questions? Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I only need to refer briefly to a few documents. In
Document Book 1, I submit Document 24, Page 86. I refer to the note:
“An agreement was reached with the Prosecution to the effect
that the fact should be accepted that the Enabling Act of 24
March 1933 was preceded by two Enabling Acts in 1923.”
I refer to Document Book 2, Document 63, an article from _The Stars and
Stripes_ of 27 March 1946. These are the peace efforts through Earle.
The article is to supplement the interrogatory of Lersner.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 36?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Number 63, Page 153.
Furthermore, I refer to Volume II...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. This document that you just put before us is
a document of 27 March 1946. What are we going to do with that? It is a
newspaper article.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is a newspaper article on an interview with Earle. He
was speaking with Lersner. To supplement the testimony of Lersner, which
we do not have here, I should like to use this newspaper article. It
enlarges on something which is briefly mentioned in Lersner’s written
testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: But you had the opportunity of getting an affidavit from
Lersner or for putting what questions you wanted to Lersner, and now you
are putting in a newspaper article dated 1946 whilst the Trial is going
on.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, since I cannot hear Lersner himself
because of his absence—we intended to hear him as a witness—the
question in the interrogatory was answered rather briefly. To complete
it...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Lersner interrogatory is dated 15 April 1946. It is
Document 93. Date of the interrogatory, 15 April 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal doesn’t think that this document ought
to be admitted. Newspaper articles whilst the Trial is going on are not
the sort of evidence which the Tribunal thinks it right to admit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In Volume III I submit Document 99, an affidavit by
Schaffgotsch, Page 245. It is just being submitted, Mr. President. It is
a brief affidavit concerning Papen’s vain efforts in the spring of 1934
to reach Hindenburg.
Finally, as Document 100, I shall submit the appeal of the Reich
Government of 1 February 1939, which was mentioned yesterday, and also
an excerpt on foreign policy from Hitler’s speech of 23 March. Yesterday
it was referred to during the proceedings.
Furthermore, I refer to all documents in all three document books which
have been submitted and ask that you take judicial notice of them.
Then I have one final request. Yesterday parts of the discussion of the
affidavits of Schröder and Meissner were read into the record. I believe
the Prosecution, since they have not made use of the affidavits, will be
willing that these parts be stricken from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: It was Meissner’s affidavit which was used to some
extent, wasn’t it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it was. My Lord, I should have
thought the most convenient course was that the Tribunal would take it
that I have merely put the facts out of the affidavit and would not
consider that the evidence of the affidavit was before them. Otherwise,
I think it would be very difficult to correct the record, but of course
I accept that position.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we think so. We will treat it as those facts having
been put to the witness and the witness having answered them, without
considering it as a sworn statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, purely as my questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am now finished with the case of the Defendant Von
Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit on Saturday in open session from 10
to 1.
I call on counsel for the Defendant Speer.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Perhaps the
High Tribunal will recall the fact that when we were discussing the
evidence material which I had suggested for presentation in this case I
dispensed with the testimony of witnesses and stated that I would limit
myself to the use of interrogatories and to the questioning of witnesses
outside of the courtroom.
I had hoped I should thus be able to produce my entire evidence.
However, I am not in possession of all the interrogatories I sent out. I
have only received part of them. I will use those replies which are at
my disposal to the best of my ability in the examination of the
defendant so that a special presentation of those interrogatories and of
the depositions will be superfluous. Despite everything, I hope to
conduct the examination of the defendant in such a manner that in my
estimation I shall be finished in a day and at the most 7 hours.
Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should like to call the
Defendant Speer to the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Defendant Speer took the stand._]
Will you state your full name, please?
ALBERT SPEER (Defendant): Albert Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: Sit down.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you please tell the Tribunal about your
life up until the time you were appointed Minister?
SPEER: I was born on 19 March 1905. My grandfather and my father were
successful architects. At first I wanted to study mathematics and
physics; but then I took up architecture, more because of tradition than
inclination. I attended the universities at Munich and Berlin; and in
1929 at the age of 24, I was the first assistant at the technical
college in Berlin. At the age of 27, in 1932, I went into business for
myself until 1942.
In 1934 Hitler noticed me for the first time. I became acquainted with
him and from that period of time onward I exercised my architect’s
profession with joy and enthusiasm, for Hitler was quite fanatical on
the subject of architecture; and I received many important construction
contracts from him. Along with putting up a new Reich Chancellery in
Berlin and various buildings on the Party Rally grounds here in
Nuremberg, I was entrusted with the replanning of the cities of Berlin
and Nuremberg. I had sketched buildings which would have been among the
largest in the world, and the carrying through of these plans would have
cost no more than 2 months of Germany’s war expenditure. Through this
predilection which Hitler had for architecture I had a close personal
contact with him. I belonged to a circle which consisted of other
artists and his personal staff. If Hitler had had any friends at all, I
certainly would have been one of his close friends.
Despite the war, this peaceful construction work was carried on until
December 1941, and only the winter catastrophe in Russia put an end to
it. The German part of the manpower was furnished by me for the
reconstruction of the destroyed railroad installations in Russia.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution, in Document 1435-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-216, has quoted a remark from your first speech as a Minister, dated
February 1942, in which you state that at that time you had placed
10,000 prisoners of war at the disposal of the armament industry.
Mr. President, this remark may be found in my document book, on Page 4
of the English text and Page 1 of the French text.
Herr Speer, what do you have to say about this document?
SPEER: At that time in my capacity as an architect I had nothing to say
as to whether these workers were to be taken into armaments or not. They
were put at the disposal of the Stalag, the prisoner-of-war installation
of the OKW. I took it as a matter of course that they would be put at
the disposal of armaments in the larger sense.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, did you ever participate in the planning and
preparation of an aggressive war?
SPEER: No. Since I was active as an architect up until the year 1942,
there can be no question about that whatsoever. The buildings which I
constructed were completely representative of peacetime building. As an
architect I used up material, manpower, and money in considerable
amounts for this purpose. This material, in the last analysis, was lost
to armaments.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you...
SPEER: One moment, please.
The carrying out of these large building plans which Hitler had
supported was, actually and especially psychologically, an obstacle to
armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution asserts you had been a Reichsleiter.
SPEER: No, that is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You wore the Golden Party Badge. When and why did you
receive it?
SPEER: I received the Golden Party Badge from Hitler in 1938. It was
because I had completed the plans for a new building program in Berlin.
Besides myself, five other artists received this Golden Party Badge at
the same time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you a member of the Reichstag?
SPEER: In 1941 I was called into the Reichstag by Hitler, that is,
outside of an election, as replacement for a member who had left the
Reichstag. Hitler at that time told me that in my person he also wanted
an artist represented in the Reichstag.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you ever receive a donation?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How did your activity as a Minister start?
SPEER: On 8 February 1942, my predecessor, Dr. Todt, was killed in an
airplane crash. Several days later Hitler declared I was to be his
successor in his many offices. At that time I was 36 years of age. Up
until that time, Hitler considered the main activity of Todt to be in
the building sphere, and that is why he called me to be his successor. I
believe that it was a complete surprise to everyone when I was called to
office as a Minister.
Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be seen that not building
but the intensification of armaments was to be my main task, for the
heavy losses of material in the battles in Russia during the winter of
1941-1942 was a great blow. Hitler called for considerable
intensification of armament production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When you assumed office, did you find an office
completely set up in the Reich Ministry for Arms and Munitions?
SPEER: No, Dr. Todt had neglected this function of his up until that
time; and in addition, in the fall of 1941 Hitler issued a decree
according to which the armament of the Army was to take second place to
the armament of the Air Force. At that time he foresaw a victorious
outcome of the war in Russia and had decreed that armament was to be
concentrated on the imminent war against England and was to be converted
to that end. Because of this unbelievable optimism of his, the
rescinding of that order was postponed until January 1942; and only from
that date onward—that is, during the last month of his life—did Dr.
Todt start to build up his organization. Therefore I had the difficult
task first of all to work myself into a completely new field; secondly,
at the same time to create all organizational prerequisites for my task;
and thirdly, to restore the decreasing armament production for the Army
and to increase production as much as possible within the next few
months. As is very well known today, I succeeded in doing that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What promises did you receive from Hitler about the
duration of your task and about the set-up of your staff of
collaborators?
SPEER: Hitler promised me that I should consider my task only as a war
task and that after the war I might once more resume my profession of
architect.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: At this point I should like to mention a passage from
Document 1435-PS, which deals with a speech delivered by Speer on 24
February 1942, 10 days after he assumed office. This document shows that
he was very reluctant about changing his profession of architect for
that of Minister. I quote:
“Finally I can say for myself that my personal contribution is a
very large one. Up until very recently I lived in a world of
pure ideals.”
In Document 1520-PS, which is Exhibit GB-156, found on Page 2 of my
document book, Page 5 of the English text and Page 2 of the French and
Russian texts, on 8 May 1942 Hitler stated; and I quote: “The Führer
thereupon stated several times that the Reich Ministry Speer would be
dissolved on the day when peace was concluded.”
I should further like to submit Document Number Speer-43 which is a
memorandum from Speer to Hitler, dated 20 September 1944. Mr. President,
this may be found on Page 6 of the English text, Page 3 of the French
and Russian texts. From this document you can see that Speer was
considered hostile to the Party (“parteifremd” and “parteifeindlich”) by
Bormann and Goebbels because of his circle of collaborators. Speer
writes in his memorandum, and I quote:
“The task which I have to fulfill is a nonpolitical one. I was
content in my work as long as I personally and my work were
evaluated only according to professional achievements and
standards. I do not feel strong enough to carry out successfully
and without hindrance the technical work to be accomplished by
myself and my co-workers if it is to be measured by Party
political standards.”
Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles according to
which you built up your Ministry?
THE PRESIDENT: What exhibit number are you giving that?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Exhibit Number 1, Mr. President.
Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles which you
followed in building up your Ministry?
SPEER: I personally was no expert, and I did not want to act as an
expert. Therefore, I selected the best possible experts to be found in
Germany as my co-workers. I believed that these men were to be found
within industry itself. Therefore, I made up my Ministry of honorary
industrial workers. This was done in the United States in a similar way
during the war in matters of production. Professional civil servants
were lacking in my Ministry, and you cannot really consider my Ministry
as one set up along normal lines. In June 1944 I delivered a speech in
Essen about the fundamental principles upon which I founded my Ministry
and its work, to defend myself against the various attacks against my
system in Party circles.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I regret, but I believe that the High
Tribunal is not yet in possession of my document book containing the
interrogatories. I would have been glad to point out that the statements
given by witnesses Saur and Schieber in this connection are summed up in
this answer. Now I shall submit...
THE PRESIDENT: If you will give us the references—give us the names of
the witnesses; we can take notice of them afterwards. What is the name?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The witness Saur and we are dealing with his answers to
Points 4, 5, and 8 of the interrogatory. The witness Schieber gives a
statement regarding this point under Figure 12 of his interrogatory.
Now I should like to submit the speech given by Speer on 9 June 1944 as
Exhibit Number 2. It confirms the testimony which the defendant has made
about the set-up of his Ministry by engaging honorary industrial
co-workers. I shall quote it. I am sorry to say that this speech also is
not contained in Your Honor’s supplementary volume. I am very sorry. I
will just have to read it, and I quote:
“These honorary co-workers drawn from industry....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, it is a little bit inconvenient to the
Tribunal not to have these documents before them. You could not possibly
postpone the particular documents that you have not got here until
tomorrow morning? Shall we have the supplementary volume then?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The promise was given me that it would be at my disposal
by this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; well, then, would it be convenient to leave those
parts which are contained in the supplementary volume over until
tomorrow?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the Supplementary Volume Number 5 we find a document,
very short in part, with which I shall not concern myself today. Only
this one speech which I am mentioning now is...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I quote:
“These honorary co-workers, drawn from industry, carry the
responsibility to the last detail for what is manufactured in
the various enterprises and industries and how it is
manufactured.”
Then a few lines further down:
“Among your main tasks, next to the awarding of contracts to
these industries, is to supervise the restrictions on types, the
specialization of industries, involving under certain
circumstances the closing-down of certain enterprises; to
further rationalization from the point of view of raw materials,
construction, and production; as well as unconditional exchange
of experience, without regard to patents.”
From various passages of this document it can be seen clearly that Speer
considered his office an improvised instrument which made use of the
existing authorities of the Reich for the fulfillment of his tasks but
without burdening himself with these tasks. The decree of 10 August,
which is mentioned in the speech of Speer, shows that he expressly
prohibited his offices from turning into administrative offices. The
defendant did not want bureaucratic official methods of working in his
Ministry.
THE PRESIDENT: What speech of Speer are you referring to?
You said the decree of 10 August.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is still the same speech, Mr. President, which I just
mentioned. The decree is mentioned therein.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t get what the year was when you began. What was
the year?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The year was 1942, 10 August; and the speech was given in
the year 1944. Therefore, he was referring to a decree which had been in
force for some time.
Just how important it was to the defendant to have new non-bureaucratic
forces in his Ministry is shown in the passage from his speech which I
would like to quote now:
“Any institution which has lasted for some period of time and
which exceeds a certain size has a tendency to become
bureaucratic. Even if, in one of the first large attacks on
Berlin, large parts of the current files of the Ministry were
burned, and therefore, for some time, we were lucky enough to
have unnecessary ballast taken from us, we cannot expect that
occurrences of that sort will continuously bring new vigor into
our work.”
Herr Speer, so far as the Tribunal wishes, will you please briefly
supplement these statements about the tasks of your Ministry from the
technical point of view?
SPEER: I shall try to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you, Dr. Flächsner, you read us the speech.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The speech, yes...
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be very remote to every issue, even as it is,
and why you should want to supplement it, I don’t know.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I thought it might be of interest to the High Tribunal to
hear about the sphere of activity which the defendant had in his
capacity as Minister. This speech was made to experts and is, therefore,
really only of interest to an expert. I assumed that the High Tribunal
would wish to know just what the task of the Production Ministry of Herr
Speer was. I think the Prosecution imagined its sphere of activity to be
considerably greater than it actually was.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to know what he says about the tasks of his
Ministry, you can ask him. But you have just been reading his speech,
and we don’t want to...
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No, no, I do not want that either. He is just to give us
briefly some of the technical tasks of his Ministry. That is what I
wanted to know.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to be hearing me accurately. Wouldn’t it
be better if you put your earphones on?
What I said was that you had read the speech and we didn’t want to hear
any more argument upon the speech from the defendant. If you want to ask
the defendant what the tasks of his Ministry are, ask him. What you
asked him was, “Do you wish to supplement the speech?”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you please tell us what the tasks were
which your Ministry had to carry out and please do not refer to the
things that I mentioned in the speech.
SPEER: I believe the tasks of a production ministry are well known in
all industrial states. I just wanted to summarize briefly which
functions I had to concern myself with in detail in this Ministry.
For one, we had to surmount the deficiency, in raw materials, metals,
and steel. Then, by the introduction of assembly-line work, which is
customary in the United States but was not yet current in Germany, the
work was systematized; and thus machinery and space were utilized to the
utmost. Also, it was necessary to amplify the production programs, for
example, for fine steel, aluminum, and individual parts like ball
bearings and gear wheels.
One of the most important tasks was the development of new weapons and
their serial production; and then, beginning with 1943, the reparation
of the damage caused by the extraordinarily sudden bombing attacks,
which forced us to work with improvised means and methods.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was the importance of this activity in the sphere of
your Ministry?
SPEER: It is to be taken as a matter of course that this sphere of
activity was the most important in our country, if only because it
included providing equipment for the Army. I claimed that during the war
the rest of the economy would have to be regulated according to the
exigencies of armament. In times of war, at home, there are only two
tasks which count: To furnish soldiers for the front, and to supply
weapons.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Why was the task of your Ministry purely a war function?
SPEER: Because during peacetime the giving of orders is normally
regulated according to supply and demand, but in wartime this regulating
factor is lacking.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Therefore it was one of the main tasks of your Ministry
to exercise a State control over the distribution of orders?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Then, at first, you had responsibility only for armaments
production for the Army; but at the end of 1944, you were responsible
for the entire field of armament and war production. Can you briefly
tell me the stage of this development, and how thereby the extent of
your task grew?
SPEER: It would be best for me to tell you about the development by
dealing with the number of workers I had.
In 1942 I took over the armaments and construction programs with
altogether 2.6 million workers. In the spring of 1943 Dönitz gave me the
responsibility for naval armament as well, and at this point, I had 3.2
million workers. In September of 1943, through an agreement with the
Minister of Economy, Herr Funk, the production task of the Ministry of
Economy was transferred to me. With that I had 12 million workers
working for me.
Finally, I took over the air armament from Göring on 1 August 1944. With
that the total production was marshaled under me with 14 million
workers. The number of workers applies to the Greater German Reich, not
including the occupied countries.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How was it possible to have a task of that magnitude
directed by a Ministry that consisted almost exclusively of honorary
members, who moreover had no practical routine experience in purely
administrative matters?
SPEER: The administrative sectors in the various armament offices
retained their tasks. In that way, for example, in the Army, the
Heereswaffenamt—the Army Ordnance Office—which contained several
thousand workers, gave the orders, supervised the carrying out of these
orders, and saw to it that delivery of the orders and payment were
carried out in a proper manner. Only in that way did I succeed in having
the entire armament production—which amounted to 3,000 or 4,000 million
marks a month—carried through with an honorary co-worker staff of 6,000
people.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were all armament enterprises of a Wehrmacht branch
subordinate to you?
SPEER: No. There actually was a small group of enterprises which were
run directly by the Wehrmacht branches with their own workers. These
were excepted. They were the munition plants and similar industries, and
also the enterprises of the SS.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution is changing you with the fact you share
the responsibility for the recruiting of foreign workers and prisoners
of war and for taking manpower from concentration camps. What do you say
to this?
SPEER: Neither I nor the Ministry was responsible for this. The Ministry
was a new establishment, which had a technical problem to deal with. It
took no competence in any field away from an existing authority. The
conditions of work were still handled through the old existing
authorities. The Food Ministry and the various offices connected with it
were responsible for the food supply, and the occupation-supervising
agencies in the Reich Labor Ministry were responsible for the
maintenance of safe and bearable conditions at the places of work; the
Trustees of Labor, working under the Plenipotentiary for Labor
Commitment, were responsible for the salaries and the quality and
quantity of work done; and the Health Office of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior was responsible for health conditions. The Justice
Department and the Police Department were responsible for violations
against labor discipline, and, finally, the German Labor Front was
responsible for representing the interests of labor with the employers.
The centralizing of all of these authorities lay in the hands of the
Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commissioner. The fact that the SS put itself
and its concentration camp internees outside the control of the State is
not a matter with which I or my Ministry was concerned.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Your Codefendant Sauckel testified to the effect that
with the carrying out of the recruiting of workers for the industries,
his task was finished. Is that correct in your opinion?
SPEER; Yes, certainly, as far as the placing of workers is concerned,
for one of the subjects of dissension between Sauckel and me was that
the appropriate employment of workers in industry itself had to be a
matter of the works manager and that this could not be influenced by the
labor office. It applied however only to labor recruitment and not to
the observance of labor conditions. In this connection, the office of
Sauckel was partly responsible as supervising authority.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: To what extent could the works manager conform with the
decrees of Sauckel as to labor conditions and so on?
SPEER: The decrees issued by Sauckel were unobjectionable, but the works
managers did not always find it possible to carry through the decrees
for reasons which were outside their power. The bombing attacks brought
about difficulties, disorganized transportation, or destroyed living
quarters. It is not possible to make the managers responsible for the
observance of these decrees under circumstances which often took on
catastrophic proportions after the summer of 1944. These were times of
crises and it was a matter for the Reich authorities to determine just
how far it was possible to carry through these decrees and it is not
right to push this responsibility on the little works manager.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How far was the factory manager responsible to your
Ministry in this regard?
SPEER: Within the framework of the above-mentioned responsibility which
industry enjoyed, the armament factory managers had received a
semiofficial function from me. This, of course, applied only to
technical tasks.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were there any industries making secret items which were
not permitted to be inspected by the Gauleiter? I recall evidence given
here where this was reported.
SPEER: There were some industries which concerned themselves with secret
matters; but in such cases the works trustee of the Labor Front was
represented, and he could report to the Gauleiter on conditions in the
factory through the Gauobmann (chief of the Labor Front in a Gau).
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you approve the punishment of people who were
unwilling to work?
SPEER: Yes, I considered it right that workers who violated labor
discipline should be punished, but I did not demand supplementary
measures in this regard. As a matter of principle, I represented the
view that a satisfactory work output on the part of 14 million workers
could be achieved in the long run only through the good will of the
worker himself. This is a bit of experience which applies generally,
causing every employer in the world to do all in his power to have his
workers satisfied.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you support the efforts made by Sauckel to improve
the social conditions of the workers, and if so, why did you?
SPEER: Naturally I supported them, even though I did not have any
jurisdiction along that line; and the same reasons which I have just
mentioned applied, for our experience showed that labor which is
satisfied has much less loss in the way of material. This for me was
very important, considering our deficiency in raw materials. It is
obvious moreover that the better quality produced by satisfied laborers
is of special significance in time of war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the records of your discussions with Hitler, there are
various directives made by Hitler dealing with the care and the
treatment of foreign workers. Did you cause Hitler to give these
directives?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit three pieces
of evidence—first of all, Document Speer-11. Mr. President, this is
found on Page 10 of the English text, Page 7 of the French text. In this
document, upon Speer’s request in March 1942, it was put down; and I
quote:
“That the Russians under all circumstances were to receive
sufficient food and that civilian Russians were not to be put
behind barbed wire and be treated as prisoners of war.”
As my next piece of evidence, which will be Exhibit Number 4, I would
like to submit Document Number Speer-13. According to this document, in
May 1943 Hitler decided, at the suggestion of Speer, that the German as
well as Russian miners should receive a substantial amount of
supplementary rations and it is specified there that especially the
Russian prisoners of war are to receive compensation in the form of
tobacco and similar items for special efforts and achievements.
The next piece of evidence is Exhibit Number Speer-5, and it is Document
Number 9. Mr. President, this is found on Page 12 of the English text
and Page 9 of the German text in the document book. According to this
document the food supply in Italian armament plants is to be put at
about the level of the German rations. In this connection it is
important that Speer, at the same time, issued directives that also the
families of these workers receive equivalent care.
I had other documents of this type at my disposal but in order to save
the time of the translation department, I did not include them in my
document book.
Herr Speer, to whom did the bonuses of the armament industry go, and
what did they consist of?
SPEER: We gave out many millions of packages to armament plants. They
contained additional food, chocolate, cigarettes, and so forth; and
these bonuses were given in addition to all the extra food rations which
were determined by the Food Ministry for those who worked longer hours
or who did heavy work. In the industries, these bonuses were given to
all workers without distinction, including the foreign workers,
prisoners of war, and the workers from concentration camps.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall again refer to the fact that these bonuses were
also given to armament workers from concentration camps later on when
discussing another document.
In what form did your Ministry put its demands to the industries?
SPEER: It is important to note that the demands made of industries were
only in the manner of production schedules and it was up to the
industries to place their demands as to manpower, machinery, and
material on the basis of these schedules.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was there often an unusual increase in working hours in
industry and how did this happen?
SPEER: Working time should remain uniform in modern assembly-line
production during the entire month. Due to the bombing attacks, delays
in supplying tools and raw materials set in. As a result the number of
hours of work varied from 8 to 12 a day. The average, according to our
statistics, might have been 60 hours to 64 hours a week.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were the working hours of the factory workers who
came from concentration camps?
SPEER: They were exactly the same as for all the other workers in the
industry, for the workers from concentration camps were on the whole
only a part of the workers employed; and these workers were not called
upon to do any more work than the other workers in the factory.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How is that shown?
SPEER: There was a demand on the part of the SS that the inmates of
concentration camps be kept in one part of the factory. The supervisors
consisted of German foremen and specialists. The working hours, for
inherent reasons, had to be co-ordinated with those of the entire
industry, for it is a known fact that there is only one rhythm of work
in a given industry.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is shown unequivocally from two documents which I
shall submit in another connection that the workers from concentration
camps in army and naval armament and in the air armament branch worked
on an average 60 hours per week.
Why, Herr Speer, were special KZ Camps, the so-called work camps,
established next to the industries?
SPEER: The work camps were established so that long trips to the
factories could be avoided and in this way permit the workers to arrive
fresh and ready for work.
Furthermore, the additional food which the Food Ministry had granted for
all workers, including the workers from concentration camps, would not
have been received by these men if they had come directly from big
concentration camps; for then this additional food would have been used
up in the concentration camp. In this way, those workers who came from
concentration camps received, in full measure, bonuses which were
granted in the industry, such as cigarettes or additional food.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you know, during your activities, that the workers
from concentration camps had advantages if they worked in factories?
SPEER: Yes. My co-workers called my attention to this fact, and I also
heard it when I inspected the industries. Of course, a wrong impression
should not be created about the number of concentration camp inmates who
worked in German industry. In toto, 1 percent of the labor personnel
came from concentration camps.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When you inspected establishments, did you ever see
concentration camp inmates?
SPEER: Of course, when on inspection tours of industries I occasionally
saw inmates of concentration camps who, however, looked well fed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Concerning the report which Herr Speer made about
concentration camps and the treatment which the inmates received in
factories, I refer to a confidential letter from the office chief
Schieber to Speer, dated 7 May 1944. I submit it as Document Number
Speer-44, Exhibit Number 6.
Mr. President, I am sorry, this will also be found in the second
document book, which has not yet been submitted. But it would be a pity
if I were not to discuss it at this time, for it fits so well into this
pattern. Therefore, I should like to quote briefly from it.
The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister as follows...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the Tribunal thinks it would be much more
helpful to them to have the document before them.
We are told that the book will be ready tomorrow afternoon, and that it
will not be ready before tomorrow afternoon.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything possible
at the time to see that the documents were put at the disposal of the
translation department in good time. The difficulty must have arisen
from the fact that the interrogatories did not come back in time. I
assume that that is what happened.
The quotation from this document is not long, Mr. President. I believe I
might as well quote from it now. Or do you wish that...
THE PRESIDENT: No; go on, if it is more convenient to you. I do not
mind. You may go on.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you very much.
The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister:
“Considering the care which the manpower from camps received
from our factory managers in spite of all the difficulties and
considering the general decent and humane treatment which
foreign and concentration camp laborers received, both the
Jewesses and concentration camp laborers work very efficiently
and do everything in order not to be sent back to the
concentration camp.
“These facts really demand that we transfer still more
concentration camp inmates into armament industries.”
And a few lines further down:
“I have discussed this whole matter in great detail with the
delegate of Obergruppenführer Pohl, Sturmbannführer Maurer, and
especially pointed out that by a decentralized dividing-up of
concentration camp laborers it might be possible appropriately
to utilize their forces while affording them better nourishment
and satisfactory lodging.”
Then it says:
“Moreover, Maurer especially points out....”
THE PRESIDENT: You need not make such long pauses as you are making.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: “Aside from that, Maurer especially points out
that Obergruppenführer Pohl constantly improved the food
situation of concentration camp inmates working in factories and
that by granting additional protein foods, given under constant
medical supervision, a marked increase in weight was obtained
and thereby better work achieved.”
In another document we see that the employment of concentration camp
workers in armament industries is recommended, in that advantages accrue
to these workers and that for this reason concentration camp inmates are
glad to work in armament industries.
I refer, in this connection, to Document 1992-PS, which may be found on
Page 11 of the document book. It is Page 14 in the English text. This
document shows that already in 1937 inmates of concentration camps were
being employed in workshops and that this work was quite popular.
Herr Speer, what do you know about the working conditions in
subterranean factories?
SPEER: The most modern equipment for the most modern weapons had been
housed in subterranean factories. Since we did not have many of these
subterranean works at our disposal, we had to house in the main this
latest equipment there. This equipment required perfect conditions of
work—air which was dry and free from dust, good lighting facilities,
big fresh air installations, so that the conditions which applied to
such a subterranean factory would be about the same as those in a night
shift in a regular industry.
I should like to add that contrary to the impression which has been
created here in Court, these subterranean factories, almost without
exception, were staffed with German workers, because we had a special
interest in having these modern installations manned by the best workers
which were at our disposal.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us about how many of these factories there
were?
SPEER: It was an insignificant number at the end of the war. We were
using 300,000 square meters of subterranean premises and were planning
for 3,000,000 square meters.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, in the year 1943 you visited the
concentration camp at Mauthausen? Why did you visit this camp?
SPEER: I learned, when I inspected industries at Linz, that along the
Danube, near the camp at Mauthausen, a large harbor installation and
numerous railroad installations were being put up so that the paving
stone coming from the quarry at Mauthausen could be transported to the
Danube. This was purely a peacetime matter which I could not tolerate at
all, for it violated all the decrees and directives which I had issued.
I gave short notice of an impending visit, for I wanted to ascertain on
the spot whether this construction work was an actual fact and request
stoppage of the work. This is an example for giving directives in this
field even within the economic administrative sphere of the SS. I stated
on that occasion that it would be more judicious to have these workers
employed during wartime in a steel plant at Linz rather than in
peacetime construction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Will you describe the visit to the camp?
SPEER: My visit ostensibly followed the prescribed program as already
described by the witness Blaha. I saw the kitchen barracks, the washroom
barracks, and one group of barracks used as living quarters. These
barracks were made of massive stone and were models as far as modern
equipment is concerned. Since my visit had only been reported a short
time in advance, in my opinion it is out of the question that big
preparations could have been made before my visit. Nevertheless, the
camp or the small part of the camp which I saw made a model impression
of cleanliness. However, I did not see any of the workers, any of the
camp inmates, since at that time they were all engaged in work. The
entire inspection lasted perhaps 45 minutes, since I had very little
time at my disposal for a matter of that kind and I had inner repulsive
feelings against even entering such a camp where prisoners were being
kept.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The main purpose of your visit then was to request the
stoppage of the work which you considered nonessential to the war
effort?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: On your visit were you able to learn about the working
conditions in the camp?
SPEER: No, I could not do that, since no workers were to be seen in the
camp and the harbor installations were so far from the street that I
could not see the men who were working there.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation that came through to me was that it was
against him spiritually to enter such places. Was that correct? Well,
what did you say?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No. I asked him whether on the occasion of this visit he
was able to learn about the working conditions which applied in this
camp. That was my question.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you say anything about “spiritually”?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No.
Did you learn, on your visit at Mauthausen or on another occasion, about
the cruelties which took place at this concentration camp and at other
concentration camps?
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Now, I should like to conclude my questions on the
utilization of workers by asking you: Did you have any interest in the
fact that a healthy and sufficiently trained labor supply should be at
your disposal?
SPEER: Naturally I had the utmost interest along this line even though I
was not competent for this. As from 1942 we had mass production in
armament, and this system with assembly-line workers demands an
extraordinary large percentage of skilled workers. Because of drafting
for military service, these skilled laborers had become especially
important, so that any loss of a worker or the illness of a worker meant
a big loss for me as well.
Since a worker needed an apprenticeship of 6 to 12 weeks and since even
after this for a period of about 6 months a great amount of scrap must
be allowed for—for it takes about that much time before quality work
can be expected—it is evident that the care of skilled workers in
industry was an added worry for us.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has mentioned the so-called extermination
by work. Could a change of personnel, which would have taken place
through extermination by work, be tolerated at all by an industry?
SPEER: No. A change in the workers, in the way in which it was described
here, cannot be borne by any industry. It is out of the question that in
any German industry anything like that took place without my hearing
about it; and I never heard anything of that sort.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution asserts that you applied
means of terror and brutality so that the achievements of the compulsory
workers would be increased to the utmost...
SPEER: No.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Just a moment. I have not finished. The Prosecution is of
the opinion that you used SS and Police against recalcitrant workers and
favored and recommended the use of concentration camps for such. Is that
correct?
SPEER: No, not in that form, for that was against my interests. There
were efforts in Germany to bring about increased productivity through
very severe compulsory measures. These efforts did not meet with my
approval. It is quite out of the question that 14 million workers can be
forced to produce satisfactory work through coercion and terror, as the
Prosecution maintains.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, please refer to Page 7 of the English
text, Page 4 of the French text. I should like to quote from Document
Number Speer-43. It says there:
“I do not believe that the second system which might be applied
in our economy, the system of compulsion by plant commissars, or
extensive proceedings and punishment when output is
insufficient, can lead to success.”
Now, Mr. President, I have come to the end of my first part.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH DAY
Thursday, 20 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. In the first place,
supplementary witnesses will be heard at the end of the case for the
defendants. Secondly, interrogatories and other documents received by
that time must be offered in evidence then. Thirdly, interrogatories and
other documents allowed before the end of the evidence but received at a
later date will be received and considered by the Tribunal up to the end
of the Trial. That is all.
[_The Defendant Speer resumed the stand._]
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yesterday we finished talking about the utilization of
labor in industry, and now we shall turn to the question of how the
factories were supplied with manpower; that is to say, the question of
mass and special demands for laborers.
Herr Speer, you stated in your testimony of 18 October 1945 first, that
you categorically demanded new laborers from Sauckel; secondly, that you
knew that among these laborers there would be foreigners; thirdly, that
you had known that some of these foreign workers were working in Germany
against their will. Please comment on this statement.
SPEER: This voluntary statement is quite correct. During the war I was
very grateful to Sauckel for every laborer whom I got through him. Many
a time I held him responsible for the fact that through lack of manpower
the armament industry did not achieve the results it might have, but I
always emphasized the merits which accrued to him because of his
activity on behalf of armaments.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Now, when in your testimony of 18 October 1945, and at
present again, you refer to manpower, do you mean all manpower in
general, including German workers, foreigners from occupied countries,
and foreigners from friendly or annexed states, and also prisoners of
war?
SPEER: Yes. Beginning with the middle of 1943, I was at odds with
Sauckel over questions of production and about the insufficient
availability of reserves of German labor. But that has nothing to do
with my fundamental attitude toward Sauckel’s work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What percentage of the total number of laborers assigned
was Sauckel obliged to furnish upon your demands?
SPEER: You mean of the total labor supply, not foreigners?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes.
SPEER: Up to August, 1944—that is up till the time when I took over the
air armament as well—perhaps 30 or 40 percent of all the workers
provided. Of course, by far the majority of them were German workers.
When in August 1944 I took over the air armament I had no appreciable
demand for workers because the bomber attacks on the transportation
system in the Reich resulted in a steady decline of armament production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was your need for labor unlimited?
SPEER: No. The volume of armament production and also of our entire
production with my corresponding need for labor was governed by our raw
material supply.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: That means, your need was restricted by the amount of raw
materials available?
SPEER: My need for labor was limited by the amount of raw materials.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You achieved a marked increase in production figures for
armament. In order to achieve this increase, did the workers employed
increase proportionally?
SPEER: No. In 1944 7 times as many weapons were manufactured as in 1942,
5½ times as many armored vehicles, and 6 times as much ammunition. The
number of workers in these branches was increased by only 30 percent.
This success was not brought about through a greater exploitation of
labor but rather through the abolition of obsolete methods of production
and through an improved system of controlling the production of
armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was meant by the concept “war
production”—“Kriegsproduktion”?
SPEER: The concept which is frequently used here, “war production,” is
nothing else but the ordinary concept, production. It comprises
everything which is manufactured industrially or by artisans, including
the civilian needs.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What was meant in Germany by the concept of “armaments”?
What did that include?
SPEER: The concept of “armaments” was in no way restricted to that
sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war agreement.
The modern concept of “armaments” is a much more comprehensive one. It
includes a much wider sphere of activity. There were no basic principles
set down for our concept of “armaments.” The characteristic of an
armament factory was that as an intermediary authority, the Armament
Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for
instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to armament; all
rolling mills, foundries and forges; the production or the manufacture
of aluminum and modern synthetic materials; the chemical production of
nitrogen or fuel or synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wool;
the manufacture of individual items the use of which in armament cannot
be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as ball bearings,
gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth, or the production of tool
machinery; the setting up of assembly lines; similarly the manufacture
of motor cars and the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships,
also textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather goods or
wooden wares.
In the interrogatories which I sent to my witnesses, I tried to have
stated what percentage of the German armament industries produced
armaments as defined by the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give
you the figures. My co-workers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20
percent of our armament program was concerned with the production of
weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equipment which
the various branches of the Armed Forces required. The bulk of the
material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva
Convention. The reason for the expansion of the concept of “armament” in
Germany was, besides manufacturing reasons, the preferential treatment
which applied to these industries, a treatment which resulted in
numerous industries clamoring to be called armament industries.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in the questionnaires which have not yet
been submitted to the Tribunal because the book is not yet ready, the
witness Sauer under Figures 7 and 10, the witness Schieber under Figures
6 to 9, and the witness Kehrl under Figures 4 to 7, concern themselves
with the definition as applied to the concept of armament.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the last name?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Kehrl.
Herr Speer, by way of example, you know Krupp’s at Essen. How far did
this concern produce armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva
prisoner-of-war agreement, that is, weapons, munitions, and objects
which are necessary for the direct conduct of war?
SPEER: Krupp’s are an excellent example of the fact that an armament
concern only reserves a fraction of its production for war equipment. Of
course, I must point out the fact that especially this Krupp concern was
one of those armament industries which, among others, had the smallest
production of armament, on a percentage basis.
Krupp’s main interest lay in mines, and in three large works which
produced unprocessed and highly tempered steel. The manufacture of
locomotives and products for the chemical industry were specialties of
Krupp’s. On the other hand, the actual armament specialty of
Krupp’s—the construction of armored turrets for warships, and large
special guns—was not at all exploited during this war. Only in 1944 did
Krupp erect the first big factory for the production of guns near
Breslau. Up to that time Krupp was mainly concerned with the designing
of new weapons, while for the production other firms were licensed. All
in all, one can say that at Krupp’s, 10 to 15 percent of the personnel
turned out armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva Agreement, even
though the entire works were classified as armament works.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What did you and your Ministry have to say as to whether
a factory would receive German or foreign workers?
SPEER: My Ministry had no influence in that direction at all. The need
for workers was reported to my Ministry by the industries which were
subordinate to me. They reported a total figure of workers needed, and
there were no specifications as to whether foreign workers, prisoners of
war, or German workers were wanted. This total figure was forwarded to
the Plenipotentiary General for Labor. Sauckel refused to accept
detailed demands, and he was quite right in this respect, for he could
not issue detailed directives to the offices subordinate to him
concerning the percentage of German or foreign workers which were to be
allocated locally to the various factories.
The ultimate distribution of workers to the factories was taken care of
by the labor offices without any intervention of my offices or agencies.
Therefore, here too, we did not exert influence as to whether Germans,
foreigners or prisoners of war were allocated to any factory. The
factory then had to report back to us about the number of workers newly
received. This report was turned in to my Ministry in a lump figure so
that I could not tell whether and what number of foreign workers or
prisoners of war the total figure contained. Of course, I knew that
foreign workers worked on armament equipment, and I quite agreed to
that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, to facilitate matters for the Tribunal I
would like to remark that Figures 1, 7, 8, and 17 of the questionnaire
of the witness Schmelter deal with these questions. In the questionnaire
of Schieber, Numbers 10, 11, 30, and 31 deal with this point.
Furthermore, in the questionnaire of Kehrl relevant material is
contained in the answers to Numbers 8 and 9.
Herr Speer, who sent in the demands for manpower needed in armament to
the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?
SPEER: The demands for workers were split up into various sectors,
according to the different economic branches. There were approximately
15 different sectors which placed their demands. I placed demands for
Army and Navy armament and for construction, and beginning with
September of 1943, for the sectors chemistry, mining, and other
production. Air armament had its special labor allocation department,
and their demands were voiced by the Reich Air Ministry.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In the questionnaires, the witness Schmelter has dealt
with this matter in his answer to Question 2; the witness Schieber in
his answers to Questions 2, 3, and 5; and the witness Kehrl under
Questions 2 and 3.
Weren’t the demands for labor for the three branches of the Armed Forces
centralized in your Ministry?
SPEER: No. Of course, beginning with March 1942, I had nominally taken
over the Armament Office under General Thomas from the OKW, and this
Armament Office was a joint office of all three Armed Forces branches,
where labor allocation problems were discussed too. Through an agreement
between Göring and me it was decided that air armament, independently of
me, should look after its own interests. This agreement was necessary
since at first, as Minister for Army Armament, I had a biased interest
and therefore did not want to make decisions regarding the demands for
labor of a unit that was not subordinate to me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How far are you responsible for the employment of
prisoners of war in armament, and here I mean armament in a restricted
sense and in contradiction to the Geneva Convention?
SPEER: I did not exert my influence to have prisoners of war employed
contrary to the directives given out by the OKW. I knew the point of
view held by the OKW, according to which the Geneva Convention was to be
strictly observed. Of course, I knew as well that these Geneva
regulations did not apply to Russian prisoners of war and Italian
military internees. I could not exert any influence on the allocation of
prisoners of war to the individual factories. This allocation was
determined by the labor offices in connection with the offices depending
on the chief of Prisoner of War Affairs, the “Stalag.”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to the
questionnaire of the witness Schmelter, to his reply to Question 14.
Herr Speer, who was the competent officer on the intermediate level
under the OKW?
SPEER: The supervision of the proper allocations of prisoners of war was
carried out by the Military Economy Officer (Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier) as
the intermediary authority. He was incorporated in the office of the
Military Area Commander who was under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Deuss,
who is an American statistics expert. This is Document 2520-PS.
According to this affidavit, 400,000 prisoners of war were employed in
the production of war equipment. These figures are supposed to originate
from statistics in your Ministry. Will you comment on this figure?
SPEER: The figures are well known to me through my activity as a
Minister, and they are correct. This figure of 400,000 prisoners of war
covers the total number of prisoners of war employed in armament
production.
It is a wrong conclusion drawn in this affidavit that all these
prisoners of war were connected with the production of objects of
armament as specified by the Geneva Convention. Statistics concerning
the number of prisoners of war employed in those industries which
produced armament goods as specified in the Geneva Convention were not
kept by us and, therefore, no such figure can be compiled from my
documents.
Apart from that, this figure of 400,000 prisoners of war includes
200,000 or 300,000 Italian military internees, all of whom were brought
into my production field at that time. This affidavit does not prove,
therefore, that prisoners of war were employed in the production of
armament goods as such.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Central Planning Board was mentioned here frequently.
You were a member of this board. Can you describe in detail the origin
of the Central Planning Board and its sphere of activity?
SPEER: When in 1942 I assumed my office it was imperative to centralize
the allocation and distribution of various materials for the three
branches of the Armed Forces, and to guarantee the proper direction of
war economy for a long time to come. Up to that time this matter had
been taken care of in the Ministry of Economy, and partly in the OKW.
Both these agencies were much too weak to prevail against the three
Armed Forces branches.
In pursuance of my proposal, in March 1942 the Central Planning Board
was established by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Its three
members, Milch, Körner, and myself, were entitled to make joint
decisions only, which, however, could always be reached without any
difficulty. It is obvious that through my predominant position I was the
decisive factor in this Central Planning Board.
The tasks of the Central Planning Board were clearly outlined and laid
down in Göring’s decree, which I had drafted. To make statistics on the
demands for labor or on the allocation of workers was not a matter which
was laid down in this decree. This activity was not carried out
systematically by the Central Planning Board despite the documents
presented here. As far as the decisions regarding demands and allocation
of labor were concerned, I tried to have this done by the Central
Planning Board, since this would have been an essential factor in the
directing of the entire economy. This, however, always met with
Sauckel’s refusal because he considered it as interfering with his
rights.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: To this point I submit the decree of Göring regarding the
establishment of a Central Planning Board under the Four Year Plan. It
was published on 25 April 1942, and this shall be Document Number
Speer-42, Exhibit Number 7.
Mr. President, this text may be found on Page 17 of the English document
book.
The sphere of activity of the Central Planning Board...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What number are you giving to it? On the
document here it has got Speer Number 142.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: No, that must be a typographical error. It should be 42,
Mr. President; it may be found...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Exhibit Number Speer-7.
THE PRESIDENT: What does 42 mean? What is the point of putting 42 on it
if its exhibit number is 7?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, that is the number according to which the
document was admitted when we compiled the document book. However, the
Exhibit Number 7 is the decisive number in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is only meant to facilitate finding it in the document
book. It is on Page 17 of the English text; and I might be allowed to
call the attention of the High Tribunal to Figure 3 of the decree.
According to this, the Central Planning Board had to decide on all the
necessary new industrial projects, on the increase in the production of
raw materials and their distribution, and also on the co-ordination of
the demands on the transportation system. This decree does not provide
for any regulation of the labor problem.
Herr Speer, how did it come about that, despite this, labor demands were
discussed in the Central Planning Board?
SPEER: These minutes of all the 60 meetings of the Central Planning
Board which took place from 1942 until 1945 are contained in the
stenographic records. These 5,000 typed pages give a clear report on the
tasks and the activities carried out by the Central Planning Board. It
is quite obvious to any expert that there was no planning with regard to
manpower allocation, for it is clear that a plan regarding labor
allocation would have to be revised at least every 3 months, just as we
had to do for raw materials. In fact, three to four meetings took place
in the Central Planning Board which were concerned with labor
allocation. These three or four discussions were held for the following
reasons: In the years 1942 and 1943, that is, before I took over the
management of the total production, whenever soldiers were recruited for
the Armed Forces, I had reserved for myself the right to distribute the
various recruitment quotas in the different sectors of production. At
one meeting this distribution was effected by the Central Planning Board
as a neutral committee. At this session, of course, there was a
representative of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor, since at the same time the problem of replacements had to be
dealt with. Another problem which was discussed by the Central Planning
Board was the distribution of coal for the following year. Just as in
England, coal was the decisive factor in our entire war economy, too. At
these discussions we had to determine at the same time how the demands
for labor supply for the mines could be satisfied by the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor, because only in agreement with him
could proper plans be made for the following year. From this discussions
resulted on the allocation of Russian prisoners of war in mines, a
matter which has been mentioned here. Furthermore, two sessions took
place in which the demands put forward by all interested parties were
actually discussed, and in a way which the Prosecution would like to
generalize as applying to the entire activities of the Central Planning
Board. These two sessions took place in February and March of 1944, and
no others were held either before or after. Besides, these two sessions
took place during my illness. Even at that time it was not quite clear
to me why it was that just when I was ill Sauckel first complied with my
wish to have the Central Planning Board included, and then later went
back on his promise.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution have submitted various extracts dealing
with sessions of the Central Planning Board.
As far as you know, are these extracts taken from the stenographic
records, or are they taken from the minutes?
SPEER: They are taken from the stenographic records. Besides these
stenographic records, minutes were taken on the result of the meeting.
These minutes are the actual result of the meeting. No material from the
actual minutes has so far been submitted by the Prosecution. The
contents of the stenographic records are, of course, remarks and debates
which always take place when matters of such importance are dealt with,
in every war economy of every country, even when the authorities
involved are not directly responsible for questions such as those
dealing with labor allocation.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Therefore, do these quotations which have been heard here
concern decisions made by the Central Planning Board or by you?
SPEER: I have already answered that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I would like to put one more question to you. You were
the Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Four Year Plan? What about
that?
SPEER: In March 1942, Göring, giving heed to my proposal, created the
office of Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, in the Four
Year Plan, and I was appointed to that office. This was purely a matter
of form. It was generally known that Göring had quarreled with my
predecessor, Todt, since armament problems for the Army had not been put
under his control in the Four Year Plan. In assuming this capacity as
Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, I had subordinated
myself to Göring. In fact, the Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War
Production never achieved any influence. I issued no directives
whatsoever in that capacity. As Minister I possessed sufficient
authority, and it was not necessary that I should use the authority
which I had under the Four Year Plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: For the benefit of the High Tribunal, when dealing with
the question of the Central Planning Board perhaps I might refer to the
fact that statements were made relative to it by the witness Schieber in
his questionnaire under Figures 4 and 45, and by the witness Kehrl in
his questionnaire under Figure 2.
Now I shall turn to the problem of the responsibility for the number of
foreign workers in general.
Herr Speer, the Prosecution charges you with coresponsibility for the
entire number of foreign workers who were transported to Germany. Your
Codefendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that first of all
he worked for you in this matter, so that his activity was primarily
determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this?
SPEER: Of course, I expected Sauckel to meet above all the demands of
war production, but it cannot be maintained that he primarily took care
of my demands, for beginning with the spring of 1943 I received only
part of the workers I needed. If my maximum had been met, I should have
received all of them. For this I need cite but one example. During that
same period some 200,000 Ukrainian women were made available for
housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they
could be put to better use in armaments production. It is also clear
that the German labor reserve had not been fully utilized. In January
1943 these German reserves were still ample. I was interested in having
German workers—including, of course, women—and this nonutilization of
German reserves also proves that I cannot be held solely responsible for
covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labor.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses
have made statements in connection with this problem in their respective
questionnaires: The witness Schmelter in Points 12, 13, and 16; the
witness Schieber, in Point 22; the witness Rohland in Points 1 and 4;
and the witness Kehrl in Point 9.
Herr Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then of course you
knew that you would receive foreign workers among them. Did you need
these foreign workers?
SPEER: I needed them only in part, in view of my requirements for
production. For instance, the coal mines could not get along without
Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to employ
German reserves, which consisted mainly of women, in these mines. There
were, furthermore, special assignments for which it was desirable to
have foreign skilled labor, but the majority of the needs could be met
by German workers, even German female workers. The same principle was
followed in the armament industries in England and America and certainly
in the Soviet Union, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you go on, Dr. Flächsner? There is no need to wait.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes. In my documentary evidence I shall return to this
point in more detail.
Herr Speer, I should like to go back to your testimony of 18 October
1945. In it you stated several times that you knew that the workers from
occupied countries were being brought to Germany against their will. The
Prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror.
Will you comment on that?
SPEER: I had no influence on the method by which workers were recruited.
If the workers were being brought to Germany against their will that
means, as I see it, that they were obliged by law to work for Germany.
Whether such laws were justified or not, that was a matter I did not
check at the time. Besides, this was no concern of mine. On the other
hand, by application of force and terror I understand police measures,
such as raids and arrests, and so on. I did not approve of these violent
measures, which may be seen from the attitude I took in the discussion I
had with Lammers on 11 July 1944. At that time I held the view that
neither an increase in police forces, nor raids, nor violent measures
were the proper thing. In this document I am, at the same time, referred
to as one of those who expressed their objections to the violent
measures which had been proposed.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, that is Document 3819-PS, which the
Prosecution submitted in the cross-examination of, I believe, the
Defendant Keitel and of the Defendant Sauckel. I did not include it in
my document book.
Herr Speer, why were you against such violent measures?
SPEER: Because through violent measures of that kind a regular
allocation of manpower in the occupied countries would not have been
possible in the long run. However, I wanted production to be regulated
and orderly in the occupied countries. Measures of violence meant to me
a loss of manpower in the occupied countries, because there was the
danger that these people would in increasing numbers take to the woods
so as not to have to go to Germany, and thus strengthen the lines of the
resistance movements. This, in turn, led to increased acts of sabotage
and that, in turn, to a decrease of production in the occupied
countries.
Therefore, time and again the military commanders, and the commanders of
the army groups, as well as myself, protested against large-scale
measures of violence as proposed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you especially interested in the recruiting of
workers from specific countries, and if so, why?
SPEER: Yes. I was especially interested in labor recruitment from
France, Belgium and Holland—that is, countries in the West—and from
Italy, because, beginning with the spring of 1943, the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor had decreed that mainly workers from
these regions were to be assigned for war production. On the other hand,
the workers from the East were mainly to be used for agriculture, for
forestry, and for the building of railroads. This decree was repeatedly
stressed to me by Sauckel, even as late as 1944.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190. This document is found on Page 19 of
the English text, and Page 16 of the French text of my document book. I
quote from the conference of the Economic Inspectorate South in Russia.
Peuckert—the delegate of Sauckel in Russia—states here, and now I
quote:
“....provisions have been made for employing workers from the
East principally in agriculture and in the food economy, while
the workers from the West, especially those skilled workers
required by Minister Speer, are to be made available to the
armament industry....”
Document 1289-PS, which is Exhibit Number RF-71, may be found on Page 42
of the English text of my document book and Page 39 of the French and
German texts. Here we are concerned with a file note by Sauckel on 26
April 1944 and I quote:
“Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied
western territories can the urgent need of German armament for
skilled workers be satisfied. For this purpose the reserves from
other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in
quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of
agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent
of the workers from the West have always been allocated to
armament.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, speaking for myself, I don’t know what the
problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are
putting forward, in the very least. I don’t know what relevance this has
at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether
they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant’s
argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does
not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into
armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned
with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what
is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?
I mean, I only want to know because I don’t understand in the least what
you are getting at.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is to prepare for the problem to
which we are now turning, and that is the problem of the blocked or
protected factories (Sperrbetriebe). By setting up these blocked
factories, Speer, if I may put it that way, wanted to put an effective
stop to the transfer of workers from the West to Germany. Therefore I
first have to show that up to that time his workers, the labor for his
industries, mainly came from the West. I want to establish that...
THE PRESIDENT: Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the
West; what difference does it make?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Speer is being charged with actively
having taken part in the deportation of workers from the West, workers
who were used in his armament industries. Now, the date is important
here. Beginning with the year 1943 he followed a different policy.
Before that time, as may be seen from the evidence, the workers who had
come to Germany had to a large extent been voluntary workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were all voluntary
workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing
evidence to that at all.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final goal of my evidence. I
should like to carry it on through, if possible, to the end.
THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don’t understand what the
end is.
Go on; don’t wait any further.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor designated Italy and the occupied western
territories as the countries from which foreign laborers would mainly be
recruited for armament purposes.
How far did you endorse Sauckel’s measures in these countries?
SPEER: Up to the spring of 1943 I completely endorsed them. Up to that
time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning
with the spring of 1943, workers from the West refused in
ever-increasing numbers to go to Germany. That may have had something to
do with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on
Germany. Up to the spring of 1943, to my knowledge, the labor
obligations were met with more or less good will. However, beginning
with the spring of 1943, frequently only part of the workers who had
been called up came to report at the recruiting places.
Therefore, approximately since June 1943, I established the so-called
blocked factories through the military commanders in France. Belgium,
Holland, and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these blocked
industries. It is important to note that every worker employed in one of
these blocked factories was automatically excluded from allocation to
Germany; and any worker who was recruited for Germany was free to go
into a blocked factory in his own country without the labor allocation
authorities having the possibility of taking him out of this blocked
factory.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What consequences did this have on the recruitment of
laborers in the occupied western territories?
SPEER: After the establishment of the blocked factories, the labor
allocation from the occupied countries in the West to Germany decreased
to a fraction of what it had been. Before that between 80,000 and
100,000 workers came for instance from France to Germany every month.
After the establishment of the blocked factories, this figure decreased
to the insignificant number of 3,000 or 4,000 a month, as is evident
from Document RF-22. It is obvious, and we have to state the facts, that
the decrease in these figures was also due to the resistance movement
which began to expand in the West at that time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you and your offices endorse the policies followed by
Sauckel at that time?
SPEER: No. At that time the first serious difference arose about the
“blocking” of these workers from labor allocation in Germany. This came
about through the fact that the loss of laborers, which I had in the
production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of
workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West.
This may be seen from Document RF-22. According to it perhaps 400,000
workers came from France to Germany in 1943, especially during the first
half of the year. Industrial workers in France, however, decreased by
800,000, and the French workers in France who worked for Germany
decreased by 450,000.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Why did you demand to take over the entire German
production from the Ministry of Economics in the summer of 1943?
SPEER: According to my opinion there was still a considerable latent
reserve in the German production, since the German peace economy had not
been converted into a war economy on a sufficiently large scale. Here
was, in my opinion, next to the German women workers, the largest
reserve of the German home labor supply.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What did you undertake when the total production was
handed over to you by the Ministry of Economy?
SPEER: At that time, I had already worked out the following plan. A
large part of the industry in Germany produced so-called consumer goods.
Consumer goods were, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other
necessary articles for the Armed Forces and for the civilian
requirements. In the occupied western territories, however, the
industries which supplied these products were kept idle, as the raw
materials were lacking. But they nevertheless had a great potential. In
carrying through this plan I deprived German industries of the raw
materials which were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, and
sent them to the West. Thereby, in the long run, a million more workers
could be supplied with work in the country itself; and thus I obtained 1
million German workers for armament.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you not thereby want to increase armament production
or help it along in France as well?
SPEER: No. All these plans failed. Before the outbreak of war the French
Government did not succeed in building up armament production in France,
and I also failed, or rather my agencies failed, in this task.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were your intentions with this new plan? What
advantages did you gain?
SPEER: I will comment on it quite briefly. Through this plan I could
close down whole factories in Germany for armament; and in that way I
freed not only workers, but also factory space and administrative
personnel. I also saved on electricity and transportation. Apart from
that, since these factories had never been of importance for the war
effort they had received hardly any foreign workers; and thus I almost
exclusively obtained German workers for the German production, workers,
of course, who were much more valuable than any foreign workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did not such a plan entail dangers and disadvantages for
the German industrial development?
SPEER: The disadvantages were considerable, since any closing down of a
factory meant the taking out of machinery, and at the end of the war a
reconversion to peacetime production would take at least 6 to 8 months.
At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted
to be successful in this war, we would have to be those to make the
greater sacrifices.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How was this plan put into effect?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the
details of these plans? What do we care whether his plans were efficient
or whether they were inefficient? The only question this Tribunal has
got to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the
character of international law. It does not matter to us whether his
plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans
were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of
these plans.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I wanted to show that the tendencies, or rather the
tendency, followed by the defendant in his labor allocation policy was
to employ foreigners in their own country and to use the German reserves
solely for his own purpose, that is, for armament proper. Thus
everything which...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Flächsner, that is a question of efficiency, not
of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers,
good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of
producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his
industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other
western countries.
What have we got to do with that? If they were forced to work there, it
is just as illegal as if they had been brought to Germany to be forced
to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the
Prosecution.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, but I thought and believed...
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear defendants’ counsel at 2 o’clock
tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the
defendants’ counsels’ speeches.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, please tell us briefly how you and M.
Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, agreed on your program; but
please be concise.
SPEER: Immediately after taking over production in September 1943, I
agreed with Bichelonne that a large-scale program of shifting industry
from Germany to France should be put into operation, according to the
system I already described. In an ensuing conference, Bichelonne stated
that he was not authorized to talk about labor allocations with me, for
Minister Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to
point out, he said, that a further recruitment of workers on the present
scale would make it impossible to adhere to the program which we had
agreed upon. I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the
entire French production, beginning with coal, right up to the finished
products, should be declared as “blocked industries.” In this connection
both of us were perfectly aware of the fact that this would almost
inhibit the allocation of workers for Germany, since, as I have already
explained, every Frenchman was free to enter one of these blocked
factories once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave
Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a
protracted period, and, in spite of all difficulties which occurred, I
kept my promise to him.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in connection with this I should like to
quote from Document R-124, which is Exhibit USA-179. It is on Page 37 of
the English document book. It is a speech of Sauckel’s before the
Central Planning Board and has been mentioned frequently. I shall quote
from it only what follows:
“....when I came to France the next time my agencies in France
stated:.... Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with
Minister Speer according to which only French workers are to be
considered for allocations in France and none of them need go to
Germany any more. This coincided with the first large-scale
conference.”
Herr Speer, what were the consequences of this change-over of labor
allocation from Germany to France?
SPEER: I have already mentioned that. Beginning with 1 October
recruiting of labor came almost to a complete standstill.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Later on I shall comment in detail, on the strength of
documents, on the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and on the
tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to
apply this principle. At the moment I shall therefore discontinue the
questions on the subject and will confine myself to quoting from the
official French document, RF-22, Page 20 of the English text of my
document book, Page 17 of the German and French texts. I quote:
“Finally a real hostility arose between Sauckel and Speer, who
was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the
occupied territories.”
And then a few lines further on:
“The superiority of the former over the latter which made itself
felt more and more during the ... occupation facilitated to a
large degree the resistance against the removal of workers.”
The text shows that the first-mentioned, the Defendant Speer, and the
military commander...
THE PRESIDENT: That is all cumulative; that’s what you have been proving
three or four times already.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well, I shall not continue with it.
I only want to rectify a mistake, Herr Speer. It is mentioned in the
document that you had something to do with organizing forced labor in
France; is that true?
SPEER: No, the organization of labor in France was not under my control.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have already mentioned that this shifting of the
labor program was not only confined to France. Will you tell me to which
other countries it also applied?
SPEER: Summarizing the last question: The program was extended to
Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The entire production in
these countries was also declared blocked, and the laborers in these
blocked industries were given the same protection as in France, even
after the meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944, during which the new
program for the West for 1944 was fixed. I adhered to this policy. The
result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from
France to Germany as compared with 500,000, proposed during that
conference; and from other countries, too, only about 10 percent of the
proposed workers were taken to Germany.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What about the figures applying to workers from the
Protectorate?
SPEER: Everywhere only a fraction of the numbers proposed was sent.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: A document, Number 1739-PS, Exhibit RF-10, has been
submitted by the Prosecution. It is on Page 23 of the English text of my
document book and is a report by Sauckel dated December 1942; also there
is a document, Number 1290-PS, on Page 24 of the English text, which has
also been submitted. These documents appear to show that, according to
Sauckel’s personal assertions, from the beginning of his activities
until March inclusively there was an excess supply of labor. Is that
true?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Document 16-PS, Exhibit USA-168, which is on Page 25 of
the English text of my document book, shows that Sauckel was not in
favor of using German women in all the armament industry, but in the
summer of 1942 he had several hundred thousand Ukrainian girls placed at
the disposal of German households.
These three documents together show that Speer in his Ministry cannot be
held responsible for the total number of workers who came to Germany.
I should also like to present another document as Exhibit Number
Speer-8. Mr. President, it is given Number 02 in the document book, and
it is on Page 26 of the English text. It refers to a meeting of the
Central Planning Board.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of
any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in
evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some
numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit Number 8?
THE PRESIDENT: What about the one before? Oh, that is already in.
Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper
exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall be glad to do that. I should
like to quote—this is a remark made by Speer:
“For this it is necessary to supply the industries with new
German workers, even unskilled labor, because I cannot replace
all those which we have to give up as soldiers, with foreigners.
The German supply is simply becoming too scanty. Already today
we are having one case of sabotage after another and we do not
know their origin. Cases of sabotage will arise. The measures
which will have to be taken in order to switch at least 1
million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard
and will, in my opinion, lower the entire living standard of the
upper classes. Therefore this means that, roughly speaking, we
are going to be proletarians for the duration of the war, if it
lasts a long time. This matter has to be faced coolly and
soberly. There is no alternative.”
This opinion and project of Speer, namely, to exploit ruthlessly the
labor reserve within Germany, was not realized until the summer of 1944.
And this was a subject for argument between Speer on one side, and
Sauckel and the Gauleiter on the other. The testimony of the witnesses
in the questionnaires will deal with it. To assist the Tribunal I should
like to state that with Schieber, it is the answer to Question 22; with
Rohland, it is the answer to 1 and 4; with Kehrl, it is answer Number 9;
and in the case of Schmelter it is Questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I
cannot quote the pages of the English book, Mr. President, because I
have not yet seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the filled-in questionnaires in the
supplement volume of my document book, which I hope is now in the hands
of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Besides, I should like to reserve the right to submit
these documents _in toto_ at the end of my examination. I am only taking
the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses have dealt
with this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Furthermore, we are informed about the different opinions
presented by Sauckel and Speer through a conference of Speer’s during a
meeting of the Central Planning Board on 21 December 1943. I refer to
Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my
Exhibit Number 9. I quote...
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t need to quote it, Dr. Flächsner; I thought I
had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency
or the inefficiency of these plans.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, there is an important document submitted by
the Prosecution. It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on 4 January
1944. It has been submitted as 1292-PS, Exhibit USA-225. I refer to Page
28 of the English text of my document book. How was this meeting
arranged?
SPEER: It was called by request of Hitler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: For what reason?
SPEER: To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And what was Hitler’s decision?
SPEER: His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with
Hitler. These blocked factories were to be maintained, and for this
purpose Sauckel was given the order to obtain 3,500,000 workers from the
occupied territories. Hitler gave the strictest instructions through the
High Command of the Armed Forces to the military commanders that
Sauckel’s request should be met by all means.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you agree to this decision?
SPEER: No, not at all; for if it were executed my program of shifting
industries to the West had to collapse.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And what action did you take after that?
SPEER: Contrary to the Führer’s decision during that meeting, I informed
the military commander of the way I wanted it, so that in connection
with the expected order from the High Command of the Armed Forces the
military commander would have two interpretations of the meeting in his
hands. Since the military commander was agreeable to my interpretation,
it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document which is on
Page 29 of the English text of my document book, Page 26 of the German
and French texts. This is a teletype message from Speer to General Studt
in Paris. It will be Exhibit Number 10. Two things appear from this
letter. First, Speer wrote, and I quote:
“Gauleiter Sauckel will start negotiations with the appropriate
agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in
order to achieve clarity on the manner and possibility of the
execution.”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flächsner?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the Prosecution has submitted this
document, 1292-PS, to prove...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant just told us what’s in the document. He has
told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the
difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: This document shows the reaction on the part of the
defendant, namely what he did, so that Hitler’s decision, as such, would
be contravened or at least weakened. In this letter the defendant said
to General Studt...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest
possible indication of the view they take about these matters of
different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why
don’t you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other
part of it?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument
between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as
to put his point of view into practice. This does not refer to...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just now, the
defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all
out to us again.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a
document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book,
Page 27 of the German and French texts; Exhibit Number Speer-11. It is a
letter from Speer to Sauckel dated 6 January 1944, and it is ascertained
in this letter that for the French industrial firms working in France
400,000 workers should be reserved at once, and another 400,000 workers
during the following months, who therefore would not be deported.
What results did these two letters have, Herr Speer, with reference to
Hitler’s order that 1 million workers should be taken from France to
Germany?
SPEER: I should like to summarize the entire subject and say a few words
about it. We had a technique of dealing with inconvenient orders from
Hitler that permitted us to by-pass them. Jodl has already said in his
testimony that for his part he had developed such a technique too. And
so, of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only clear
to the expert as to their meaning and the results they would have to
have.
From the document which is being presented now, from Sauckel’s speech on
1 March 1944, Document Number R-124, it is evident, too, what the
results were in regard to the labor allocation in the occupied
territories. The result is clear and I have already described it here,
and I think we can therefore pass to Page 49.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, can you give me a description of the results
of the air attacks on the occupied western territories?
SPEER: Yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few
points. The invasion was preceded by heavy air attacks on the
transportation system in the occupied western territories. As a result
of that, beginning with May and June 1944, production in France was
paralyzed and 1 million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of
shifting production had collapsed as far as I was concerned; and
according to normal expectations of the French officials, too, the
impression was general that a large-scale movement toward Germany would
now set in.
I gave the order that in spite of the fact that the entire French
industry was paralyzed the blocked factories should be kept up, although
I knew as an expert that their rehabilitation, considering the damage to
the transportation system, would not be possible in less than 9 or 12
months, even if the air attacks should cease entirely. I was, therefore,
acting against my own interests here.
The French Prosecution has confirmed this in Document RF-22. The
corresponding passages are indicated in the document book.
Between 19 and 22 June I had a conference with Hitler and I obtained a
decree according to which the workers in the occupied territories, in
spite of the difficulties of transport, had to remain on the spot no
matter what happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar
decision applied to Holland. Upon my orders the workers in these blocked
factories even continued to receive their wages.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection I submit Exhibit Number Speer-12. It
is an extract from the Führer conference from 19 to 22 June 1944, and I
beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The document is on Page
22 of the English text of my document book.
Herr Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that following
this decision of yours at least 1 million unemployed workers in all the
western territories would be unproductive for quite a long time. How
could you justify such a decision?
SPEER: I must say quite openly that this was the first decision of mine
which had its inner justification in the war situation having
deteriorated so disastrously. The invasion was a success. The heavy air
attacks on production were showing decisive results. An early end of the
war was to be forecast and all this altered the situation as far as I
was concerned. The practical conclusions I drew from this situation will
become apparent through various other examples which I shall put forward
in the course of the Trial. Of course, Hitler was not of the same
opinion during that period. On the contrary, he believed that everything
ought to be done in order to utilize the last reserves of manpower.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please describe briefly your attitude toward the meeting
of 11 July 1944, to which we have already referred once before. This was
Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.
SPEER: During this meeting of 11 July I maintained my point of view.
Once again I pointed to Germany’s reserves, as becomes apparent from the
minutes, and I announced that the transport difficulties should not be
allowed to influence production, and that the blocked factories were to
be kept up in those territories. Both I and the military commanders of
the occupied territories were perfectly aware of the fact that with this
the well-known consequences for these blocked factories would be the
same as before, that is, that the transfer of labor from the occupied
western territories to Germany would be stopped.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution has presented a Document Number
814, Exhibit RF-1516. It presented it during the session of 30 May, if I
remember correctly. It came up during the cross-examination of your
Codefendant Sauckel.
According to this order troops were to round up workers in the West.
Please give a brief statement on that. So as to refresh your memory, I
want to say that reference is made in this telegram to the meeting of 11
July.
SPEER: The minutes of the meeting show, as I said before, that I opposed
measures of coercion. I did not see Keitel’s actual order.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Number 824 is another document submitted by the French
Prosecution on the same subject. It is a letter by General Von Kluge
dated 25 July 1944; Exhibit RF-515. It refers to the telegram from
Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about
it, and whether that order was ever actually carried out?
SPEER: I know that the order was not carried out. To understand the
situation, it is necessary to become familiar with the atmosphere
prevailing about 20 July. At that time not every order from headquarters
was carried out. As the investigations after 20 July proved, at that
time in his capacity as Commander, West, Kluge was already planning
negotiations with the western enemies for a capitulation and probably he
made his initial attempts at that time. That, incidentally, was the
reason for his suicide after the attempt of 20 July had failed. It is
out of the question...
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, Number 824 is the number which the French
Prosecution has given to this document. That is the number under which
it has submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit
number. I have made inquiries, but I have not had an answer yet.
I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit
number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SPEER: It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge, in the
military situation in which he found himself, and considering his views,
should have given orders for raids and measures of coercion at that
moment. The release of the Sauckel-Laval agreement, which was mentioned
in this document, had no practical significance, since the blocked
factories were maintained, and thus this agreement could not become
effective. This was well known to the officials in France, and the best
proof for the fact that the order was not carried out is Document RF-22
of the French Prosecution, which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000
workers came to Germany from France. If the military authorities had
used measures of coercion, it would have been a simple matter to send a
very much larger number of workers than these 3,000 from France to
Germany.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you use your influence to stop completely the
allocation of labor from occupied territories to Germany?
SPEER: No; I must state quite frankly that although I did use my
influence to reduce the recruitment of labor or to put an end to
measures of coercion and raids, I did not use it to stop the allocation
of labor completely.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall now pass to another problem.
The Prosecution has touched upon and mentioned the Organization Todt.
Can you briefly explain the tasks of the Organization Todt to the
Tribunal?
SPEER: Here, again, I shall give a little summary. The tasks of the
Organization Todt were exclusively technical ones, that is to say, they
had to carry out technical construction work; in the East, particularly
road and rail construction, and in the West the construction of concrete
dugouts which became known as the so-called Atlantic Wall. For this
purpose the Organization Todt used foreign labor to a disproportionately
high degree. In the West there were about 20 foreigners to 1 German
worker; in Russia there were about 4 Russians to 1 German. This could
only be carried out in the West if the Organization Todt could use local
construction firms and their work-yards to a considerable extent. They
supplied the technical staff and recruited their own workers, it being
clear that these firms had no possibility to recruit by coercion.
Accordingly a large number of workers of the Organization Todt were
volunteers; but naturally a certain percentage always worked in the
Organization Todt under the conscription system.