Forces. As a technical detail it should be stated in this connection
that foreign workers did not, of course, belong to it, but only German
workers who naturally in occupied territories had to figure as members
of the Armed Forces in some way or other. The Prosecution had a
different opinion on this matter.
Apart from the Organization Todt there were certain transport units
attached to my Ministry, which were working in occupied territories, and
it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were on
principle recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution has alleged that the
Organization Todt was the comprehensive organization for all military
construction work in the occupied territories. That is not the case.
They only had to carry out one-quarter to one-fifth of the construction
program.
In May 1944 the Organization Todt was taken over by the Reich and
subsequently made responsible for some of the large-scale construction
programs and for the management of the organization of the
Plenipotentiary for Control of Building in the Four Year Plan. This
Plenipotentiary for Control of Building distributed the contingents
coming from the Central Planning Board and was responsible for other
directive tasks, but he was not responsible for the carrying out and for
the supervision of the construction work itself. There were various
official building authorities in the Reich, and in particular the SS
Building Administration had their own responsibility for the building
programs which they carried out.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has alleged that you had concentration
camp inmates employed in the armament industry and has submitted
Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179.
Mr. President, this document is on Page 47 of the English text in my
document book. It is about a conference with Hitler in September 1942.
How did that conference come about, Herr Speer?
SPEER: When in February 1942 I took over the armament department of the
Army there were demands for considerable increases all along the line;
and to meet them it was necessary to construct numerous new factories.
For this purpose Himmler offered his concentration camps both to Hitler
and to me. It was his plan that some of these necessary new
constructions, as well as the necessary machinery, should be housed
within the concentration camps, and were to be operated there under the
supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the Army,
Generaloberst Fromm, was against this plan, and so was I. Apart from
general reasons for this, the first point was that uncontrolled arms
production on the part of the SS was to be prevented. Secondly, this
would certainly entail my being deprived of the technical management in
these industries. For that reason when planning the large armaments
extension program in the spring of 1942, I did not take into
consideration these demands by the SS. Himmler went to see Hitler and
the minutes of this conference, which are available here, show the
objections to the wishes which Hitler put to me upon Himmler’s
suggestions.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw
your attention to Page 44 of the German text, which is Page 47 of the
English text. It is Point 36 of a Führer protocol. There it says, and I
quote:
“....beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to
organize armament production in the concentration camps....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flächsner, the witness has just given us the
substance of it, has he not?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, according to this document you proposed that
factories should be staffed entirely with internees from concentration
camps. Did you carry that out?
SPEER: No, it was not carried out in this form because it soon became
clear that it was Himmler’s intention to gain influence over these
industries and in some way or other he would undoubtedly have succeeded
in getting these industries under his control. For that reason, as a
basic principle, only part of the industrial staff consisted of
internees from concentration camps, so as to counteract Himmler’s
efforts. And so it happened that the labor camps were attached to the
armament industries. But Himmler never received his share of 5 to 8
percent of arms, which had been decided upon. This was prevented due to
an agreement with the General of the Army Staff in the OKW, General
Buhle. The witness will testify to this.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I further draw your attention to Document 1584-PS, on
Page 48 of the English text in my document book. It is Exhibit USA-221,
and is a letter from Himmler to Göring dated 9 March 1944. Himmler is
emphasizing the fact that if his responsibility, that is to say, that of
the SS, would be extended, a speeding-up and an increase in production
could be expected. The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows
that it was proposed to supervise and control the employment of
concentration camp inmates and even to use the SS as responsible works
manager. According to his experience and knowledge, it would not be
sufficient merely to assign the internees to other industries. The SS,
therefore, wished to supervise and control the labor employment in these
industries.
This document shows something else, however; for it confirms the
statement of the Defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps
were also paid premiums if they proved particularly efficient;
furthermore, it shows on the last page that on an average the working
hours of all internees were 240 hours per month, which would correspond
to 60 working hours per week.
I also refer to a document which has already been mentioned yesterday;
it is Number 44 and has already been submitted by me as Exhibit Number
6; it is in the second document book. Mr. President, that is the first
book in the supplementary volume.
This document shows clearly how far the extension of the SS industries
was determined by Himmler’s and Pohl’s ambition. The document also
states, and I quote:
“....the monthly working hours contributed by concentration camp
inmates did not even amount to 8 million hours, so that most
certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from
concentration camps can be working in our armaments industries.
This number is constantly diminishing.”
Mr. President, this sentence is on Page 90, at the bottom. You will find
it there in the English text.
The letter also shows that the author computes nearly the same number of
working hours as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours
per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week.
Herr Speer, through this letter you learned of the fact that workers,
particularly foreigners, were not returned to their old places of work
when for certain acts they had become involved with the Police, but that
they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take then?
SPEER: Here again I should like to summarize several points. I received
the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin, when I returned after my
illness. Its contents greatly upset me because, after all, this is
nothing more than kidnaping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the
number of people thus being removed from the economic system. The round
figure was 30,000 to 40,000 a month. The result was my declaration in
the Central Planning Board on 22 May 1944, where I demanded that these
workers, even as internees, as I called them, should be returned to
their old factories at once. This remark, as such, is not logical
because, naturally, the number of crimes in each individual factory was
very low, so that such a measure was not practicable. Anyhow, what I
wished to express by it was that the workers would have to be returned
to their original places of work. This statement in the Central Planning
Board has been submitted by the Prosecution.
Immediately after the meeting of the Central Planning Board I went to
see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944. The minutes of
the Führer conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for
any such procedure, and I cited many arguments founded entirely on
reason, since no other arguments would have been effective. Hitler
declared, as the minutes show, that these workers would have to be
returned to their former work at once, and that after a conference
between Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision
of his to Himmler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I submit Exhibit Number 13, which is an extract from the
Führer conference of 3 to 5 June 1944; you will find this document on
Page 92 of the document book.
SPEER: Immediately after this conference I went to see Himmler and
communicated to him Hitler’s decision. He told me that no such number
had ever been arrested by the Police. But he promised me that he would
immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler’s demands;
namely, that the SS would no longer be permitted to detain these
workers. I informed Hitler of this result, and I asked him once more to
get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to
mistrust Himmler’s promise because, after all, it is not customary for
Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much. But anyhow, I did not
have any further complaints from my assistants concerning this affair. I
must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my
affair, but the information appeared so incredible to me that I
intervened at once. Had I known that already 18 months before Himmler
had started a very similar action, and that in this letter, which has
been submitted here...
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this is Document 1063-PS, and it is
Exhibit USA-219. I have reproduced it on Page 51 of the English text of
my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now
referring.
How far did your efforts go to get workers for the armaments industry
from concentration camps?
SPEER: I wanted to make a brief statement with reference to the
document.
Had I known this letter, I would never have had enough confidence in
Himmler to expect that he would correctly execute his order as
instructed by Hitler.
For this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept
secret from other offices. These other offices could only be the office
of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor or my own
office.
Finally, I want to say in connection with this problem that it was my
duty as Minister for Armament to put to use as many workers as were
possibly available for armaments production, or any other production. I
considered it proper, therefore, that workers from concentration camps,
too, should work in war production or armament industries.
The main accusation by the Prosecution, however, that I deliberately
increased the number of concentration camps, or caused them to be
increased, is by no means correct. On the contrary I wanted just the
opposite, looking at it from my point of view of production.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: May I refer in this connection to the answers of the
witness Schmelter to Numbers 9 and 35 in the questionnaire which was
submitted to him, and to the answer of the witness Schieber to Number
20.
Herr Speer, Document Number R-124, Exhibit USA-179, which was submitted
by the Prosecution, contains several remarks you made during the
meetings of the Central Planning Board.
Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 53 of the English text
of my document book.
Herr Speer, what do you mean to say by your remark concerning “idlers”
in the meeting of 30 October 1942?
SPEER: I made the remark as reproduced by the stenographic record. Here,
however, I had an opportunity to read all the shorthand notes of the
Central Planning Board and I discovered that this remark was not
followed up in any way and that no measures by me were demanded.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: On the same page of the document book, Mr. President,
there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943.
Herr Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark
regarding Russian prisoners of war?
SPEER: It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that
the conception “armaments” must be understood in the way I have
explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians
employed in armaments originated, according to this document, were the
iron, steel, and metal industries with 29,000; and the industries
constructing engines, boilers, vehicles and apparatuses of all sorts
with 63,000.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution has also mentioned a remark
made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on Page 53 of the
English text of the document book. There you said at a conference with
Keitel and Zeitzler that in accordance with Hitler’s instructions the
groups of auxiliary volunteers were to be dissolved, and that you would
effect the transfer of the Russians from the rear army areas.
SPEER: Here, again, I read through the shorthand notes. It can be
explained briefly. The “Hiwi” mentioned in the document are the
so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in
Russia. As the months went by, they took on large proportions, and
during the retreat they followed along, as they would probably have been
treated as traitors in their own country. These volunteers were not,
however, as I desired it, put into industry, since the conference which
was planned did not take place.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please make a brief statement concerning Sauckel’s
memorandum, 556-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution, of a
telephone call on 4 January 1943 which refers to labor allocation.
SPEER: After this telephone call further measures were to be taken in
France to increase the number of workers available for allocation.
Minutes of a Führer conference which I found recently, namely, those of
the meeting of 3 to 5 January 1943, show that at that time Hitler’s
statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people
in France for local industry and economy.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because
up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long you are going to be,
Dr. Flächsner?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be through before 5
o’clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you
already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been
adducing up to date?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I will not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, this morning we stopped at a discussion of
Sauckel’s telephone message of 4 January 1943 regarding the matter of
labor allocation. As you have already stated, the minutes of a Führer
conference of 3 to 5 January, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later
on, are connected with this. Will you please make a brief statement on
the subject of that discussion?
SPEER: This record states that measures must be taken to raise economy
in France to a higher level. It contains stern injunctions from Hitler
concerning the ways and means that he contemplated using to this end. It
states that acts of sabotage are to be punished with the most rigorous
means and that “humanitarian muddleheadedness” is out of place.
These minutes also show that at that time I asked Hitler to transfer the
management of production questions in France to me, a step which was
actually taken several months later.
I mention this only for the purpose of making it clear, while I am still
in a position to testify as a witness, that I did not carry out Hitler’s
policy of abandoning all “humanitarian muddleheadedness” in France.
My attention was drawn to one case in which 10 hostages were to be shot
as a reprisal for acts of industrial sabotage committed in the
Meurthe-et-Moselle district. At that time I managed to prevent the
sentence from being carried out. Roechling, who was at that time in
charge of iron production in the occupied western territories, is my
witness in this case. That is the only case I know of where hostages
were to be shot on account of sabotage in production.
I can also prove that, through a decision by Hitler dated September
1943, I was responsible for providing a supplementary meal in addition
to the existing ration for factory workers employed in France. In a
letter which I sent to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor in December 1943, I strongly urged the necessity not only of
paying wages to the workers in the occupied western territories, but
also of making available to them a corresponding quantity of consumer
goods—a line of policy which doubtless does not accord with the policy
of plundering the western regions, on which so much stress has been laid
by the French Prosecution.
All three documents are in my possession and they can be produced. I
only mention these facts to show that I neither approved nor followed
the very harsh policy laid down by Hitler for application in France in
the records of 3 to 5 January.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I now turn to another point. Herr Speer, what did you
have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?
SPEER: We have already discussed this at sufficient length. No armament
goods were manufactured, only bottleneck parts and consumer goods.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well. I merely wanted to get that clear.
The Prosecution has submitted to you minutes of a Führer
conference—R-124—dated March 1944 and containing a statement that you
discussed with Hitler the Reich Marshal’s proposal to deliver prisoners
of war to France.
What can you say to that?
SPEER: This record is dated 3 March 1944. From January until May 1944 I
was seriously ill, and the discussion took place without me. A member of
my staff was in charge of this discussion—a man who enjoyed the
confidence of Hitler in an unusually high degree. In any case, the
proposal was not carried out.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, you attended the session of 30 May, at which
the question was discussed of how the office of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor came to be established. Will you
comment briefly on that point?
SPEER: I should like to say that I wanted a delegate to deal with all
labor allocation problems connected with my task of military armament
production. My chief concern in the allocation problem, at the beginning
of my term of office, was with the Gauleiter, who carried on a policy of
Gau particularism. The nonpolitical offices of the Labor Ministry could
not proceed against the Gauleiter, and the result was that manpower
inside Germany was frozen. I suggested to Hitler that he should appoint
a Gauleiter whom I knew to this post—a man named Hanke. Göring, by the
way, has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed. Two days later, Bormann
made the suggestion that Sauckel be chosen. I did not know Sauckel well,
but I was quite ready to accept the choice. It is quite possible that
Sauckel did not know anything about the affair and that he assumed—as
he was entitled to do—that he was chosen at my suggestion.
The office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
was created in the following way:
Lammers declared that he could not issue special authority for a
fraction of labor allocation as that would be doubtful procedure from an
administrative point of view, and for that reason the whole question of
manpower would have to be put into the hands of a plenipotentiary. At
first they contemplated a Führer decree. Göring protested on the grounds
that it was his task under the Four Year Plan. A compromise was made,
therefore, in accordance with which Sauckel was to be the
Plenipotentiary General within the framework of the Four Year Plan,
although he would be appointed by Hitler.
This was a unique arrangement under the Four Year Plan. Thereby Sauckel
was in effect subordinated to Hitler; and he always looked upon it in
that way.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have heard that Sauckel, in giving his testimony on
30 May, said that Göring participated in the meetings of the Central
Planning Board. Is that true?
SPEER: No, that is in no way correct. I would not have had any use for
him, for after all, we had to carry out practical work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted a statement by Sauckel
dated 8 October 1945, according to which arrangements for his delegates
to function in the occupied territories were supposed to have been made
by you. Is that true?
SPEER: No. In 1941 I had not yet anything to do with armament; and even
later, during the period of Sauckel’s activity, I did not appoint these
delegates and did not do much to promote their activities. That was a
matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution quoted from the record of
Sauckel’s preliminary interrogation on 27 September 1945. According to
this record you gave a special order for transport trains with foreign
workers.
SPEER: I believe it would be practical to deal at the same time with all
the statements made by Sauckel which apply to me; that will save time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please go ahead.
SPEER: Arrangements for transport trains were made by Sauckel and his
staff. It is possible that air raids or a sudden change in the
production program made it necessary for my office to ask for transport
trains to be rerouted; but the responsibility for that always rested
with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
Sauckel also testified here that after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started
on the “total war effort.” But that is not correct in this form.
Stalingrad was in January 1943, and Goebbels started on his “total war
effort” in August 1944. After Stalingrad a great reorganization program
was to be carried out in Germany in order to free German labor. I myself
was one of those who demanded this. Neither Goebbels nor I, however, was
able to carry out this plan. A committee of three, Lammers, Keitel, and
Bormann, was formed; but owing to their lack of technical knowledge they
were unable to carry out their task.
My Labor Allocation Department was further mentioned by Sauckel in his
testimony. This worked as follows: Every large factory and every
employer of labor had an allocation department which, naturally, came
under mine. None of these departments, however, encroached in the
slightest degree on Sauckel’s tasks. Their sphere of activity was not
very great, as may be seen from the fact that each was one of 50 or 60
departments coming under my office. If I had attached very much
importance to it, it would have been one of my six or eight branch
offices.
Sauckel further mentioned the Stabsleiter discussions which took place
in his office. A representative of my Labor Allocation Department for
Army and Navy armament and for building attended these conferences. At
these meetings, which were attended by about 15 people who were in need
of labor, the question of priority was settled on the basis of Sauckel’s
information on the state of economy generally. These were really the
functions erroneously ascribed here to the Central Planning Board.
In addition it was asserted that I promoted the transport of foreign
workers to Germany in April 1942 and that I was responsible for the fact
that foreign workers were brought to Germany at all. That, however, is
not true. I did not need to use any influence on Sauckel to attain that.
In any case, it is evident from a document in my possession—the minutes
of a Führer conference of 3 May 1942—that the introduction of
compulsory labor in the western region was approved by the Führer at
Sauckel’s suggestion.
I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on 18 April 1942,
showing that at that period I was still of the opinion that the German
building industry, which employed approximately 1.8 million workmen, was
to be discontinued to a large extent to divert the necessary labor to
the production of armaments. This speech which I made to my staff, in
which I explained my principles and also discussed the question of
manpower, does not contain any mention of the planning of a foreign
labor draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans, surely
I would have mentioned the subject in this speech.
Finally, in connection with Sauckel’s testimony, I must correct the plan
of the organization submitted here. It is incorrect in that the separate
sectors enumerated in it are classified under various ministries. In
reality these sectors of employers of labor were classified under
various economic branches, independently of the ministries. They only
corresponded where my own Ministry and the Air Ministry were concerned.
It is also incorrect in stating that the building industry was
represented in the Ministry of Economics. That came under my
jurisdiction. From 1943 on, the chemical and mining industries, both of
which are listed under the Ministry of Economics, were under my
jurisdiction. To my knowledge, these branches were represented through
plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan even prior to September 1943 and
stated their requirements directly to Sauckel independently of the
Ministry of Economics.
This plan further is incorrect in stating that the demands for these
workers from individual employers went directly to Hitler. It would have
been impossible for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers.
As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter conferences,
over which Sauckel presided.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, what did you do with your documents at the
end of the war?
SPEER: I felt bound to preserve my documents so that the necessary
transition measures could be taken during reconstruction. I refused to
allow these documents even to be sifted. They were turned over in their
entirety to the Allied authorities here in Nuremberg, where I had a
branch archive. I handed them over when I was still at liberty in the
Flensburg zone. The Prosecution is thus in possession of all my
documents to the number of several thousand, as well as all public
speeches, Gauleiter speeches, and other speeches dealing with armament
and industry; some 4,000 Führer decisions, 5,000 pages of stenographic
records of the Central Planning Board, memoranda, and so forth. I
mention this only because these documents show conclusively to what
extent my task was a technical and economic one.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In your documents, as far as you remember, did you ever
make statements regarding ideology, anti-Semitism, _et cetera_?
SPEER: No; I never made any statements of the kind, either in speeches
or memoranda. I assume that otherwise the Prosecution would be in a
position to produce something like that.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, you also figured as armament Minister on the
list of members of the new Government drawn up by the men responsible
for the Putsch of 20 July. Did you participate in the attempted
assassination of 20 July?
SPEER: I did not participate, nor was I informed of it in advance. At
that time I was against assassinating Hitler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, this point is mentioned in interrogatories
by the witness Kempf under Point 9 and the witness Stahl under Point 1.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the reason why you, as the only
minister from the National Socialist regime, were on the opposition
list?
SPEER: At that period I was working in collaboration with Army experts
of the General Staff and the commander of the Home Defense Forces. Both
staffs were the nucleus of the attempt of 20 July. I had particularly
close relations with Generaloberst Fromm, chief of the Home Defense
Forces, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the Chief of the Army
General Staff. After 20 July Fromm was hanged and Zeitzler was dismissed
from the Army. A close contact developed through this collaboration, and
these circles recognized my technical achievements. I assumed at that
time that that was why they wanted to retain me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: So political reasons did not play any part in that
connection?
SPEER: Certainly not directly. Of course, I was well known for the fact
that for a long time I had spoken my mind emphatically and in public
regarding the abuses which took place in Hitler’s immediate circle. As I
found out later, I shared the opinions of the men of 20 July in many
points of principle.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were your relations with Hitler in regard to your
work?
SPEER: My closest contact with him, in my capacity of architect, was
probably during the period from 1937 to September 1939; after that, the
relationship was no longer so close on account of the circumstances of
the war. After I was appointed successor to Todt a closer but much more
official working relationship was again established. Because of the
heavy demands made upon me by my armament work, I had very little
opportunity to go to headquarters. I only visited the Führer’s
headquarters about once in 2 or 3 weeks. My 4 months’ illness in the
spring of 1944 was exploited by many people interested in weakening my
position, and after 20 July the fact that I had been scheduled for the
Ministry undoubtedly occasioned a shock to Hitler—a fact which Bormann
and Goebbels used to start an open fight against me. The details are
shown by a letter which I sent to Hitler on 20 December 1944 and which
has been submitted as a document.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were you able to carry on political discussions with
Hitler?
SPEER: No, he regarded me as a purely technical minister. Attempts to
discuss political or personnel problems with him always failed because
of the fact that he was unapproachable. From 1944 on, he was so averse
to general discussions and discussions on the war situation that I set
down my ideas in memorandum form and handed them to him. Hitler knew how
to confine every man to his own specialty. He himself was therefore the
only co-ordinating factor. This was far beyond his strength and also his
knowledge. A unified political leadership was lacking in consequence, as
was also an expert military office for making decisions.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Then, as technical minister, do you wish to limit your
responsibility to your sphere of work?
SPEER: No; I should like to say something of fundamental importance
here. This war has brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German
people, and indeed started a world catastrophe. Therefore it is my
unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for this
disaster before the German people. This is all the more my obligation,
all the more my responsibility, since the head of the Government has
avoided responsibility before the German people and before the world. I,
as an important member of the leadership of the Reich, therefore, share
in the total responsibility, beginning with 1942. I will state my
arguments in this connection in my final remarks.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Do you assume responsibility for the affairs covered by
the extensive sphere of your assignments?
SPEER: Of course, as far as it is possible according to the principles
generally applied and as far as actions were taken according to my
directives.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Do you wish to refer to Führer decrees in this
connection?
SPEER: No. Insofar as Hitler gave me orders and I carried them out, I
assume the responsibility for them. I did not, of course, carry out all
the orders which he gave me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I turn now to a second part of my evidence
in the case of the defendant. This presentation is not meant to
exonerate the defendant from those charges, brought against Speer by the
Prosecution, which apply to his actual sphere of activity.
This part concerns itself rather with the accusations raised by the
Prosecution against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint
conspiracy. This second part is relatively brief and I assume that I
shall be able to conclude my entire presentation of evidence within an
hour.
In this matter we are concerned with Speer’s activity in preventing
Hitler’s destructive intentions in Germany and the occupied countries
and with the measures he took and the attempts he made to shorten a war
which he believed already lost.
I assume that the High Tribunal will agree to my presentation.
Herr Speer, up to what time did you devote all your powers to obtaining
the strongest possible armament and thus continuing the war?
SPEER: Up to the middle of January 1945.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Had not the war been lost before that?
SPEER: From a military point of view and as far as the general situation
was concerned, it was certainly lost before that. It is difficult,
however, to consider a war as lost and to draw the final conclusions as
regards one’s own person if one is faced with unconditional surrender.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did not considerations arising out of the production
situation, of which you were in a position to have a comprehensive view,
force you to regard the war as lost long before that?
SPEER: From the armament point of view not until the autumn of 1944, for
I succeeded up to that time, in spite of bombing attacks, in maintaining
a constant rise in production. If I may express it in figures, this was
so great that in the year 1944 I could completely re-equip 130 infantry
divisions and 40 armored divisions. That involved new equipment for 2
million men. This figure would have been 30 percent higher had it not
been for the bombing attacks. We reached our production peak for the
entire war in August 1944 for munitions; in September 1944 for aircraft;
and in December 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats. The new weapons
were to be put into use a few months later, probably in February or
March of 1945. I may mention only the jet planes which had already been
announced in the press, the new U-boats, the new antiaircraft
installations, _et cetera_. Here too, however, bombing attacks so
retarded the mass production of these new weapons—which in the last
phase of the war might have changed the situation—that they could no
longer be used against the enemy in large numbers. All of these attempts
were fruitless, however, since from 12 May 1944 on our fuel plants
became targets for concentrated attacks from the air.
This was catastrophic. 90 percent of the fuel was lost to us from that
time on. The success of these attacks meant the loss of the war as far
as production was concerned; for our new tanks and jet planes were of no
use without fuel.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you tell Hitler about the effect on production, of
the bombing attacks?
SPEER: Yes, I told him of this in great detail, both orally and in
writing. Between June and December 1944 I sent him 12 memoranda, all
with catastrophic news.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to submit
to the Tribunal a document, a Speer memorandum of 30 June 1944. It is
reproduced on Page 56 of the English document book and will be Exhibit
Number 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer writes to Hitler:
“But in September of this year the quantities required to cover
the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot possibly be
supplied any longer, which means that from that time on there
will be a deficiency which cannot be made good and which must
lead to tragic consequences.”
Speer informed Hitler in another memorandum, dated 30 August 1944, on
the situation in the chemical industry and the fuel production industry.
This is Page 62 of the English text, Exhibit Number 15. I quote only one
sentence:
“....so that these are shortages in important categories of
those materials necessary for the conduct of modern warfare.”
Herr Speer, how was it possible that you and the other co-workers of
Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do
everything possible to continue the war?
SPEER: In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. From the
summer of 1944 on he circulated, through Ambassador Hewel of the Foreign
Office, definite statements to the effect that conversation with foreign
powers had been started. Generaloberst Jodl has confirmed this to me
here in Court. In this way, for instance, the fact that several visits
were paid to Hitler by the Japanese Ambassador was interpreted to mean
that through Japan we were carrying on conversations with Moscow; or
else Minister Neubacher, who was here as a witness, was reported to have
initiated conversations in the Balkans with the United States; or else
the former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin was alleged to have been in
Stockholm for the purpose of initiating conversations.
In this way he raised hopes that, like Japan, we would start
negotiations in this hopeless situation, so that the people would be
saved from the worst consequences. To do this, however, it was necessary
to stiffen resistance as much as possible. He deceived all of us by
holding out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of
diplomatic steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victories
through the use of new troops and new weapons and by systematically
spreading rumors to encourage the people to believe in the appearance of
a miracle weapon—all for the purpose of keeping up resistance. I can
prove that during this period I made continual reference in my speeches
and in my letters, which I wrote to Hitler and Goebbels, as to how
dishonest and disastrous I considered this policy of deceiving the
people by promising them a miracle weapon.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, were orders given to destroy industry in
Belgium, Holland, and France?
SPEER: Yes. In case of occupation by the Allies, Hitler had ordered a
far-reaching system of destruction of war industries in all these
countries; according to planned preparations, coal and mineral mines,
power plants, and industrial premises were to be destroyed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you take any steps to prevent the execution of these
orders?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And did you prevent them?
SPEER: The Commander, West was responsible for carrying out these
orders, since they concerned his operational zone. But I informed him
that as far as I was concerned this destruction had no sense and no
purpose and that I, in my capacity of Armament Minister, did not
consider this destruction necessary. Thereupon no order to destroy these
things was given. By this, of course, I made myself responsible to
Hitler for the fact that no destruction took place.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When was that?
SPEER: About the beginning of July 1944.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: How could you justify your position?
SPEER: All the military leaders whom I knew said at that time that the
war was bound to end in October or November, since the invasion had been
successful.
I myself was of the same opinion in view of the fuel situation. This may
be clearly seen from the memorandum, which I sent to Hitler on 30
August, in which I told him that in view of this development in the fuel
situation no operational actions by the troops would be possible by
October or November. The fact that the war lasted longer than that can
be ascribed only to the standstill of the enemy offensive in 1944. This
made it possible to throttle our fuel consumption and to give the
Western Front new supplies of tanks and ammunition. In these
circumstances I was perfectly willing to accept responsibility for
abandoning the industries in the western countries to the enemy in an
undamaged condition, for they could be of no use to them for at least 9
months, the transport system having been destroyed beforehand. This
memorandum coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in
the blocked factories—a matter which I dealt with this morning.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Hitler sanction these measures?
SPEER: He could not sanction these measures for he knew nothing about
them. It was a period of such hectic activity at headquarters that he
never thought of checking up on the measures taken for destruction.
Later, in January 1945, reports appeared in the French press on the
rapid reconstruction of their undestroyed industries. Then, of course,
serious charges were raised against me.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The French Prosecution has submitted a document, RF-132.
This is a report by the field economics officer attached to the
Wehrmacht commander for the Netherlands. According to this report, a
decree by the Commander, West was still in existence in September 1944.
This said that destructive measures were to be taken only in the coastal
towns and nowhere else, and the field economics officer for the
Netherlands stated, as may be seen from the document, that the order
issued by the Commander West was obsolete and that he himself had
therefore decreed on his own initiative that the industries in Holland
should be destroyed. How was this possible and what did you do about it?
SPEER: As a matter of fact, some overzealous lower officials caused the
basic decrees not to destroy in the West to be ignored. Our
communications system for orders had been largely destroyed through
bombing attacks. Seyss-Inquart had drawn my attention to the fact that
destruction was to take place in Holland. He has already testified that
I authorized him not to take destructive measures. This was in September
1944. In addition, in order to prevent such destruction, on 5 September
1944, acting without authorization, I directed the managers of the coal
and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in
Luxembourg to prevent destruction in the Minette ore mines, in the Saar
coal mines, and the coal mines of Belgium and Holland, et cetera. In
view of the hopeless war situation at that time, I, as the person
responsible for supplying electric current, continued to furnish current
to the undertakings on the other side of the front so that the pump
stations in the coal mines would not have to stop working, because if
these pump stations had stopped the mines would have been flooded.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I am submitting a copy of a letter
from Speer to Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Exhibit Number
Speer-16, Page 57 of the English text in my document book.
Herr Speer, with regard to the other occupied countries apart from
France, Belgium, and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent
destruction?
SPEER: From August 1944, in the industrial installations in the
Government General, the ore mines in the Balkans, the nickel works in
Finland; from September 1944, in the industrial installations in Upper
Italy; beginning with February 1945, in the oil fields in Hungary and
the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this
connection that I was supported to a great extent by Generaloberst Jodl,
who quietly tolerated this policy of non-destruction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What were Hitler’s intentions with regard to the
preservation of industry and means of existence for the German
population at the beginning of September 1944, when enemy troops
approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich from all sides?
SPEER: He had absolutely no intention of preserving industry. On the
contrary, he ordered the “scorched earth” policy with special
application to Germany. That meant the ruthless destruction of all
animate and inanimate property on the approach of the enemy. This policy
was backed by Bormann, Ley, and Goebbels, while the various branches of
the Wehrmacht and the competent ministries opposed it.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Since these efforts by Speer to prevent the application
of destructive measures, which had been considerably intensified, also
applied to areas then considered part of the German Reich, such as
Polish Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine, Austria, the Protectorates of
Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part
of my evidence.
Herr Speer, did the commanders of the armies in the wider German area
that I have just defined have executive powers to carry out orders of
destruction?
SPEER: No. As far as industries were concerned, those executive powers
were vested in me. Bridges, locks, railroad installations, et cetera,
were the affair of the Wehrmacht.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In your measures for the protection of industry, did you
differentiate between the territory of the so-called Altreich and those
areas which were added after 1933?
SPEER: No. The industrial region of Upper Silesia, the remaining
districts of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, and Austria,
of course, were protected against destruction in the same way as the
German areas. I made the necessary arrangements by personal directives
on the spot—particularly in the Eastern Territories.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: What steps did you take against the scorched earth
policy?
SPEER: I returned from a trip to the Western Front on 14 September 1944
and found the decree awaiting me that everything was to be destroyed
ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counterdecree officially ordering all
industrial installations to be spared. At that time I was very much
upset about the fact that industries were now to be destroyed in Germany
in the hopeless war situation, and I was all the more upset because I
thought I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western
territories from destruction.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I should like to submit a document in this connection, a
decree by Speer dated 14 September 1944 for the protection of
industries. It is on Page 58 of the English text of my document book;
Exhibit Number 17.
Herr Speer, did you succeed in getting this order carried out?
SPEER: The scorched earth policy was officially proclaimed in the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ at the same time in an official article by the
Reich press chief, so that I realized quite clearly that my
counterdecree could not be effective for any length of time. In this
connection I used a method which is perhaps typical of the means
employed by Hitler’s immediate circle. In order to dissuade him from the
scorched earth policy, I made use of the faith which he induced in all
his co-workers that the lost territories would be recaptured. I made him
decide between the two situations: Firstly, if these industrial areas
were lost, my armament potential would sink if they were not recaptured;
and secondly, if they were recaptured they would be of value to us only
if we had not destroyed them.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You thereupon addressed a letter to Bormann.
I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit Number 18, Mr. President;
Page 59 of the English text of the document book. This teletype...
SPEER: I think we can dispense with the quotation.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Yes. You sent this teletype message to Bormann before you
discussed the contents with Hitler?
SPEER: Yes. I should like to summarize...
THE PRESIDENT: Would you give the French page as well so that the French
members may have it?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is Page 56 of the French text of the document book.
SPEER: Hitler approved of the text which I suggested to him, in which I
gave him the alternative of either considering the war as lost or of
leaving the areas intact. For the time being there was in any case no
danger, because the fronts remained stable. Hitler insisted particularly
on the destruction of the Minette ore mines in France; but in this case
too I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing
the destruction of these mines—again by exploiting Hitler’s hopes of a
successful counterattack.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant has
just referred is an extract from the Führer decree of 18 to 20 August
1944; and I submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-19. It is reproduced in
the supplement to my document book, Page 101.
Herr Speer, how did this order originate?
SPEER: I have already told you.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The term “paralysis” frequently occurs in your document
in connection with industrial installations, et cetera. Will you tell
the Tribunal just what you mean by the use of this term?
SPEER: I can only say briefly that this concerns the removal of specific
parts, which put the plant temporarily out of commission; but these
parts were not destroyed; they were merely concealed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You emphasized a few minutes ago that up to January 1945
you tried to achieve the highest possible degree of armament. What were
your reasons for giving up the idea after January 1945?
SPEER: From January 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter begins: The
last phase of the war and the realization that Hitler had identified the
fate of the German people with his own; and from March 1945 onward, the
realization that Hitler intended deliberately to destroy the means of
life for his own people if the war were lost. I have no intention of
using my actions during that phase of the war to help me in my personal
defense, but this is a matter of honor which must be defended; and for
that reason I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, what was the production situation in the
various activities under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?
SPEER: The fuel production had been quite inadequate since the beginning
of the attacks on fuel plants in May 1944, and the situation did not
improve afterwards. The bombing of our transportation centers had
eliminated the Ruhr area as a source of raw material for Germany as
early as November 1944; and with the successful Soviet offensive in the
coal areas of Upper Silesia, most of our supply of coal from that region
had been cut off since the middle of January 1945.
Thus we could calculate precisely when economy must collapse; we had
reached a point at which, even if there were a complete cessation of
operations on the part of the enemy, the war would soon be lost, since
the Reich, because of its lack of coal, was on the verge of an economic
collapse.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, I submit a memorandum which Hitler
received from Speer on 11 December 1944, as Exhibit Speer-20. Mr.
President, you will find an extract on Page 64 of the English document
book, Page 61 of the German and French books. It states, and I quote:
“In view of the whole structure of the Reich economy, it is
obvious that the loss of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area
will in the long run spell ruin for the whole German economy and
the further successful prosecution of the war. This would mean,
in fact, the total loss of the Ruhr territory as far as the
German economy is concerned, with the exception of products
manufactured locally within the sector.... It is superfluous to
discuss the consequence resulting for the whole German Reich if
it is deprived of the Ruhr territory....”
On 15 December 1944, in connection with the Ardennes Offensive which was
then imminent, Speer pointed out to Hitler in detail the consequences
entailed by a possible loss of Upper Silesia.
In this connection I submit Speer’s memorandum—Page 102 of the
supplementary volume of my document book in the English text and the
same page in the French text. This is an extract from a memorandum
addressed to the Chief of the Army General Staff, dated 15 December
1944, Exhibit Number 21.
SPEER: This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: It is not necessary to quote from this memorandum. It
points out that a possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting
impossible even after a few weeks and that the Wehrmacht could in no way
be supplied with armaments. A large part of Upper Silesia was actually
lost shortly afterwards. On 30 January 1945, Speer again sent a
memorandum to Hitler—Page 67 of the English text of the document book,
Page 64 in the French text. I submit this document as Exhibit Number 22,
and I quote only the following:
“After the loss of Upper Silesia, the German armament production
will no longer be in a position to cover even a fraction of the
requirements of the front as regards munitions, weapons and
tanks, losses on the front, and equipment needed for new
formations.”
By way of special emphasis, there follows this sentence—and I quote:
“The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer
be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers.”
Herr Speer, what did you mean by the last sentence I quoted?
SPEER: At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in defense of the
fatherland the soldiers’ bravery would increase tremendously and that
_vice versa_ the Allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied
territories, would have less will to fight. That was also the main
argument employed by Goebbels and Bormann to justify the use of all
means to intensify the war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, did other sources advise Hitler in the same
way that you yourself did?
SPEER: In this connection I shall take several points together.
Guderian, the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop at that
time to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to
Hitler. Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of
February that pessimistic statements of the nature of those contained in
my memorandum or the step I had taken in regard to the Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs would in future be considered as high treason and
punished accordingly. In addition, some days later, in a situation
conference, he forbade his other close collaborators to make any
statements about the hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who disobeyed
would be shot without regard for position or rank and his family would
be arrested.
The statements which Guderian and I made to Hitler about the
hopelessness of the war situation had precisely the opposite effect from
that which we desired. Early in February, a few days before the
beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler sent for his press expert and
instructed him, in my presence, to announce in the most uncompromising
terms and in the entire German press, the intention of Germany never to
capitulate. He declared at the same time that he was doing this so that
the German people should in no case receive any offer from the enemy.
The language used would have to be so strong that enemy statesmen would
lose all desire to drive a wedge between himself and the German people.
At the same time Hitler once again proclaimed to the German people the
slogan “Victory or Destruction.” All these events took place at a time
when it should have been clear to him and every intelligent member of
his circle that the only thing that could happen was destruction.
At a Gauleiter meeting in the summer of 1944 Hitler had already
stated—and Schirach is my witness for this—that if the German people
were to be defeated in the struggle it must have been too weak, it had
failed to prove its mettle before history and was destined only to
destruction. Now, in the hopeless situation existing in January and
February 1945, Hitler made remarks which showed that these earlier
statements had not been mere flowers of rhetoric. During this period he
attributed the outcome of the war in an increasing degree to the failure
of the German people, but he never blamed himself. He criticized
severely this alleged failure of our people who made so many brave
sacrifices in this war.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Generaloberst Jodl has already testified before this
Court that both Hitler and his co-workers saw quite clearly the
hopelessness of the military and economic situation. Was no unified
action taken by some of Hitler’s closer advisers in this hopeless
situation to demand the termination of war?
SPEER: No. No unified action was taken by the leading men in Hitler’s
circle. A step like this was quite impossible, for these men considered
themselves either as pure specialists or else as people whose job it was
to receive orders—or else they resigned themselves to the situation. No
one took over the leadership in this situation for the purpose of
bringing about at least a discussion with Hitler on the possibility of
avoiding further sacrifices.
On the other side there was an influential group which tried, with all
the means at their disposal, to intensify the struggle. That group
consisted of Goebbels, Bormann, and Ley, and, as we have said, Fegelein
and Burgsdorff. This group was also behind the move to induce Hitler to
withdraw from the Geneva Convention. At the beginning of February Dr.
Goebbels handed to Hitler a very sharp memorandum demanding our
withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitler had already agreed to this
proposal, as Naumann, who was State Secretary to Goebbels, told me. This
step meant that the struggle was to be carried on with all available
means and without regard for international agreements. This was the
sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler.
It must be said that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed on
account of the unanimous resistance offered by the military leaders, as
Naumann also told me later.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, the witness Stahl said in his written
interrogatory that about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded
from him a supply of the new poison gas in order to assassinate Hitler,
Bormann, and Goebbels. Why did you intend to do this then?
SPEER: I thought there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to
take this step as it had become obvious to me since the beginning of
February that Hitler intended to go on with the war at all costs,
ruthlessly and without consideration for the German people. It was
obvious to me that in the loss of the war he confused his own fate with
that of the German people and that in his own end he saw the end of the
German people as well. It was also obvious that the war was lost so
completely that even unconditional surrender would have to be accepted.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did you mean to carry through this assassination
yourself, and why was your plan not realized?
SPEER: I do not wish to testify to the details here. I could only carry
it through personally because from 20 July only a limited circle still
had access to Hitler. I met with various technical difficulties...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear the particulars, but will
hear them after the adjournment.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what circumstances
hindered you in your undertaking?
SPEER: I am most unwilling to describe the details because there is
always something repellent about such matters. I do it only because it
is the Tribunal’s wish.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Please, continue.
SPEER: In those days Hitler, after the military situation conference,
often had conversations in his shelter with Ley, Goebbels, and Bormann,
who were particularly close to him then because they supported and
co-operated in his radical course of action. Since 20 July it was no
longer possible even for Hitler’s closest associates to enter this
shelter without their pockets and briefcases being examined by the SS
for explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had
an air-conditioning plant similar to the one installed in this
courtroom.
It would not be difficult to introduce the gas into the ventilator of
the air-conditioning plant, which was in the garden of the Reich
Chancellery. It was then bound to circulate through the entire shelter
in a very short time. Thereupon, in the middle of February 1945, I sent
for Stahl, the head of my main department “Munitions,” with whom I had
particularly close relations, since I had worked in close co-operation
with him during the destructions. I frankly told him of my intention, as
his testimony shows. I asked him to procure this new poison gas for me
from the munitions production. He inquired of one of his associates,
Oberstleutnant Soika of the armament office of the Army, on how to get
hold of this poison gas; it turned out that this new poison gas was only
effective when made to explode, as the high temperature necessary for
the formation of gas would then be reached. I am not sure whether I am
going too much into detail.
An explosion was not possible, however, as this air-conditioning plant
was made of thin sheets of tin, which would have been torn to pieces by
the explosion. Thereupon I had conferences with Hänschel, the chief
engineer of the Chancellery, starting in the middle of March 1945. By
these discussions I managed to arrange that the antigas filter should no
longer be switched on continuously. In this way I would have been able
to use the ordinary type of gas. Naturally, Hänschel had no knowledge of
the purpose for which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time
came, I inspected the ventilator shaft in the garden of the Chancellery
along with Hänschel; and there I discovered that on Hitler’s personal
order this ventilator had recently been surrounded by a chimney 4 meters
high. That can still be ascertained today. Due to this it was no longer
possible to carry out my plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I shall now come to another problem. Herr Speer, you have
heard the testimony of the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this courtroom;
and they have already testified to your activities after the middle of
February 1945, which you undertook in order to secure the food position.
What do you yourself have to say in regard to your work in that
direction?
SPEER: I can say quite briefly that the preferential food supplies which
I finally put into effect were arranged at the time for the purpose of
planned reconversion from war to peace. This was at the expense of
armament, which I personally represented. The tremendous number of
measures which we introduced would be too extensive to describe here.
All of these decrees are still available. It was a question of
arranging, contrary to the official policy, that shortly before their
occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food and of
taking every step to insure that, despite the catastrophe in
transportation, the 1945 crop should be insured by sending the seed in
good time, which was a burning problem just then. Had the seeds arrived
a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad.
These measures had, of course, a direct, disadvantageous effect on
armament production which cannot be measured. But at any rate, armaments
were only able to maintain production through reserves until the middle
of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning.
This was due to the fact that we had only 20 to 30 percent of the
transportation capacity at our disposal, which necessitated preference
for food transports over armaments. Therefore transportation of
armaments was, practically speaking, out of the question.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was it possible to carry out such measures, which were
openly against the official war plans of “Resistance to the Last,” on a
large scale? Were there any people at all who were prepared to approve
such measures as you suggested and to put them into practice?
SPEER: All these measures were not so difficult; and they were not so
dangerous, as one might perhaps imagine, because in those days—after
January 1945—any reasonable measure could be carried out in Germany
against the official policy. Any reasonable man welcomed such measures
and was satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of
these conferences took place among a large circle of specialists. Every
one of these participants knew the meaning of these orders without its
ever being said. During those days I also had close contacts with
reference to other similar measures with the State Secretaries of the
Ministries of Transport, of Food, of Propaganda, and later even with the
State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, that is, Bormann himself. They
were all old Party members and in spite of that they did their duty to
the nation at that time differently from the way in which many leading
men in the Party were doing it. I kept them currently informed—in spite
of Hitler’s prohibition—of the developments in the military situation,
and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the
insane orders of those days.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In which sectors did you see a danger for the bulk of the
German people through the continuation of the war?
SPEER: By the middle of March 1945 the enemy troops were once more on
the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those
territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied. That
included the territories of Polish Upper Silesia and others outside the
borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during
retreat was actually the greatest danger, because a bridge blown up by
engineers is much more difficult to repair than a bridge which has been
destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to
the destruction of the entire life of a modern state.
In addition, beginning with the end of January, radical circles in the
Party were making demands for the destruction of industry; and it was
also Hitler’s opinion that this should be so. In February 1945 therefore
I stopped production and delivery of the so-called industrial dynamiting
materials. The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines
and in private possession should be diminished. As a witness of mine has
testified, these orders were actually carried out. In the middle of
March Guderian and I tried once more to stop the ordered destruction of
bridges or to reduce it to a minimum. An order was submitted to Hitler
which he refused bluntly, on the contrary demanding intensified orders
for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on 18 March 1945, he had
eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in
connection with the destruction of a bridge. He announced this fact in
the Armed Forces bulletin so that it should serve as a warning for
future cases. Thus it was extremely difficult to disobey orders for the
destruction of bridges. In spite of this existing prohibition I sent a
new memorandum to Hitler on 18 March 1945, the contents of which were
very clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the
measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the attention of
numerous of his associates.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on
Page 69 of the English text of the document book (Exhibit Speer 23).
Will you continue, please?
SPEER: I shall quote something more from that memorandum; on Page 69,
Mr. President:
“The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic
installations. Economic transportation has thereby been
considerably reduced.... In 4 to 8 weeks the final collapse of
German economy must therefore be expected with certainty....
After that collapse, the war cannot even be continued
militarily.... We at the head have the duty to help the nation
in the difficult times which must be expected. In this
connection we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask
ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the
more remote future. If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation
and the basis of its existence, then he must do the job himself.
We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most
primitive manner, a basis of existence for the nation to the
last.”
Then there follow a few of my demands, and I shall summarize them
briefly. I quote:
“It must be insured that, if the battle advances farther into
the territory of the Reich, nobody has the right to destroy
industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply
facilities, as well as traffic facilities and inland shipping
routes, _et cetera_. The blowing-up of bridges to the extent
which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would
be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last
years have been able to achieve. Their destruction means the
removal of any further possibilities of existence for the German
nation.”
Then, I shall quote briefly the conclusion of the memorandum:
“We have no right, at this stage of the war, to carry out
destructions on our part which might affect the life of the
people. If the enemies wish to destroy this nation, which has
fought with unique bravery, then this historical shame shall
rest exclusively upon them. We have the obligation of leaving to
the nation all possibilities which, in the more remote future,
might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction.”
This expressed clearly enough something which Hitler must know in any
case, because there was no need for much economic insight to realize the
results of such destruction for the future of the nation.
On the occasion of the handing over of the memorandum Hitler knew of the
contents, since I had discussed it with some of his associates.
Therefore his statements are typical of his attitude toward this basic
question.
I would not have raised the severe accusation which I made here by
saying that he wanted to draw Germany into the abyss with him, if I had
not confirmed his statements in that respect in the letter of 29 March
1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you meaning May or March?
SPEER: March 1945, Mr. President.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, you will find this document on Page 75 of
the English text of the document book, and it is Page 72 in the French
text. I submit it as Exhibit Number 24. It is Speer’s letter to Hitler
dated 29 March 1945.
Will you continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read this letter?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: The defendant wishes to read it himself.
Will you read it?
SPEER: I quote:
“When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you, I was of the
firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the
present situation for the maintenance of our national power
would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had
once determined that it was the task of the Government to
preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.
“However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the
tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as
follows: If the war were lost, the nation would also perish.
This fate was inevitable. There was no necessity to take into
consideration the basis which the people would need to continue
a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better
to destroy these things ourselves, because this nation will have
proved to be the weaker one and the future belongs solely to the
stronger eastern nation. Besides, those who would remain after
the battle were only the inferior ones, for the good ones had
been killed.”
I go on to quote:
“After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next
day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the
strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward
the realization of these intentions....”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, may I in this connection submit as a Speer
document the destruction order of Hitler dated 19 March 1945, which the
Tribunal will find on Page 73 of the French and Page 76 of the English
text of the document book.
I also submit to the Tribunal the execution order for the traffic and
communication systems which you will find on Page 78 of the English text
and Page 75 of the French text. They become Exhibit Number Speer-26.
Then I submit the order for destruction and evacuation by Bormann, dated
23 March 1945, which is contained on Page 102 of my document book. The
latter document bears the Exhibit Number Speer-27.
Herr Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you
please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?
THE PRESIDENT: You said that last one was at Page 102 of the second
volume. In my copy is a document of General Guderian of 15 December
1944.
Dr. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake.
It is not Page 102, it is Pages 93 and 94, I beg to apologize. I have
only just received the document today.
Herr Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?
SPEER: I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the
Gauleiter to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, all
important electrical facilities, water works, gas works, and so on, and
also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My
jurisdiction had specifically been excluded by that order, and all my
orders for the maintenance of industry had been canceled.
The military authorities had given the order that all bridges should be
destroyed, and in addition all railway installations, postal systems,
communication systems in the German railways, also the waterways, all
ships, all freight cars, and all locomotives. The aim was, as is stated
in one of the decrees, the creation of a traffic desert.
The Bormann decree aimed at bringing the population to the center of the
Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and
prisoners of war were to be included. These millions of people were to
be sent upon their trek on foot. No provisions for their existence had
been made, nor could it be carried out in view of the situation.
The carrying out of these orders alone would have resulted in an
unimaginable hunger catastrophe. Add to this that on 19 March 1945 there
was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiter that
the battle should be conducted without consideration for our own
population.
With the carrying out of these orders, Hitler’s pledge of 18 March would
be kept, namely, that it would not be necessary “....to take into
consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most
primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better to destroy
these things ourselves....” Considering the discipline which came into
force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its
contents, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out.
These orders also applied to those territories which had been included
in the Greater German Reich.
During journeys into the most endangered territories, and by means of
discussions with my associates, I now quite openly tried to stop the
carrying out of these orders. I ordered that the high explosives which
were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and
that the stores of high explosives which were on the building sites
should be hidden.
We distributed submachine guns to the most important plants so that they
could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat
exaggerated; but the situation at the time was such that if a Gauleiter
had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was a single
submachine gun available, then it would have been fired.
I tried to convince the local army commanders of the nonsensical
character of the task of exploding bridges, which had been given to
them, and furthermore by talking to the local authorities I succeeded in
stopping most of the evacuation which had been ordered. In this
connection the State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klopper,
deserves credit in that he held up the evacuation orders which were to
be sent to the Gauleiter.
When I came back from this journey, I was called before Hitler at once.
This was on 29 March 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so
openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiter
that my insubordination must have become known to him. Witnesses are
available from that period who know that that is what I wanted to
achieve.
I did not want to betray him behind his back. I wanted to put the
alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference he stated
that he had had reports from Bormann to the effect that I considered the
war as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He
demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not
consider the war lost, and I replied, “The war is lost.” He gave me 24
hours to think, and it was during those 24 hours that the letter was
written from which the extract has been quoted and which has been
submitted to the Tribunal in full.
After this period of reflection, I intended to hand him this letter as
my reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that
he could rely on me in the future, and in that way I was able to get him
to hand over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: In this connection, may I submit Hitler’s order dated 30
March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English and
79 of the French text in the document book. It will be Exhibit Number
28.
Then what did you do on the strength of this new order which you had?
SPEER: I had the text of it drawn up and it gave me the possibility of
circumventing the destruction which had been ordered. I issued an order
at once re-establishing all my old orders for the safeguarding of
industry. In this connection, I did not submit this new order of mine
for Hitler’s approval, although he had expressly made this proviso in
his order.
Contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely, that I would
stand behind him unconditionally, I left as early as the following day
to see Seyss-Inquart, who has testified to that here, and two other
Gauleiter to tell them too that the war was lost and to discuss the
consequences with them.
On that occasion I found Seyss-Inquart very understanding. Both my
decree for the prevention of destruction and my discussions were
contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on 29 March. I considered
that this was my natural duty.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I submit as Exhibit Number Speer-29 the instructions
issued by Speer on 30 March for carrying out the order which has already
been mentioned. In the French and German texts of the document book it
appears on Page 81 and in the English document book on Page 85.
SPEER: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still
remained in force; and everywhere in Germany, Austria, and Poland and
elsewhere you can see the results today. I made numerous journeys to the
front and had many conferences with the commanders of the front-line
troops. Perhaps that may have brought about relief in some form or
other. Finally, I succeeded in persuading the commander of the Signal
Corps, on 3 April 1945, to forbid at least the destruction of the
signal, postal, railway, and wireless installations by means of a new
order.
Finally, on 5 April I issued six OKW orders under the name of General
Winter, who has been a witness in this courtroom. These orders were to
insure the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still
in existence. I issued these orders through my command channels and the
channels of the Reich railways; and considering the tremendous mix-up of
orders at the time, such orders, which I was not empowered to give,
would at least have a confusing effect.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Herr Speer, a number of attempts on your part to shorten
the war became known to the press. Could you please describe to the
Court the situation which has been hinted at in the press.
SPEER: I do not want to spend too much time on things which did not
succeed. I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the
Government and to force them to account for their deeds. To carry out
that and other plans, eight officers from the front joined me, all of
whom held high decorations. The State Secretary of the Propaganda
Ministry made it possible for me on 9 April to speak briefly over the
entire German radio system. All preparations were made, but at the last
moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should approve
the text of my speech. I submitted to him a very modified text. But he
forbade even this very modified text.
On 21 April 1945 it was possible for me first of all to record a speech
at the broadcasting station at Hamburg. This was to be broadcast as the
instructions for the final phase. The recording officials, however,
demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler’s death,
which would relieve them of their oath of allegiance to him.
Furthermore, I was in contact with the chief of staff of an army group
in the East, the Army Group Vistula. We were both agreed that a fight
for Berlin must not take place and that, contrary to their orders, the
armies should by-pass Berlin. To begin with, this order was carried out;
but later several persons empowered with special authority by Hitler
were sent outside Berlin and succeeded in leading some divisions into
Berlin. The original intention however that entire armies should be led
into Berlin was thus not carried through. The chief of staff with whom I
had these conferences was General Kinzler.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Were these attempts still of any avail at the beginning
of April and later on?
SPEER: Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, for Churchill,
too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the
end of July 1945.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You have described here how much you did to preserve
industrial plants and other economic installations. Did you also act on
behalf of the foreign workers?
SPEER: My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty,
therefore, in the first place to hand over my sector undamaged. Yet
several attempts of mine were also in favor of foreign workers in
Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war,
through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were
quite obviously cobeneficiaries of my work during the last phase.
Secondly, during local discussions on the prevention of blastings,
contrary to the evacuation orders which had been received from the
Party, I made it possible for the foreign workers and prisoners to
remain where they were. Such discussions took place on 18 March in the
Saar district, and on 28 March in the Ruhr district. At the beginning of
March I made the proposal that 500,000 foreigners should be repatriated
from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say,
the Dutch to Holland, the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The Reichsbahn,
however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the
traffic system had already been so damaged that the carrying out of this
plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in the speech I intended to
make over the German broadcasting system on 9 April and in the attempted
Hamburg speech, I pointed out the duties which we had toward the
foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the prisoners from concentration
camps during this last phase.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 88 of
the English text in this connection; it is Page 84 of the French, and I
submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-30.
Herr Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of
the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not
resign?
SPEER: I had a chance to resign on three occasions; once in April 1944,
when my powers had been considerably reduced; the second time in
September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my
resignation; and the third time on 29 March 1945, when Hitler himself
demanded that I should go on permanent leave, which was equivalent to
resignation. I turned down all these opportunities because, beginning
with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect
that the last phase of the war, that is, from January 1945, was
justified from the point of view that the nation should be spared
unnecessary sacrifices. Were you of that same opinion?
SPEER: No. It was said that military protection against the East would
have been necessary to protect refugees. In reality, until the middle of
April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and
munitions were used for the fight against the West. The tactical
principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if
the fight had been carried out with the aims which have been stated
here. The destruction of bridges in the West and the destruction orders
against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The
sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were
senseless. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man
responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler. The same
is true of the ruined cities, which in this last phase had to lose
tremendous cultural values and where innumerable dwellings suffered
destruction. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is
suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic
installations, trucks, locomotives, and ships. The German people
remained loyal to Adolf Hitler until the end. He betrayed them with
intent. He tried to throw them definitely into the abyss. Only after 1
May 1945 did Dönitz try to act with reason, but it was too late.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I have one last question.
Was it possible for you to reconcile your actions during the last phase
of the war with your oath and your conception of loyalty to Adolf
Hitler?
SPEER: There is one loyalty which everyone must always keep; and that is
loyalty toward one’s own people. That duty comes before everything. If I
am in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation
are acted against in such a way, then I too must act. That Hitler had
broken faith with the nation must have been clear to every intelligent
member of his entourage, certainly at the latest in January or February
1945. Hitler had once been given his mission by the people; he had no
right to gamble away the destiny of the people with his own. Therefore I
fulfilled my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in everything,
but I am glad today that by my work I was able to render one more
service to the workers in Germany and the occupied territories.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my
examination of the Defendant Speer.
May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that
statements have been made on the theme which was the subject of this
afternoon’s session by the witnesses: Kehrl, in his interrogatory under
10 and 12; Rohland, under 5, 6, and 8; Schieber, under 25; Guderian,
under 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and on point 6; Stahl, named by Speer, under
Points 1 and 2 of his testimony; and Kempf, under Number 10 of her
testimony.
Still outstanding are an interrogatory from the witness Malzacher and an
interrogatory—which is most important to the defense—of the witness
Von Poser, since he was the liaison officer between the General Staff of
the Army and Speer’s Ministry; these will be handed in when received.
Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory of General Buhle,
who was the Chief of the Army Staff, and Colonel Baumbach, who was
commander of a bomber squadron. The remaining documents I shall submit
to the Tribunal at the end of the final examination of the Defendant
Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the negotiations which Sauckel had in
1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present
who came from your department and did they support Sauckel’s demands?
SPEER: During these conferences representatives from my departments were
sometimes present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the
blocked factories and also to see to it that there were no encroachments
on the production interests which I planned to protect.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives were, therefore, not acting
to support Sauckel’s demands but were against them?
SPEER: It was not the task of these representatives to act for or
against Sauckel’s demands, because Sauckel stated his demands in such a
definite way that a subordinate official was not in a position to speak
either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a
task which I would have had to carry out myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives did not fulfill any task?
SPEER: My representatives were the representatives from the armament,
from the heavy armament and war production in the occupied territories,
and as such they had their special tasks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you in 1943, acting independently and
without consultation with Sauckel, transfer 50,000 French Organization
Todt workers to the Ruhr district?
SPEER: Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Möhne Dam and the Eder
Dam in April and May 1943, I went there and in that period I ordered
that a special group from the Organization Todt should take over the
restoration of these plants. I did this because I also wanted the
machinery and the technical staff on the spot. This special group right
away without asking me brought the French workers along. This had
tremendous repercussions for us in the West because the workers on the
building sites on the Atlantic Wall, who had up to that time felt safe
from Sauckel’s reach...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done
there. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 OT workers
were obtained without Sauckel’s agreement and by yourself independently;
and that you have confirmed, haven’t you?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hours
in these plants. Do you know that the 10-hour day was later on ordered
by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare,
applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?
SPEER: That is probably true. I do not directly recollect it, but I
assume it is right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not
applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was
not recognized for Soviet prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied _de
facto_, and that there were orders to that effect?
SPEER: I cannot give you any information about that, because it was too
much of a detail and was dealt with by my departments directly. I should
like to confirm it for you.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit to the Tribunal a document which
confirms this.
Do you know that Italian civilian internees, that is, those who came
from the Italian Armed Forces, were transferred to the status of free
workers and therefore did not come under the Convention?
SPEER: Yes, that is true, and it was done on Sauckel’s request.
DR. SERVATIUS: The factory managers were responsible for carrying out
Sauckel’s orders in the factories. Is that right?
SPEER: As far as they could be carried out, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you have said that if, on account of special events
such as air attacks, it was not possible to carry them out, the supreme
authorities in the Reich would have had to take them over?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?
SPEER: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: That would be Sauckel?
SPEER: Yes. And the German Labor Front, which was responsible for
accommodations and working conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to
stop these abuses? Was this a matter of practical assistance then?
SPEER: No. I think you have misunderstood me. The “catastrophe
emergency” comprised conditions brought about by _force majeure_. Nobody
could remedy them, even with the best will in the world, because every
day there were new air attacks. But it is impossible, as Sauckel has
testified, to hold the factory manager also responsible for the fact
that these conditions could not be alleviated. I wanted to indicate that
in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and
decide whether conditions were still bearable or not. In that connection
it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the official who made the reports
and gave the orders, to convene such meetings.
DR. SERVATIUS: To whom then was he supposed to make such
recommendations?
SPEER: To the Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have explained your own administrative
organization and you have said that you were an opponent of a
bureaucratic administration. You introduced self-administration for the
factories; and on the professional side, you formed “rings” and above
them committees which were directed by you.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And it was a closed administration which could not be
penetrated from the outside by other authorities?
SPEER: Yes, I would not have allowed that.
DR. SERVATIUS: So you were actually the representative of these firms
toward the higher authorities.
SPEER: Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned, as I have
stated here.
DR. SERVATIUS: You limited yourself to the technical tasks?
SPEER: Well, otherwise I would have been responsible for food
conditions, or health conditions, or matters which concerned the Police;
but that was expecting too much. In that case one would have had to give
me another post.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not refer earlier to the fact that,
particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions
which would benefit the workers; and are you not in that way confirming
my view that you bore the entire responsibility for that sector?
SPEER: Not in the least. I believe that I undertook the actions of the
last phase within my general responsibility, but not the particular
responsibility for that sector.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, Witness, you spoke about the responsibility of the
Gauleiter as Reich defense commissioners with reference to the armament
industries. Could you describe in more detail the scope of that
responsibility, because I did not understand it.
SPEER: From 1942, responsibility was transferred to the Gauleiter as
Reich defense commissioners to an ever-increasing degree. This was
mostly the effort of Bormann...
DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have?
SPEER: Just a minute ... who desired the centralization of all the
forces of the State and the Party in the Gauleiter. This state of
centralization had almost been achieved in full after 1943, the only
exception which still existed being my armament offices, the so-called
Armament Inspectorates. These, since they had previously come under the
OKW, were military establishments which were staffed by officers; and
that made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction of the
Gauleiter. But the Gauleiter was the central authority in his Gau, and
he assumed the right to give orders where he did not have it. The
situation with us was, as you know, that it was not so important as to
who was vested with authority; it was a question of who assumed the
right to give orders. In this case most Gauleiter did assume all the
rights, by which means they were the responsible and central authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you mean by “central authority”? Perhaps I may
put something to you: The Gauleiter, as Reich defense commissioner, only
had the task of centralizing the offices if a decision was necessary in
the Gau, for instance, after an air attack, the removal of the damage,
construction of a new plant, or acquisition of new grounds, so that the
various departments would be brought to one conference table; but he did
not have the authority to give orders or make decisions. Is that right?
SPEER: No. I should like to recommend that you talk to a few Gauleiter
who will tell you how it was.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, I will drop the question. I will submit the
law. You then went on to say, Witness, that during a certain period
there was a surplus of labor in Germany. Was this due to the fact that
Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?
SPEER: There may be an error here. My defense counsel has referred to
two documents according to which during the time from April 1942 until
April 1943 Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than
armament had requested. I do not know if that is the passage you mean.
DR. SERVATIUS: I can only remember that you said that there had been
more workers than were required.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You do not mean to say that this had been caused by the
fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign
countries?
SPEER: No. I wanted to prove by that answer that even according to
Sauckel’s opinion at the time he did not endeavor to bring workers to
Germany from France, _et cetera_, corresponding to my maximum demands.
For if in a report to Hitler he asserts that he brought more workers to
the armament sector than I demanded, as can be seen from the letter,
then it would be clear that he did more than I asked him to do.
Actually, it was quite different. In actual fact, he did not supply
these workers at all, and we had a heated argument because it was my
opinion that he had supplied a far smaller number and had boosted his
report to Hitler. However, for this Trial the document is valid.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have just pointed out also that there was an argument
between you and Sauckel as to whether there were sufficient labor
reserves in Germany; and if I have understood you rightly, you said that
if workers had been mobilized in the manner used by England and the
Soviet Union, one would not have needed any foreign workers at all. Is
that true?
SPEER: No, I did not say that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, how am I to understand it?
SPEER: I have expressed clearly enough that I considered Sauckel’s labor
policy of bringing foreigners into Germany to be the proper course. I
did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there did exist
considerable reserves of German labor; that again is only proof of the
fact that I was not responsible for the maximum demands made, and that
was all I wanted to prove.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are the laws known to you according to which German women
and youths were used to a very considerable degree?
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you also know that officers’ wives and the wives of
high officials also worked in factories?
SPEER: Yes, as from August 1944.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, where were these labor reserves of which you
are speaking?
SPEER: I was talking about the time of 1943. In 1943 I demanded in the
Central Planning Board that the German labor reserves should be drawn
upon, and in 1944 during the conversation of 4 January with Hitler I
said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated—and that can be seen
from his speech of 1 March 1944, which has been submitted as a
document—that there were no longer any reserves of German workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
SPEER: But at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded
in 1944 in mobilizing a further 2 million workers from Germany, whereas
at a conference with Hitler on 1 January 1944 he considered that to be
completely impossible. Thus he has himself proved here that at a time
when I desired the use of internal labor he did not think there was any,
although he was later forced by circumstances to mobilize these workers
from Germany after all; therefore my statement at the time was right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these 2 million workers you have mentioned, were
they people who could be employed in industry?
SPEER: Yes, of course.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they employed directly as skilled workers in
industry?
SPEER: No, they had to be trained first.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not first of all have to go through complicated
transfers to be released from one firm to another?
SPEER: Only partly, because we had a possibility of using them in the
fine-mechanical industry and other kinds of work; and also, as everyone
who is familiar with American and British industry knows, these modern
machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for
difficult work.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not interested in all these details, Dr.
Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am very interested in the basic
question, because if workers were obtained from foreign countries in
excess numbers and if, therefore, there was no necessity for the State
to have them, it is of the greatest importance from the point of view of
international law in considering the question as to whether labor can be
recruited. That is what I wish to clarify.
I have two more questions, and perhaps I may put them now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those
details.
DR. SERVATIUS: No, they are questions on other points.
Witness, you have stated that your attempt to subordinate Sauckel to
yourself failed. Did you not achieve that subordination in practice by
the fact that on the intermediate level Sauckel’s Gau labor exchanges
would have to do what your armament commissions ordered?
SPEER: No. That is a matter into which I shall have to go in greater
detail. If you want an explanation...
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said “no”...
SPEER: Yes. But these are entirely new conceptions which should first be
explained to the Court, but if “no” is sufficient for you...
DR. SERVATIUS: There is no need for any lengthy statement, because if
you clearly say “no,” the matter is settled.
Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel decided the question
of distributing labor within his working staff.
SPEER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: He himself says that the Führer made certain decisions.
Must not one differentiate between the wholesale demands for a program
where it is a problem of the distribution of labor over a lengthy
period, and the distribution which was effected currently according to
the progress of the program?
SPEER: According to my recollection, and also from having read the
records I received of the Führer conferences, there are two phases to be
distinguished. The first one ended in October 1942, during which there
were frequent joint conferences with Sauckel, which I attended. During
these conferences the distribution of labor for the next months was
discussed in detail. After that time there were no longer any
conferences with Hitler, which went into detail, at which I was present.
I only know of the conferences of January 1944, and then there was
another conference in April or May 1944 which has not yet been mentioned
here. During those conferences there was only a general discussion, and
the distribution was then carried out in accordance with the directives,
as Sauckel says.
DR. SERVATIUS: But that is just what I am asking you. These were lump
demands referring to a program, and the basic decision was made that 2
million workers were to be obtained from foreign countries; the
subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.
SPEER: Yes, that is right, and I can confirm Sauckel’s testimony that
his orders concerning the occupied territories always came from Hitler,
since he needed Hitler’s authority to assert himself in occupied
territory.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH DAY
Friday, 21 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Speer resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do any other defendants’ counsel want to ask
any questions?
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, on
25 January 1946 you handed two statements to my client here in the
prison at Nuremberg. During his examination Dr. Schacht made brief
mention of these, and for the sake of brevity I should like the Tribunal
to allow me to read out the statement which the defendant gave me that
day so that its truth may be confirmed. It is very brief. The first
statement reads as follows:
“I was on the terrace of the Berghof on the Obersalzberg waiting
to submit my building plans”—this was in the summer of
1937—“when Schacht appeared at the Berghof. From where I was on
the terrace I could hear a loud argument between Hitler and
Schacht in Hitler’s room. Hitler’s voice grew louder and louder.
At the end of the discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and,
visibly excited, he told the people about him that he could not
collaborate with Schacht, that he had had a terrible argument
with him, and that Schacht was going to upset his plans with his
finance methods.”
Now, that is the first statement. Is it correct?
SPEER: Yes, it is.
DR. KRAUS: It is correct. The second statement deals with the events
after 20 July. It reads as follows:
“It was on or about 22 July that Hitler said in my presence to a
fairly large group of people....”
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
DR. KRAUS: 1944, Your Lordship.
“....that Schacht, as one of the opponents of the authoritarian
system, should be one of those to be arrested. Hitler went on to
speak harshly of Schacht’s activities and of the difficulties
which he, Hitler, had experienced through Schacht’s economic
policy as regards rearmament. He said that actually a man like
Schacht should be shot for his oppositional activity before the
war.”
The last sentence of the statement says:
“After the harshness of these remarks, I was surprised to meet
Schacht here alive.”
Is this statement correct, too?
SPEER: Yes, it is.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions?
Then, do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
Defendant, your counsel divided your examination into two parts which he
described first as your personal responsibilities, and secondly as the
political part of the case, and I will follow the same division.
You have stated a good many of the matters for which you were not
responsible, and I want to make clear just what your sphere of
responsibility was.
You were not only a member of the Nazi Party after 1932, but you held
high rank in the Party, did you not?
SPEER: Correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was the position which you held in the
Party?
SPEER: I have already mentioned that during my pre-trial interrogations.
Temporarily in 1934 I became a department head in the German Labor Front
and dealt with the improvement of labor conditions in German factories.
Then I was in charge of public works on the staff of Hess. I gave up
both these activities in 1941. Notes of the conference I had with Hitler
about this are available. After 8 February 1942 I automatically became
Todt’s successor in the central office for technical matters in the
Reichsleitung of the NSDAP.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was your official title?
SPEER: Party titles had just been introduced, and they were so
complicated that I cannot tell you at the moment what they were. But the
work I did there was that of a department chief in the Reichsleitung of
the NSDAP. My title was Hauptdienstleiter or something of the kind.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In the 1943 directory it would appear that you were
head of the “Hauptamt für Technik.”
SPEER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your rank appears to be “Oberbefehlsleiter”?
SPEER: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which as I understand corresponds roughly to a
lieutenant general in the army?
SPEER: Well, compared to the other tasks I had it was very little.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you attended Party functions from time to time
and were informed in a general way as to the Party program, were you
not?
SPEER: Before 1942 I joined in the various Party rallies here in
Nuremberg because I had to take part in them as an architect, and of
course besides this I was generally present at official Party meetings
or Reichstag sessions.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you heard discussed, and were generally
familiar with, the program of the Nazi Party in its broad outlines, were
you not?
SPEER: Of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You—there is some question as to just what your
relation to the SS was. Will you tell me whether you were a member of
the SS?
SPEER: No, I was not a member of the SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You filled out an application at one time, or one
was filled out for you, and you never went through with it, I believe,
or something of that sort.
SPEER: That was in 1943 when Himmler wanted me to get a high rank in the
SS. He had often wanted it before when I was still an architect. I got
out of it by saying that I was willing to be an ordinary SS man under
him because I had already been an SS man before. Thereupon,
Gruppenführer Wolff provisionally filled out an application form and
wanted to know what my previous SS activities had been in 1932. It came
up during his inquiries that in those days I was never registered as a
member of the SS, and because of this they did not insist on my joining
as I did not want to become a new member now.