PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT.
The close of the battle of Chancellorsville found the Union army
still strong in numbers, defeated, but not disheartened, and ready,
as soon as reinforcements and supplies arrived, and a brief period
of rest and recuperation ensued, to take the field again. To resist
the effects of this defeat and recruit our armies required, however,
great determination and serious effort on the part of the
Administration; for a large and powerful party still clogged and
impeded its efforts, and were allowed full liberty to chill the
patriotism of the masses, and oppose, with tongue and pen and every
species of indirection, all efficient action which looked to national
defence. This opposition was so strong and active that the President
almost preferred the risk of losing another battle to the commotion
which would be excited by attempts to enforce the draft; for hitherto
we had relied entirely on voluntary enlistments to increase our
strength in the field. Men are chilled by disaster and do not
readily enlist after a defeat; yet the terms of service of thirty
thousand of the two years' and nine months' men were expiring, and
something had to be done. Our army, however, at the end of May
was still formidable in numbers, and too strongly posted to be
effectually assailed; especially as it had full and free communication
with Washington and the North, and could be assisted in case of
need by the loyal militia of the free States.
The rebels had obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory,
at Chancellorsville. It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense of
life, and when the battle was over they found themselves too weak
to follow up our retreating forces. While the whole South was
exulting, their great commander, General Lee, was profoundly
depressed. The resources of the Davis Government in men and means
were limited, and it was evident that without a foreign alliance,
prolonged defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, would
ultimately exhaust the seceding States, without accomplishing their
independence. It became necessary, therefore, for General Lee to
chose one of two plans of campaign: Either to fall back on the
centre of his supplies at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to
invade the North. By retiring on Richmond he would save the great
labor of transporting food and war material to the frontier, and
would remove the Northern army still further from its sources of
supply and its principal depots. One circumstance, however, would
probably in any event, have impelled him to take the bolder course.
The situation in Vicksburg was becoming alarming. It was evident
the town must fall and with its surrender the Federal fleet would
soon regain possession of the Mississippi. The fall of Vicksburg,
supplemented by the retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, would
dishearten the Southern people, and stimulate the North to renewed
efforts. It was essential, therefore, to counterbalance the
impending disaster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the
East.
There was perhaps another reason for this great forward movement,
founded on the relation of the Confederacy to the principal European
powers. England still made a pretence of neutrality, but the
aristocracy and ruling classes sided with the South, and a large
association of their most influential men was established at
Manchester to aid the slaveholding oligarchy. The rebels were
fighting us with English guns and war material, furnished by blockade
runners; while English Shenandoahs and Alabamas, manned by British
seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels
and swept our commercial marine from the ocean. The French Government
was equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe
which did not sympathize with the South, allied as they were by
their feudal customs to the deplorable system of Southern slavery.
Russia alone favored our cause, and stood ready, if need be, to
assist us with her fleet; probably more from antagonism to England
and France, than from any other motive. The agents of the Confederate
Government stated in their official despatches that if General Lee
could establish his army firmly on Northern soil England would at
once acknowledge the independence of the South; in which case ample
loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a
foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to
re-open the Southern ports.
While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the Confederate
spies and sympathizers who thronged the North greatly encouraged
the Davis Government by their glowing accounts of the disaffection
there, in consequence of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by
the war, and by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon
have to be enforced as a defensive measure. They overrated the
influence of the _Copperhead_ or anti-war party, and prophesied
that a rebel invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal
cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce the Federal
forces in the field.
These reasons would have been quite sufficient of themselves to
induce Lee to make the movement, but he himself gives an additional
one. He hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out, where he could
strike him a decisive blow, and thus ensure the permanent triumph
of the Confederacy. He was weary of all this marching, campaigning,
and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling the whole
matter at once. Having been reinforced after the battle of
Chancellorsville by Longstreet's two divisions and a large body of
conscripts, he determined to advance. On May 31st, his force,
according to rebel statements, amounted to 88,754, of which 68,352
were ready for duty. Recruits, too, were constantly coming in from
the draft, which was rigidly enforced in the Southern States.
Hooker having learned from his spies that there was much talk of
an invasion, wrote to the President on May 28th, that the enemy
was undoubtedly about to make a movement of some kind. On June
3d, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's corps started for
the general rendezvous at Culpeper. A change in the encampment on
the opposite side of the river was noted by the vigilant Union
commander, who at once ordered Sedgwick to lay two bridges at the
old crossing place, three miles below Fredericksburg, pass over
with a division, and press the enemy to ascertain if their main
body was still there. Fresh indications occurred on the 4th, for
Ewell's corps followed that of Longstreet. The bridges being
completed on the 5th, Howe's division of the Sixth Corps was thrown
over and Hill's corps came out of their intrenchments to meet it.
Some skirmishing ensued, and Sedgwick reported, as his opinion,
that the greater portion of the enemy's force still held their old
positions. Hooker, however, was determined to be prepared for all
contingencies, and therefore, on the same day, detached the Fifth
Corps to be in readiness to meet the enemy should they attempt to
force a passage anywhere between United States Ford and Banks'
Ford. Resolved to obtain certain information at all hazards, on
the 7th of June he ordered Pleasonton to make a forced reconnoissance
with all the available cavalry of the army, in the direction of
Culpeper, to ascertain whether the Confederate forces were really
concentrating there, with a view to an invasion of the North.
Should this prove to be the case, Hooker desired to cross the river,
to envelop and destroy Hill's corps, and then follow up the main
body as they proceeded northward, thus intercepting their communications
with Richmond. The authorities at Washington, however, did not
look with much equanimity upon the possibility of finding Lee's
army interposed between them and the Army of the Potomac, so they
refused to sanction the plan and it was abandoned.
Nevertheless, in my opinion it was about the best method that could
have been devised to check the invasion, provided that Hooker did
not lose his water-base; for Lee always showed himself very sensitive
whenever his communications with Richmond was threatened. If that
was severed no more _ammunition_ or military supplies would reach
him. The amount of cartridges on hand was necessarily limited.
It would soon be expended in constant skirmishes and engagements,
and then he would be helpless and at the mercy of his antagonist.
Consequently, the moment he heard that a portion of the Sixth Corps
had crossed and confronted Hill, he directed Ewell and Longstreet
to halt at Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, and be in readiness
to return to Fredericksburg to assist Hill in case there was any
danger of his being overpowered. Finding Sedgwick's advance was
a mere reconnoissance, the two rebel corps resumed their march to
Culpeper.
Hooker deemed it essential to success, that all troops connected
with the theatre of invasion should be placed under his command,
so that they could act in unison. In his opinion most of their
strength was wasted in discordant expeditions, which were useless
as regards the general result. He referred more particularly to
General Dix's command at Old Point Comfort, General Heintzelman's
command in Washington, and General Schenck's troops posted at
Baltimore, along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and in the Valley
of the Shenandoah. This request was reasonable and should have
been granted. Hooker's demands, however, were not considered
favorably. There was no very good feeling between General Halleck,
who was commander of the army, and himself; and as he felt that
his efforts were neither seconded nor approved at headquarters, he
soon after resigned the command.
The main body of the Union cavalry at this time was at Warrenton
and Catlett's Station. Hooker, having been dissatisfied with the
result of the cavalry operations during the Chancellorsville
campaign, had displaced Stoneman in favor of Major-General Alfred
Pleasonton.