THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
Notwithstanding Hooker's order of 9.30 A.M. calling Howard's
attention to the weakness of his right flank, and the probability
that Jackson was marching to attack it, no precautions were taken
against the impending danger. The simple establishing of a front
of two regiments toward the west when half his command would hardly
have been sufficient, unless protected by works of some kind, was
perfectly idle as a barrier against the torrent about to overwhelm
the Eleventh Corps. So far as I can ascertain, only two companies
were thrown out on picket, and they were unsupported by grand
guards, so that they did not detain the enemy a moment, and the
rebels and our pickets all came in together. Great stress has been
laid upon the fact that Howard did have a reserve force--Barlow's
brigade of 2,500 men--facing west, which Hooker withdrew to reinforce
Sickles; but is not shown that Howard made any remonstrance or
attached any great importance to its removal. Even if it had
remained, as there were not strong intrenchments in front of it,
it is not probable that it would have been able to resist Jackson's
entire corps for any length of time. There was no reason other
than Howard's utter want of appreciation of the gravity of the
situation to prevent him from forming a strong line of defence to
protect his right flank. If made with felled timber in front and
redoubts on the flanks, Jackson could not have overleaped it, or
even attacked it without heavy loss. If he stopped to do so,
Sickles' corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with
the reserve forces under Berry and French, would soon have confronted
him. If he had attempted to keep on farther down to attack the
United States Ford, he would have met the First Corps there, and
would have permanently severed all connection between himself and
Lee, besides endangering his line of retreat. The apathy and
indifference Howard manifested in relation to Jackson's approach
can only be explained in the supposition that he really believed
that Jackson had fled to Gordonsville, and that the demonstrations
on his front and right proceeded merely from Stuart's cavalry; and
yet why any one should suppose that Lee would part with half his
army, and send it away to Gordonsville where there was no enemy
and nothing to be done, is more than I can imagine. Jackson was
celebrated for making these turning movements; besides, it was
easy, by questioning prisoners, to verify the fact that he had no
surplus trains with him. Nothing, in short, but ammunition wagons,
and ambulances for the wounded; a sure indication that his movement
meant fight and not retreat.
From 10 A.M., when Hooker's order was received, to 6 P.M., when
the assault came, there was ample time for Howard to form an
impregnable line. His division commanders did not share his
indifference. General Schurz pointed out to him that his flank
was in the air, but he seemed perfectly satisfied with his line as
it was, and not at all desirous of changing it in any particular.
Schurz, of his own volition, without the knowledge of his chief,
posted three regiments in close column of division, and formed them
in the same direction as the two regiments and two guns which were
expected to keep Jackson back, but the shock, when it came, was so
sudden that these columns did not have time to deploy. Devens,
having two reserve regiments, also faced them that way, of his own
accord, behind the other two, but having no encouragement to form
line in that direction it is probable both generals hesitated to
do so.
Jackson, having debouched from the country road into the plank
road, was separated from Lee by nearly six miles of pathless forest.
He kept on until he reached the turnpike, and then halted his
command in order that he might reconnoitre and form line of battle.
He went up on a high hill and personally examined the position of
the Eleventh Corps. Finding that it was still open to attack, and
that no preparations had been made to receive him, he formed Rodes'
and Colston's divisions two hundred yards apart, perpendicular to
the plank road, with the road in the centre, and with Hill's division
both on the plank road and turnpike as a support to the other two.
Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry was left on the plank road to menace
Howard from that direction.
It will be seen by a glance at the map that his lines overlapped
that of the Eleventh Corps for a long distance, both in front and
rear. The first notice our troops had of his approach did not come
from our pickets--for their retreat and his advance were almost
simultaneous--but from the deer, rabbits, and other wild animals
of the forest, driven from their coverts by his advance. It is
always convenient to have a scape-goat in case of disaster, and
the German element in the Eleventh Corps have been fiercely censured
and their name became a byword for giving way on this occasion.
It is full time justice should be done by calling attention to the
position of that corps. I assert that when a force is not deployed,
but is struck suddenly and violently on its flank, resistance in
_impracticable_. Not Napoleon's Old Guard, not the best and bravest
troops that ever existed, could hold together in such a case, for
the first men assailed are--to use a homely but expressive word--
driven into a _huddle_; and a huddle cannot fight, for it has no
front and no organization. Under such circumstances, the men have
but a choice of two evils, either to stay where they are and be
slaughtered, without the power of defending themselves, or to run;
and the only sensible thing for them to do is to run and rally on
some other organization. The attempt to change front and meet this
attack _on such short notice_ would have been hopeless enough,
drawn up as Howard's men were, even if they had been all in line
with arms in their hands; but it is a beautiful commentary on the
vigilance displayed, that in many cases the muskets were stacked,
and the men lounging about some playing cards, others cooking their
supper, intermingled with the pack-mules and beef cattle they were
unloading. It will be remembered that in the order previously
quoted, Howard was directed _"to advance his pickets for the purpose
of observation,"_ in order _that he might have ample time for
preparation._ The object of this injunction is plain enough. It
was to make sufficient resistance to Jackson's advance to delay
it, and not only give time for the Eleventh Corps to form, but
enable Hooker to send his reserves to that part of the line. The
pickets, therefore, should have been far out and strongly backed
with a large force which would take advantage of every accident of
ground to delay the rebel column as long as possible. Howard seemed
to have no curiosity himself, as he sent out no parties; but Sickles
and Pleasonton had their spies and detachments on the watch, and
these came in constantly with the information, which was duly
transmitted to Howard, that Jackson was actually coming. Schurz
also became uneasy and sent out parties to reconnoitre. General
Noble, at that time Colonel of the Seventeenth Connecticut Infantry,
two companies of whose regiment were on the picket line there,
writes as follows: "The disaster resulted from Howard's and Devens'
utter disregard and inattention under warnings that came in from
the front and flank all through the day. Horseman after horseman
rode into my post and was sent to headquarters with the information
that the enemy were heavily marching along our front and proceeding
to our right; and last of all an officer reported the rebels massing
for attack. Howard scouted the report and insulted the informants,
charging them with telling a story that was the offspring of their
imaginations or their fears."
If this be true, there has been but one similar case in our annals,
and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort Sims, by the
savages, in 1813, near Mobile, Alabama; soon after a negro had been
severely flogged by the commanding officer for reporting that he
had seen Indians lurking around the post.
Adjutant Wilkenson, of the same regiment, confirms General Noble's
statement and says, "Why a stronger force was not sent out as
skirmishers and the left of our line changed to front the foe is
more than I am able to understand."
General Schimmelpfennig, commanding a brigade of Schurz's division,
says he sent out a reconnoissance and reported the hostile movements
fully two hours before the enemy charged.
The Germans were bitterly denounced for this catastrophe, I think
very unjustly, for in the first place less than one-half the Eleventh
Corps were Germans, and in the second place the troops that did
form line and temporarily stop Jackson's advance were Germans;
principally Colonel Adolph Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's
division, aided by a few regiments of Schurz's division, who gave
a volley or two. Buschbeck held a weak intrenched line perpendicular
to the plank road for three-quarters of an hor, with artillery on
the right, losing one-third of his force. His enemy then folded
around his flanks and took him in reverse, when further resistance
became hopeless and his men retreated in good order to the rear of
Sickles' line at Hazel Grove where they supported the artillery
and offered to lead a bayonet charge, if the official reports are
to be believed. Warren says he took charge of some batteries of
the Eleventh Corps and formed them in line across the Plank Road
without any infantry support whatever.
In reference to this surprise, Couch remarks that no troops could
have stood under such circumstances, and I fully agree with him.
An officer of the Eleventh Corps who was present informed General
Wainwright, formerly Colonel of the 76th New York, that he was
playing cards in the ditch, and the first notice he had of the
enemy was seeing them looking down upon him from the parapet above.
As for Devens, who was nearest the enemy, it is quite probable that
any attempt by him to change front to the west previous to the
attack would have been looked upon by Howard as a reflection upon
his own generalship and would have been met with disfavor, if not
with a positive reprimand. The only semblance of precaution taken,
therefore, was the throwing out two regiments to face Jackson's
advance. Devens could not disgarnish his main line without Howard's
permission, and it is not fair, therefore, to hold him responsible
for the disaster. As it was, he was severely wounded in attempting
to rally his men. The only pickets thrown out appear to have been
_two companies of the 17th Connecticut Infantry._
Just as Jackson was about to attack, a furious assault was made at
the other end of the line, where Meade was posted. This was repulsed
but it served to distract Hooker's attention from the real point
of danger on the right.
It would seem from all accounts that nothing could vanquish Howard's
incredulity. He appeared to take so little interest in Jackson's
approach that when Captain George E. Farmer, one of Pleasonton's
staff, reported to him that he had found a rebel battery posted
directly on the flank of the Eleventh Corps, he was, to use his
own language, _"courteously received, but Howard did not seem to
believe there was any force of the enemy in his immediate front."_
Sickles and Pleasonton were doing all they could to ascertain
Jackson's position, for at this time a small detachment of the
Third Corps were making a reconnoissance on the Orange Court House
Plank Road, and Rodes states that our cavalry was met there and
skirmished with Stuart's advance. Farmer said _he saw no Union
pickets,_ but noticed on his return that Howard's men were away
from their arms, which were stacked, and that they were playing
cards, etc., utterly unsuspicious of danger and unprepared for a
contest. Notwithstanding the reports of Jackson's movement from
spies and scouts, Howard ordered no change in his lines.
An attempt has been made to hold Colonel Farmer responsible for
this surprise, on the ground that he should have charged the battery
and brought in some prisoners, who would give full information;
but there had been warnings enough, and prisoners enough, and as
Colonel Farmer had but forty men, he would have had to dismount
half of them to make the assault, and with part of his force holding
the horses, he could only have used about twenty men in the attack,
which is rather too few to capture guns supported by an army.
Besides, Farmer was sent out by General Pleasonton with specific
instructions, and was not obliged to recognize the authority of
other officers who desired him to make a Don Quixote of himself to
no purpose.
If the two wings of the rebel army had been kept apart, the small
force left under Lee could easily have been crushed, or driven off
toward Richmond. The commander of the Eleventh Corps, however,
far from making any new works, did not man those he had, but left
his own lines and went with Barlow's brigade to see what Sickles
was doing.
The subsequent investigation of this sad business by the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce, and
necessarily unreliable; for so long as both Hooker and Howard were
left in high command, it was absurd to suppose their subordinates
would testify against them. Any officer that did so would have
soon found his military career brought to a close.
Howard was in one or two instances mildly censured for not keeping
a better lookout, but as a general thing the whole blame was thrown
on the Germans. Hooker himself attributed the trouble to the fact
that Howard did not follow up Jackson's movements, and allowed his
men to stray from their arms.
A great French military writer has said, "It is permissible for an
officer to be defeated; but never to be surprised."
It is, of course, only fair to hear what Howard himself has to say
in relation to this matter.
He writes in his official report of the battle as follows:
"Now as to the cause of the disaster to my corps.
"_First_.--Though constantly threatened, and apprised of the moving
of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to move
a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances,
nor scouts ascertained.
"He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my
right.
"_Second_.--By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire,
regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.
"_Third_.--The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had
previously located in reserve, and in _echelon_ with Colonel Von
Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank."
The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson
intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for
him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and
his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the
weak part of his line. To suppose that Jackson would run a great
risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the
purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for
he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he
desired to do so.
The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously
with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small
regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually
fronted them in line.
Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's
Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements. He was told, "he must
hold his post with the men he had, and trust to God;" information
which was received by the irate German with objurgations that were
not at all of an orthodox character.
Devens' division, thus taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's
division, and the being unable to form, was heaped up after some
resistance on Steinwehr's division, in the uttermost confusion and
disorder. Steinwehr had only Buschbeck's brigade with him; the
other--that of Barlow--having been sent out to reinforce Sickles;
but he formed line promptly, behind a weak intrenchment, which had
been thrown across the road, and with the aid of his artillery kept
Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour. Howard exerted
himself bravely then, and did all he could to rally the fugitives;
but Rodes' division, which attacked him, was soon reinforced by
that of Colston, and the two together folded around his flanks,
took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a
rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through
the flying crowd, who were streaming in wild disorder to the rear
past Hooker's headquarters.
And now, with the right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap
where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been
posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson
taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on
Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army
was inevitable.
Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force
between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever
Jackson from the main body. If Sickles had been allowed to attack
the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested
permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement
could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it
was too late to attempt it. As already stated, Williams' division
struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws
across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock. Geary found the
enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his
works. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams
also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who
now occupied the intrenchments he had left. Sickles thinks if this
had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been
cut off from the main body.