And I went on to say to Hitler that if we achieved this pacification and

established good and friendly relations with Austria, we could even join

in the Danube Pact. This was the combination of the French, the

Italians, and the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favor of a pact of

the Danube powers including Austria. We in Germany had opposed the

policy of those powers at the time, because we feared that if Austria

joined a Danube Pact, she would be estranged from Germany once and for

all. If, on the other hand, we were on good terms with Austria and

friendly relations were established again, we could, as I pointed out to

Hitler, join in this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something

extraordinarily constructive for the cause of European peace.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes that you expressed this

morning?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just said that you pursued an honest policy of

the amicable settlement of interests.

Is it true that you persuaded Hitler to make a statement in favor of

Austria’s independence in his Reichstag speech on 21 May 1936?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the

prerequisite for any normalcy and settlement of interests in a

revolutionary way; for our joint policy could only be advanced by

Austria. Austria had been ordered by the Peace Treaty of St. Germain and

the Geneva Protocol to remain aloof from Germany. If Austria, therefore,

were to take the initiative and improve her relations with Germany, it

was essential that we should first recognize her sovereignty.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the

translation. In the English translation, instead of the words spoken by

the defendant, the words “revolutionary way” were said instead of

“evolutionary way.”

Will you please comment on the pact of 11 July 1936?

VON PAPEN: The Agreement of 11 July has been described by Sir David as a

deceptive maneuver and an attempt to get the Austrian Government into

new difficulties, to undermine it by introducing men of pro-German

sympathies, like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This

judgment passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think

historically untenable; and I think that that has been demonstrated here

by the hearings and testimony of the Austrian Foreign Minister.

The pact was the result of my efforts over 2 years to re-establish

normal relations between the sister nations. The agreement was desired

by both Governments, not by the German Government only, and Chancellor

Schuschnigg admitted that himself, as mentioned in a report of mine

dated 1 September 1936 on a speech made by Schuschnigg to Austrian

workers. Why should the Austrian Government have concluded this pact?

They were not compelled to conclude it, unless they themselves wanted to

bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich.

For that very reason I had asked Hitler to proclaim Austrian sovereignty

in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was certainly not intended to

imply our willingness to give up the idea of union at a later date,

which we wanted, but it acknowledged Austria’s full independence of

action. But the aim of union of the two States was now to be pursued in

a regular and evolutionary manner.

This corresponded with the agreement which I had made with Hitler on 26

July. There was a second part to that agreement which was not published.

That second part contained all the elements necessary for pacification:

an amnesty, the regulation of our press relations, and the lifting of

the so-called “1,000 mark bar.” This was a frontier bar imposed by

Hitler’s decree upon people traveling into Austria. Any German wishing

to go to Austria at that time had to pay 1,000 marks. This bar was

removed. Herr Schuschnigg, for his part, promised in this unpublished

part of the agreement that men in his confidence who were members of the

National Opposition were to be drawn in to co-operate in Austria. It

appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian Opposition in Austrian

parliamentary procedure was an essential condition for any further

peaceful solution. In other words, the Party was gradually to lose its

illegal status and become a legal factor.

Mr. Messersmith, if I may add, stated incorrectly in his affidavit:

“Part II of this pact contained a clause that a number of persons who

were in the Chancellor’s confidence should be called to positions in the

Cabinet.” That, obviously, is a mistaken conclusion on Mr. Messersmith’s

part, because we were not concerned with people who had Hitler’s

confidence, but with those who had Schuschnigg’s confidence. This was an

agreement made by Schuschnigg. Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says

with reference to this agreement that:

“....the first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian

Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido

Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”

This is entirely wrong. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and made Austrian

policy; he represented Austrian interests, as was natural, and at no

time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign

Minister.

On the whole, world public opinion at that time regarded this agreement

as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the

Prosecution to call it a deceptive maneuver.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Prince Erbach’s affidavit, Document Number

Papen-96 of the English book, Pages 233 and 234, Questions 4 to 7 and

Questions 12 and 13, dealing with the subject which we have just

discussed.

Did you, after the conclusion of the July Agreement, regard your mission

in Austria as terminated?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I regarded it as terminated. That is proved by the

resignation which I tendered to Hitler on 16 July 1936.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Papen-71, Page 165 of the second

document book. I quote the beginning:

“On 26 July 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I

should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission to restore

normal and friendly relations.

“With the Agreement signed on 11 July, the decisive step has

been taken in this direction.”

In a later part of the document, he asks to be recalled; I go on to

quote the second paragraph from the end:

“Even though the ‘German question’ will need very careful and

considerate handling in the future too—especially after the

incredible difficulties which have gone before—I would like

now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to place my

resignation in your hands.”

The Prosecution have used the report you made to Hitler on 1 September

1936, 2246-PS, and they accuse you of remaining in contact with the

illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, of attempting to

bring that Opposition into the Fatherland Front, and of desiring to

change the Schuschnigg regime.

VON PAPEN: In the report mentioned I wrote:

“In the normalization of relations to Germany, progress has been

hindered by the staying power of the Ministry of Security, where

the old anti-National Socialist officials are located. Changes

in personnel are, therefore, urgently required.”

The expression which I used in this report: “Changes in the regime,”

actually means “Changes in personnel”; in that connection I also go on

to say, in the following sentence, that economic negotiations will

follow in the near future. This shows quite clearly that these words do

not refer to a removal of Schuschnigg’s person. Apart from that, this

report speaks of the gravity of the situation in the Danube area, and

makes proposals for a peaceful solution.

If I am accused by the Prosecution of having had contacts with the Nazi

Opposition, although the July Agreement had excluded all intervention in

Austrian affairs, I must point out that I was perfectly entitled to

these contacts because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how

far Herr Schuschnigg kept his promise to take in men from the

nationalist Opposition in whom he had confidence for collaboration. Just

how far the Nazi Opposition submitted to that Agreement of 11 July is

shown by Leopold’s statement in January 1937, which Mr. Messersmith has

attached to his own affidavit.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number Papen-75, Page 171, which

contains this file note of Leopold’s. The document is identical with the

appendix, which has the number Exhibit USA-57. There is an error in the

English translation. In the fifth line from the end, on Page 1, the word

“Anschluss” has been translated by “annexation.”

Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold’s proposals?

VON PAPEN: Leopold’s proposals show the following. The leaders of the

Austrian Nazis fully accepted the policy of the July Agreement. They

recognized that in future the question of the Anschluss would be an

internal Austrian affair to be settled by the Austrian Government. They

proposed that this solution should be found in an evolutionary manner by

the Austrian Government and the Party. In favor of this solution is the

fact that by means of the declaration of the sovereignty of Austria

these arguments could in the future no longer represent foreign

political dangers for Austria, that is, that the Agreement of July was

understood by the Austrian National Socialists and approved of, and that

they were prepared to proceed in a legal way with the Austrian

Government.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH DAY

Tuesday, 18 June 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Guido Schmidt has referred to an incident

involving a flag at Pinkafeld, in May 1937. Would you please describe

your activities in settling that incident.

VON PAPEN: The flag incident at Pinkafeld is mentioned by myself, or

rather by my defense counsel, because it is a typical example of

Hitler’s attempts to pass on to an aggressive policy in Austria, even in

the days before 1938.

On 1 May 1937 in the small hamlet of Pinkafeld a flag of the German

Reich was hauled down by an Austrian official. There was great

excitement in the press; I instantly tried to settle the matter amicably

with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereupon I received a

telegram to proceed to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported

to Hitler. Hitler did not receive me. I waited for 3 days. After 3 days,

I wrote and told him, “It appears that you are trying to use the flag

incident at Pinkafeld to introduce an aggressive policy against Austria.

In that case there is nothing more for me to do, and I beg to hand in my

resignation.” A quarter of an hour later he called me to the Reich

Chancellery. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour, furious

and beside himself with rage over the humiliations which the German

Reich could no longer tolerate. After his rage had spent itself I told

him that our agreement of 26 June ruled that the policy concerning

Austria was to be conducted on evolutionary lines. The Agreement of 11

July emphasized that. “If you wish to pursue a different policy, then

dismiss me,” I said.

As a result of this very serious conversation he said, “No, no. Go back

and settle everything; we do not want to change our peaceful policy.” I

returned to Vienna, and the incident was settled satisfactorily with the

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs within 24 hours.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you talk to representatives of other powers regarding

the policy which you pursued in Austria?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I repeatedly discussed this policy with representatives

of other powers. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I discussed it with

the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been

produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: “I wrote

a letter.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we have not got that letter, neither have we a copy

of it. The files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin by air attacks.

VON PAPEN: May I add, Mr. President, that the Austrian Minister for

Foreign Affairs has confirmed the incident in Court and the course it

took. Herr Von Neurath also knows this incident very well indeed.

THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs who confirmed

it?

VON PAPEN: The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, who was

here as a witness; the witness Guido Schmidt.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

VON PAPEN: With reference to that question, may I remark that I, of

course, very often spoke to representatives of other powers about our

Austrian policy. For instance, in June 1938 I discussed it with Sir

Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin. In October 1937 I

visited Paris, incognito, and there talked to many of the leading

politicians about this problem, among them the President of France, M.

Daladier, and M. Léon Blum. I assured these gentlemen that we would seek

a solution of the Austrian problem exclusively on an evolutionary basis

and that the hoped-for union of the two States would never prove a

threat to the interests of France, that on the contrary we were only

looking for that solution within the European framework, that is, with

the consent of France.

At that time, I was under the impression that in England as well as in

France it was being increasingly understood that a general settlement

was necessary.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof that the defendant could actually have been

convinced that the other powers—by virtue of an evolutionary

development in Austria—might eventually be prepared to come to a

peaceable agreement, I submitted Document Number 74, Page 169. It is a

report from Von Papen to Hitler on the conversation just outlined with

Sir Nevile Henderson on 1 June 1937.

I draw your attention to this document and should like to point out that

Henderson has stated that he was well disposed toward an amicable

solution of the Austrian problem and trusted that he too could exercise

a corresponding influence in Paris.

I further draw your attention to Document Number 80, Page 177. It is a

statement of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Spaak, after the

Anschluss. I invite your attention to the last sentence: “I have

believed, for a long time past, that the Anschluss complied with the

logic of facts and had it been ratified in a normal manner, I should not

have been surprised.”

Mr. Messersmith alleged that Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid

for out of German funds. Did you ever give or arrange for any funds for

that purpose?

VON PAPEN: The Party never received a penny, either from me personally

or through the German Embassy. It is, however, quite possible—and even

probable—that German Party funds did pour into Austria. I was never

informed of this, for it was a well-known fact that I did not enjoy the

confidence of the Party in either country.

There is, however, one exception which I particularly wish to emphasize,

namely, the donation—and it was known to me—of funds in support of the

“Langot” subsidy.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has reproached you for your anti-Semitic

attitude in connection with your report to Hitler of 12 May, in which

you suggested giving financial aid to the Freedom League for the

furtherance of their fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom League?

VON PAPEN: The Freedom League was a focal point, a union of the former

Christian Trade Unions and the Christian Workers’ Union, under the

leadership of the president of the Trade Unions. Dollfuss took over the

leadership in 1934. It would be utterly ridiculous to accuse this

Freedom League, mainly composed of Catholic workers, of an anti-Semitic

attitude in the National-Socialist sense.

The Freedom League fought to purge the administration of Vienna of

unsuitable Jewish elements. The problem of this undue alien penetration

was absolutely similar to conditions then existing in Germany,

conditions which I mentioned yesterday in detail. This fact is also

proved by the report submitted yesterday to the Prosecution. I learned

that the Czechs were endeavoring to establish close relations with the

Freedom League and that for this purpose they desired to support the

League with large sums of money.

I thereupon suggested to Hitler that this possible influencing of the

Freedom League by Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it

ourselves. But we could not of course tell the Freedom League: “We are

now going to subsidize you so that you do not go over to the Czechs.” So

I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys in consideration

of the League’s continued fight against Jewry, which was pure

camouflage. Had I wanted to give this money specifically for the fight

against Jewry, I would not have written “in consideration of” but “for

the furtherance of its fight.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 32, Page 112 of the document

book. It is an excerpt from the Austrian _Yearbook_ of 1933-1934, which

is an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of

the second paragraph, where it is explained that the Freedom League

originated in the Christian Workers’ Unions and the Christian Trade

Unions.

I further draw your attention to the fifth line from the bottom, and I

quote, “At the beginning of 1934 the late Federal Chancellor, Dr.

Dollfuss, took over the supreme leadership of the Freedom League.”

I also draw your attention to Document Number 72, Page 166. It is a

report of Von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes a report from the

Prague Secret Service. Of interest, in this connection, is a reference

to the fact that the Freedom League was striving for an understanding

with Social Democracy.

The next document, Number 70, has already been presented as GB-243. I

draw your attention to the first paragraph which reflects the efforts of

the Czech diplomats. Document Number 70, Page 164. This is the document

mentioned by the Prosecution, part of which has been submitted under

GB-243. The first paragraph is important in that it deals with the

activities of Czech diplomacy, mentioned a short time ago by the

defendant. Furthermore, there is, with reference to this Freedom League,

Von Papen’s report, Document Number 73, Page 176, to which I wish to

invite your attention.

Another report of Von Papen’s is interesting, Document Number 69, Page

163. It shows the efforts of the Freedom League to gain a foothold in

the political constellation of that day.

Witness, in the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to

persuade the National Opposition to collaborate. What do you know about

it and what were the subsequent developments?

VON PAPEN: In the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to keep

his promise to induce the National Opposition to collaborate. The visit

of Minister Glaise-Horstenau to Hitler in June 1938 took place with

Schuschnigg’s consent.[1] This choice of members was effected without

any participation on my part. But with regard to this “Committee of

Seven” I should like to make a statement. Obviously the Chancellor’s

attempts for appeasement were either not sufficiently far-reaching for

the Party in Austria, or they were too slow. In November 1937 the

Austrian police discovered in the office of this “Committee of Seven”

documents known as the “Tafs Papers” which led us to believe that new,

illegal, and radical purposes were already prevailing. The Austrian

Government did not inform me of these papers, and no official _démarche_

took place. But I did learn that amidst the documentation was a plan for

my assassination. It was suggested that an attempt be made on my life

which would provide a pretext for marching into Austria.

-----

[1] Later he founded the so-called “Committee of Seven” with Dr. Jury

and Dr. Tafs.

-----

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, confirmed this fact

the day before yesterday before the Tribunal, and it appears to me that

this suggestion, this plan against me, best proves exactly how great was

the harmony between my policy and that of the Austrian or German

National Socialists, which the Prosecution insists on taking for

granted.

At that time I was very pleased that the Austrian Chancellor had also

included Dr. Seyss-Inquart, whom I knew personally, in this work of

appeasement. At this point I consider it only fair to make a correction.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has reported a conversation

which he had with me at Ankara, in October 1943. I told him at the

time—and I also repeated my statement during my preliminary

interrogation—that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had proved to be the greatest

disappointment of my life. I had assumed that it was he who had called

for the entry of the German troops into Austria and who was responsible

for the Nazification of Austria after the Anschluss. In the light of the

knowledge we have gained from various documents, I must correct my

previous verdict.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: At the end of 1936 your foremost collaborator, Counsellor

of Embassy Prince Erbach, was recalled from Vienna. His successor was

Counsellor of Embassy Von Stein. Since he took over your duties after

you had been recalled on 4 February 1938, it would be interesting to

know what his attitude was toward both the Party and you.

VON PAPEN: Later I learned that Counsellor of Embassy Baron von Stein

was appointed my Embassy Counsellor by special request of the Party

because he was to have control over my policy as regards the Party. Herr

Von Stein was an ardent National Socialist. His relations with me were

entirely different from those I had with his predecessor, Prince Erbach.

But I want to state that also during that period I continued to pursue

my original line of policy and that Von Stein merely had the management

of technical matters.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Hossbach Document of 5 November 1937 has been

frequently mentioned—did you know of this conference at Berchtesgaden

that this report was based on?

VON PAPEN: Of this sensational conference, of this truly important

document in the hands of the Prosecution, I, of course, never even had

an inkling. I first became acquainted with the document here in this

courtroom. But if I may be permitted to say something more: The

concatenation of ideas between the events of 11 March and this document

appears to be rather tenuous. This document indicates that Hitler only

intended to march into Austria by force, only intended to carry out the

Anschluss by force, if a certain European constellation would make this

possible. He expected this constellation to appear between 1943 and

1945.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this is mere argument, isn’t it? He says

he never saw the document until he came into this Court. He is now

arguing to us about his connection with the events of March 1938. Well,

that is a matter for you, not for the defendant.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, then I shall deal with that later.

Witness, on 4 February 1938 you were, much to your surprise, dismissed

from your post in Vienna. Please inform the Tribunal on the matter.

VON PAPEN: At the end of January 1938 I had been to Berlin to see

Hitler; I talked to him about the conversation which I had had with Dr.

Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch, and I received no indication of any kind that

he intended to dismiss me from his service. I was notified to this

effect by a telephone call from Dr. Lammers on 4 February. This sudden

dismissal, for which I was given no reasons, coinciding with the

dismissals of Von Fritsch and Blomberg and of other leading diplomats,

led however to one final conclusion. I was quite aware of the fact that

this recall meant a change, at the very least, of the political

direction. The following day I discussed the situation with the Austrian

Minister for Foreign Affairs and told him of my troubles. Subsequently I

took leave of the Austrian Government in an official note, and on the

following day I went to see Hitler. I must, however, introduce the

following: I considered this development, through the very fact of my

recall, so serious that I decided on the evening of the 4th that all my

political reports, compiled during those 4 years, were to be removed to

Switzerland. I wanted to be in a position to prove to the whole world

that I had pursued a peaceful and evolutionary policy in Austria during

those 4 years; I wanted to be in a position to prove this to the outside

world in case Hitler should commit an act of aggression. This decision,

particularly on the part of a high-ranking official, was certainly not

an easy one to reach, because I would have to suffer all the

consequences which this forbidden action might entail.

On the following day, I went to Hitler. I felt the urge to tell him that

even if he no longer wanted me, he should at least send another

reasonable and moderate man to Austria. During the discussion I had with

him he did not mention the reasons for my dismissal. I had suspected

that this was due to a wish of Herr Von Ribbentrop, who had become

Minister for Foreign Affairs on this 4 February; but Hitler told me that

this was not the case. During the discussion on the Austrian situation I

told Hitler, inter alia, that I very much regretted that he had recalled

me because, particularly during recent weeks, Chancellor Schuschnigg had

declared himself willing to have a personal discussion with Hitler in

order to eliminate all differences between the two States. When Hitler

heard this, he told me, “If that is the case, then I should be very glad

if you would go back to arrange for this discussion with Herr

Schuschnigg.” I told him, “That is rather a peculiar task. Yesterday you

recalled me, and today you want me to go back. But if there is something

I can do in the interest of the Austrian problem—if I can bring about

such a discussion, I am only too willing to do it.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: How did you prepare that conference?

VON PAPEN: On my return, I went to see Herr Schuschnigg, and with him

too, I discussed the change in the situation created by my recall and

the appointment of the new German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told

Herr Schuschnigg, “It appears to me that in this situation a discussion

between the two heads of State regarding the differences which have

arisen from the interpretation of the July Agreement could be nothing

but helpful.” The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has, as a matter

of fact, confirmed that we had discussed those personal meetings as far

back as November 1937. The proposal was that there should be in

Berchtesgaden discussions about all the differences. No definite program

was drafted. It was arranged that these conferences should take place on

the basis of the July Agreement, that is to say, on the basis of the

maintenance of Austria’s sovereignty. The only essential problem

discussed was the inclusion of a minister in the Austrian Cabinet who

would act as the _homme de confiance_ of both States and whose task

would be to keep the peace between the Austrian and German National

Socialist Parties, in other words, to eliminate in future all

interference by the German Party in Austrian affairs.

Later on, during the Berchtesgaden conference, it was demanded that the

Ministry for Security should be handed to Dr. Seyss-Inquart. This demand

was entirely unknown to me, nor had I discussed it with Schuschnigg. It

was merely mentioned that a suitable man, perhaps Seyss-Inquart, should

be given the Ministry of the Interior. Today we know from the testimony

of witnesses that, in addition to this official conference of mine,

there were Austrian Party channels through which proposals were sent to

Hitler, proposals that were unknown to me.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us an idea of the course of the discussion at

Berchtesgaden.

VON PAPEN: This conference has been repeatedly described here. I

accompanied Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt there personally; and it

is quite possible that when I received them at the Austrian or the

German frontier, I told them that, in addition to Hitler, they might

find one or several generals up there, because quite possibly I had

telephoned to Berchtesgaden in the morning and learned that these

generals were present.

The course of the conference differed, of course, very much from that of

customary conferences of diplomatic life; but it was not quite so

dramatic as has been described here by various sources. To my knowledge,

these generals, called in by Hitler on the previous evening and unknown

to me, were merely effective by their presence and were only meant to

have that effect. As far as I know and within the framework of my own

participation, they were not called in to join the political

conferences.

The tone in which Hitler negotiated, the accusations which he hurled

against Schuschnigg, were to my mind most unpleasant; and for that

reason I repeatedly intervened as a mediator. I remember very well an

incident which occurred when Hitler and Schuschnigg were negotiating

together and the discussion became extraordinarily loud. I entered the

conference room to find that Hitler was accusing Herr Schuschnigg of

being no German, of lacking in national feeling, so that I intervened

and told Herr Hitler, “You are completely misjudging Herr Schuschnigg.

Herr Schuschnigg’s way of thinking is as German as yours and mine, only

he does not want a union of our two countries under the state doctrine

which you are now representing in Germany.” During this conference, a

program was submitted to Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt, which was

unknown to me personally, as I already said. After negotiating, a number

of points were removed from this program, for instance, the commanding

of the Austrian Army by General Von Glaise, and all economic demands;

and therefore, toward evening, when the conference was coming to an end,

I told Herr Schuschnigg that he had better accept the remainder so that

further peaceful development should not be prejudiced. Apart from this,

Herr Schuschnigg only made the express reservation in connection with

this program or this agreement that the stipulations would have to be

confirmed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian President.

Therefore the possibility for later correction on the part of Austria

certainly was provided.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In one point your relation has not been quite clear. Did

you arrive at Berchtesgaden only when Schuschnigg and Dr. Schmidt did?

Were you already in Berchtesgaden, or had you spent the night elsewhere?

VON PAPEN: I traveled from Vienna to Salzburg with Herr Schuschnigg,

spent the night there with him, and went on with him the next morning to

Berchtesgaden. In other words, I was not in Berchtesgaden before him.

However, Herr Schuschnigg has alleged that the morning before our visit

I told him that generals were up there. I cannot remember that; but it

is possible, because it may be that I put a telephone call through from

Salzburg in the morning and was told of it.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is one more point to be supplemented. Schuschnigg

said that you met him at the border. Perhaps you can clear up that

point, too.

VON PAPEN: Well, Herr Schuschnigg and I had spent the night together in

Salzburg, as I have said. The next morning I went ahead as far as the

border, and waited for him at the German border.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Berchtesgaden agreement differ basically from the

Agreement of 11 July 1936?

VON PAPEN: The result of the Berchtesgaden arrangements was certainly an

enlargement compared with the Agreement of July. But there was no

departing from the basis of the July Agreement—from its principles,

that is, the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty. This is evident also

from the two communiqués by the Governments which were issued on the

occasion of the acceptance of the agreement.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the official communiqué, Document Number 78,

Page 174; and also to Document Number 79, Page 175, Hitler’s Reichstag

speech of 20 February, with reference to this question.

On 26 February you paid an official farewell visit to Schuschnigg. The

Prosecution have presented a file memorandum in this connection. Please

tell us about this farewell visit.

VON PAPEN: This note from the files obviously contains the information I

gave Herr Von Ribbentrop over the telephone regarding my farewell visit.

In this note I drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this note?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The file note is dated 26 February and was submitted by

the Prosecution.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Book 11a, Page 1.

VON PAPEN: In this memorandum I mention the pressure brought to bear on

Schuschnigg and under which he acted. The fact that I informed the

Foreign Office should really indicate that I personally disapproved of

this pressure; otherwise I would not have made a report on it. On 26

February my temporary activities, then, were also fully at an end.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 9 March 1938 Schuschnigg proclaimed the plebiscite.

Kindly comment on this.

VON PAPEN: The plebiscite announced by Herr Schuschnigg was, of course,

a complete surprise. In my view it was contrary to the spirit of the

arrangements agreed upon at Berchtesgaden and contrary to the tendency

of a peaceful settlement of the tension.

The plebiscite was a violation of the Austrian Constitution, too. It was

not a decision of the Austrian Government but was a spontaneous measure

of the Austrian Chancellor, and in my opinion it was quite evident that

those elements in Austria who were in favor of a union of the two States

were most displeased with this plebiscite.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Rainer has said in his testimony, and in the

speech which was quoted, that on the evening of 9 March he was at your

apartment. Was this a prearranged conference, a conference at all, or an

exchange of views?

VON PAPEN: Not at all. I was absent from Vienna from the evening of the

26th, as far as I remember, until about 9 March. On that day I returned

to Vienna, and it is naturally possible that these gentlemen came to my

Embassy and talked to me there. There was no question of anything

prearranged on my part.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you in Berlin on 11 March?

VON PAPEN: On the evening of 10 March a telephone call from the Reich

Chancellery reached me at the Embassy with the order from Hitler to go

to Berlin immediately that very night. I flew to Berlin the following

morning and approximately between 9 and 10 in the morning I arrived at

the Reich Chancellery. Why Hitler sent for me I do not know; I assumed

that as this crisis developed he might want my advice; perhaps, too, he

may have thought that my presence in Vienna would interfere with his

plans. At any rate, on this fateful day, 11 March, I was in Berlin and

at the Reich Chancellery. I met Hitler surrounded by numerous ministers,

Herr Göring, Dr. Goebbels, Von Neurath, state secretaries, and also

military people. He greeted me with the words: “The situation in Austria

has become intolerable; Herr Schuschnigg is betraying the German idea

and we cannot admit this forced plebiscite.”

And when I saw how aroused he was, I reminded him again of his promise

to me at Bayreuth and warned him urgently against over-hasty decisions.

But on this morning he told me, “Either the plebiscite must be canceled

or the Government must resign.”

Today we know from the letter, which he sent to Dr. Seyss by special

courier, of this ultimatum to the Austrian Government. At that time he

did not inform me of this active intervention on his part. Then during

the day I, along with most of the persons present, remained in the large

hall while Göring telephoned from Hitler’s private office. What was

telephoned is something we, who were waiting in the large hall, could

only gather fragmentarily; but of course today we know it from the

documents here.

There is only one incident which I want to mention. Toward 5 o’clock in

the afternoon, the report came from Vienna that Schuschnigg’s Government

was prepared to resign. Thereupon I pressed Hitler to cancel his

military orders. Herr Hitler did that. Between 5 and 6 o’clock in the

afternoon the order to the military forces standing by was withdrawn. On

that occasion I congratulated General Keitel and General Von

Brauchitsch, who were present, on our being spared this issue. But 1

hour later the situation was once more entirely different. When a

telephone call came through from Vienna stating that the Federal

President refused to nominate a Seyss-Inquart Government, Hitler again

issued the orders to the troops. Following that, late in the evening, it

was learned that the Austrian Government had requested the entry of

German troops, since otherwise they could not control the situation. I

can still see Herr Von Neurath standing next to me telling me, “This is

such an important report from Vienna that we absolutely have to have it

in writing.”

Thus we were under the impression that this call for assistance came to

us from Vienna. The further events of the evening are known, and I can

only say that I personally was deeply shaken by this turn of events

because it was perfectly clear that marching in with the Army could lead

to incidents and to bloodshed, and new bloodshed between our two nations

would not only have badly compromised the German problem again, but

would also leave the worst possible impression of the conduct of German

policy.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw your attention here to Document Number 97, Page

241, of the third document book. I beg your pardon, it is not yet

contained in the book, it is just being presented—Document 97, Page

241. It is an affidavit by Thass, a friend of the witness Papen, who

talked to him on the evening of 11 March. I quote approximately from the

middle of the document:

“On 11 March 1938, the beginning of the march of German troops

into Austria, Herr Von Papen appeared at the Union Club late in

the evening where he very excitedly and despairingly declared:

“‘I have just come from the Reich Chancellery. I tried to talk

Hitler out of marching into Austria and strongly advised against

it, but he has carried through with the madness and has just

given the order to march into Austria.’”

Did you, Witness, know anything about the military plan “Case Otto”?

VON PAPEN: I have heard about this Case Otto for the first time during

this Trial. The Case Otto was, it was stated, a theoretical preparation

for a military attack in the event that, as a consequence of the

restoration of the Hapsburgs, the Czechs and Hungarians should march

into Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: This is exactly what the defendant was doing just now

when I interrupted you. He said he did not know anything about the

document and he is now trying to explain it. This is argument, not

evidence.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, quite, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Let us pass on to the next question. A

little while ago you mentioned that you had decided that the files which

were documentary proof for your activity in Vienna should be taken to

Switzerland. Was this actually carried out later on?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that was done. My secretary, Herr Von Ketteler, took the

files to Switzerland at the beginning of March 1938.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Describe briefly the circumstances of the assassination

of your assistant, Baron von Ketteler, after the entry of German troops

into Austria. In particular, what did you do to have that case cleared

up?

VON PAPEN: During the days of the march into Vienna my secretary and

friend, Herr Von Ketteler, had suddenly disappeared. I informed the

Viennese police at once, as well as Herr Himmler, Herr Heydrich, and Dr.

Kaltenbrunner. They promised investigation. The investigation was for a

long time without success. Originally I had assumed that Herr Von

Ketteler had fled, since his relations with the Austrian Party had been

very bad. But then a few weeks later it transpired that Von Ketteler’s

body was found in the Danube below Vienna. I filed a charge of murder by

an unknown person with the public prosecutor. I requested a post-mortem

examination of the body. The post-mortem examination took place with the

result that no signs of death by force were found.

Nevertheless, I am perfectly certain that this new act was an act of

revenge by the Gestapo against me and my policies and my friends. I

addressed myself to Göring, who was in command of the Gestapo, and asked

for his assistance. Göring demanded the files from the Gestapo and told

me that there was proof that Herr Von Ketteler had prepared an attempt

on Hitler’s life. I stated that that was quite out of the question. But

then it was ascertained by Göring, through the Gestapo, that I had taken

my files to Switzerland and that Herr Von Ketteler had assisted in this.

Herr Göring promised me to negotiate with Hitler and to demand the

punishment of the Gestapo people who had taken part in this case. I

believe that he did that, but this intervention met with no success.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: After your departure from Vienna you retired to private

life. Did you have new offers for posts abroad?

VON PAPEN: I retired to private life, since my experiences after the

30th of June and later in Austria were not such as to make me desire a

new post. I can only say that, during the period following, Herr Von

Ribbentrop asked me twice to go to Ankara as Ambassador and that I

refused it twice.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a last question with reference to the Austrian

complex, I want to ask whether Hitler awarded you the Golden Party Badge

after the march into Vienna? Please make a statement on that.

VON PAPEN: That is correct. As we know, Hitler was accustomed to make

sudden dismissals; and he had dismissed me abruptly on 4 February and

solved the Austrian question without me. For public consumption he used

to camouflage such acts with cordial letters and decorations. Perhaps I

should have turned down this Golden Party Badge at that time, because I

was no longer in any official position and there was no reason for my

accepting it. However my position in those days was so difficult that I

did not want to make it any worse. My assistant Ketteler had

disappeared, and I had to expect that I might be involved in a State

trial because I had removed my files to Switzerland. Thus I accepted the

badge. But I deny that doing this established my Party membership. I

believe that no one who knows me—even among the gentlemen sitting in

this dock with me—will maintain that I was ever in my life a National

Socialist.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I now come to the discussion of a relatively brief

period, that is, your time in Turkey. May I start on that now?

THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into the affairs after the

Anschluss in March 1938, in view of what the Prosecution has stated? I

mean, does it throw any light upon the past? As I understand it...

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have finished then with the entire

Austrian complex. I now have to deal only with a brief subject, the

defendant’s activities during his time as Ambassador to Ankara. I am

only asking whether this would be a suitable moment to begin with this,

or whether the Court wishes to recess. I shall have completely finished

in about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will in a moment, but what I was asking you was why is

it necessary to go into the history of the defendant in Ankara in view

of what the Prosecution have said with reference to their charges

against the defendant? As I understand it, the Prosecution have said

that they make no charges against the defendant in connection with his

work at Ankara. Unless the history of that time throws light upon the

past, upon the time up to March 1938, it does not appear to be relevant

to this Trial.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In discussing his activities in Turkey, I shall confine

myself to a few points, for the sole purpose, as the Tribunal have

observed, of throwing light on the previous activities of the Defendant

Von Papen. The evidence will, therefore, refer to the fact that through

his activities the defendant made it quite clear that he was a definite

opponent of the war in every phase, and that in every phase of the war

he merely tried to achieve peace. This material from the period in

Turkey is, therefore, to furnish the counterevidence against the charge

that previously the defendant had been in any way an active participant

in the war policy. We must also get a complete picture of a man who is

under the indictment of conspiracy. If he was in an official position

directly before the outbreak of the war and during the war, then

certainly we must investigate whether his attitude during that time does

not supply precise counterevidence against his having been previously in

any way in agreement with the plans which, it is true, were first

executed during his early days in office. The questions are brief, and

we shall...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Under what circumstances were you appointed Ambassador to

Ankara in April 1939? Why did you accept this post?

VON PAPEN: I accepted the post, after I had refused it twice, under

quite extraordinary circumstances. On the day of Italy’s occupation of

Albania, Herr Von Ribbentrop called me up and urgently asked me to come

to Berlin. There he explained to me that the post in Ankara, which had

been vacant for 6 months, would have to be filled immediately because of

the complications which might arise in the southeast from the occupation

of Albania. Before I accepted this post I carefully considered whether I

could do and had to do anything more for the Hitler Government. After 15

March, the entry into Prague, we knew that we were sitting on a powder

keg. In this European problem there were two possibilities of conflict;

one was the Polish problem, where I could do nothing; the other was the

southeast problem which had become acute through the occupation of

Albania. I felt that I could do something here and could contribute to

the maintenance of peace in Europe. For that reason I offered to go to

Ankara at this moment.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: First you went to Ankara to obtain information; you

obtained a picture of the situation there, and then in an oral and a

written report you explained your opinion. Please comment on this.

VON PAPEN: In Ankara I immediately obtained a picture of the whole

situation because I knew all the leading personalities there.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren’t proposing to take the defendant

through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, are you?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention. The problem is dealt with

in a report which the defendant made in Berlin not only to Hitler but

also to other offices. The making of this report and its contents show a

positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I have gone

into this affair briefly. And, Witness, I ask you to outline...

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report is also in the files of the Foreign

Office to which I do not have access.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you had better deal with the subject, but

deal with it shortly.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, please continue.

VON PAPEN: I will be very brief, My Lord. I came back from Turkey, and

told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to maintain

European peace. I sent this memorandum also to Keitel and Brauchitsch. I

stated in this report that it was necessary, in order to keep the

situation in the southeast under control, for Italy immediately to give

positive promises indicating that her military forces would be withdrawn

from Albania and her relations with Turkey would be adjusted, in order

to remove there any doubt in the sincerity of Italian policy. A very

heated discussion on this advice followed between Count Ciano and

myself. Count Ciano was in Berlin on that day to sign the German-Italian

Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was most indignant at

these demands and complained about me to Herr Von Ribbentrop. A very

heated discussion then took place with Herr Von Ribbentrop who told me

that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I, and that it

was after all not my task to make suggestions for keeping the peace.

Then I offered my resignation to Herr Von Ribbentrop and told him it was

useless under the circumstances to send me to Ankara; but Herr Von

Ribbentrop withdrew his statement, and I returned.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this report, did you warn in general against a war

adventure and what reasons did you give for this warning?

VON PAPEN: The memorandum which I gave also to General Keitel and

General Brauchitsch also contained a military presentation of the

situation, in which I stated that to begin a war over the Polish

Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war

were to break out, Germany’s position would be hopeless, for there was

no doubt that England would keep its promise to Poland and that England

and France would come to Poland’s aid.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your reaction to the news about the outbreak of

war on 1 September 1939?

VON PAPEN: When the news of the outbreak of the Polish war reached me in

Ankara, I was profoundly shocked. I had, of course, hoped that Hitler

would avoid this step which must plunge us into the greatest misfortune.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 14, Page 62, an affidavit of the lady

who was for long years private secretary of the witness Von Papen. I

will quote a brief passage from Page 64, the second paragraph from the

end:

“I heard the radio announcement of the outbreak of war in the

Embassy at Ankara with the Ambassador and the entire staff.

Afterwards I walked in the Embassy park with the Ambassador. The

Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and shaken. I had never

seen him like this, not even after the darkest days of June 1934

and not even after the murder of his friend Ketteler.

“That is why I can recall exactly every word which the

Ambassador said to me on that occasion: ‘Remember my words: To

have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the greatest

madness which Hitler and his people could have committed.

Germany cannot win this war. All will be buried under the

ruins.’”

Witness, what were your decisions for the future?

VON PAPEN: What could I do? I could either protest—then, in order not

to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain abroad. I

could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I have always believed

that one can work better in one’s own country than as an emigrant. I

could resign; then I would return to Germany and become a soldier. The

best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and where I could

best help my fatherland.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I come to discuss your various efforts toward peace.

Please describe first your negotiations with the Dutch Minister, Dr.

Visser.

VON PAPEN: Immediately after the Polish campaign I had negotiations with

the Dutch Minister in Ankara, at that time Dr. Visser, who declared

himself willing to have his Foreign Minister mediate in London. The

condition for a peace would, of course, have been the restoration of

Poland with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor problem, the

problem of the German sections.

I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Herr Von

Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin;

and therefore in November 1939 I went to Berlin myself. Herr Von

Ribbentrop told me, “The Führer does not want to hear anything of peace

negotiations; please do not undertake any further steps.”

Nevertheless I went to Hitler, reported the Dutch offer to him, and

expressed the wish of the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin

personally. Unfortunately Hitler rejected all my arguments.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of the Court

an interrogatory on this subject was sent to Minister Dr. Visser, but

the interrogatory has not yet been received.

Did you make further suggestions as to ending the war in 1939? I am

thinking in this connection of a report on the restoration of legal life

in Germany.

VON PAPEN: Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report for Hitler

to Herr Von Ribbentrop, and in this report I said that the first

condition for any conclusion of peace and for any readiness abroad to

conclude a peace would be the renunciation of the present government

methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional conditions in

Germany. Then I told Hitler, “If you do this, you will have more credit

abroad; and it might be possible to prepare the way for peace

negotiations.”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the instruction which you received from Berlin

in regard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless?

VON PAPEN: The Reich Foreign Minister repeatedly issued strict orders to

the chiefs of missions under no circumstances to extend any peace

feelers. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, such attempts would be a

sign of weakness.

I did not observe this ruling because I was determined on my own

initiative to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the

spring of 1941 before the Balkan crisis, I addressed myself to His

Majesty the King of Sweden with the request to begin a peace mediation.

I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, to consider the

possibilities of mediating. President Inönü agreed to do so, while His

Majesty the King of Sweden refused, saying that the situation did not

seem to him suited to such efforts. The Turkish President asked only

that he be officially requested to mediate. That, of course, was not

done.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you think about the events of 10 May 1940, the

entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium; and what statement, did

you make in this connection?

VON PAPEN: On 10 May 1940 I visualized the impression which had

dominated the whole first World War, the question of why Germany had

violated Belgian neutrality. It was completely incomprehensible to me

that this psychological error should be repeated a second time and I

expressed this opinion of mine in a letter which I sent to the Dutch

Minister, Dr. Visser, on 10 May.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do in order to check the spread of the war

to the Balkans?

VON PAPEN: When the Yugoslav crisis broke out and our troops marched

through Bulgaria, I had Hitler send a personal letter to the Turkish

President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that under no

circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason he had

ordered German troops to keep at 40 kilometers distance from the Turkish

border.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1941 you concluded a treaty of friendship with.

Turkey. Will you state briefly the reasons for that?

VON PAPEN: The reasons were very simple: To limit the war. Turkey was to

know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the war in

the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never threaten

Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to advance

through Turkey to the Suez Canal. The negotiations were very long and

difficult, because Herr Von Ribbentrop did not want in this treaty any

mention of Turkey’s contractual obligations to the Allies. I then

pointed out to Herr Von Ribbentrop by cable that the Turks were faithful

to their treaties.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know of Hitler’s intentions against Russia? What

did you think about this war?

VON PAPEN: The beginning of the war with Russia was, of course, a

complete surprise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both

sides, but of course I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact

with Russia and that he would not begin this war. I considered the

beginning of the war against Russia a crime, from the point of view of

German as well as European interests.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, after you returned from a visit to Germany in

the fall of 1943, continue your efforts toward peace?

VON PAPEN: In the fall of 1943, after Stalingrad, it had become clear

that no peace could be established with the Hitler Government. Regarding

this, there was much discussion between me and my friends, including my

military friends. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the so-called

Beck Plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness Gisevius. At

that time this plan did not intend to eliminate Hitler through an attack

on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters surrounded

by troops and then to put Hitler on trial. The reasons for this were

obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war had to

be stopped, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler because

they were of the opinion that Hitler still enjoyed very great prestige.

Moreover, there was the further difficulty that if Hitler were removed,

no one knew what the Allies would do with us.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more shortly,

Dr. Kubuschok.

VON PAPEN: As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to learn

what the Allies would do with Germany in such a case; and for this

purpose I turned to the American Minister, at that time Mr. Earle, who

reported on the matter in the press, too.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 93, Page 214. This is the

interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call as a

witness but who could not come here because of transportation

difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to Question 7 is:

“My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were

always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt to

mediate general world peace between all belligerent states.

Prior to all peace measures, I engaged in detailed discussions

with Ambassador Von Papen and was always warmly supported by him

to the utmost, although every peace measure was forbidden him

and was at least as perilous for him as for me.

“He also made me acquainted with a number of foreigners, above

all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop

Roncalli.

“When in 1942 I resolved to go to the Vatican, not only did

Ambassador Von Papen urgently advise me to make the trip; but he

also personally procured for me all the necessary papers and

passports for Rome, where in spite of the express prohibition of

the Reich Government I suggested to Cardinal Maglione and the

diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop Montini, a world peace

drive by Pope Pius XII with all belligerent powers.

“When in April 1944 I had the opportunity to establish contact

with Mr. George Earle, the former American Minister to Vienna

and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt, with whom I had

long been personally acquainted, Papen again helped me in every

way. He even took it upon himself....”

THE PRESIDENT: These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that the

defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace? Then you

can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which

confirm what the defendant says.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will dispense with any further reading of

this answer to Question Number 7, and I refer then to Document 94, Page

217, a letter of the witness Lersner to Mr. Kirkpatrick. He makes

reference in the letter to the fact that as early as 1939 the Defendant

Von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so that on the basis of

his international connections he could work for peace. He describes the

difficulties in connection with this plan, which, however, was carried

out by Papen. The letter also mentions further peace efforts with

Admiral Von Horthy and with King Boris of Bulgaria. I should like

briefly to give documentary corroboration to the questions raised by the

witness Gisevius. I wish to present evidence that Von Papen was by no

means unfavorably received in the circle of the conspirators of 20 July,

but that on the contrary he was scheduled for the office of Foreign

Minister. I refer to the affidavit of Count Bismarck, Document Number

90, Page 201. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events following 20

July, was sent to a concentration camp. This indicates the character of

the witness. In Document Number 90 Bismarck points out that in case of a

change of government Papen would have placed himself at their disposal.

There was an agreement to send communications through Herr Von Trott,

who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was condemned to death following

the events of 20 July.

Finally I refer to Document Number 89, Page 199, a letter from Pfeil to

the son of the witness Papen. Pfeil points out that Colonel Count von

Stauffenberg, the would-be murderer of 20 July, had proposed to the

defendant that he serve as Foreign Minister later. The Court has already

admitted this letter.

Witness, what was your position as regards the Party during your period

in Turkey?

VON PAPEN: My position as regards the Party was exceptionally bad. For

years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in

Turkey. This man told my Embassy officials, “Herr Von Papen belongs in a

concentration camp, or he must be shot.” I had to struggle a long time

to have this man removed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do during this time regarding Church

matters?

VON PAPEN: During the war I did everything in my power to counteract an

intensification of the fight against the Church. That means that I took

all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer here to Document Number 53, Page 141, and

Document Number 51, Page 138.

What did you do with respect to the Jewish problem during your period in

Turkey?

VON PAPEN: I opposed all measures of the German Government against

German Jews. A long Party trial took place because German members of my

Embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these officials of

mine against this charge, and I refused to take away the passports of

the German Jews in Turkey and to deprive them of their citizenship.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 227, the

interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In Questions 4, 5, and 6 he

discusses this problem. In the answer to Question 6, the last paragraph

is very noteworthy, and as the witness Von Papen has not yet mentioned

it I should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer

to Question 6:

“I remember particularly clearly an incident in the spring of

1944, when I called upon Herr Von Papen at the request of Mr.

Barlas, the Refugee Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in order

to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from

deportation to Poland for extermination. These Jews had formerly

held Turkish nationality but they had later given it up. Herr

Von Papen complied with my wish and through his intervention the

lives of these Jews were saved, as I learned later from Mr.

Barlas himself.”

I continue to quote:

“Details of this incident, on which Mr. Steinhardt, then United

States Ambassador in Ankara, and Numan Menemencioglu, then

Foreign Minister of Turkey, were also informed, can be obtained

by questioning Mr. Barlas.”

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr. Kubuschok,

that you have taken very much longer than you said you were going to

take.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very short time, in a few minutes, I will be

through.

I ask the last question of the witness: When, on 2 August 1944 Turkey

broke off relations with Germany, you returned to Germany, why did you

not remain in Turkey and separate finally from Germany?

VON PAPEN: I can state that on the day of the severance of relations

between Turkey and Germany the British Prime Minister Mr. Churchill said

the following in the House of Commons: “The breaking-off of relations

between Turkey and Germany will have many consequences, including

consequences for Herr Von Papen. On 30 June he escaped the blood bath.

This time he will not succeed.”

As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey. I

refused to do so. I said, “I shall return to Germany where I belong. I

will not emigrate, for perhaps I might still do something for my

fatherland.” Thus I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed

that as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after 20

July there was no possibility at all of doing anything. For the rest of

the time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 226, which has

already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. I

refer to the answer to Question 3 and I should like very briefly to read

the last half of this answer in connection with the problem just

mentioned by the witness:

“The last conversation on this subject took place on 2 August

1944, on the day before his final departure from Ankara after

the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between Germany and

Turkey.

“To my advice not to leave Turkey, but to address an appeal from

here to the German people and the German Army to overthrow

Hitler and discontinue the senseless war immediately, Von Papen

answered in substance as follows:

“‘I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done

away with from a foreign country; one must be in the country

itself in order to fight the regime effectively. Therefore, I

have determined to return to Germany and to conduct the fight

against the Hitler regime there and thus hasten the end of the

war.’”

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have finished questioning the witness Von Papen.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of Defense Counsel want to ask any

questions?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Papen, I should like to ask you a few

questions, with the permission of the Court.

How long have you known Herr Von Neurath?

VON PAPEN: Since 1932.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Is it true that it was the express wish of the

then Reich President Von Hindenburg that Herr Von Neurath was to be

taken into the Government which you formed in 1932, as Reich Foreign

Minister?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is entirely true.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you aware, or did you know from previous

activities of Herr Von Neurath in his various positions as Ambassador

but especially in his last post in London, that Herr Von Neurath was a

faithful follower and an impassioned champion of a policy of peace?

VON PAPEN: That was known to me and to everyone in Germany.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And you yourself approved of this also?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fast. Go on.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself also approve of this peace

policy?

VON PAPEN: Of course I approved of this policy. Otherwise we would not

have found ourselves side by side in this Cabinet engaged in common

work.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, a few months later, take any

part in the negotiations leading to the transfer of the Reich

Chancellorship to Hitler?

VON PAPEN: In no way.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know that Reich President Von

Hindenburg made the express condition that Herr Von Neurath was to

remain as Reich Foreign Minister also in the new Hitler Government?

VON PAPEN: I have already mentioned here that this was an express

condition of Hindenburg’s.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was Hitler’s attitude to that in

principle? Did he accept it only in order to be able to form the

Government at all, or did he approve of Hindenburg’s choice?

VON PAPEN: I believe that Hitler approved completely of the choice of

Neurath as Foreign Minister.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this?

VON PAPEN: Yes, frequently. And I learned from Hitler that he thought

highly of Herr Von Neurath’s personality and capacity.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And did you ever talk to Herr Von Neurath himself

about it?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he make the decision to form this Cabinet

readily?

VON PAPEN: I imagine that Herr Von Neurath also had the same inner

reservations I had at that time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, according to your knowledge, as far as you

could learn from statements of Hitler’s, what were Hitler’s foreign

political aims and efforts at that time?

VON PAPEN: Hitler’s foreign political aims at that time were quite

limited: Abolition of discrimination by peaceful means and by

strengthening Germany’s position in the world.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Until the end of 1937, did you ever hear any

statements from Hitler indicating that he might be determined to use

armed force if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?

VON PAPEN: I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then it is always asserted that in leading

Party circles he expressed such sanguinary intentions?

VON PAPEN: I never heard that in the Party, even among the most radical

National Socialists, anyone ever spoke of the idea of a war.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then to sum up, you agreed fully with the aims of

a peaceful policy that were intended and advocated by Herr Von Neurath?

VON PAPEN: Absolutely.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now the charge is made against Herr Von Neurath of

having co-operated in the rearmament of Germany. What was Hitler’s

reason and motive for this rearmament, which it may be supposed started

before the actual taking over of the military sovereignty?

VON PAPEN: I stated yesterday that the actual rearmament began only

after I had resigned from the Cabinet. But as far as I am informed, all

of my former colleagues held the view that a rearmament was only to

serve the purpose of giving Germany a defensive protection for her

borders.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know

the attitude of Herr Von Neurath concerning the Austria problem?

VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath’s attitude concerning the Austria problem

was the same as mine. Like myself, he constantly protested in the

Cabinet against the terror measures staged by the Party in 1933 and

1934.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you yourself, when Hitler sent you on an

extraordinary mission to Vienna, under Herr Von Neurath? And did you

receive your instructions from him or only from Hitler?

VON PAPEN: I was not subordinate to Herr Von Neurath but had asked that

I might be directly subordinate to Hitler. But, of course, I reported

all steps which I took to Herr Von Neurath and the Foreign Office, as is

proved by the documents submitted here.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the

negotiations in the summer of 1936 which led to the Agreement of 11 July

between Germany and Austria?

VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath had exactly the same opinion as I had, that

this agreement was to serve and had to serve the cause, once and for

all, of peace between these two peoples of the same race.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he influence Hitler in this direction, too?

VON PAPEN: I do not know, but I certainly assume he did.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that he was honest and sincere in this

agreement? What is your opinion? I point out here that the Prosecution

asserts and makes it a charge against Herr Von Neurath that this

agreement was concluded with a treacherous intention.

VON PAPEN: I spoke in detail on that point yesterday, and protested

against the Prosecution’s charging us with treacherous intentions. Herr

Von Neurath had such intentions just as little as I did.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I have two more brief questions.

Do you know what attitude Herr Von Neurath took as to Germany’s leaving

the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I know that very well. Herr Von Neurath was of the

opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference. But,

like me, he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League

of Nations. With his approval, as I told the Court yesterday, I followed

Hitler to Munich at that time in order to persuade him not to leave the

League of Nations.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions, Mr. President.

DR. SEIDL: With the approval of the Court, substituting for my absent

colleague, Dr. Stahmer, I should like to ask a question on behalf of the

Defendant Göring.

Witness, this morning you said that in connection with the murder of

your friend Ketteler in 1938 you turned to Göring because he was in

charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this

fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively

under Himmler and was formally under the Reich Minister of the Interior?

VON PAPEN: It is possible that through my 4 years’ absence from Germany

in Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, of

course. In any case, I had the feeling when I turned to Göring that he

was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo; and after Hitler had

refused to speak to me on this matter, it was only natural that I should

turn to him as the second man in Germany.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the

documents arranged then and it might be more convenient for the

Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1355 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember saying in your

interrogation on 19 September of last year that your present view was

that Hitler was the greatest crook that you had ever seen in your life?

VON PAPEN: That is quite true. That is the opinion which I arrived at

after I learned here of all the crimes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was on 19 September 1945. But I am

more interested in your next answer. Was that not when you were asked

when you made your mind up that Hitler was the greatest crook you had

ever seen in your life, “only after I have known the facts after which

he started to go to war”?

Do you remember saying that?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was not that rather a long time for you to

discover that somewhat obvious truth after your close co-operation with

Hitler?

VON PAPEN: My opinion about Hitler and his inner political significance

was completely clear after 30 June 1934. But, like all other human

beings, I could assume that in the field of foreign politics at least he

would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich

Agreement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see whether you had not

had an opportunity of forming that view much earlier. When you were

Reich Chancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to acquaint yourself

with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party, was it

not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you did so, did you not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember—I do not want to delay by

referring to the document, but you may take it as an exact

quotation—that on 16 November 1932 Hitler wrote to you and said: “You

must be aware of my attitude and the attitude of my Party.”

VON PAPEN: Of course, I knew the aims of his Party; but I may add, if a

party forms a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a great

deal from its program and form a coalition program. That was what Hitler

did on 30 January.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before we come to 30 January I want to

ask you—get your view in 1932. You had very little doubt in 1932,

during the period of your Chancellorship, that if Hitler got into power

Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and unconstitutional

methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power?

VON PAPEN: Doubtless the program of the National Socialists was

revolutionary in this connection, but I explained in detail to the Court

that when we came to this forced solution of 30 January we established a

number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our

opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was very strongly the view of President Von

Hindenburg in the middle of 1932 that it would be most dangerous to put

power into Hitler’s hands, was it not?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that was indeed his opinion, that Hitler had to be

controlled by restricting his power.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just will give you one sentence from the

affidavit of Herr Meissner, which the Tribunal will find in Document

Book 11a on Page 43. This will be GB-495. The number is 3309-PS.

This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner:

“Hindenburg stated that because of the tense situation he could

not with a clear conscience risk transferring the power of

government to a new party, such as the National Socialists,

which did not command a majority and which was intolerant,

noisy, and undisciplined.”

That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President’s views at that

time, is it not?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you know, Defendant—I am not talking about

a coalition, I am talking about if the National Socialists came into

power themselves—it was obvious to you that they had few scruples and

would make short work of their political opponents, is that not so?

VON PAPEN: One cannot say that. In political life it always happens that

a radical party—any party, but particularly a radical party—if it

comes to power and is made responsible, has to eliminate much of its

program. For example, we have seen that in the case of the socialist

parties of all countries.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, is it true, as the Defendant Göring stated

under oath, that he told you in 1932 that whatever else the Nazis would

do Hitler would not become a “Vice” or second man; that he would oppose

any political set-up which did not give him the first place? Is that

correct?

VON PAPEN: Yes, Hitler always told me that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And therefore you realized that Hitler and his

accomplices wanted a full opportunity to put their program and

intentions into effect, did you not?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that. That is a statement which you make

here which does not reflect the conditions at that time. You need only

read the government program, our coalition of 1 February.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do not be afraid that I am not coming

to the period of your coalition of 30 January. For the moment I am just

asking you one or two questions about your view of Hitler, and

Hindenburg’s view of Hitler in 1932 because I want to take it by very

quick but very clear stages.

I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: Did you

realize that if Hitler and his accomplices came into power they wanted,

and would be content only with, a full opportunity of putting their

program and intentions into effect?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that; otherwise I would not have made the

attempt in 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you have told us, I think, but I just want

to get it quite clear, that your views as to what was necessary for

Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the political

differences and strife internally, and an adjustment of relations with

the Western Powers to ease the requirements of Versailles. I am trying

to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And were these aims—I think your first approach

was to invite Hitler to be Vice Chancellor in your Government in August

1932, was it not?

VON PAPEN: That is quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Hitler refused that and he refused a repetition

of your offer in November 1932, is that not right?

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, in order to save time I just want to see if

Herr Meissner puts the position correctly in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of his

affidavit. I will summarize it for you, and believe me, I will be most

pleased to read anything of which you have any doubt. He puts it in this

way: That in November 1932 you thought that the general situation and

the Nazi Party, in particular, could be controlled if the President gave

you the power to make decrees under Article 48 and you had the support

of the Reichswehr and the Police, and at that time General Von

Schleicher disagreed because he thought that the Reichswehr was not

capable of keeping order in Germany. Is that right?

VON PAPEN: It is incorrect insofar as this process cannot be covered by

any paragraph of the Constitution, but constitutes a breach of the

Constitution. Otherwise it is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That he might have had to use

ultra-constitutional methods to keep control, is that what you mean?

VON PAPEN: Yes. As I have said here he gave me this assignment on 1

December.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but originally, is Meissner right in saying

that you desired, after you had failed to get Hitler into your

Government, to rule by decree and by keeping control with the

Reichswehr, and General Von Schleicher said that it could not be done?

VON PAPEN: Now, that is not true. After President Von Hindenburg had

decided that he did not want to break the Constitution he appointed

General Von Schleicher Reich Chancellor, as is well known. At that time

Herr Von Schleicher wanted to create a majority by splitting the Party

and, of course, I supported this attempt of Herr Von Schleicher’s.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just in case it is any mistake of mine may I

just give you Meissner’s own words. It is Paragraph 5, Page 44 of

Document Book 11a. I think, Defendant, it would be convenient for you to

follow it, if you do not mind, so that there is no possibility of

mistake.

VON PAPEN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 5 of Herr Meissner’s statement:

“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg

would probably have taken place if he had been prepared to take

up an open fight against the National Socialists, which would

have involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time

of his resignation Papen and some of the other ministers agreed

on the necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by

employing all means at the disposal of the State and taking

recourse to Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might

lead to armed conflict. But the other ministers believed that

such a course would lead to civil war.

“The decision was provided by Schleicher who earlier had

recommended energetic action against the National Socialists

even if this meant the use of the Police and the Army. Then in

the decisive Cabinet meeting he abandoned this idea and declared

himself ready for an understanding with Hitler.”

Is that correct?

VON PAPEN: In part it is correct, and in part it is not correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell us as shortly as you can the part which

is not correct.

VON PAPEN: My reappointment as Chancellor by Hindenburg, as Herr

Meissner puts it, would have been possible if I had been ready to wage

an open battle against the Nazis. That is completely false historically.

On 1 December I suggested to Hindenburg that he violate the Constitution

and thereby wage open battle against the Nazi Party. Herr Von Schleicher

contradicted that. That is the historical truth.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just so that we will have it in sequence, if you

will look at Paragraph 6 of the same document, about the second

sentence, it begins:

“When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter

Schleicher’s Cabinet, and that Schleicher on his part was unable

to split the National Socialist Party as he had hoped to do with

the help of Gregor Strasser, the policy for which Schleicher had

been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked. Schleicher was aware

that Hitler was particularly embittered against him and would

never agree to co-operate with him. Therefore he changed his

mind and decided to fight against the Nazis, which meant that he

now wanted to pursue the policy which he had sharply opposed a

few weeks before, when Papen had suggested it.”

Is that right?

VON PAPEN: That is quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you see—I want to get the position quite

clear. You told us that you had approached Hitler first in August;

before you approached Hitler you had already legalized the position of

the SA and the SS, which had been made illegal by Chancellor Brüning.

You did that on 14 June, did you not?

VON PAPEN: I had lifted the prohibition, yes, but only for 4 weeks.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it was a good thing to lift the

prohibition against the SA, the terror of the streets?

VON PAPEN: I stated expressly to the Court how the lifting of this

prohibition came about. The intention was to bring Hitler and his Party

to tolerate my Cabinet. The second reason was that the prohibition of

these formations was one-sided, if the socialist and communist fighting

formations were not also prohibited.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on 20 July you had forcefully got rid of the

Braun-Severing Government and got control of Prussia and the Prussian

police under your own hand?

VON PAPEN: It cannot be expressed in that way, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you had got rid of the Braun-Severing

Government and got power over Prussia and the Prussian police under your

own hands, had you not?

VON PAPEN: I did not have the Prussian police in my hands. The Reich

Commissioner for Prussia, whom I had appointed—a very moderate man—now

had charge of the Prussian police.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under the Weimar Constitution you, as

Chancellor, had the right to dictate all lines of broad policy, and the

Commissioner for Prussia and every other minister had to take his broad

policy from you; was that not right?

VON PAPEN: After I had appointed a commissioner, I had the right to

determine the general lines of policy for Prussia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to look at a speech

of yours which you made at Essen in November 1933, where you speak about

this time.

It is Document Book 11, Page 54, and it is Page 47 of the German

document book.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you see the introductory words:

“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of

the national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I

have tried to support with all my strength the work of the

National Socialist movement and its leader.”

Is that true?

VON PAPEN: Absolutely, yes, that refers to...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you if it is true. I may come back

to it again.

“Just as I, when I took over the Chancellorship”—that refers to

you, your taking over the Chancellorship—“advocated paving the

way to power for the young fighting liberation movement.”

Was your work in paving the way to power for the young fighting

liberation movement to legalize the SA and to turn out the moderate

Government in Prussia and centralize the control of the police?

VON PAPEN: No, that would have been a very bad comparison.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause there and tell me if that was not

what you had done. Tell the Tribunal how you had paved the way to power

for the young fighting liberation movement, if it was not by doing that.

VON PAPEN: Yes, I will say that very exactly. The program of the

National Socialist Party provided for the liberation of Germany from the

discrimination to which we were subjected by the Versailles Treaty. I

have spoken here in detail about this. I have explained what efforts I

made to obtain the co-operation of the big powers in this connection. We

wanted to become a big power again, after being a second-rate nation.

That was the meaning of it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I do not want to stop you, and the

Tribunal will give you every opportunity of repeating what you said on

that point, but I do want you to answer my question. If I am wrong in

what I have put to you as the two things you have done to pave the way,

just tell us quite shortly: What else had you done to pave the way for

this fighting liberation movement? That is the question. What had you

done?

VON PAPEN: I had asked Hitler twice to join my own Government, and, when

at the end of January 1933 there was no other way out, I formed a

coalition at Hindenburg’s request with the National Socialist Party.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you believe at that time that Hitler

was absolutely necessary for Germany?

VON PAPEN: I was of the opinion that a man who in March 1932, before I

was in the Government, had 36.8 percent of all German votes in the

presidential election, that that man and his party had to be included in

responsible government work.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But beyond his electoral success, did you think

that Hitler, from his personality, aims, and program, was essential for

Germany at that time?

VON PAPEN: I do not know how a party which controlled 36.8 percent of

all German votes could be dealt with by means of the police.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at your own words in the next paragraph of

that letter. You do not seem to refer to merely electoral success:

“The dear Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep

distress a leader who will lead it through all crises and

moments of danger, with the assured instinct of the statesman,

into a happy future.”

That was, shall we say—we will not say extravagant—but rather strong

language for an ex-cavalry officer to use of a political figure if he

did not think, or if he did not want other people to think, that he

firmly believed in him. Did you really mean what you are saying there?

VON PAPEN: May I say the following in answer? After I had formed the

coalition with Hitler, I was convinced that he would keep this pact of

coalition, and repeatedly—not only in this speech—I professed my

allegiance to Hitler and to our joint program, and I have already told

the Court why I took his part precisely in this speech. This was a

question of stating before the whole world that Hitler’s solemn promise

to keep peace was a serious promise to which we all subscribed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am not going to delay. You

understand that what I am putting to you, Defendant, is this: That

during the early months of your Chancellorship you took action and tried

to get Hitler to come in with you. When he refused you for the second

time, you then, according to Meissner, were prepared to use force

against him. When that was refused to you through Schleicher, you

resigned. When Schleicher took over and got into difficulties, you

turned around to Hitler again. That is what I am putting to you; and it

was at your request, was it not, that you and Hitler had the meeting at

the house of Kurt von Schröder on 4 January 1933?

VON PAPEN: No, that is a completely false idea. Unfortunately, the Court

did not permit me to go into detail about this meeting on 4 January.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you disagree with Von Schröder that it

was at your request that the meeting took place?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. This meeting took

place at Hitler’s wish.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him to tell us about that meeting on 4

January?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly; I am going to deal with it.

Well, now, do you say that Hitler asked for the meeting? I am suggesting

to you, you see, that Von Schröder, who was the intermediary, says that

you asked for the meeting. Do you disagree with that?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I am of an entirely different opinion. What Herr Von

Schröder says does not correspond to the facts. Herr Von Schröder...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you tell the Tribunal who arranged it.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I object to the use of the Schröder affidavit. The

document was to be submitted when the Prosecution presented its

evidence. I asked that the witness be called since he is located nearby.

The Court asked the Prosecution to bring the witness. The Prosecution

chose not to call the witness. Now, in cross-examination, the affidavit

is to be used. I do not believe that that is permissible, since the

decision of the Court would be crossed. The Court decided on the use of

the affidavit in conjunction with the witness. Now it would be used

without the witness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is quite true. I should submit that

it is a different matter using it in cross-examination when Dr.

Kubuschok has put in as part of his own evidence—evidence from

Schulthess’ _Calendar of European History_—an account of this very

meeting, which you will find in Volume I, Page 27, of his document book,

and then, surely, if evidence of this kind has been put in a document

book, I am entitled to challenge that evidence in cross-examination by

the affidavit of Von Schröder.

My Lord, I am sorry, I should have gone further. My friend has put in an

actual statement from Baron von Schröder, which appears on Page 26. He

says that at the same time Baron von Schröder handed the following

declaration to the County Bureau to correct the false press news.

“The initiative for bringing about a discussion between former

Reich Chancellor Von Papen, as the representative of the widest

National Conservative circles, and Herr Hitler, as the sole

leader of the National Socialist movement, emanated solely from

me personally.”

I should have thought that, inasmuch as a statement from Von Schröder

has been put in, I am entitled to challenge that with another statement

of Von Schröder.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I say something, Mr. President?

There are two entirely different things here. Sir David is referring to

a document which I produced from Schulthess’ _Calendar of History_. That

is a joint communiqué by Papen and Schröder, which was published in the

papers at the time. I object, however, to an affidavit of the witness

Schröder, and I pointed it out at the time. The Prosecution agreed with

me at that time that Schröder was a person open to suspicion under the

Indictment and that he himself was involved in the matter to such an

extent that producing an affidavit is possible only if we have an

opportunity to put the appropriate question to Von Schröder. At any

rate, what is here is nothing but a copy of contemporary documents from

the historical calendar by Schulthess. These documents, in agreement

with the Prosecution, were accepted by the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, can you not put the facts without relying on

the document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I can quite easily, My Lord; I will do that.

At this meeting, Defendant, did you not suggest—I am sorry, I

apologize. I think we should have gotten the surroundings. First we will

get where it was and who was there.

It was in Baron von Schröder’s house in Cologne, I think, or his flat in

Cologne; is that not right?

VON PAPEN: Yes, but no friend of mine.