THE CHRISTENING OF THE CHESTNUT TROOP.
The course of our narrative brings us again to the Continent of Europe.
In the year 1798, an expedition was ordered from England, with a view to
the destruction of the basin, gates, and sluices of the Bruges Canal,
and the consequent injury to the internal navigation between Holland,
Flanders, and France. The prevention of a meditated invasion of England
by the French would, it was hoped, by this means also be ensured. The
naval part of the expedition was under the control of Captain Home
Popham, while the military force was commanded by General Sir Eyre
Coote. Eight companies of the Guards, the 11th Regiment, and the flank
companies of the 23rd and 49th Regiments, [Sidenote: D.A. Gen.’s
Correspondence.] constituted the Infantry employed; and the Artillery
consisted of two companies attached to a battery of four 6-pounders and
three light howitzers. The Artillery officers were Captain W. H. Walker
(in command), Captain--afterwards Sir Wiltshire--Wilson, Captain C.
Godfrey, Lieutenants Simpson, Hughes, Ilbert, and Holcroft. The guns
were carried in different vessels, and landed near Ostend. On the 19th
May, at daybreak, the troops disembarked, and commenced destroying the
works. In a few hours they undid the labour of five years, besides
burning a number of transports, which had been collected for the
conveyance of French regiments to England; but this was not effected
without considerable loss. When, however, the English force attempted to
re-embark, it was found to be impossible, owing to the high wind which
prevailed and the heavy sea. It was therefore found necessary, after
going through the empty form of summoning the citadel, to encamp for the
night on the sands. The English were attacked at daybreak by the enemy
in overwhelming numbers; and after a severe action, in which Sir Eyre
Coote was wounded, the whole force was compelled to surrender. The
conduct of the Artillery was worthy of their comrades in the battle; and
their commander, Captain Walker, received wounds from which he died. Of
the rest the following official mention was made:--“Captains [Sidenote:
‘London Gazette,’ 21 July, 1798.] Wilson and Godfrey, and Lieutenants
Simpson, Hughes, and Holcroft, all of the same distinguished Corps,
after having done everything men could do, spiked their guns and threw
them over the banks at the moment the enemy was possessing himself of
them. The latter gentleman, Lieutenant Holcroft, when all his men were
wounded except one, remained at his gun, doing duty with it to the
[Sidenote: D. A. Gen., R.A., to Lieut.-Gen. of the Ordnance, 14 Nov.
1798.] best of his ability.” From subsequent official correspondence we
learn that the following officers were permitted, with their
soldier-servants, to return to England on parole, viz., Captain Wilson,
Lieutenants Simpson, Hughes, and Holcroft, Captain Godfrey remaining at
Lille with the men. From a plaintive letter to the
Deputy-Adjutant-General, written by the last-named officer, it would
appear that the prisoners were in a very sorry plight; for he implored
an advance of pay for all, as they “wanted almost everything sorely.”
Next year an expedition on a larger scale took place, although not much
more fortunate. It has an especial interest to the Artilleryman, as
being the first expedition in which a general officer of Artillery was
considered necessary with the force, on account of the large proportion
present belonging to that arm. General Pattison, who had held a command
in America, did so as an _Army_ not as an _Artillery_ General; and
General Phillips, who also commanded in that war, was merely a
regimental field officer, with army rank as General. The expedition to
the Helder, in 1799, had a contingent of Artillery, consisting of one
troop of Horse Artillery, and eight companies of Marching Artillery, as
they were termed. The troop was A, or the Chestnut Troop, commanded by
Major Judgson; and although part of it had taken a share in the
suppression of the Irish rebellion, this was the first occasion on which
any portion of the Royal Horse Artillery proceeded on _foreign_ active
service; and, as will appear, the troop had rather a rough [Sidenote:
Vol. i. p. 378.] _baptême de feu_. General Farrington was selected for
the command of Artillery, receiving the following letter from the
[Sidenote: D. A. Gen.’s Correspondence.] Deputy Adjutant-General, on the
8th August, 1799:--“In conversation yesterday with Lord Howe, he
observed that if the expedition now embarked was to be followed by the
troops and Artillery ordered to be in preparation, he should consider it
necessary for them to be accompanied by not only an Artillery officer of
experience and abilities, but by one high in rank in the Corps; and
under that idea I was desired to address myself to you, to know if your
health would admit of his proposing you to the Commander-in-Chief for
the command of the whole....” The offer was eagerly accepted by the
General, and his appointment was confirmed. He selected
Captain--afterwards Sir William--Robe as his Brigade-Major, and Captain
Maclean as his Aide-de-Camp.
The expedition was in two divisions: the first, under Sir Ralph
Abercromby, going from Southampton, while the second, and main division,
was being assembled in Kent. When united, the command-in-chief was to be
assumed by the Duke of York. Sir R. Abercromby applied for
Lieut.-Colonel--afterwards Sir Francis--Whitworth to command the
Artillery of his division, and his request was complied [Sidenote: MS.
Returns to the Board of Ordnance.] with. The following was the strength
of General Abercromby’s Artillery, viz.: 1 field officer, 6 captains, 13
subalterns, 2 surgeons, 40 non-commissioned officers, 371 gunners, and 6
drummers. There were also present with him, belonging to the Driver
Corps, 1 subaltern, 3 quartermaster commissaries, 15 non-commissioned
officers, 152 drivers, 5 artificers, and 200 horses.
The main Artillery force, under General Farrington, which followed that
just given, was of considerable strength, including, [Sidenote: D. A.
Gen. R.A. Correspondence.] besides Major Judgson’s Troop,
Lieut.-Colonels Smith and Trotter, 9 captains, 14 subalterns, 1 surgeon,
43 non-commissioned officers, 412 gunners, and 8 drummers, besides a
detachment of the Driver Corps, consisting of 1 captain, 4
quartermaster-commissaries, 12 non-commissioned officers, 166 drivers, 9
artificers, and 400 horses. The strength of Major Judgson’s Troop was as
follows: 2 captains, 3 subalterns, 1 surgeon, 16 non-commissioned
officers, 97 gunners, 58 drivers, 7 artificers, and 1 trumpeter; making
a total of 185, besides 191 horses.[8] A second troop of Horse
[Sidenote: * Captain Scott’s Troop, now A Battery, B Brigade.]
Artillery[*] was put under orders, but did not embark; and of a further
detachment of the Driver Corps, which was held in readiness, consisting
of 226 men and 400 horses, about one-half ultimately went, if not more.
The whole Artillery force which it was at first intended should be
sent--including the Driver-Corps auxiliaries--amounted to 1857 officers
and men and 1344 horses; and of this number certainly 1600 men and 1000
horses accompanied the expedition. Among the names of officers not yet
mentioned, who accompanied the Army to the Helder, the letters of the
period include the following: Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Terrot, Major Lewis,
Captain Mudge, Captain--afterwards Sir Augustus--Frazer, Captain Riou,
Captain Nicholls, Captain Ramsey, Captain-Lieutenant Geary, Lieutenant
Knox, Lieutenant Morrison, and Assistant-Surgeon Jameson. From other
sources we learn that two officers, who subsequently attained great
distinction in the Corps, were [Sidenote: Memoir of Sir E. C.
Whinyates.] also present--Sir E. C. Whinyates and Sir John Michell--both
officers being then 2nd Lieutenants. Lieutenants [Sidenote: Kane’s
List.] Simpson and Eligée are also known to have been present,
[Sidenote: Browne’s ‘England’s Artillerymen.’] from the fact that both
were among the wounded in the actions which took place. The reason why
uncertainty prevails as to the regimental details of the Artillery force
on this expedition will appear at the end of this chapter.
It will be readily understood that so large a force was not collected
without difficulty. But of the extent of the labour involved no one can
adequately judge who has not had access to the official letter-books of
the time. The expedition to the Helder proved at once the necessity of a
head-quarters staff for the Royal Artillery, and the capacity of the man
who had been selected as the first Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Corps.
The later campaigns, in whose organization Sir John Macleod had so large
a share, were undoubtedly on a grander scale; but it is questionable
whether his zeal, tact, and activity were ever so prominent, as in the
arrangements for this unfortunate expedition to Holland. He did
everything, and made a point of knowing everything, himself: he gave
himself no rest until he accomplished his purpose; nor yet did the
amount of his official labours interfere with the courtesy to all ranks
for which he was so remarkable. A private letter of friendly notice
always preceded the order for movement, where such intimation could be
given without detriment to the Service; no unnecessary mystery attended
his actions: he was almost laboriously anxious to meet the convenience
of all concerned, and evinced in his letters a sympathy, such as he
could not have surpassed in his dealings with his own relations. His
correspondence with the various commanding officers, from under whose
control he had to steal detachments to bring the companies for service
up to their required strength, is a masterpiece. Never for one moment
leaving the line of action which necessity and the Board had imposed on
him, he yet seemed to consult and defer to the Generals whose divisions
he was weakening, and to obtain by their consent what he really was
taking by force. If ever a wrong system, such as the old dual government
of the Artillery was, could be made less detestable, it was made so by
Colonel Macleod’s tact and courtesy. And it is better that the
deformities of a military system should be laid bare in time of _peace_,
than on the eve of _war_, when the almost inevitable confusion cannot
afford to be increased by ill-timed revelations. An indifferent machine
well-worked is better than an admirable one whose powers are paralysed
by some temporary, but thorough disarrangement. It is not when breakers
are ahead, that men speculate on the beauties of their engines: it is
_then_ that--be they what they may--they are expected to work to the
utmost of their power. In the hands of Colonel Macleod the evils of a
wrong system were reduced to a _minimum_: but the system was a wrong one
still.
His exertions to perfect the force which he had to organize were as
admirable, as were his endeavours to remove all possible friction. There
have been times in our military history, when the great wheel of
progress and success has--after much creaking--been set in motion by the
untiring exertions of unexpected leaders, or uncomplaining heroism in
the ranks, instead of the labours of those on whom the organization of
the armies depended. And at such times of unexpected fortune, it has
generally been found that the official flies have buzzed most loudly
around the revolving wheel, as if they had been the motive power. Not so
with Colonel Macleod in 1799. Nothing was beneath his notice; no
exertion was spared by him which could ensure the perfection, as well as
the harmony, of the machine. The same pages which reveal his
consideration for individuals show also his determination to render the
Artillery part of the expedition unrivalled: and his difficulties were
very great. In the single item of horses, he found an obstacle which bid
fair to be insurmountable; for the horses did not exist in the service,
and could hardly be bought. Such animals as were procured by scouring
the country were in so wretched a condition, that they could barely
crawl in harness. So important was every day of decent rations to the
sorry brutes, that to every party marching to the port of
embarkation--Ramsgate--Colonel Macleod sent orders to shorten the
marches, and to delay going on board as long as possible--and [Sidenote:
D. A. Gen.’s Correspondence.] at all hazards, “except,” he wrote, “that
of allowing it to be said, ‘We are waiting for the Ordnance.’”
Among other evils was the monotonous cry from distant colonies--not only
heard in 1799, nor by one Deputy Adjutant-General--of “More men from
England!” Every place was drained of every available man; even the old
gunners at the Tower were drafted away, and raw recruits sent in their
place: but the colonial wants were not satisfied. Militia regiments,
which were embodied, were also sending daily petitions for battalion
guns, followed by remonstrances and strongly-worded indignation. And
Colonel Macleod, in spite of his _personal_ opinions, was obliged to
strain every nerve to meet a wish, which was still supported by our
military system. His personal opinions, it has been said,--and truly:
for the correspondence of the period reveals the fact that Colonel
Macleod had commenced to detest the existing system of battalion guns.
He dared not say openly what he thought; but from a private letter
written at this time his opinion may be easily learnt. Writing of some
detachments which had been collected under an officer’s command,
[Sidenote: Letter to Colonel--afterwards Sir John--Smith.] he said: “I
believe they are intended for the battalion guns of the Infantry
Brigades, and I had some thoughts of drawing them to Chatham, where I
would have them drilled to the duty expected of them--appointing 1
non-commissioned officer and 7 gunners to each 6-pounder, and
accustoming them to make use of a horse to advance, _instead of
drag-rope men_--a custom which weakens the battalions they are attached
to without aiding the services of the Artillery. For, between you and I,
six men are _too few to drag guns_, and _too many to stand with ropes in
their hands to be shot at_.”
An incident, which occurred at this time, shows that the system of
drawing lots was not confined to choice of stations or barracks at home.
In a letter to the commanding officer at Newcastle--Colonel
Lawson--Colonel Macleod, in calling for one of the companies under his
command for service in the expedition, requested him to assemble the
Captains, and make them draw lots for the duty.
It was in August 1799 that the force sailed from England; and the
student, who has realised the labours of Colonel Macleod, will also be
able to conceive the feelings of relief with which he despatched, at 3
A.M. on a day at the beginning of that month, a mounted orderly, to
carry the intelligence from Woolwich to the Duke of York at Deal, that
the last man and horse of the Artillery had embarked. It will now be
necessary to follow the expedition, merely remarking here that the
casualties, which speedily occurred, rendered a fresh supply of
ammunition and horses necessary before many weeks had passed, and that
consequently Colonel Macleod had but a brief respite from his toil.
The expedition to the Helder was intended to effect two things--the
capture of the Dutch fleet, which in the hands of the French was an
unmistakable danger to England, and a military demonstration in Holland,
which should lead to a rising against the Republican Government. In the
first of these objects the expedition succeeded; in the second it
miserably failed. For an exhibition of fruitless gallantry, it has not
been surpassed in the annals of the British Army. But happily it was
the closing scene in the drama of military failure, with which the last
decade of the eighteenth century was surfeited. With the new century
came a spirit in England’s military operations, which made her campaigns
by land as glorious as her successes by sea. The wars of the nineteenth
century threw into the background the share taken by our armies in the
wars of the French Revolution, during the period which preceded the
overthrow of the Directorate in France and the virtual assumption of the
supreme power by Napoleon in the winter of 1799. But the Regimental
historian has to bring even fruitless and unsuccessful wars to light
again, in his search for stories of individual gallantry or for the
causes of failure.
England’s ally in the expedition to the Helder was Russia. It had been
arranged by the two governments that the land forces should comprise a
Russian contingent of 17,000 men, and an English army of 13,000. England
more than fulfilled her promise: for the actual force sent by her was as
much as that promised as the Russian contribution. In addition, England
furnished vessels to assist in the transport of the Russian troops from
the Baltic, and a powerful fleet, of more than sixty men-of-war, under
Admiral Lord Duncan. On the 21st August, 1799, the fleet and transports
arrived off the mouth of the Zuyder Zee, and anchored off the Helder:
but foul weather prevented a disembarkation until the 27th,--a delay
which gave undoubted advantage to the French and Batavian troops. The
enemy was at first under the command of General Daendels, but he was
almost immediately superseded by General Brune; and the army, which had
at first been 10,000 strong, rose in a few weeks to nearly treble that
number.
[Sidenote: 23rd, 27th, 29th, 55th, and 85th Regiments.]
Abercromby’s division was the first to land, and after a very severe
engagement, in which the Infantry under Generals Sir James Pulteney and
Coote behaved most gallantly, the Dutch were driven back, and the
English took possession of the Kirkduin, and the fort of the Helder. The
Artillery was not landed till after this engagement: nor was the
[Sidenote: Cust.] ground favourable to the use of the Dutch artillery.
The fleet was summoned to surrender: and the Dutch Admiral, conscious
of a strong spirit of insubordination among his crews, ever since the
appearance of the British flag, consented to deliver over his ships,
unconditionally; and thus gave over to the English the complete control
of the Zuyder Zee. On this taking place, the Dutch troops retired, and
took up a position in front of Alkmaar, where they were joined by
General Brune and 7000 French. Abercromby occupied the ground vacated by
the Dutch, and strengthened it in every way possible, being resolved to
await there the arrival of the Duke of York and the Russian contingent.
General Brune, however, saw the advantage of an engagement before such a
junction could be effected; and therefore on the 10th September he
assumed the offensive, but without success,--being totally defeated with
a loss of 2000 men. [Sidenote: ‘London Gazette,’ 16 Sept. 1799.] The
Artillery was of great service to Abercromby; and it was in this
engagement--known as the action of Zyp--that Lieutenant Simpson was
wounded. The French resumed their old position in front of Alkmaar,
which they greatly strengthened; and confined their operations to
preventing Abercromby from advancing out of the contracted space in
which he was situated.
On the 12th September the Russians arrived, and on the day following the
Duke of York assumed the command, and resolved on leaving the position
where the army had been stationed, and on attacking the enemy with the
large force now at his disposal, numbering about 35,000 men. He divided
his army into four columns: the right being under General Hermann, and
composed entirely of Russians; the second, under General Dundas,
consisting partly of British, and partly of Russians; the third, under
Sir James Pulteney, with a large proportion of Artillery and Cavalry;
and the fourth, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, consisting entirely of
British troops; the last being intended to make a _détour_ on the
evening of the 18th September--the day before the intended battle--and
to turn the enemy’s right flank. The first three columns were ordered to
attack simultaneously at break of day on the 19th, moving on different
named points. These arrangements, which have been somewhat severely
criticised, would doubtless have succeeded, had the Duke’s orders been
obeyed; but unfortunately the first, or Russian, column precipitated the
engagement by attacking the enemy two or three hours before the other
columns were ready to move, and drove the enemy out of the village of
Bergen. General Brune brought up his reserve to recover his lost ground,
and fell upon the Russian troops when in a state of intoxication from
the excesses of which they had been guilty since the capture of the
village. A disgraceful scene followed, ending in the tumultuous flight
of the Russians with the loss of many prisoners. The Duke of York
accompanied the second column, but the retreat of the Russians on his
right compelled him to fall back, and to send orders to the third and
fourth columns to do the same. Great success had in the meantime
attended the efforts of Sir James Pulteney,--the Guards, 17th and 40th
Regiments, having greatly distinguished themselves; but, owing to the
change given to the whole plan by the mistake and misbehaviour of the
first column, when night came the Allies occupied precisely the same
ground as they held in the morning. The loss to the English amounted to
500 killed and wounded, and 500 taken prisoners;--and the Russians lost
3000 men; but an equal number of the enemy had been taken prisoners by
the Allies. In this engagement, known as the battle of Bergen or
Alkmaar, the loss of the Royal Artillery was as follows:--
[Sidenote: ‘London Gazette,’ 24 Sept. 1799.]
First Lieutenant Eligée, wounded and taken prisoner;
Volunteer John Douglass, wounded;
_Killed_: 5 gunners; 4 gunner-drivers; and 3 additional gunners.
_Wounded_: 8 gunners; 6 gunner-drivers; and 4 additional gunners.
_Missing_: 7 gunners, and gunner-drivers.
In the interval between this engagement and the severe battle on the 2nd
October,--when the event occurred which gives the title to the present
chapter,--both armies were employed in strengthening their positions on
shore, in obtaining reinforcements, and in arranging their respective
gun-boats in such a way as to obtain from them an enfilade fire, in
event of attack. The Duke of York felt the importance of making a final
effort, before the season was further advanced: and his dispositions on
the 2nd October were much the same as on the 19th September, except that
he gave the right column to General Abercromby, whose force consisted of
8000 Infantry and 1000 Cavalry, with Major Judgson’s [Sidenote: General
Farrington to D. A. G. 17 Sept. 1799.] troop of Horse Artillery. The
troop was partly armed with 12-pounders,--a very heavy armament for
Horse Artillery, and one never again used:--and it seems all the more
unsuitable, when we find that the battalion guns, which were merely
6-pounders, were in one instance brigaded into a battery under Captain
Frazer,--presenting the anomaly in the army, on this 2nd October, of a
_light_ field artillery, intended for rapid movements, being armed with
guns of twice the calibre of those used by what should have been the
_medium_ field artillery, and only required to accommodate itself to the
movements of infantry.
The second column was composed of Russian troops, under Count Essen; the
third was under General Dundas; and the fourth under Sir James Pulteney.
The main interest attaches to the first column, whose duty it was to
keep close to the seashore as far as Egmont-op-Zee, and thence menace
the French left and rear. The other columns were to drive back the
enemy’s line if possible; and, at all events, so to occupy him as to
prevent the left from being strengthened in such a manner as might
endanger the success of the first column. The exertions of General
Dundas’s brigade were marvellous, and were crowned by success; but they
were almost undone by the refusal of the Russians, at a critical moment,
to advance against the village of Bergen, which had been laid bare by
the retreat of the enemy before the impetuosity of the English troops.
This refusal was never forgotten, nor was there from that hour any
harmony between the allied troops. Encouraged by the impunity allowed
them, the enemy resumed the offensive; but, although unable to drive
them farther back, the English succeeded, although with great loss and
difficulty, in holding the ground they had taken.
The first column, under General Abercromby, reached Egmont-op-Zee
without difficulty; but there it found a large force of all arms, under
General Vandamme, drawn up in line of battle. The engagement which
followed was prolonged and bloody. Sir Ralph was at last successful; but
his advantage was short-lived, for reinforcements arrived from Alkmaar
in such numbers that it required all the skill of the English General,
and all the undaunted courage of his men, to prevent his left from being
broken before night put an end to the engagement. It was at this time
that the Chestnut Troop received its baptism of fire. By some oversight
on the part of the General, or possibly owing to ignorance as to the
powers of this new weapon--Horse Artillery,--Major Judgson’s Troop had
been advanced to a dangerous distance, and left with an inadequate
escort. General Vandamme observed this, and, placing himself at the head
of his Cavalry, swept down upon the guns. The scene which followed was
an exciting one. Taken by surprise, the gunners did not lose their
presence of mind, but fired into the advancing cavalry until they were
in their midst; and then, with any weapons they had, they struggled with
the troopers, who, in immense numbers, surrounded them, and sabred them
at their guns. According to one [Sidenote: Browne.] account, two only of
the guns were carried off by the [Sidenote: Cust.] cavalry when they
retired; according to another, the whole were captured. Be it as it may,
the prize was not left long undisputed, for Lord Paget, placing himself
at the head of the 15th Light Dragoons--now the 15th (King’s)
Hussars--charged the enemy’s cavalry, pursuing them for over a mile;
and, assisted by the explosion of one of the captive limbers, succeeded
in recovering all the guns. The story is calculated to create a friendly
sympathy between the Chestnut Troop and the gallant Regiment which
proved so staunch a godfather to it at this its christening, and is one
to be talked over by the camp-fire in days coming on. In the order which
was issued after the battle, Major Judgson [Sidenote: ‘London Gazette,’
24 Oct. 1799.] received special mention. “In the severe action on this
day His Royal Highness expressed his thanks to Lieutenant-Colonels
Whitworth and Smith, who commanded the Artillery of reserve, and to
Major Judgson, of the Horse Artillery. Captain Nicholls was wounded in
this action, and is since dead.”
Although the Allies had not driven the enemy back as far as they had
hoped, they nevertheless occupied the ground on which the French General
had taken up his position, at the commencement of the battle. The loss
to the British was severe, 1300 having been killed and wounded,
including 100 officers.
Another attempt was made by the Allies on the 7th October to drive the
enemy back, and to escape from the position in which they had been
cramped since the commencement of the campaign; but, although they
defeated with severe loss the troops to whom they found themselves
immediately opposed, the _cordon_ beyond still hopelessly surrounded
them. As there was no symptom of a popular rising in the country on
their behalf, and as reinforcements were daily reaching the French, the
Duke of York decided on opening negotiations with a view to the
evacuation of Holland by the Allies. These were ultimately successful;
and the only beneficial result of this campaign, which survived the
negotiations, was the retention of the Dutch fleet by the English.
The conclusion of the Artillery share in this campaign had an element of
the ludicrous in it. In the old letter-books, deposited in the Royal
Artillery Record Office, is the following one, showing the pitiable way
in which poor General Farrington, who had left with all the pomp and
circumstance of war, returned to his home. Writing from [Sidenote: To D.
A. General, Nov. 3, 1799.] Blackheath, he says:--“After a very fatiguing
voyage and journey, I am this moment arrived at my own house. Trotter,
Smith, Terrott, Robe, Maclean, Lieut. Knox, and Dr. Jameson, came over
passengers with me, and will be at Woolwich this night, or to-morrow
morning. The want of horses keeps them back, and my anxiety of mind to
arrive as early as possible led me to accept a passage in a post-chaise;
but I have a melancholy tale to unfold. The ship in which we came
passengers, mistaking the entrance into Yarmouth Harbour, ran on the
sands, on which she struck with such violence as, with the first shock,
to unship her rudder, and stave in her bottom; but, wonderful to tell,
after keeping us in a most distressed state for an hour, she passed the
sands with 4 feet of water in her hold, and, by the exertion of the
boats of the fleet, every soul on board was saved--about 70 in number;
and in about half an hour the ship sank in 10 or 11 fathoms of water.
The cargo, such as guns, shot, and shells, may be saved; the ammunition,
of course, destroyed; and _we are all reduced to our ship-dress only_;
everything else lost. It has been a most providential escape, and
sincerely ought we to offer up our prayers for His mercy.
“I am too unwell to wait upon Lord Howe, _nor have I things to see him
in_; but if you could ride over here to-morrow, I will tell you all I
can respecting the embarkation of the Artillery horses, &c., _for I have
not a paper left_.”
While sympathising with the ill-fated General, the student cannot
refrain from anathematising the blundering pilot, who mistook the
entrance to Yarmouth Harbour, and was thus the cause of papers being
lost, which would doubtless have been priceless to the compiler of a
narrative of the Artillery share in the campaign of 1799.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Return dated Woolwich, 5 Dec. 1799.]
The following return of the losses of the Royal Artillery, _exclusive_
of the Driver Corps, in this campaign, was rendered by the
Deputy-Adjutant-General to the Board of Ordnance:--
Killed, and died of their wounds 25 of all ranks.
Wounded 21 ”
Prisoners and Missing 15 ”
Horses sent from England 910
Received in Holland from the } 200
Commissary-General’s Department}
----
Total 1110
Killed, dead, and left behind 654
----
Returned to England 456
----
(Signed) J. MACLEOD,
D.-A.-General.