FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.
There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to
Fredericksburg--one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources
of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the
north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the
other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more
broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third
road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at
Banks' Ford.
On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four
columns.
Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on
the right.
Sykes' division of Meade's corps, followed by Hancock's division
of Couch's corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.
The remainder of Meade's corps--Griffin's division, followed by
that of Humphreys--took the river road.
Lastly, French's division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn
off and march to Todd's Tavern.
Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry,
which, in fact, had been close to Anderson's pickets all the
morning.
Before these troops started, Sickles' corps arrived, after a short
march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the
Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out
to Dowdall's Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor's house.
Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against
Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry.
Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form
line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle
Church, and his left covering Banks' Ford. It did not seem to
occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent
the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and
deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every
direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a
tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through
them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment. Under
these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult,
and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads,
aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick
undergrowth, without being able to find any one. It was worse then
fighting in a dense fog.* The enemy, of course, were also impeded
in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better
acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had
a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon.
The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles,
offered excellent defensive positions for them.
[* One brigade of Griffin's division was out all night trying to
find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army
until 4 A.M. Wilcox's brigade, which came the next day from Banks'
Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]
McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of
battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes,
who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which,
in spite of their gallantry--for they rode up and fired in the
faces of the enemy--were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry
of Mahone's brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the
fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his
invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible,
had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other
about two and half miles from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met
the advance of McLaws' division only a mile out, and drove it back
steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson's
division, and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division. Anderson gave
Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks;
for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the
right nor Meade's two divisions on the left were abreast with him.
He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed
as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy were gaining
the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front
and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his left
resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which
commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a
good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery
could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the
thickets. The reserves could have struggled through those in the
rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to
suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all
events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the
other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially
as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks' Ford, which
it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of
the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to obtain
possession of Banks' Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting
there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out
his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on
the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall
back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the
engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles' corps, could
easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to
fall back upon. General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker's
staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front,
upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for
the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he
(Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the order came to retire,
Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily
refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded
his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the
ridge and the enemy were in possession of it. There was too much
vacillation at headquarters. Slocum, who was pressing the enemy
back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed
it, and retreated without being molested. It is true, Wright's
brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh
Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was
generally good at this time for an advance. The column on the
river road also retired without interference. As Couch had waited
to hear from Hooker, Hancock's right flank became somewhat exposed
by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss. French also,
who had started for Todd's Tavern, returned. He encountered the
enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them.
That portion of the country around Chancellorsville within the
Union lines on the morning of May 2d, may, with some exceptions,
be described as a plain, covered by dense thickets, with open spaces
in the vicinity of the houses, varied by the high ground at Talley's
on the west and by the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove on the
south, and terminating in a deep ravine near the river. Our general
line was separated from that of the enemy by small streams, which
principally ran through ravines, forming obstacles useful for
defensive purposes. This was the case on the east and south, but
on the west, where Howard's line terminated, there was nothing but
the usual thickets to impede the enemy's approach.
As the narrative proceeds, the position of the Confederate army,
who held the broken ground on the other side of those ravines, will
be more particularly described.
After all, a defensive battle in such a country is not a bad thing,
for where there are axes and timber it is easy to fortify and hard
to force the line; always provided that free communications are
kept open to the central reserve and from one part of the line to
another. It must be confessed that the concealment of the thickets
is also favorable to the initiative, as it enables the attacking
party to mass his troops against the weak parts without being
observed. Hooker probably thought if Lee assailed a superior force
in an intrenched position he would certainly be beaten; and if he
did not attack he would soon be forced to fall back on his depots
near Richmond for food and ammunition. In either case the prestige
would remain with the Union general.
The rebels followed up our army closely, and it is quite possible
that a sudden attack, when it was heaped up around Chancellorsville,
might have been disastrous to us. Gradually, under the skilful
guidance of Captain Payne of the Engineers, who had made himself
well acquainted with the country, the different corps took the
positions they had occupied on the previous night, and order came
out of chaos. The line, as thus established, covered all the roads
which passed through Chancellorsville. The left, held by Meade's
corps, rested on the Rappahannock, near Scott's Dam; the line was
then continued in a southerly direction by Couch's corps, facing
east, French's division being extended to a point near to and east
of Chancellorsville, with Hancock's division of the same corps
holding an outpost still further to the east. Next came the Twelfth
Corps under Slocum, facing south, and then, at some distance to
the west, in echelon to the rear along the Plank Road, Howard's
corps was posted. The Third Corps under Sickles was kept in reserve,
back of the mansion. The next morning two brigades and two batteries
of Birney's division were interposed between Slocum and Howard,
with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out in front. The 8th
Pennsylvania Cavalry picketed the roads and kept the enemy in sight.
The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable,
so that an advance against the enemy's lines became exceedingly
difficult and manoeuvring nearly impracticable, nor was this the
only defect. Batteries could be established on the high ground to
the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while
our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important
of all, the right of Howard's corps as "in the air," that is, rested
on no obstacle.
Hooker was sensible that this flank was weak, and sent Graham's
brigade of Sickles' corps with a battery to strengthen it; but
Howard took umbrage at this, as a reflection on the bravery of his
troops or his own want of skill, and told Graham that he did not
need his services; that he felt so secure in his position that he
would send his compliments to the whole rebel army if they lay in
front of him, and invite them to attack him. As Hooker had just
acquiesced in the appointment of Howard to be Commander of the
Eleventh Corps, he disliked to show a want of confidence in him at
the very beginning of his career, and therefore yielded to his
wishes and ordered the reinforcements to return and report to
Sickles again.
Chancellorsville being a great center of communication with the
plank road and turnpike heading east and west, and less important
roads to the south, and southeast, Hooker desired above all things
to retain it; for if it should once fall into the hands of the
enemy, our army would be unable to move in any direction except to
the rear.
General Lee formed his line with Wickham's and Owens' regiments of
cavalry on his right, opposite Meade's corps, supported by Perry's
brigade of Anderson's division; Jackson's line stretched from the
Plank Road around toward the Furnace.
Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part
of Slocum's corps and drove it in on the main body. They then
brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum's position
on the crest of the hill. Failing to make any impression they soon
retired and all was quiet once more.
The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of
Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock's front with considerable
effect. They also enfiladed Geary's division of Slocum's corps,
and became very annoying, but Knap's battery of the Twelfth Corps
replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.
As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the
rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain
where our troops were posted.
When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction,
for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as
much as possible.
The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from
encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army
carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre
and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his
shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen,
etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an
enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork,
and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such
obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so
that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before
giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously
reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there
was not a vulnerable point there.