Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of
the comrades of the first World War at Wels?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937,
was it not?
VON PAPEN: Quite right, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And all the preparations had been made for a
nonpolitical meeting, a reunion of the Austrian regiments and old
comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to
have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish
in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That meeting was addressed by General
Glaise-Horstenau and yourself?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Glaise-Horstenau—without any disrespect
to him—I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was
your impression, wasn’t it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but
not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am
merely trying to get the point.
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You made a speech which lasted for quite a short
time, didn’t you? Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: After your speech, there was beating and
shooting through the streets of Wels, wasn’t there? There was a riot
there, wasn’t there?
VON PAPEN: May I give you a more exact description?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the
fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no document on this.
VON PAPEN: A meeting had been arranged in Wels between organizations of
the old German Army from the first World War, the so-called Warriors’
Society, (Kriegerverein) and the veterans’ associations of Austria. It
was perfectly legitimate and in the spirit of our joint policy that the
mutual experiences during the first World War should be renewed between
these formations. At this meeting, which according to my wish and that
of the Austrian Government was to be completely nonpolitical in
character, the following events took place: When I arrived, the place
where this meeting of veterans’ associations was held, was surrounded by
between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive
their German guests, brought an honor company of the Army, and when the
Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these
10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem,
for the tune is the same, as you know.
When in the course of the celebration I made a brief speech I found
myself constantly interrupted by thousands of people, in a demonstrative
manner. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National
Socialists had planned a big political demonstration here; so I broke
off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place, and left Wels
also.
It is quite true, as Sir David said, that when the celebration broke up
and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of
persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurred.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the
facts of the incident. Now I want to pass to another point, because I
can only give examples of your activities in Austria.
Before you heard the evidence of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, do you
remember the phrase “the Trojan Horse technique” being referred to with
regard to Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes. Seyss-Inquart did not want to lead the Trojan Horse.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred
to the Trojan Horse technique.
My Lord, it is Document Book 11, Page 133. The passage I am referring to
is from Page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is
Page 163, Sergeant Major.
That is your report of 21 August 1936, where you quote an instruction of
the Prague Secret Service to its Vienna branch, which says:
“Unfortunately it must be noted that the wild National Socialist
excesses of 29 July of this year have not had the result we
expected. Austria’s approach to the Third Reich in the field of
foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the
process of cultural collaboration between the two sister
nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that
the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing greater
confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and
particularly into the ranks bf the Heimatschutz (Home Guard).
Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations,
which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears
nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously lacks
only good organization.”
Now, does that Czech report describe correctly what was going on, the
superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse movement
working inside the country?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service
and perhaps of the Czech Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I remind you, Defendant, that it is the
opinion quoted by you in your report to the Führer, and not
contradicted. There is not a word in your report suggesting that it is
not the truth. In fact you say you introduce it, “To illustrate the
present position in Austria...”
You are introducing it as correct information for the Führer, so you
cannot, I suggest, write it off by saying it is merely a Czech report.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I do. Let me point out that this report was written on
21 August 1936. That is 1 month after the conclusion of our July
Agreement, which you asserted was a deceitful maneuver, but which we and
the Austrian Foreign Minister established as a very seriously intended
agreement. We were now on a completely different basis with Austria and
for that reason I quoted this peculiar Czech report as an interesting
document to show how, in spite of our efforts for normalization, the
Czechs regarded matters in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you leaving that document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the last paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I will certainly deal
with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 134.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
It goes on:
“Besides, it appears hopeless and also impracticable for us to
strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwehr
movement. There are, on the other hand, comparatively strong
elements in Austrian Catholicism which could, with certain
reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are
gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund (Freedom
League) and which are inclined on principle to work for an
agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion,
that group which would in certain circumstances be inclined to
bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria.”
Did you put that forward as also representing your view?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I gave the Court a most exact explanation of the
aims and character of the Freiheitsbund yesterday; and the Court knows
from the report that the Czech Government endeavored to exert a certain
amount of political influence on this Freiheitsbund. That is quite clear
from the connection. This is all in the Czech report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you were putting it forward, were you not,
as your view to Hitler that, to speak loosely, the Catholic Left might
be used as a means of approach by you. That is really what you are
saying.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, surely you do not want to impute that I submitted
a Czech report to Hitler in order to identify myself with this report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I am accusing you of. If you
write to the head of the State, “To illustrate the present position in
Austria, I append an extract from a report....” then what I am
suggesting is that that means this report accurately represents the
position, as I see it. That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: No, for another report which you also submitted to the Court
shows that I asked Hitler to work against these efforts made by the
Czech Government to exert influence on the Freiheitsbund by binding it
to ourselves. I am of quite different opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you asked Hitler to give 100,000
Reichsmarks to the Freiheitsbund. That is exactly what you are following
out in what you have suggested here, that they might be a body who would
be a useful _point d’appui_ for you in order to gain an influence with
another section of Austrian opinion. I am suggesting to you that the two
things are quite consistent. You tell Hitler that they are useful.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you support them with 100,000 Reichsmarks.
That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That you were all the time burrowing under one
section of Austrian opinion after another in order to work towards the
suppression of the freedom of Austria—that is what I am putting to you.
I do not think there is any doubt about it.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if this report shows anything clearly, it is the
fact that, apart from the National Socialists in Austria, there were
other groups, namely, the Christian Trade Unions and the Freiheitsbund,
who worked politically towards the union of the two countries. And you
cannot say I am committing a crime if, as a diplomat who wants to bring
about such an aim in an evolutionary way, I co-operate with the
interests of these groups.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was not anything very evolutionary about
the Trojan Horse, was there? However, that may be comment. Let us go on
to another point.
Did you know Baron Gudenus?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that he was the closest confidant of
the Archduke Otto. Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is shown in my report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well now, let us just look and see what
Baron Gudenus had to say.
Your Lordship will find that on Page 93, and it is 72 to 75 of the
German version, Document D-687 which will become GB-507. It is Paragraph
2 (b) and it appears on Page 74, Defendant.
“Baron Gudenus, the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto,
writes to....”
There is a mistake there, my Lord. The “me” should be “one.”
“....one of my acquaintances on 30 March:
“....I brought back many gratifying impressions of the progress
of our Movement with me from Austria; but I cannot deny that in
some respects the Government’s policy worries me greatly. Of
what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July
1934—or those of them who were caught—are sentenced, if the
Government is too weak, too slovenly, or intentionally too
tolerant, to prevent ‘brown’ and ‘red’ propaganda being carried
on privately unhindered in the cinema, in the press, and on the
radio, and mainly by State officials or organs of the Fatherland
Front, supported and paid by financial and other means which are
pouring in bountifully from Germany. What is that learned
idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that
Papen and the other ‘brown’ agents in his own country
continually spit into the hand so persistently held out to them?
He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria,
as long as Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown
inside and out. The methods over there have, it is true, become
more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more
dangerous.”
That was about 7 months after your arrival.
“Sinister also are the continual differences between Schuschnigg
and Starhemberg....” and so on.
Now, isn’t it correct, Defendant, that anyone, that everyone, even a
visiting monarchist agent, knew that these activities were going on with
you on the top and the Austrian National Socialist Party working
underneath?
Before you answer, it is only fair to look at your own comment on that.
“The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could
hardly be described more graphically than in this letter.”
Why did you not say to Hitler, if these were the facts: “Baron Gudenus
is talking nonsense. I am carrying out a perfectly honest moral
assignment for the normalizing of relations with Austria.” Why did you
not deny it, if it was not true?
VON PAPEN: It seems to me that this report shows, in the first place,
that I passed on to Hitler with complete frankness all the reports which
I received, even that of an adherent of the Hapsburg restoration.
Obviously to 100 percent...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting, Defendant, that you passed them
on because they were true; you adopted them and passed them on to Hitler
because they were true reports; that that was a true picture of the
situation. That is what I am suggesting to you. You just tell the
Tribunal, were they true or were they not? If they were not true, why
did you pass them on without saying they were not true? That is what I
am asking you.
VON PAPEN: If you read this report by Baron Gudenus, you will see that
he speaks of internal conditions in Austria and of the sinister
differences existing between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, the rivalry
between their guards, and the constant underground Republican sentiment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is 3 lines out of 20. There is a lot
more before you come to that part. That is what I am asking you about;
the other 17 lines of the report.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, the points which I have just mentioned are proof
of the internal weaknesses of the Austrian Government, on which I am
reporting. If you mean that I should have explained to Hitler that I was
not a “brown” agent, well surely on 26 July we came to a very clear
agreement as to under what conditions my work in Austria was to be done.
There was no necessity for me to explain that to Hitler in a report. I
sent this report for his information only.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your explanation, just look at the
next paragraph of your letter. It shows in another way how you were
working. Paragraph 3:
“The film ‘The Old and the Young King’ ...”—the Tribunal may not
remember, but you correct my recollection. That is a film, if I remember
rightly, dealing with Friedrich—the relations of Friedrich Wilhelm I
and Friedrich the Great. Am I right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The film ‘The Old and the Young King’
was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence
of Herr Jannings.”—That is Emil Jannings, the actor.—“It
provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. The scene where the king
stresses the fact that ‘French trash and Roman books do not mean
anything to Prussia’ led to particularly vociferous applause.
The police wanted to ban it. Together with Herr Jannings, we
explained to them that, should this film be banned, we would
take steps to prohibit the showing of all Austrian films in
Germany. This had the desired effect. The film—except for the
above-mentioned scene, which was expunged—is being shown now
and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within
the next few days.
“Yesterday I received Jannings and a number of actors from the
Burgtheater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his
success, and we discussed in detail plans for a Bismarck picture
for the production of which I recommended Beumelburg to write
the script.”
That is, you were forcing a film which contained Prussian propaganda to
be shown in Austria on the threat of excluding Fräulein Wessely and
“Maskerade” and the other Austrian films of that time from the German
market; you were forcing your propaganda on the threat of excluding
Austrian films; is that right?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and I will also tell you the reason. I must enlarge your
historical knowledge of these things, Sir David. Frederick the Great
played a very important part in the relations between Germany and
Austria, as you know; and at that time we were trying, in the
relationship between our two countries, to clear up the historical
inaccuracies which originated in the time of Frederick the Great. For
this purpose the famous Austrian historian, Professor Srbik, wrote a big
work. The film which we are discussing served the purpose of showing
that a great German history is common to both peoples alike. To help the
cultural _rapprochement_ of the two countries I insisted that this film
should be shown, and this was done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not the slightest doubt about your
motives in wanting the film to be shown, Defendant, but what I am asking
you is, why you pressed it against the wish of the Austrian authorities
by threat of excluding Austrian film production from the German market?
Why did you threaten the Austrian authorities in that way?
VON PAPEN: It frequently happened that the Austrian police were afraid
that certain films might be made a basis for demonstrations. But after
we had talked matters over with the police, and had agreed that certain
parts of the film should be cut, they were quite ready to admit it; and
of course, I also told them that if we did not reach an agreement, the
consequences would be that Germany would send no more films to Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I put the point. Do you remember
telling the Tribunal that you did not keep up contacts with the NSDAP in
Austria? Is that Correct?
VON PAPEN: No, it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did keep up contacts?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Close contacts?
VON PAPEN: I did not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Intimate contacts? Were your contacts close?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if they were not, will you just turn a
page back. It is probably Page 72 of your report. It is the same report.
My Lord, it is Page 93 of Your Lordship’s book.
You began that report by saying:
“I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:
“On 23 March complete agreement was reached in Krems between
Captain Leopold, (Retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In
accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold
in every way and recognized him as Führer for Austria. As soon
as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he will
become deputy leader, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant
of Leopold, will be consulted on every important question.”
Furthermore, Leopold has nominated somebody else and asked him to be
deputy, while:
“Major General Klupp, (Retd.) will be taken into consultation in
strict confidence,” and I want to read the last lines:
“Furthermore, Leopold expressed the desire that at long last,
the continual intrigues against him on the part of _émigrés_
living in the Reich—of the type of Frauenfeld and his
friends—be stopped.”
That is a pretty complete picture of the set-up of the Party in Austria,
wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Well, Sir David, may I call to your attention the fact that
this report is dated 4 April 1935, a date previous to the July
Agreement, when my interest in these Party affairs can still be readily
understood.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you attach importance to the date, just
look at the report of 1 September 1936, which is on Page 33 of Document
Book 11, Page 26 of the German book. You remember this is the report
which you referred to, and you said:
“For the method to be employed (Marschroute) I recommend on the
tactical side continued and patient psychological treatment,
with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the
regime.”
You told the Tribunal that that meant you wanted a change in the
officials of the Ministry of the Interior. I am not going to trouble
about a statement like that, but just go on for a moment:
“The conference on economic relations proposed for the end of
October will be a very useful tool for the realization of some
of our projects.
“In discussion both with Government officials and with leaders
of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who take their
stand entirely on the Agreement of 11 July, I am trying to
direct the next developments so as to aim at corporative
representation of the Movement in the Fatherland Front.”
Now, it is quite clear, is it not, that you were on 1 September 1936,
after the agreement, having discussions with the leaders of the illegal
Party, Leopold and Schattenfroh, so may we take it—I don’t want to
spend time on it—that throughout your time in Austria you were in close
and constant touch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialist
Party?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David, the conference which you just mentioned refers
to and is justified by the July Agreement; I have already explained that
to the Court yesterday. In the July Agreement Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg promised that members of the National Opposition would be
called upon for co-operation. Consequently it was, of course, my duty to
be interested in whether and to what extent the co-operation of such
forces was actually sought by Schuschnigg. That was the subject of this
talk with the leaders, and I can state expressly that my contact with
the Austrian Party, after the July Agreement, was only in this
connection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, I am not going to go into that
further. I have referred the Tribunal to two documents, and there are
other references which I need not worry about.
I want you to come now to November 1937. Could you fix as carefully and
closely as you can the date of your meeting with the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I met the Defendant Seyss-Inquart by accident—that is,
not by appointment—at the Olympic Winter Games at
Garmisch-Partenkirchen in January 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: January 1938. I just want to collate these
dates. You had become very friendly with the Foreign Minister Guido
Schmidt, who gave evidence here, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I was on very friendly terms with the Foreign Minister, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you gave him the “Du,” although you were 20
years his senior; you had given him the “Du” for some time? You had been
on intimate relations? Is that right?
VON PAPEN: I do not think that a friendship can be measured by 20 years’
difference in age. I regarded Herr Schmidt, as I have said, as an
upright man.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will agree with me that it is
unusual for an Ambassador to be on terms with a Foreign Minister,
especially one 20 years his junior—not his contemporary—on such terms
that he used the familiar “Du” to him. Won’t you agree with me that it
is a quite unusual form of intimacy between an Ambassador and a Foreign
Minister?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if you had ever been in Austria in your life, you
would know that in Austria almost everyone says “Du” to everyone else,
and to clear up this incident, may I add the following: On the day of
our separation, when I left Austria, I said to Foreign Minister Schmidt,
of whom I am very fond, “Dear friend, we have worked together so much,
now we can say ‘Du’ to each other.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am interested in is this: It was in
November 1937 that you and Dr. Guido Schmidt first began to discuss the
question of Herr Schuschnigg meeting Hitler, was it not?
VON PAPEN: I believe that I discussed this matter not only with Foreign
Minister Schmidt but also with Herr Von Schuschnigg himself at that
time. After a discussion between them...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment; will you answer my question? You
discussed with Schmidt—you heard Dr. Schmidt give his evidence that the
Defendant Göring had told him with great frankness, as the Defendant
Göring said he told everyone else and has told this Court, that he was
out for the union of Germany and Austria by any means and at all costs.
You heard Dr. Schmidt say that Göring had told him that that was his
view, and I say, in all fairness, it is perfectly consistent. It is the
view he has expressed here and apparently to a lot of other people. Do
you remember that Dr. Schmidt said that? You can take that from me.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard that the Defendant Göring said
that, not only to Dr. Schmidt, but to Mussolini and to the High
Tribunal, and I think to several other people. Had he never said it to
you?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. With regard to the Austrian...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that it was his view?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know that was Göring’s view?
VON PAPEN: Please let me say something. Of course, I knew that Göring’s
wish was to bring about a union of the two States, and I myself was
present at the talk with Mussolini.
Please consider, however, that at that time Herr Göring was not
competent to decide foreign policy. The question of what our policy in
Austria should be had been agreed upon between Hitler and myself
exclusively and I do not remember discussing it with Marshal Göring in
the years between 1936 and 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am dealing with November 1937, at the moment,
and 3 months later the Defendant Göring was very competent in foreign
politics in the Austrian question, as you, who listened to the accounts
of his telephone conversations, must know.
I just want you to take the dates as we have got them now. Göring had
told Schmidt his views; you and Schmidt were discussing this meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler. In January you had a political
discussion with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch.
I am one date out of order. On 11 November, as Mr. Dodd put to Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, he had written a letter to Dr. Jury saying, “I don’t
think anything will happen this year, but the developments will take
place in the spring.” Then, after that letter, he sees you at Garmisch
in January, and in February you finally arrange this meeting between
Schuschnigg and Hitler.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you know very well that the whole object
of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to the Reich’s
wishes, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart, a general political amnesty
which would release all the members of the Nazi Party in Austria and put
them at the disposal of their leaders, and a declaration of equal rights
for the Party? Didn’t you know that the whole object of the meeting was
to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to these terms so that you would have
the Austrian National Socialist Party unfettered and free to work for
Germany’s interests in Austria?
VON PAPEN: In my talk with Dr. Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch-Partenkirchen
we discussed the necessity of making the Austrian Nazi Party
independent, that is, under all circumstances removing it from the
influence of the Reich, in the form agreed upon in the July Agreement,
and with the aim that the way should be paved for a union of our two
countries, and that that aim should be pursued from the Austrian side in
terms of foreign policy, and not by the Reich.
When I met Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch no mention was ever made of this
meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg. I was at that time not in a
position to know whether such a talk would ever take place. That was not
decided until 5 February, as you will recall. In other words, we
discussed only the perfectly general question of how we could get nearer
to our goal.
May I further recall to your memory that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had received
an official commission from the Federal Chancellor to investigate all
existing possibilities of incorporating the National Opposition, that
is, the Austrian National Socialist Party, into Schuschnigg’s political
program. That was his official mission, so that after all I had a right
to discuss these things with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Dr. Rainer—the witness that the Tribunal
has seen—wasn’t he present at the Garmisch meeting too?
VON PAPEN: That seems to have been the case, Sir David; I do not
remember it any more. Seyss-Inquart has told me that it is possible that
Dr. Rainer joined us on a walk. I personally do not remember. I did not
carry on any political discussion with Rainer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you have given your explanation as of
the turn of the year. I just want to remind you of one other point. You
were very well aware of the Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch crisis in the
Army, were you not? I don’t want to go into disagreeable details again,
because it is not at present before the Tribunal, but you knew that that
crisis had arisen?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you will see the importance of this.
General Von Fritsch had been at the War Academy with you, had he not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was an old friend, and you knew, as I think
everyone who has mentioned his name in this Court has said, that General
Von Fritsch was a man of the highest character and that the sort of
charge that was brought against him was one which anyone who knew him
would regard with ridicule if it wasn’t so tragic, and they would regard
it with contempt? That was your view?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had a pretty good idea, had you not,
apart from the treatment of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, that Von Fritsch
had been the subject of a trumped-up charge in order to prevent him
becoming head of the Armed Forces? You knew that, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: In any case, that became clear to me later, when I learned of
the circumstances.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, that is not the important thing,
Defendant, your state of mind on 5 February 1938. You knew by then that
the Nazi clique in the Government had brought a framed-up charge against
a man whom you regarded as the soul of honor, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now with that knowledge, on 5 February, after
you see Hitler, you tell him about the fact that Schuschnigg may come,
and he jumps to it at once. He says, “Go and get Schuschnigg,” doesn’t
he? He was quite bored, if I may put it that way, with what you had to
say up to that point. As soon as you say there is a chance of a meeting
with Schuschnigg, Hitler seizes it like a trout to a May fly, doesn’t
he, or rather, like a lion to the kill; that is right, isn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Sir David. I described to the Court the impression made
on me by events in Berlin and by my own dismissal on 4 February. Do you
think it is surprising that I now tried, just because I was afraid
another course would be adopted, to bring about this long-desired
discussion between the two chiefs of state which I hoped would clear up
the differences and prevent the adoption of a radical course? I told
Foreign Minister Schmidt and Chancellor Schuschnigg that, when I asked
them both to take part in a discussion to clear up matters if they could
possibly do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to go through the
circumstances of the meeting of 12 February, because I went through them
with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the Court is well aware of them.
I want to ask you this one question, and I do ask you to consider it
carefully because the question of your own veracity may depend on it.
Are you now saying that there was no pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg at
that interview?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I never made such a statement—you know that
yourself, because it is in my reports; I myself said that pressure was
exerted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am asking you is this, and please let me
make it quite clear because the Court have heard the evidence of your
friend Dr. Schmidt and a lot of other evidence. I only want to ask you
the one question, and please get it clear.
Do you now, on this day, say that pressure was not put on Chancellor
Schuschnigg to make him agree to the terms of 12 February? That is the
one question I want to ask you, and I give you the chance of answering.
What do you say today? Was or was not pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I never denied it. I do not understand why you ask me. I
never denied it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Ribbentrop denied it quite strongly,
but we won’t go into that.
Now, one other question and then I am finished with Austria.
Did you arrange a meeting between Hitler and Cardinal Innitzer?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I did; and that was...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange that the leaders of the Church
and the diplomatic corps, apart from the French and British
representatives, should be present at Hitler’s entry into Vienna?
VON PAPEN: As for the leaders of the Church, it is not customary for
them to be present at parades, and I certainly did not suggest it. As to
the diplomats...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange for the diplomatic corps to be
present?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that some of my diplomatic colleagues asked me
if they could attend this ceremony, and I said that of course they could
attend; why should they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue about the way you
put it.
My Lord, I have now finished with Austria. I have three very minor
matters which I hope will take a short time, but this might be a
convenient period in which to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, are the Tribunal to take it that
broadly you were against the anti-Semitic movement and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, it was my aim and my desire, and it
constituted the entire program of my work, to contribute as far as
possible to a union between the two countries, because that was the
great wish of the German nation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you can have understood my
question. Let me repeat it. I am now coming to the Jews.
VON PAPEN: Oh, the Jews?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, let me repeat it again. Are the
Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against anti-Semitic action
and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I have already told the High Tribunal just what my
attitude in principle was toward the racial question and toward the
question of the elimination of foreign influence in certain cultural
aspects of public life. These are two entirely different questions,
however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I appreciate that. Now, will you look at
Document 3319-PS, which is Exhibit GB-287?
My Lord, it begins at Page 48 of Document Book 11a. It is on Pages 44
and 45 of the German book.
The part I want you to refer to is on Pages 58 and 59. This, Defendant,
is from a confidential report of the work session of the consultants on
Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe, on 3 and 4 April
1944. I want you just to look at Page 44, I think, of the German
version, Page 58 of the English, at the contribution to this discussion
of a certain Herr Posemann, from Turkey. Was he from your staff? If you
would not mind, just say “yes” or “no,” because it must go to a short
end...
VON PAPEN: May I tell you just who Herr Posemann was?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said, if you would tell me, was he a member of
the Embassy staff, and if not, what was he; that is what I want to know.
VON PAPEN: No; certainly not. Herr Posemann was a German bookseller who
had settled in Ankara. He was certainly not a member of my Embassy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, at any rate, he was a consultant of
the German Foreign Office for this discussion. Now, just listen to what
he says:
“Early last year the Turkish Government struck a blow at Jewry
in connection with an attempt to solve the minorities problem.
Very drastic measures were taken to carry out this action.
Suspicions on the part of Allied circles that purely anti-Jewish
measures were concerned were countered by Turkey with references
to simultaneous measures taken against the minorities. At any
rate, Turkey abandoned further measures to find a solution of
the minorities problem and therewith of the Jewish problem. For
this reason it is impossible to continue to practice anti-Jewish
propaganda under our direction at the present moment, as it is
undesirable and would be a burden on Turkey’s present foreign
policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, apart
from caricatures and comic books about Jews. The first signs of
realization of the extent of international Jewish domination are
evident in the translation of the _Protocol of the Elders of
Zion_ and of Ford’s book, _The International Jew_. The sale and
distribution of these brochures have been promoted by the
Embassy. For the time being, work is possible only within this
narrow range since, as was already emphasized, an anti-Jewish
propaganda obviously inspired by Germany might cause us
unfavorable political complications.”
Now, do you believe in the _Protocol of the Elders of Zion_? Do you
believe it is a correct and authentic work?
VON PAPEN: Not at all, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why was the marketing of these brochures
being promoted by the Embassy?
VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may give the Tribunal a very brief explanation on
the whole connection of this meeting. The meeting had been called by the
Foreign Office, and was to be attended by experts from the embassies and
legations who had been specifically employed to deal with the Jewish
problem. In my Embassy there was no such expert, as I always refused to
have one. For this reason the Party had of its own accord instructed the
bookseller Herr Posemann to deal with this problem, and had delegated
him to attend this conference.
If Herr Posemann here sets forth that the Embassy circulated the
propaganda brochures which are mentioned here, then he is gravely
mistaken. Firstly, the Turkish Government would never have tolerated the
circulation of such material, and secondly, you, Sir David, can convince
yourself today that all these brochures are still lying in the basement
of my Embassy at Ankara.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that this statement made at the Foreign
Office meeting, you say, is wrong?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you had nothing to do with that;
that is your answer? I want to ask you one or two things about the
Catholic Church. You remember the Fulda Declaration of the Bishops?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right, is it not? That was made and
based on an assurance which Hitler gave to the Church of his good
intentions, on 23 March 1933? Do you remember Hitler’s making a
statement like that?
VON PAPEN: Not only on the 23d, but also in the Government declaration
Hitler expressly stated his view that every policy must be based on both
the Christian denominations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that in turn was the result, at least in
part, of a statement of yours at a Cabinet meeting on 15 March 1933,
when you stressed the importance of incorporating political Catholicism
into the new State; that is a correct and factual statement, is it not?
That is the way the thing works out?
VON PAPEN: Completely, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
VON PAPEN: I made every effort to induce Hitler to establish this
Christian basis of his policy firmly by means of solemn engagements; and
I think I have already explained to the High Tribunal that I really made
every effort to carry through this program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now let me ask you to look once again at
Document 11, Page 96; Page 78 of the German version, which is Document
2248-PS. It is your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935. Now in that report
you use these words: “....the clever hand which eliminates political
Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany....”
My Lord, it is on Page 99 of the English text and it is Page 86 of the
German text. My Lord, it is the first paragraph, Page 99:
“Cultural problems have a special significance. The way in which
Germany deals with her political and religious difficulties, the
clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without
weakening the Christian foundations of Germany will not only
have a decisive reaction on England or Catholic Poland. We may
rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question
stands or falls with it.”
Now, what I want you to bear in mind: This is your account to Hitler in
July 1935, over 2 years after the Concordat: “....the clever hand which
eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian
foundations of Germany....” Now your counsel quoted one passage of His
Holiness the Pope’s allocution, and I would just like you to look and
tell the Tribunal whether you agree with the next passage, which occurs
after the bit quoted by Dr. Kubuschok.
My Lord, this is a new document—no, My Lord, I am sorry. It is an old
exhibit. It is Document 3268-PS, which is Exhibit USA-356. Your Lordship
remembers that Dr. Kubuschok quoted a portion, in his document book, of
the Pope’s allocution. My Lord, I have some extra copies.
Now after the bit which Dr. Kubuschok quoted as to the Concordat having
prevented worse evils, His Holiness goes on to say:
“The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become more and
more embittered: the disbanding of Catholic organizations; the
progressive suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools,
both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from
family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the
conscience of the citizens, and especially of civil servants;
the systematic defamation, by means of clever, closely organized
propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, and of the
Church’s institutions, teaching, and history; the closing,
disbanding, and confiscation of religious houses and other
ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the
Catholic press and publishing houses.”
Do you agree with His Holiness that that is a correct description of the
action of the German Reich against the Catholic Church?
VON PAPEN: Completely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you also to look at
the “Mit Brennender Sorge,” which is Document 3280-PS.
Your Lordship will find it at Page 40 of Document Book 11—I am sorry,
My Lord, it is Page 47. I said 40. It is 40 of the German text.
Now, if you notice, that is quite early, on 14 March 1937, 4 years after
the Concordat, and he says in the second sentence at the beginning:
“It discloses intrigues which from the first had no other aim
than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had
labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others—like the enemy
in Holy Scripture—sowed the tares of suspicion, discord,
hatred, calumny, of secret and open basic hostility to Christ
and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and
employing every available means. They, and they only, along with
their silent or vocal protectors are responsible for the fact
that on the horizon of Germany there is now to be seen, not the
rainbow of peace, but the threatening stormcloud of destructive
religious wars.”
Now, Defendant, what I want you to tell the Tribunal—do you agree with
that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you agree with these statements of the head
of the Church, how could you possibly write to Hitler, 2 years after the
Concordat, in July 1935, that he had “eliminated political Catholicism
without touching the Christian foundations of Germany”? It was
absolutely wrong, wasn’t it, that Hitler and the Nazis had not touched
the Christian foundations of Germany? They had uprooted them and were in
process of destroying them?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, you are confusing two completely different things,
political Catholicism...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I don’t want to interrupt you, but I
have made that point quite clear. The point I am putting to you is not
the elimination of political Catholicism. I am not, for the moment,
dealing with the relation between you and Monsignor Kaas. What I am
dealing with is your other statement, that it had been done without
touching the Christian foundations of Germany. What I am putting to you
is what His Holiness is saying, that the Christian foundations of
Germany were being destroyed. I don’t mind, for the moment, about the
views that Monsignor Kaas had of you or you had of Monsignor Kaas. I
know what they are.
VON PAPEN: Let me explain these things to you. The struggle against the
Church and its institutions, against which His Holiness the Pope
inveighs in his encyclicals in the years 1937 and 1945, and in which he
recognized the intensification of the situation obtaining during the
war—all of these things were an attack on the Christian foundations of
Germany, an attack which I always condemned most strongly. But this has
no connection at all with the elimination of so-called political
Catholicism for which I hoped and which I demanded. These are two
completely different things. Perhaps it is hard for you to understand,
since you are not familiar with circumstances in Germany.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please believe, Defendant, that I have spent a
great deal of time in pursuing the troubles between you and Monsignor
Kaas. I am not going to bring them out before the Tribunal because they
are not important. I appreciate and agree—not as well as you do, but I
appreciate the position of political Catholicism and I am not asking you
about that. I am asking you about your statement. Why did you say to
Hitler that he had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany?
That is what I want to know. You must have known in 1935 that that
wasn’t true?
VON PAPEN: But, Sir David, that is a complete distortion of the contents
of this report. I am telling Hitler that the Christian foundations of
Germany must not be weakened and that may still be read in the report
today: “Political Catholicism must be eliminated without weakening the
Christian foundations of Germany.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you appreciate how it begins. You say
“....that a clever hand which eliminates it without touching....” Just
let me remind you: Didn’t you say, in your interrogation, that your
trouble—part of your trouble in the summer of 1934, before you made the
Marburg speech, was due to the nonfulfillment of the Concordat, that
after it had been signed, with the consent of Hitler, “....he treated it
just as a scrap of paper and I couldn’t do anything”? Then there was the
persecution of the Churches and the Jews at the same time. That was late
in 1933 and in 1934. Is that your view in 1934, “....that there had not
only been treating of the Concordat as a scrap of paper but persecution
of both the Churches and the Jews”?
VON PAPEN: I do not know which document you are quoting from, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is your interrogation on the morning of 19
September 1945.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course. When I delivered the Marburg speech, I
believed that the State was violating all these things; otherwise, I
would not have made the speech. But in this speech, Sir David, I again
expressly emphasized the fact that no European occidental state can
exist without a Christian foundation, and that by disregarding our
Christian basis we would cut ourselves off from the group of Christian
peoples and from our mission in Europe. I could scarcely say it more
clearly than that. And perhaps I can tell you something else on the
subject of political Catholicism. You have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do as you want to. I especially want to avoid
burdening the Tribunal with the exchanges between you and Monsignor
Kaas, because both of you used harsh language and it might not sound
very good if I repeated it now. If you want to go into it, do, but don’t
open it up unless you must.
VON PAPEN: I regard this accusation which you are making against me as
one of the most tremendous for it violates my whole conception.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you remember you told the Tribunal
just before the adjournment that you had introduced Cardinal Innitzer to
Hitler when you went into Austria. You remember that after the statement
to which Dr. Kubuschok has referred, that Cardinal Innitzer in a
broadcast from Rome made it clear that he was only accepting the Nazi
rule of Austria on certain conditions. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like to see what happened to
Cardinal Innitzer.
This is a new document, My Lord, D-903, which becomes GB-508. My Lord,
this is a statement in the form of an affidavit from a priest, Dr.
Weihbacher, which I only got from Vienna on 7 June.
You will see that this priest—well, at any rate I take it he is a
priest; he is the archbishop’s secretary in the cathedral chapter. Let’s
just look at it.
“On 8 October 1938”—that is a little over 6 months after you
had arranged for Cardinal Innitzer to meet Hitler—“a serious
attack was made by youthful demonstrators on the archbishop’s
palace in Vienna. I was present during the attack and can
therefore describe it from my own experience.”
Then he describes how they smashed window panes, broke in the gate. The
priests took the archbishop into an inner room and hid him there. They
took the cardinal to safety in the personalia archive and locked the
iron door behind him, and:
“....then we two priests, seeing ourselves opposed by a crowd of
invaders, personally took up a stand at the entrance to the
cardinal’s house chapel in order to prevent any destruction from
being wrought there at least.”
My Lord, this is about 10 lines from the foot of the page.
“Shortly after we had reached the chapel, the invaders stormed
into the cardinal’s rooms adjoining the chapel. As soon as they
reached the door we warded them off. Pieces of wood came flying
into the chapel; I received a push that knocked me over; but we
managed to prevent them from entering the chapel. The
demonstrators were youths aged from 14 to 25 and numbering about
a hundred. After we had warded off the first troop, we opened up
the Tabernacle and consumed the consecrated wafers so as to
prevent the Most Holy from being desecrated. But new invaders
were already storming in; and we warded them off. In the
meantime an indescribable orgy of destruction was going on in
the remaining rooms among all the fittings. With the brass rods
holding the carpet in place on the staircase, the youths
destroyed tables and chairs, candelabras and valuable paintings,
and in particular all the crucifixes.”
Then it describes the plate-glass doors and so on, and there was an
alarm when the cardinal was discovered. This priest himself was dragged
from the chapel by about six people and dragged across the anteroom to
the window with shouts of “We’ll throw the dog out of the window.”
And then, eventually, the police came, and you will notice their idea of
what was proper reparation.
“Then a lieutenant colonel of police arrived and apologized. He
was followed by a representative of the Gestapo who expressed
his regret that the police had not been very active in their
intervention.
“Meanwhile other demonstrators attacked the cathedral rector’s
house at 3 Stephansplatz where they threw the cathedral curate
Krawarik out of the window into the yard. This priest lay in
hospital until February with both thighs fractured.”
Now I ask you to look at the penultimate paragraph:
“That the demonstration was not the result of youthful
wantonness or embitterment, but a well-laid plan known to
official quarters, is obvious from the speech of Gauleiter
Bürckel who, on 13 October on the Heldenplatz, in the basest
possible manner represented the cardinal as guilty.”
Now, Herr Von Papen, you had a great responsibility in relation to
Cardinal Innitzer, had you not? You had introduced him to Hitler. You
must have learned from the ramifications and communications of the
Catholic Church of this attack on the cardinal’s house 6 months after
the Anschluss, did you not? You must have learned of this.
VON PAPEN: I heard about it later, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What protest did you make when you heard of this
disgraceful attack on the principles of the Church, the throwing of the
cathedral curate out of the window and breaking both his thighs, the
desecration of the chapel, the breaking of crucifixes? What protest did
you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I should like to remind you, Sir David, that I had resigned
from office more than 6 months before and no longer had anything
whatsoever to do with these matters. Naturally the details of the
incident were in the highest degree regrettable and, indeed, amounted to
criminal attacks; but the details did not appear in the German press, so
that I am probably seeing them for the first time in this form here. But
let me add...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Defendant, you haven’t answered the question. The
question was: What complaint did you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I made no protest, for I was no longer in an official
position at the time. I was a private citizen, and all I learned
officially about these things was what the German papers were allowed to
publish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, Defendant, surely you have told us that you
were one of the leading Catholic laymen in Germany. You are not going to
tell the Tribunal that in the Catholic Church it wasn’t known to every
bishop in Germany and probably to every parish priest that this
abominable and sacrilegious insult had been offered to a prince of the
Church in his own house in Vienna. Surely it would permeate through the
Church in a few days.
VON PAPEN: That is quite possible, Sir David; but would you expect me, a
private citizen, to do anything? What could I do? The Tribunal did not
take notice of the discussion which I brought about between Cardinal
Innitzer and Hitler. You mentioned that for the first time here today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly why I am putting this incident
to you, that you were responsible for bringing about the meeting between
Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler in March of 1938. When His Eminence is
attacked in October, I should have thought—it is not for me to express
my thoughts—that you might have taken the trouble to protest to Hitler,
and all that you do is to take another job under Hitler within 6 months,
in April 1936.
What I am asking you is why you didn’t make a protest. You could have
written to Hitler. The Defendant Göring has expressed his great
religious interests. A number of the other defendants have said that
they had great religious sympathies. Why couldn’t you have got in touch
with them?
VON PAPEN: Because in autumn 1938 I retired from political life; I was
living in the country and was no longer taking any active interest in
politics. But perhaps I may say just why I was responsible for promoting
a meeting with Cardinal Innitzer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not the point that I am interested
in at the moment, the meeting on 15 March. I am interested in the fact
that this took place, that you knew of it, and made no protest.
Now I am going to come to another point. Dr. Kubuschok can raise it
later on, if he wants.
Defendant, you have heard a number of your codefendants giving evidence
and saying that they didn’t know of the terrible repressive measures
that were taking place in Germany. You knew very well about these
repressive measures, did you not? You knew about the action of the
Gestapo, the concentration camps, and later you knew about the
elimination of the Jews, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I only knew this much, that in the years 1933 and 1934
political opponents were interned in the concentration camps. I very
frequently protested against the methods used in concentration camps. In
various cases I liberated people from these camps; but at that time I
was quite unaware that murders had even been committed in them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let me take that up. It is good
to get down to a concrete instance.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that at the beginning of 1935 your
secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was ordered to return from Vienna to
Berlin for examination by the Gestapo. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember that he refused to go and he
sent you a detailed report of his reasons for not going? Do you remember
that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us look at that together very shortly.
My Lord, that is Document D-685, which would become Exhibit GB-509; Your
Lordship will find it at Page 87 of Document Book 11, and it is at Page
60 of the German version.
Now, at Page 87 there is Herr Von Tschirschsky’s own letter to you, in
which he says, at the end of the second paragraph: “I am not in a
position ... to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for
interrogation.”
And then he says that—to quote his own words—that he has been
influenced only by the “human, understandable desire to live” and then
he sends a report, he encloses a report, to you of what had happened to
him on 30 June which got him into the bad books of the Gestapo.
Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And summarizing the beginning of it, which would
be almost humorous if it did not show such a dreadful state of affairs,
your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was arrested simultaneously by
two competing groups of Reich policemen, I think the Criminal Police and
the Gestapo, and there was a severe danger of Herr Von Tschirschsky and
some of the police being shot before they could decide who was to take
him into custody. But I want you to come to when he is taken into
custody.
My Lord, it is at Page 89, and it is at the end of Page 65 of the German
version, Defendant.
You see, this is after, I think, the Gestapo had won the internecine
struggle and it got possession of the body of Herr Von Tschirschsky, and
then he says, just toward the end—My Lord, it is the middle of Page 89.
He is told the other police are following the Gestapo and he says:
“....we went to the Gestapo building in the Prinz
Albrecht-Strasse and through a courtyard to a back entrance.
There was another exchange of words between the two groups of
Criminal Police. I again joined in this debate and suggested as
a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each
of the groups should see some higher authority in the building
and let him decide what should be done. There would still be
three Criminal Police officials and four SS men available to
guard me and the other two gentlemen. This course was adopted;
and eventually they came back and explained that the
misunderstanding was now cleared up and we could be taken away.
Whereupon we were taken by three SS men, not accompanied by the
Criminal Police officials, on a lengthy trip through the
building into the basement. There we were handed over without
comment and were ordered by the SS men on duty there to go and
sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then
forbidden to talk to each other. I spent a few hours like this
sitting on the bench. It would make too long a story to give
further details of the events which took place during this time.
I will therefore restrict myself to the case of the shooting of
a well-known personality who was publicly stated to have
committed suicide.
“The person in question was brought in under the escort of three
SS men and led past us into a cell running parallel to our
corridor. The leader of the detachment was an SS
Hauptsturmführer, short, dark, and carrying an Army pistol in
his hand. I heard the command ‘Guard the door!’ The door leading
from our corridor into the other one was shut. Five shots were
fired and immediately after the shots the Hauptsturmführer came
out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand,
muttering under his breath, ‘That swine is settled.’ Feverish
excitement reigned all around; cries and shrieks of terror were
heard from the cells. One of the SS men on duty, a comparative
youngster, was so excited that he apparently lost all
consciousness of the entire situation and informed me,
illustrating his remarks with his fingers, that the person
concerned had been liquidated by means of three shots in the
temple and two in the back of the head.”
You had a pretty good idea of SS and Gestapo methods after Herr Von
Tschirschsky had given you that report, hadn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and you can also see that this report...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us, before we leave that elevating extract
which I have just read, who was the well-known person who was supposed
to have committed suicide and who was shot with three shots in the
temple and two in the back of the head. Who was it?
VON PAPEN: I cannot tell you. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you mean to say that Herr Von Tschirschsky
was on your staff for several months afterwards and he never told you
who this was?
VON PAPEN: I do not recall, Sir David, that he discussed this matter
with me; and in any case I may have forgotten it. In any event one of
the personalities who died on 30 June.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause. You say you might have forgotten. Do
you mean that dreadful occurrences like this were so familiar to you
that you cannot remember the account of the actual shooting of a
supposed suicide who was a prominent person?
Have another think. Cannot you tell the Tribunal who this unfortunate
man was?
VON PAPEN: If I remembered that, I would willingly tell you. I have no
reason to conceal the information.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let the Tribunal see how you
passed this on to Hitler. You believed, did you not, that Herr Von
Tschirschsky was telling the truth? You said so. You believed he was
telling the truth, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at page...
My Lord, it is Page 86 of the English version; and, Defendant, it is 58
of the German book, Page 58.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you going to investigate the facts as to
what happened to the man who made this report?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes, I will clear that up, I am so
sorry.
Defendant, just before we come to what happened when he made the report,
Herr Von Tschirschsky himself was—I think he went to a concentration
camp and had his head shaved and then eventually after a certain period
he was released and rejoined your service and was in your service up
until February of 1935. Is not that so, Defendant?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord. That takes up the story
until we come to February 1935. He is then asked to report to the
Gestapo and then this correspondence takes place.
Now, you see that in your letter to Hitler of 5 February, which is
Document D-684, Exhibit GB-510, you say:
“As already reported yesterday by telegram, I have passed on to
Herr Von Tschirschsky the order of 2d instant, repeating the
demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo, 5
February.
“He then announced to me officially that he would not comply
with this order as he was convinced that he would be killed in
one way or another. He will give all his reasons for this
refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.
“Yesterday I finally relieved Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I had
already suspended for the duration of the proceedings, of his
post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all
connections of an official nature as soon as the files and such
have been handed over tomorrow.”
Then you say you telegraphed the Defendant Von Neurath and you had given
Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave. Then just look at the last paragraph.
“After I had repeatedly asked that Herr Von Tschirschsky be
given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the
charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that
the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce
Herr Von Tschirschsky to take the course indicated to him of
submitting to interrogation by the Gestapo.”
Defendant, is that right, that you left nothing undone to get this man
in your staff sent to his death to be murdered by the Gestapo?
VON PAPEN: I think it would be fair, Sir David, to call the attention of
the High Tribunal to the other letters which show that I asked Hitler
not only once, but repeatedly, to have the matter of Tschirschsky
investigated by means of a regular trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite true and it was referred to in
that letter.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course, but please let me finish...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite true.
VON PAPEN: When this proposal was turned down and the Führer would not
agree to have a regular trial, he, Hitler, let me know that he would use
his personal influence, and that he would assume personal responsibility
that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky if he was
investigated by the Gestapo. You will also find that in these letters.
The Führer promised him exceptional immunity if he would allow himself
to be interrogated by the Gestapo. Therefore, after the suggestion for a
regular trial had been turned down and Hitler had promised that nothing
would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky, I asked Herr Von Tschirschsky to
submit to the investigation, as the charges made against him had to be
cleared up somehow. But I believe...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn back to your letter of 31
January, which you will find...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think you should read the whole of this
letter which you have just been on, 5 February, at some stage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will. My Lord, I am so sorry. My
Lord, I do not want to omit anything; but I am, of course, trying to
shorten the matter; but I will read anything Your Lordship wants.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ought to be in possession of the whole
letter. You stopped at the word “courier,” in the middle, with reference
to reporting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. With reference to reporting his
dismissal to the Austrian Government:
“With regard to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian
Government, I am afraid that if I dismiss him abruptly tomorrow,
the matter will become the theme of public discussion. I think
this scandal should be avoided and I have therefore given Herr
Von Tschirschsky sick leave in the meantime, as far as the
public is concerned. I shall report his dismissal later.
“I shall return to the Tschirschsky affair and its connections
with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later, in a
detailed report.”
My Lord, I am grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You left off after the word “Gestapo” in the next
paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will read the whole thing again.
“After I had repeatedly asked....”
THE PRESIDENT: No, you read that down to “Gestapo,” but you did not go
on with the rest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But if he persists in his resolve to
avoid this interrogation, even though he knows that this means
social and material ruin for himself and his family, and as he
has given me his word that he will do nothing while an _émigré_
which would be harmful to the Führer and to the country, I can
only add my wish that everything should be avoided which could
turn this affair into an open scandal.”
I am grateful, My Lord.
Now, Defendant, you had already said to Hitler on 31 January, which was
5 days before that—Page 84, My Lord, and the foot of Page 55 and the
beginning of 56 of the German book:
“Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I have, incidentally, for the time
being relieved of his duties, has now learned from several
sources which he—and I myself as well, unfortunately—regards
as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have
for some considerable time been planning to liquidate him.”
My Lord, that will be Document D-683, Exhibit GB-511.
You believed that it was authentic on 31 January that the Gestapo wished
to neutralize him. On 5 February, in the part that the Tribunal just
asked me to read, you say it will be the ruin of his social and material
position for himself and his family, but if the thing is kept quiet,
your wish is that everything be done to avoid a scandal.
Now, Defendant...
VON PAPEN: My wish was first of all that everything possible should be
done to have the matter cleared by means of a public trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first wish, but you very soon gave
that up.
VON PAPEN: Just a moment, please. After Hitler had refused to agree to
my wish, and after he had determined that Von Tschirschsky would enjoy
the personal protection of Hitler during his investigation by the
Gestapo—that is, if the head of the State says “I will be responsible
for the fact that nothing will happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky!” then
you will allow that naturally the only course of action open to me is to
say to Herr Von Tschirschsky, “Take this course and let them interrogate
you; for after all you have to clear yourself of the suspicion resting
on you.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, let me remind you that there is not a
word in your letter of 5 February about any promise from Hitler to give
an indemnity to Herr Von Tschirschsky. All that you are saying is that
he will disappear into disgrace. There is nothing in any other letter
either.
VON PAPEN: Yes. It is in one of Tschirschsky’s reports. I cannot find it
at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can find anything about an
indemnity, I can only tell you that I have not been able to find it in
any of your letters.
VON PAPEN: But it is there.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could look for this document at the
recess, at 1 o’clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, very well. My Lord, if there is such a
document, I am very sorry; I don’t know about it.
Yes, My Lord; I am sorry. I think I have got the reference. On Page 91,
My Lord. It is not in the defendant’s letter, but there is a reference
in Herr Von Tschirschsky’s report. On Page 91, My Lord. Page 69. It
says:
“In conclusion—the reason why I feel myself under no obligation
either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at
all, in spite of the extraordinary protection promised me by the
Führer and Reich Chancellor—I make the following declaration:
“During the period of my activities in Berlin, information had
already frequently reached me to the effect that there existed
in the Reich a terror organization which had sworn the oath of
mutual allegiance in life and death. It is expressly pointed out
to men who are or who may be accepted into this brotherhood that
they are under an obligation to submit to the secret court and
that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to
feel that they belong in a high degree to the brotherhood and
only in a smaller degree to Adolf Hitler. I could not have
believed this monstrous thing, had I not been informed of it
about 6 months previously by a man in the Reich—I wish to
stress this particularly—who is not opposed to the Third Reich,
but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions
believes in Adolf Hitler’s mission, a Reich-German and a
National Socialist of many years’ standing, who himself at one
time was to be asked to join this brotherhood but who was able
to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his
willingness publicly to announce the names which he mentioned to
me of members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to
this effect in case these people should be already dead. He must
only be assured that this terrorist brotherhood is no longer
active, especially as there are persons belonging to this
brotherhood who are among those most trusted by the Führer and
Reich Chancellor.”
I am sorry; I knew there was nothing in the letters from the defendant,
but I had forgotten that there was this passage in the letter.
Now, that was Von Tschirschsky. You told us that Baron von Ketteler was
murdered at the end of your time in Vienna. You remember Baron von
Ketteler’s father was murdered, if my memory is right, and that caused
the German expedition against the Boxers in China. That is the family
the gentlemen belonged to, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the effect of this, the murder of Von
Ketteler, on you after the experience with Von Tschirschsky was that you
were ready to take new employment under the Nazi Government in Turkey.
There is just one other point that I want to put to you.
VON PAPEN: May I add just a few remarks on this point? I told the
Court...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, I will finish on that because I
think we have the other reference to Marchionini’s affidavit, and then
you can make all the other remarks you like.
Why didn’t you after this series of murders which had gone on over a
period of 4 years, why didn’t you break with these people and stand up
like General Yorck or any other people that you may think of from
history, stand up for your own views and oppose these murderers? Why
didn’t you do it?
Now you can give your explanation.
VON PAPEN: Very well. You can see that I submitted Von Tschirschsky’s
report on these murders to Hitler, in all its details, but what you do
not know is the fact that I myself frequently told Hitler that such a
regime could not possibly last; and if you ask me, Sir David, why
despite everything I remained in the service of the Reich, then I can
say only that on 30 June I personally broke off the relations into which
we had entered on 30 January. From that day onward I did my duty—my
duty to Germany, if you wish to know. I can understand very well, Sir
David, that after all the things we know today, after the millions of
murders which have taken place, you consider the German people a nation
of criminals, and that you cannot understand that this nation has its
patriots as well. I did these things in order to serve my country, and I
should like to add, Sir David, that up to the time of the Munich
Agreement, and even up to the time of the Polish campaign, even the
major powers tried, although they knew everything that was going on in
Germany, to work with this Germany.
Why do you wish to reproach a patriotic German with acting likewise, and
with hoping likewise, for the same thing for which all the major powers
hoped?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The major powers had not had their servants
murdered, one after the other, and were not close to Hitler like you.
What I am putting to you is that the only reason that could have kept
you in the service of the Nazi Government when you knew of all these
crimes was that you sympathized and wanted to carry on with the Nazis’
work. That is what I am putting to you—that you had this express
knowledge; you had seen your own friends, your own servants, murdered
around you. You had the detailed knowledge of it, and the only reason
that could have led you on and made you take one job after another from
the Nazis was that you sympathized with their work. That is what I am
putting against you, Herr Von Papen.
VON PAPEN: That, Sir David, is perhaps your opinion; my opinion is that
I am responsible only to my conscience and to the German people for my
decision to work for my fatherland; and I shall accept their verdict.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have finished.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Had you finished, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I had finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Did any of the other prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
Dr. Kubuschok?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the cross-examination yesterday it was pointed out to
you that in your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935—British Document Book
11a, Page 79—you point out that, according to legal findings, leading
Reich-German personalities applied the use of force in Austria in July
1934. In this connection you mentioned the name Habicht. I should like
to receive some information about the personality of Habicht. Was
Habicht a Reich-German?
VON PAPEN: Habicht was a Reich-German and had his headquarters in
Munich. He was Provincial Inspector (Landesinspekteur) of the entire
National Socialist Party in Austria. That means the following:
The Austrian Party had a Gauleiter in Austria, but it was directed from
Munich from the Reich Party Directorate by a specially appointed
Landesleiter, Provincial Inspector Habicht. Since this man had charge of
the whole Austrian Party, his position in the Party was, of course,
considered as a leading one. One could not call him a “liaison officer,”
but a leading Reich-German personality.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In cross-examination yesterday various letters were
submitted to you which you wrote to Hitler between 4 and 17 July 1934.
These letters should be gone into more closely. What was the purpose of
the letters?
VON PAPEN: I am glad to have an opportunity to go into this
correspondence once more. One must consider the situation which existed
at that time: Bose shot, three co-workers arrested, great excitement;
and everyone who was in any way in opposition was under suspicion of
being connected with this SA revolt. It was similar to the situation
after 20 July 1944.
Therefore the first goal was to clear up the Bose case as well as the
other cases through legal proceedings. I requested that in my first
letter of 4 July. I also demanded this rehabilitation in further
letters, but it was a prerequisite to establish first of all that we
were not in any way connected with the SA conspirators.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the letters you assure Hitler of your faithfulness and
loyalty. Is this not astonishing after the events of 30 June?
VON PAPEN: It may seem astonishing to an outsider, but not to a person
who remembers the hysterical atmosphere of those days, for at that time
everyone who had been in any opposition at all or who had criticized the
system was branded as a co-conspirator. For that reason I thought it
advisable to make it clear, by means of such a letter, that I and the
Vice Chancellery had nothing to do with this conspiracy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution thinks your letters
have only the purpose of rehabilitating your own person. What do you
have to say about this?
VON PAPEN: I ask that the Tribunal study these letters. In them it can
be seen that I repeatedly pointed out that my co-workers too must be
absolutely rehabilitated. In the letter of 12 July, on Page 3, I say
that the honor of my own officials is also my own honor; and I
repeatedly demanded that the Bose case be cleared up.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you believe to be able to achieve through the
legal proceedings which you suggested?
VON PAPEN: Legal proceedings would have had two effects: In the first
place, nonparticipation in the Putsch would have been established; and
that would necessarily have shown that the arrest of my co-workers and
the killing of Bose had been an arbitrary act, an act for which those
responsible were to be punished.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a letter of 14 July you welcomed Hitler’s speech of
justification before the Reichstag on 13 July. What comment do you have
to make on this?
VON PAPEN: I may ask you to look at the text of this letter. I welcomed
the suppression of the intended second revolution, but this must by no
means be taken as recognition of the acts of violence carried out
against persons not participating in the revolution; and furthermore,
the following is to be considered: The events of 30 June were divided
into two parts. In the first place, Hitler himself had turned against
the revolting SA; the fact that such a revolt was actually planned
seemed quite credible to all of us, for the rumors of a second
revolution had been current in the country for weeks. In Marburg I had
already made reference to it. The revolt of the SA leaders, who
represented an effective power, could be considered a danger to the
State; and the executions had been directed against SA leaders who were
especially well-known and whose names were connected with the excesses
of 1933.
The second part of the action had been directed against persons outside
this circle. Slowly the news of the individual cases leaked out. The
justification for taking steps against these persons was in part
explained by saying that they had some sort of connection with SA
leaders and that some of them had offered resistance. That had to be
cleared up, for here an emergency law could be referred to; but it was
not possible to deviate from an orderly legal procedure. Hence my letter
to Hitler of 12 July, in which I asked him not to deviate from the
orderly legal procedure. I warned him against identifying himself with
these events, and I demanded from him—referring to the Bose case—the
latter’s rehabilitation and legal proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got the letters, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the purpose of this questioning is to clear up the
matter and to explain the contents of the letters, but I believe the
defendant has said enough and we can go on to another question now.
Your letter of 17 July is signed without a complimentary closing, and
also deviates from other letters in its general form. How do you explain
this?
VON PAPEN: On 17 July, I had to consider my efforts to achieve legal
proceedings as having failed. I had not even received my files back. For
that reason, I gave up further efforts and there was no longer any
reason to announce my resignation publicly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You mean to put it off.
Now I come back to a document which the British Prosecution referred to
today. It is 2248-PS in the British Document Book 11a, Page 99. The
representative of the British Prosecution has tried to obtain an
explanation from the defendant. I believe difficulties in the
translation and the manner of expression in general have made it a bit
hard to understand. I will read the sentence in question once more and
ask the defendant to explain this sentence. I will quote on Page 99 of
the English text, the second paragraph from the top.
“The way Germany....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we have had a very long explanation
already.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the explanation suffered from the fact
that the defendant did not understand the translation correctly or that
the British Prosecution did not understand the defendant. The form of
the German text is not clear. The defendant will be able to explain it
very easily. The explanation goes...
THE PRESIDENT: All right, go on then, go on.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: “The way in which Germany deals with
politico-religious difficulties, the clever hand which
eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian
foundation of Germany, will not only have a decisive effect on
England,” _et cetera_.
Please explain the sense of this sentence which I have just read.
VON PAPEN: I meant to say to Hitler, “You must eliminate political
Catholicism with a clever hand, but the religious foundation must under
no circumstances be touched.” It depended upon the clever solution of
this question...
THE PRESIDENT: No question of translation arises. The passage was read
to us _verbatim_ as it is before us, and it was read by Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant, and the defendant has given the same
answer over and over again in answer to Sir David.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, may I point out the following: The whole
sentence was in the future tense, the whole sentence...
THE PRESIDENT: It was read to us just now by the interpreter _verbatim_
in the words which are before us in the book and the words which were
put by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant. There is no question of
difference of tense at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, there is a special language difficulty,
because in the first part the first two verbs are in the present tense
in connection with the auxiliary “wird” used later; and in accordance
with German language usage the present is to be understood as meaning
the future also. In the opinion of the British Prosecution, the first
two verbs “deals” and “eliminates” are to be considered past tense, and
that is the difference.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter of verbal argument on the words of the
document.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. Now one last question to the witness.
A while ago Cardinal Innitzer’s talk to Hitler in Vienna was discussed.
What occasioned you to arrange this meeting of Hitler with Cardinal
Innitzer?
VON PAPEN: With our march into Austria and the Anschluss of Austria to
the Reich, Hitler had joined a Catholic country to Germany; and the
problem, which was to be solved, was winning this country from the
interior as well. That was possible only if Hitler recognized the
religious basis, recognized what rights Catholicism had in this country;
for this reason I arranged a talk between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler
in order to make sure that Hitler in the future would follow a policy
which stood on a Christian basis in Austria.
By arranging this interview, I thought I would be able to do one last
service for Austria; that was the reason.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is the end of the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: I have just two or three questions I should like to ask
you.
When did you first hear about the murder of Jews?
VON PAPEN: I believe, My Lord, that that was during the war.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the war lasted 6 years. When during the war?
VON PAPEN: I cannot say with certainty, My Lord. I cannot say on my oath
when it was.
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot say with more certainty than that?
VON PAPEN: No; our general knowledge was that the Jews were sent to
camps in Poland. But we knew nothing of a systematic extermination of
Jews such as we have heard of here.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness whose affidavit your counsel has put in
evidence, Marchionini, what do you know about him?
VON PAPEN: Marchionini, My Lord, is a very well-known professor who was
employed by the Model Hospital in Ankara and who was also my family
doctor.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got your volumes of exhibits before you?
VON PAPEN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Could the defendant have Volume III?
[_The documents were handed to the defendant._]
Volume III; it’s in the affidavit from Marchionini, the last paragraph
of the answer to Question 6.
VON PAPEN: One moment, My Lord. I have not found it yet.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no hurry.
VON PAPEN: I have the affidavit now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have Question 6, or rather the answer to Question
6?
VON PAPEN: The questions are not numbered here.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the last question but one.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to that question, he says this:
“I clearly remember an incident in spring 1944 when I called
upon Von Papen at the request of Herr Barlas, the Refugee
Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, to request his assistance in
saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for
extermination. These Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality
which they later renounced.”
Then, he says, through your intervention “....the lives of these Jews
were saved.” Is that statement true?
VON PAPEN: Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: So at any rate by the spring of 1944 you knew that 10,000
Jews in France were about to be deported for extermination?
VON PAPEN: I believe they were to be deported to Poland, My Lord. But we
did not know in 1944 that they were to be exterminated. We wanted to
protect them from deportation.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said the statement was true.
VON PAPEN: For the purpose of exterminating—I believe that was not said
to us at the time. The question was only whether I was willing to help
keep 10,000 Jews who were in France from being deported to Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. You may return to the dock.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I had three witnesses approved by the Tribunal. The
witness Freiherr von Lersner could not come here at the time because of
transportation difficulties. He cannot be here before the end of July.
After the questioning of the defendant and considering the fact that
Lersner has answered an interrogatory, I believe I can dispense with the
witness. I regret this, because he is a man who was a companion of the
defendant during his whole political career, a witness who would have
been especially valuable because of his objectivity in these questions.
He was president of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have the affidavit or the interrogatory, you can
put it in. We do not need any further statements about it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
The second witness was Count Kageneck. Since the questions which were to
be asked of Kageneck have been covered in the questioning of the
defendant and the cross-examination did not touch upon them, I can also
dispense with this witness.
There remains only the witness Dr. Kroll, whom I now call to the stand.
[_The witness Kroll took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS KROLL (Witness): Hans Kroll.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath, after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, what was your occupation in Ankara?
KROLL: I was the First Counsellor of the Embassy, and later Minister. I
was in Ankara from the fall of 1936 until April 1943; from April 1939
until April 1943 I worked together with Ambassador Von Papen as his
principal collaborator. Daily, mostly in the morning and in the
afternoon, we conferred together for several hours, so that I believe I
am well informed about the various phases of his activity during this
period in Turkey; that is, about his activity during the war.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For explanatory purposes I would like to say that these
questions will refer mostly to the peace policy of the defendant.
Did you know Herr Von Papen before he became Ambassador in Ankara?
KROLL: No. We met in Ankara.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you a member of the NSDAP?
KROLL: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After taking over the position as Ambassador, Herr Von
Papen came to Ankara for a short stay. What was the purpose of this
visit?
KROLL: Herr Von Papen wanted, first of all, to present himself to the
Turkish Government and to obtain information on the general situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen at that time, through his conduct and
his statements, express his agreement with German foreign policy and, in
particular, with the policy toward Poland? Or did he, as far as he was
able, attempt to work against this policy?
KROLL: After the arrival of Herr Von Papen, I was, of course, interested
to learn what he imagined the future development of the general
situation would be and, in particular, the Polish question. I assumed,
of course, that as he came from Germany he was well informed about
Hitler’s plans; and I was disappointed to find that he knew no more than
I did, which was nothing at all.
Then we discussed the situation in detail; as far as I was able to tell,
Herr Von Papen, who spoke very frankly with me about these things,
distrusted Hitler’s foreign policy. He was an enemy of war, a true and
sincere enemy of war; and, of course, he was also an enemy of war
against Poland. He was quite convinced that an agreement could be
reached on the Polish question if it could only be made clear to Hitler
that a conflict with Poland would of necessity lead to a World War. He
then endeavored, and I must say in very open, clear, and courageous
language, to point out this view in his reports. And in his talks with
the Turkish statesmen, as well as with the accredited diplomats in
Ankara, he attempted to prove that, in fact, a conflict with Poland
would of necessity lead to a conflict with England and France. I often
told myself later that he was convinced that if everyone, Germans as
well as foreigners, had spoken to Hitler in this clear manner, the war
would have been avoided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After the outbreak of the Polish war, what was the
attitude of Herr Von Papen toward the spread of the war to the Nordic
States, Holland, Belgium, and finally, Russia?
KROLL: Herr Von Papen, of course, hoped that during this winter pause
some agreement would be reached or at least a meeting arranged. He knew
that once the action spread to the west, the war would break out in all
its horror and that then it would probably be too late to talk things
over. Of course, as far as possible, he looked for mediation in Turkey
and he was glad and willing to consider any opportunity, such as had
resulted from talks with his friend, the Dutch Minister in Ankara, Van
Visser. The motive behind this offer of Visser was Holland’s wish to
have the war ended before spring and along with that the fighting in the
west, and the goal was to be a talk between Germany and England.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am interested in knowing what Herr Von Papen’s opinion
of such a peace was. Did he think that it would be possible to achieve
annexation by way of peace, or what was the purpose of this peace which
he had in mind?
KROLL: I believe it is known from the previous activity of Herr Von
Papen that he was a friend and believer in European understanding. He
knew that this war had not begun because of a territorial problem but
because of a principle; that is to say, the prevention of future
one-sided aggressive wars. And so, in the restoration of the legal
status before the beginning of the war, that is, in the restoration of
the _status quo ante_ on the basis of 1938, including the restoration of
Poland and Czechoslovakia, he saw the prerequisite for instituting
_pourparlers_.
He considered the second prerequisite for the successful carrying on of
such _pourparlers_ the restoration of confidence in the German
signature, which was known to have been destroyed through Hitler’s
foreign policy. The only question was how this confidence could be
restored. He clearly realized that the prerequisite for this was a basic
reform of the regime, with the aim of making Germany a legal state once
more. Finally, Herr Von Papen, posted as he was in Turkey, believed he
saw the possibility of ending the war by reaching an understanding,
because Turkey was in a better position for mediation than practically
any other state of equal importance in foreign politics. It enjoyed the
confidence of both belligerent parties, and that is essential for
arranging a _pourparler_. And so he endeavored, in all his talks with
Turkish statesmen, to win Turkey over for a mediation. During all his
years in Turkey that was the leitmotif of his work, namely, to bring the
war to an end as soon as possible. It is a fact that he finally enjoyed
the satisfaction of hearing the Turkish President, in 1942 in a big
public speech before the Turkish National Assembly, offering the
services of Turkey for mediation between the belligerents.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you have knowledge of the efforts of Herr Von Papen
to avert a spread of the war toward Turkey, contrary to the efforts of
certain circles of the Axis partners around Hitler? During the war there
were several crises which you might briefly mention.
KROLL: I should like to say first that Papen’s activity in Turkey can be
summed up in one word. He considered it his mission to make one and the
same the interests of Germany, his country, and the interests of peace.
That meant, in effect, that he endeavored to prevent the spreading of
the war to Turkey and the Near East and thus create the prerequisite for
having Turkey intervene as mediator at the proper time.
Now, as to the crises. I should like to limit myself to those cases in
which Herr Von Papen had the impression that the neutrality of Turkey
was endangered by the intentions of the Axis partners.
THE PRESIDENT: I think I did before draw your attention to the fact that
there was no charge against Von Papen in connection with his activities
at Ankara; and also, I may add, that this was a summing-up in one word,
I thought.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There are only a very few cases, Your Lordship. He will
tell us about them briefly to complete the general picture.
THE PRESIDENT: The only way in which the evidence can be relevant at all
is insofar as it throws light upon Von Papen’s activities before he went
to Ankara. That is what I pointed out to you before.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I said the other day, Your Lordship, that the personality
of a person charged with war conspiracy cannot be judged correctly if
only one period of his activity is mentioned. He was at a post where he
could do only negative or positive things. It is certainly not
irrelevant if at least it may be presented in brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this witness has been telling us for a
considerable time that Papen’s activities were entirely peaceful and
that they were endeavors to make Turkey mediate; and what he is doing
now is simply going on with further details on the same subject, and it
is over a period when, as I say, no charge is made against Von Papen at
all by the Prosecution.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: If the Tribunal understands that the Defendant Von Papen
actually interpreted his mission in Ankara as a peace mission, I need
put no further questions to the witness. Then I come to my last
questions.
What was the position of Herr Von Papen in regard to the Party,
especially as to the Landesleitung in Ankara?
KROLL: On his arrival Von Papen was received with unconcealed distrust.
No wonder, for it was known that he was no National Socialist. During
these 4 years in Turkey I did not meet anyone who considered him a
National Socialist. His relationship to the Party became worse in the
course of the years, and finally it resulted in open conflict. That was
in 1942, when the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Ankara once told
his colleagues, if it rested with him he would have Herr Von Papen shot.
Then he was challenged about it and corrected himself. He said he didn’t
say that; he only said he would have him put in a concentration camp.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Von Papen to the Jewish
question?
KROLL: In repeated public speeches as well as in his actions, Herr Von
Papen quite clearly opposed the anti-Jewish policy of the Party. He was
acquainted with Jewish emigrants. He had Jewish doctors; he bought in
Jewish stores. In short, I believe that was one of the main reasons
which caused this tension between him and the Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen even employ a Jewish woman in the
Embassy?
KROLL: As far as I know, yes. I believe that was the wife of his
servant, his porter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: She was employed as a telephone operator there? Frau
B...., is that right?
KROLL: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know a Herr Posemann? Did he have any connection
with the German Embassy?
KROLL: At my time, Posemann was not in the German Embassy. I recall that
he had a bookstore in Ankara. He had nothing to do with the Embassy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Herr Von Papen in the personnel
question? Did he employ National Socialists in the Embassy, or what
preferences did he have?
KROLL: It is well known that the Party was never quite satisfied with
Von Papen’s choice of workers. That was shown by the very severe
consequences on 30 June and after the Anschluss. It was somewhat
dangerous to be one of his first co-workers.
Of course, he was regarded with suspicion because he did not make a
National Socialist command post out of the Embassy, as was done in the
Balkans, and because, when he asked for personnel, he chose people who
he knew were not National Socialists. I think I need only mention two
names, Herr Von Haeften and Legationsrat Von Trott zu Solz, two men who
I believe were executed in connection with 20 July. Of course, it was
especially held against Von Papen that he opposed all efforts to remove
me from my post. I do not know whether I should go into that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please do, briefly.
KROLL: Repeatedly—I could really say every month—an attempt was made
to have me eliminated as deputy of Von Papen. Finally when that did not
do any good, since Von Papen always opposed these attempts, the
Landesgruppenleiter, beating the war drum, and the Ortsgruppenleiter of
Ankara and Istanbul in the spring of 1942 came to see Von Papen and
officially in the name of the Party demanded that I should be removed
from my post. Von Papen refused this once more but finally in 1943 the
pressure of the Party became too great, especially since other sources
conspired against me, and so then I was excluded.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A final question: During the years you worked together
you became well acquainted with the activity of Von Papen and his
personality. Perhaps you can give us a brief picture of the defendant.
KROLL: I already said before...
THE PRESIDENT: No, he has already sketched it at very considerable
length and we don’t want it briefly reiterated.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then I shall dispense with this question. I have finished
the examination of the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no questions, My Lord.