EGYPT.
The history of the Regiment in 1800 and 1801 has its main interest in
the operations of the English Army in Egypt. In these, so glorious in a
military point of view, so effective in a national,--for they were the
main instrument in bringing about the Peace of Amiens--the Artilleryman
finds much to interest him, and much of which he may be justly proud.
It is fortunate for the purpose of this history that the officer who
commanded the Artillery in Egypt placed on [Sidenote: Brig.-Gen.
Lawson’s MSS. on Egypt, deposited in the R. A. Library.] record many
most interesting details, which the general historian would have
certainly overlooked, and whose reproduction in these pages will give a
far more graphic sketch of the difficulties which were encountered, than
could be given by the most skilful writer who had not himself been an
eye-witness. The unpretending account of the means adopted to overcome
the difficulties cannot fail also to inspire any officer, who may find
himself in a similar position, with a resolution to yield to no
obstacles.
The reader will remember that in the year 1800 there was a French army
stationed in Egypt, which, although reduced from its original numbers,
was yet too strong to be overcome by the Turks. England resolved to
reinforce the Turkish army by means of an expedition from England, the
military part of which was to be commanded by Sir R. Abercromby; the
naval, by Admiral Lord Keith. The Artillery of the Expedition was placed
under the command of Colonel Lawson, who, after much importunity,
obtained from the Duke of York the rank of Brigadier-General. Officers
of his own standing had obtained that rank to command brigades of
Infantry on the Expedition; and Colonel Macleod, although, [Sidenote:
Correspondence of D. A. General, R.A.] as he wrote, “bewildered with
orders and projects, alterations and inventions,” fought loyally to
obtain from the Board a recommendation that the officer commanding the
Artillery should receive it also.
[Sidenote: Embarkation Return, rendered to B. O. on 9 April, 1800.]
The strength of the Royal Artillery ordered to embark for Egypt under
General Lawson was as follows:--
1 Field Officer,
7 Captains,
12 Subalterns,
3 Surgeons,
54 Non-Commissioned Officers,
7 Lance N.-C. Officers,
450 Gunners,
9 Drummers,
making a total of 543, besides 38 women and 7 children. The civil branch
of the Ordnance was represented by 1 paymaster, 1 paymaster’s clerk, 1
commissary of stores, 1 assistant commissary and 4 clerks, 6 conductors
of stores, and 19 artificers.
The names of the officers named at first were Colonel Lawson, Captains
Thomson, Lemoine, Evans, Meredith, and Miller; Captains-Lieutenant
Newhouse and Boger; Lieutenants Raynsford, Munro, Lawson, F. Campbell,
Fauquier, Cleaveland, Armstrong, Michell, and Trelawny; and 2nd
Lieutenants Kirby, Rook, and Nutt. This force was augmented in the
Mediterranean from Minorca and Malta, and received a contingent, which
will presently be mentioned, from Lisbon; certain changes, also, were
made in it by [Sidenote: Report to D. A. Gen. from Gen. Lawson.] landing
at Gibraltar a company of the 6th Battalion, receiving one of the 5th
Battalion in exchange. The battalions actually represented in Egypt were
the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th, and the companies, which were present are
detailed in the first volume of this work. The 3rd Battalion was at this
time mainly stationed in the West Indies.
On the 5th May, 1800, General Lawson reached Portsmouth to take command
of the Artillery of the Expedition, which he had been informed was on
the point of sailing. He had also been informed that all necessary
particulars had been communicated to him by the authorities; but in
neither respect was his information correct, and the official fountain
of his knowledge was found to have poured forth a somewhat muddy
stream. Three weeks elapsed before he sailed--three weeks of wild,
hopeless confusion--affairs having been complicated by the Government
having decided on a secret expedition elsewhere, the Artillery of which
was placed under the orders of Colonel Seward, then in command at
Portsmouth. An interchange of companies between his force and that of
General Lawson was threatened, and mutual drafts were made, as far as
officers and a few men were concerned. Another company, under Major
Cookson, who distinguished himself subsequently in Egypt, joined General
Lawson at Portsmouth--a fact of which the student first becomes aware by
finding a joint letter from the subalterns of the company, petitioning
the Board, with considerable presence of mind, for an advance of pay,
they “being quite out of cash.” It is presumed that their request was
granted, for, [Sidenote: Colonel Seward to Colonel Macleod, 25 May,
1800.] on the morning of the 25th May, Colonel Seward reported the
embarkation of this company “between eleven and twelve o’clock in _high
spirits_.” The whole of General Lawson’s force had sailed by the 3rd
June, and reached Gibraltar on the 22nd of the same month. The gallant
General’s existence had been embittered during the last few days of his
stay in England by the masterly silence, profound as the grave, with
which all his inquiries for information, reiterated daily, were received
by the Board. The subsequent difficulties which he encountered were
mainly due to this triumph of official reticence.
Leaving General Lawson’s force at Gibraltar, let the reader return for a
moment to that under Colonel Seward, which was to form part of the
Secret Expedition. The Royal Artillery employed consisted of 386 of all
ranks, besides that marvellous accompaniment of all expeditions in those
days, whether secret or open,--22 women and 11 children. The armament
consisted of 16 light 6-pounders. Three companies were taken complete,
commanded by Major [Sidenote: Embarkation Returns, D. A. General’s
Correspondence.] Borthwick, Captain Salmon, and Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel
Bentham; and the following officers accompanied the force:
Captains-Lieutenant S. G. Adye and A. MacDonald; 1st Lieutenants W. R.
Carey, E. Curry, T. Masson, R. Carthew, S. Maxwell, D. Campbell, W.
Holcombe, and L. Carmichael; 2nd Lieutenants W. Norman Ramsay, W. D.
Nicolls, J. Rollo, and H. B. Lane. Major Borthwick was appointed by
Colonel Seward Brigade-Major to the Artillery. Besides these three
companies, drafts from almost every company in England were taken to
complete them to their proper establishment, and to man the battalion
guns. This heart-breaking system of robbing one company to feed the
wants of another prevailed to a great and continual extent during the
earlier part of this century, and its evil results show the vast
improvement of the depôt system, which clothes the cadres of dwindling
batteries abroad, without taking from those at home the men trained in
and for themselves.
Considerable trouble was experienced by Colonel Seward in obtaining the
co-operation of commanding officers of regiments in matters relating to
the battalion guns; and this expedition acted as another nail, so to
speak, in the coffin of that objectionable system. But infinitely
greater was the trouble caused by the vacillation and uncertainty of the
authorities, who, after the embarkation of the whole force, sent orders
for it to disembark and encamp near Southampton, until they could arrive
at some decision as to its destination. This afforded an opportunity for
clerkdom to run riot. Questions as to ship rations and land rations,
ship pay and land pay, poured on the ill-fated captains of companies
every day; and seldom did a mail reach them without a disallowance.
At length the expedition set sail (the military part of the force being
placed under Sir James Pulteney), and made an attempt on Ferrol, in
whose harbour some large men-of-war were lying. The troops landed under
a covering fire from the English fleet, and in the skirmish which
followed they had [Sidenote: Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’] the
advantage. But, Sir James Pulteney, becoming alarmed at the strength of
the Spanish works, and at the news he received of their preparations,
re-embarked the troops the same evening, and sailed for Gibraltar. Here
Colonel Seward transferred to Colonel Lawson many of his officers, men,
and stores; and with the remainder, and all the sick, he went to Lisbon,
whence--pending his return to England--he [Sidenote: D. A. General’s
Correspondence.] wrote the most gloomy letters, that ever crossed the
threshold of Colonel Macleod’s office. The transfer of his officers to
General Lawson’s command at Gibraltar, and the receipt of others from
the companies in garrison, account for the presence in Egypt of many who
did not embark with the latter from England, such as Major Sprowle,
Captains Duncan and Adye, and Lieutenants D. Campbell, Sturgeon, and
Burslem. One of the companies which sailed from [Sidenote: B. General
Lawson to Colonel Macleod.] England with General Lawson was landed at
Gibraltar in exchange for Major Sprowle’s; and by this means the glories
of Egypt were denied to Captain Meredith and Lieutenants Cleaveland,
Michell, and Nutt.
[Sidenote: Colonel Cuppage, R.A., to Colonel Macleod, 11 July, 1800.]
From Gibraltar General Lawson went to Minorca, which he reached on the
10th July, after a tedious passage of nineteen days. Here he landed his
men to await the return of Sir R. Abercromby, who had at first started
for Genoa, with all the troops he could collect from Minorca and
elsewhere. While on the passage, however, Sir Ralph received a message
from the Admiral, Lord Keith, informing him that the Austrians had
evacuated Italy. He therefore diverted his course to Leghorn, where he
remained a week, and then went on to Malta. When the citadel of Valetta
in that island was given up by the French in September, and Malta passed
into the hands of the English, General Lawson followed Sir Ralph, and
the expedition to Egypt was in that island finally organized.
During this time the English force in the Mediterranean had been
increased by the arrival of a body of 4000 men, under Lord Dalhousie,
from Belleisle, where they had at first been intended to act. This
reinforcement, with others [Sidenote: Cust.] which followed, brought Sir
R. Abercromby’s force up to 17,489 men before it finally left Malta; and
an additional force of 6000 men, under Sir David Baird, was expected to
meet them from India. The story of the Expedition after leaving Malta
will be told in General Lawson’s own words. But, in passing, it may be
stated that Minorca was the residence at this time of Colonel Cuppage
of the Artillery, whose correspondence with the Deputy Adjutant-General
reveals the fact that he was allowed a power over the Royal Artillery in
the Mediterranean of a very extensive and unusual description. As a
rule, as little power as possible was allowed to commanding officers on
out-stations; the movements of officers especially were carefully
regulated from England; but Colonel Cuppage evidently had the power, and
exercised it, of transferring officers and men from companies, even
belonging to different battalions,--of appointing officers to the bomb
service in the Mediterranean, and of disembarking others already
appointed; and, in a word, of exercising unlimited control over that
part of the Regiment which came within the area of his command. This is
mentioned because such control, however advisable, was rarely exercised
by the Board, which was jealous of anything approaching independence in
those under its orders;--and it is impossible to avoid expressing
surprise that a system which succeeded so admirably on this occasion did
not receive further trial. The fact of Minorca being the residence of
the Commanding Officer of Artillery must not be construed as implying
that the old Ordnance Establishment and Train, which disappeared with
the capitulation of Port Mahon in 1782, had been revived. His residence
there was almost accidental, and mainly on account of its
convenience,--previous to the capture of Malta,--as a rallying point for
the naval and military forces in the Mediterranean.
One instance must be given, before entering upon General Lawson’s
narrative, to show how infamously the arrangements of the civil branch
of the Ordnance were often conducted, after a campaign had been
undertaken, and how scandalously the shortcomings of the _civil_ were
left to be expiated by the _military_ branch. These instances will be
frequent as this work proceeds, and they are reproduced with a double
and deliberate purpose: first, to show under what difficulties our
armies obtained their successes; and second, to remind those who are
ever ready to criticise the slightest shortcoming of the same
description in the present day, that in our older campaigns, whose
glories are remembered when their blunders are forgotten, the faults
which are deprecated so loudly to-day existed in an appalling degree.
Major Cookson’s company was the first of General Lawson’s force to leave
Portsmouth. The earliest report of its movements is a letter written by
Major Cookson from the Island of Houat, where he found 132 of the 6th
Battalion, making, with his own company, a total force of Artillery
amounting to 227 of all ranks. With characteristic energy, he commenced,
after landing his company, to improve and strengthen his position. The
reader will be good enough to remember that Major Cookson’s company was
one of those, on the equipment of which the Board had expended unusual
energy; and had felt such confidence in the omniscience of their _civil_
officials, that they would not even reply to the hints and prayers of
the officers of Artillery, who were most deeply interested. Doubtless,
then, everything will be found as it should be. Yet let us hear what
Major Cookson reports: [Sidenote: Major Cookson, from I. of Houat, 24
June, 1800.] “I have only a moment to tell you how very much distressed
I am; and how much the Service is retarded for want of a _Clerk of
Stores_ who understands his duty. There is a man here who calls himself
Conductor of Stores, but he is very far from being adequate to the
situation, being, in the first place, _incapable of writing_.... I have
16 pieces of ordnance under my charge (10 6-pounders and 6 howitzers),
all of which I had to complete to 100 rounds each, on board of the
different vessels they were in, and to mount them ready to land in a
_chasse-marée_, which was cut down and prepared for the purpose, and
which I got done in two days; since which I have been obliged to land
some here, and to put others from the ‘Diadem’ and ‘Inconstant’ on board
the ‘John’ ordnance ship, and into boats. Conceive, then, how much I
must have been in want of conductors and clerks of stores! On board the
‘John,’ when in a hurry for completing the ammunition, we were much
annoyed to find _12-pounder flannel cartridges for the 5½-inch
howitzers_, and other like mistakes; however, I _set the women to work_
and got over that difficulty and many others.... _All the camp equipage
for the officers and men whom I brought out is deficient_; do, pray,
therefore, send me out the camp equipage for my company ... with a
hospital and laboratory tent, as soon as you possibly can; as also
camp-kettles, canteens, and haversacks. The whole of the men have been
uncommonly harassed for some days past.”
This is a charming picture of official foresight, and one which we shall
find painted again and again in the succeeding pages of English story.
Blind to the fact that the men, who were to use them, were also the best
judges of the things required and--
“Being too blind to have desire to see,”
the civil branch of the Ordnance too often reasoned _à priori_--evolved
out of its own consciousness certain ill-defined wants, which the troops
might possibly have--and, with many blunders and shortcomings,
endeavoured to meet them. And then, with monotonous recurrence, came a
pitiful struggle to maintain its own dignity in the face of incessant
failure.
[Sidenote: Major Cookson, from Houat, 1 August, 1800.]
That the response to Major Cookson’s appeal was not wholly satisfactory
may be gathered from the following extract from a subsequent
letter:--“Conceive,” he wrote, “their sending me a common soldiers’ tent
for the sick, and five horsemen’s tents _without their poles_, which to
obtain here would be impossible, as all the men-of-war have expended
already every inch of wood that could be spared. You will see by the
return that we have 50 men ill, and, I am sorry to say, several of them
dangerously so.”
It is a relief to turn, now, to the words of a man eminently capable of
removing the difficulties with which he was surrounded.
[Sidenote: Brig.-Gen. Lawson, R.A., MSS. Narrative in R. A. Library.]
“The Expedition, under the orders of Admiral Lord Keith and General
Abercromby, proceeded from the Island of Malta on the 21st December,
1800, arrived at Marmorice Bay, in Asia Minor, on the New Year’s Day
following, and remained there, waiting the co-operation of the Turks
(being the time of their Ramadan), until the 20th February. During this
period every measure was taken the situation admitted of to lessen the
numerous difficulties expected to be met with in Egypt,--such as a
dangerous shore to land upon--a country destitute of wood, water, or
roads--where (as the Commander-in-Chief informed the General Officers,
assembled by order) nothing was to be looked for but a wild waste of
desert, and obstacles which the most unremitting exertions had only a
chance of surmounting, independent of a formidable opposition from the
French troops.
“Under these ideas, and the battering train (originally designed against
Belleisle only) having joined the army very indifferently provided
indeed for such an uncommon, arduous enterprise, no time could be lost.
All the artificers were landed, and strong working parties sent into the
woods to cut down timber for making additional spars, skids, and
various-sized rollers, to form gangways for landing the heavy ordnance
upon, assisting them over deep sandy beaches, and in crossing the canals
formed for conveying the rising waters of the Nile into the towns and
cultivated spots of the country.
“The generally acknowledged difficulty of travelling by wheeled
carriages in Egypt induced the trial of a number of contrivances to
lessen that evil also, the first of which were a kind of litters,...
termed ‘horse-barrows.’ No wood growing in this country proper for such
purposes, rendered it necessary to dig saw-pits, in order to cut the
pine timber into long scantling (16 feet in length, and about 4 inches
square), something near the shape of a common hand-barrow, preserving
the grain as entire as possible. Two movable cross-bars, which are
secured by two small bolts, keep these shafts at a proper interval, to
admit a horse at each end between them. Each horse or mule had a small
cart saddle with girth, back-band, breastplate, and crupper, and a
halter for leading it by. These barrows were particularly useful for
narrow paths and the trenches of an attack, or for conveying any
individual weight too heavy for a single horse, such as a small piece of
ordnance, standing carriage, large casks of provisions, &c. (The powder
and ammunition expended at the attack of Aboukir Castle were mostly
conveyed from the landing-place to the batteries in this manner.)
Besides these single barrows, a design was formed for double ones,
consisting of three shafts, to be carried by four horses in pairs; and
also others upon a still larger scale for camels, but neither time nor
materials admitted of their being put into immediate execution. A very
considerable number of carrying-poles, about 9 feet long each, were
formed out of the small-sized trees, to which rope-slings were added,
for the soldiers to convey kegs of musket-ball cartridges,
ammunition-boxes, or royal mortars with.
“A number of horses were purchased at Constantinople on the part of the
English Government, and sent to Marmorice, for remounting the Light
Dragoons, and those rejected by them were turned over to the Artillery
service. Such poor undersized animals as they were rendered it
absolutely necessary not only to take the harness entirely to pieces, in
order to bring it anything near fitting them, but also to lay aside all
the heavy parts, such as neck-collars, chain-traces, curb-bits, &c., and
replace them with light leather breast-collars, rope-traces, and pads
formed out of the waggon harness, a great part of which, fortunately,
was not likely to be otherwise called for.
“About 130 horses being thus completed with harness, some light
pieces--guns and howitzers--were landed, and a small park formed, in
order to drill them to the draught. Every reform possible was made to
lighten the travelling of the ordnance, and it was very much wished to
have exchanged the limber-shafts for poles also, on account of their
weight, as well as other considerations; but no proper wood could then
be procured--even at the Island of Rhodes--for the purpose. The
clock-trailed light 6-pounder carriages had ten horses allotted to each
for draught; but the framed ones required twelve when going over heavy
sand or shingle.
“A few of the most useful horse-artillery manœuvres were also practised
here, it being the Commander-in-Chiefs intention to establish some
pieces on that principle whenever horses could be procured for it.
Drivers were also very much wanted, several of those which came out
originally with the battering train having, with their officer,
returned, in a very unaccountable manner, from Lisbon to England, after
the attempt on Cadiz.
“The following considerations were submitted to the Commander-in-Chief
at Marmorice Bay, on 10th Jan., 1801:--
“1st. As the passage of the fleet to the coast of Egypt may probably be
short, it is humbly proposed to have the light field-pieces of the first
division of troops conveyed from hence on the decks of the ships of war,
so as to be at once lowered down altogether into the boats, having their
Artillery detachments along with them, without the necessity of any
other preparation after coming to anchor.
“2nd. The ordnance ships, in which the other pieces next for landing are
aboard, to be conducted and stationed by the agent himself (the masters
alone not being sufficient at such a crisis) as near to the shore as
safety will admit. And it will be necessary, on account of the crowded
manner in which they were loaded in England (being taken upon freight),
to have light vessels alongside of them to receive the water-casks, and
articles not immediately wanted, in clearing away to those sought for.
“3rd. Small vessels or decked boats, with field ammunition and
musket-ball cartridges, will be required (particularly if the coast
proves shallow) still nearer in shore, and to be stationed opposite the
centre of attack immediately after the landing of the first division of
the troops, distinguished by Ordnance Jacks. In order to furnish the
most speedy supply possible, a number of hand-carts and carrying-poles
may be thrown on shore from these boats, for the soldiers to take off
any ammunition wanting, until the horses can be landed.
“4th. The flat boats and launches of the ships of war are wished to be
employed in carrying the field ordnance, &c., ashore, instead of
transports’ long-boats, which (as was experienced at Cadiz), from their
want of hands and general size, are quite inadequate to the business.
“5th. Planks, joined together lengthways by staples and cordage, may be
necessary to travel the carriages upon over the heavy sands. The French,
it is said, made use of raw hides in passing the deserts with their
field-pieces. Perhaps lengths of rope, about 30 feet each, with narrow
netting between to receive the wheels upon, might be found as useful,
and, in our situation, more readily procured.
“6th. One thousand seamen, provided with drag-ropes or harness, will be
required to assist in landing and drawing up the heavy ordnance and
stores.
“7th. The mode of advancing into the country will depend upon the means
of draught found there; but, at all events, if a strong detachment of
seamen can be procured to remain with the Artillery, it will be highly
beneficial to service.
* * * * *
“Agreeable to these representations, application was immediately made to
Lord Keith, who consented to take aboard each of the line-of-battle
ships two field-pieces, which were placed on the poops ready for
lowering down into the launches all together. Twenty-five seamen and
officers were allotted to each piece, with fifteen of the Artillery.
These 350 were all the seamen his Lordship could spare out of the 1000
demanded. Two general rehearsals of landing were then practised: the
guns got ashore very readily, and _quicker than the troops could leap
out of their boats_. Each ship-of-war formed its own boat’s gangway; the
best of them was made out of the fishing of a mast, which, being hollow,
secured the wheels of the carriage from slipping, without side-pieces.”
_Alterations made in Carronade Carriages._--“The moving of heavy
ordnance over the deserts of Egypt the French thought impracticable, and
attempted no larger calibre than 8-pounders or 12-pounders. Something
more, however, seemed necessary for us to make trial of against an enemy
so much more formidable than any they had had to contend with,
independent of the ambition of superior resource. Upon comparing all
circumstances together, it appeared likely that whatever works they
might have raised in the interior of the country since their possession
of it, could not be very solid ones, even if composed of masonry, for
want of time to settle and the cement to harden sufficiently in such
substances; and earth alone, in this climate, must soon crumble to dust
or sand, and easily be destroyed by shells. From these considerations it
was concluded that carronades might probably be found sufficiently
powerful to breach them in either case at moderate distances, and be
easily conveyed by the double horse or camel-barrow across the country
if necessary. The circumstance being suggested to Sir Ralph Abercromby,
and, at the same time, the means proposed of altering the carriages for
this purpose without affecting their sea-service in the smallest degree,
His Excellency communicated the idea to Lord Keith, who immediately
ordered several of these 24-pounder carriages (though larger ones were
wished for) ashore from the ships-of-war, to undergo the necessary
alteration. This operation being soon executed, some trials of shot and
shells were made there, and afterwards aboard the ‘Foudroyant,’ in
presence of the Admiral and the General, and much approved of.”
For the information of the non-professional reader, it may here be
mentioned that carronades are far lighter than guns of the same calibre.
The details by which General Lawson describes, in his MSS., the
modifications made by him to render the carronade-carriages suitable for
his purpose, are illustrated by carefully-prepared diagrams, without
which the description would hardly be intelligible. It may be stated
briefly that, by certain additions to the carriage--which could easily
be removed when again wanted on board ship--he produced something akin
to the modern dwarf traversing platform, requiring little or no ground
platform on which to be traversed. The navy officers who were present at
the experiments expressed their opinion that the alteration would be
very useful to their service also, for taking up posts occasionally
ashore.
The MS. proceeds next to describe the arrangements made by General
Lawson.
“Many mistakes, as well as loss of time, happening on service by the
ammunition being sent into the field with the waggons accompanying the
guns in the same state as lodged in the storehouses; that is, round
shot, case shot, cartridges, and small stores, each article in separate
packing-boxes, it was thought advisable, especially on this occasion,
where the ammunition must be mostly carried on camels’ backs, to
complete each individual box with a certain number of rounds (one fourth
case), including small stores, and everything necessary to the firing of
them. This was effected by only raising the round-shot packing-case
about two inches higher, and the addition of a small board as a false
bottom, which admitted of stowings as follows, viz., for light
6-pounders, 15 rounds and a extra case-shot; light 12-pounders, 8
rounds; medium 12-pounders, 7 rounds. For the royal howitzer ammunition,
it was necessary to have two packing-boxes on this principle, viz., one
containing 9 live shells and 1 case-shot; the other with 2 case-shot and
all the articles for firing 12 rounds complete. This mode was found
extremely useful in the field, and is strongly recommended for all
immediate occasions of service, as no possible mistake can then happen,
either from ignorance or neglect, in supplying the guns or limber-boxes
with the utmost expedition.
“The ammunition for field-service was usually conveyed on camels’ backs,
each carrying four of the altered 6-pounder packing-boxes, two on each
side, in a sort of netted bag thrown over a pack-saddle; but, useful as
these animals are generally for great weights, there are inconveniences
attending them in this particular service; viz., when loaded (which, of
course, must be daily repeated) they move very slowly, therefore quite
unfit for Horse Artillery;--in order to load or unload, they must first
be made to kneel down, which in an action they are not always inclined
to, and sometimes become very refractory and unmanageable; also,
whatever quantity of ammunition is required for the gun must always be
taken equally from both sides at the same time, to preserve its
equilibrium, &c.
“These reasons determined a trial of light carriages in their stead,
first beginning with royal howitzer ammunition, it being the most
dangerous and liable to injury. Some of the hand-carts were selected for
this purpose, and, in order to travel the better, converted to
curricles. The poles were accordingly lengthened, and cross-bars fixed
to support them in front of the horses’ collars, much in the same manner
as the 3-pounder carriages formerly used in the Horse Artillery, only
more simplified. These carriages were drawn by four horses each, and
went through all the marches of the army to and from Grand Cairo
remarkably well, travelling very rapidly with 48 rounds of the howitzer
ammunition completed for immediate service, as already mentioned.”
_Light 3-pounder Carriages altered for Cavalry._--“Our Cavalry, from
their want of proper horses, being found very unequal to the
capitally-mounted French dragoons, it became necessary to aid that
defect by the attachment of Artillery. Four light 3-pounders (brought
from Malta) were first prepared for this service. Their original mode of
travelling with shafts and single line of draught was altered to a
double one by cutting off the shafts of the limber at the cross-bar, and
introducing a pole instead of them, together with other improvements.
(For example, a block of wood was fixed by two bolts to the back of the
axletree, and the iron pintail removed from the centre of it to this
block to receive the trail of the carriage upon. This was done in order
to make room for a 6-pounder ammunition-box, to be fixed crossways in
the front. The old side-boxes belonging to the carriage being rejected
entirely, _their places furnished seats for two gunners_. At small
expense an ammunition-box, containing 8 rounds, was made to fit in
between the cheeks of the gun-carriage, after the French manner. _A
copper tray or drawer was introduced under one of the gunners’ seats to
contain the slowmatch, instead of carrying a lintstock._) Four or six
horses, with two drivers (according to the ground), drew the carriage.
These pieces were served by four Artillerymen, _two on the carriage and
two mounted on the off draught-horses_. They went through the service to
Grand Cairo, and travelled much better than was expected from the
lowness of the limber-wheels, which defect there was no remedy for in
Egypt.
“Four light 6-pounders upon block-trail carriages, with two royal
howitzers, were also equipped (as nearly as the means would admit) for
Horse Artillery service. Seven Artillerymen and three drivers, with ten
horses, were allotted for the service of each piece, the gunners riding
the horses in draught, but the non-commissioned officer mounted single
for the purpose of advancing to examine roads, reconnoitring the enemy,
&c. These block-trail carriages, from their lightness, short draught,
and quick turning, passed over the inundation dykes and desert with
great ease, while the framed carriages with more horses were attended
with difficulty and delay, and once in the desert, were obliged to be
left behind.
“The success of the curricle carts (for field ammunition) induced a
trial if something might not be done with the waggons also, hitherto
looked upon as out of all question, except the local duties of the park.
Some of them were taken to pieces, and all the heaviest parts laid
aside--that is, the bolsters, sides, and shafts. The bottoms were then
contracted both in length and breadth, so as just to receive nine or ten
of the altered packing-cases only. The hoops were lowered, and the
painted covers made to fit exactly. Poles were used instead of shafts,
and the usual swingle trees reduced fewer in number. The rejected parts
being weighed, no less than six hundred pounds appeared saved in the
draught by this simple operation, and a larger proportion of ammunition
conveyed by it at the same time with less labour. The immense weight and
bulk of the platform and devil carriages rendered them totally useless;
some of these altered waggons were substituted as a light class of the
former kind, by taking away the bottoms entirely, and fixing in their
stead a couple of very strong planks to each, with an interval between
them resembling the original. These light platform carriages proved very
useful in withdrawing the ordnance and stores from our lines across very
heavy sands for re-embarkation.”
The next subject treated of in the MS. is “Heavy weights raised without
a Gin,” as follows:--
“The two-wheeled trench-cart (of which there were luckily a number on
the Expedition) is a most useful little carriage for carrying articles
of moderate bulk to a ton in weight; indeed, even so far as 10-inch iron
mortar-beds of 23 cwt. were transported in them, but in these cases it
was necessary, of course, to make use of a gin also. To obviate this
circumstance and render the cart of more independent utility, an
inclined plane was attached to the rear of it, and a small windlass
fixed in the front, with a rope and iron block hooked to the weight,
having rollers to ease the purchase, the weight being thus brought up on
the cart by turning the windlass. By this simple means six men were
sufficient to mount upon the cart, and deliver at a battery any article
the strength of the axletree and wheels could bear, without making the
appearance or drawing the attention of the enemy, which such large
machines as devil carriages and sling carts constantly do, besides
taking into consideration the vast difference, in point of weight,
between these carriages in themselves. Another considerable advantage is
that this contrivance is only occasionally applied, and the cart may be
immediately worked in its original capacity.
[Sidenote: Narrow wheels prevented from sinking in the sand.]
“It being apprehended that extraordinary heavy weights might cause the
low, narrow wheels of the trenched cart to sink so much into the sand as
to retard the draught considerably, a contrivance was thought of to
prevent this from happening, by occasionally increasing the breadth of
the fellies. The staves of casks being strong, and of a favourable shape
for the purpose, and still more valuable from their being easily
procured at the Commissary-General’s store, it was proposed to cut them
into lengths of seven or nine inches each piece, having two small iron
staples fixed at an interval, the breadth of the _felley_. A rope equal
in length to the circumference of the wheel is run through each of these
lines of staples, secured so as not to slip out, but keep the staves
parallel at one inch and a half asunder. They are then applied to the
wheels, and fixed by small lashings to the spokes, to keep the whole
from any alteration in travelling.”
SOME REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING ARTICLES.
1st. “The original intention of the Expedition did not appear to have
Egypt for its object, and for a considerable while was very
inauspicious. In the first instance it proved too late to be any use to
the Austrians in Italy, and afterwards became unsuccessful at Cadiz.
Much time appeared to be lost before it reached the _rendezvous_ at
Marmorice Bay; and it was then thought by the Turks a very unseasonable
part of the year for any attempt on the coast of Egypt, besides which it
happened to be the time of their Ramadan, when no operations of any kind
are undertaken by them. This last delay, however, although much
regretted, turned out advantageous to the future proceedings of the
army. Some useful arrangements were made then, besides the opportunity
it gave of landing the sick after a long confinement on board ship, by
which many recovered; and the Island of Rhodes, just in the
neighbourhood, afforded hospitals for the remainder.”
2nd. “All the field ordnance, which had been landed at Ferrol with
Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney’s army, and afterwards joined
General Sir Ralph Abercromby, were re-embarked there in so disorderly a
manner that no one piece was found fit for immediate service. This
circumstance will for ever unfortunately occur, _unless the direction of
the business is left entirely to the Artillery Corps_, whether navy
boats and ships of war or those of the Ordnance only receive them. It
cannot be expected that the navy officers are in the first place fully
acquainted with the real importance of keeping all the parts of such
carriages, ammunition-boxes, &c., exactly sorted together, or that they
can bestow much consideration on the subject, hurried as they generally
are upon such occasions.”
3rd. “The turning over only rejected horses from the Dragoons to the
Artillery services was not so well judged as might be expected. It would
have been fortunate (the best of theirs bearing no comparison with the
French cavalry) to have rendered the movement of the Ordnance more
effectual; as it was, both corps remained insufficient; the effects of
which were fully experienced in the action of the 13th March, when, had
only a part of the number of pieces then in the field been very well
horsed, the fate of Alexandria (it is more than probable) might have
been decided on that day. The French, on the other hand, _constantly
applied the very prime of their strong horses (those belonging to the
officers not excepted) to the draught of their ordnance_, which were
chiefly on the Horse Artillery establishment, with 8-pounder guns and
6-inch howitzers, opposed to light 6-pounders and royals only.”
4th. “The disembarking of ordnance, unless in the instance of
field-pieces let down into the boats ready mounted from ships of war,
however regularly performed, is always liable to some confusion. This
principally arises from the parts of the same natures of carriages not
corresponding so correctly as they might do, particularly in the
diameters of the wheels and arms of the axletrees, which should likewise
be as general throughout the whole as possible. The waggons and carts
being frequently made by contract, are very defective in these points,
even to the fitting of their head and tail-boards; and, trifling as this
may appear to a workman at home, it often occasions delays of
consequence to the service, or credit of those concerned in it abroad.
No nation, in point of economy alone, requires so much attention to the
construction and solid stowage of its military carriages and stores as
Great Britain does, on account of their frequent embarkations, the
expenses of which in the course of a war are prodigiously great.”
5th. “The considerations submitted to the Commander-in-Chief respecting
the first landing of the ordnance and stores, were much approved, and
happily executed with great despatch, notwithstanding some very serious
impediments, arising from the manner of loading the ships _by freight_
(carrying as much as possible without order), instead of being regularly
assorted. The embarking troops also on board such ships is always
attended with, not only great inconvenience, but considerable damage,
from the quantity of water necessary to carry for them, the waste and
leakage of which injures the carriages and stores considerably
underneath, besides the difficulty it occasions of getting at them when
required for service. In the preparations for landing at Cadiz, seventy
tons of water were obliged to be first removed from one ship only. Great
inconveniences were also found from the magnitude of some of the ships,
which could not be brought within some miles of the shore. They should
for such services never exceed 600 tons, and a moderate draught of
water.”
6th. “Carronades might certainly be employed in the land service to
considerable advantage in many situations, particularly on the flanks or
firing over the parapets of fortifications and for field-works in
general. It would also be very well worth while to have some experiments
tried with them in breaching walls and earthworks. The common objection
made to their shortness injuring the embrasures has more of imagination
than reality in it. They may be advanced the extent of any gun mounted
upon a travelling carriage, and much farther than the largest garrison
howitzer, with less explosion of powder. If their present carriages are
found to recoil too far, it is easily checked by only laying a few
filled sand-bags upon them, and in the rear, as was practised in Egypt
with perfect success; or it may be checked by small iron wedges with
chains, placed to receive the fore-trucks upon.”
7th. “The arrangement made of the spare field-ammunition on the passage
from Marmorice Bay to the coast of Egypt was very fortunate, as it
proved impossible to have carried any quantity forward otherwise, for
want of conveyance, excepting a few camels taken from the enemy on the
first landing in Aboukir Bay.”
8th. “The 3-pounder light guns, patched up as they were, gave
considerable confidence to the Dragoons. This calibre might be rendered
very useful to Cavalry in general by an increase of dimensions, to 4½
feet in length, and about 4 cwt. in weight, with carriages upon a quick
travelling construction, not overloaded with ammunition, which our
service is rather liable to.
“Foreigners frequently observe the singularity of shafts being preferred
in the British Artillery carriages to poles, made use of by all other
nations as being simpler, lighter, and cheaper; added to which the
experience of having travelled over the most difficult features of
Europe, and ground of every description with them, fully evinces their
perfect sufficiency. A strong instance of the inconvenience of shafts
occurred to us at Rahmanich: just as one of the 6-pounders was limbering
up, the shaft-horse was killed by the enemy; much time was lost in
clearing the carriage from him, and the harness being also damaged,
rendered it difficult to apply another in his place.
“In the marching of the 12-pounders to Grand Cairo (drawn by oxen with a
horse in the shafts) the want of double or travelling trunnion-boxes was
much regretted. Some few carriages were formerly so constructed for the
Horse Artillery, but why discontinued remains unknown, as they are
undoubtedly very advantageous to a heavy draught or indifferent horses.
“In moving the 24-pounder guns across the country from the first
position near Cairo (where a bridge of boats to communicate with the
Grand Vizier’s army was thrown over the Nile) for the attack of Gizeh,
the axletrees of the sling-carts giving way, the medium 12-pounder
carriages were appropriated to this purpose, the trench-carts carrying
the mortars, standing carriages, &c.”
9th. “No carriage appears to want reform more than the common Artillery
waggon. There is too much of it merely for carrying ammunition, and it
is too narrow for baggage or bulky stores. In the alterations made for
the proposed arrangement of spare ammunition, the boxes will require for
hard roads to be more securely fixed than was necessary for travelling
in Egypt.”
10th. “The inclined plane, or purchase for raising weights upon the
trench-carts, might prove very useful, upon a larger scale, for mounting
or dismounting heavy ordnance without being obliged to make use of a
gin, which not only requires a number of men to work, and a carriage to
convey it to a battery, but when fixed there becomes a considerable
object to the enemy besieged. This proposed machine being quite free
from all these inconveniences makes it extremely well worth while to try
the experiment for such occasions.”
11th. “If the mode mentioned of preventing narrow wheels from sinking in
deep sandy situations should have the appearance of possessing more
fancy than judgment, it must be placed to the variety of obstacles which
hourly presented themselves in Egypt, and called for every assistance
the mind could catch at to surmount. And still perhaps the idea may lead
to something useful even in a northern climate, passing over snow, &c.”
12th.... “The extraordinary heavy weights of the iron mortars and beds
proved a great embarrassment without any peculiar advantage derived from
them. Indeed, where no considerable extent of range is required--as is
the case in most attacks--brass mortars mounted upon proportional iron
beds seem in general much preferable, at least under 13 inches in
diameter....”
13th. “Flat boats are the best and most useful conveyance for troops,
and ordnance, possible; every means, therefore, should be employed to
preserve them from injury. Though apparently slight, it is surprising
what they can bear. In moving the stores up Lake Etcho, for the attack
of Fort Julian, some of them were dragged three miles over sand and
mudbank. The battering-pieces for this service were obliged to be landed
on the open sea-beach, and conveyed four miles across the deserts and
swamps to their batteries. These laborious and difficult operations were
frequently repeated during the expedition. Upwards of thirty 24-pounders
were disembarked from the ordnance ships, conveyed by boats up Aboukir
Lake, and landed near the head of it for the attack of Alexandria. From
thence twenty were returned to the ships in Aboukir Bay, conveyed to the
mouth of the western branch of the Nile, disembarked and taken over that
dangerous bar by _sea-jerms_, landed at Fort St. Julian, re-embarked
there in _river-jerms_, in order to proceed up the Nile. Several were
landed within four miles of Grand Cairo, and conveyed from thence twelve
miles across the country, for the attack of Gizeh;--returned back after
the surrender of Cairo by the same route, and exactly in like manner to
Alexandria;--relanded there for further operations of attacks carrying
on both on the eastern and western side of it,--the capitulation of
which concluding the campaign, they were again conveyed to the ships in
Aboukir Bay.
“Besides the articles already detailed, numerous minute circumstances
happened in the course of the campaign, which necessity continually
urged the imagination to provide against. Every movement by land or
water was attended with infinite labour and difficulties; added to which
the violent heat of the sun, and shocks received by passing over the
formidable cracks it occasioned in the ground (annually overflowed by
the Nile) on the march to Cairo operated so powerfully on the carriages,
as to require perpetual attention and daily repair--without the most
common materials for such occasions, either of wood or iron, to be found
in the country.
“N.B. The oxen drew very well upon common ground, but in deep sand they
generally became restive. The large-sized mules were excellent in
draught when well-disposed; but, from their natural obstinacy, it was
found best to intermix them with horses.”
RETURN OF ORDNANCE CAPTURED IN EGYPT.
No. of Pieces.
In the Field On the 8th March 5
On the 13th ” 3
On the 21st ” 2
On the 22nd August 7
Garrisons Aboukir Castle 11
Fort Julian 15
Fort Burlos 5
Grand Cairo and Dependencies 121
Gizeh Lines and Arsenal 530
Alexandria Arsenal 411
Island of Marabout 10
Damietta and Walls of Lesbie, &c. 54
Ships of war in the Harbour of Alexandria 77
----
Total number of pieces 1251
----
N.B.--Besides the above, the French were allowed to embark 50
field-pieces from Cairo, and 10 from Alexandria.
The extremely interesting notes just quoted, although relating more to
questions of _matériel_ than _personnel_, still give a clear idea of the
difficulties attending the movements of the Artillery in Egypt, the
overcoming of which was no less honourable, if, indeed, not more so,
than their marked courage in the field. In alluding to the latter, a
very brief sketch of the campaign will suffice.
On the morning of the 8th March, 1801, the English army disembarked in
Aboukir Bay under a heavy fire, and drove back the French with a loss of
five guns. On the 13th the severe action known as the affair of
Nicopolis took place, in which the French were again defeated, but not
[Sidenote: Cust.] without a loss to the English of 1300, killed and
wounded. The siege of Aboukir Castle followed, the bombardment
[Sidenote: Browne.] being conducted by Major Cookson, and it surrendered
on the 19th. On the 21st, the memorable battle of Alexandria was
fought,--memorable not merely for its victorious result, but also for
the irreparable loss which the English army suffered in the death of Sir
R. Abercromby. The conduct of the Artillery in the battle attracted
great attention; the [Sidenote: Stewart’s ‘Highlanders of Scotland.’]
precision of their fire was strongly commended, and, but for the
wretched animals with which the guns were horsed, an advance of the army
might have then taken place, which would have ensured the immediate fall
of Alexandria. [Sidenote: Browne.] Lieutenants H. Sturgeon, J. G.
Burslem, and D. Campbell, of the Royal Artillery, were wounded. The
battle had been waged mainly on the right of the English army, and
before the end of the day the ammunition of both Artillery and Cavalry
on the English right was all but exhausted, so much so that “on an
attempt of the French to advance anew against this flank, the soldiers
of the 28th actually [Sidenote: Cust.] pelted them with stones.”
Unfortunately for the modern Artilleryman, General Lawson was a very bad
correspondent during the war; and when the student commences anxiously
to search for his despatches to the Ordnance, he finds, [Sidenote:
Colonel Macleod to General Lawson.] instead, indignant remonstrances
addressed to the gallant General for his silence. He was so occupied
with overcoming the natural difficulties of the expedition, that he had
no time for writing; and he valued no words of commendation, which were
spoken with regard to his services, so much as those referring to the
chief engineer and himself, which formed part of a despatch written by
General Hutchinson, [Sidenote: ‘London Gazette,’ 22 October, 1801.] the
successor of Sir R. Abercromby:--“The skill and perseverance of those
two officers have overcome difficulties which at first appeared almost
insurmountable.”
The arrival of a Turkish division, 6000 strong, to support him, on the
3rd April, 1801, induced General Hutchinson, who succeeded Sir R.
Abercromby in the command, to carry the war farther up the Nile, instead
of waiting before Alexandria. He commenced with some detached
operations: Rosetta surrendered on the 8th, and Fort St. Julian, after
[Sidenote: Browne’s ‘England’s Artillerymen.’] a bombardment, on the
19th. “On the 18th April a mortar battery, erected against Fort St.
Julian, under the direction of Captains Lemoine and Duncan, fired some
shells with remarkable accuracy: one of them pitched on the centre of
the roof, and tore away the flagstaff and colours, which the French
never dared to erect again.”
The great events of the campaign were the surrender of Cairo on the
28th June, 1801, and of Alexandria on the 2nd September. It was during
the march on Cairo that the ingenuity and endurance of the Royal
Artillery were most severely tried. Other writers have borne
testimony--in glowing, but not exaggerated terms--to the gallantry of
the other arms of the service in this campaign; and it must not be
assumed that the necessary allusions to a particular corps in a work
like this imply any assertion of superiority; such conduct would be at
once unjust, and subversive of the main purpose of this history. There
are regiments, the very mention of whose names brings instinctively to
the hearer’s memory the brave story of Egypt; but, where all were brave,
the special professional duties of Artillerymen obtained for those, who
served in that capacity, opportunities of displaying energy and
ingenuity which were denied to others. There have been campaigns where
the exertions of the Infantry have dwarfed those of the other arms;
there have been occasions--sung by poets, and boasted of with just pride
by all Englishmen--when the honour of England was entrusted to her
Cavalry, and was brought back with redoubled lustre; it is, therefore,
in no spirit of depreciation of the other arms that the services of the
Artillery are especially pointed out, during a campaign where the
hardest work was not in battle, and in a work which hopes to hand down
to their successors the merits of those who, in Egypt, were responsible
for their Regiment’s reputation. It is with such a hope that words like
the following, referring to the siege [Sidenote: Stewart’s ‘Highlanders
of Scotland.’] of Alexandria, are reproduced:--“The proceedings against
Alexandria showed to what a pitch of perfection the British Artillery
had arrived. The battery on the Greenhill opened at six o’clock on the
morning of the 26th August, and before mid-day the enemy were completely
silenced, their batteries destroyed, and their guns withdrawn. On the
west of Alexandria, the tower of Marabout was bombarded from a battery
commanded by Captain Curry,[9] of the Royal Artillery. The first shot
struck the tower, four feet from the ground; every succeeding shot
struck the same spot; and in this manner he continued, never missing his
mark, till a large hole was in a manner completely bored through, when
the building fell, and, filling up the surrounding ditch, the place was
instantly surrendered.”
At the surrender of Cairo no fewer than 13,754 French were present, and
were allowed to evacuate Egypt; and at Alexandria, where General Menou,
the French Commander, [Sidenote: Cust.] was stationed,--11,000 French
soldiers, exclusive of civilians, surrendered to the English. In a
campaign which lasted only from March to September, the power of the
French in Egypt, and even their presence, disappeared. Prior to the
capitulation of General Menou, he made a strong effort to drive the
English from before Alexandria. This took place on the 22nd August, and
in the general orders issued after the engagement the following words
appeared:--“The brunt of the day fell on the Artillery, under the
command of Major Cookson, and the advance corps, who used every
exertion, and showed much discipline.” It is also mentioned by a
[Sidenote: Browne, author of ‘England’s Artillerymen.’] writer often
quoted in these pages, whose industry becomes more and more apparent the
more his work is studied, that “the celerity with which the guns at the
siege of Alexandria had been brought up was a remarkable instance of
zeal, as they had to be carried over almost inaccessible rocks.”
Two events occurred during the campaign, which deserve mention. A
contingent of troops arrived from India under Sir David Baird, including
some of the East India Company’s Artillery. The first instalment arrived
on the 10th June, and was present at the surrender of Cairo by the
French; and Sir David, with the main body, arrived in sufficient time to
witness the successful termination of the siege of Alexandria, and with
it the conclusion of the war.
The second event involves some explanation. In 1798 a detachment of the
Royal Artillery was ordered to Turkey to assist in the instruction and
organization of the Turkish Artillery, and in the strengthening of their
fortifications. The officer in command was Brigadier-General Koehler,
who had as a subaltern attracted attention during the great Siege of
Gibraltar, and who had been almost continuously employed on the Staff of
the army since that time. The Artillery officers who accompanied him
were Majors Hope and Fead, Captain Martin Leake, and Assistant-Surgeon
Wittman. The duties of these officers, as far as can be learned from the
correspondence which is extant, were of a somewhat motley
order,--embracing artillery, engineering, archæology, and military
organization. Their travels in Turkey, Greece, Syria, and Egypt were
very extensive; and if we may judge from a quaint manuscript in the
Royal Artillery Record Office, describing a journey made by them to
Jerusalem, they must have travelled as royal personages. General Koehler
died on the 29th December, 1800, of a malignant fever, which had carried
off his wife and many of his detachment; and the regret and positive
grief, which were felt by English and Turks alike, were strongly
expressed [Sidenote: Major Hope, R.A., to D. A. General, January 1801.]
in Major Hope’s reports to England. After his death, Major Hope, with
the remainder of the detachment, accompanied the Grand Vizier and the
Turkish contingent, which went to Egypt to swell the English forces, and
earned well-deserved praise before Cairo, where the union between them
and the latter took place. Major Hope’s abilities as an Artilleryman
received favourable mention from the Grand Vizier. After the conclusion
of the campaign, Captain Leake obtained special employment in the
Turkish dominions, and that he attained no mean position in the
scientific and literary world may be gathered from the [Sidenote:
Obituary notice of Lieut.-Col. W. M. Leake, R.A., in Address of the
President of the Royal Geographical Society, May 1860.] following
obituary notice:--“On the 6th January, 1860, Colonel Leake passed from
us, after a short and sudden illness. His intellect never weakened; his
energies scarcely relaxed, notwithstanding the weight of eighty-three
years. The Greek minister, at his own desire, followed him to the grave,
expressing thereby the gratitude of his country to one who had spared no
effort on behalf of the Greek nationality, and had done so much by his
works towards elucidating the remarkable features of the land of Greece,
and the scenes of her glorious history. In him we have lost not only a
scholar and an antiquary, but one other link (when so few survived) that
connected us to the politics, the literature, and the society of the
foregone generation.”
On the 16th November, 1801, an order was issued for the withdrawal of
the companies from Egypt, under which Captain Beevor’s company of the
3rd Battalion, and Captain Cookson’s, Major Sprowle’s, and Captain
Wood’s of the 5th, returned to England; and Major Borthwick’s, Captain
Lemoine’s, and Captain Adye’s proceeded to Gibraltar. Major Borthwick
remained in command of his company during the war, although, by the
records of the 2nd Battalion, to which it belonged, Captain Mudge had
been posted to it some time previously, an appointment which must have
been subsequently cancelled, doubtless owing to his being employed by
Government on the Trigonometrical Survey of Great Britain. In this
occupation he was engaged during the greater part of his life, and his
admirable conduct of the survey procured for him numerous literary and
scientific distinctions.
Among the officers of artillery who received special mention for their
services in Egypt, besides General Lawson, [Sidenote: Kane’s List.] were
Major Cookson, who, in addition to receiving high praise in general
orders and despatches, was appointed, on the 29th October, 1801,
commandant of the ancient Pharos Castle and of all the Artillery in
Egypt, and was presented with a gold medal by the Grand Vizier; Captains
Lemoine, A. Duncan, and S. G. Adye. Major Thompson, who had received
brevet rank of Colonel during the war, died of wounds received on the
9th May, 1801, near Ramanieh; and it should be mentioned that General
Lawson himself was severely wounded at the battle of Alexandria.
By General orders of 31st October and 1st November, 1803, the officers,
non-commissioned officers, and men of the various companies which had
served in Egypt were permitted to wear the “Sphynx,” with the word
“Egypt” on their regimental caps; but the distinction was a _personal_
one, and not to be perpetuated in the companies. In regiments of the
Line the distinction is perpetuated by emblazonment on their colours.
Although, however, the decoration itself was but personal, the
traditions of the deeds which it commemorated are the inheritance of the
batteries, whose predecessors fought under the shadow of the Pyramids.
Let them treasure the memories of gallantry and of difficulties
overcome, and in the hours of their own toils and dangers let them
“remember Egypt.”
* * * * *
_Note._--Detachments of two, if not three companies, in addition
to those named above, were present in Egypt, and will be found
mentioned in the tables in Volume i.