SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the people who were in the house—and I

will come to who were present at the meeting: Hitler’s party, that is,

himself, the Defendant Hess, Himmler, and Keppler, was it not?

VON PAPEN: That is possible, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keppler is the gentleman of whom the Tribunal

have heard as being in Vienna in March of 1938, is that not so?

VON PAPEN: He was a man who was always in Hitler’s entourage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the actual discussion took place between

you and Hitler, with Von Schröder present. Is that not so?

VON PAPEN: No. Perhaps I might give the Court a short account of the

conference as the Court desired.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I think it is easier to put the facts to

you. I will take them quite shortly. I am in the hands of the Tribunal.

Do you say that Von Schröder was not present?

VON PAPEN: Schröder may have been present for parts of the conversation.

I recall that in the main I talked to Hitler alone.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The meeting started at about 11:30 in the

morning, did it not? The meeting between you and Hitler?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the first point that you raised was to

explain to Hitler that although you had not been able to release the two

Nazis who had been condemned for killing a Communist, that you had tried

to get President Von Hindenburg to pardon them. Is that not right?

VON PAPEN: I recall that Hitler strongly reproached me because of the

death sentence against these National Socialists.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the second point that you raised as an

explanation to Hitler was that it was not through any intrigue or

machinations of yours that President Von Hindenburg had refused to

discuss with Hitler the question of Hitler’s becoming Chancellor. Was

that not the second point; it was not you who had caused Von Hindenburg

to refuse the discussion?

VON PAPEN: Yes. I explained that my offer to him of 13 August 1932 had

been meant absolutely honestly.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that was an answer to your question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not explain to Hitler that it was not

your fault that Von Hindenburg had refused to discuss the question of

making Hitler Chancellor in August of 1932...

VON PAPEN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...when Hitler had met Von Hindenburg?

VON PAPEN: No, that cannot be right, for according to the evidence of

historical documents Hitler had a talk with Von Hindenburg on 13 August,

and Hindenburg explained to him the reasons why he did not agree to

Hitler’s Chancellorship.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you is that you told Hitler

on 4 January, when you had that talk with Von Hindenburg: “I want you to

understand it was not my fault that Von Hindenburg was not ready to

discuss the question of your being Chancellor.” Did you not tell him

that, that it was not your fault, that you thought Von Hindenburg would

have been ready?

VON PAPEN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, that is what Herr Von Schröder says; but

that is not right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, what do you say was said on the point

of Von Hindenburg and Hitler? If you do not accept what I suggest to

you, what do you say?

VON PAPEN: What Hindenburg told Hitler can be read in all the books;

that is a well-known matter of history.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no. What we want to know—if I may say so,

with great respect to the Tribunal—is what you told Hitler on 4

January. What did you tell him, if you told him anything, about the

position between President Von Hindenburg and himself?

VON PAPEN: If you had permitted me to make an explanation about the

course of the conference, I would already have explained that.

In the course of this talk I did nothing but call Hitler’s attention to

the fact of how necessary it was to reach an agreement with Herr Von

Schleicher, how necessary it was to enter his Government. In other

words, I continued those efforts which I had made in 1932 to induce the

Nazi Party to co-operate.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that you

told Hitler that he should go into a Schleicher Cabinet?

VON PAPEN: I told him he should enter a Schleicher Cabinet.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I put to you. I am suggesting that

is entirely wrong. What you suggested to Hitler was that it would be a

sound thing for the conservatives and nationalists, whose political

views coincided with yours, to join with Hitler in forming a government,

that you put to him what actually happened on 30 January, you suggested

it to him at this meeting. Do you say that is untrue?

VON PAPEN: Not one word is true; that is absolutely false. As proof of

this, I state the following:

Immediately after the conversation I wrote a letter to Schleicher, on 4

January, in the afternoon. He probably received this letter on the

morning of the 5th. However, even before Herr Von Schleicher received

this letter of mine on the actual substance of the talk, the morning

papers of 5 January started a tremendous campaign against me, asserting

that this talk with Schröder showed disloyalty to Schleicher. Returning

to Berlin, I went to see Herr Von Schleicher immediately, and I

explained to him what the substance of our talk had actually been. Herr

Von Schleicher then published a communiqué on this subject. This

communiqué...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But he was not the only person, you know, that

published a communiqué. You and Hitler published a communiqué.

I want you to remember, Defendant, I put to you that the suggestion from

you was that you and Hitler would form a coalition with the conservative

forces behind you, and the National Socialist forces behind Hitler. Now

just look at the communiqué that you and Hitler issued.

Will you give the defendant Document Number D-637. My Lord, this is a

new document, which will become GB-496.

Look at the foot of it, Defendant, the end of the document:

“Adolf Hitler and Herr Von Papen publish the following joint

declaration:

“In answer to false deductions which have in many cases been

circulated in the press regarding Adolf Hitler’s meeting with

the former Reich Chancellor Von Papen, the undersigned declare

that the conversation dealt exclusively with the question of the

possibility of a great national political united front and that

in particular the opinions of both parties on the present Reich

Cabinet were not touched on at all in this general discussion.”

Now, Defendant, when you have been reminded of what you published

yourself, is it not correct what I have put to you, that you suggested

to Hitler that you should form this coalition of conservatives and

nationalists who agreed with you, and the Nazi Party under Hitler?

VON PAPEN: No, Mr. Prosecutor, this communiqué states two things: In the

first place, I point out that we did not speak at all about overthrowing

the Schleicher Cabinet or replacing it by another government, as the

press generally assumed. Then I state that it is necessary to create “a

great national, political united front.” Herr Von Schleicher headed the

same Cabinet that I had headed, with the same political forces. So if I

called on Hitler to enter this Cabinet, then that is exactly the same

political combination as if I had asked him to join my Cabinet.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am not going to argue with you. If

you say that that communiqué is your way of expressing that you had

asked Hitler to take the Nazis into Von Schleicher’s Government, and

that you had not discussed forming the coalition, if you say that that

is what that communiqué expresses, I have no further questions, and I

will pass on to another point. I have made my suggestion, and I suggest

the communiqué bears it out.

But now, let us come to the next action of yours. Do you deny that

during January you were active in making contact with Hitler, and on

Hitler’s behalf with President Von Hindenburg, in order to bring Hitler

into the Government? Or do you agree with that?

VON PAPEN: That is true, and I will say in what respect. I had two

official talks with Hindenburg. On 9 January, when I returned to Berlin,

I went from Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher to Reich President Von

Hindenburg. Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher, being of the opinion that

in the Schröder talk I had been disloyal to him, had asked Von

Hindenburg not to receive me any more. I informed Von Hindenburg of the

actual contents of the Schröder talk and, after I had reached an

agreement with Von Schleicher, Hindenburg was also convinced that the

whole thing had been a big misunderstanding.

Then, to the best of my memory, I did not talk officially to Herr Von

Hindenburg about these governmental matters again until 22 January.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see what the Chief of the

Presidential Chancellery says about it, and see whether he can reinforce

your memory. Would you look at Herr Meissner’s affidavit, at the second

part of Paragraph 6?

[_A document was handed to the defendant._]

My Lord, it is 11a, Page 45, about 7 lines from the foot of the page.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You see, just after the first section of

Paragraph 6, Defendant, the second part, it begins:

“Schleicher first made these suggestions to Hindenburg in the

middle of January....”

Then the next sentence is:

“In the meantime Papen had returned to Berlin and, through

arrangements with Hindenburg’s son, had several talks with the

President. When Schleicher renewed his demand for emergency

powers, Hindenburg declared that he was unable to give him such

blank authority and must reserve for himself decisions in every

individual case. Schleicher, for his part, said that under these

circumstances he was unable to stay in the Government and

tendered his resignation on 28 January 1933.”

Then, Paragraph 7:

“In the middle of January, when Schleicher first asked for

exceptional powers, Hindenburg was not aware of the meetings

between Papen and Hitler, particularly the meeting which had

taken place in the house of the Cologne banker, Kurt von

Schröder. In the second part of January Papen played an

increasingly important role in the house of the Reich President,

but in spite of Papen’s persuasions Hindenburg was extremely

hesitant, until the end of January, to appoint Hitler

Chancellor. He wanted to have Papen as Chancellor once more.

Papen finally won him to Hitler with the argument that the

representatives of the other right-wing parties which would

belong to the government would restrict Hitler’s freedom of

action. In addition Papen expressed his misgivings that, if the

present opportunity were once again neglected, a revolt of the

National Socialists and civil war would be likely.”

Is that right?

VON PAPEN: No.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I make a comment on the use of the Meissner

affidavit? The case is similar to but not quite the same as the Schröder

case. The Meissner affidavit was not offered to the Court during the

proceedings. But during the Prosecution’s case it came to my knowledge

that a Meissner affidavit was to be used. I talked to the Prosecution

and pointed out that I would not under any circumstances be satisfied

with the submitting of the Meissner affidavit, but would insist on

calling Meissner as a witness. The reason is the same. The personality

of the witness Meissner, who was very involved in these affairs, makes

extreme caution advisable. The Prosecution told me that they would not

use the affidavit, and finally told me that they would not call Schröder

as a witness. I had no reason to call the witness myself. Now I am in a

position where the affidavit is being submitted in cross-examination,

and I am unable to question or expose the suspect witness Meissner

before the Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, concerning the position with regard to

this affidavit, Major Barrington tells me that he did not have it when

he presented the individual case against Von Papen. I am using it now.

If the Tribunal thinks there is sufficient divergence between what the

witness accepts and the affidavit to justify it, I have not the

slightest objection to Dr. Kubuschok’s making application for Meissner

to be cross-examined.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about the allegation of Dr. Kubuschok

that the Prosecution says they were not going to use the affidavit?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not say that. Major Barrington,

who was with me, had no recollection of my saying that at all. Major

Barrington certainly never said that. It was never our intention,

because it clearly was a most important document for us to use.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The 28th of November. We gave a copy to Dr.

Kubuschok.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.

Mr. President, may I explain? The British Prosecution did not make a

binding statement that they would not submit the affidavit and not call

the witness. I always said that if an affidavit were to be used, I would

call the witness. I asked the Prosecution repeatedly, “Are you going to

call the witness or not?” They said, “No.” Then I said, “Then I am not

interested in it. We will drop this whole subject, and I will not call

the witness.”

THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit seems to have been made a long time ago.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Actually, it was almost as soon as the Tribunal began. I

think that perhaps you ought to use the facts and not use the affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am perfectly prepared to do whatever

the Tribunal wants. If there is any question, and Dr. Kubuschok wants

Meissner for cross-examination, as far as I am concerned, he can have

him. I mean, I am in a slightly different position from that with

respect to Von Schröder. As far as fairness is concerned, I want Your

Lordship to understand that certainly none of my staff thought for a

moment that the Defense understood we were not going to use it, because

we always intended to use it. We gave a copy of this affidavit to the

Defense so that there would be ample notice of this affidavit.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, that was done, and I gratefully acknowledged it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am really anxious not to occupy too

much of the Tribunal’s time. I would rather go on and put the facts in

and save any discussion about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, do that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you said, Defendant—you put it that you

had two meetings with President Von Hindenburg and then, I think, after

18 January you had meetings with Hitler, and after 22 January you had

meetings with the Defendant Göring, as he said in his evidence, is that

not so?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not meet with Hitler from 4 January until 22

January.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will call it about 4 days, the dates of the

Nazi Party say that you began negotiations on the 18th, but we will not

quarrel about a day or two. The crucial meeting was the meeting which

was arranged with Oskar von Hindenburg at the Defendant Von Ribbentrop’s

house, was it not?

VON PAPEN: It was a preliminary talk; it was at any rate the first

contact with the National Socialists, with Hitler, and with Göring.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Oskar von Hindenburg had private

conversations with Hitler which lasted for about an hour, at that

meeting at Von Ribbentrop’s house; is that not so?

VON PAPEN: That is possible. I do not recall it any more.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And thereafter, the decision was come to that

Hitler would become Chancellor in the new Government and that he would

bring into the Government the Defendant Frick as Minister of the

Interior, and the Defendant Göring as Minister without Portfolio, and he

himself would head the Government as Chancellor?

VON PAPEN: No; on the 22d, we did not reach any agreement as to this;

rather we limited ourselves to...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said only within a few days that had been

agreed between you, had it not?

VON PAPEN: Yes, but it is very important to establish—forgive me if I

add this—that we did not begin these talks until after it was certain

that Herr Von Schleicher could not form a government, after the attempt

to split the Nazi Party had failed. That is very important.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, are you telling the Tribunal that at this

time you did what you have agreed you have done to bring Hitler into

power, simply because he was head of the biggest party in the Reichstag,

or because you thought he was the most suitable man to be Chancellor of

Germany at that date; which was your motive?

VON PAPEN: My motive, Mr. Prosecutor, was very simple. In the situation

existing after 23 January, there were only two possibilities, either to

violate the Constitution, which would result in civil war, or to form a

government headed by Hitler. I believe I explained that in great detail

to the Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I really want to know, Defendant, is that

at this time you had had these contacts with Hitler. You have been

Chancellor of Germany yourself. At this time did you think that Hitler

personally, and Hitler’s aims and intentions and personality, were a

good thing for Germany to have as Chancellor? It is a perfectly simple

question. I want a straight answer. Did you think it was a good thing to

have Hitler, as you knew him then, as Chancellor of Germany?

VON PAPEN: To that I can say only that the coalition which I formed on

behalf of the Reich President was a forced solution. There was no

question of whether it was better or worse. We had to accept it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just let us see. I think you said

that you were not certain that Hitler would eliminate opposition before

he came into power. How long did it take you, after Hitler became

Chancellor, to find out that his desire was to eliminate all opposition?

VON PAPEN: I realized that finally when I made the last attempt in my

Marburg speech to hold him to the joint program, and when this attempt

failed...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 18 months later, on 17 June 1934. Are

you telling the Tribunal that it took you 17 months to realize that

Hitler wanted to break down the opposition?

VON PAPEN: No, I told the Court...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you of one or two things. Do

you remember Herr Ernst Heilmann, who had been the leader of the Social

Democrats in the Prussian Diet?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was, I think, for 10 years a member of the

Prussian Diet with you. He went into a concentration camp at once and

was treated with the most terrible cruelty, was he not?

VON PAPEN: I learned of that later, here, for the first time. I did not

know it at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not

know in 1933 that Ernst Heilmann went into a concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: I knew only that a number of political opponents, Communists

and Socialists, had been sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo.

That I knew.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, answer my question. Here was the leader of

the Social Democrats in the Prussian Diet, a man who sat in Parliament

with you for 10 years. Do you say that you did not know that he had gone

to a concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: I do not recall, no. I believe I learned of it only here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let me give you a famous name, Karl

von Ossietzki, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, the author and

journalist. Did you not know that he had gone into a concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: I remember Herr Ossietzki only as the publisher of a

periodical; otherwise I know nothing about him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know that he was the 1936 winner of

the Nobel Peace Prize, did you?

VON PAPEN: I could not possibly have known that in 1933.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but you did not know he won it later on? Did

you not know that he was put in prison?

VON PAPEN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought I might have connected his name with

you. Let me take somebody else. Take Dr. Ernst Eckstein, who had been a

Reichstag Deputy, who was a well-known lawyer from Breslau. Did you not

know that he was put in a concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know Dr. Eckstein, unfortunately.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Or Dr. Joachim, the Social Democrat lawyer from

Berlin. Did you know he was put in a concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him and I did not know this either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, apart from individuals, did you not

know that within a few months of Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, hundreds,

if not thousands, of Social Democrats and Communists went into a

concentration camp?

VON PAPEN: Thousands?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us say hundreds, if you like. That is

the figure Defendant Göring agreed to, so let us take, as the inside

figure, hundreds of Social Democrats and Communists. Minister Severing

put it at 1,500 of each; did you not know that?

VON PAPEN: I recall very exactly that the Defendant Göring came to the

Cabinet one day after he had had the headquarters of the Communist

Party, the Liebknecht Haus, taken over by the Police. He told the

Cabinet that he had found a great number of documents which showed to

what extent the Communists and other elements were trying to disturb

public order and overthrow the new Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you answer my questions. Did you not

know that hundreds of Social Democrats and Communists had been put in

concentration camps?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know there were hundreds. I knew that

individual leaders had been thrown into concentration camps.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you mentioned, in giving your evidence to

the Court, that the Amnesty Decree of 21 March was only the sort of

thing that had happened before; that was a concretely one-sided amnesty,

was it not? It was an amnesty to those who had fought in the national

revolution, that is, an amnesty for Nazis. It was not an amnesty for

Communists or Social Democrats or anyone who had been on the other side,

was it?

VON PAPEN: Quite true, yes. It was an amnesty for the people who had

worked against the formation of the Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you knew these things. Well, in your speech

at Essen, let us just look at it again; your own account of what you

have done. It is Page 54 of Document Book 11. You just told me that it

was true what you said in that speech—this was in November—that you

had tried to support with all your strength the work of the National

Socialist movement and its leader and, if you will notice, you say later

on that you were “selected by a gracious fate to put the hand of our

Chancellor and Führer into the hand of our beloved Field Marshal.” By

November 1933 you must have had a very good idea about the way that

Hitler, your Chancellor and Führer, was dealing with those who were

politically opposed to him. Why were you—you told us your point of

view—why were you saying how proud you were to have supported with all

your strength the work of the National Socialist Party unless you agreed

with it?

VON PAPEN: Hitler’s and the Party’s acts in violation of the coalition

policy we opposed to the best of our power within the Cabinet.

Certainly, we knew of these violations. I, personally, in many speeches

which have not been submitted to the Court, referred to these

violations, but as long as this coalition pact was in existence I had to

hope that we would put our views through, and only for this reason did I

therefore assure Hitler of my loyalty so that he, on his part, would be

loyal to the others of us.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just give you the last words. Here you are

appealing in a careful and special appeal to your Catholic fellow

citizens, and you say:

“Let us in this hour say to the Führer and the new Germany that

we believe in him and his work.”

Why did you talk like that when you must have known, in November 1933,

that his program was to smash opposition, smash his political opponents,

smash the trade unions and put himself in complete control of Germany?

Why were you making speeches like that unless you believed and agreed

with everything Hitler wanted to do?

VON PAPEN: I will tell you that very precisely. You know that in July of

that year I concluded the Concordat, and that I received Hitler’s

assurance that he would make religious peace the basis of his policy.

The more conservative elements could be brought to back the Government,

so much the better it would be for the fulfillment of my program.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your answer, we will pass to another

point. I think you said today, or you said a few moments ago, that you

began to realize what sort of team you were running with when you made

the Marburg speech on 17 June. Now, please do not think I am being

offensive...

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I request of the Tribunal that

tomorrow and the day after tomorrow my client, Herr Von Neurath, be

absent from the session so that he may prepare and complete his own

defense?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you have told the Tribunal a

considerable amount about your Marburg speech. Was one of your

associates a gentleman called Jung?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And—believe me I do not mean it in any

offensive way—Herr Jung had helped you considerably with the

composition of the Marburg speech, had he not?

VON PAPEN: Herr Jung quite frequently drafted outlines for speeches of

mine, and the same applies to the Marburg speech.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. He was shot after the 30th of June, was he

not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a man for whom you had not only great

affection, but for whose political views—I think you would call him a

progressive conservative—you had great respect and agreement, is that

not so?

VON PAPEN: Perfectly right, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have told us about Herr Von Bose. He was

shot. Herr Von Tschirschsky was arrested by two different lots of

people, was he not, after this occasion?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was Herr Von Savigny arrested?

VON PAPEN: I cannot remember. I do not think so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, in all—it does not matter about the

names—there were two members of your staff who were shot, and three

were arrested, were they not?

VON PAPEN: One member of my staff was shot, and two were arrested. Herr

Jung was not a member of my staff.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Jung was not a member of your staff, but he

was a close associate of yours. Now...

VON PAPEN: He was an associate who, as I said, quite often assisted me,

when I was very busy, by drafting outlines for speeches, and with whom I

exchanged conservative ideas.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, of course, it is common knowledge that

General Von Schleicher and his wife were also shot, and—I think my

recollection is right—that General Von Bredow was shot too, was he not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were placed under arrest, as you have

told us, for 3 days, and I think your files were taken, were they not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did this performance shake your faith in the

regime?

VON PAPEN: My faith in what? I beg your pardon.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did this performance shake your faith in the

regime and in Hitler?

VON PAPEN: Quite. I explained to the Tribunal yesterday that by this

action the Pact of 30 January had been broken.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you offered your resignation on 2 July, I

think.

VON PAPEN: No, I offered it even earlier.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had already offered it on 18 or 19 June, and

you reaffirmed your offer on 2 July.

VON PAPEN: Quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite right; my mistake. Now, do you tell the

Tribunal that you reaffirmed your offer of resignation because you had

lost your faith in the regime, or because of the insult to your own

pride, because of your being arrested and having your files taken and

your secretaries shot?

VON PAPEN: I offered my resignation, first, because of the unbearable

affront to my own person and my staff and, secondly, because by this

action the Pact of 30 January had been broken by Hitler and because any

political co-operation with him in domestic matters had become

impossible for me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, just look at Document Number D-714,

will you. My Lord, this will be GB-497.

This is a letter from you to Hitler written on 4 July, and you say:

“Yesterday at 10 in the morning I had the honor of informing you

orally of my attitude towards the events of the last days, after

my term in police custody had been suspended on 2 July at 9

o’clock in the evening. At this time I pointed out to you that I

could not possibly take my seat in the Cabinet until my honor

and that of my officials has been restored.

“On 30 June five of my co-workers were arrested; one of them was

shot. My files have been confiscated, my office sealed, and my

private secretary also arrested. This is still the position at

the moment.

“A procedure of this kind against the second highest official of

the State could be justified only if he and his officials were

guilty of complicity in the plot against Führer and nation.

“It is in the interest not only of protecting my personal honor

but even more so of protecting the authority and decency of the

State that either the guilt in this case be proved at once or

honor restored.”

Then you say:

“The events have become known abroad, in part in distorted

form....”

And that for that reason not a single hour should be lost. You appeal to

his soldierly sense of honor, and you ask that the case should be put in

the hands of the Prosecutor General, or a communiqué published stating:

“....that the investigations had established no evidence of any

complicity in the plot, in order that my honor and that of my

officials thus be restored.

“If you do not wish to undertake these steps, my remaining in

the Cabinet any longer would be an impossibility.”

Now look at the rest of the letter.

“I had placed my office at your disposal, Chancellor, as early

as 18 and 19 June. I can ask for my dismissal with a much

lighter heart today since the work jointly commenced by us on 30

January 1933 now appears to have been made secure against

further revolts. At the same time I request to be relieved of my

position as Commissioner for the Saar.

“I assume that you will make your decision regarding the

restoration of my honor, for which I am asking you, within the

next few hours.

“I remain loyally devoted to you and to your work for our

Germany.”

Was it true that it lightened your heart that the work of Hitler now

appeared to be secured against further revolts?

VON PAPEN: I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it true what you say there, that it lightened

your heart that the work of Hitler now appeared to be secured against

further revolt?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I was under the impression that there had been a

revolution which he had suppressed. This letter was written one day

after I was released from custody, and I had the feeling there had been

a revolution and now it was settled.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that General Von Schleicher and his

wife had been killed?

VON PAPEN: I do not think I knew that at this moment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You just knew that Herr Von Bose had been shot?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is mentioned in the letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you knew there was not the slightest reason

on earth for General Von Schleicher, Jung, and Bose being shot, did you

not?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know the reason. As far as I remember...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you knew that there was no reason, did you

not?

VON PAPEN: No, to my question regarding the reason Hitler replied that

Herr Von Bose had been involved in a matter of giving information to the

foreign press.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So that we may take it that you were

speaking with your head and your heart, and with complete confidence and

sincerity when you said: “I remain loyally devoted to you and to your

work for our Germany,” on 4 July 1934, is that right?

VON PAPEN: Yes, because I had to hope that his further work would not

lead to any disadvantages for Germany, even though he might separate

himself from me as far as matters of domestic policy were concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You need not go on with the letters. You may

take it that I shall deal with them in time, so do not read the others

in advance.

As a result of that, you saw Hitler on that day, did you not?

Would you mind just answering my questions. I assure you I will take you

through these letters.

You saw Hitler on that day?

VON PAPEN: I saw him earlier.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also saw him after.

VON PAPEN: I saw him the day before. In the letter it says...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but you saw him after this letter, and did

you not agree with Hitler to remain Vice Chancellor until September, and

that you would then take employment under the Foreign Office?

VON PAPEN: I do not believe so, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you do not believe that, look at the

next letter which is D-715, which becomes Exhibit GB-498.

This is a letter of 10 July, and it begins:

“Our agreement of 4 July”—that is the date of the last

letter—“to the effect that I am to retain my position as Vice

Chancellor until September and then be employed in the Foreign

Service was based between us on the following condition: The

immediate and complete restoration of my authority and honor,

which will enable me to remain in the service of the Reich, in

whatever capacity.”

Now, do you tell the Tribunal that on 10 July you did not know that

General Von Schleicher and his wife had been killed and General Von

Bredow had been killed and that Jung as well as Bose had been murdered?

You say you did not know on 10 July?

VON PAPEN: I am not denying by any means that I knew that, but as I have

already told the Tribunal I demanded that an investigation regarding all

these matters be conducted so that we might know the precise reasons for

them.

It was stated to the public that Schleicher was shot in self-defense, so

that all these matters at the time were not at all clear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is correct, of course, as you write here,

that you had agreed with Hitler to carry on as Vice Chancellor until

September and then to be employed in the Foreign Service on this

condition, is that right?

VON PAPEN: No, that is not correct, for I have already explained...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your letter, Defendant, it is your own

letter.

VON PAPEN: Yes, but this letter was written because Hitler had promised

me a clarification, an investigation which would enable me, after my

honor had been restored and all these crimes cleared up, to remain in

the service of the Reich. But that was never done.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Von Bose and Jung had been working with you in

close co-operation and if anyone knew whether they were innocent men or

not it was you. Why did you, with that knowledge, agree with Hitler to

carry on as Vice Chancellor and then to enter the Foreign Service?

VON PAPEN: I have stated that I had resigned. The sentence dealing with

my possibly remaining in office is only a supposition.

_De facto_ I had resigned and _de facto_ I did not exercise any

governmental activity from 4 July on.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next words in this letter:

“To this end I submitted to you on 5 July my proposal for a

statement to be issued officially, explaining why the arrest of

a number of officials of my staff had taken place and how Von

Bose had lost his life, and averring the nonparticipation of all

the members of my staff in the SA revolt. This statement

requested by me was approved and published by you only in part,

inasmuch as the release and innocence of Herr Von Tschirschsky,

Herr Von Savigny, and of my private secretary, Stotzingen, were

announced.”

You had put before Hitler your own version and asked him to pass it and

he would not pass it. He would not clear the people who were working

closely with you and yet you had agreed with him. You had agreed with

him to continue as Vice Chancellor and to go into the Foreign Service.

You see what I am putting to you? I am putting to you quite clearly that

all you cared about was your own personal position, your dignity being

restored. You were prepared to serve these murderers so long as your own

dignity was put right.

VON PAPEN: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot give better proof for my intentions

to separate myself from the regime than lies in the fact of my actual

resignation. If everything had been clarified, if the fact that my

employees and officials had been innocent when they were arrested and

murdered had been made clear, then perhaps it might have been possible

for me to remain in the service of the Reich, but not as Vice

Chancellor, from which position I had resigned. But you can see from

this letter that Hitler made no attempt to give such a declaration.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And as a result of his making no such attempts

you wrote an even more fulsome statement of your admiration for his

actions. Look at Document Number D-716, which will become Exhibit

GB-499.

“Most honored Reich Chancellor:

“I reflected a long time on our conversation of yesterday, and

the statements made to me, in particular what you told me about

your intentions regarding your Reichstag speech, have occupied

me constantly in view of the enormous importance of the speech

and its special effect on Germany’s position in the sphere of

foreign politics as well. I therefore feel impelled, in fact I

feel it my duty, to let you know my opinion, as I have

frequently done on previous occasions.

“You explained to me yesterday that you intend publicly to

accept responsibility for everything that happened in connection

with the crushing of the SA revolt. Allow me to tell you how

manly and humanly great I consider this intention. The crushing

of the revolt and your courageous and firm personal intervention

have met with nothing but recognition throughout the entire

world.

“What are, however, at the moment a burden on Germany are solely

those events that took place outside the bounds of your own

initiative and without any immediate connection with the revolt,

such as the examples you yourself gave me. This has been given

expression particularly in the British and American press.”

Then, leaving out three paragraphs, you say:

“Allow me to assure you once again that my person or my

position, except for the restoration of my personal honor, do

not matter at all and are at issue only insofar as the events in

the Vice Chancellery on 30 June are being regarded by the public

as the consequence of a breach between you and me.”

Then, after some more of the same you finish up:

“With unchanged admiration and loyalty....”

Did it not come to this, Defendant, that so long as you could get your

dignity cleared it did not matter whether your collaborators were shot

or the Government of which you had been a member had adopted murder as

an instrument of policy? These things did not matter to you so long as

you kept your own dignity and the chance of a future job in the Foreign

Service.

VON PAPEN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you write stuff like that to the

head of a gang of murderers who had murdered your collaborators? Why did

you write to him:

“The crushing of the revolt, your courageous and firm personal

intervention have met with nothing but recognition throughout

the entire world.”

Why did you write it?

VON PAPEN: Because at that time it was my opinion that there actually

had been a revolution and that Hitler had crushed it. That on the other

hand numerous people had been murdered, members of my own office staff,

that was something about which Hitler was to ascertain the truth.

When he told me that he himself would assume responsibility, I

considered this an excellent act on his part, though not, as it was

actually done afterwards by Hitler, when he stated to the Reichstag that

these events were proper. I understood it to mean that if he himself

assumed responsibility for these events he would clarify them to the

world and not state to the world in a law without any investigation that

they were proper.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you tell the Tribunal that on 12 July you

thought there was any doubt or any possibility that your friend Jung

could be guilty of treason against the Reich or of a plot against

Hitler? Did you believe that for an instant?

VON PAPEN: Herr Hitler explained to me at that time that the shooting of

Bose was first of all only a...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I asked first of all about yourself. I

asked, did you believe for a moment that Jung had been guilty of treason

against the Reich or of a plot against Hitler?

VON PAPEN: No, certainly not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you knew very well that Hitler was

worried from the point of view of foreign opinion as to publicity being

given to the effect of a break between you and him, did you not?

You knew that the support, after the blood purge, of an ex-Chancellor of

the German Reich and, as you have told us, a Catholic of old family with

great position amongst the German population—the support of someone of

that kind would be of great value to him after this blood purge, which

had caused foreign opinion to be very disturbed, did you not? You knew

that?

VON PAPEN: No, it seems clear from this letter that I constantly asked

Herr Hitler to ascertain why and for what reasons action had been taken

in this manner against my associates and me. He was to explain this to

the world.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, if you, as an ex-Chancellor of

the Reich and, as you said yourself, one of the leading Catholic laymen

of Germany, an ex-officer of the Imperial Army, had said at that time “I

am not going to be associated with murder, cold-blooded murder as an

instrument of policy,” you might at some risk to yourself have brought

down the whole of this rotten regime, might you not?

VON PAPEN: That is possible, but had I said it publicly, then quite

probably I would have disappeared somewhere just as my associates did.

And, apart from that, the world knew from my resignation that I did not

identify myself with this affair.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you were writing. If you

look at Document Number D-717, which will become Exhibit GB-500, that

emphasizes the importance that Hitler was attaching to your adherence.

If you will look at the second paragraph—I will read it, it is quite

short. You say:

“I hope you have received my letter of yesterday and that you

received it in the spirit in which it was intended.

“Today I ask you, for personal reasons, to excuse me from

participating in the session of the Reichstag. Yesterday you

were, indeed, of the opinion that my staying away might create

the impression that there was disagreement between us. But this

impression can surely not arise if in your statements you refer

to the case of the Vice Chancellery in the way in which you

promised me you would.

“During all these days I have behaved with the greatest possible

reserve towards the outside world and have shown myself as

little as possible, and you will surely understand my not

wanting to appear in public again until every shadow has been

removed from me.

“I have also asked the Party Chairman to excuse my absence.”

Who is the Party Chairman? Is that the Chairman of the Nazi Party?

VON PAPEN: No, I believe the Chairman of the Party was Dr. Frick.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was the Government Party, was it?

VON PAPEN: Yes. The letter shows that I requested Hitler to give an

account of the actions undertaken against me and my associates before

the Reichstag.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You wanted a statement saying that you had never

swerved from your loyalty towards him; that is what you wanted, was it

not?

VON PAPEN: No, I wanted...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you disagree with that, look at

Document Number D-718, which will become Exhibit GB-501, and see what

you say the next day:

“Most honored Chancellor:

“After you have given the nation and the world last night your

great account of the internal developments which led up to 30

June, I feel the need to shake your hand, as I did on 30 January

1933, and to thank you for all you have given anew to the German

nation by crushing the intended second revolution and by

announcing irrevocable and statesmanlike principles.

“Painful, tragic circumstances have prevented me for the first

time since 30 January from appearing at your side. You yourself

excused me and showed understanding for the fact that a Vice

Chancellor cannot take his seat on the ministerial bench as long

as he finds himself subjected to special treatment. (My

confiscated files have still not been returned to me, in spite

of Göring’s and your own orders.)

“Your statements clearly show to history that any suspicion of a

connection between my person and these treasonable practices was

an intentional defamation and calumniation. I thank you for

stating this.”

Then, after saying that people are still believing it, in the

penultimate paragraph you say:

“I should, therefore, be grateful if you could soon find the

occasion to point out positively that up to today”—that was 14

July—“I have loyally stood by and fought for you, your

leadership, and your work for Germany.”

Now, Defendant, do you deny what I put to you a moment ago, that all you

wanted was your loyalty to the regime to be made clear to the world? It

was not worrying you at all that Von Schleicher and his wife, and Von

Bose, and Jung, and all these other people had been murdered by the

Government of the Reich; otherwise, why did you write a letter like

that?

VON PAPEN: I wrote this letter, as the letter itself shows, because I

was still being accused of having agreed to the attempts on the lives of

Goebbels and Göring and of various other conspiracies. That is the

reason why it was important to me to have Chancellor Hitler state that I

was not involved in any conspiracies against him in connection with the

various actions of this revolt. Of course, first of all I dealt in this

letter with my position and the position of my associates. The

restoration of General Von Schleicher’s honor was the task of the Army,

and not my task.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will come to that when we deal with the

Army, but at the moment, you see, what I am putting to you is this: That

even after you knew that your own friends had been murdered, to say

nothing of your old colleagues, your own friends had been murdered, you

again and again protest your loyalty and the fact that you had always

worked and co-operated with Hitler in all his work. Was that honest? Is

what is contained in these letters honest, or do you say they were just

lies in order to protect yourself?

VON PAPEN: No, I wrote that because, in fact, the entire action against

me, Himmler’s attempt to murder me, the fact that I was arrested, were

all based on the supposition that I had participated in a conspiracy

against Hitler’s Government. It had therefore to be clarified that as

long as I was a member of this Government, I had acted toward it with

absolute loyalty. That is the reason why I was asking for this

clarification.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember your learned counsel, on your

instructions, putting an interrogatory to Baron von Lersner? It is

Number 2(a) on Page 212 of Defense Document Book 3, Question 2(a):

“Did the Defendant Von Papen continue to hope to change Hitler’s

policy to his own way of thinking by impregnating it with

conservative ideas, until the murders taking place on 30 June

1934 and Hitler’s justification of them had convinced him that

his efforts and his hope had been in vain?”

And Baron von Lersner, not unnaturally, answers “yes” to that question.

Does that correctly express your point of view “....until the murders

taking place on 30 June 1934 and Hitler’s approval of them had convinced

him....”—that is you—“that your efforts and your hopes had been in

vain”? Do you agree with that? It is an interrogatory put by your own

learned counsel.

VON PAPEN: Yes, I agree with that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your view, why did you write these

letters expressing this fulsome admiration of Hitler?

VON PAPEN: What I wished to express in the interrogatory, or rather what

I wanted Herr Von Lersner to be asked was the following: Is it

correct...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The answers the witness expects are in his

question. It is one of the best examples of a leading question I have

ever seen. You say that your interrogatory expresses your view, do you

not?

VON PAPEN: I might say that if I were of this opinion that with the 30th

of June it became apparent that further co-operation with Hitler was no

longer possible and that, therefore, the coalition program which had

been agreed upon between us had collapsed...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say again that you have an unchanged loyalty

and admiration and that you have co-operated?

“I remain loyally devoted to you for your work, for our

Germany.”

If your view is put in that interrogatory, that the foundations of your

faith had been shaken, why do you write that you remain loyally devoted

to Hitler’s work for Germany?

VON PAPEN: I have already told you and the Tribunal that I hoped that,

in spite of the collapse of the domestic situation, Hitler would at

least in the field of foreign policy pursue a reasonable course. He was

there; we could not remove him. We had to reckon with Hitler and his

Government. All the gentlemen continued to co-operate; I was the only

one who stepped out. All these letters with which you are trying to

prove I am insincere or that I am not truthful, or, as you call it, that

I am a liar or a deceiver, cannot deny to the world the fact that I

resigned at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took another job within 11 days. Eleven

days after the last letter you had taken the job of representing

this—well, I will not say a gang of murderers—this Government which

had adopted murder as an instrument of policy, as Plenipotentiary to

Austria, within 11 days of your last letter.

Let us just see whether the murder motif did not come into that. Did you

think that Hitler had been behind the July Putsch in Austria, which had

resulted in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss?

VON PAPEN: I know that Herr Habicht, who had been appointed by him to

lead the Austrian Party, at any rate had some connection with this

affair. That Herr Hitler himself had approved this act, that was not

known to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, did you think that the German Foreign

Office had been behind the July Putsch?

VON PAPEN: The German Foreign Office, in my opinion, had nothing at all

to do with the July Putsch.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that Dr. Rieth—if I have his

name, yes, Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna—did you think that he

had been behind the Putsch?

VON PAPEN: No. I knew only that Dr. Rieth had negotiated with the

Austrian Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know that Hitler had been behind it.

You deny that the German Foreign Office had been behind it. You did not

know that Dr. Rieth had been behind it. Just look at Page 96 of Document

Book 11a. It is Pages 79 and 80 of the German book.

This is a report, your report a year later. I am taking it slightly out

of time because of this sentence where you recapitulate the facts, and

if you will look at paragraph—I think it is the last paragraph on Page

79 in the German text.

My Lord, it is the second last paragraph on Page 96 in the Document Book

11a.

“The hope that the personal conversation between the Führer and

Reich Chancellor and the head of the Italian State at Stresa

would lead to a settlement of German-Italian differences has

been changed into the exact opposite by the threatening attitude

taken up by Mussolini because of the assassination of his friend

Dollfuss, and by the partial mobilization of Italian corps on

the Brenner. It became apparent that the attempt to

‘re-establish normal and friendly relations’ by sending me to

Vienna was not immediately possible after what had just

happened. Mistrust of the forcible methods of the Austrian

NSDAP”—now look at the next words—“influenced, as became more

and more apparent from the trials which were held, by leading

Reich-German persons, was too strong. The impression caused by

the terrorist methods and the death of the Federal Chancellor

was too lasting in the widest circles.”

Now, Defendant, tell the Tribunal who the leading German personalities

were to whom you were referring as supporting the Putsch in July 1934

and the murder of Dollfuss? Who were they?

VON PAPEN: By no means the former German Minister to Vienna, Herr Rieth,

but only Herr Habicht and the persons subordinate to him who at the time

were running the Austrian Nazi policy at Hitler’s order.

But I might point out that it says in this sentence that mistrust of the

methods of force employed by the Austrian Nazis had become more and more

apparent from the trials held, and that is something which we discovered

a year later and not at the time when I was given the task.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know is this. My question was:

Who were the leading German personalities? You are not going to tell the

Tribunal that Habicht, who was a liaison man with the NSDAP in Austria,

was a leading Reich-German personality. Who were they? You are not going

to say that Austrian Nazis were leading Reich-German personalities. Who

were they? Who were the leading Reich-German personalities that you were

talking about?

VON PAPEN: The leading personality was, no doubt, Herr Habicht. But this

letter was written to tell Hitler: “Here, look what you have done.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you seriously want the Tribunal to understand

this as a statement on which they will judge your veracity, that by a

leading Reich-German personality you mean Herr Habicht, and you have no

one else in mind although you use the plural? Is that what you want the

Tribunal to understand? I do not know if you remember, Defendant—just

think of it before you answer—but General Glaise-Horstenau could not

even remember Habicht’s name when he was giving his evidence.

You cannot seriously mean that you meant a liaison agent with the

Austrian NSDAP when you referred to prominent Reich-German

personalities. Surely you can do better than that.

Think again and tell the Tribunal whom you had in mind.

VON PAPEN: Mr. Prosecutor, Herr Habicht was not an agent. Herr Habicht

had been appointed by Hitler as the leader of the Party in Austria, so I

am surely justified in calling him a leading personality. If Herr Hitler

himself had knowledge of these matters at that time, then when reading

my letter he would know what I was hinting at.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even if I were to allow you Herr Habicht, which

I certainly never would, he is only one man. Who were the others? You

referred to Reich-German personalities. Who were the other people who

had been behind this Putsch and this murder?

VON PAPEN: Quite candidly I must tell you that after the 12 or 15 years

which have passed since then I can no longer remember which people I

might have had in mind when I wrote that. At any rate, the purpose of

the letter was—and you will appreciate this—to tell Hitler that the

methods which had been employed were doing more damage and were much

more incredible than we had known at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will accept it. We will go on from the

point that you knew there were some unspecified prominent Reich-German

personalities who had been behind the murder of Dollfuss.

Now, let us just, advancing from that, let us consider what you say with

regard to Mr. Messersmith. As I understand it, you deny—if I may say

so, with some vigor—what Mr. Messersmith says regarding you. Therefore,

let us just look at what he says and see how much of it you can

seriously suggest is not true.

I think I gave Your Lordship the references yesterday. The reference to

the affidavit 1760-PS is Document Book 11, and Page 22 is the relevant

part; and the other affidavit, Document 2385-PS, is 11a, Page 24. This

is rather shorter.

I think the one that I would like you to look at, Defendant, is 1760-PS,

and I think it begins on Page 3. I want you to come to the bit in the

affidavit—and I am afraid I cannot give you the exact German

place—where he deals with yourself.

It is Page 22, My Lord.

The paragraph begins:

“That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was

confirmed to me by Franz Von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as

German Minister.”

Have you got the passage, Defendant?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you look down a few lines in Mr.

Messersmith’s statement, he says:

“When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation he greeted

me with: ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the

conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then

proceeded to tell me that all of southwestern Europe, to the

borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he

had been charged with the mission of facilitating German

economic and political control over all this region for Germany.

He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was

to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in

Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government, and

from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the governments in

the other states to the south and southeast. He said that he

intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain

influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,

toward that end. He said that he was telling me this because the

German Government was bound on this objective of getting this

control of southwestern Europe and there was nothing which could

stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England

was not realistic.”

Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was shocked, and that

you merely smiled and said that, of course, this conversation was

between you and Mr. Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to

other people. Then he says:

“I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation

as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness

with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.”

Now, you have told the Tribunal that you said nothing like that to Mr.

Messersmith. Apart from whether you said it to Mr. Messersmith or not,

do you deny that these were your aims and intentions?

VON PAPEN: Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims were those

which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit here. I told the

Court yesterday...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to take these quickly. Would you

just refer back to the document you were looking at a short time ago,

which is Document 2248-PS?

That is Page 96, My Lord. It starts there, in 1la, and I want to pass on

to Page 97. That is Page 81 of the German book.

Now, Defendant, this was your view in 1935, if you will look at the

beginning of Page 81 of the German text.

My Lord, it is the first break in Page 97.

“The great historical speech of the Führer’s on 21 May of this

year, and later the naval treaty, caused a strong _détente_ in

the field of foreign policy as regards England. But the clear

and final definition of the attitude of National Socialism to

the Soviet doctrine of state naturally doubled Franco-Russian

attempts to cripple us in the east and southeast, without at the

same time achieving a _détente_ in the other direction by

clearly renouncing the annexation, or Anschluss, of Austria.

“Any attempt at an economic and, even more so, at a political

offensive by the newly-formed Third Reich in the direction of

southeastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front

formed by the whole of Europe.”

Who put into your mind the question of a commercial or a political

offensive in the direction of southeastern Europe? Had you discussed

that with the Defendant Von Neurath?

VON PAPEN: No, not at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you think you spoke for yourself?

VON PAPEN: Certainly. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David,

namely, that an advance into the southeastern area would come up against

a front formed by all of Europe. I am thus warning of that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Herr Von Papen, that I cannot

make any comments at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to

matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had got that idea from,

say, the Foreign Minister, or whether it was your own idea. You say it

is your own idea.

Just look on Page 82.

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 82. There is a paragraph—My Lord, it is

the same page, 97, in the English version—where you go on to say:

“This realistic political survey of the European constellation

shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem cannot, at

least in the near future, be successfully approached from the

direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be

content with not allowing Austria’s international status to

deteriorate in view of a later solution. In this connection the

danger of a nonintervention pact with bilateral treaties of

assurance seems to be successfully prevented. The maturing of a

solution was and still remains dependent on nothing but the

shape of German-Austrian relations.”

Why were you so afraid of a nonintervention pact, if your idea was that

there should only be an evolutionary solution of Austria based on

Austria’s will? Why were you afraid of a nonintervention pact which

would bind the Reich to not interfering in Austria?

VON PAPEN: For a very simple reason. All political combinations which

our opponents were making at the time had only one end, that Austria

should be pushed into such a situation, whether it was a Danube pact or

a pact with Italy and France, which would make it impossible to advance

the thought of the Anschluss. For that reason it had to be and remain

our natural political aim that the international status of Austria

should not be allowed to deteriorate, as I have expressed it here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. That is the answer which I thought you

would have to give. Now, just look at Page 83, which is in the very next

paragraph:

“The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a veritable

path of suffering in order to secure its unity. With the dawn of

National Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by means

of the final overthrow of all particulars, an opportunity,

unique and never to be repeated, seemed to present itself to

complete Bismarck’s work and to bring relations between Germany

and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of

internal events in Germany.”

I will see if I can put quite shortly what you mean by the completion of

this man’s work, because I hope we shall not disagree about ancient

history, whatever we do about the other. As I understand, your view is

that this, Bismarck’s setting up the German Empire in 1871, was merely

an attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg Empire separated from

Germany, and the final completion of his work was that the old Hapsburg

dominions should be brought back with the states which had been in the

Holy Roman Empire. Is that roughly the truth?

VON PAPEN: Quite right; not all the Hapsburg states, but Austria, the

German part.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The original Hapsburg domains?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite right. I hope I am putting it objectively

enough.

VON PAPEN: Oh, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With regard to that, what did you mean by saying

that the solution of the relations between Germany and Austria should be

brought about by “dynamic consequences of internal events in Germany”?

What did you mean by that?

VON PAPEN: By that I mean the following: Never in Germany’s history had

it happened that a large party whose aim was Germany’s unity existed in

both nations. That was a unique historical event. And I wished to state

that the dynamic force of this movement in the two countries, which was

urging unity, gave promise of a solution.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, Defendant, the difficulty that I want

you to explain is: How do you square an approval of centralization in

Germany with a Nazi Government whose unscrupulous message you then knew

after the affairs since 30 June 1934—how do you square an unscrupulous

centralized Germany with an evolutionary solution of the Austrian

problem?

That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am suggesting is

that it means a much simpler thing than you have told us. It means that

you were out to get an annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity

under the National Socialist Reich.

VON PAPEN: Of course, I had to reckon with existing conditions, and I

did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I wanted to

attempt, with the help of the factors present in the National Socialist

Party in both countries, to come to a solution. But I see no

contradiction, Sir David. You are saying, how could I achieve my aim by

centralization. But if you would be good enough to look at the end of

this report of mine, then you will find that I am proposing

decentralization to Hitler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the moment, you see, I was really asking you

for an explanation of what you meant by the expression, “dynamic result

of internal events in Germany.” In short, I want you to realize,

Defendant—I am not going to argue with you, because I ought not

to—that the first point of Mr. Messersmith was a question of this

action in southeastern Europe; the second point, that Austria was the

first line, the first thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will

be good enough to take the same bundle and turn over to Page 102 which

is a report of your own dated 8 October 1935. I want you to deal with

Mr. Messersmith’s third suggestion against you, which you deny, that you

were going to work in Austria by a weakening of the regime.

Now I will just read the first sentence so that you will get the point

into your mind. The report that I am dealing with is of 18 October 1935.

You are dealing with the Austrian Government reshuffle, and you are

saying—My Lord, this is a new document. It is GB-502, Document Number

D-718. It is in 11a, Page 106. It begins:

“Yesterday’s Cabinet reshuffle resembles a bloodless

insurrection led by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr

(Austrian Home Defense Organization). It is clear that Minister

Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that as early as

yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna

occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The

Government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing

the occupation by Police forces.”

Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the beginning of the

report. Then, if you turn to the next page, at 102, and refer about

halfway down the page, you say this:

“In spite of the Vice Chancellor’s clear victory and of the

strenuous efforts of the Austrian press to make it appear

plausible that the Cabinet reshuffle was carried out for reasons

of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards a

completely uncertain development prevails in the Austrian

public, as also in the Heimwehr circles.

“From our point of view the change of affairs is only too

welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of advantage, even

if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The

fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to

keep them moving.”

Now, Defendant, by that it is quite clear, is it not, that you meant

that so long as there is political uncertainty or political trouble in

the Austrian State, it does not matter whether the move may be an

anti-German one, so long as the struggle grows with distrust spreading?

That was an advantage to Germany, and that is what you want. That is

what the lines mean, is it not?

VON PAPEN: No, not quite.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not quite?

VON PAPEN: I should like to make the following remarks about your

explanation, Sir David. Here in this report we are concerned with a

change in the Austrian Government, with Prince Starhemberg and the

Heimwehr involved. You know that Starhemberg and the Heimwehr had allied

themselves with Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening-up of

this inner political front which was working against the interests of a

union could be only advantageous, in the light of my policy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what I do not understand is this. You see,

you have said, “In spite of the Vice Chancellor’s clear victory and of

the diligent efforts of the Austrian press....” and you go on to say,

“....every new weakening of the system is of advantage.” You see, Prince

Starhemberg and the Italian party, according to you, had won, because

you say, “In spite of....” this “....clear victory.”

Then you say, “every new weakening of the system.” That could not be

Starhemberg’s alliance, because that had been successful. By “the

system” you mean the Government of Austria, do you not? You cannot mean

anything else.

My Lord, perhaps I should not continue the argument. But it is a

somewhat complicated subject.

VON PAPEN: Yes, it is.

THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should perhaps draw attention to

the few remaining sentences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, certainly I will read on:

“The continuation of negotiations for a settlement which I had

recommended since the Geneva declaration, seems to be entirely

superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to

continue the increasingly excited public feeling against the

Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press

without, however, giving the Government justifiable cause for

having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new

propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the

Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced

journalists to work in this connection.

“For the rest, we can confidently leave further developments to

the near future. I am convinced that the shifting of powers on

the European chess board will permit us in the not too distant

future to take up actively the question of influencing the

southeastern area.”

Extraordinary—if I may so—extraordinary how Mr. Messersmith had got

your ideas if you had never had this conversation with him, was it not?

My Lord, perhaps this will be a convenient time to adjourn.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.

VON PAPEN: But may I come back to that question tomorrow?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 19 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY

Wednesday, 19 June 1946

_Morning Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant

Von Neurath is absent.

[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, Defendant,

I want to ask you three questions about the other countries in

southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that

the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement

among the Sudetendeutschen?

VON PAPEN: I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In

1935, when this report was written, the Sudeten-German question was not

acute.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When did you learn about it?

VON PAPEN: Mainly here in this room.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Did you know that the Reich was

supporting Mr. Codreanu and the Iron Guard in Romania?

VON PAPEN: I believe that that was also much later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You learned that sometime later than 1935, did

you? When did you learn that?

VON PAPEN: I cannot say; but I believe that events in connection with

the Iron Guard in Romania took place about 1937. I may be wrong; but I

do not think so.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a

little too near you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I am sorry.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know that in 1944 you were

discussed in a Reich state paper edited by the Defendant Kaltenbrunner

as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange

for Hungary’s acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside

Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired? Did you know that?

VON PAPEN: No. In the first place, I did not know that; and in the

second place I may say that the idea is impossible, because I was a

close friend of the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. In my

interrogatory to Admiral Horthy I asked him a question which he

unfortunately failed to answer because he did not remember. It says that

in the autumn of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior,

Keresctes-Fischer, handed me a document showing that German or German

and Hungarian forces wanted to bring about the incorporation of Hungary

into the Reich through a revolt. At Regent Horthy’s desire, I at once

handed this document over to Herr Von Ribbentrop and asked him to take

the appropriate measures to prevent it. That is all set down in the

files, and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior will be able to

confirm it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my point. I do not mind whether you

would have taken it or not. The point that I am putting is that you were

the choice. Don’t you know that? You know the document I am referring

to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbrunner, in which you were

discussed as being the possible person to do the internal work in

Hungary.

My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11, and Page 46 of the German

Document Book 11.

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I went over this note the day before yesterday

after you submitted it here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you with it if you only

learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in

1944 that you were being suggested in a German state document as being

the person who might do the internal work in Hungary in order that

Hungary might be acquired by the Reich? If you say you do not know, I

shall not trouble you with it any further. You say you only knew that

since the day before yesterday?

VON PAPEN: Yes, and in the second place, it is a historical fact that I

repeatedly opposed these efforts in Hungary which aimed in one way or

another, ultimately by occupation, at making Hungary a part of the

German Reich. I considered that the most mistaken and most impossible

policy imaginable.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you about the documents since

you have not known; we will come to another point.

You remember Gauleiter Rainer, the gentleman with whom you had the

fortuitous and I am sure very interesting talk on the eve of the

Anschluss; Dr. Rainer, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr.

Rainer’s view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal

whether you agree with that.

My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812-PS. It

starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page

8.

Have you got the passage that begins:

“Thus began the first phase of battle, which ended with the July

uprising of 1934. The decision for the July uprising was right;

but many mistakes were made in carrying it out. The result was

the complete destruction of the organization, the loss of entire

groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the

‘Altreich,’ and, with regard to the political relationship

between Germany and Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the

existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With

the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal

relationships between the two States, the Führer liquidated the

first stage of the battle and began a new method of political

penetration.”

Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, “a new

method of political penetration”?

VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. That is a very inaccurate description of my

activity.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you don’t agree with Dr. Rainer, tell

me—you know, you must know very well, the witness Dr. Paul Schmidt. You

know him?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. Now I think you will agree with me

that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word

during this Trial. Do you agree? I haven’t heard a word of criticism of

Paul Schmidt. Don’t you agree with me?

VON PAPEN: Do you mean the witness—the interpreter Schmidt or the

Foreign Minister Schmidt?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter.

VON PAPEN: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. I will give you my opinion on

that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you agree that he is a trustworthy

person or not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?

VON PAPEN: I have nothing to say against the human qualities of Herr

Schmidt, but I have a very strong objection to the fact that Herr

Schmidt takes the liberty of criticizing my political activities in

Austria.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, before you explain it, just have a look at

it. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt’s affidavit on Page 41 of Document

Book 11, that is Page 37 of the German document book, Document 3308-PS.

Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt’s view, Paragraph 8:

“Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi

program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder

of Dollfuss necessitated a more cautious approach to this

problem for a time; but the application of sanctions against

Italy by the League of Nations plus the rapid increase of German

military strength, made the resumption of the Austrian program

safer. When Göring visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that

the union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and must be

expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in

German, remained silent and uttered only a mild protest when I

translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss

was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to

preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the

Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the

expected move.”

Then, Defendant, so that we are being quite clear, he makes a

mistake, and it is a speech of Hitler’s on 18 February to which,

unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not

relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree

with is that it was your role, “....to preserve smooth

diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more

devious ways....” Do you agree with that as a correct

description of your program, your mission in Austria?

VON PAPEN: On the contrary, Sir David, the exact opposite is the case. I

explained my task in Austria very clearly and distinctly to the

Tribunal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see.

VON PAPEN: It was a task of pacification and normalization and a

continuation of the policy of the grafting together of the two States in

an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this

affidavit of Dr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this

chair we established the fact that this affidavit was placed before him

when he was still in bed in the hospital after a severe illness, and

this document was given to him for his signature...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, with respect to that, the Tribunal will

deal with it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been

cross-examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know

everything about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have

anything to comment on the contents of it, I am sure the Tribunal would

willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That

is all before the Tribunal.

VON PAPEN: I will comment on the contents, I will state that Minister

Schmidt, who later played a highly influential role with Foreign

Minister Von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here

had a very subordinate position in the Foreign Office which did not

afford him insight—any exact insight—into conditions in Austria and

into my policy and my reports.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is so...

VON PAPEN: Sir David, Herr Von Neurath will be able to confirm that for

you tomorrow or the day after.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we won’t argue that any further. The

Tribunal have the whole of Dr. Schmidt’s record before them and the

affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of

your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in

Austria, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the

explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going

back to the development of the “top hat” idea to which you objected so

strongly, wasn’t it?—Well, if you don’t remember, let me remind you. It

is Document D-689, Page 101.

The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90

and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11, becoming GB-504.

This is the opening of the Grossglockner Road, which, as you know, is a

road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Carinthia. Do

you remember that, after your description about the people being in

Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then

the German drivers competing, in the third and next paragraph you say:

“The building of this road is undoubtedly a first-class work of

culture, in which Reich-German construction firms took the main

and decisive part. The chief engineer of the Reich-German firm

which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me

of the position of the explosive chambers in this tunnel. I sent

him to the military attaché.”

That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German

road constructions with obtaining the position of the explosives of the

tunnel at the important strategic portion of the road. Why did you

consider that of sufficient importance to send it to Hitler with three

copies to the Foreign Office?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I am giving an exact account of what happened at

the inauguration of this road.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want that. The Tribunal can get that.

What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the

Reich-German engineer was disclosing to you the explosive chambers on

the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why

were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the

Tribunal.

VON PAPEN: Because it seemed interesting to me that this man approached

me voluntarily and told me, “At this and this point, the tunnel can be

blown up.” You know that at that time our relations with Italy were very

strained and that Italy mobilized on the Brenner border. For that reason

it seemed of interest to me that this new connection between Italy and

Germany could be broken again at any suitable time. Moreover, I referred

the matter to my military attaché because it did not interest me

personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you had then moved out of the class of doing

that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was

a matter for the military attaché.

But was that your plan, Defendant, that, when you introduced German

Kultur as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the

strategic information which you could pass on to your Government,

undermining the Austrian Government’s strategic plans to use the road?

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which

joined Germany to Italy?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The road actually goes from

Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Carinthia in

south Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and south

in Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it

connect Austria with Italy?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Austria.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, let’s take something else in which

you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian

supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be

situated, were you not?

VON PAPEN: I do not remember.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t recall it, look at it

yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on.

It is Page 110, My Lord, in the English book; Page 108 of the German

book. It will become Exhibit GB-505. Its date is 26 November 1935. It is

Page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is Page 111.

Defendant, you ought to find it just at the top of Page 112 of the

German version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose

Jewish extraction you referred to, and then you go on to Prince

Starhemberg. It reads:

“After the manufacture of munitions for Italy in Hirtenberg had

to be stopped because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, loaded

the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work

in Italy.”

Then, note the next words in brackets:

“Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria’s supply of

munitions....”

Was that one of your conceptions of restoring normal relations, that you

should report on the movements in the Austrian munition manufacture?

VON PAPEN: No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir

David, that I was repeating a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski,

who told me that this munitions factory, the only one which existed in

Austria, was being moved to Italy. I wrote, with regard to this, that it

is a remarkable circumstance if a country has to get its munitions

supplies from a foreign country. You must surely admit that that is a

peculiar situation and one that deserves inclusion in a report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your explanation. I won’t waste time on

it.

Now, I want to pass—and again I want to deal with it very quickly—to

your own personal experiences in Austria.

You remember when you went to the Salzburg Festival in 1935, when you

had been there about a year; do you remember? I don’t know because you

probably went every year.

The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you

went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made

such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to

telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German

Ambassador had caused a great Nazi demonstration? Do you remember that?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at Page 102,

Document D-689, which I have already referred to, Page 102 of Document