THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.
At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the
side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing
the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his
reconnoissance. He said the right flank of Howard's corps was
defenceless and easily assailable. Jackson at once asked permission
to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through
the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly
upon the weak point referred to by Stuart. It was a startling
proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for
when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to
withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven
back to Fredericksburg or crushed. If the Eleventh Corps had
prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with
redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber
and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles,
crossing its fire in front, Jackson's corps would have been powerless
to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one-
half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless
against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have
assailed him in front and on each flank.
There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre,
for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union
commanders could make it successful.
Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a
retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the
worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the
Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns
by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent
the junction. Jackson received the required permission, and started
off at once by a secluded road, keeping Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of
cavalry between his column and the Union army to shield his march
from observation.
At 2 A.M., Hooker sent orders for the First Corps, under Reynolds,
to which I belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of
United States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way.
The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence
from which Hancock had retreated the day before. A battery there
opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open
plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell
mell to the rear.
At dawn Hooker rode around, accompanied by Sickles, to inspect his
lines. He approved the position generally, but upon Sickles'
recommendation he threw in a division of the Third Corps between
the Eleventh and Twelfth, as he thought the interval too great
there.
As soon as Jackson was en route, Lee began to demonstrate against
our centre and left, to make Hooker believe the main attack was to
be there, and to prevent him from observing the turning column in
its progress toward the right. A vigorous cannonade began against
Meade, and a musketry fire was opened on Couch and Slocum; the
heaviest attack being on Hancock's position, which was in advance
of the main line.
In spite of every precaution, Jackson's column as it moved southward
was seen to pass over a bare hill about a mile and a half from
Birney's front, and its numbers were pretty accurately estimated.
General Birney at once reported this important fact at General
Hooker's headquarters. It is always pleasant to think your adversary
is beaten, and Hooker thought at first Jackson might be retreating
on Gordonsville. It was evident enough that he was either doing
that or making a circuit to attack Howard. To provide for the
latter contingency the following order was issued:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
CHANCELLORSVILLE, Va., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD:
I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to say that the
disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a
front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your
flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the
positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be
prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests
that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency.
The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No
artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there
appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the
General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be.
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our
right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as
far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their
approach.
(Signed) JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,
_Brigadier-General and Aide-de-camp_.
For what subsequently occurred Hooker was doubtless highly censurable,
but it was not unreasonable for him to suppose, after giving these
orders to a corps commander, that they would be carried out, and
that minor combats far out on the roads would precede and give
ample notice of Jackson's approach in time to reinforce that part
of the line.
When the enemy were observed, Sickles went out with Clark's battery
and an infantry support to shell their train. This had the effect
of driving them off of that road on to another which led in the
same direction, but was less exposed, as it went through the woods.
A second reconnoissance was sent to see if the movement continued.
Sickles then obtained Hooker's consent to start out with two
divisions to attack Jackson's corps in flank and cut if off from
the main body.
Sickles started on this mission at 1 P.M. with Birney's division,
preceded by Randolph's battery. As Jackson might turn on him with
his whole force, Whipple's division of his own corps reinforced
his left, and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps his right.
He was greatly delayed by the swamps and the necessity of building
bridges, but finally crossed Lewis Creek and reached the road upon
which Jackson was marching. He soon after, by the efforts of
Berdan's sharpshooters, surrounded and captured the 23d Georgia
regiment, which had been left to watch the approaches from our
lines. Information obtained from prisoners showed the Jackson
could not be retreating, and that his object was to strike a blow
somewhere.
Birney's advance, and the capture of the 23d Georgia were met by
corresponding movements on the part of the enemy. A rebel battery
was established on the high ground at the Welford House, which
checked Birney's progress until it was silenced by Livingston's
battery, which was brought forward for that purpose. Pleansonton's
cavalry was now sent to the Foundry as an additional reinforcement.
Sickles' intention was to cut Jackson off entirely from McLaws'
and Anderson's divisions, and then to attack the latter in flank,
a plan which promised good results. In the mean time Pleasonton's
cavalry was sent forward to follow up Jackson's movement. Sickles
requested permission to attack McLaws, but Hooker again became
irresolute; so this large Union force was detained at the Furnace
without a definite object, and the works it had occupied were
vacant. While Sickles was not allowed to strike the flank, Slocum's
two divisions under Geary and Williams were sent to push back the
fortified front of the enemy in the woods; a much more difficult
operation. Geary attacked on the plank road, but made no serious
impression, and returned. Williams struck further to the south,
but was checked by part of Anderson's division. A combined attack
against Lee's front and left flank, undertaken with spirit earlier
in the day, would in all probability have driven him off toward
Fredericksburg and have widened the distance between his force and
that of Jackson; but now the latter was close at hand and it was
too late to attempt it. As the time came for the turning column
to make its appearance on Howard's right, a fierce attack was again
made against Hancock with infantry and artillery, to distract
Hooker's attention from the real point at issue.
Pleasonton, after dismounting one regiment and sending it into the
woods to reconnoitre, finding his cavalry were of no use in such
a country, and that Jackson was getting farther and father away,
rode leisurely back, at Sickles' suggestion, to Hazel Grove, which
was an open space of considerable elevation to the right of the
Twelfth Corps. As he drew near, the roar of battle burst upon his
ears from the right of the line and a scene of horror and confusion
presented itself, presaging the rout of the entire army if some
immediate measures were not taken to stem the tide of disaster.