BUSACO AND TORRES VEDRAS.
It may not be uninteresting to the reader, before resuming the
consideration of the Peninsular War, to study some statistics connected
with the Regiment in the year 1810, the period to be treated of in this
chapter. The number of troops and companies remained as before,
112--exclusive of the invalid battalion. They were distributed as
follows:--16 [Sidenote: Kane’s List.] in the Peninsula, 5 in Italy and
Sicily, 56 on home stations, 4 in Canada, 3 at the Cape of Good Hope, 3
in Ceylon, where they had been engaged on active service during the
previous year, 6 in Gibraltar, 4 in Jamaica and 6 in the rest of the
West Indies (these ten companies being actively engaged in the defence
of the colonies), 1 in Madeira, 4 in Malta, 1 in Newfoundland, and 3 in
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton.
The following tables show the strength of the battalions, and the
proportions of the various ranks. They also show the pay of the various
ranks, _less_ the charges for agency, which are not deducted in the pay
tables published in Kane’s List. But, in addition to the strength of the
Royal Artillery, the reader will find detailed statements of the other
corps which swelled the total Artillery force of Great Britain. It is
hoped that, by publishing these tables in this form, reference will be
easier, and lengthy description may be dispensed with. It cannot be too
often repeated that the services in the Peninsula of the King’s German
Artillery, the detail of which is given in the annexed tables, were of
the most gallant description, unsurpassed by those of the corps to which
they were attached. The active service of the corps, named the Royal
Foreign Artillery, was chiefly in the West Indies.
[Sidenote: From MS. Returns in Library of the Royal United Service
Institution.]
STATEMENT OF THE ARTILLERY FORCES of GREAT BRITAIN IN THE YEAR
1810--ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT LAID DOWN IN THE KING’S
WARRANT--WITH THE VARIOUS RATES OF PAY, LESS AGENCY CHARGES.
1.--ROYAL ARTILLERY.
_a._ STAFF.
Rank. Pay per diem.
£. _s._ _d._
1 Master-General } No pay on the
1 Lieutenant-General } establishment.
10 Colonels-Commandant each 2 14 4
20 Colonels ” 1 6 0
30 Lieutenant-Colonels ” 0 17 11
10 Majors ” 0 16 9
1 Deputy-Adjutant-General 1 0 0
10 Adjutants each 0 8 6
10 Quartermasters ” 0 7 10
1 Chaplain 0 9 11
10 Sergeant-Majors each 0 3 7¼
10 Quartermaster-Sergeants ” 0 3 7¼
_b._ COMPANY OF GENTLEMEN CADETS.
1 Captain 1 4 7¾
1 Second Captain 0 13 0
2 First Lieutenants each 0 6 10
1 Second Lieutenant 0 6 10
200 Gentlemen Cadets each 0 2 0
1 Drum-Major 0 2 4
1 Fife-Major 0 2 4
_c._ TEN BATTALIONS, CONSISTING EACH OF
10 Captains each 0 11 0
10 Second Captains ” 0 11 0
20 First Lieutenants ” 0 6 10
10 Second Lieutenants ” 0 5 7
40 Sergeants ” 0 2 5¼
40 Corporals ” 0 2 3¾
90 Bombardiers ” 0 2 1¾
1240 Gunners ” 0 1 5¾
30 Drummers ” 0 1 5¾
----
1490 being the total for each battalion, and
therefore 14,900 for the ten.
_d._ INVALIDS.
1 Colonel-Commandant 2 14 4
2 Second Colonels each 1 0 0
2 Lieutenant-Colonels ” 0 19 9
3 Second Lieutenant-Colonels ” 0 17 11
1 Major 0 16 9
1 Adjutant 0 9 0
1 Quartermaster 0 7 10
2 Staff Sergeants each 0 3 7¼
12 Captains ” 0 11 0
12 First Lieutenants ” 0 7 10
12 Second Lieutenants ” 0 5 7
48 Sergeants ” 0 2 5¼
48 Corporals ” 0 2 3¾
108 Bombardiers ” 0 2 1¾
100 First Gunners ” 0 1 9¾
620 Second Gunners ” 0 1 5¾
12 Drummers ” 0 1 5¾
48 Non-effectives ” 0 1 5¾
_e._ ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.
1 Colonel-Commandant 2 19 3
2 Colonels each 1 12 0
3 Lieutenant-Colonels ” 1 6 9
1 Major 1 2 8
1 Adjutant 0 16 6
1 Quartermaster 0 10 9
1 Regimental Staff Sergeant 0 3 9¼
1 Regimental Sergeant (for Staff) 0 2 7¼
2 Farriers and Carriage Smiths each 0 3 5¼
1 Collar-maker 0 3 5¼
1 Trumpet-Major 0 2 3¾
12 Captains each 0 15 11
12 Second Captains ” 0 15 11
36 First Lieutenants ” 0 9 10
24 Troop Staff Sergeants ” 0 3 9¼
36 Sergeants ” 0 2 7¼
36 Corporals ” 0 2 3¾
72 Bombardiers ” 0 2 1¾
480 Gunners mounted ” 0 1 5¾
628 Gunners dismounted ” 0 1 5¾
720 Drivers ” 0 1 5¾
12 Farriers and Shoeing Smiths ” 0 3 5¼
12 Carriage Smiths ” 0 3 5¼
24 Shoeing Smiths each 0 2 3¾
24 Collar-makers ” 0 2 1¼
12 Wheelwrights ” 0 2 1¼
12 Trumpeters ” 0 2 1¾
_f._ RIDING-HOUSE TROOP.
1 Captain 0 15 0
1 Lieutenant, at 0 15 0
1 ” at 0 13 0
1 ” at 0 11 0
1 Quartermaster 0 7 10
2 Staff Sergeants each 0 3 2
3 Sergeants ” 0 2 2
3 First Corporals ” 0 2 0
3 Second Corporals ” 0 1 10¼
1 Trumpeter 0 1 11¼
1 Farrier 0 3 2¾
1 Collar-maker 0 1 10¾
44 Riders each 0 1 3¼
II.-FIELD TRAIN.
1 Chief Commissary.
5 Commissaries.
24 Assistant Commissaries.
113 Clerks of Stores.
115 Conductors.
13 Military Conductors.
1 Foreman.
7 Smiths.
6 Collar-makers.
7 Wheelers.
2 Carpenters.
1 Painter.
III.-ROYAL ARTILLERY DRIVERS.
1 Major 1 1 0
2 Adjutants each 0 10 0
8 Veterinary Surgeons ” 0 8 0
11 Captain-Commissaries ” 0 15 0
55 First Lieutenants ” 0 9 0
11 Second Lieutenants ” 0 8 0
55 Staff Sergeants ” 0 3 2
165 Sergeants ” 0 2 2
165 First Corporals ” 0 2 0¼
165 Second Corporals ” 0 1 10¼
22 Rough-riders each 0 1 3¼
55 Farriers ” 0 3 2¾
165 Shoeing Smiths ” 0 2 1¼
110 Collar-makers ” 0 1 10¾
110 Wheelers ” 0 1 10¾
55 Trumpeters ” 0 1 11¼
4950 Drivers ” 0 1 3¼
IV.--ROYAL FOREIGN ARTILLERY.
1 Major.
4 Captains.
4 Second Captains.
12 Lieutenants.
6 Sergeants.
4 Corporals.
17 Bombardiers.
124 Gunners.
8 Drummers.
V.--ARTILLERY OF THE KING’S GERMAN LEGION.
Officers.
1 Colonel Commandant.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
2 Majors.
8 Captains.
8 Second Captains.
16 First Lieutenants.
16 Second Lieutenants.
1 Captain Commissary.
1 Paymaster.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.
1 Surgeon.
3 Assistant Surgeons.
1 Veterinary Surgeon.
Sergeants and Horse Artillery. Foot Artillery.
Rank and File.
Staff Sergeants 4 3
Sergeants 6 14
Corporals 8 18
Bombardiers 14 23
Trumpeters 8
Farriers 2
Smiths 6
Collar-makers 4
Wheelers 2
Gunners 186 372
Drivers 116 Drummers 9
DRIVER CORPS.
Sergeants and Rank and File.
4 Sergeants.
8 Corporals.
4 Farriers.
9 Smiths.
8 Collar-makers.
5 Wheelers.
189 Drivers.
[Sidenote: MS. ‘Wear and Tear’ Returns for 1809, to B. of Ordnance.]
The recruiting for the Regiment during the year 1809 had been
successful, no fewer than 1820 gunners and 868 drivers having been
enlisted. The establishment just given was nearly maintained, and even
occasionally exceeded, during 1810; and the usual decrease, caused by
the discharge of men by purchase, did not occur during that year, all
such discharges being forbidden. A falling off in the strength of the
Regiment became apparent, however, in the winter of 1810.
The “wear and tear” among the horses of the Royal Horse Artillery and
the Royal Artillery Driver Corps had been excessive during the year
1809, owing to the Peninsular Campaigns and the Scheldt Expedition. No
fewer than 2786 had either died or been destroyed; and 3367 had to be
purchased to compensate for these losses, and to meet the
ever-increasing demand. Very large numbers were sent to Portugal during
the year 1810; and, owing to the consequent [Sidenote: D.-A.-Gen. to
Gen. Howorth, 28 Oct. 1816.] increase in the numbers of the Driver Corps
attached to Lord Wellington’s armies, it was decided to appoint a field
officer to command them. This duty, with cavalry pay, was given to
Colonel Robe.
The numerical force of Artillery, serving under General Howorth in the
Peninsula, in the end of 1809, was as follows.
[Sidenote: MS. Returns, compiled from the Monthly Returns, dated
Woolwich, 17 Dec. 1809.]
{ 187 of all ranks, besides a contingent
Royal Horse Artillery { of drivers attached to the Troops,
{ numbering 106.
Foot Artillery 627 of all ranks, with 545 drivers.
King’s German Artillery 322 of all ranks, with 160 drivers.
The total being 1957, of whom 821 belonged to the Driver Corps. Of
this number 357 were returned as sick; and there were in addition
39 prisoners of war.
The number of horses attached to the Artillery in the Peninsula
was 951, of which 256 were returned as sick; and there were 132
mules, chiefly attached to the brigades of field and King’s German
Artillery.
[Sidenote: MS. Returns, Dated Woolwich, 11 Sept. 1810.]
The following tables will show that before a year had elapsed a very
considerable increase to this force had taken place; and are also
useful, as showing the companies which were present, and the names of
the senior officers. (_See opposite page._)
It is difficult, without a study of the correspondence of this period,
to realise the energy with which General Macleod endeavoured to meet the
wants of the Regiment abroad. Unfortunately, there was not similar
energy in the other public departments. Large reinforcements, both of
men and horses, were ready early in the summer of 1810; but no ships
could be found for their conveyance until the end of December. From the
nature of these drafts, and from various remarks in General Macleod’s
letters, it was clear that the remonstrances made by the various
officers concerned on the subject of the want of mobility of the field
brigades had produced their effect, and the rapid increase in the force
of Horse Artillery in the Peninsula which took place between 1810 and
1814 was the consequence. Anticipating that Lord Wellington would prefer
a complete troop of Horse Artillery to more of the sluggish field
brigades, General Macleod suggested that the remnant of Captain
Lefebure’s troop, which was under orders for England, should remain in
Portugal; and he despatched men and horses to complete it in that
country. At the same time he did everything in his power to improve the
field brigades in the point of mobility, by sending out large numbers of
horses. No fewer than 500 were embarked in the first week of January
1811.
_Artillery Force in the Peninsula._
Index.
A. Colonels.
B. Field Officers.
C. Captains.
D. Subalterns.
E. Surgeons and Asst.-Surgs.
F. N.C. Officers.
G. Gunners.
H. Drivers.
I. Artificers.
J. Drummers & Trumpeters.
K. Total.
L. Horses.
M. Mules.
+---------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
| |Data of Last |Colonels, Field Officers, |Battalions| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Stations.|Returns. |and Captains of Companies. |and Corps.| A.| B.| C.| D.| E.| F.| G.| H.| I.| J.| K.| L. | M. |
+---------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
|Portugal.|1st July, 1810.|Brig.-Gen. Howorth | H.B. | 1| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | |Lieut.-Col. Framingham | 1 | | 1| | | 5| | | | | | 9| | |
| | |Lieut.-Col. Robe | 3 | | 1| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | |Lieut.-Col. Fisher | 10 | | 1| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | |Major Hartmann | K.G.A. | | 1| | | 2| | | | | | 3| | |
| | |Captain Bull | H.B. | | | 2| 3| 1| 12| 81| 73| 7| 1| 180| 157| |
| | |Captain Lefebure | H.B. | | | 2| 3| 1| 13| 45| 10| 5| 1| 80| 70| |
| | |Captain Ross | H.B. | | | 2| 3| 1| 13| 81| 75| 8| 1| 184| 156| |
| | |Captain May | 1 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 107| | | 1| 127| | |
| | |Captain Glubb | 5 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 109| | | 2| 130| | |
| | |Captain Thompson | 7 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 105| | | 1| 125| | |
| | |Captain Bredin | 8 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 99| | | 1| 118| | |
| | |Captain Lawson | 8 | | | 2| 4| | 13| 117| | | 2| 137| | |
| | |Detachmt. of British Art. | | | | 2| 4| | 6| 26| | | 1| 39| | |
| | |Captain Heise | K.G.A. | | | 1| 4| | 14| 80| 53| 6| 1| 159| 60 | 57|
| | |Captain Gesenius | K.G.A. | | | 2| 4| | 13| 80| 30| 5| 2| 136| 7 | |
| | |Captain Arentschild | K.G.A. | | | 2| 4| | 13| 80| 37| 6| 2| 144| 107| 7|
| | |Captain Purner | R.A.D. | | | 1| 3| 1| 31| | 221| 25| 4| 286| 218| 50|
| | |Captain Lane | R.A.D. | | | 1| 4| | 35| | 318| 33| 4| 395| 330| 72|
| | | +----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
| | | Total in Portugal | | 1| 4| 25| 47| 11| 218| 1010| 817| 95| 24| 2252| 1105| 186|
+---------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
|Cadiz. |1st July, 1810.|Major Duncan | 6 | | 1| | | 3| | | | | | 4| | |
| | |Captain Campbell | 2 | | | 1| 3| | 7| 53| | | | 64| | |
| | |Captain Owen | 5 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 98| | | 2| 119| | |
| | |Captain Hughes | 9 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 100| | | 1| 119| | |
| | |Captain Dickson | 10 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 98| | | 2| 118| | |
| | |Captain Shenley | 10 | | | 2| 3| | 12| 99| | | 1| 117| | |
| | |Captain Roberts | 10 | | | 2| 3| | 12| 97| | | 1| 116| | |
| | |Lieutenant Wilkinson | R.A.D. | | | | 2| | 12| | 134| 10| 1| 159| 218| |
| | | +----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
| | | Total in Cadiz | | | 1| 11| 20| 3| 84| 545| 134| 10| 8| 816| 218| |
+---------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+----+-----+----+---+---+-----+-----+----+
[Sidenote: MS. Returns, Dated Woolwich, 19 Nov. 1810.]
The numerical division of the Regiment for home and foreign service in
the year 1810 was as follows:--
At Home. Abroad.
All ranks. All ranks.
Horse Brigade (including drivers) 1499 433
Marching Battalions 8235 5940
Invalid Battalions 822 39[23]
[Sidenote: MS. Returns, Dated Woolwich, 11 Sept. 1870.]
The force in the Mediterranean garrisons, which was considered available
in event of sudden demands from the Peninsula, appears in the following
tables (_see pp._ 271 _and_ 272), which also show the names of the
senior officers. With these the statistics for the year to be treated in
this chapter will terminate, and the consideration of the campaign be
resumed.
The campaign of 1810 in the Peninsula was, in one sense, the least
active of any during the war. Napoleon certainly made a great effort to
completely subdue the country, and to expel the English armies. For this
purpose, Marshal Massena was placed in command of the French troops; but
the duty proved to be beyond his powers. It is doubtful if in any period
of the Duke of Wellington’s military career he displayed more ability,
more patience, more foresight, than he showed during the first nine
months of the year 1810. Not merely had he to contend with local
influences, but he failed to secure the requisite support from the
English Government. There was at home a fear of losing power, which led
English statesmen to commit unworthy actions, and to display a
nervousness in administration, which demoralized such of their agents as
were not above the ordinary standard. The wisdom of publishing the
private letters of a great man is certainly questionable; but once
published, they become the historian’s legitimate property. From the
letters of the Duke of Wellington we have a [Sidenote: Gurwood’s
Despatches of the Duke of Wellington.] graphic picture of the Government
in 1810. “What,” he wrote to Admiral Berkeley, “can be expected from men
who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great
deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more
public sentiment--and if there was any Government.” Again, in pleading
his inability to carry out certain operations, he urged, in a letter to
the Right Hon. H. Wellesley, that he would have been able to do so, “if
the Government possessed any strength, or [Sidenote: Gurwood’s
Despatches of the Duke of Wellington.] desire to have anything done but
what is _safe_ and _cheap_.” The same hands that applauded the conqueror
at Talavera strove, in timorous anxiety, to drag him back from any
further operations. The terror of the French armies, which had obtained
possession of the Portuguese Government and people, seems to have
reached London. The Government despatches to Lord Wellington breathed
nothing but advice to guide him _when he should be expelled from
Portugal_. While _he_ was ensuring in a masterly manner the safety of
Lisbon, _they_ were urging on him the claims of Cadiz. Their letters and
the tone of the public press swelled the despondency, the presence of
which in Portugal Lord Wellington lamented; and his protests, assuring
the Government that he had left nothing undone,--whether the event
should be defeat or victory,--were treated as idle words, or as the
heated expression of a mere soldier’s hopes. Had Wellington been a
weaker man, the lines of Torres Vedras had been got ready in vain, the
battle of Busaco had never been fought, and the unpaid arrears of the
French troops would have been liquidated by the plundering of Lisbon and
Oporto.
_Artillery in Mediterranean Garrisons._
Index.
A. Colonels.
B. Field Officers.
C. Captains.
D. Subalterns.
E. Surgeons and Asst.-Surgs.
F. N.C. Officers.
G. Gunners.
H. Drivers.
I. Artificers.
J. Drummers & Trumpeters.
K. Total.
L. Horses.
M. Mules.
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+----------------------------+
| |Data of Last |Colonels, Field Officers, |Battalions| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Stations. |Returns. |and Captains of Companies. |and Corps.| A.| B.| C.| D.| E.| F.| G.| H.| I.| J.| K.| L.| M.| Remarks. |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+----------------------------+
|Gibraltar.|1st July, 1810.|Major-General Smith | 3 | 1| | | | | | | | | | | | |N.B. At Ceuta, |
| | |Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay | 2 | | 1| | | 2| | | | | | 5| | |1 captain, 1 subaltern, |
| | |Lieut.-Colonel Wright | 5 | | 1| | | | | | | | | | | |3 N.-C. officers, |
| | |Captain Godby | 1 | | | 1| 3| | 14| 87| | | 2| 107| | |and 11 gunners. |
| | |Captain Dodd | 2 | | | 1| 2| | 17| 117| | | 4| 141| | | |
| | |Captain Smyth | 4 | | | 2| 2| | 11| 81| | | 2| 100| | |At Tarifa, 1 subaltern, |
| | |Captain Morrison | 8 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 86| | | 2| 105| | |6 N.-C. officers, and |
| | |Captain Birch | 10 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 102| | | 2| 120| | |61 gunners included in |
| | |Captain Fead | 10 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 101| | | 1| 120| | |the general total. |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+-------+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+ |
| | | Total in Gibraltar. | | 1| 2| 8| 15| 2| 81| 576| | | 13| 698| | | |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+-------+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+ |
|Malta. |1st June, 1810.|Colonel Bentham | 7 | 1| 1| | | 1| | | | | | 8| | |A detachment of 1 subaltern,|
| | |Lieut.-Colonel Harris | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |2 N.-C. officers, and |
| | |Captain Vivion | 2 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 93| | | 2| 113| | |25 gunners belonging to |
| | |Captain Reynell | 5 | | | 2| 3| | 13| 88| | | 2| 108| | |these companies serving |
| | |Captain Carey | 8 | | | 2| 2| | 10| 71| | | 1| 86| | |in Sicily, and not included |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+in the general total. |
| | | Total in Malta | | 1| 1| 6| 8| 1| 36| 252| | | 5| 310| | | |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+ |
|Sicily. |1st May, 1810. |Lieut.-Colonel Lemoine | 5 | | 1| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | |Lieut-Colonel Dickinson | 10 | | 1| | | 4| | | | | | 6| | |At Zante, |
| | |Captain Gamble | 6 | | | 1| 2| | 13| 99| | | 1| 116| | |2 captains, |
| | |Captain Williamson | 8 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 98| | | 2| 119| | |2 surgeons, |
| | |Captain Fraser | 8 | | | 2| 3| | 14| 98| | | 2| 119| | |13 N.-C. officers |
| | |Captain Pym | 8 | | | 2| 2| | 13| 99| | | 1| 117| | |and 80 gunners |
| | |Captain Hickman | 8 | | | 2| 2| | 14| 99| | | 1| 118| | |included in the |
| | |Detachment of Artillery } | | | | 2| 1| | 2| 25| | | | 28| | |general total. |
| | | from Malta } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | |Captain Bussman | K.G.A. | | | 2| 2| 1| 16| 105| 39| 6| 2| 175| | | |
| | |Lieut. G. Smith | R.A.D. | | | | | | 5| | 32| 2| | 40| 109| 45| |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+ |
| | | Total in Sicily. | | | 2| 11| 18| 5| 91| 623| 71| 8| 9| 838| 109| 45| |
+----------+---------------+---------------------------+----------+---+---+---+---+---+---+----+---+---+---+----+----+---+----------------------------+
But his difficulties were not confined to the chilling advice of the
Government. At a time when he required the best men in the army to aid
him, the exercise of home patronage inflicted on him the most incapable
assistants. Not merely did he suffer from useless subordinate staff
officers, but even his general officers were not always what he wished.
[Sidenote: Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 582.] “Really,” he
wrote to Colonel Torrens, “when I reflect upon the characters and
attainments of some of the general officers of this army, and consider
that these are the persons on whom I am to rely to lead columns against
the French Generals, and who are to carry my instructions into
execution, I tremble; and, as Lord Chesterfield said of the Generals of
his day, ‘I only hope that when the enemy reads the list of their names,
he trembles as I do.’” And at the very time that these men were being
sent out to him, he was debarred from offering reward, in the shape of
promotion, to any one under his command whose gallantry might seem to
him to have earned it. No subject is more frequently alluded to in his
letters than this. The Government would gladly make political capital
out of his successes,--would greedily gather votes by making
appointments to his army, but declined to strengthen him by trusting his
military knowledge, or increasing his legitimate authority.
But the aggravation to which he had to submit in 1810 did not cease
here. While the French were advancing into Portugal, and the English
Government as little realised the strength of the lines which Wellington
had prepared for his troops as Massena himself, the cry was always to
embark,--to quit Lisbon,--to devote his energies to Cadiz; yet when
strategical reasons and absolute necessity compelled him to leave Ciudad
Rodrigo to its fate, the same voices, in querulous terror, remonstrated
with him on his inaction. When he gained the victory of Busaco, the
first idea with the Government was, not recognition of his merits, but
political capital. And when, after a fruitless and self-destructive
residence before the lines of Torres Vedras, Massena was obliged to
retire from Portugal, who so loud in their cries for pursuit as the very
men who had scoffed at the bare possibility of offering resistance to
the French invaders?
The year 1810 was, however, not merely a year which tested the
marvellous ability and patience of Wellington;--it was also the year
which placed on the Portuguese troops the seal of ability to face their
dreaded French enemies. At Busaco, the courage of the Portuguese, under
English discipline, was nobly manifested,--and the value of this
discovery [Sidenote: Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 606.] was
beyond expression at that most critical time. As Lord Wellington said,
the battle had the best effect in inspiring confidence in the Portuguese
troops; it removed an impression, which had been general, that the
English intended to fight no more, but to retire to their ships; and it
gave the Portuguese a taste for an amusement to which they were not
before accustomed, and which they would not have acquired in a position
less strong than that of Busaco. Had the battle been productive of no
other gain than this, it ought to have found favour with a Government,
whose members desired that their successes might be “_cheap_.”
When the campaign commenced, the head-quarters of the English army were
at Celorico; and Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were organized for defence.
The latter city, which was defended by Spaniards, capitulated on the
10th July, after a month’s siege; and Almeida, a small place with a
Portuguese garrison, followed suit on the 28th August. During the siege
of the latter place, the combat of the Coa, as it was termed, took
place; and, as the Chestnut Troop took part in it, it deserves some
notice. Crawford, who commanded the Light Division, and had the outpost
duties to perform, had retired before the French, after the fall of
Ciudad Rodrigo, under the walls of Almeida. The position which he took
up was very dangerous. The river Coa, crossed by a single bridge, was in
his rear, and an open country in front. He had been ordered to cross
this river on the approach of the French, but had foolishly
remained--with a small force of 5000 men and one battery of Artillery,
the Chestnut Troop--awaiting the arrival of Ney’s force, of more than
three times the number. Regardless of the fire from the guns of Almeida,
Ney availed himself of Crawford’s blunder, and attacked him with
vehemence. The crossing of the bridge, now absolutely necessary, was
most difficult, and could not have been effected but for the gallantry
of the regiments, and the precision of the fire of the Chestnut Troop,
which had been sent across the bridge early in the affair to occupy some
rising ground, and to cover the retreat of the other troops. The bridge
was crowded by the retiring columns of the English, so as to be almost
impassable; and when, ultimately, the whole had succeeded in crossing,
the pursuing columns of the French blocked the passage in a similar
manner, and, under a heavy fire, were reduced into heaps of killed and
wounded, level with the parapet of the bridge. A [Sidenote: Cust.]
tremendous storm of rain, which set in, flooded the pans of the French
muskets, and put an end to the engagement, which, in point of losses,
had been on both sides very severe. Of the Artillery on this occasion,
Napier wrote that it played on both sides across the river and ravine,
the sounds repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, slowly rising,
resolving itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm and
sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. Cust, in his
‘Annals of the Wars,’ describes the Chestnut Troop, from the high
ground, sending well-directed shot over the heads of the skirmishers.
The gallant officer who [Sidenote: ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ pp. 11,
12.] commanded the troop wrote as follows: “General Crawford ordered a
retreat. Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Artillery, brought me the order to
retire, as rapidly as in my power, across the bridge, and to get my guns
into position on the opposite heights. At this time we had five guns in
action.... Our fire was excellent, and broke them two or three times.”
Captain Ross’s brother, an officer of Engineers, who was serving with
the army, writes of this combat of the 24th July: “Hew’s guns did their
duty.” The loss on the English side during this engagement was over
three hundred killed and wounded; that of the French was over a
thousand.
But a battle on a larger scale has now to be mentioned. Lord Wellington
retreated towards Coimbra, followed by Marshal Massena on the north hank
of the Mondego. The English General resolved to make a stand on the
Sierra de Busaco, a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a
northerly direction about eight miles. In the battle which followed,
Lord Wellington displayed an ignorance of Artillery tactics, from the
results of which he was happily saved by the intelligence and gallantry
of the representatives of that arm. This want of knowledge, which he
never overcame, was the cause of a not unfrequent irritation against
Artillery [Sidenote: Capt. T. B, Strange, R.A., on Practical Artillery.]
as an arm, and a tendency to depreciate its value. At Busaco, instead of
massing his Artillery in reserve until the attack should develop itself,
the guns were placed, as a rule, in the easiest parts of the position,
where it was supposed the French _would_ attack; and they were massed
in these positions so as to form an excellent mark for the enemy’s fire.
This was more especially the case with Major Arentschild’s 6-pounder and
9-pounder brigades of Portuguese Artillery. Fortunately, the Artillery
was well served, and, [Sidenote: ‘Life of Sir J. Burgoyne,’ vol. 1.] as
Sir John Burgoyne wrote, “the guns had great effect.” Captain Thompson’s
company of the 7th Battalion--now D Battery, 11th Brigade, Royal
Artillery, was of essential service, although it was broken up into
divisions during the [Sidenote: MS. Letter among Cleaveland’s MSS.]
battle. Captain Lane, who was 2nd Captain of the company, thus describes
the conduct of one division: “My men did their duty. Lieutenant F.
Bayley’s conduct was admirable. It was the first time he had been in
action, and no old soldier could have acted better. The French
Voltigeurs (37th Regiment) came close to the guns; and one was killed
only eight paces off. An immense column showing themselves in the
ravine, we, with three cheers, gave them a few rounds of case and
round-shot together, at about seventy paces distance, which drove them
back.” The same officer, who was quoted above as alluding to the
services of his brother’s troop at the Coa, wrote of Busaco: [Sidenote:
‘Memoirs of Sir H. D. Ross.’] “I will venture to assert that the
greatest loss the enemy sustained was by our Artillery; and the guns
that had the most duty, and, I believe I might say, that were best
placed for effect--even if nothing is said of the admirable manner in
which the guns were fought--were those of Hew’s troop.... Several
officers who remained on the field the day after the retreat, among
others General Crawford himself, were convinced, more than those who
only looked on it from the heights, of the immense slaughter the enemy
sustained from the Shrapnel shells thrown from my brother’s guns, aided
for a short time by those of Captain Bull’s troop.” This opinion, which,
coming from a brother, might perhaps be considered more indulgent than
just, was confirmed by the great historian of the war. In the resistance
offered to the attack of Loison’s division, Napier says that Ross’s guns
were worked with incredible quickness, and their shot swept through the
advancing columns. The attack having failed, Crawford’s Artillery, with
which was the gallant Chestnut Troop, was equally useful against the
attack of Marchaud’s division, which followed. “It heavily smote,”
writes Napier, “the flank of Marchaud’s people in the pine-wood; and
Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous cannonade
for an hour, relinquished that attack also.” [Sidenote: Lord Wellington
to Lord Liverpool, dated Coimbra, 30 Sept. 1810.] Well might Lord
Wellington say, “I am particularly indebted to ... Brigadier-General
Howorth and the Artillery.”
The force under Lord Wellington’s command on this occasion did not
exceed 50,000, and extended over a distance of eight to ten miles. The
French are estimated by Napier to have been 65,000 in number; but
Wellington considered that [Sidenote: Ibid. dated Pero Negro, 3 Nov.
1810.] they exceeded that number by 5000 men. The French loss amounted
to 4500 killed and wounded, while that of the Allies was under 1300, the
English having lost 631, and the Portuguese 622. The absence of
Artillery on the side of the French, who overrated the difficulties of
the ground, and the great activity shown in the use and service of the
guns of the Allies, accounted for the great difference in the number of
casualties. Much of the efficacy of the fire of the Royal Artillery was
due to the use of Shrapnel’s spherical case-shot,--a projectile which
was daily increasing in favour,--with no one more than with Lord
Wellington himself. [Sidenote: Dated Sabugal, 23 Feb 1812.] “At the
battle of Busaco,” wrote Major May to Colonel Shrapnel, “your shells
were of the utmost use, and their destruction plainly perceived from the
heights.”
Marshal Massena, finding it impossible to cross the Sierra de Busaco by
either of the two direct roads, while such an enemy lined the heights,
but being resolved to press on to Coimbra, turned the position by its
left flank,--Wellington continuing the retreat which he had varied by so
noble an episode. Massena reached Coimbra just as the English rear-guard
quitted it; and his troops were there guilty of the grossest licence.
The English army continued slowly to retire to the lines which its
prudent commander had prepared for it; and when Massena came up he found
it in a position which was almost impregnable, while his own
communications were interrupted, and his flanks and rear annoyed by
levies of Portuguese Militia. The lines of Torres Vedras were an emblem
of military sagacity and of engineering skill. Seated behind them the
Allied Army received a training which proved fruitful in the campaign of
the following year; the Portuguese contingent was made more efficient;
and the folly of the Portuguese Government received repeated rebukes
from the mouth of a General whose prudence and determination were never
more clearly shown than in the history of Torres Vedras and Busaco.
Croakers, as he wrote, might include the latter among useless battles;
but an encounter, which made each Portuguese soldier feel himself a
match for a Frenchman, was the best assistance which fortune could throw
in Lord Wellington’s way. Having realised the value of this beforehand,
his next task was to ensure it _independently_ of fortune.