attacked on the west and Ewell assailed me at the same time on the
north; but I occupied the central position, and their converging
columns did not strike together until the grand final advance at
the close of the day, and therefore I was able to resist several
of their isolated attacks before the last crash came.
Stone's brigade in the centre had a difficult angle to defend, but
was partially sheltered by a ridge on the west. His position was
in truth the key-point of the first day's battle. It overlooked
the field, and its possession by the enemy would cut our force in
two, enfilade Morrow's and Biddle's brigades, and compel a hasty
retreat.
After Hall's battery was driven back, no other artillery occupied
the ground for some time, then General Wadsworth borrowed Calef's
regular battery from the cavalry, and posted it in rear of the
position Hall had occupied. When the remainder of the division
came up, Captain Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York Artillery,
as already stated, was sent to assist Calef in keeping down the
fire of two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west; but when
Ewell's artillery also opened, the cross fire became too severe.
Calef was withdrawn, and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel
batteries soon after ceased firing for the time being; and at
Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the
First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds' battery, under Lieutenant
Wilbur, on Seminary Ridge, south of the railroad cut; Stewart's
Battery "B" 4th United States being on a line north of the cut.
Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewell's attack from the north,
and Stevens' 5th Maine battery was retained behind the Seminary in
reserve.
Barlow's division on the right and Schimmelpfennig's on the left,
formed somewhat hastily against Ewell, whose line of battle faced
south. Barlow rested his right on a wooded knoll, constituting
part of the western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open
country to the east he considered that flank secure, for no enemy
was in sight then, and if they came from that direction, there
would be time to make fresh dispositions. After the formation
there was an interval of a quarter of a mile between their left
and the First Corps, which might have been avoided by placing the
two divisions further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for
the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from
penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my
reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out.
It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been
_echeloned_ in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right
had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at
the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have turned the right
without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering
his communications; a movement he would hardly like to make,
especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up.
Still they had a preponderating force, and as their whole army was
concentrating on Gettysburg, it was not possible to keep them back
for any great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps
were heavily reinforced. The position of our forces and those of
the enemy, will be best understood by a reference to the map on
page 125.
About 2 P.M., after the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General
Howard rode over, inspected, and approved it. He also examined my
position and gave orders, in case I was forced to retreat, to fall
back to Cemetery Hill. I think this was the first and only order
I received from him during the day.
Rodes' division of five brigades was formed across Seminary Ridge,
facing south, with Iverson on the right, supported by Daniel and
O'Neill in the centre, and Doles on the left, Ramseur being in
reserve. Iverson was sent to attack the First Corps on Seminary
Ridge, and O'Neill and Doles went forward about 2.45 P.M., to keep
back the Eleventh Corps. When the two latter became fairly engaged
in front, about 3.30 P.M., Early came up with his whole division
and struck the Union right. This decided the battle in favor of
the enemy.
Barlow had advanced with Von Gilsa's brigade, had driven back
Ewell's skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson's battery was
preparing to hold the Carlisle road. He was not aware that Early
was approaching, and saw Doles' advance with pleasure, for he felt
confident he could swing his right around and envelop Doles' left;
a manoeuvre which could hardly fail to be successful.
Schimmelpfennig now threw forward Von Amberg's brigade to intervene
between O'Neill and Doles, and to strike the right flank of the
latter; but Doles avoided the blow by a rapid change of front.
This necessarily exposed his left to Barlow, who could not take
advantage of it as he was unexpectedly assailed by Early's division
on his own right, which was enveloped, and in great danger. His
men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made
stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them.
As Barlow was shot down, and their right flank enveloped, they were
forced to retreat to the town. This isolated Von Amberg's brigade,
and Doles claims to have captured the greater portion of it.
The retrograde movement of the Eleventh Corps necessarily exposed
the right flank of the First to attacks from O'Neill and Ramseur.
Howard sent forward Coster's brigade, of Steinwehr's division, to
cover the retreat of the Eleventh Corps; but its force was too
small to be effective; its flanks were soon turned by Hays' and
Hoke's brigades, of Early's division, and it was forced back with
the rest.
We will now go back to the First Corps and describe what took place
there while these events were transpiring.
When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps was
brought to my notice by Colonel Bankhead of my staff, I detached
Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division to fill it. This brigade
moved promptly, and took post on Cutler's right, but before it
could form across the intervening space, O'Neill's brigade assailed
its right flank, and subsequently its left, and Baxter was forced
to change front alternately, to meet these attacks. He repulsed
O'Neill, but found his left flank again exposed to an attack from
Iverson, who was advancing in that direction.* He now went forward
and took shelter behind a stone fence on the Mummasburg road, which
protected his right flank, while an angle in the fence which turned
in a southwesterly direction covered his front. As his men lay
down behind the fence, Iverson's brigade came very close up, not
knowing our troops were there. Baxter's men sprang to their feet
and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range, which left
500 of Iverson's men dead and wounded, and so demoralized them,
that all gave themselves up as prisoners. One regiment, however,
after stopping our firing by putting up a white flag, slipped away
and escaped. This destructive effect was not caused by Baxter
alone, for he was aided by Cutler's brigade, which was thrown
forward on Iverson's right flank, by the fire of our batteries,
and the distant fire from Stone's brigade. So long as the latter
held his position, his line, with that of Cutler and Robinson's
division, constituted a demi-bastion and curtain, and every force
that entered the angle suffered severely. Rodes in his report
speaks of it as "a murderous enfilade, and reverse fire, to which,
in addition to the direct fire it encountered, Daniel's brigade
had been subject to from the time it commenced its final advance."
[* General Robinson states that these changes of front were made
by his orders and under his personal supervision.]
While Iverson was making his attack, Rodes sent one of his reserve
brigades--the one just referred to, that of Daniel--against Stone.
This joined Davis' brigade of Hill's corps, and the two charged on
Stone's three little regiments. Stone threw forward one of these
--the 149th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight, to the
railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered. Colonel Dana's
regiment, the 143d Pennsylvania, was posted on the road in rear of
Dwight and to the right. When I saw this movement I thought it a
very bold one, but its results were satisfactory. Two volleys and
a bayonet charge by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being.*
In this attack Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the command
of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the 150th
Pennsylvania.
[* Dwight was a hard fighter, and not averse to plain speaking.
Once, when Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more
passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for permission for
an old man to visit his dying son. The request was refused;
whereupon Dwight said: _"My name is Dwight, Walton Dwight, Lieutenant-
Colonel of the 149th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. You can
dismiss me from the service as soon as you like, but I am going to
tell you what I think of you,"_ and he expressed himself in terms
far from complimentary; whereupon Stanton rescinded the order and
gave him the pass.]
This attack should have been simultaneous with one from the nearest
troops of Hill's corps, but the latter were lying down in a sheltered
position, and Daniel urged them in vain to go forward.
Not being able to force his way in front on account of Dwight's
position in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to enfilade
it, and threw the 32d North Carolina across it. The cut being no
longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road and formed on Dana's
left.
Daniel had been originally ordered to protect Iverson's right, but
Iverson swung his right around without notifying Daniel, and thus
dislocated the line.
Ramseur now came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul's brigade
of Robinson's division, which was preceded by Robinson in person,
to assist Baxter, and, if possible to fill the interval between
the First and Eleventh Corps, for I feared the enemy would penetrate
there and turn my right flank.
When Paul's brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but
proceeded to refill his cartridge-boxes from those of the dead and
wounded.
General Howard has stated that the interval referred to was filled
by Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries of the Eleventh Corps, but a
glance at the official map will show that, before Paul's advance,
these batteries were several hundred yards distant from the First
Corps.
Another attack was now made from the north and west by both Daniel's
and Davis' brigades. Colonel Wister faced his own regiment, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Huidekoper, to the west, and the other two
regiments to the north. The enemy were again repulsed by two
volleys and a gallant bayonet charge, led by Huidekoper, who lost
an arm in the fight. Colonel Wister having been shot through the
face, the command devolved upon Colonel Dana, another veteran of
the Mexican war.
There had been a great lack of co-ordination in these assaults,
for they were independent movements, each repulsed in its turn.
The last attack, however, against Wister by extended by Brockenborough's
and Pettigrew's brigades to Morrow's front in the woods, but Morrow
held on firmly to his position.
I now sent my last reserve, the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-
Colonel McFarland, to take post between Stone's and Biddle's
brigades.
So far I had done all that was possible to defend my front, but
circumstances were becoming desperate. My line was very thin and
weak, and my last reserve had been thrown in. As we had positive
information that the entire rebel army was coming on, it was evident
enough that we could not contend any longer, unless some other
corps came to our assistance. I had previously sent an aide--
Lieutenant Slagle--to ask General Howard to reinforce me from
Steinwehr's division, but he declined to do so. I now sent my
Adjutant-General, Halsted, to reiterate the request, or to obtain
for me an order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to remain
where I was, in the face of the constantly increasing forces which
were approaching from the west. Howard insisted that Halstead
mistook rail fences for troops in the distance. The lorgnettes of
his staff finally convinced him of his error; he still, however,
refused to order me to retire, but sent Halsted off to find Buford's
cavalry, and order it to report to me. The First Corps had suffered
severely in these encounters, but by this additional delay, and
the overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed.
General Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded,
and Rowley's division suffered in the same proportion. Hardly a
field officer remained unhurt. After five color-bearers of the
24th Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took the flag
in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated. A private then
seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still held it firmly in
his grasp. Similar instances occurred all along the line. General
Robinson had two horses shot under him. He reported a loss of
1,667 out of 2,500. Buford was in a distant part of the field,
with Devin's brigade, covering the retreat of the Eleventh Corps,
and already had all he could attend to. He expressed himself in
unequivocal terms at the idea that he could keep back Hill's entire
corps with Gamble's cavalry brigade alone.
As Howard seemed to have little or no confidence in his troops on
Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps justified in retaining them in line
there for the moral effect they would produce.
About the time the Eleventh Corps gave way on the right, the
Confederate forces made their final advance in double lines, backed
by strong reserves, and it was impossible for the few men left in
the First Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender's large
division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile; Robinson's
right was turned, and General Paul was shot through both eyes in
the effort to stem the tide. They could not contend against Ramseur
in front, and O'Neill on the flank, at the same time.
Under these circumstances it became a pretty serious question how
to extricate the First Corps and save its artillery before it was
entirely surrounded and captured.
Biddle, Morrow, and Dana were all forced back from the ridge they
had defended so long, which bordered Willoughby's Run. Each brigade
was flanked, and Stone's men under Dana were assailed in front and
on both flanks. Yet even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting
which took place before he could win the position.
What was left of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied
on Seminary Ridge. Many of the men entered a semi-circular rail
entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early in the day,
and held that for a time by lying down and firing over the pile of
rails. The enemy were now closing in on us from the south, west,
and north, and still no orders came to retreat. Buford arrived
about this time, and perceiving that Perrin's brigade in swinging
around to envelop our left exposed its right flank, I directed him
to charge. He reconnoitered the position they held, but did not
carry out the order; I do not know why. It was said afterward he
found the fences to be an impediment; but he rendered essential
service by dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south
of the Fairfield road, where they opened a severe fire, which
checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting us off
from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill.
The first long line that came on us from the west was swept away
by our artillery, which fired with very destructive effect, taking
the rebel line _en echarpe_.
Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still
made strong resistance around the Seminary, and by the aid of our
artillery, which was most effective, beat back and almost destroyed
the first line of Scales' brigade, wounding both Scales and Pender.
The former states that he arrived within seventy-five feet of the
guns, and adds: "Here the fire was most severe. Every field
officer but one was killed or wounded. The brigade halted in some
confusion to return the fire." My Adjutant-Generals Baird and
Halstead, and my aides Lee, Marten, Slagle, Jones, and Lambdin had
hot work carrying orders at this time. It is a marvel that any of
them survived the storm of bullets that swept the field.
Robinson was forced back toward the Seminary, but halted notwithstanding
the pressure upon him, and formed line to save Stewart's battery
north of the railroad cut, which had remained too long, and was in
danger of being captured.
Cutler's brigade in the meantime had formed behind the railroad
grading to face the men who were pursuing the Eleventh Corps. This
show of force had a happy effect, for it caused the enemy in that
direction to halt and throw out a skirmish line, and the delay
enabled the artillery soon after to pass through the interval
between Cutler on the north and Buford's cavalry on the south.
As the enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry came
from my right and left, I had little hope of saving my guns, but
I threw my headquarters guard, under Captain Glenn of the 149th
Pennsylvania, into the Seminary and kept the right of Scales'
brigade back twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by
Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division, enabling the few remaining
troops, ambulances, and artillery to retreat in comparative safety.
It became necessary, however, to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds'
battery, as several of the horses were shot and there was no time
to disengage them from the piece. Three broken and damaged caisson
bodies were also left behind. The danger at this time came
principally from Hoke's and Hays' brigades, which were making their
way into the town on the eastern side, threatening to cut us off
from Cemetery Hill. The troops in front of the Seminary were stayed
by the firm attitude of Buford's cavalry, and made a bend in their
line, apparently with a view to form square.
I waited until the artillery had gone and then rode back to the
town with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale and
frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food, and
implored us not to abandon them.
Colonel Livingston of my staff, who had been sent on a message,
came back to the Seminary, not knowing that we had left. He says
the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously, evidently
under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for them there.
They were also forming against cavalry.
On the way I must have met an aide that Howard says he sent to me
with orders to retreat, but I do not remember receiving any message
of the kind.
I observe that Howard in his account of the battle claims to have
handled the First and Eleventh Corps from 11 A.M. until 4 P.M.;
but at 11 A.M. his corps was away back on the road, and did not
arrive until about 1 P.M.
The map previously given on page 125 demonstrates that we were a
mere advance guard of the army, and shows the impossibility of our
defending Gettysburg for any length of time.
The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed. There
were but few left, but they showed the true spirit of soldiers.
They walked leisurely from the Seminary to the town, and did not
run. I remember seeing Hall's battery and the 6th Wisconsin regiment
halt from time to time to face the enemy, and fire down the streets.
Both Doles and Ramsey claim to have had sharp encounters there.
Many of the Eleventh Corps, and part of Robinson's division, which
had been far out, were captured in the attempt to reach Steinwehr's
division on Cemetery Hill, which was the rallying point.
When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his
staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery. He made
arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which
diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the
First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the
Eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after he rode over to ask me,
in case his own men (Steinwehr's division) deserted their guns, to
be in readiness to defend them. General Schurz about this time
was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible
to encourage them to form line again. I understood they were told
that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought
justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that the
discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a
measure injured their morale and _esprit-de-corps_, for they were
rallied with great difficulty.
About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General
Meade to supersede Howard. Congress had passed a law authorizing
the President to put any general over any other superior to rank
if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and
General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President.
Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade
must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled
without fighting. More than half of them, however, lay dead and
wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped.
Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit
to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff,
who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in a subsequent
account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as
a staff officer acting for General Meade. He says "General Hancock
greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these
words, 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.'
I replied, 'All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You
take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the
right.' I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without
consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill,
but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection." He adds
that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M. Hancock,
however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff
officer. He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M. I know
he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and
directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth's
division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of
companies.
Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive
position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field.
Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders
to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on
either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were
great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington
and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce
with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving
along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final
success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of
battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate
his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages,
and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures
to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely
used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops.
Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little
cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy
with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying
Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made
a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell
had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed
to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not
so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from
Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach
the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson,
however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy
a great numerical superiority.
General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock's movements
and dispositions through his field-glass. He was not deceived by
this show of force, and sent a recommendation--not an order--to
Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion
as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost 3,000 men, and
both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general
engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired
for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff,
states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the
height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade
to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a supposed
Union advance in that direction.
The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the
arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action. When
the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the
opportunity for a successful attack had passed.
In sending Hancock forward with such ample powers, Meade virtually
appointed him commander-in-chief for the time being, for he was
authorized to say where we would fight, and when, and how. In the
present instance, in accordance with his recommendation, orders
were immediately sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery
Ridge. Two-thirds of the Third Corps, and all of the Twelfth came
up, and by six o'clock the position became tolerably secure.
Stannard's Second Vermont brigade also arrived, and as they formed
part of my command, reported to me for duty; a very welcome
reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles had taken the
responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing that we were
hard pressed. His command prolonged the line of the First Corps
to the left. Slocum's Corps--the Twelfth--was posted, as a reserve,
also on the left.
Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to Slocum and
rode back to Taneytown to confer with Meade and explain his reasons
for choosing the battle-field.
Longstreet's corps soon arrived and joined Ewell and Hill; so that
the whole rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning,
with the exception of Pickett's division.
At the close of the day General John Newton rode up and took charge
of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and I resumed the
command of my division. Several incidents occurred during the
severe struggle of the first day which are worthy of record.
Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was cut off during the retreat
of Robinson's division, and took refuge in a house. A rebel
lieutenant entered and called upon him to surrender his sword.
This he declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several
of his men, formed them in line, took out his watch and said to
the colonel, "You are an old gray-headed man, and I dislike to kill
you, but if you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I shall
order these men to blow your brains out." When the time was up
_the Colonel still refused to surrender._ A sudden tumult at the
door, caused by some prisoners attempting to escape, called the
lieutenant off for a moment. When he returned the colonel had
given his sword to a girl in the house who had asked him for it,
and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then marched
to the rear, but being negligently guarded, escaped the same night
and returned to his regiment.
Another occurrence recalls Browning's celebrated poem of "An Incident
at Ratisbon." An officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant-
Colonel Dawes, the commander of the regiment, after the sharp fight
in the railroad cut. The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect
attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders of some
kind; but the compressed lips told a different story. With a great
effort the officer said, _"Tell them at home I died like a man and
a soldier."_ He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound,
and dropped dead at the colonel's feet.
Another incident was related to me at the time, but owing to our
hurried movements and the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never
had an opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the
retreat of the artillery one piece of Stewart's battery did not
limber up as soon as the others. A rebel officer rushed forward,
placed his hand upon it, and presenting a pistol at the back of
the driver, directed him not to drive off with the piece. The
latter did so, however, received the ball in his body, caught up
with the battery and then fell dead.
We lay on our arms that night among the tombs at the Cemetery, so
suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame;
but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these
and were too much exhausted to think of anything but much-needed
rest.
CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY.
The ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has
already been partially described. In two places it sunk away into
intervening valleys. One between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill;
the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top,
as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to
distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top.
At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw him, soon after
daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and
want of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At dawn he commenced
forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a
view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the
Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the
movement. It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous
enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren
reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily
be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in
at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans
out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and
every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we
had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle
of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind
Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below.
Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left,
and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled
them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of
retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time. It is
an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle-
ground Hancock had selected.
Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as
unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view
to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion, would have been
much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and,
fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by
ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line.
There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and
recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them
lost the battle of Gettysburg.
I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience
demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost
invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg
seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns
of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession
and were defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive
in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old fable. The
peasant could not break the bundle of fagots, but he could break
one at a time until all were gone.
Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took
him three times as long as it did us to communicate with different
parts of his line, and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried
orders and the reinforcements he sent moved on the circumference
and ours on the chord of the arc.
The two armies were about a mile apart. The Confederates--Longstreet
and Hill--occupied Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery
Ridge, upon which our forces were posted. Ewell's corps, on the
rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the
right.
Lee could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position
on the heights, and should have done so. When he determined to
attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all his force
was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union
army, the Fifth and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades
of the Third Corps were also absent.
The latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was
controlled by the enemy, Sickles felt anxious for the safety of
his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort
them in. This was not done, however. The trains were warned off
the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested.
There has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet,
Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox, and others as to whether Lee did or did
not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and as to whether
Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it. When a
battle is lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on
the part of each general to lay the blame on somebody else's
shoulders. Longstreet waited until noon for Law's brigade to come
up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching
to avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too much
delay. The fact is, Longstreet saw we had a strong position and
was not well pleased at the duty assigned him, for he thought it
more than probable his attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to
take up a position where Meade would be forced to attack him, and
was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded. The
rebel commander, however, finding the Army of the Potomac in front
of him, having unbounded confidence in his troops, and elated by
the success of the first day's fight, believed he could gain a
great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to
attempt it. He was sick of these endless delays and constant
sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his
opponent, and enable the South to crown herself queen of the North
American continent.
By 9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was
actively engaged with that of the enemy, who were making a
reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road. No serious affair,
however, occurred for some hours. Meade, as stated, was forming
his lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied. The
Fifth Corps, which came up about 1 P.M., was posted, as a reserve,
south of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the attack which has
already been referred to. About 3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to
arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four miles, and
its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of
Round Top, to reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an
attack on the left. Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance
against him, but boldly directed that each flank of the Union army
should be assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations
against our centre were to be kept up, to prevent either wing from
being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns with
an interval of several miles between them upon a central force,
and, like almost all such enterprises, failed from want of proper
co-operation in the different fractions of his line.
[Map]
GETTYSBURG.--Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second
Day.*
[* The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield
and Hanover roads. The second day's battle south of the same
roads.]
REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
_Union Troops,_ [filled rectangle]
MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD commanding the First and Eleventh Corps.
FIRST CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding.
_a. First Brigade._ Colonel Henry A. Morrow, 24th Michigan.
_b. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler.
SECOND DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON.
_c. First Brigade._ Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul.
_d. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Henry Baxter.
THIRD DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY.
_e. First Brigade._ Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st Pennsylvania.
_f. Second Brigade._ Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania.
ELEVENTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. C. BARLOW commanding.
_g. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Gilsa.
_h. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames.
SECOND DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG.
_k. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Arnsberg.
_l. Second Brigade._ Colonel Kryzanowski.
_m. Coster's Brigade,_ of Steinwehr's Division.
_Confederate Troops,_ [open rectangle]
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL commanding Third Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY HETH commanding Division.
1. Archer's Brigade. 3. Brockenborough's Brigade.
2. Davis' Brigade. 4. Pettigrew's Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. PENDER commanding Division.
6. McGowan's Brigade. 8. Thomas' Brigade.
7. Scales' Brigade. 9. Lane's Brigade.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENJ. EWELL commanding Second Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES commanding Division.
10. Daniel's Brigade. 12. Iverson's Brigade.
11. Ramseur's Brigade. 13. O'Neill's Brigade.
14. Doles' Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division.
15. Gordon's Brigade. 17. Hoke's Brigade.
16. Hays' Brigade. 18. Smith's Brigade.
Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and
although Ewell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on
our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by
General Meade, by which the force in that part of the field was
withdrawn just as Ewell advanced against it. But we are anticipating
our narrative.
Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps,
complains that he was not allowed to go past Round Top and flank
us on the south, as he might have done, but was required by his
orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles' line
along the Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to
me, as he started late in the afternoon, if he had made the detour
which would have been necessary in order to attack us on the south,
he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might
have interposed to cut him off from the main body.
Before describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final
disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary to fight
a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe.
The Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right; next came one division
of the First Corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on
Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First Corps at the base;
next the Second Corps; then the Third, and the Fifth Corps on the
extreme left, the Sixth Corps being posted in rear of Round Top as
a general reserve to the army. Sickles, however, denies that any
position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong
Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following
reasons: _First,_ because the ground was low, and _second,_ on
account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which
ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned
him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their
artillery; _third,_ because the ground between the valley he was
expected to occupy, and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor
ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded
excellent cover for an enemy operating in his immediate front. He
had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that
an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating
a suitable position for his corps. At his request, General Hunt,
the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose. They rode out
to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted
along that road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard, which was
about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his
right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his
left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard
with the other part of the line, and bent around, so as to cover
the front of Little Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of
this position are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force
to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which
constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the force _A_
will have both its lines _a1_ and _a2_ enfiladed by batteries at
_b1 b2_, and must yield. The ground, however, may be such that
the enemy cannot plant his guns at _b1_ or _b2_; but under any
circumstances it is a weak formation and the enemy easily penetrate
the angle. When that is the case, and it was so in the present
instance--each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and
the position is no longer tenable.
[Diagram]
_________________________
| _b2_
|
|_b1_ _________________
| | _a1_
| |
| | _A_
| |_a2_
| |
| |
If one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot
be enfiladed, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes
permissible.
Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General
Meade, who, however, censured the movement afterward. As soon as
Sickles took position, General Buford's division of cavalry was
sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and
Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the
rebel left.
Sykes' corps--the Fifth--came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon
after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and
formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's
Pennsylvania Reserves at their right and front.
There had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders,
called at Meade's headquarters, and it was universally agreed to
remain and hold the position. As the Third Corps, in answer to
the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible
concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his
command and General Meade went with him. The latter objected to
Sickles' line, but thought it was then too late to change it.
The severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of
the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to a furious attack
against Ward's brigade on the left. This attack soon extended to
the Peach Orchard. The fight became very hot against Birney's
division from the left to the centre, but the troops on the right
of the centre--Humphreys' division--were not at first actively
engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Birney with one of his brigades,
and subsequently with a regiment.
The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines
was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to
describe the movements of the contestants. Some idea of it can
probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram:
It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A,
and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB. The
angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the
west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on
the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward
and took the position DE.
The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade
on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels
advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked the force there
with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were
ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL. Two divisions
of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one
after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from
D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked
by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to
retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor. Indeed,
Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries,
HI. The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line
and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of
the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of
the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels
gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field.
The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking
in of the angle at A will be described further on. The general
result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements
sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to
the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of
Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important
to be wholly omitted.
About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left,
by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two
lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart
Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain,
and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called
the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded
ridge beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing
on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the
Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent. This central
point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's
and Humphreys' divisions. Birney's two brigades, commanded by
Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought
with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line
was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps
was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished
his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them
in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the
necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could
hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three-
quarters of an hour.
It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle
was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach
Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division
perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced
line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought
turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this
idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road,
and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor
ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry
out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from
Sykes' corps.
Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on
the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was
long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the
ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He
attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching
the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand
had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send
the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank.
Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant
charge upon the rebel advance.
The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.
General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had
ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top,
to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the
enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived
that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into
their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole
line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so
that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and
must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes
had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the
relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and
who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment he rode down the
slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's
brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He
then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had
done and to represent the immense importance of holding this
commanding point.
The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a
battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right;
but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up
the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top
which seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed
on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not
having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save
the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were
alive with musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the
enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular
battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of
Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was
dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the
140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon
the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre,
had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position,
Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated
at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed
the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon
killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was on the crest
with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as
Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck
him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief. Colonel
Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent.
The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around
through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's
regiment--the 20th Maine--was folded back by him, around the rear
of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like
wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over
the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in
their turn. This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the
Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the
hill. The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels
from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number
of prisoners. Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a
third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition. Vincent's
men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five
hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill in his
official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise."
We will now return to the Peach Orchard. In answer to a shot from
Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries
opposite. Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this
iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which
were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under
Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became
necessary to sacrifice one of them--that of Bigelow--to enable the
others to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham still held the
Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's
brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A battery
was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg
road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position,
but was mortally wounded in doing so.* Sickles lost a leg about
this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell
into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved
upon General Birney.
[* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a
brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had known him as an
officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of Congress
he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.]
The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road
below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much
shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off
temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's
brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand.
Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to
give the others time to form a new line. He fought with _fixed
prolonge_ until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then
retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men.
Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience.
McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this
artillery was served. He says one shell killed and wounded thirty
men, out of a company of thirty-seven.
The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy
directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right. The
disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in
after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and
an enfilading fire from the right.
While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place
in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of
Sickles' line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to
the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then
turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing
through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand
held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force
--a front of two regiments--and his contest with Semmes' brigade
in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very
destructive. At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven
back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and
occupied the wheat-field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps,
composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his
assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining
several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy
who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to
give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined
fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's
force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used
them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments,
charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone
fence which bounded it.
Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the
contest. Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and
Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the
advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed
in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came
forward in its place. Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid
charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through
the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second
time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another
line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time
was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was
really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes'
brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades,
rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in
retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell,
under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy
loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely
surrounded.
Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles,
went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and
Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He
struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would
have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and
drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line,
from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with
ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained
but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished
with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed
and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round
Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops
were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time,
and withdrew by piece.
[* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first
Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation
of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its
battles and minor engagements.]
The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now
swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and
Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a
division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which
at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the
Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army.
Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State,
and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors
of one of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an
impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a
stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless
stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it
was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other
brigade of Crawford's division--that of Fisher--had previously been
sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope
of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was
not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on
the left of Little Round Top and fortified it.
As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of
Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little
Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh
troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to
reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther
advance.
The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and
held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which
rocky cavern they took shelter.
It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach
Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham--which took place
soon after--upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the
right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney
assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his
left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection
with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach
Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely
demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing
the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend
with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the
Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire
front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from
Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which
now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to
the road. Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that
part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that
they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received
orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge
itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock, who had been placed in
command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable
in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line"
wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His activity and
foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the
last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the
right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat. Humphreys was
followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright--about
the best fighting material in the rebel army. Perry was driven
back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between
the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported
on the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as
soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so,
and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move
forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would
have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results.
Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached
the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers
had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. Webb gave
him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward
with two regiments. He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned
it upon them. Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this
advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox
did the same. On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to
accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, _for he
pierced our centre,_ and held it for a short time, and had the
movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it
might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have
resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration
of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a
central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour
appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack
of support.
Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him.
The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops
rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating
himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have captured
temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.
As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped
off. The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line
of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove
off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his
bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at
him.* I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's
name.
[* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that
this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian,
a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright.
Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.]
In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as
Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round
Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line. As he
passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second
Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my
command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up
in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field
at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged
he passed over to the right. On his return late in the day he saw
Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade
established on the crest barring his way back. He rode rapidly
over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and
down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which
might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and
which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff.
Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have
pierced our centre." Meade expressed surprise at the information
and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?" Tidball replied, "I do not
know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a
short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are
available." Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton
and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and
I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated.
There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at
Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the
action. When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who
followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more
guns. I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as
Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of
the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to
be located in that part of the field.
It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position
Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from
the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us
and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was
propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted
all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which
after all was of no particular benefit to them. They were still
outside our main line. They pierced the latter it is true, but
the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood
triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the
divisions which should have supported them remained inactive. I
must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these
supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command
exerted a benumbing influence on the second day.
It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance
against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's
corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights
as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point
held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of
the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and
nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling
into the hands of the enemy.
Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had
pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him
orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of
the army. Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg,"
published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey,
of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear
actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported
that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time
the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation
he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a
leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the
battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate
scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which
the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the
presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he
looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and
perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture
of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded
the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General
Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would
probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies
that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in
occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat
of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such
a movement was contemplated.
Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the
Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate
forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move
to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's
assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the
fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two
brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns
never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the
extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made
their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First
Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.
In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the
conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of
ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right
and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum,
sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep
Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and
thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the
extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk
in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large
force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades
should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.
Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek
about half and hour before sunset. It suffered so severely from
our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in
disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced
against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals
had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed.
Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took
possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our
communications.
Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's
position saw this movement of Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the
column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish
on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to
meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in
the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine,
perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being
flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having
graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what
ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it
was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or
where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before
taking any further action. Yet they were now but a short distance
from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our
reserve artillery. A night attack on the rear of our army, in
conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's
front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have
succeeded.
During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson.
Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes,
and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as
the battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery
about his movements which needs to be cleared up.
To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent
reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed
to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous
artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on
Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied
and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's infantry moved
forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left,
under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was
supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while
Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent
any attack against his right. The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's
brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the
hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was
Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens'
batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were
now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright,
Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to
attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last.
The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by
Stevens' battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the
approaching line energetically. The rebel left and centre fell
back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and
undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von
Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries.
In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a
terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of
Ricketts' guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement,
exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible
fire of double canister into their ranks. The 33d Massachusetts
also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were
penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to
the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand
to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They
shouted, _"Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose
our guns."_ Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on
his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as
they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great
danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be
turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined
by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's
division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous
silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came
over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they
were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their
assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive
fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known
as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his
defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him.
The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our
extreme right. As it could only be reached by a long circuit it
was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening
other parts of his line. That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery
Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to
any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer.
He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change
front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and
by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been
repulsed.
The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious
on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue
his efforts. He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses,
and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce
Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's
troops, the _élite_ of his army, who had not been engaged, against
our centre. He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in
front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter
the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been resting the
tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after
the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle
around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown.
This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's
cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field
about 4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and
Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged
against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put
an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked
at Two Taverns for the night.
Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post
opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right.
There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack
and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own
skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet
him. At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike
where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded
the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's
cavalry.
At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously
voted to stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the
result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily,
"Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to
fight a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually
prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced
during the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought it
better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing
all.*
[* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in
the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend
to leave the field. So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat
is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it
is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency. It
is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a
battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid
down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in
official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat,
where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not
always so easy to decide. On the night of the 2d the state of
affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days,
the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated;
the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and
only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh.
It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great
success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions,
and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion. In such
a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as
an organization, and there is a vast difference between a _destroyed_
army and a _defeated_ army. By retiring while it was yet in his
power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety
of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue;
and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies,
were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very
energetically. Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced
from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the
centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was
necessary for renewed effort.
There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his
communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at
Gettysburg.
It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton
objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They
merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy
from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between
us and Washington. Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of
the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining
now to fight it out.]
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT.
At dawn on the 3d the enemy opened on us with artillery, but the
firing had no definite purpose, and after some hours it gradually
slackened.
The principal interest early in the day necessarily centred on the
right, where Johnson's position not only endangered the safety of
the army, but compromised our retreat. It was therefore essential
to drive him out as soon as possible. To this end batteries were
established during the night on all the prominent points in that
vicinity. Geary had returned with his division about midnight,
and was not a little astonished to find the rebels established in
the works he had left. He determined to contest possession with
them at daylight. In the meantime he joined Greene and formed part
of his line perpendicular to our main line of battle, and part
fronting the enemy.
On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he
would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with
Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division.
As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the
morning our artillery opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the
steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring
any artillery with him, he could not reply. It would not do to
remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes
of winning a better position on higher ground. His men--the old
Stonewall brigade leading--rushed bravely forward, but were as
gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close
and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks.
Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the
rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse.
Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty
of support for Geary. Troops were sent him, including Shaler's
brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re-
establishing the line.
At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat
threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded
slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave
up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until
night.
Our line was once more intact. All that the enemy had gained by
dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of
co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating
orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by
our fire.
Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without
having been able to establish himself permanently on either.
Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous
of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure
his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington.
He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what
could be done. General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws'
division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United
States Army, as follows: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade
Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told him that
the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest. He asked if I
could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.'
He said quickly, 'Why not?' 'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy
have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing
a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'"
Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat,
or attack the centre. Such high expectations had been formed in
the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he
determined to make another effort. He still had Pickett's division,
the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was
full of enthusiasm. He resolved to launch them against our centre,
supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of
the army. He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been
able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre
could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson
having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone,
or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia.
Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their
batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand
charge--the supreme effort--which was to determine the fate of the
campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was
to rule the Northern States.
It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations.
Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely
handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure
of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join
in the attack at close quarters. Wilcox, too, who one would think
had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate
enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support
the right flank of the attack. Wright's brigade was formed in
rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there
was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the
right.
At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns
opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps
under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under
Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard. The object
of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare
the way for Pickett's charge. The exigencies of the battle had
caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being
on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my
own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon
on the right. The convex shape of our line did not give us as much
space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery,
promptly posted eighty guns along the crest--as many as it would
hold--to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered
severely in the two hours' cannonade. Not less than eleven caissons
were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me. When the smoke
went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be
heard along a line of several miles. At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered
our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to
preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he
foresaw would soon take place.
My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I
sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill,
and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences.
The cessation of our fire gave the enemy the idea they had silenced
our batteries, and Pickett at once moved forward, to break the left
centre of the Union line and occupy the crest of the ridge.* The
other forces on his right and left were expected to move up and
enlarge the opening thus made, so that finally, the two wings of
the Union Army would be permanently separated, and flung off by
this entering wedge in eccentric directions.
[* The attack was so important, so momentous, and so contrary to
Longstreet's judgment, that when Pickett asked for orders to advance
he gave no reply, and Pickett said proudly, "I shall go forward,
sir!"]
This great column of attack, it was supposed, numbered about
seventeen thousand men, but southern writers have a peculiar
arithmetic by which they always cipher down their forces to nothing.
Even on the left, on the preceding day, when our troops in front
of Little Round Top were assailed by a line a mile and a half long,
they figure it almost out of existence. The force that now advanced
would have been larger still had it not been for a spirited attack
by Kilpatrick against the left of Longstreet's corps, detaining
some troops there which otherwise might have co-operated in the
grand assault against our centre.
It necessarily took the rebels some time to form and cross the
intervening space, and Hunt took advantage of the opportunity to
withdraw the batteries that had been most injured, sending others
in their place from the reserve artillery, which had not been
engaged. He also replenished the ammunition boxes, and stood ready
to receive the foe as he came forward--first with solid shot, next
with shell, and lastly, when he came to close quarters, with
canister.
General Meade's headquarters was in the centre of this cannonade,
and as the balls were flying very thickly there, and killing the
horses of his staff, he found it necessary temporarily to abandon
the place. Where nothing is to be gained by exposure it is sound
sense to shelter men and officers as much as possible. He rode
over to Power's Hill, made his headquarters with General Slocum,
and when the firing ceased rode back again. During his absence
the charge took place. He has stated that it was his intention to
throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the flanks of the attacking
force, but no orders to this effect were issued, and it is questionable
whether such an arrangement would have been a good one. It would
have disgarnished the left, where Longstreet was still strong in
numbers, and in forming perpendicular to our line of battle the
two corps would necessarily have exposed their own outer flanks to
attack. Indeed, the rebels had provided for just such a contingency,
by posting Wilcox's brigade and Perry's brigade under Colonel Lang
on the left, both in rear of the charging column under Pickett and
Pettigrew. Owing to a mistake or misunderstanding, this disposition,
however, did not turn out well for the enemy. It was not intended
by Providence that the Northern States should pass under the iron
rule of the slave power, and on this occasion every plan made by
Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner.
The distance to be traversed by Pickett's column was about a mile
and a half from the woods where they started, to the crest of the
ridge they desired to attain. They suffered severely from our
artillery, which opened on them with solid shot as soon as they
came in sight; when half way across the plain they were vigorously
shelled; double canisters were reserved for their nearer approach.
At first the direction of their march appeared to be directly toward
my division. When within five hundred yards of us, however, Pickett
halted and changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees,
so that the attack passed me and struck Gibbon's division on my
right. Just here one of those providential circumstances occurred
which favored us so much, for Wilcox and Lang, who guarded Pickett's
right flank, did not follow his oblique movement, but kept on
straight to the front, so that soon there was a wide interval
between their troops and the main body, leaving Pickett's right
fully uncovered.
The rebels came on magnificently. As fast as the shot and shell
tore through their lines they closed up the gaps and pressed forward.
When they reached the Emmetsburg road the canister began to make
fearful chasms in their ranks. They also suffered severely from
a battery on Little Round Top, which enfiladed their line. One
shell killed and wounded ten men. Gibbon had directed his command
to reserve their fire until the enemy were near enough to make it
very effective. Pickett's advance dashed up to the fence occupied
by the skirmishers of the Second Corps, near the Emmetsburg road,
and drove them back; then the musketry blazed forth with deadly
effect, and Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall
behind; for the nature of the ground was such that they were more
exposed than other portions of the line. They were much shaken by
the artillery fire, and that of Hays' division sent them back in
masses.*
[* The front line of Hays' division, which received this charge,
was composed of the 12th New Jersey, 14th Connecticut, and 1st
Delaware. The second line was composed of the 111th, 125th, 126th,
and 39th New York.]
Before the first line of rebels reached a second fence and stone
wall, behind which our main body was posted, it was obliged to pass
a demi-brigade under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the 20th New
York State Militia, and a Vermont brigade under General Stannard,
both belonging to my command. When Pickett's right became exposed
in consequence of the divergence of Wilcox's command, Stannard
seized the opportunity to make a flank attack, and while his left
regiment, the 14th, poured in a heavy oblique fire, he changed
front with his two right regiments, the 13th and 16th, which brought
them perpendicular to the rebel line of march. In cases of this
kind, when struck directly on the flank, troops are more or less
unable to defend themselves, and Kemper's brigade crowded in toward
the centre in order to avoid Stannard's energetic and deadly attack.
They were closely followed up by Gates' command, who continued to
fire into them at close range. This caused many to surrender,
others to retreat outright, and others simply to crowd together.
Simultaneously with Stannard's attack, the 8th Ohio, which was on
picket, overlapping the rebel left, closed in on that flank with
great effect. Nevertheless, the next brigade--that of Armistead--
united to Garnett's brigade, pressed on, and in spite of death-
dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon's
line and capture his guns.