BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD).
The 8th of June was a day of preparation on both sides. Pleasonton
was engaged in collecting his troops and getting everything in
readiness to beat up the enemy's quarters the next morning, and
Stuart was preparing to cross for the purpose of either making a
raid on the railroad, as Pleasonton states, or to take up a position
to guard the right flank of the invading force as it passed by our
army. Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, asserts the
latter. Pleasonton's information was founded on captured despatches,
and on interviews held by some of our officers with the Confederates
under a flag of truce.
The four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down near the
river opposite Beverly Ford on the 7th, to cover the proposed
crossing. They were imperfectly supported by the remainder of
Stuart's force. Jones' brigade was posted on the road to Beverly
Ford, that of Fitz Lee* on the other side of Hazel River; that of
Robertson along the Rappahannock below the railroad; that of W. H.
F. Lee on the road to Melford Ford, and that of Hampton in reserve,
near Fleetwood Hill--all too far off to be readily available. In
fact, the batteries were entirely unsuspicious of danger, although
they were a quarter of a mile from the nearest support and there
was only a thin line of pickets between their guns and the river.
[* A familiar abbreviation for Fitz Hugh Lee, adopted in the rebel
reports.]
In the meantime Pleasonton's three divisions, "stiffened"--to use
one of Hooker's expressions--by two brigades of infantry, stole
down to the fords and lay there during the night, quietly, and
without fires, ready at the first dawn of day to spring upon their
too-confident adversaries and give them a rude awakening.
Pleasonton in person remained with Buford's division--the First--
which was lying near Beverly Ford with Ames' infantry brigade.
The other two divisions, the Second, under Colonel Duffie, and the
Third, under General Gregg--supported by Russell's infantry brigade,
were in bivouac opposite Kelly's Ford.
As each commander is apt to overstate the enemy's force and underrate
his own, it is not always easy to get at the facts. Pleasonton
claims that the rebels had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve
guns. Major McClellan of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine
thousand three hundred and thirty-five men, on paper, and twenty
guns; but states there were nearly three thousand absentees.
General Gregg estimates the Union cavalry at about nine thousand
men and six batteries, but--as will be seen hereafter--a third of
this force was detached toward Stevensburg, and their operations
had little or no effect on the general result. The batteries do
not seem to have been brought forward in time to be of much service.
At daybreak Pleasonton's troops began to cross; Buford's division
and Ames' infantry at Beverly Ford; the other two divisions, under
Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's infantry at Kelly's Ford, six
miles below. Each division was accompanied by two light batteries.
Pleasonton's plan was founded on the erroneous supposition that
the enemy were at Culpeper. He used the infantry to keep the lines
of retreat open, and directed the cavalry to rendezvous at Brandy
Station. They were to arrive there at the same time, and attack
together. Duffie's column was to make a circuit by way of Stevensburg.
Unfortunately, Stuart was not at Culpeper, but at Brandy Station;
that is, he occupied the point where they were to rendezvous, and
the plan therefore appertained practically to the same vicious
system of converging columns against a central force. What happened
may be briefly stated as follows: The First Division, under Buford,
came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford. A
battle ensued at St. James' Church, and as their whole force
confronted him, and they had twenty pieces of artillery, he was
unable to break their line. After fighting some hours he was
obliged to turn back with a portion of his command to repel an
attempt against his line of retreat. Gregg next appeared upon the
scene, and succeeded in getting in Stuart's rear before the rebel
general knew he was there. Buford having gone back toward Beverly
Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's
force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie. It can
hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action,
for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day. And
then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered
a retreat.
For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state
that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry,
is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of
the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less
scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of
a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and
strike in mass.
Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a
company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy
had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and
therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that
had been lost.
Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against
Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our
cavalry back across the river.
Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his
reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled
Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel
cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder
of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route
of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original
intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy.
GETTYSBURG.
CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.
An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and
necessary, it only remained to select the most available route.
There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would
have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be
crossed were controlled by our gunboats.
To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the
immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous,
because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is
liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced.
It would seem that Lee's first intention was to move along the
eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.* The
appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt
and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and
induce him to make an attack. In such a case, as the rebels were
in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at
Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result.
This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back
that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements.
This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy
Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah
Valley, which had many advantages. The mountain wall that intervened
between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for
it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through
the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold
against a superior force. If Hooker had attempted to assail these
positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other
two captured Washington.
[* See map facing page 1.]
The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the
valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense
with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country.
There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress
in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier,
Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at
Winchester.
It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared
of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed
and capture his convoys.
With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through
Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to
Chester Gap and Front Royal.
The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in
Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was
better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and
retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the
enemy's approach. Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders
from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament
and supplies back to Harper's Ferry. Milroy remonstrated, saying
that he could hold the place against any force that would probably
attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacrifice the Union men
who looked to him for protection.
In reply to this Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but
must be in readiness to retreat whenever circumstances made it
necessary.
Milroy, in answer to another inquiry, reported that he could move
in six hours.
On the 12th he sent out two scouting parties, and learned there
was a considerable force at Cedarsville, which he thought might
form part of Stuart's raid, information of which had been communicated
to him.
He could not believe it possible that an entire rebel corps was
near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg.
His superiors had not informed him, as they should have done by
telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. He
thought if Lee left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of
the Potomac would follow and he would receive full information and
instructions. He telegraphed General Schenck late that night for
specific orders, whether to hold his post or to retreat on Harper's
Ferry, stating there appeared to be a considerable force in front
of him. As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he never received
any answer. He sent a messenger the same night to notify Colonel
McReynolds, at Berryville, that there was a large body of the enemy
on the Front Royal road, and directed him to send out scouts to
Millwood, and keep himself advised of its approach, in order that
he might prepare to fall back on Winchester the moment he was
attacked by superior numbers.
On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions directly on Winchester,
while he sent the third--that of Rodes--to take Berryville. Thanks
to the timely warning McReynolds had received, his brigade got off
in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery, the 6th
Maryland Infantry, and part of the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry.
These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the
main body. Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at
Opequan Creek, where he made a fierce attack, which was promptly
repulsed by the rear guard, aided by the artillery with canister.
After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command
reached Winchester at 10 P.M.--a march of thirty miles.
Soon after the affair at the Opequan, Major Morris, with 200 men,
was attacked at Bunker Hill, an outlying post of Winchester. He
occupied a fortified church, but moved out to meet the enemy, under
the impression it was only a small raiding party. When he found
two thousand men in line of battle he retreated, fighting, to the
church again. There, as the doors were barricaded, and the walls
loopholed, the rebels could make no impression, and were obliged
to fall back to a respectful distance. In the night Morris managed
to steal away, and soon rejoined the main body at Winchester.
The arrival of these reinforcements seriously embarrassed Milroy;
and it will be seen hereafter that it would have been much better
for all concerned if they had retreated to Harper's Ferry at once.
They acted, however, strictly in obedience to orders.
Rodes' division, after the taking of Berryville, kept on towards
Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point.
On the morning of the 13th Milroy had sent out a detachment under
General Elliot on the Strasburg road, and another under Colonel
Ely on the Front Royal road, to reconnoitre. Eliott found no enemy,
and returned. An attempt was made to cut him off from the town,
but it was repulsed. His troops were then massed on the south side
behind Mill Creek and a mill-race which ran parallel to it, and
were protected by stone fences. Colonel Ely had a brisk artillery
skirmish with Ewell's advance, and then fell back to Winchester,
taking post at the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads.
The enemy did not attempt to cross the creek that night, but at 5
P.M. they advanced and captured a picket-post which commanded the
Strasburg road, but were soon driven out.
From a prisoner captured in this skirmish Milroy learned the highly
important intelligence that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and
that Longstreet was rapidly approaching.
The most natural course under the circumstances would have been
for him to retreat at once, but McReynolds' brigade had just arrived,
exhausted by their forced march, and could go no further, without
some hours' rest. To move without them would be to sacrifice a
large part of his force. He still cherished the hope that Hooker's
army would follow Lee up closely and come to his relief.
Ewell at night directed Early's division to attack the works on
the north and west of the town at daylight the next morning, while
Johnson's division demonstrated against the east and southeast.
Early on Sunday, the 14th, Milroy sent out a detachment to see if
the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney
roads. The party returned about 2 P.M. and reported the roads
clear, but soon after the rebels came in great force from that
direction, so that Milroy's hopes of escaping by the routes leading
to the northwest were dissipated. Immediately west of Winchester,
and parallel with Applebie Ridge, on which the main forts were
situated, there is another ridge called Flint Ridge, where rifle
pits had been commenced to command the Pughtown and Romney roads.
These were held by one regiment, and part of another under Colonel
Keifer of the 110th Ohio, together with Battery "L" of the 5th
United States Artillery. Early's division made a sudden attack
there, preliminary to which he opened fire with four batteries.
He charged into these rifle-pits and took them, but the garrison
retreated successfully, under cover of the fire, from the main
works above, which were held by Elliot's and McReynolds' brigades.
This was followed by an artillery duel, which was kept up until 8
P.M. without any special results.
Johnson's division at daybreak attacked the eastern side of the
town, held by Colonel Ely's brigade, but was gallantly met and
repulsed by the 8th Pennsylvania and 87th Pennsylvania. These two
regiments, by Milroy's order, made a bold charge against the enemy
as they were retiring, but the latter were so suddenly and strongly
reinforced that the two regiments were glad to get back to their
shelter in the fortified suburbs. They were followed up however,
and after severe fighting Johnson gained possession of a part of
the town. This apparent success proved of no avail, for the forts
above shelled him out. He therefore retired and made no further
attempt in that direction.
Darkness ended the struggle for the day. Johnson then left one
brigade to prevent Milroy from escaping toward the east and went
off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg
pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept Milroy's
retreat in that direction.
While these events were going on in the Valley, Imobden's cavalry
was engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near
Romney, to prevent Milroy from receiving any reinforcements from
the west.
The latter now found himself in a perilous situation. His cannon
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations
for his men. He resolved to give up all further attempts to defend
the place, to abandon his wagon train and artillery, and to force
his way through the hostile lines that night; taking with him only
the horses and small arms. This involved his leaving also his sick
and wounded, but it was unavoidable. He ordered all the guns
spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the cisterns.
At 1 A.M. on the 15th, he moved silently out through a ravine and
was not molested until he struck the Martinsburg road, about four
miles from the town. There Elliot, who was in the advance with
his brigade, met a rebel skirmish line, and soon ascertained that
their main body were formed, partly on high ground in a woods east
of the road, and partly in an open field east of and adjoining the
woods. The enemy were in effect sheltered by a stone fence which
bordered a railroad cut, with their reserve and artillery principally
posted on elevated ground in the rear.
The only thing to do was to break through their lines as soon as
possible. It was now about 3:30 A.M. Elliot, whose record of
long, careful, and brilliant service in the regular army is an
exemplary one, formed line of battle with his three regiments and
fought the six regiments that held the road for about an hour with
varied success, encountering a severe artillery fire and driving
back their right in disorder by a gallant charge of the 110th Ohio
and 122d Ohio; but unfortunately their left held firm, in spite of
repeated attacks made by Colonel Shawl with two regiments, reinforced
with two more and by part of Colonel Ely's brigade. Their force
in front, too, was sustained by heavy reserves both of infantry
and artillery.
A signal-gun fired at Winchester showed that the enemy there were
aware of the flight and were in full pursuit. The main road being
blocked, Milroy determined to try another, and directed the troops
to fall back a short distance and turn to the right. Part of them
did so, but the greater number, through some misunderstanding,
filed to the left, and took the road to Bath. It was no longer
possible to reunite the two columns and as Milroy's horse was shot
under him about this time, he could use no personal exertions to
remedy the disaster. A portion of the command who were not pursued
reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon.
Those who moved out on the Bath road also made good their escape,
crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and rallied at Bloody Run. The
greater part of Colonel Ely's brigade, and Colonel McReynolds'
brigade, however, were captured. Milroy claims to have brought
off 5,000 men of the garrison, and that the 2,000 paroled by Early,
consisted principally of the sick and wounded. Early says he sent
108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners to Richmond.
Johnson, who intercepted the retreat, says he captured 2,300
prisoners, 175 horses, and 11 battle flags.
While two-thirds of Ewell's corps were attacking Winchester, the
other division under Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry,
pursued McReynolds' wagon train to Martinsburg, arriving there late
in the afternoon of the 14th. The town was held as an outlying
post of Harper's Ferry by a small detachment of all arms under
Colonel Tyler, a subordinate of General Tyler, who formed his men
outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until night, when
his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry
to Williamsport. In carrying out these movements, however, he lost
five guns and five caissons. He passed the river and rejoined the
main body at Harper's Ferry. The latter place is wholly indefensible
against an enemy holding the hills around it. It is like fighting
at the bottom of a well. General Tyler had therefore very wisely
moved across the river to Maryland Heights, where he had a strong
fortified post. From that commanding eminence he could very soon
shell out any force that attempted to occupy the town.
The Shenandoah valley was now clear of Union troops, and soon became
the great highway of the invasion. However disastrous Milroy's
defeat may be considered on account of the losses incurred, it was
not without its compensation. The detention of Ewell's force there
gave time to the general Government and the Governors of the loyal
States to raise troops and organize resistance, and it awakened
the entire North to the necessity of immediate action.
Hooker, having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, advanced
his right to prevent any crossing in his immediate vicinity, and
confine the enemy to the Valley route. He sent the Third Corps to
hold the fords opposite Culpeper, and the Fifth Corps to guard
those lower down.
On the 13th he gave up his position opposite Fredericksburg, and
started north toward Washington, giving orders to Sedgwick to
recross and follow on to Dumfries. That night the First Corps
reached Bealeton, and the Eleventh Catlett's station. Reynolds
was placed in command of the left wing of the army (the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps) and I relieved him in command of the
First Corps. The right wing (that is the Second, Fifth, Twelfth,
and Sixth Corps) was accompanied by Hooker in person, who reached
Dumfries on the 14th.
As soon as Hill saw Sedgwick disappear behind the Stafford hills,
he broke up his camp and started for Culpeper.
Some changes in the meantime had occurred in the Army of the Potomac,
and General Hancock was assigned to the Second Corps instead of
General Couch, who had been sent to organize the department of the
Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
The teamsters and fugitives from Winchester, making for Chambersburg
in all haste, told the inhabitants of the towns through which they
passed that the rebels were close behind them. This created the
wildest excitement. As many cases had occurred in which negroes
had been seized, and sent South to be sold as slaves, the whole
colored population took to the woods and filled up the roads in
all directions. The appearance of Jenkins' brigade, who crossed
at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th and reached Chambersburg
the same day, added to the alarm.
Jenkins was at the head of 2,000 cavalry, and soon became a terror
to the farmers in that vicinity by his heavy exactions in the way
of horses, cattle, grain, etc. It must be confessed he paid for
what he took in Confederate scrip, but as this paper money was not
worth ten cents a bushel, there was very little consolation in
receiving it. His followers made it a legal tender at the stores
for everything they wanted. Having had some horses stolen, he
sternly called on the city authorities to pay him their full value.
They did so without a murmur--_in Confederate money._ He pocketed
it with a grim smile, evidently appreciating the joke. He boasted
greatly of his humanity and his respect for private property, but
if the local papers are to be believed, it must be chronicled to
his everlasting disgrace that he seized a great many negroes, who
were tied and sent South as slaves. Black children were torn from
their mothers, placed in front of his troops, and borne off to
Virginia to be sold for the benefit of his soldiers. There was
nothing out of character in that, he thought, for it was one of
the sacred rights for which the South was contending.
Prompt measures were taken by the Northern States to meet the
emergency. Mr. Lincoln called on the Governors of West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York to raise 120,000 men for
temporary service. It was easy to get the men, but difficult to
arm them, as nearly all serviceable muskets were already in possession
of the Army of the Potomac. As early as the 9th two new departments
had been created for Pennsylvania: That of the Monongahela, with
headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H.
Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Carlisle,
to Major-General Darius N. Couch.
On the 15th Ewell reached Williamsport with a force estimated at
twelve thousand men and sixteen guns.
Before Couch could reach Carlisle it was already occupied by Jenkins'
cavalry, and the terrified farmers of that section of country were
fleeing in crowds across the Susquehanna, driving their horses and
cattle before them.
CHAPTER II.
HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE--
ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE.
A shower of telegrams came to Hooker, notifying him of these untoward
events, and demanding protection; but he simply moved one step
toward the enemy. On the 15th he had three corps--the First, Sixth,
and Eleventh--grouped around Centreville, with the Third Corps at
Manassas, and the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps in reserve at
Fairfax Court House. The left flank of the army was guarded by
Pleasonton's cavalry, posted at Warrenton. Hooker was not to be
drawn away from the defence at Washington by any clamorous appeal
for his services elsewhere; his plan being to move parallel to
Lee's line of advance and strike his communications with Richmond
at the first favorable opportunity. He obtained some reinforcements
at this time, Stannard's Second Vermont brigade being assigned to
my division of the First Corps, and Stahel's cavalry division,
about six thousand strong, being directed to report to General
Pleasonton for duty.
As Harrisburg lay directly in the track of the invading army,
Governor Curtin made strenuous efforts to collect a force there.
He called upon all able-bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and
complained that Philadelphia failed to respond. New York acted
promptly, and on the 15th two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on
their way to the front.
On the same day Longstreet, having been relieved by Hill, left
Culpeper with his corps and marched directly across the country
east of the Blue Ridge to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.
Stuart's cavalry were to guard his right flank, but did not leave
until the next day. The object of Longstreet's movement was to
tempt Hooker to abandon his strong position in front of Washington
and march against the Gaps, in which case it was hoped some
opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush the
Army of the Potomac in the open country or possibly outmanoeuvre
it, so as to intervene between it and Washington; but Hooker remained
stationary.
Rodes' division of Ewell's corps reached Williamsport and remained
there during the 16th, 17th, and 18th, to support Jenkins, and
receive, and transmit to the rear, the cattle, horses, negroes,
and provisions, taken by him.
The commotion created by the approach of the invader was not all
one-sided. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, received
orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended at this
time. As through their manifold offences in the way of starving
our prisoners, etc., the rebel President and his cabinet were afraid
of reprisals, there was great dismay at the weakness of the garrison
there, and bitter denunciations of Lee for leaving so small a force
behind. The Union troops for this counter-invasion were landed at
Yorktown and sent on to the White House. General Getty, in command
of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on the 13th as
far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridge over the North and
South Anna, and as much of the railroad as possible, in order to
make a break in Lee's communications. At the same time General
Keyes, with another column of about five thousand men, moved from
the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy, and
thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to advance on the city.
The Davis Government, however, called out the militia and concentrated
enough men for defence by weakening the garrisons in South Carolina
and elsewhere; but there is no doubt the fright at one time was so
serious that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces;
especially on the 15th of June, when it was learned that General
Keyes' column was at New Kent Court House within fifteen miles of
the city.
On the 16th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock--with the
exception of the 15th Virginia, which remained with Hill--and
bivouacked at Salem with Fitz Lee's brigade at Piedmont. Their
orders were to keep along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, and
guard the front of Longstreet's corps in the Gaps.
Our own cavalry were concentrated at Warrenton and Catlett's.
On the 17th Fitz Lee's brigade was sent forward from Piedmont to
Aldie, via Middleburg, to anticipate our troops in holding the Gap
there; it being considered important to occupy the Bull Run range
of mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations. Fitz Lee's
brigade was supported by that of Robertson which was moved to
Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve to W. H. F.
Lee's brigade which had gone forward to occupy Thoroughfare Gap.
No opposition was anticipated in the latter place, Pleasonton having
moved to Centreville, with his main body. Stuart made his headquarters
at Middleburg on the 17th.
Fitz Lee halted near Dover to close up his command, and sent his
pickets on to Aldie Gap. Pleasonton, who was scouting in the
vicinity, had no orders to go through the pass, but felt prompted
to do so by one of those presentiments which rarely deceive. He
pushed on, therefore, with Gregg's division until about 2.30 P.M.,
when he came upon the rebel pickets, who fell back on the main
body. The latter had made a march of forty miles to reach the Gap,
and Fitz Lee chose a strong position on a hill directly west of
Aldie, in which to fight a defensive battle. His line covered the
road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the road to Middleburg
and Ashby's Gap.
A sanguinary contest ensued, which, including the pursuit, lasted
until 9 P.M. The rebel front was strengthened by a ditch and a
line of hay-stacks. After fighting for three hours the battle was
finally decided by a gallant charge of the 1st Maine Cavalry, who,
after our line had been broken and driven back, were led by Kilpatrick
in person, against a regiment of mounted infantry on the Ashby's
Gap road, capturing four guns. The Harris Light Cavalry had been
in disfavor for having failed in an attack at Brandy Station, but
on the present occasion they redeemed themselves, made several
brilliant charges, and greatly contributed to the success of the
day.
The rebels claim to have taken 134 prisoners, and some flags in
this affair, and state that they only fell back to Middleburg in
obedience to Stuart's orders. Ascertaining that Colonel Duffie
was advancing on that place with his division, Stuart thought, by
concentrating his entire force there, he could overwhelm him. This
may account for the retreat, but it is very certain that the loss
of the pass at Aldie was a serious blow to the rebel cause. This,
supplemented by Colonel Duffie's operations, which will be described
hereafter, gave Hooker possession of Loudon County, and threw the
invading column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded in
posting forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains, and
in occupying the wooded country between Thoroughfare Gap and
Leesburg, they would not only have hidden all their own movements
from view, but would have had command of the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry to within thirty miles of Washington, so that they could have
operated on either side of the river.
While Gregg's division were thus engaged, Colonel Duffie started
under orders with his regiment from Centreville for Middleburg, by
way of Thoroughfare Gap. The enemy (W. H. F. Lee's brigade) were
already there, but he forced them out, and kept on to Middleburg,
which was reached about 9.30 A.M. He found Stuart's rear guard or
escort there, and drove them out. Stuart fell back to Rector's
Cross Roads, and sent word to all his forces to concentrate against
Duffie. Duffie barricaded the streets of the town and prepared to
hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldie, not being
aware that there was any impediment in that direction. At 7 P.M.
the different rebel brigades advanced on him from the direction of
Aldie, Union, and Upperville. By sheltering his men behind stone
walls and barricades, he repelled several assaults, but at last
was surrounded by overwhelming forces, and compelled to retreat by
the road upon which he had advanced in the morning. He fell back
until he crossed Little River, picketed the stream and halted there
to get some rest. This gave time to the enemy to surround him,
and by half past one the next morning all the roads in the neighborhood
were full of cavalry; an entire brigade being formed on that which
led to Aldie. He tried to force his way through the latter, but
was received with heavy volleys on both flanks, and with loud calls
to surrender. He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby, who
were in advance, to charge through everything in front of them,
and the way was cleared for the main body, which at last gained
the junction of the Aldie road with that which leads to White
Plains. He then retreated on the latter, with his men all intermixed
with those of the enemy and fighting every step of the way. He
finally disengaged his force from this _mélée_ and made his way
through Hopewell Gap back to Centreville, losing two-thirds of his
command.
In this affair at Middleburg, Stuart states that he was unable with
his entire force to drive the 1st Rhode Island regiment from a
position it had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry
it displayed.
On the 18th, Stuart took post outside of that town with Robertson
and W. H. F. Lee's brigade. Fitz Lee's brigade was on his left at
Union, and Jones' brigade was ordered up as a reserve.
Pleasonton moved forward with all his available force and occupied
Middleburg and Philemont on the road to Snicker's Gap; releasing
some of Duffie's men who had been captured the day before. Gregg's
division encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middleburg
and drove them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap. There
was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of fighting was
adopted on both sides, by taking advantage of every stone, fence,
bush, or hollow, to shelter the men. Before the action was over
Kilpatrick's command came up and took a prominent part.
Buford's division, which had advanced beyond Philemont on the
Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged. They turned the
left flank of the rebels and pressed on successfully, but the
squadron left to guard the bridge over Goose Creek was overpowered
by numbers and the bridge was burned. Part of Pleasonton's force
made a reconnoissance toward Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade
there.
On the 19th Pleasonton held the positions he had gained and sent
back for an infantry support.
As there were indications that the whole of Stuart's cavalry would
be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville, Pleasonton went forward
with his entire force and a brigade of infantry to support it.
After a series of brilliant engagements he drove Start steadily
back into Ashby's Gap, where he took refuge behind Longstreet's
Corps, a portion of which came up. Pleasonton then returned to
Upperville and next day to Aldie. The object of these movements--
to gain possession of Loudon County--having been attained, Hooker
was wary, and did not propose to be lured away from his strong
position, to take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a
definite object. He still found it difficult to realize that Lee
would still further lengthen out his long line from Richmond, and
endanger his communications, by invading Pennsylvania; and he
therefore waited for further developments. Lee, however, impelled
by public opinion behind him, which it was hardly safe to brave,
still went forward, and directed Ewell to cross the Potomac with
his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind the Shenandoah to
act in conjunction with Hill, who had relieved Ewell at Winchester
on the 17th, against any attempt to strike the rear of his long
column. Like Achilles he felt that he was only vulnerable in his
heel.
Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments
of General Schenck's command, which picketed the north bank of the
Potomac, and bands of rebel partisans. The former were surprised
and captured in two or three instances. In one of these expeditions
a locomotive and twenty-three cars were disabled on the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. Imboden, too, who occupied Cumberland on the
17th, in order to favor the general plan of invasion, tore up some
miles of the track west of that town, with a view to prevent any
reinforcements coming from that direction.
It would have been much better for the interests of the Southern
Confederacy if Lee, instead of making a downright invasion, had
been content to remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two
corps, while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in
Pennsylvania, and to sever all connection between the East and
West, by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires.
Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to meet
the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent upon nothing
else than the entire subjugation of the North and the occupation
of our principal cities.
Pleasonton's operations having cleared the way, Hooker moved forward
promptly on the 18th to occupy the gaps. The Twelfth Corps were
sent to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thoroughfare
Gap. The other corps formed a second line in reserve. This covered
Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations.
In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's division of
Pennsylvania Reserves, and Abercrombie's division were sent to him.
As the latter was just going out of service, it was of no use.
Hooker contended that his army constituted the proper defence of
Washington, and that it was not necessary to keep a large force
inactive there, who could be of much more service at the front.
The authorities were timid, however, did not see the force of this
reasoning and therefore refused to place Schenck's and Heintzelman's
commands under his orders.
The enemy made a feeble attempt about this time to occupy Harper's
Ferry, but were promptly shelled out by our batteries on Maryland
Heights.
Lee having failed, on account of the discomfiture of his cavalry,
in crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, was forced either to
remain where he was or go forward. Impelled by public opinion he
kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley. Hooker being very desirous
of keeping the invasion west of the Blue Ridge, asked Heintzelman
to co-operate with him by sending the 2,000 men which seemed to be
of no service at Poolesville to the passes of South Mountain, which
is an extension of the same range; but Heintzelman said those passes
were outside of his jurisdiction, and the men were needed in
Poolesville. Hooker replied somewhat angrily that he would try
and do without the men. The two generals had quarreled, and there
was not the best feeling between them.
All of Ewell's corps were across the river on the 22d, and Jenkins'
cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg. He was ordered to remain there
until reinforced, but failed to do so, as Union troops were
approaching from the direction of Carlisle.
Longstreet and Hill were left behind to prevent Hooker from striking
the rear of this long column. Hooker still remained quiescent,
engaged in trying to obtain 15,000 men as reinforcements. He was
but partially successful, for as soon as the New York regiments
reached Baltimore, Lockwood's brigade of Maryland troops, about
three thousand, was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and
was assigned to the Twelfth Corps.
The Army of the Potomac at this time was posted as follows: The
Twelfth Corps at Leesburg, supported by the Eleventh on Goose Creek,
between Leesburg and Aldie; the Fifth Corps near Aldie, and the
Second at the next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps
at Gum Springs. The First Corps was behind the Eleventh and Twelfth
Corps, near Guilford, on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad. Our
cavalry, which had left Aldie, covered the approaches to Leesburg.
On the 23d they had a sharp engagement at Dover, on the road from
Aldie to Leesburg, with part of Stuart's force, who beat up their
quarters, but they drove off their assailants without much
difficulty.
Lee now, with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the
authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard
assemble at Culpeper; a request which was looked upon by Davis as
one quite impossible to carry out, owing to the scarcity of troops,
and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston in the West and Beauregard
in the South.
Two of Ewell's divisions, those of Rodes and Johnson, reached the
frightened town of Chambersburg on the 23d. The other, under Early,
took the road to York, _via_ Gettysburg, and halted on that day at
Waynesborough.
By this time twenty regiments of militia were on their way from
New York to Baltimore and Harrisburg.
Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and Hill at
Shepherdstown, on the 24th. Their columns united at Hagerstown
the next day. Thus supported, Ewell's main body resumed its march
to Carlisle, which it occupied on the 27th; gathering large supplies
there and along the road by means of foraging parties sent out to
depredate on the farmers. As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins'
brigade left for Harrisburg.
Hooker having now satisfied himself that the Capital was safe from
a _coup-de-main_, and that the main body of the rebels were still
marching up the Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel
line on the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy the
gaps at once, in case the enemy turned east, toward Washington and
Baltimore. To carry out this design his army began to cross the
Potomac at Edwards' Ferry on the 25th, and at night Reynolds' corps
was in front and Sickles' corps in rear of Middletown, in readiness
to hold either Crampton's or Turner's Gap. Howard's corps was
thrown forward to Boonsborough.
On the 26th Slocum's corps was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in
conjunction with the garrison there--supposed to be 10,000 strong
--against the enemy's line of communication with Richmond. The
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Md., as
a support to the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps. Gregg's cavalry
division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all
completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick.
On the 25th, Early, leaving his division at Greenwood, went to
Chambersburg to consult Ewell, who gave him definite orders to
occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burn the bridge over
the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoin the main body
at Carlisle.
It seems strange that Lee should suppose that the Union army would
continue inactive all this time, south of Washington, where it was
only confronted by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find
him so totally in the dark with regard to Hooker's movements. It
has been extensively assumed by rebel writers that this ignorance
was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart, who thought it
would be a great benefit to the Confederate cause if he could ride
entirely around the Union lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York.
He had made several of these circuits during his military career,
and had gained important advantages from them in way of breaking
up communications, capturing despatches, etc. It is thought that
he hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his
crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg,
and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly
a mistake. When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted,
his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly
over. As cavalry are the eyes of an army, it has been said that
Stuart's absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and
position of Hooker's army. Stuart has been loudly blamed by the
rebel chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust;
Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it; for he directed
Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington, and move with part
of his force to Carlisle and the other part to Gettysburg. Besides,
Stuart left Robertson's and Jones' brigades behind, with orders to
follow up the rear of the Union army until it crossed, and then to
rejoin the main body. In the meantime they were to hold the gaps
in the Blue Ridge, for fear Hooker might send a force to occupy
them. These two brigades, with Imboden's brigade, and White's
battalion, made quite a large cavalry force: Imboden, however,
was also detached to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to
prevent forces from the West from taking Lee in rear; all of which
goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in regard
to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond.
At 1 A.M. on the 25th, Stuart started on his expedition and advanced
to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came upon Hancock's corps,
which had left Thoroughfare Gap, and was on its way to Gum Springs.
He opened fire against them but was soon driven off. He then
returned to Buckland and Gainesville; for to keep on, in presence
of our troops, would have frustrated the object of his expedition
by indicating its purpose.
This was the day in which Longstreet and Hill united their columns
at Hagerstown. Some Union spies who counted the rebel forces as
they passed through the town made their number to be 91,000 infantry,
280 guns and 1,100 cavalry. This statement, though much exaggerated,
gained great credence at the time, and added to the excitement
among the loyal people throughout the Northern States, while the
copperhead element were proportionally active and jubilant.
On the 26th, General French assumed command of the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights.
On the same day the Richmond Government were much alarmed by the
unexpected appearance of Colonel Spear's 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry
within eleven miles of the city. Spear had made quite a successful
and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines of
communication. He made, too, a very important capture by bringing
in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded at the battle of Brandy
Station, and who was a son of General Robert E. Lee. The Davis
Government had determined to hang one of our captains who was a
prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of General Robert E.
Lee was in our power prevented them from carrying out their intention
for fear he might be hanged by way of retaliation.
Early's division of Ewell's corps stopped at Gettysburg on its way
to York. The other two divisions kept on toward Carlisle.
These movements at once caused Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania to
call out 60,000 men for the defence of the State. They were styled
the emergency militia. As there was little else than shot-guns
for them, these hasty gatherings did not promise to be very
effective.
The Governor still complained of a lack of zeal in Philadelphia.
The people there, said "Isn't this awful!" but very few volunteered.
They soon awoke from their apathy, however, and took prompt measures
to defend the city.
On the 27th the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg,
and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed
on to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg. At the same
time Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern
Central Railroad, and by night he entered York. About the only
opposition he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg,
but this was soon driven away.
There was wild commotion throughout the North, and people began to
feel that the boast of the Georgia Senator Toombs, that he would
call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument,
might soon be realized. The enemy seemed very near and the Army
of the Potomac far away.
On the same day Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing
the Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville. He found our troops
were now all north of this river, so that one object of his expedition
--to detain them on the south side--had failed.
On the 28th he resumed his march, and as he passed close to Washington
and Baltimore, he created considerable excitement in those cities.
At Rockville he came upon a large train full of supplies, on its
way to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort,
after which he kept on in a northerly direction through Brookeville
and Cookesville, travelling all night.
On this day the Adjutant-General at Richmond telegraphed for troops
to be sent there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he
estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty thousand
men, and considered the capital to be in great danger. Neither
Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to have any successes
Lee might obtain at the North supplemented by their own execution
at the South, a result they felt was not wholly improbable, in the
excited state of public feeling at that time, if the city should
be taken.
Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up, continued his
aggressive advance. Early took prompt measures to seize the bridge
over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. If successful, he intended
to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all direct connection
between Philadelphia and the West, by railroad and telegraph. This
done, he proposed to march along the north side of the river,
capture Harrisburg and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle. As Gordon's
brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia,
they found it in flames, the Union commander at Columbia, Colonel
Frick, having given orders for its destruction. Early gained some
compensation for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution
on York of one-hundred thousand dollars in cash; two hundred barrels
of flour; thirty thousand bushels of corn; one thousand pairs of
shoes, etc.
The Union army still remained in Frederick, with the left wing
(three corps) under Reynolds thrown out toward the enemy, the
Eleventh Corps under Howard at Boonsborough, the First Corps under
my command at Middletown, supported by the Third Corps under Birney,
two or three miles in rear, with Buford's division of cavalry
holding the passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry
being at Frederick.
Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison of 10,000 men in a
passive attitude at Harper's Ferry. I think he was quite right,
for the war could not be decided by the possession of military
posts or even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until
one army or the other was destroyed. He therefore applied to
Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocum, in
order that the two might act directly against Lee's communications
by following up his rear while preserving their own line of retreat.
Slocum had been already ordered there, for this purpose, but Halleck
would not consent that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be
withdrawn under any circumstances, and positively refused Hooker's
request. Hooker then considering himself thwarted in all his plans
by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation. It was
promptly accepted, and Major-General George G. Meade, then the
commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command of the
Army of the Potomac. He was a general of fine intellect, of great
personal bravery, and had had a good deal of experience in the war
in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success,
or met with any serious reverse.
Upon ascertaining that the enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker
had determined to throw out his different corps in a fan shape
toward the Susquehanna, and advance in that direction with three
corps on the left to defend that flank, in case Longstreet and Hill
should turn East, instead of keeping on toward the North. At the
same time it was his intention to have Slocum follow up Lee's
advance, by keeping in his rear, to capture his trains and couriers,
and to cut off his retreat should he be defeated.
General Meade's first order was for all the troops to concentrate
in Frederick, where he proposed to have a grand review; but at the
urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's
Chief of Staff, and who stated that this delay would give Lee time
to cross the Susquehanna, and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia,
Hooker's orders were allowed to stand, with some exceptions. Meade
appears to have disapproved all movements against Lee's line of
retreat, for he ordered Slocum to rejoin the main army, and had
the hardihood to break up the post at Harper's Ferry, in spite of
the fact that Hooker had just been relieved from command for
requesting permission to do so. The bulk of the garrison, under
Major-General French, was directed to take post as a reserve at
Frederick, when our forces moved forward. The general idea of our
advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia if he
went north, or between him and Baltimore and Washington in case he
turned back. The orders at night were for Buford's division of
cavalry to take post on the left flank, in the direction of Fairfield;
Gregg's division on the right flank at Westminster; and Kilpatrick's
division in advance of the centre, at Littlestown, the different
corps to be posted between New Windsor and Emmetsburg.
Ewell's corps, as stated, were at Carlisle and York, Lee and
Longstreet's at Chambersburg, and Hill's corps at Fayetteville.
Lee was startled to learn from a countryman who came in on the 28th
that Hooker was at Frederick, and not south of the Potomac, as he
had supposed. He saw at once that his communications with Richmond,
about which he was so solicitous, were greatly endangered, for the
Union army could be formed to interpose between him and Williamsport,
and still keep a safe line of retreat open to Washington. This
might not be so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food
and forage; for he could probably live on the country for some
time, by making predatory excursions in different directions, but
when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition, the matter
would become very serious. An army only carries a limited amount
of this into the field and must rely upon frequent convoys to keep
up the supply, which is constantly decreasing from the partial
engagements and skirmishes, so prevalent in a hostile country.
The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel
communications is demonstrated by the fact the Lee immediately
turned back. The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its
tail was trodden upon. He came to the conclusion to prevent an
attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole
force. This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further
east to confront him, and thus prevent it from operating in heavy
force in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly on the night of the
28th, Lee sent expresses to all his corps commanders to concentrate
at Gettysburg. If he had known that Meade was about to withdraw
all the troops acting against his line of retreat he would probably
have gone on and taken Harrisburg.
As the new commander of the Union army was a favorite of General
Halleck, no notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in
detaching the garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Couch, who
commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under
his orders, a favor which had been denied to Hooker. The troubles
of the latter were not quite over, for on his appearing in Washington
to explain his action, he was immediately put under arrest for
visiting the Capital without his (Halleck's) permission; a piece
of petty persecution which might have been spared under the
circumstances. It was, however, a short and easy method of settling
all complaints that were inconvenient to answer.
CHAPTER III.
STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLANS.
At dawn of day on the 29th, Stuart's command, after riding all
night, reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commenced
disabling it, so far as the limited time at their disposal would
allow, by burning a bridge at Sykesville and tearing up a portion
of the track at Hood's Mill. They remained at the latter place
during the day to rest, but started again in the afternoon, and
reached Westminster about 5 P.M. At this place they were gallantly
attacked by the 1st Delaware Cavalry, which Stuart says was driven
off after hard fighting and pursued some distance toward Baltimore,
adding very much to the panic there. At night the head of his
column halted at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and
Littlestown. It may as well be stated here that Stuart found
himself greatly embarrassed by attempting to hold on to the long
train he had captured at Rockville. It lengthened out his column
to such an extent that it became difficult to defend all parts of
the line without scattering and weakening his command. As Kilpatrick's
division was waiting to intercept him at Littlestown, this
consideration became a matter of considerable importance. Gregg's
division also moved in the morning to head him off at Westminster,
but owing to the roads being very much blocked up by our infantry
and trains marching in that direction, Gregg did not succeed in
reaching his destination until some hours after Stuart had passed.
At night two brigades of Buford's division of cavalry covered the
left flank of the Union army near Fairfield, with one brigade at
Mechanicstown. The First and Eleventh Corps were at Emmetsburg,
the Third and Twelfth at Middleburg, the Fifth Corps at Taneytown,
the Second Corps at Uniontown, and the Sixth Corps at New Windsor.
The advance of the rebel cavalry under Jenkins were now within
sight of Harrisburg, and skirmishing only four miles from the town.
Jenkins' object was to make a thorough reconnoissance in order to
ascertain the best positions to be taken for an attack. There was
a perfect exodus from the city. All business was suspended, too,
in Philadelphia, and the authorities there busied themselves in
hastening the work on the fortifications in the suburbs of the
city. They were active enough now, and large numbers were enrolled.
Pleasonton, who was under general orders to guard the flank nearest
the enemy, directed Buford on the 29th to occupy Gettysburg the
next day, and hold it until the Army of the Potomac came to his
relief. He realized the importance of the position to the future
success of our arms.
Hill's corps was at Fayetteville on the 29th, but one division,
that of Heth, was thrown forward on that day to Cashtown, within
eight miles of Gettysburg. The object of the movement was to join
Ewell at York, and co-operate with him in the destruction of the
railroads on the other side of the Susquehanna, etc. This plan,
as I have already stated, was suddenly changed on the evening of
the 28th, when Lee found his communications endangered, and now
all the advanced troops under his command turned back to concentrate
at Gettysburg. Longstreet left Chambersburg and marched to
Fayetteville, leaving Pickett's division behind to guard the trains.
Early received the order to return in the afternoon of the 28th,
recalled Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, and made preparations
to start the next morning. Rodes' and Johnson's divisions left
Carlisle and marched on Gettysburg; the former by the direct route,
and the latter by way of Greenwood, to convoy the trains full of
stolen property.
A number of partisan skirmishes took place during the day, which
were creditable to our troops, particularly that at McConnellsburg,
to the west of Chambersburg.
The raid against Richmond ended by the return of Colonel Spear's
regiment to the White House. Hooker had urged that General Dix
assume command of all his available troops, march against Richmond,
and plant himself firmly on Lee's line of communication, but his
recommendations were slighted by Halleck. There was much disappointment
in the North at this failure to make a serious attack on the rebel
capital, for it was generally believed that it might have been
captured by a _coup de main_.
On the 30th General Meade advanced his army still nearer the
Susquehanna. At evening his extreme left, the First Corps, was at
Marsh Creek, on the Emmetsburg road, while the extreme right, the
Sixth Corps, was away off at Manchester. The intermediate corps
were posted, the Eleventh at Emmetsburg; the Second at Uniontown;
the Third at Taneytown; the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth
at Frizzelburg. General French moved from Harper's Ferry with the
bulk of the garrison and occupied Frederick. The First Corps was
ordered to Gettysburg, but General Reynolds halted it at Marsh
Creek, as the enemy were reported to be coming from the direction
of Fairfield.
Meade now resolved to take up a defensive position on Pipe Creek.
He threw out his forces as before in a fan shape, but any corps
encountering the enemy was expected to fight in retreat until it
reached the new line, where all the corps were to assemble. This
line as laid out was a long one, extending from Manchester to
Middleburg, a distance of about twenty-five miles. Falling back
to fight again, is hardly to be commended, as it chills the ardor
of the men; nor is it certain that Lee would have attacked the
intrenchments at Pipe Creek. If he found them formidable he might
have preferred to fight on the defensive with two corps, while the
Third Corps took Harrisburg, and broke up the railroad lines to
the west, or marched directly against Philadelphia; or, as Pipe
Creek did not interfere with his communications in any way he might
have chosen to let it severely alone, and have kept on depredating
in Pennsylvania, after capturing Harrisburg. This would have forced
Meade sooner or later to attack him.
On the night of the 30th Ewell's corps had reached Heidlersburg,
nine miles from Gettysburg, with the exception of Johnson's division,
which was at Greenwood. Rodes' division had marched direct from
Carlisle by way of Petersburg. Longstreet with two divisions was
at Fayetteville; the other division, that of Pickett, was left at
Chambersburg to guard the trains. Hill's corps had reached Cashtown
and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was still back
at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road.
Stuart, ascertaining that Early was no longer at York, and not
knowing that the army was concentrating on Gettysburg, turned toward
Carlisle. He had bivouacked half way between Westminster and
Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting
for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by
going through cross roads to Hanover. He found Farnsworth's brigade
of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them
back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances. The 5th New York
made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again.
He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade,
which arrived in time to reinforce him. Custer's brigade then came
up from Abbotstown. The battle lasted until night, when Stuart
gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession.
Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments
at Littlestown, but were repulsed. He then, having no time to
spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost.
He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to
Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near. Had they
effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long,
fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle
on the first day. It was one of those accidental circumstances
which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every
incident at Chancellorsville was against us.
Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle,
which he found occupied by our troops. He demanded the surrender
of the place under a threat of bombardment. General W. F. Smith,
one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by
menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition
to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to
take part in the battle. He arrived there on the afternoon of the
2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions;
on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle. This force when
it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins'
brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it.
By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's
scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew
that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at
Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night. He simply stated that
the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders
when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces
were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in
contact, and a fight or retreat was inevitable.
Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian,
and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was
most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible. I speak
from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told
me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was
necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering
the whole State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was
not difficult to divine what his decision would be. He determined
to advance and hold Gettysburg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to
come up as a support to the First, and he recommended, but did not
order, the Third Corps to do the same.
Buford, with two of his cavalry brigades, reached the place that
night, but not without considerable difficulty. He left Fountaindale
Gap early in the morning and attempted to move directly to his
destination, but he came upon Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps,
and was obliged to fall back to the mountains again. Later in the
day he succeeded, by going around by way of Emmetsburg. Before
evening set in, he had thrown out his pickets almost to Cashtown
and Hunterstown, posting Gamble's brigade across the Chambersburg
pike, and Devin's brigade across the Mummasburg road, his main body
being about a mile west of the town.
While these great movements were going on, some minor affairs showed
great gallantry on the part of partisan officers. Captain Ulric
Dahlgren made a raid upon the rebel communications, capturing some
guns and prisoners, and gaining very important information which
will be referred to hereafter.
The two armies now about to contest on the perilous ridges of
Gettysburg the possession of the Northern States, and the ultimate
triumph of freedom or slavery, were in numbers as follows, according
to the estimate made by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial
observer, and who has made a close study of the question:
_The Army of the Potomac under General Meade_, 82,00 men and 300
guns.
_The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee_, 73,500 men and
190 guns.
Stuart had 11,100 cavalry and 16 guns.
Pleasonton had about the same number of cavalry, and 27 guns.
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863.
On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, as stated, held
the ridges to the west of Gettysburg, with his cavalry division,
composed of Gamble's and Devin's brigades. His vedettes were thrown
far out toward the enemy to give timely notice of any movement for
he was determined to prevent the rebels from entering the town if
possible, and knew the First Corps would soon be up to support him.
The enemy were not aware that there was any considerable force in
the vicinity, and in the morning sent forward Heth's division of
Hill's corps to occupy the place, anticipating no difficulty in
doing so. Buford in the meantime had dismounted a large part of
his force, had strengthened his line of skirmishers, and planted
his batteries at the most commanding points.
General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him
as commander of the Left Wing of the army, that is of the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps, had turned over the command of the First
Corps to me. He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to
assist Buford.
As my corps was largely engaged in the first day's operations, I
must be excused for having a good deal to say in the first person
in relation to them. Reynolds sent for me about six o'clock in
the morning, read to me the various despatches he had received from
Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with
the nearest division--that of Wadsworth--to aid the cavalry. He
then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery
and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible.
Having given these orders, he rode off at the head of the column,
and I never saw him again.
The position of the two armies on the morning of the 1st of July,
was as follows: The First Corps at Marsh Creek; the Second and
Third Corps at Taneytown; the latter being under orders to march
to Emmetsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed
to join the First Corps at Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps was at
Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps at Hanover, and the Sixth Corps about
thirty-five miles off to the right at Manchester. Kilpatrick's
and Gregg's divisions of cavalry were also at Hanover. The
Confederate army was advancing on Gettysburg from the west and
north. The concentration of their troops and the dispersion of
ours are indicated on the map.
It must be remembered that the enemy had but _three_ corps, while
the Union army had _seven_. Each of their corps represented a
_third_, and each of ours a _seventh_, of our total force. The
same ratio extended to divisions and brigades.
Heth's division, which started early in the morning to occupy the
town, soon found itself confronted by Buford's skirmishers, and
formed line of battle with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front,
followed by those of Pettigrew and Brockenborough. At 9 A.M. the
first gun was heard. Buford had three cannon-shots fired as a
signal for his skirmish line to open on the enemy, and the battle
of Gettysburg began.*
[* Lt.-Col. Kress, of General Wadsworth's staff, entered Gettysburg
about this time and found General Buford surrounded by his staff
in front of the tavern there. Buford turned to him and said, "What
are you doing here, sir?" Kress replied that he came on to get
some shoes for Wadsworth's division. Buford told him that he had
better return immediately to his command. Kress said, "Why, what
is the matter, general?" At that moment the far off sound of a
single gun was heard, and Buford replied, as he mounted his horse
and galloped off, _"That's the matter."_]
As the rebels had had several encounters with militia, who were
easily dispersed, they did not expect to meet any serious resistance
at this time, and advanced confidently and carelessly. Buford gave
way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract
the struggle. After an hour's fighting he felt anxious, and went
up into the steeple of the Theological Seminary from which a wide
view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight.
One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had
preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him there,
and examine the country around. Although there is no positive
testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to
Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent
features of the landscape. An aide of General Howard--presumably
Major Hall--soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up
to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps.
Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps
forward at once and _form them on Cemetery Hill_ as a reserve.
General Howard has no recollection of having received any such
orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps
was to occupy _some place_ in rear, as a support to the First Corps,
nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him
to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to
any experienced commander. Lieutenant Rosengarten, of General
Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and heard
the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge.
The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately
gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting it. It is not to be supposed that either Howard or
Rosengarten would mistake the matter. It is quite probable that
Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which his force
could rally if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable
battle-field for the army. It has since been universally conceded
that it was admirably adapted for that purpose.
It will be seen from the above map, that there are two roads coming
to Gettysburg from the west, making a considerable angle with each
other. Each is intersected by ridges running north and south. On
that nearest to the town, and about three-fourths of a mile from
the central square, there is a large brick building, which was used
as a Lutheran Theological Seminary. A small stream of water called
Willoughby's Run winds between the next two ridges. The battle on
the first day was principally fought on the heights on each side
of this stream.
Buford being aware that Ewell's corps would soon be on its way from
Heidlersburg to the field of battle, was obliged to form line facing
north with Devin's brigade, and leave Gamble's brigade to keep back
the overpowering weight of Hill's corps advancing from the west.
While this fighting was going on, and Reynolds and Wadsworth were
pressing to the front, I was engaged in withdrawing the pickets
and assembling the other two divisions, together with the corps
artillery. As soon as I saw that my orders were in process of
execution, I galloped to the front, leaving the troops to follow,
and caught up with Meredith's brigade of Wadsworth's division,
commonly called "The Iron Brigade," just as it was going into
action.
In the meantime the enemy approaching from the west were pressing
with great force against Buford's slender skirmish line, and Reynolds
went forward with Cutler's brigade to sustain it. He skilfully
posted Hall's 2d Maine battery in the road, and threw forward two
regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, a short distance
in advance on the left. At the same time he directed General
Wadsworth to place the remaining three regiments of the brigade,
the 147th New York, the 76th New York, and the 56th Pennsylvania,
on the right of the road. When this formation was completed the
cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been fighting there, withdrew
and formed in column on the left of the infantry; but the other
cavalry brigade, under Devin, which was not facing in that direction,
still held the position, awaiting the advance of Ewell's corps from
the north.
As Davis' rebel brigade of Heth's division fronting Wadsworth were
hidden behind an intervening ridge, Wadsworth did not see them at
first, but formed his three regiments perpendicularly to the road,
without a reconnoissance. The result was that Davis came over the
hill almost directly on the right flank of this line, which being
unable to defend itself was forced back and directed by Wadsworth
to take post in a piece of woods in rear on Seminary Ridge. The
two regiments on the right accordingly withdrew, but the 147th New
York, which was next to the road, did not receive the order, as
their Colonel was shot down before he could deliver it. They were
at once surrounded and very much cut up before they could be rescued
from their perilous position.
The two regiments on the right, which were forced back, were
veterans, conspicuous for gallantry in every battle in which the
Army of the Potomac had been engaged since the Peninsula campaign.
As Wadsworth withdrew them without notifying Hall's battery in the
road, or the two regiments posted by Reynolds on the left, both
became exposed to a disastrous flank attack on the right. Hall
finding a cloud of skirmishers launched against his battery which
was now without support, was compelled to retreat. The horses of
the lost gun were all shot or bayonetted. The non-military reader
will see that while a battery can keep back masses of men it cannot
contend with a line of skirmishers. To resist them would be very
much like fighting mosquitoes with musket-balls. The two regiments
posted by Reynolds, the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, finding
their support gone on the right, while Archer's rebel brigade was
advancing to envelop their left, fell back leisurely under Colonel
Fowler of the 14th Brooklyn, who assumed command of both as the
ranking officer present.
I reached the field just as the attack on Cutler's brigade was
going on, and at once sent my adjutant-general, Major Halstead,
and young Meredith L. Jones, who was acting as aide on my staff,
to General Reynolds to ask instructions. Under the impression that
the enemy's columns were approaching on both roads, Reynolds said,
"Tell Doubleday I will hold on to this road," referring to the
Chambersburg road, "and he must hold on to that one;" meaning the
road to Fairfield or Hagerstown. At the same time he sent Jones
back at full speed to bring up a battery.
The rebels, however, did not advance on the Fairfield road until
late in the afternoon. They must have been in force upon it some
miles back, for the cavalry so reported, and this caused me during
the entire day to give more attention than was necessary to my
left, as I feared the enemy might separate my corps from the Third
and Eleventh Corps at Emmetsburg. Such a movement would be equivalent
to interposing between the First Corps and the main army.
There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground
on each side. It seemed to me this was the key of the position,
for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on
either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in
front by the cavalry. I therefore urged the men as they filed past
me to hold it at all hazards. Full of enthusiasm and the memory
of their past achievements they said to me proudly, _"If we can't
hold it, where will you find men who can?"_
As they went forward under command of Colonel Morrow* of the 24th
Michigan Volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere
youth, was engaged in the Mexican War, I rode over to the left to
see if the enemy's line extended beyond ours, and if there would
be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction. I saw,
however, only a few skirmishers, and returned to organize a reserve.
I knew there was fighting going on between Cutler's brigade and
the rebels in his front, but as General Reynolds was there in
person, I only attended to my own part of the line; and halted the
6th Wisconsin regiment as it was going into the action, together
with a hundred men of the Brigade Guard, taken from the 149th
Pennsylvania, to station them in the open space between the Seminary
and the woods, as a reserve, the whole being under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin.
[* I sent orders to Morrow under the supposition that he was the
ranking officer of the brigade. Colonel W. W. Robinson, 7th
Wisconsin, was entitled to the command, and exercised it during
the remainder of the battle.]
It is proper to state that General Meredith, the permanent commander
of the brigade, was wounded as he was coming up, some time after
its arrival, by a shell which exploded in front of his horse.
Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods.
Archer's rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing
Willoughby's Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went
in on the other. General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of
the woods, surrounded by his staff. He felt some anxiety as to
the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops
would be up in time. While looking back in this way, a rebel
sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet
coming out near the eye. He fell dead in an instant, without a
word. The country sustained great loss in his death. I lamented
him as almost a life-long companion. We were at West Point together,
and had served in the same regiment--the old 3d Artillery--upon
first entering service, along with our present Commander-in-Chief,
General Sherman, and General George H. Thomas. When quite young
we had fought in the same battles in Mexico. There was little
time, however, to indulge in these recollections. The situation
was very peculiar. The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler's
brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods,
preceded by the 2d Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly
and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer's brigade, and
captured a large part of it, including Archer himself. The fact
is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is
said, that they had only militia to contend with. The Iron Brigade
had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were
recognized at once by their old antagonists. Some of the latter
were heard to exclaim: "There are those d----d black-hatted fellows
again! 'Taint no militia. It's the Army of the Potomac."
Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept
on beyond Willoughby's Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite
side.
The command now devolved upon me, with its great responsibilities.
The disaster on the right required immediate attention, for the
enemy, with loud yells, were pursuing Cutler's brigade toward the
town. I at once ordered my reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes
to advance against their flank. If they faced Dawes, I reasoned
that they would present their other flank to Cutler's men, so that
I felt quite confident of the result. In war, however, unexpected
changes are constantly occurring. Cutler's brigade had been
withdrawn by order of General Wadsworth, without my knowledge, to
the suburbs of Gettysburg. Fortunately, Fowler's two regiments
came on to join Dawes, who went forward with great spirit, but who
was altogether too weak to assail so large a force. As he approached,
the rebels ceased to pursue Cutler, and rushed into the railroad
cut to obtain the shelter of the grading. They made a fierce and
obstinate resistance, but, while Fowler confronted them above,
about twenty of Dawes' men were formed across the cut by his
adjutant, E. P. Brooks, to fire through it. The rebels could not
resist this; the greater number gave themselves up as prisoners,
and the others scattered over the country and escaped.
This success relieved the 147th New York, which, as I stated, was
surrounded when Cutler fell back, and it also enabled us to regain
the gun which Hall had been obliged to abandon.
The enemy having vanished from our immediate front, I withdrew the
Iron Brigade from its advanced position beyond the creek, reformed
the line on the ridge where General Reynolds had originally placed
it, and awaited a fresh attack, or orders from General Meade. The
two regiments of Cutler's brigade were brought back from the town,
and, notwithstanding the check they had received, they fought with
great gallantry throughout the three days' battle that ensued.
There was now a lull in the combat. I was waiting for the remainder
of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his
shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades
forward. The remnant of Archer's brigade was placed on the right,
and made to face south against Buford's cavalry, which, it was
feared, might attack that flank. What was left of Davis' brigade
was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram's artillery
was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby's
Run.
Thus prepared, and with Pender's strong division in rear, ready to
cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if
victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack.
As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight
larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have
been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the
position until ordered to leave it. I did not believe in the
system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy. I quite
agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as
possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions,
would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was
left in a condition to take the field. A retreat, too, has a bad
effect on the men. It gives them the impression that their generals
think them too weak to contend with the enemy. I was not aware,
at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me
no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was
at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed
General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on
Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to
see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of
some kind. As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg
to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee
would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was
in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.
While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or
dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading
despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard. It seems
that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps,
just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been
outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order.
Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General
Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with
the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the
field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced
retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of
an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field.
It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the
greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for
their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.
About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together
with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. By
this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding
position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down
the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as
it was in the centre of the enemy's line, who were advancing on
each side of it, and Calef--exposed as his battery was--fired over
the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the
storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and
inflicted great damage on his adversaries. He was soon after
relieved by Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York, which was
sustained by Colonel Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvania troops,
which I ordered there for that purpose. Stone formed his men on
the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and
partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance,
from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate
contest.
It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive
with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and,
under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards,
they cried out, _"We have come to stay!"_ The battle afterward
became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down
their lives there for the cause they loved so well. Morrow's
brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle's
brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest
of the same ridge, with Cooper's battery in the interval. Cutler's
brigade took up its former position on the right of the road.
Having disposed of Wadsworth's division and my own division, which
was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed
General Robinson's division to remain in reserve at the Seminary,
and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove
in front of the building. Toward the close of the action this
defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great
service.
The accompanying map shows the position of troops and batteries at
this time.
It will be seen that Heth's division is formed on the western ridge
which bounds Willougby's Run and along a cross-road which intersects
the Chambersburg road at right angles.
Pender's division, posted in the rear as a support to Heth, was
formed in the following order by brigades: Thomas, Lane, Scales,
and McGowan (under Perrin); the first named on the rebel left and
Perrin on the right. To sustain Heth's advance and crush out all
opposition, both Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery were posted on
the crest of the ridge west of the Run.
While this was going on, General Howard, who was awaiting the
arrival of his corps, had climbed into the steeple of the seminary
to obtain a view of the surrounding country. At 11.30 A.M. he
learned that General Reynolds was killed, and that the command of
the three corps (the First, Eleventh, and Third) constituting the
Left Wing of the army devolved upon him by virtue of his rank. He
saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds and sent
back for the Eleventh Corps to come up at double-quick. Upon
assuming command of the Left Wing he turned over his own corps to
Major-General Carl Schurz, who then gave up the command of his
division to General Barlow. Howard notified General Meade of
Reynolds' death, but forgot to take back or modify the false
statement he had made about the First Corps, now engaged before
his eyes, in a most desperate contest with a largely superior force;
so that General Meade was still left under the impression that the
First Corps had fled from the field.
Howard also sent a request to Slocum, who was at Two Taverns, only
about five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward, but Slocum
declined, without orders from Meade. He probably thought if any
one commander could assume the direction of other corps, he might
antagonize the plans of the General-in-Chief.
Upon receiving the news of the death of General Reynolds and the
disorder which it was supposed had been created by that event,
General Meade superseded Howard by sending his junior officer,
General Hancock, to assume command of the field, with directions
to notify him of the condition of affairs at the front. He also
ordered General John Newton of the Sixth Corps to take command of
the First Corps.
The head of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg at 12.45 P.M.,
and the rear at 1.45 P.M. Schimmelpfennig's division led the way,
followed by that of Barlow. The two were directed to prolong the
line of the First Corps to the right along Seminary Ridge. The
remaining division, that of Steinwehr, with the reserve artillery
under Major Osborne, were ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in rear
of Gettysburg, as a reserve to the entire line. Before this
disposition could be carried out, however, Buford rode up to me
with the information that his scouts reported the advance of Ewell's
corps from Heidlersburg directly on my right flank. I sent a staff
officer to communicate this intelligence to General Howard, with
a message that I would endeavor to hold my ground against A. P.
Hill's corps if he could, by means of the Eleventh Corps, keep
Ewell from attacking my right. He accordingly directed the Eleventh
Corps to change front to meet Ewell. As it did so, Devin's cavalry
brigade fell back and took up a position to the right and rear of
this line just south of the railroad bridge.
The concentration of Rodes' and Early's divisions--the one from
Carlisle and the other from York--took place with great exactness;
both arriving in sight of Gettysburg at the same time. The other
division, that of Johnson, took a longer route from Carlisle by
way of Greenwood, to escort the trains, and did not reach the battle-
field until sunset. Anderson's division of Hill's corps was also
back at the pass in the mountains on the Chambersburg road. It
had halted to allow Johnson to pass, and then followed him to
Gettysburg, reaching there about dusk.
The first indication I had that Ewell had arrived, and was taking
part in the battle, came from a battery posted on an eminence called
Oak Hill, almost directly in the prolongation of my line, and about
a mile north of Colonel Stone's position. This opened fire about
1.30 P.M., and rendered new dispositions necessary; for Howard had
not guarded my right flank as proposed, and indeed soon had more
than he could do to maintain his line. When the guns referred to
opened fire, Wadsworth, without waiting for orders, threw Cutler's
brigade back into the woods on Seminary Ridge, north of the railroad
grading; a movement I sanctioned as necessary. Morrow's brigade
was concealed from the view of the enemy, in the woods where Reynolds
fell, and Biddle's brigade, by my order, changed front to the north.
It could do so with impunity, as it was behind a ridge which
concealed its left flank from Hill's corps, and was further protected
in that direction by two companies of the 20th New York State
Militia, who occupied a house and barn in advance, sent there by
the colonel of that regiment, Theodore B. Gates, whose skill and
energy were of great service to me during the battle.