BAROSSA, BADAJOZ, AND ALBUERA.
Leaving Massena in front of Torres Vedras, the reader is requested to
turn towards Cadiz. Here Spanish pride had long resisted offers of
English assistance, hoping without foreign aid to raise the siege of the
city; but here the English Government thought it very desirable that
some demonstration should be made. In 1810 the presence of a British
contingent was at length tolerated; and the Artillery [Sidenote: Vide
page 269.] element has been detailed in the preceding chapter. Major
Duncan and the companies under his command had originally embarked for
Gibraltar; but the opening in Cadiz [Sidenote: General Macleod to Major
Duncan, dated 23 April, 1810, and 8 May, 1810.] led to their proceeding
to that city instead. Their arrival having been reported, steps were
immediately taken by General Macleod to equip them for service in the
field; and with this view, three batteries of six guns each, with the
necessary equipment, were despatched from England, and a small supply of
horses, seventy-four in number,--to form a nucleus of a larger
establishment.
[Sidenote: D.-A.-Gen. to Major Duncan, 13 May, 1810.]
It had been intended that Colonel Framingham should be the officer to
command the Artillery at Cadiz, as soon as the Spaniards should deign to
admit any. Fortunately for Major Duncan, it was found impossible to
spare that officer from the head-quarters of the army; and at the urgent
request of General Graham, who commanded the English troops at Cadiz,
the command of the Artillery with his force was left in Major Duncan’s
hands, and remained so until 1812, when he was accidentally killed by
the explosion of a powder-mill at Seville.
In the records already given of the services of the companies of the
10th Battalion, reference has been made to the duties of the Royal
Artillery at Cadiz. In this chapter it is proposed to describe a battle
which was fought by General Graham’s force, and in which,--it has been
said, the Artillery [Sidenote: General Graham to Lord Liverpool, 6
March, 1811.] covered themselves with glory. The gallant General stated
that Artillery had never been better served; but it may be added that it
had never been better handled than by him. His contingent was but
small--ten guns--but it was never idle, and always in the right place.
The circumstances which led to the battle of Barossa may be summarised
as follows:--An attempt had been resolved upon by the Anglo-Spanish
leaders in Cadiz to raise the French siege, the opportunity being
favourable, as the besieging force did not at the time exceed 12,000
men. The English had 4200, and the Spaniards nearly 10,000. To
facilitate matters, General Graham consented to serve under the Spanish
General La Pena, although the event proved that there never was a man
less fitted to hold a command. The plan of action was to transport the
allied force to Tarifa, disembark there, and effect a junction with
another Spanish force; and then countermarch the whole on the rear of
the besieging force at Chichlana. Inclement weather prevented the first
part of the scheme from being carried out; and the [Sidenote: Cust’s
Annals.] landing was effected, not at Tarifa, but at Algesiras. The
whole army, however, effected a junction at the former place on the 28th
February, 1811, and, driving the French before them, reached a place
known as the Vigia de la Barrosa, or Barossa, at noon on the 5th March.
Here they were encountered by the French Marshal, Victor, who had been
warned of the expedition, and who promptly availed himself of the
numerous openings which the blunders and incompetency of the Spanish
General offered. The tale of these is too long to reproduce in a merely
Regimental history; suffice it to say that, owing to them, General
Graham found himself in an extraordinary and embarrassing position.
Having been ordered to march from the height of Barossa, which was the
key of the whole position, and to proceed to Bermeja through a difficult
pine-wood, he obeyed, but with regret. Assuming that the important point
he had just quitted would be occupied by the Spaniards, he left his
baggage with a small guard. To his amazement, he soon learned that no
such precaution had been taken; that the French Marshal, detecting the
omission, was already ascending the height; and that his own
baggage-guard was in extreme and imminent danger. Retracing his steps as
rapidly as the nature of the wood would admit of, he arrived in time to
see the enemy in complete possession of the height,--himself face to
face with the French, and utterly unsupported by the Spaniards. By what
has been called by Napier an inspiration--but such an inspiration as
never comes to the short-sighted or ignorant--he realised that retreat
would be folly, and that his only hope of success lay in immediately
assuming the offensive. Massing his Artillery, he desired Major Duncan
to keep up a powerful fire, while he organized his force into divisions
for the attack. Of this fire Napier writes that it ravaged the French
ranks. As soon as the Infantry had formed, General Graham advanced his
Artillery to a more favourable position, whence, as he afterwards wrote,
it kept up a most destructive fire on the French columns now advancing.
The right division of the English, under General Dilkes, and the left,
under Colonel Wheatley, encountered respectively the French divisions
under Generals Ruffin and Laval. The Infantry regiments engaged were the
Guards, 28th, 7th, 67th, and 87th,--the flank companies of the 1st
Battalion 9th Foot, 2nd Battalion 47th, and 2nd Battalion 82nd, besides
part of the 20th Portuguese Regiment. Where all behaved with gallantry,
it may seem invidious to select any particular regiment for notice; but,
at a most critical moment, the defeat of General Laval’s division was
completed by a magnificent advance of the 87th Regiment. Both the French
divisions were borne backwards from the hill; and, uniting, attempted to
reform and make another attack. But their attempt was frustrated by the
fire of the Artillery, which from being terrific, as Napier termed it,
became now [Sidenote: Napier, vol. iii. p. 446.] “close, rapid, and
murderous, and rendered the attempt vain.” Marshal Victor, therefore,
withdrew his troops from the field, and the English, having been
twenty-four hours under arms and without food, were too exhausted to
pursue.
In this battle, which only lasted one hour and a half, over 1200 were
killed and wounded on the side of the English, and more than 2000 on the
side of the French. Six guns and 400 prisoners also fell into the hands
of the conquerors. Of the conduct of his troops generally, General
Graham wrote to Lord Liverpool that nothing less than the almost
unparalleled exertions of every officer, the invincible bravery of every
soldier, and the most determined devotion to the honour of His Majesty’s
arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success, against such a
formidable enemy so [Sidenote: To Admiral Sir C. Cotton, dated Cadiz, 7
March, 1811.] posted. Sir Richard Keats, the Admiral on the station, who
had superintended the transport of the troops to Algesiras, wrote that
the British troops, led by their gallant and able
commander,--forgetting, on the sight of the enemy, their own fatigue and
privations, and regardless of advantage in the numbers and situation of
the enemy,--gained by their determined valour a victory uneclipsed by
any of the brave achievements of the British army.
The special expressions used by General Graham in his despatch with
reference to the services of the Royal Artillery on this occasion are
well worthy of a place in the records of the Corps. “I owe too much,” he
wrote, “to Major Duncan and the officers and corps of the Royal
Artillery, not to mention them in terms of the highest approbation:
_never was artillery better served_.” He recommended Major Duncan for
promotion, and the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was accordingly
conferred upon him.
The losses of the Artillery at Barossa were as follows:--
Died of his wounds, Lieutenant Woolcombe.
Wounded: Captains Hughes and Cator,--Lieutenants Mitchell, Brereton,
Manners, Maitland, and Pester.
Three rank and file killed, and 32 wounded: besides of the Royal
Artillery Drivers, 1 sergeant, 2 rank and file, and 18 horses killed: 1
sergeant, 7 rank and file, and 22 horses wounded.
The ordnance captured from the French was as follows:--
[Sidenote: Major Duncan to General Graham.]
Two 7-inch howitzers, 3 heavy 8-pounders, 1 4-pounder,--with their
ammunition waggons, and a proportion of horses.
The fruits of the battle of Barossa might have been very considerable,
had the Spanish General been capable of understanding even the rudiments
of his profession. As he was at once ignorant and proud, General Graham
found it necessary to return with his force to Cadiz; the object of the
expedition had failed, for the siege was not raised,--but Marshal Victor
had received a check which alarmed him considerably, and which led to
eager demands for reinforcements. In his conduct, both in the action of
the 5th March, and in his withdrawal to Isla de Leon on the following
day, when he separated from the Spaniards, General Graham received the
warmest support from Lord Wellington, to whose movements the reader is
now invited to return.
After an inactivity of five months before the lines of Torres Vedras,
Massena commenced to evacuate Portugal. He had no siege artillery with
which to attack the fortifications behind which his enemy was securely
sheltered; and his supplies were becoming every day more difficult to
obtain; he therefore had no other alternative. As he retired, he was
closely followed by the English army, and many smart affairs took place
between the advanced guards of the latter and the rear-guard of the
French army, in which the Royal Horse Artillery did good service. The
limits of the largest work and the patience of the most enduring reader
would be exhausted were these minor actions given in detail. Suffice it
to say, that the Artillery engaged on these occasions included the
troops commanded by Captain Ross and Captain Bull,--that the names of
the various actions are given in the first volume of this history at
pages 396 and 401, and that the way in which they performed their duty
may be gathered, in the first place, from Lord Wellington’s despatches,
and, in the second, from the exhaustive narrative of Napier. In writing
of the actions of the 11th, 12th, and 13th March, 1811, at Pombal,
Redinha, and Cazal Nova, [Sidenote: To Lord Liverpool, dated 14 March,
1811.] Lord Wellington said that the troops of Horse Artillery under
Captains Ross and Bull particularly distinguished themselves. At the
affair of Foz d’Arouce, on the 15th March, he also wrote that the Horse
Artillery, under Captains [Sidenote: Ibid. dated 16 March, 1811.] Ross
and Bull, distinguished themselves. Later, in the affair which took
place on the 7th April, during a reconnaissance, in which the English,
under Sir W. Erskine, drove a division of the French army before them
across the [Sidenote: Ibid. dated 9 April, 1811.] Turones and Dos Casas,
Lord Wellington wrote that “Captain’s Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery
did great execution on this occasion.”
[Sidenote: Vol. ii. chap. ii.]
At the celebrated engagement of Fuentes d’Onor,[24] the dashing affair
mentioned in an early part of this work took place, in which Captain
Norman Ramsay, of Bull’s troop, so greatly distinguished himself. On
this occasion the losses of the Artillery were as follows:--
Royal Horse Artillery--1 rank and file and 3 horses killed: 1 rank and
file, and 3 horses wounded.
Royal Foot Artillery--1 sergeant, 4 rank and file, and 9 horses killed;
1 captain, 2 subalterns, 18 rank and file, and 21 horses wounded.
The officers wounded were Captain Thompson,--whose brigade did as good
service as it had done at Busaco, and the practice made by which
attracted universal admiration,--Lieutenant Martin, and a subaltern of
the same name as the officer who fell at Barossa, Lieutenant Woolcombe.
The total casualties on the side of the Allies amounted to 1786: those
of the French to 2665. The battle resulted in the evacuation of Portugal
by Massena, and the capture of Almeida by the English, although,
unfortunately, not until the garrison had made its escape.
During these continued successes, Lord Wellington was afflicted by a
want of adequate supplies and money,--and by discouraging letters from
England. With a temerity such as few commanders would have displayed, he
did not hesitate to point out to the Government how weak and mistaken
their vacillating, timorous policy was. Still undeceived as to the
worthlessness of Spanish promises, the English rulers urged upon
Wellington to make Spain the theatre of his operations, and yet declined
to make him independent of the Spanish authorities. His protestations,
also, in favour of Portugal as a base of operations fell on doubting and
unwilling ears. English statesmen seemed to live in a fools’ paradise:
and from their dreams it seemed impossible to [Sidenote: To Lord
Liverpool, dated Santa Marinha, 23 March, 1811.] wake them. On the 23rd
March, 1811, Lord Wellington had actually to write, beseeching the
Government to forego an intention which appeared to have been formed of
withdrawing the troops from Portugal on account of the expense of the
war. He had already urged on them the folly of starving an expedition in
the hope of securing popularity for their party; and he now boldly
asserted that if they carried out their intention, and freed the French
from the pressure of military operations in the Continent, they must
prepare to meet a French army in England. “Then,” he wrote, “would
commence an expensive contest;--then would His Majesty’s subjects
discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God,
they have hitherto had no knowledge.” It was a difficult task which Lord
Wellington had to perform,--not merely to fight his country’s battles
under difficulties and discouragement,--not merely to be exasperated by
advice, the folly of which was glaring,--but also in his few moments of
leisure to have to take up his pen, and teach her senators wisdom. The
superiority of England’s greatest General cannot be realised without a
careful study, not merely of his campaigns, but also of his
correspondence.
It is necessary now to turn to Marshal Beresford’s force, with which
was Major Dickson, now serving in command of the Portuguese Artillery.
It had been hoped that this army would reach Badajoz in sufficient time
to raise the French siege of that city; but a slight delay in
Beresford’s movements, combined with undoubted treachery on the part of
the garrison, frustrated this hope, and rendered it necessary to prepare
for a siege of the city with its now French garrison. From this time,
the reader will enjoy an advantage which cannot be overrated, and which
appears now for the first time in any narrative of the Peninsular War.
Sir Alexander Dickson was not merely a great Artilleryman, but also a
most methodical and industrious collector and registrar of details which
came under his notice. During the various sieges in the Peninsula which
were conducted by him, he kept diaries mentioning even the most trifling
facts: and on his return to England he procured from General Macleod the
whole of the long series of letters which he had written to him between
1811 and 1814. The mass of information which he thus possessed was
arranged, and at his death the whole passed into the hands of his son,
Sir Collingwood Dickson. In the hope that the papers of the most
prominent Artilleryman of the Duke of Wellington’s armies would be
useful in framing a history of the Corps in which he spent his life, Sir
Collingwood kindly placed them at the disposal of the author of this
history. Priceless under any circumstances, they are even more so from
the fact that several of the letter-books of the
Deputy-Adjutant-General’s department during the Peninsular War have been
mislaid;--and these refer chiefly to the periods covered by the
manuscripts of Sir Alexander Dickson. On the latter, therefore, the
narrative of the period between 1811 and 1814 will be chiefly based: and
it is hoped that the reproduction of the opinions and statements of one,
so able to express the former with confidence and the latter with
authority, will be a welcome addition to the literature of England’s
wars in the Peninsula.[25]
On the 9th April, 1811, Marshal Beresford advanced from the Guadiana and
invested Olivença. When he reconnoitred the place, Major Dickson pointed
out an inclosed lunette in front of the gate of San Francisco, from
which he knew, by a former visit to Olivença, that the curtain could be
battered in breach. Approving of the suggestion, Marshal Beresford
despatched Major Dickson to Elvas that night to bring up the siege
artillery. This consisted of six heavy brass 24-pounders, each provided
with all necessary stores, and with ammunition at the rate of 300 rounds
per gun. To move this battery and equipment from Elvas to Olivença 104
pairs of bullocks were required, and a company of Portuguese Artillery
attended as escort. On the 13th April the guns arrived at the camp
before Olivença, and immediately proceeded to the neighbourhood of the
point of attack. The breaching battery for four 24-pounders had been got
in complete readiness, and an attempt was accordingly made at once to
put the guns in battery. It was found, however, impossible to effect
this on that day, on account of the dreadful state of the roads, and the
circuit which the guns were obliged to take. By the night of the 14th,
the communications had been made practicable, and four guns were placed
in the battery, with ammunition and stores, in readiness to open fire at
dawn. Two field batteries of the King’s German Artillery were also
placed so as to keep the enemy’s fire in check. The field-pieces
employed by these were five 6-pounders and one 5½-inch howitzer.
The breaching battery did not open fire until 8 A.M., on the 15th, the
point aimed at being the curtain to the left of the San Francisco gate,
and the distance being about 340 yards. At 11 A.M. the enemy showed a
flag of truce, which occasioned a cessation of fire; but nothing
definite resulting, it was resumed, and after a few more rounds the
enemy surrendered at discretion. Major Dickson was much pleased with
the practice made by the young Portuguese Artillerymen under his
command. Only 320 rounds had been fired in the four hours, and yet the
breach was almost practicable. A brisk fire from five or six guns had
been kept up by the enemy against the breaching battery, and had
inflicted some slight loss; but the field guns of the German Artillery
did much to moderate it, firing about sixty rounds a gun.
[Sidenote: Sir. A. Dickson’s MSS.]
On taking Olivença the following ordnance was secured:--_Mounted_.
Brass, one 8-pounder and two 4-pounders; iron, five 12-pounders, two
8-pounders, and two 6-pounders. _Dismounted._ Brass, one 8-pounder;
iron, two 12-pounders.
On the 17th April, Major Dickson waited on Marshal Beresford at Zafra,
and received orders to proceed to Elvas to make preparations for the
siege of Badajoz. On the 20th Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas, and
issued instructions for the carrying on of the siege to Marshal
Beresford, Colonel Fletcher of the Engineers, and Major Dickson, the
last-named officer being appointed to direct the Artillery department of
the operation. From the 21st April to the 10th May, the greatest
exertions were made, both at Elvas and around Badajoz, to prepare the
necessary ordnance and stores for the siege, transport them, and make
and arm the batteries. The following shows, in a tabulated form, the
nature and distribution of the ordnance employed:--
[Sidenote: Prepared from various returns among Sir A. Dickson’s MSS.]
TABLE A.[26]
FIRST SIEGE OF BADAJOZ.
April 23, 1811.--Ordnance selected for the Siege:--
Sixteen brass 24-pounder guns.
Eight ” 16-pounder ”
Two 10-inch brass howitzers.
Six 8-inch ” ”
The ammunition to be at the rate of 800 rounds per gun, and 400
rounds per howitzer.
The following distribution of ordnance was determined on for the
first operations of the siege, on the 8th May, 1811:--
1. For the attack of St. Cristoval:
24-pounders 3 } 5
8-inch howitzers 2 }
2. For the false attack on Pardaleras:
24-pounders 3 } 4
8-inch howitzer 1 }
3. For the false attack on Picurina:
24-pounders 3 } 4
8-inch howitzer 1 }
On the 9th May, the following additional ordnance was sent from
Elvas for the St. Cristoval attack, viz.:
24-pounders 2 } 3
8-inch howitzer 1 }
Four brass 12-pounders were at the same time ordered from Elvas to
enfilade the bridge of Badajoz. Four guns for the attack of St.
Cristoval were replaced on the 11th May--having been damaged--by
three heavy 12-pounders and a field howitzer.
On the 12th May, four 24-pounders were sent from the great park to
the Cristoval attack.
On the 13th May the siege was ordered to be raised, as will hereafter be
shown.
* * * * *
Badajoz was invested on the right bank on the 8th May, and on the
morning of the 11th the breaching battery against San Cristoval opened.
Being, however, totally unsupported, and having to resist a very heavy
fire from that fort and the Castle, the young Portuguese Artillerymen
proved unequal to the contest. Their practice, after a few rounds,
became very uncertain; and in the course of the morning the battery was
silenced, all the pieces being disabled except one howitzer.
On the night of the 11th, the battery intended to enfilade the bridge
was armed, and the disabled ordnance in the breaching battery exchanged.
Captain Hawker, commanding a 9-pounder field brigade of the Royal
Artillery, lately arrived from Lisbon, was directed to place himself
under the orders of Major Dickson, although regimentally senior to that
officer, and was placed in charge of the Artillery operations against
San Cristoval.
The commencement of the siege was very disheartening. On the day before
the solitary battery opened fire, the Allies had met with a severe loss
during a sally made by the garrison; and now, in a few hours their one
battery was silenced. Beresford was also disquieted by rumours which
reached him that Soult was on his way to raise the siege, and that he
would certainly arrive before the city could be taken. He therefore sent
for Major Dickson late on the night of the 11th, and desired him not to
bring forward any more ammunition or stores from Elvas, and to be in
readiness to remove at the shortest notice what had already arrived.
Colonel Fletcher also was ordered not to break ground that night against
the Castle. In event, however, of the operations proceeding, it was
arranged that four 24-pounders should be moved from the south attacks to
that of San Cristoval, and that they should be replaced by six
additional guns of the same calibre from Elvas.
On the morning of the 12th intelligence reached Beresford which led him
to doubt the accuracy of the reports which had reached him on the
previous day, and he ordered active operations to recommence at once.
Additional guns were therefore sent forward from the park at Elvas, and
at night ground was broken for the batteries against the Castle. The new
activity, however, was but short-lived; for positive information was
received at midnight as to the enemy’s movements. On the morning of the
13th the siege was ordered to be raised, and Major Dickson directed to
send the heavy ordnance, ammunition and stores back to Elvas. This duty
was admirably performed. As many pieces of ordnance were at once
despatched, as the means of conveyance would permit; and in the first
instance it was thought sufficient to take the pieces across the flying
bridge, and to park them in a situation not visible from Badajoz. On the
Cristoval side the guns were removed from the battery on the night of
the 13th; and at the same time the battery in the false attack against
Picurina was dismantled. The 14th May was spent in carrying away the
ordnance and stores in such a way as to conceal from the enemy the fact
that the siege was being raised; and by noon on the 15th the whole of
the besieging artillery and ammunition from the great park had been sent
across the river, and the flying bridge removed, while the park of the
Cristoval attack had been taken back to the vicinity of Elvas.
The investing troops on the south bank were then withdrawn; but a corps
remained on the north bank to cover the removal of the heavy artillery
to Elvas. Of the duty performed by Major Dickson on this occasion, under
Marshal Beresford’s orders, Napier writes that “the arrangements for
carrying off the stores were admirably executed; ... and that the
transactions were so well masked by the 4th Division, which, in concert
with the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment, that it was
only by a sally on the rear-guard, in which the Portuguese piquets of
the 4th Division were very roughly treated, that the French knew the
siege was raised.”
The same author visits the failure of this siege, and the heavy losses
attending all the subsequent sieges carried on by the British in Spain,
on the absence of any properly-equipped corps of Sappers and Miners to
assist the officers of Engineers. The want of such a corps, with the
necessary implements, rendered, according to Napier, the British sieges
a mere succession of butcheries. But Sir Alexander Dickson was ready to
accept part of the responsibility of this failure for his own
department. In his diary of the first siege of [Sidenote: Sir A.
Dickson’s MSS.] Badajoz he wrote: “Every praise was due to the
Portuguese Artillery for the activity, zeal, and willingness they
displayed in this service. Indeed, nothing could exceed their personal
exertions; but, from their professional inexperience, Major Dickson has
great doubts whether a satisfactory result would have been obtained
without the assistance of a proportion [Sidenote: Dated Elvas, 22 May,
1811.] of better-trained Artillerymen.” At the same time, however, he
distinctly stated, in a letter to General Macleod, that his wish was not
to begin the fire from any one battery until the whole attack should be
more advanced, and that the Cristoval attack should be supported from
other points. He added that the battery against the Picurina, although
well placed as an auxiliary for general attack, afforded no support to
that against San Cristoval. In these points, he wrote, “my opinions
coincide entirely with those of Colonel Fletcher (R.E.), with whom it is
a pleasure to serve.”
Marshal Beresford was brave, but was better as an administrator in peace
than as a General in war. No praise can exceed his deserts in reference
to the organization and training of the Portuguese army, or his fidelity
to Wellington; but his abilities as a commander in the field were
feeble, and the success of his troops in the battle which followed the
raising of the siege of Badajoz was won in spite of, rather than by him.
Albuera was one of the fiercest battles of the Peninsula; with it the
name of Beresford will always be associated; but its chronicler will
always have to register with the stories of its gallantry that of his
incapacity. The policy of fighting the battle at all--a question which
lies with a General alone--was more than doubtful; but, even admitting
that it was wise, his tactics were extremely faulty, and the errors were
expiated only by the courage and losses of his men. With a General like
Soult against him, the arrangement of his army on the morning of the
16th May revealed a childlike innocence, which, in a General charged
with the lives of men, was criminal. Part of his army was still at
Badajoz, and could not possibly reach his position in time for the
battle;--part had barely succeeded in doing so on the eventful
morning;--he had, on the previous day, allowed the French to occupy a
wood on the other side of the Albuera River, where they could conceal
their intentions;--and, with marvellous blindness, he had allowed them
to secure a hill in the immediate front of his own right, behind which
they organized the famous attack, which so nearly proved fatal.
On the afternoon of the 15th, Major Dickson, having completed his duties
at Badajoz, proceeded to Albuera, where the army had taken up its
position, and resumed the command of his two brigades of Portuguese
Field Artillery. About the same hour on the morning of the 16th as that
on which General Cole’s division happily succeeded in joining
Beresford’s army, the enemy showed himself in force. The first
appearance was the advance of seven or eight squadrons of cavalry, some
light infantry, and a troop of horse artillery, from the wood towards
the bridge of Albuera by the Seville road. This was a feint, but not
immediately recognized as such by Marshal Beresford. They drove in the
English piquets, and formed in the plain, where they opened an artillery
fire towards the village of Albuera, a small place, which, with the
exception of its church, was almost in ruins, and which was without
inhabitants. This fire was answered by some of Major Dickson’s and of
the German Artillery, which directed their practice against the cavalry.
At first Major Dickson thought it was merely a reconnoissance; but it
was soon seen that the real attack was intended against the right, which
was composed of Blake’s Spanish troops. Beresford sent orders to Blake
to throw back the right at right angles to the line; but the command was
not obeyed until he went in person to enforce it, by which time the
French were upon them, harassing them, as they wheeled, with a murderous
fire. From the position occupied by Major Dickson near the bridge, which
was opposite the centre of the line, he first saw a column of infantry
advancing to the bridge by the same road as had been taken by the
cavalry, on which a brigade of General Stewart’s division was at once
sent to the village to support Baron Alten, who commanded there. Very
soon afterwards, however, he saw another column moving through the wood
in the direction of the Allied right, and as, at the same time, the
column approaching the bridge first halted, and then commenced to
retire, it was evident that the real French effort would be made
against the right. Stewart’s British brigade, therefore, at once marched
from the village to the right, followed by the rest of the division, and
Cole’s division formed up in support.
By this time a heavy shower of rain had commenced, which greatly
favoured the approach of the French columns against the Spaniards on the
right, and during which they passed the river, and advanced upon and
came round the height which the latter occupied, and on which they were
then, in great confusion, wheeling into a new position. In describing
the conduct of the Spanish troops at Albuera, Major Dickson, referring
to this particular episode in the [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated 22 May,
1811.] battle, wrote to General Macleod as follows: “The fact is, the
Spaniards, once in line, could not be moved--I mean, could not
manœuvre--and the Marshal was obliged to use the British, that knew how
to move, or else our flank must have been completely turned.”
This quite corroborates Napier’s account of the battle. It was on the
hill occupied by the Spanish that the contest was decided; it was there
that the gallantry of the French Cavalry and the heroism of the English
Infantry were manifested; there a murderous artillery fire of grape at
close range was maintained incessantly on both sides; and it was there
that the grand final episode took place which was [Sidenote: Napier.]
described with poetic fervour by the great historian. “The Fusileer
battalions of Cole’s division advanced in gallant line, but, struck by
the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. But, suddenly
and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies; and then
was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights....
Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of
undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of
their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their
front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys
swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts
overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the
tumultuous crowd, as, slowly and with a horrid carnage, it was pushed
by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the
height.... At last the mighty mass gave way, and, like a loosened cliff,
went headlong down the steep. The rain flowed after in streams
discoloured with blood; and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant
of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the
fatal hill!” Before this final charge took place, Beresford thought the
battle was lost, and commenced arrangements for a retreat. He ordered
the withdrawal of Alten’s Germans and Major Dickson’s guns from Albuera
bridge. This was strongly asserted by Napier, although denied by one of
his critics; and it is confirmed [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. 22 May, 1811.]
by a passage in one of Major Dickson’s letters. “The Marshal himself,
for a moment, thought he was defeated, as I received an order to
retreat, with my Artillery, towards Valverde, and Baron Alten
absolutely, by order, quitted the village for a moment. All this was,
however, soon countermanded and rectified.” To Colonel Hardinge was due
the credit of ordering the final and successful advance.
The Artillery force at Albuera, on the side of the Allies, comprised:--
[Sidenote: Sir A. Dickson to General Napier, dated 16 Dec. 1830, and to
Lord Beresford, dated 19 March, 1831, in correction of the former.]
Captain Lefebure’s Troop of Royal Horse Artillery, consisting of
4 6-pounders.
Captain Hawker’s Brigade of Royal Artillery, now No. 4 Battery,
7 Brigade, R.A., consisting of 4 9-pounders.
Captain Cleeve’s Brigade, King’s German Artillery, consisting of
5 6-pounders and 1 5½-inch howitzer.
Captain Sympher’s Brigade, King’s German Artillery, consisting of
5 6-pounders and 1 5½-inch howitzer.
Captain Braun’s Brigade, Portuguese Artillery, consisting of
6 9-pounders.
Captain Arriaga’s Brigade, Portuguese Artillery, consisting of
6 6-pounders.
Spanish Artillery, consisting of 6 6-pounders.
No explanation is given in any of the Regimental records why Captain
Lefebure had only four guns; it may, however, be assumed that his troop
had not yet recovered the drain on its resources which was made on its
arrival in the Peninsula, when it was called upon to fill up the
vacancies in the Chestnut Troop.
A detailed statement of the services of the Artillery at Albuera was
forwarded by Major Dickson to General Howorth, for transmission to
England, but, unfortunately, was lost. The student has, therefore,
merely a private letter from Major Dickson to General Macleod to rely
upon, whose details are, of course, less ample than could be wished. In
it he mentioned that the cannonade on both sides was tremendous during
the whole battle, and that probably on few such occasions had there been
more casualties from artillery fire. Major Hartmann was in command of
the British and German Artillery; Major Dickson of the Portuguese. These
latter behaved admirably. Captain Lefebure’s troop also distinguished
itself, one gun having been, for a short time, taken, but afterwards
recovered. Captain Hawker’s brigade, from Major Dickson’s personal
observation, did great execution. General Cole spoke in the highest
terms of Captain Sympher’s brigade; and Captain Cleeve’s guns went
through a number of vicissitudes. Being placed on the hill, where the
great attack was made, the whole of them fell into the enemy’s hands,
but were afterwards recovered, with the exception of one howitzer. They
were admirably served until the French were actually amongst them; and
then retreat was impossible, the enemy’s cavalry having swept round the
hill, and taken them in rear.
Modern battles may dwarf those of the Peninsula in point of the numbers
engaged; but it is questionable if the British courage displayed at
Albuera, and the proportionate losses to the number engaged, have ever
been surpassed.
The severe fighting lasted about four hours; and in that time nearly
7000 of the Allies, and over 8000 French, were killed or wounded. On the
side of the Allies, over 4000 of the casualties were among the British
troops, only 1800 of the total number engaged being untouched. Major
Dickson, in describing the scene, said that every one declared they had
never seen such a field; that on the hill where the great struggle had
been, in the space of from 1000 to 1200 yards, there were certainly not
less than 6000 lying dead or wounded. Napier’s description of the field
after the battle is characteristically graphic, and leaves an indelible
impression on the reader’s mind. Such was the crippled and famished
state of the Allies, that, had the French attacked again on the 17th,
resistance would have been impossible. Fortunately, Soult resolved to
retire; and Lord Wellington, reaching Albuera on the 19th, sent
Beresford to watch his movements, while he himself proceeded to reinvest
Badajoz. The order issued by Marshal Beresford, after the battle,
included the following paragraph:--“To Major Hartmann and Major Dickson,
and to the officers and soldiers of the British, German, and Portuguese
Artillery, the greatest praise is due, and the Marshal returns them his
best thanks.” In [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 29 May, 1811.]
forwarding to the Ordnance a copy of this order, Major Dickson, with
soldierlike generosity, added: “The Marshal’s orders are not strong
enough in favour of the Fusileer Brigade, who really saved the day.” In
Lord Wellington’s letter to Admiral Berkeley, dated 20th May, 1811, he
said that he considered the battle of Albuera one of the most glorious
and honourable _to the character of the troops_ of any that had been
fought during the war. In Marshal Beresford’s report to Lord Wellington,
dated 18th May, 1811, he said: “I have every reason to speak favourably
of the manner in which our Artillery was served and fought. Captain
Lefebure’s troop of Horse Artillery did great execution.”
On the 19th May, 1811, Lord Wellington, Colonel Fletcher, and Major
Dickson arrived at Elvas, from Albuera, to make preparations for
resuming the siege of Badajoz. Colonel Framingham had joined at
head-quarters, and assumed command of the Royal and other Artillery; but
Lord Wellington expressed a wish that Major Dickson should continue to
direct all the arrangements for the siege, and communicate directly with
himself. This distinction caused no jealousy in Colonel Framingham’s
mind; on the other hand, that officer spoke of Major Dickson to Lord
Wellington in the highest terms, and during the siege assisted him in
every way. This was the beginning of a confidence between Lord
Wellington and Major Dickson, which only increased as the war went on;
and it is interesting to find, even thus early, the latter officer speak
of his great chief as follows: [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. dated Elvas, 29
May, 1811.] I have transacted business with many Generals, but never
such an one as Lord Wellington, both for general knowledge, and
attention to reason and suggestion.”
The story of the second unsuccessful siege of Badajoz, as of the first,
may be prefaced by showing in a tabular form some of the more important
Artillery statistics connected with it. These have been extracted from
the voluminous diary and almost daily correspondence of Major Dickson,
on which the summary, given afterwards in the form of narrative, is also
based.
TABLE B.
SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJOZ.
May 22, 1811.--The following was the appropriation of ordnance
determined upon for the siege:--
CRISTOVAL ATTACK. SOUTH, OR CASTLE ATTACK.
24-pounders (brass) 12 24-pounders (brass) 14
16-pounders 4 10-inch howitzers 2
10-inch howitzers 2 8-inch howitzers 4
8-inch howitzers 4 __
__ 20
22 __
__
In reserve: 24-pounders (brass) 4
Detail of men for siege artillery:--
1st Regt. Portuguese Artillery: officers and men 100
2nd ” ” ” ” 100
3rd ” ” ” ” 300
Royal Artillery ” ” ” 110
___
610
___
Many of these guns were replaced during the siege, as may be gathered
from the following table:--
10-in. 8-in.
24-pounders. howitzers howitzers.
Disabled by the fire of the enemy 3 .. 3
Disabled by the effects of their } 15 2 1
own fire }
__ __ __
Total 18 2 4 = 24.
__ __ __
The expenditure of ammunition during the siege was as follows:--
24-pr. 24-pr. 16-pr. Shell.
No. of rounds. round grape round
shot. shot. shot. 10-in. 8-in.
North, or San Cristoval Attack 5950 200 1134 62 989
South, or Castle Attack 8419 441 .. 640 1090
_____ ___ ____ ___ ____
Total 14369 641 1134 702 2079
_____ ___ ____ ___ ____
N.B.--The totals given above, and in the first table (Table A),
agree with those given by Sir J. Jones; but the details here are
more minute. It was but natural that Sir J. Jones, being an
Engineer officer, should devote more space and detail to the
labours of his own corps; but his artillery details in most sieges
in the Peninsula were obtained from Sir A. Dickson and Sir J. May,
and generally agree with the MSS. of the former.
On the 10th June Lord Wellington determined on raising the siege.
* * * * *
On the night of the 30th May the trenches were opened on both attacks,
and great progress was made. The whole of the guns for the batteries
were also set in movement, with ammunition at the rate of 300 rounds per
gun.
Captain Rainsford’s company (now No. 7 Battery, 17th Brigade) having
arrived from Lisbon, the Artillerymen were divided as follows:--
ATTACK AGAINST THE CASTLE.
Major Dickson commanding.
Officers’ Names.
Royal Artillery 55 officers and men. Captain Rainsford.
1st Reg. Portuguese Artillery 100 ” Captain Latham.
2nd ” ” 100 ” Lieut. Saunders.
3rd ” ” 50 ” Lieut. Willis.
___
Total 305
___
ATTACK AGAINST SAN CRISTOVAL.
Captain Cleeves, (K.G.A.), commanding under Major Dickson.
Officers’ Names.
Royal Artillery 55 officers and men. Lieut. Hawker.
3rd Reg. Portuguese Artillery 250 ” Lieut. Connel.
___
Total 305
___
[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, dated 13 June,
1811.]
This gave but a very small relief; and Lord Wellington remarked, after
the raising of the siege, that some of the Royal Artillery were
indefatigable, and had never quitted their batteries.
Captain Latham was the 2nd Captain of Captain Hawker’s Field Brigade,
and was lent for the service of the siege train. [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G.
dated 13 June, 1811.] Of him Major Dickson afterwards said: “I assure
you the assistance I derived from his professional knowledge and
activity can never be forgotten by me.” Instances like this, and others
hereafter to be mentioned, when even Horse Artillerymen served in the
trenches, are arguments against the necessity of any _complete_ divorce
between the Field and Garrison branches of the Artillery service. Of
Captain Rainsford’s company--now 7 Battery, 17th Brigade--Major
[Sidenote: Ibid.] Dickson wrote: “It was of wonderful assistance; it is
an uncommon fine one.”
[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. 20 June, 1811.]
On the 1st June the batteries on both sides were in a very forward
state, and two on the north side received their armament. On the south
side several guns were brought into the parallel, ready for mounting on
the following night, when the batteries should be prepared for them. By
half-past 8 o’clock on the morning of the 3rd everything was ready; and
on the south side a fire was commenced with fourteen guns against the
point which it was intended to breach. The fire was most vigorous, and,
although well replied to, gave considerable hopes of success. Two of the
guns became disabled from the effects of their own fire,--a casualty
whose recurrence during the siege was most monotonous. On the north side
No. 1 Battery was partly employed to breach San Cristoval, and partly to
enfilade the Castle front; No. 2 to breach San Cristoval; No. 3 against
the defences of the same fort; and No. 4 to keep in check the tête de
pont and enfilade the bridge. The breach in San Cristoval was begun in
the shoulder to the right of the work, where it formed a dead angle; and
in firing at this from a battery on the north side, a gun, on the very
first night, became disabled by muzzle-drooping. These incidents will
prepare the reader for the verdict of condemnation which was
unanimously passed on the armament of the Allied siege trains in the
earlier Peninsular sieges.
The howitzers were used as mortars, by taking the wheels off the
carriages and inventing means of elevating them. Major Dickson had
carefully tested what was the extreme elevation at which they could be
used with safety, and found the _maximum_ was an angle of 30°.
Righteous, therefore, was his indignation when he learnt that, in spite
of his own and Captain Cleeves’ positive orders, an officer on duty on
the north side, whom he tersely stigmatised as “a brute of a Portuguese
Captain,” had thought proper to elevate them to 40° or 42°, with a
charge of 2½ lbs. to 3 lbs., the result being that both carriages were
rendered entirely unserviceable, without any means of replacing them.
On the 4th June, the fire from the south side continued, but with less
effect, the shot entering the wall without bringing down any part of it
worthy of mention. On this day another gun was disabled at the vent by
the effect of its own fire; and one was rendered unserviceable by that
of the enemy. On the 4th very considerable progress was made in the
breach at San Cristoval. During the night a new battery was opened in
the south attack, and the guns from No. 1 Battery removed to it.
The 5th of June was a very disheartening day. The progress in the breach
of the south attack was little more hopeful than on the 4th; and before
afternoon the batteries were reduced--principally by their own fire--to
nine serviceable guns. Major Dickson, therefore, proceeded to Lord
Wellington, and obtained his permission to bring six _iron_ 24-pounders
from Elvas to the south attack. The breach in San Cristoval made by the
north attack made apparent progress, but was not yet deemed practicable.
Here, also, one or two of the guns showed symptoms of giving way.
On the 6th June, Lieutenant Hawker of the Royal Artillery was killed in
the north attack:--a gallant young officer, of whom Major Dickson wrote,
“He has never been out of No. 1 Battery from the commencement of the
fire.” In the south attack, a steady fire was kept up from the nine
serviceable guns during this day, and more progress was made in
breaching the wall, than had been effected during the two preceding
days. Before night, the breach was practicable for a single person. In
the evening, the breach at San Cristoval was also considered practicable
for an assault, which accordingly was ordered, but repulsed. The enemy
had previously cleared the breach, leaving a certain portion of the wall
standing perpendicular: and their fire was so warm that the troops could
not face it at the breach for any time. Attempts were made to escalade
at one or two other points, but the ladders were too short; so the party
had to retire with a loss of 130 men.
On the 7th June, another battery of the south attack, No. 3, was
completed; and the iron guns, having arrived from Elvas, were mounted
during the night. The breach on this side was a little improved, but the
resistance of the wall was far in excess of Major Dickson’s
expectations.
On the 8th June, under a fire from 16 24-pounders in the south attack,
the breach on that side seemed large enough to admit several persons
abreast. On the north side, the fire continued, but the breach was not
yet deemed again practicable. During the night of the 8th, grape-shot
was fired from the south side, but the Portuguese grape was extremely
bad, and the enemy was successful in clearing away all the rubbish from
the breach, in spite of the fire, leaving to view a considerable height
of wall yet uninjured. A quantity of 3-pounder shot was therefore
brought up from Elvas, which, when tied up in bags containing eight or
ten each, formed a better description of grape. Various guns in both
attacks showed symptoms of distress during this day.
On the 9th June, there were only twelve or thirteen guns left
serviceable on the south side after the day’s firing, but the breach was
decidedly larger, and grape was fired all night to prevent the enemy
working at it. On the north side, there were only eight or nine guns
left undisabled in in the evening, but the breach at San Cristoval was
pronounced practicable; and another attempt was made, at 9 o’clock, to
carry it by assault. It was, however, again repulsed; for it was found
that, notwithstanding the appearance of the breach, there was a
perpendicular wall about 6 or 7 feet high still standing, which had been
concealed from view by the counterscarp: and the enemy had taken every
precaution to keep it clear of the _débris_ of the breach. The gallantry
of the assailants was as great, as the defence [Sidenote: Major Dickson
to D.-A.-G. 26 June, 1811.] of the French was resolute. The ladders were
thrown down,--grenades thrown among the stormers in great abundance, and
masses of stone hurled down upon them. With the loss of 150 men, the
assailants were obliged to retire.
On the following morning it was found that the grape-shot from the south
attack had been successful in preventing the enemy from working at the
breach, and preparations for resuming the battering had been ordered,
when Major Dickson received a summons from Lord Wellington. He met him
[Sidenote: Dickson’s MSS.] with Colonel Fletcher on the north side: and
they were informed that he had decided on raising the siege. He
mentioned his reasons; but he particularly pointed out the impossibility
of getting possession of San Cristoval without advancing to the crest of
the _glacis_;--the still difficult situation of the main breach on the
south side;--the imprudence of attempting it, even when practicable,
without first having Cristoval;--the strong entrenchments which the
enemy had had time to construct within the breach;--and finally the
approach of the enemy in such force that prudence would not allow him to
be caught by them in the midst of a siege. [Sidenote: Major Dickson to
D.-A.-G.c Elvas, 13 June, 1811.] Soult was at this time in force at
Llerena, and Drouet’s corps was reported as having joined him; while the
Northern French army under Marmont was also in motion.
Major Dickson immediately set to work, and by the evening of the 12th
the whole of the guns, stores, and ammunition were either in Elvas
again, or at such a distance as to be in perfect safety in all
circumstances.
“Thus,” wrote Major Dickson to General Macleod, “ended this siege, in
which everything that artillery could do was done, considering our
miserable means; and this Lord Wellington was good enough to express,
both to Colonel Framingham and myself. The brass guns could not stand
the necessary fire, and their destruction, I am of opinion, was
considerably occasioned by the lowness of the shot, which generally had
so much windage that you could put your fingers in between the shot and
the bore.... On the whole I have to observe that our batteries were too
far off.... The whole principle of the attack was founded on the
supposed weakness of the Castle wall, which it was thought could be beat
down at a distance. On discovering the difficulty of this, the batteries
were thrown forward as far as they could, at the same time avoiding the
fire of the modern fronts, nor could they be advanced farther until
Cristoval was in our hands. Indeed, if that had been carried, I think we
should have got the place.... Lord Wellington was good enough to say
that everything that could be done on our parts, had been done.”
The casualties among the Artillery during the siege were as follows:--
Officers, Royal Artillery Lieut. E. Hawker, killed.
Lieut. W. Saunders, wounded.
Officers, Portuguese Artillery Captain Barreiros, wounded.
Lieut. Lopez, wounded dangerously.
Killed. Wounded.
N.-C. officers and men, Royal Artillery 0 4
” ” Portuguese Artillery 6 28
__ __
Total 6 32
__ __
The total loss of the Allies amounted to 118 killed, and 367
wounded and taken prisoners.
In his despatch to Lord Liverpool, announcing the raising of the siege,
in addition to expressing his great satisfaction with the Corps, Lord
Wellington said that the British service had derived great advantage in
the different operations against Badajoz from Major Dickson’s zeal,
activity, and intelligence.
The subsequent sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz, which took place
in 1812, were in marked contrast to those described in this chapter; and
the rapidity with which the breaches were then made was mainly due to
the employment of iron ordnance from England, instead of the miserable
brass Portuguese guns which were employed in the sieges of [Sidenote: To
Lord Liverpool, 13 June, 1811.] 1811.[27] Of these guns, Lord Wellington
truly said that they were very ancient and incomplete, and that their
fire was very uncertain. It had at first been intended to fire at the
rate of 120 rounds a gun _per diem_: but that was soon found to be
impossible with the wretched brass pieces at the disposal of Major
Dickson. It was therefore reduced to 80 rounds; but even with this
limited expenditure the guns were repeatedly disabled by the effect of
their own fire.
The Peninsular sieges cannot be thoroughly understood without two points
being borne in mind. First, the besieged cities belonged to, and were
inhabited by, the allies of England, and the war was only with the
garrison. The Artillery fire, therefore, was confined to breaching, and
dismounting the ordnance in battery,--not used for bombardment.
Secondly, the sieges were mere episodes in Wellington’s general
operations, not goals to which these operations tended. Hence, in 1811,
the raising of sieges, without hesitation, after but a brief
continuance; and hence, also, in 1812, the rapidity and loss of life
with which he stormed cities, rather than complicate his plans by
indulging in siege operations of a longer and, perhaps, more regular
description.