the army that, as far as his
undemonstrative nature would allow, Lord Wellington had a strong liking
for Norman Ramsay. There was no doubt of the devotion of the latter for
his great chief; and the keen suffering caused by injustice from a
person whom one loves must be realised to be fully understood. He was
happily released from arrest in time to carry his brave troop through
the many actions, with which the war concluded; and he received a
_brevet_ promotion for these services; but he was never the same man. At
Waterloo, on the morning of the battle, as the Duke rode along the line,
he saw Ramsay at the head of his troop for the first time since his
arrival in [Sidenote: Communicated by Sir J. Bloomfield, R.H.A.]
Flanders. He accosted him cheerfully as he passed. Ramsay merely bowed
his head sadly, until it nearly touched his horse’s mane, but could not
speak. In a few hours he was where sorrow and injustice are unknown.
It is necessary now to turn to the siege of San Sebastian. Pampeluna was
blockaded and ultimately starved into submission; but stronger measures
were adopted with San Sebastian, into which place Marshal Jourdan had
thrown a [Sidenote: Jones’s ‘Sieges of the Peninsula,’ vol. ii. chap.
ii.] garrison of between 3000 and 4000 men. On the land side, it was
invested by the left wing of the Allied army, under Sir Thomas Graham;
and on the sea side it was blockaded by a squadron under Sir George
Collyer. On the 4th July, 1813, Lord Wellington wrote as follows to
Colonel Dickson: [Sidenote: Dated Lanz, 4 July, 1813.] “From what I have
heard of San Sebastian, I am inclined to form the siege of that place,
and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send an officer to
Bilbao to order [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 10 July,
1813.] the train from thence to Passages.”[41] The order was immediately
obeyed, and Captain Morrison’s 18-pounder brigade was also directed to
proceed to Passages for the same purpose. On the 12th, Lord Wellington
reconnoitred San Sebastian, and on the 14th, he departed to join the
army on the field, leaving Colonel Dickson to conduct the Artillery part
of the siege. Lord Wellington’s operations in the field were at this
time of a very delicate nature. The Allied army in the east of Spain had
failed, and had raised the siege of Tarragona; while, in his front and
on his right, there were menacing French armies. French garrisons in
Pampeluna and San Sebastian also weakened his available force, by
demanding troops to watch them.
Before entering on the details of the double siege, the following list
of artillery officers, who were present, may be interesting.
[Sidenote: MS. Returns dated 12 Sept. 1813.]
LIST OF OFFICERS of the ROYAL ARTILLERY employed in the SIEGES of
ST. SEBASTIAN under LIEUT.-COLONEL DICKSON, commanding the
Artillery under the MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON.
First Second
Operation. Operation.
Lieut.-Colonel May, A. A. General 1 0
” Frazer, R. H. Artillery 1 1
Major Buckner 0 1
” Dyer 0 1
” Webber Smith, R. H. Artillery 1 1
Captain Morrison 1 1
” Douglas 0 1
” Dubourdieu (killed) 1 0
” W. Power 1 1
” Green 0 1
” J. B. Parker 1 1
” Deacon 1 1
” Dansey 1 0
” C. Gordon 0 1
” A. Macdonald, R. H. Artillery 1 0
Lieutenant J. W. Johnstone 1 1
” Henry Blachley, R. H. Artillery 1 1
” R. H. Ord 1 1
” W. Brereton, R. H. Artillery 1 0
” J. Wood 0 1
” Basil Heron 1 1
” G. Mainwaring 0 1
” R. Hardinge 1 0
” R. Harding, R. H. Artillery 1 1
” R. F. Phillips 0 1
” J. Pascoe 1 1
” R. Manners 0 1
” W. Dennis 0 1
” Hugh Morgan 0 1
” C. Shaw 1 1
” H. Stanway 1 1
” R. Story 1 1
” H. Slade 0 1
” H. Hough 0 1
” F. Monro 1 0
” H. Hutchins 0 1
” John Bloomfield 1 1
” H. Palliser 0 1
” T. G. Williams 1 1
” A. Macbean 1 1
-- --
25 33
-- --
Lieut. England’s name also appears in some of the Journals of the
First Operation, and in Jones’s ‘Sieges,’ and should be included
above.
Total, exclusive of King’s German Artillery, present at St.
Sebastian:
_First Operation._--Colonel Dickson and 25 officers of the Royal Artillery.
_Second Operation._--Colonel Dickson and 33 officers of the Royal Artillery.
Extract from a letter dated Passages de la Calçada, 12 Sept. 1813:
“These officers vied with each other in their endeavours to
forward the object in view in the most indefatigable
manner.”--COLONEL DICKSON to GENERAL MACLEOD.
The story of San Sebastian divides itself into three parts,--viz.: the
first siege, terminating in an unsuccessful assault; the blockade; and
the second and successful siege. The _matériel_ at the disposal of the
Artillery at the first siege was inadequate, even when supplemented by
field guns, and guns borrowed from the navy; but during the second siege
the supply was ample, and the fire most efficient. In sieges, the
association of the Artillery with the breach made by them ceases when
the assault commences; but this was not so in the second siege of San
Sebastian, when the assault would certainly have failed but for the
powerful fire maintained by the Artillery over the heads of the
assailants. Of this, however, more hereafter.
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D. A. G.]
San Sebastian is built on a neck of land jutting out into the sea; and
the first point which it was necessary to secure on the land side was a
place which had been fortified,--the convent of St. Bartholomew. This
was taken, after four days’ vigorous cannonade, by assault, on the 17th
July, 1813. [Sidenote: Colonel Dickson’s Diary; and Jones’s ‘Peninsular
Sieges.’] The guns employed against the convent and the adjoining
redoubt were placed in the batteries of the left attack, numbered 1 and
2, and were four 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers. Before the
assault, however, Sir Thomas Graham, who had been left by Lord
Wellington in command, [Sidenote: Sir Thomas Graham to Colonel Dickson,
dated 15 July, 1813.] directed as many field guns as possible to be
brought into play in support. This was done; and they were found to be
of material assistance, and were served with great effect during the
assault. The number of rounds expended against the convent and redoubt
was 3000: a large [Sidenote: Jones’s ‘Sieges.’] quantity of hot shot was
employed; and in his despatch announcing the success of the assault, Sir
Thomas Graham [Sidenote: To Lord Wellington, dated 18 July, 1813.] said:
“I cannot conclude this report without expressing my perfect
satisfaction with all the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, both
in the four-gun battery employed for three days against the convent, and
on the opposite bank of the river, whence several field-pieces were
served with great effect.”
The batteries against the town had been in course of preparation during
the bombardment of the convent; and the following tables extracted from
Sir A. Dickson’s letters and returns will show at a glance much that
would otherwise occupy much space in description. The numbering of the
batteries differs from that of the Engineers; but where possible, _both_
have been shown.
The batteries were divided into those of the right and left attacks.
Lieut.-Colonel May assisted, during the first siege, under Colonel
Dickson; the left or detached attack was under Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A.,
and the batteries were armed, manned, and superintended as follows:--
RIGHT ATTACK.
No. 1 Battery (No 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {2 24-pr. guns {Against the Mirador
{4 8-in. hows. {and castle,
{and to enfilade
{the land fronts.
No. 2 Battery (No. 12 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) 2 24-pr. guns {Against defences:
{only used two
{days.
No. 3 Battery (No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) 4 24-pr. guns For breaching.
No. 4 Battery (No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’[42]) 12 24-pr. guns For breaching.
No. 5 Battery (No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {4 68-pr. {Against breach,
{carronades {and to annoy
{defences.
No. 6 Battery (No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) {4 10-inch {Against land front
{mortars {and castle.
--
Total 32 pieces.
--
Major Webber Smith, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 1, 2, and 6 Batteries.
Lieut.-Colonel Frazer, R.H.A., was in charge of Nos. 4 and 5
(the breaching) Batteries.
Major Arriaga, Portuguese Artillery, was in charge of No. 3.
The officers in the various batteries were as follows:--
No. 1 Battery.--Captain Macdonald, and Lieutenants Brereton, Heron,
and Williams.
No. 2 Battery.--Captain Deacon and Lieutenant England.
No. 3 Battery.--Captain Rosières and Lieutenant Costa (Portuguese).
No. 4 Battery.--Captains Dubourdieu and Parker, and Lieutenants
Hardinge and Bloomfield of the Royal Artillery, and
Lieutenants Silva and Judice of the Portuguese Artillery.
No. 5 Battery.--Captain Dansey and Lieutenant Johnstone.
No. 6 Battery.--This was not manned at first.
LEFT ATTACK.
No. 1 Battery 4 18-prs. {Against the convent up to
{ 17 July, 1813.
No. 2 Battery 2 8-inch hows. Ditto. ditto.
No. 3 Battery 6 18-prs. {To annoy defences of land
No. 4 Battery 2 8-inch hows. { front, and support attack.
{ Doubtless these included
{ the guns from Nos. 1 and
{ 2 Batteries.
The officers of the Royal Artillery engaged in the left attack,
were--
Captain Morrison.
” Power.
Lieutenant Shaw.
” Oldham.
” Story.
” Stanway.
The strength of the companies of Artillery before San Sebastian,
on the 18th July, 1813, was as follows:--
Captain Morrison’s (18-pr. brigade) 162 of all ranks.
Major Lawson’s 57 ”
Captain Dubourdieu’s 66 ”
Captain Parker’s 68 ”
Detachment 17 ”
Portuguese Artillery 107 ”
---
Total 476
---
The ammunition expended during the first siege amounted to 27,719
rounds, and, as the batteries did not open until the 20th July,
and the assault took place on the morning of the 25th, the
rapidity of fire must have been excessive. In alluding to this,
General Jones says: “The expenditure from the breaching battery
alone, on the 22nd July, amounted to 350 rounds a gun, expended in
about 15 hours of daylight. Such a rate of firing was probably
never equalled at any siege, great accuracy of range being at the
same time observed.” Captain Dubourdieu of the Royal Artillery was
mortally wounded in the batteries on the first day; and the total
loss of the Corps and the Portuguese Artillery during the first
operation was 12 _killed_, and 44 _wounded_.
On the morning of the 24th July, two breaches were deemed quite
practicable, but the assault which was first intended to take
place on that day was postponed until the 25th at 5 A.M. It
completely failed: a certain amount of gallantry was shown by the
attacking troops, but there was a feeling of depression among
them, which seemed to have arisen from exaggerated ideas of the
difficulty of the task. Sir Thomas Graham, while giving due credit
for the courage which was shown, and which was proved by the list
of casualties, felt that his troops were not in the same mood as
those who stormed Badajoz. In a letter to Colonel Dickson
[Sidenote: To Colonel Dickson, dated 8 p.m. 25 July, 1813.] on the
night of the assault, he said: “It is evident to me that _the
troops here_ never will carry this breach, unless every annoyance
but the castle fire (which is not come-at-able at present) be
removed.... The approach to the breach is certainly very
unfavourable, and does not admit of attempting to feed or renew
the attack, as all must go in one narrow column over rough,
slippery stones,--and _that_, with an enfilading and flanking
fire, occasioned the complete failure; nor would it have been
possible at last to get any other fresh men from the trenches to
have advanced.” Further than keeping up a fire which would not
interfere with the attacking party, the Artillery had nothing to
do with the assault; but Sir Thomas Graham in reporting the
failure took the opportunity of referring to their services on the
preceding days, in the following gratifying terms:--“The
[Sidenote: To Lord Wellington, dated 27 July, 1813.] conduct,
throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of
the officers and men of the Royal Artillery and Engineers, never
was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry; and I
beg to mention particularly to your Lordship Lieut.-Colonels
Dickson, Frazer, and May, and Major Webber Smith, of the Royal
Artillery”....
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-Gen. dated 12 Aug. 1813.]
Lord Wellington came in person to look at the state of affairs,
and as it was not deemed prudent to repeat the assault, and the
ammunition of the Artillery was nearly expended, the operations
against the place were brought to a close;--greatly to the
disappointment of many. After the failure of the assault, Lord
Wellington ordered, for security, that all the guns, with the
exception of a few pieces, should be removed from the batteries,
and a blockade substituted for a siege. The forward movement of
Soult’s army, which will be discussed hereafter, produced a
further order to embark the guns and stores. On the French being
driven back, Colonel Dickson received orders to land them again;
the batteries also were repaired, new ones constructed, and
everything put in readiness for a second siege as soon as
ammunition should arrive from England. The arrival of this was,
however, delayed beyond the endurance of Sir Thomas Graham, who
was not so familiar with the dilatory habits of the Civil branch
of the Ordnance, as Colonel Dickson was. In one of his numerous
letters to the latter [Sidenote: Dated 7 Aug. 1813.] during this
period, he wrote: “It is too provoking to think of such mistakes
and delays at home, where they have nothing else to do or think
of, but the execution of demands made at an early enough period to
give full time for preparation.” Sir Thomas Graham’s
correspondence shows at this time a feverish, almost fretful,
anxiety about the preparations for the second siege, which was not
unnatural in a General anxious to wipe out the recollection of
failure. The reader of his letters cannot resist a wish to have
seen his face when the incident occurred, described by Napier:
“With characteristic negligence, this enormous armament (i.e. two
new battering trains) had been sent out from England with no more
shot and shells than would suffice for one day’s consumption.” At
length, everything was in readiness, and the batteries opened on
the 26th August, 1813. Before entering on the narrative of the
siege, a list of the batteries with their respective armaments
will be given, extracted not merely from Sir A. Dickson’s official
returns, but also from private letters written at the time,--with
all the necessary information at his hand.
To commence with the _Left Attack_. The only batteries used before
the storming of the city on the 31st August were those numbered 5
and 6,--containing 7 24-pounders, 2 8-inch howitzers, and Captain
Morrison’s brigade of six 18-pounders. Others will be given,
hereafter, which were used at the bombardment of the castle. The
object of the fire of the left attack was to breach the right face
of the left demi-bastion, and the curtain over it; also, the face
of the left demi-bastion of the hornwork, and generally to annoy
the defences. Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., again commanded the
left attack.
The _Right Attack_ was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Frazer,
and consisted of the following batteries, according to Colonel
Dickson’s numbering:--
No. 1 (evidently No. 11 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 2 8-inch howitzers.
{ 1 12-inch Spanish
No. 3 (evidently No. 13 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing { mortar, and 5 10-inch
{ mortars.
{ 5 8-inch howitzers.
No. 4 (evidently No. 14 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing { 4 68-pr. carronades.
{ 6 24-pr. guns.
No. 5 (evidently No. 15 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 15 24-pr. guns.
No. 6 (evidently No. 16 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 4 10-inch mortars.
No. 7 (evidently No. 17 in Jones’s ‘Sieges’) containing 6 10-inch mortars.
The breaching batteries were Nos. 4 and 5, but more especially the
latter. Field officers were detailed for duty alternately in these
two batteries, while the firing was going on: Majors Dyer and
Webber Smith being in No. 4, and Majors Buckner and Sympher,
K.G.A., in No. 5.
According to Sir J. Jones, the batteries opened with a general
salvo from 57 guns;--according, however, to Colonel Dickson, only
48 were in action. The whole commenced by signal, and as Sir
Thomas Graham wrote to Colonel Dickson, [Sidenote: Dated 26 Aug.
1813.] “Nothing could be more imposing than the opening of your
fire this morning.” The guns in the left attack were found to be
too distant for the effect required; but the fire from the
batteries of the right attack was so destructive, [Sidenote:
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 1 Sept. 1813.] that in the course of
five days, from the 26th to the 30th, the demi-bastion was
demolished, a breach made in the curtain behind it, the towers on
each side of the former breach laid down, and the wall laid open
which connected the curtain with the left of the first breach. The
batteries of the left attack laid open a hornwork; and four guns
having been brought forward into a battery (No. 7) which was much
nearer the works, they breached the right face of the
demi-bastion, and greatly assisted in bringing down the end of the
curtain.
About 11 o’clock A.M. on the 31st August, the column for the
assault, which had now been ordered, moved forward, and arrived at
the breach with comparatively little loss. The defence of the
French was such, however, that no lodgment could be
effected,--more than one attempt having been repulsed; and as the
enemy occupied a higher position than his assailants, he was able
to fire down upon them and inflict great loss. It was at this time
that Sir Thomas Graham ordered the Artillery to commence a fire,
which has received the greatest praise at the hands of historians,
and of which the following graphic description, from Colonel
Dickson’s pen, cannot fail to interest the reader:--“The great
body of our cannon, howitzers, and carronades fired upon the great
curtain and behind it--over the heads of our own men (_only a few
feet perpendicular lower down_), with a vigour and accuracy
probably unprecedented in the annals of artillery. It was the
admiration and surprise of Sir Thomas Graham, and Marshal
Beresford, and all who beheld it. No one could say there was a
single error to the disadvantage of our own people; and the force
of the fire entirely prevented the enemy making any effort along
the rampart to drive us from the breach. I must say the enemy
stood with great firmness, firing over the parapet as well as they
could, notwithstanding numbers had their heads taken off by our
round shot. In short, on this occasion, our artillery was served
in such a manner that I would not have believed it, had I not seen
it.”
Sir J. Jones says of the Artillery fire at this time, that it was
admirable, and occasioned no casualties among the assailants; and
Napier describes the stream of missiles, like a horrid tempest, in
its fearful course strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of
the defenders. It was a critical time; and a want of precision on
the part of the Artillery [Sidenote: Dated Oyarzun, 1 Sept.
1813.] would have produced a fatal panic among the assailants. In
his despatch to Lord Wellington, announcing the success of the
assault, Sir Thomas Graham admitted that, prior to the Artillery
coming into action on this occasion, the state of the attack was
desperate; and he described the fire (which after consultation
with Colonel Dickson he ventured to order) as having been “kept up
with a precision of practice beyond all example.” The ultimate
success was almost accidental. A large number of shells and
combustible materials had been accumulated above the breach to
throw down on the storming party. This was fortunately ignited by
the fire of the Allied Artillery, and a great explosion followed,
killing many of the French, and producing a disorder which enabled
the troops to establish themselves on the curtain, which they
fought from traverse to traverse. Some additional troops having
entered the town by another breach near the Towers, the curtain
was abandoned, and the fighting confined to the streets; but very
soon the French were driven into the castle, which alone remained
in their hands at the end of the day. The Allies lost 500 killed,
and 1500 wounded in this assault.
To ensure the surrender of the castle, a bombardment from mortars
was kept up, until two batteries were made ready in the left
attack (Nos. 9 and 10), which were armed with 17 24-pounders,--and
2 24-pounders with 1 8-inch howitzer, respectively. No. 9 was to
breach the Mirador and Battery de la Reyna, and No. 10 to operate
against the lower defences of the castle, and to enfilade the
[Sidenote: Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 12 Sept. 1813.] back
of the hill. On the morning of the 8th September, the preparations
being complete, the whole of the batteries opened on the castle.
Colonel Dickson describes the bombardment as having been conducted
in beautiful style, and carried on so vigorously, that in two
hours the enemy hoisted a flag of truce. Sir J. Jones says that
the fire was so extremely rapid and well directed, and of so
overpowering a nature, that the castle scarcely returned a single
shot. The terms of the capitulation having been agreed to, two
batteries of the castle were delivered up the same evening, and on
the next day the garrison marched out with the honours of war,
and laid down their arms. Colonel Dickson was one of the three
officers detailed to arrange the terms of the capitulation.
The sufferings of the garrison, and of the prisoners in the
castle, during the bombardment, were excessive, as may [Sidenote:
Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 12 Sept. 1813.] readily be imagined
when one learns that “they had not a bomb-proof in it except for
powder.”[43]
The siege of San Sebastian has an especial interest for the Royal
Artillery,--more especially for that part of the Regiment, the
duties of which are confined to the use of heavy ordnance. This
episode was selected by an able and dispassionate historian, as
one reflecting especial honour on [Sidenote: Gleig’s ‘Military
History.’] the Corps. “It offers,” he wrote, “an example of
precision of aim, and absolute coolness on the part of the
gunners, never surpassed.... Such services as these were rendered
thirty years ago by no other artillery in the world; and as the
same spirit still prevails, which prevailed then, in the
magnificent corps of which we are speaking, it cannot be doubted
but that when the opportunity offers again, they will prove
themselves worthy of the renown that attaches to them.”
These words corroborate what has been so frequently urged in this
work, that a regimental history differs essentially in its aim
from all others. The glow, which it endeavours to throw over past
events, is not meant to conceal defects, or to distort facts, but
to awaken the spirit of emulation;--the boastful way in which
special honours are recounted, and distinctive triumphs sung, is
not egotistical pride, or aggressive conceit, but merely the fond
treasuring of a glory which has been gained by others, and
transmitted to their successors for safe keeping;--and the anxious
gleaning among the fields of former action is but to find herbs,
which in times of peace shall brace the gleaner for coming days
of work or danger. The more truly a soldier knows and values the
deeds and honours of those who have gone before him in his
corps,--the more certain will he be to emulate them. There is no
jealousy of the dead. Admiration of their qualities passes
unconsciously into a love for their memories; and this love
inspires a longing not to be unworthy. It may seem to some but a
poor ambition, to use the weapons well which have been given to
us,--to sacrifice one’s will unmeaningly,--and never to be
downcast by discomfort or failure; but it is the highest ambition
to which a soldier can aspire. Nor is it easy for him to conceive
a higher. Cheerful obedience and conscientious zeal imply most of
the higher qualities of humanity; and a perfect soldier must
possess both. The great poet of England in these days has been the
noblest preacher, to whom her army has ever listened. As he places
before his readers the ideal of a true knight, the soldier sees a
standard which he should never cease to gaze upon. He sees, it may
be for the first time, that opposite virtues should not rebel, but
mingle; and that such should be found in himself as
“Utter hardihood, utter gentleness,
And loving, utter faithfulness in love,
And uttermost obedience to the king.”
And, once realising this,--with the knowledge, possibly, in his
heart that there have been in his corps before him men who
approached even the standard of Arthur’s knights,--he must, as he
reads of their deeds, long
“To sweep
In ever-highering eagle-circles up
To the great sun of glory, and thence swoop
Down upon all things base, and dash them dead.”