[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
_NUREMBERG_
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
_PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_
_1948_
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME XVI
_OFFICIAL TEXT_
_IN THE_
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
_PROCEEDINGS_
11 June 1946-24 June 1946
CONTENTS
One Hundred and Fifty-second Day, Tuesday, 11 June 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 32
One Hundred and Fifty-third Day, Wednesday, 12 June 1946,
Morning Session 61
Afternoon Session 106
One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Day, Thursday, 13 June 1946,
Morning Session 141
Afternoon Session 160
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Day, Friday, 14 June 1946,
Morning Session 204
Afternoon Session 239
One Hundred and Fifty-sixth Day, Monday, 17 June 1946,
Morning Session 263
Afternoon Session 288
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh Day, Tuesday, 18 June 1946,
Morning Session 312
Afternoon Session 338
One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Day, Wednesday, 19 June 1946,
Morning Session 378
Afternoon Session 417
One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Day, Thursday, 20 June 1946,
Morning Session 447
Afternoon Session 477
One Hundred and Sixtieth Day, Friday, 21 June 1946,
Morning Session 513
Afternoon Session 551
One Hundred and Sixty-first Day, Saturday, 22 June 1946,
Morning Session 592
One Hundred and Sixty-second Day, Monday, 24 June 1946,
Morning Session 621
Afternoon Session 646
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND DAY
Tuesday, 11 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand._]
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr.
President, I should like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday
with respect to the notes of the conference between this defendant and
Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts.
Apparently, Colonel Williams of our staff, who interrogated this
defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the defendant; and
somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced.
So the defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but
I think in error in saying that he turned them over to me.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Yesterday
we had reached one of the most important points in the Indictment, the
question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what
did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the
Netherlands? Did you write any letters?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Yesterday I stated that I had people
sent from the Netherlands to the Auschwitz Camp in order to ascertain
whether there were accommodations and, if so, what kind. I have given
you the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police, that is,
Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to
keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made.
For about three-quarters of a year or a year correspondence was
maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I
do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were
identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters
dropped off later—it never stopped completely—the Security Police told
me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the
Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in
Auschwitz.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, did you turn to Bormann, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich’s
order, I requested Bormann to inquire of the Führer whether Heydrich
actually had such unlimited power. Bormann confirmed this. I admit
frankly that I had misgivings about the evacuation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you do anything to alleviate these misgivings?
SEYSS-INQUART: My misgivings—which increased in the course of the
war—were that the hardships of the war would be a heavy burden, above
all for the Jews. If there were too little food in the Reich, the Jewish
camps in particular would receive little, while probably the Jews would
be treated severely and for comparatively slight reasons heavy
punishment would be imposed upon them. Of course, I also thought of the
unavoidable tearing apart of families, to a certain extent, at least, in
the case of labor commitment. That also was the reason why we brought
forward difficulties for 3 or 4 months.
The decisive argument, however, was the declaration of the competent
authority, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the
Jews were not to be in the immediate theater of operations.
I ask the Court to consider that the most important and most decisive
motive for me was always the fact that the German people were engaged in
a life-and-death struggle. Today looking at it from another perspective
the picture looks different. At that time, if we told ourselves that the
Jews would be kept together in some camp, even if under severe
conditions, and that after the end of the war they would find a
settlement somewhere, the misgivings caused by this had to be cast aside
in view of the consideration that their presence in the battle area
might weaken the German power of resistance.
In the course of 1943 I spoke with Hitler and called his attention to
this problem in the Netherlands. In his own convincing way he reassured
me and at the same time admitted that he was thinking of a permanent
evacuation of the Jews, if possible, from all of Europe with which
Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to have the
Jews settled on the eastern border of the German sphere of interest
insofar as they were not able to emigrate to other parts of the earth.
At the beginning of 1944 I spoke with Himmler, whom I happened to meet
in southern Bavaria. I asked him in a determined manner about the Jews
in the Netherlands. The fact that our Eastern Front was being withdrawn
meant that the camps would be in the battle area in the course of time,
or at least in the rear area. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews
would become even more serious then. Himmler said something to the
following effect: “Do not worry; they are my best workers.” I could not
imagine that the Jews capable of labor were working while their
relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could
expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and
strangle him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you did learn of these evacuations? In your
capacity as Reich Commissioner did you help carry out these evacuations
through your administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the evacuation was a fact, I considered it proper
to concern myself with it to the extent that was possible for me as
Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, power to
carry out the evacuation, to exercise control, and to take steps if
excesses occurred other than unavoidable difficulties, or to report such
to me. Dr. Boehmke was in constant opposition to the so-called Central
Office for Jewish Emigration. We had to intervene again and again, but I
am convinced that we did not put an end to all hardships.
The Jews were collected in the Westerborg Camp. When the first
transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I
vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and
asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly
manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the
transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions
generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains
occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is
true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the
execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of some Dutch
secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an
exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions;
the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of
exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least
according to my reports.
These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerborg Camp. When the
invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this
was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he
said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also release property on this occasion?
SEYSS-INQUART: These Jews who were made exceptions retained control of
their property.
DR. STEINBAUER: In closing this chapter I should like once more to call
the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the
document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish
problem in the Netherlands, and on Page 6 it gives all the agencies
which dealt with the Jewish problem. Under Number 3 you will find the
General Commissioner for Security, the Higher SS and Police Leader H.
Rauter, General of Police. Under Number 4 is the Central Office for
Jewish Emigration, Leader Aus der Funte—under the “General
Commissioner,” as under 3. The report says about this:
“Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality,
an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate
them, or to deport them.”
This was the most important office, which was directly under Himmler’s
Higher Police Leader, and not under the defendant.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as
Higher SS and Police Leader in this case, and not as “General
Commissioner for Security,” for the measures were carried out by the
German Police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech also spoke about his views on
the Jewish problem at one time. The Prosecution has submitted a part of
this speech.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Steinbauer, you
are putting this Document 1726-PS to the witness, which contains a
historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the
historical statement is accurate?
Do you, Defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
SEYSS-INQUART: May I see the document?
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and
it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the
document or whether he challenges it.
SEYSS-INQUART: The presentation of facts is accurate, except for the
addition of the correction which I made with reference to the “General
Commissioner for Security.”
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your
attention ought to be drawn to: February 1941, for instance. You have
the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading
February 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You have to put that to the witness. He said that the
facts are accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you will find under “February 1941” a
statement—I have only the English here—saying that Jews were arrested
and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
SEYSS-INQUART: I discussed this case yesterday. That was a measure at
the direct order of Himmler, which only came to my knowledge after it
had been carried out and against which I protested. To my knowledge,
mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur again after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that
document is accurate except where you referred to under the Numbers 3
and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my testimony yesterday I confirmed the orders
contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual
events.
DR. STEINBAUER: The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is
correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: The actual presentation, too, is basically correct.
Yesterday I spoke also of the burning of synagogues and of the
prevention of the destruction of synagogues in The Hague and Amsterdam.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to refer to Document 79, Page 203,
from Exhibit Number USA-708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made
on the Jewish question. The Prosecution submitted this document. Since
it needs a little explaining I shall begin by reading the last sentence:
“The only thing we can discuss is the creation of a tolerable
transitional state while maintaining our point of view that the
Jews are enemies, and thus applying every precaution customarily
observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will
not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public
life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves
whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the
German people for the sake of the Jews.”
Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking
of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never thought of that at all, and in this speech I was
not even thinking of evacuation. At that time I held the point of view
that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, as is done with
enemy aliens, for the reasons which are given in the preceding part of
this speech, which the American Prosecution has submitted. The idea
still prevailed of treating them as enemy aliens, even though
Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich. I have
already pointed out that that viewpoint later changed to conform to the
measures against Jews, which were customary in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: We now come to...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?
SEYSS-INQUART: This speech is of March 1941. Only once again did I
express my point of view, and that was on 20 April 1943, when I made the
somewhat, I admit, fantastic suggestion that all belligerent powers
should pool 1 percent of their war costs in order to solve the Jewish
problem from the economic standpoint. I was thus of the opinion that the
Jews still existed; incidentally, I never called the Jews inferior.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this topic and go on to another
charge which is made against you—violations of international law, the
subject of spoliation.
Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for this, and the extent to which it was
to be done, originated with the Reich offices. The operations were
carried out either by my offices, by the Wehrmacht, by the armament
inspection offices, or even by the Police and the Waffen-SS; but from
the middle of 1944 on they were carried out in the main by the office of
the Armament Minister, which was also my office, and by the field
economic commands of the High Command of the Army. At that time control
was extremely difficult.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your own attitude toward this problem?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the provisions of the Hague
Convention for Land Warfare applying to this were obsolete and could not
be applied to a modern war because the labor potential of the civilian
population is at least as important as the war potential of the soldiers
at the front. How much could be demanded seemed to me to depend on the
conditions prevailing in one’s own country. These doubtlessly varied in
each country. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reich
Marshal Göring to the effect that the Dutch were to live under the same
conditions as the German people. This promise, to be sure, was not kept
completely in the ensuing period.
DR. STEINBAUER: How was the confiscation carried out? By what
authorities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Until 1943, the Dutch offices carried out our
assignments. The technical experts had to provide me with factual
justification for confiscations, since I was not familiar with such
matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I
prevented the removal of margarine works in Dordrecht and of a brand new
electrical works in Leeuwarden.
Reich Minister Speer issued an important order that only the machines
from factories which delivered more than one-half of their total
production to the Reich, for example, Phillips in Eindhoven, could be
transferred to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: The French Prosecution charges that you favored the
black market. What do you have to say about this?
SEYSS-INQUART: We combated the black market from the beginning. It was
therefore always a so-called “grey market” with us. I had prohibited the
purchase of food from the current production and likewise of other
important consumer articles on the black market. Every case was
investigated by the competent offices in conjunction with the Dutch
offices. If it was a business which had been forbidden by me, the goods
were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch offices. These measures
were 100 percent for the benefit of the Dutch, for what the German Reich
wanted officially it got anyhow. I see from the document that the
turnover in the Netherlands was the lowest anywhere. The figures are
deceptive, though, since prices on the black market were several times
higher than those on the normal market, so that the actual amount of
goods was much lower.
DR. STEINBAUER: In Document 1321-PS the charge is made that you turned
medical instruments over to the SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Please judge that in connection with my
general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals at the
front, for all its hospitals which had been destroyed by bombings. In
the laboratories of the University of Utrecht there were microscopes
which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my office and
what seemed dispensable confiscated. In this connection I refer to a
case which was much more important for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to
tear down the Kammerlingh Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most
famous low-temperature research institutes in the world. I believe only
the Soviets and the Americans have one as well, especially suitable for
atomic research. I prevented the tearing down of this institute which
would have meant an irreparable loss for the Netherlands. Experiments
which seemed necessary were carried out by Professor Heisenberg himself
in Leyden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Document 1988-PS, RF-130, charges that you had the
rolling mill in Ymuiden removed.
SEYSS-INQUART: This rolling mill in Ymuiden was built up after May 1941
by a German firm, which in exchange was given a partnership in the blast
furnace joint stock company. The electrical installations of these works
were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the
intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion the
Reich Marshal was right in ordering that they be moved to the Reich.
This was done. Why no indemnity was paid I do not understand, for I had
issued an order that all such demands had to receive full
indemnification, but perhaps the German concern relinquished its
partnership.
DR. STEINBAUER: The charge is further made that you turned over the
essential transportation means of the Netherlands to the Reich.
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not in substance dispose of the means of
transportation; that was the concern of the transport command of the
Armed Forces. Once I merely took part in demanding 50,000
bicycles—there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands—for the
mobilization of troops in the Netherlands themselves.
DR. STEINBAUER: Another charge is that you had art objects removed from
public museums and collections.
SEYSS-INQUART: I most painstakingly took care that famous art objects,
especially pictures, in the Dutch public museums of Amsterdam,
Mauritshuis, and so forth were especially protected. But it is possible
that loans to these museums which belonged to Jewish persons were
claimed in connection with the liquidation of Jewish property. There was
just one case. A Kruller Foundation existed in the Netherlands which was
willed to the Netherlands State. Without my permission three pictures
from this foundation were taken to the Reich, for which I later
concluded a contract for sale with the museum authorities. I endeavored
to replace these pieces for the museum. They procured some beautiful Van
Goghs and a Corré from the German treasure list, and the head of the
museum once told me that the new pictures fitted better into the museum
than the old ones. The famous paintings were in a bombproof shelter on
the Dutch coast. When the coast was declared a fortified area, I induced
the Dutch authorities to have a new shelter built near Maastricht. The
pictures were taken there, always under Dutch care. No German had
anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944 Dr. Goebbels demanded that
the pictures be taken to the Reich. I definitely refused this and had
reliable guards placed at the shelter, and also sent an official from
the Dutch Ministry who was authorized to hand over the pictures to the
approaching enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in
England would see to it that these pictures remained in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself acquire any pictures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not buy any pictures for myself in the Netherlands,
except for two or three small etchings by a contemporary artist. As
Reich Commissioner I bought pictures by contemporary artists at
exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and
were offered for sale. I also bought old pictures and gave them to
public institutions in the Reich, especially to the Museum of Art
History in Vienna and the Reich Governor’s office in Vienna. They were
all purchases on the open market, as far as I am informed. Among them
was a picture attributed to Vermeer, although it was contested. On the
other hand I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by
preventing its sale to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this
defendant of having bought pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the trial brief. May I continue? Let
us conclude this question.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he
told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about
the pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. I submit to you
Document RF-136. It describes the confiscation of the property of Her
Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: To tell the full truth, I must add something to the
previous question. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from
enemy fortunes, when there was a reason for it, were liquidated and sold
in the Reich. In this connection a very lively free trade developed with
the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless favored by the
free transfer of foreign currency.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to go on to the question of the royal
property, RF-136. What do you know about the order for the liquidation
of this property?
SEYSS-INQUART: I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands we,
of course, had an order to confiscate enemy property, as in all occupied
territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was
merely placed under trusteeship, without any steps being taken to seize
it. Right after the outbreak of the campaign in the East, the Queen of
the Netherlands spoke personally on the radio in a very antagonistic
manner, severely accusing the Führer and making an express appeal for
active resistance. In view of this state of affairs the property of any
Dutch citizen might have been confiscated. I therefore decided to
proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent an excessive
extension of this measure as had been demanded of me, while having the
conviction that I could not make any exceptions. I myself, as I said,
signed the order for confiscation, in order not to implicate anybody
else.
DR. STEINBAUER: What instructions did you give in the course of the
liquidation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I immediately issued liquidation orders which in practice
prevented the liquidation being carried out. I ordered estates or
castles to be turned over to the Netherlands State—with the exception
of one apartment house, I believe—and likewise bonds and securities and
archives, and that all historic or artistic or otherwise valuable
furniture be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands
State could take it over. The commission included almost everything at
all possible in its list. I realized that and did not strike out one
piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Soestdyk and
Huis ten Bosch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted the Huis ten
Bosch installation as a memorial to the people of Brandenburg. Finally,
even the personal things...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so
detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things
were turned over to the Netherlands State.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I should like very briefly to ask in this
connection: Do you know to what extent the property was actually
liquidated?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that 3,
or at the most, 5 percent of the property was actually liquidated.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is enough.
SEYSS-INQUART: The proceeds were turned over to a fund for the repairing
of war damages.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall proceed to the question of the confiscation
of factories and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I may refer to my previous statements. From the late
summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the economic field
commands. There are individual documents available with notations
referring to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came
from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together
with the Armed Forces commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader I
ordered that the strictest measures be taken against these methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two
documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save
time. These are Documents Number 80 and 81, Pages 205 and 208. It can be
seen from these that this was a task of the Armed Forces; that these
confiscations were all carried out by the occupation forces.
In Document RF-137, Witness, the charge is made that the removal of
furniture and clothing from Arnhem was sanctioned by you.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The
front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance
lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It
was being shelled and installations and goods in Arnhem were gradually
being ruined in the course of the winter. The Führer ordered at that
time through Bormann that textiles, particularly, be brought from the
Netherlands for German families who had suffered bomb damage. Without
any doubt the furniture and the textiles in Arnhem would probably either
have been looted or would have been ruined by the weather or would have
been burned in a battle at Arnhem. Although it was not in my territory
but at the front and the executive power thus lay with the Armed Forces,
I gave my approval that under the circumstances furniture and textiles
be brought to the Ruhr area. I ordered at the same time that the items
be listed for indemnification claims. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can
confirm this as a witness.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that.
SEYSS-INQUART: The charge is also raised against me that I blew up
safes. I opposed this most strongly. When such a case was reported to
me, I had my prosecuting authority issue the indictment and the order
for arrest.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall go on to the next question. How about the
blowing up and destruction of ports, docks, locks, and mines in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Blastings were undertaken at the moment when the
Netherlands again became a theater of war. As for port and dock
installations and shipyards, the following is important: The port of
Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe
that that was of decisive importance for the further development of the
offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the
Netherlands began to blow up such installations as a precautionary
measure. I am only acquainted with the fact, not with the details; and I
refused to watch the explosions. But my commissioner and I intervened
with the Armed Forces offices, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of
the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Dutch reports.
I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from this
intervention.
When the English reached Limburg, an order was issued to blow up the
mines as being vital for war. I inquired with Reich Minister Speer about
this, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to put them
out of commission for 3 or 4 months. The orders were issued to this
effect. I hope that they were not violated.
DR. STEINBAUER: We have heard in this Trial of “scorched earth” policy.
Did that apply to the Netherlands also?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a “scorched earth” order from Bormann. Without
there being a military necessity for it, all technical installations
were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland,
that is, the western Netherlands. If explosions are carried out in 14 or
16 different places in Holland the country will be entirely flooded in 3
or 4 weeks. I did not carry out the order at first; instead I
established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting
with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had
been given in the Reich; but that he was frustrating it, that he now had
full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should
not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have
anything to do with them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know about this, and in a certain connection I did have
something to do with it.
There were previously prepared floodings by the Armed Forces for defense
purposes and there were so-called “battle” floodings, which suddenly
became necessary in the course of battle. The prepared ones were carried
out in closest contact with my office and the Dutch offices. Through
their intervention, about half of the area demanded was spared and
saved. The flooding was done mostly with fresh water so that less damage
would occur, and the outer dikes were spared. There were two battle
floodings in Holland, at the order of the commander of Holland. The
Wieringer Polder was mentioned in particular. At that time there was
great danger of a troop landing from the air which would outflank the
Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the execution of the
battle floodings. The commander had decided on it overnight.
When, on 30 April, I talked to Lieutenant General Bedell Smith, General
Eisenhower’s Chief of the General Staff, he told us: “What has been
flooded so far can be justified from the military point of view; if you
flood any more now, it is no longer justifiable.”
After 30 April there were no more floodings.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
86, Page 221, without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of
a purely military character.
Another charge which was made against you, Witness, is the question of
the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you
take to maintain the food supply of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: The food question in the Netherlands was doubtless the
most difficult question of the whole administration; and I believe,
because of the special aspects of the case, it was one of the most
difficult in all the occupied territories.
In the Netherlands there is a density of population of 270 people per
square kilometer, in Holland specifically there are more than 600 per
square kilometer to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated as a
processing economy dependent upon the importation of hundreds of
thousands of tons of food. With the occupation and the blockade all that
had disappeared. The whole food economy had to be put on a new basis, as
well as the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was
certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture and its leadership
that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very
effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich.
Food distribution in the Netherlands was also very carefully regulated,
more so almost than in any other occupied territory. The most important
thing for me was to maintain this food system, although its leader,
Generaldirektor Louwes, and his entire staff of helpers were definitely
hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office, I
nevertheless retained him, because otherwise I would not have been able
to bear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also deliver food to the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the troops, above all, claimed the right to live off
the land, I believe, but grain was supplied from the Reich to an extent
of 36,000 tons, vegetables being demanded in exchange. The Reich
demanded in addition more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle,
canned meat, seeds, and some other products. Vegetables and meat would
not have made so much difference, but the seeds caused trouble. I am
convinced that the Dutch food system did its utmost to prevent
deliveries.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that that is enough on this theme, and I
should like to ask how the general food situation was in the fall of
1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: During most of the occupation period we had a caloric
value at first of 3,000, and then of about 2,500 calories, and in 1944
about 1,800 calories. Experience today will show what that meant.
In September of 1944 the Netherlands became a theater of war again. At
about the time that the first British airborne divisions landed at
Arnhem, a general strike of the Dutch railroads began on order of the
Dutch Government in England; and it was carried out almost completely.
At the same time ships vanished from the internal waterways. It was not
a formal strike, but it amounted to the same thing.
Through this situation the defense possibilities for the German Armed
Forces were most severely endangered. The German Armed Forces then began
to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I got in
touch with the Armed Forces and was told that if the railroad strike
stopped they would not have to proceed so rigorously. I reported this to
Secretary General Hirschfeld and Generaldirektor Louwes. No result was
achieved, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I
discussed it with the Armed Forces, and I suggested that I would give
them 3 or 4 weeks’ time in which they could secure their necessary
shipping space. Out of about 2 million tons available, they needed
450,000 tons. During this time I forbade all ship traffic, because the
Armed Forces was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of
small ships in Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the
defendant?
DR. STEINBAUER: The Report of the Netherlands Government, which the
Prosecution also mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant,
as Reich Commissioner, is responsible for the famine which began in
September of 1944 and lasted until the spring of 1945 and for the great
mortality, especially of children—whole tables of statistics have been
submitted—because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike,
he prohibited the importing of food. That is one of the most important
and serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this
subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may
speak about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to be allowed to comment on this matter.
This is the charge which seems the most serious to me, too.
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now, if Your Honor
agrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Government Report it is asserted that at the time
50,000 Dutch people died of starvation; and, therefore, I should like to
ask you what reason you had for establishing this traffic embargo at
that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have already explained that in the main. The
traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to make sure of its
shipping space. As long as it did that there was no ship traffic as such
possible. I wanted to limit this to as short a period of time as
possible so that afterwards ship traffic could again be assured and
Holland regularly supplied with food. Ship traffic was not interrupted
primarily by my embargo, but rather—the witnesses will confirm this—by
the fact that all ships that could be found were confiscated. Naturally,
I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered; and I
said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for
this state of emergency, and that the military interests of the Reich
were, anyhow, equally important. I thought that if in the second half of
October I could establish an orderly ship traffic, then, according to my
experience, I would have 2 months’ time in which to take care of the
food supply for the Dutch people. Then I could bring in between 200,000
and 250,000 tons of food. And that would be sufficient to maintain
rations of 1400 to 1800 calories. I believe I can recollect that between
15 and 20 October I gave the order to establish ship traffic again.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ship traffic was not established because the Dutch
traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because
they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general
railroad strike. For weeks on end our efforts were fruitless; and
finally I talked with Secretary General Hirschfeld and gave him complete
authority, particularly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal does not think that this
matter can be gone into extreme detail like this.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, perhaps you can be very brief about this and
tell us what you did to alleviate conditions.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am practically finished. I gave Secretary General
Hirschfeld full authority in the field of transportation. He then,
although very hesitantly, re-established traffic. He will confirm that I
supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into
Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Within my sector, I then
provided additional aid, about which witness Van der Vense and, I
believe, witness Schwebel can give you information in their
interrogatories.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I should like to submit as the next document an
affidavit deposed by the witness Van der Vense. It has just arrived, but
the translations are already finished and will probably be given to the
Tribunal this afternoon or tomorrow morning. I shall now submit the
original. I do not believe it necessary to read this document which has
been translated into four languages. It describes exclusively the food
situation in this critical period of time.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch
Government...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number 105.
SEYSS-INQUART: ...that the Dutch Government changed the figure of 50,000
deaths to the correct one of 25,000.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I shall turn to the last period of your activity as
Reich Commissioner. I should like to ask you, when did you realize that
military resistance in the Netherlands was in vain?
SEYSS-INQUART: That we had to reckon with the possibility that Germany
might not win the war will be seen in my letter to the Führer in 1939.
Actual fear that this might happen arose at the time of Stalingrad.
Therefore one had to consider that possibility, and in due time I feared
that things would take this turn; I definitely and reliably knew it
through a statement which Reich Minister Speer made to me on 1 April
1945...
DR. STEINBAUER: 1945?
SEYSS-INQUART: April 1945. Up until that time I did not want to believe
it; but faced with the prospect of an unconditional surrender and
complete occupation, I naturally believed that in every respect I should
have to prepare for the worst because the consequences were
unpredictable. Speer at that time told me that the war, for Germany,
would end in a relatively short period of time because armament
production simply could not be kept up. He said 2 to 3 months.
DR. STEINBAUER: When you realized this fact, what did you do?
SEYSS-INQUART: I decided to end the defensive occupation of Holland
without violating my duties to the Reich and to the Führer. I went to
The Hague and discussed the methods with Secretary General Hirschfeld.
We agreed to get in touch at once with the confidential agents of the
Government in The Hague—which was illegal for me—and to ask them to
start negotiations on the basis that the Allied troops should not
advance against Holland, in which case no further destruction would
occur and the Allies could take over the feeding of the Dutch population
through direct contact with the Dutch authorities for food supply. Then
we would wait for the end of the war.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this not an arbitrary act on your part as far as the
German Government was concerned?
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the date of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: This conversation with Secretary General Hirschfeld took
place on 2 April 1945. Then the negotiations dragged on, and on 30 April
I had the conversation with Lieutenant General Bedell Smith. I purposely
did not ask for authorization from Berlin in order to avoid a refusal or
be prohibited from carrying out my intention. I did this on my own.
General Blaskowitz, the commander of the Netherlands, was very
apprehensive. He called me during the night, because his superiors had
asked him just what was going on. Nevertheless, I was determined to
carry through this matter, for it seemed the only reasonable step I
could take in this situation. I stated that I would assume all
responsibility. On 30 April the conference took place and the result
that I had desired in effect materialized—the giving up of the military
defense of Holland.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what did you personally do?
SEYSS-INQUART: Admiral Dönitz, as head of State, called me to Flensburg.
I went by speedboat across the North Sea and reported to him, and the
Admiral will confirm this as my witness; I succeeded in having the
demolition decree rescinded and tried my very best to return to the
Netherlands. Finally I plunged ahead and was arrested in Hamburg.
DR. STEINBAUER: Just why did you want to return to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I wanted to take care of my co-workers; in
the second place, I always was of the opinion that I should answer for
my administration there; and finally, I was of the opinion that since we
had been out in front in the hour of triumph we could lay claim to being
out in front in the hour of disaster as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination of the
witness.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Did you belong to the SS?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had an honorary position in the General SS. As such I
was not a regular member of the General SS, but I was very much
interested in the SS as an ideological and a political formation.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you exercise any functions in the SS, or did you just
have a title?
SEYSS-INQUART: _De jure_ I had only a title. Politically I tried to
exert a certain influence on the SS in the Netherlands, insofar as it
was not the Waffen-SS, the Security Police, and so on; and in April of
1945 I believe I can say that _de facto_ I was the foremost SS Führer in
the Netherlands.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you have the impression that the SS was a closed,
unified organization, or were there great divergences within the
organization itself?
SEYSS-INQUART: To outward appearances it was an extremely closed system.
Internally there were two factions. One wanted the SS to be just a
political training unit. Obergruppenführer Heissmeyer belonged to this
school. The other faction wanted to make a state executive organ out of
the SS. Heydrich belonged to this group. At first Himmler vacillated,
but later he went over completely to Heydrich’s camp. The SS ideal
disappeared, because Himmler misused it for executive powers.
DR. HAENSEL: Can you limit that as to time? When approximately, in what
year, did this ideal die out?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the first signs were evident in 1938. The
process continued with giant strides at the time of the Eastern
campaign.
DR. HAENSEL: Did not the General SS come a little to the fore ever since
1939, whereas only the executive office groups or the Waffen-SS were
active?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event from this time on Himmler transferred people
from the General SS and put them into his various executive
organizations. The General SS, for me anyway, did not come to the fore
after that time.
DR. HAENSEL: Do you think that the SS man could know about the struggle
for power in the leadership, that he had insight into this at all; or
was he unconscious of this?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that the ordinary SS man knew this, but
there were many SS men who felt very uncomfortable and who remained with
their organization only because they felt it was their duty.
DR. HAENSEL: You said in your interrogation that a decree of Heydrich’s
caused you to have Jews transported from Holland. Did you see Hitler’s
decree to Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think so—a decree from Hitler to Heydrich alone would
not have been for Heydrich.
DR. HAENSEL: You picture the situation as if Heydrich had told you that
he had this decree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, he told me that, and a few weeks later he sent me
this decree.
DR. HAENSEL: Was it in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it was in writing.
DR. HAENSEL: And what did the decree say?
SEYSS-INQUART: That he had complete charge of the final solution of the
Jewish question as well as other matters dealing therewith.
DR. HAENSEL: And when was this? 1941? 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was at about the time when the evacuations started.
That was in 1942.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be wrong. It was 1941; not later.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps he showed me the decree later. I do not know the
date of the decree.
DR. HAENSEL: That must be the case. But this decree, you said, was
conceived in general terms?
SEYSS-INQUART: General terms.
DR. HAENSEL: It could be interpreted one way or another? I mean, you
know...
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I had the impression that in the occupied
territories Heydrich was to carry through the evacuation, and at that
time I was not quite sure whether that was to be a final
evacuation—which, however, was possible. The most extreme possibility
was that the Jews would be collected in camps and after the end of the
war settled somewhere.
DR. HAENSEL: I beg your pardon, Witness, the most extreme possibility
would certainly be that the Jews would be destroyed, is that not so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am speaking of the most extreme possibility which I
thought of at the time.
DR. HAENSEL: And which you could imagine according to the words of the
decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. HAENSEL: Now, the question is: Is there a possibility that Heydrich
went beyond Hitler’s decree, that Himmler himself did not want these
acts which Heydrich committed?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot testify to that.
DR. HAENSEL: Did you talk with Hitler before 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the witness can tell what the possibility
was as to what Heydrich would do any better than we can. He cannot give
evidence about that sort of thing.
DR. HAENSEL: Yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Before 1943 did you discuss these problems
with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was merely present when Hitler talked about these
problems. It was always along this line, to eliminate the Jews from the
German population and to send them somewhere abroad.
DR. HAENSEL: But there was no talk at all about destruction of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Never.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, did
Sauckel cause raids in the Netherlands, and did he have churches and
motion picture houses surrounded?
SEYSS-INQUART: He could not have done that. I would not have allowed
that; and he did not ask to have that done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the operations of
the Army in 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, he did not know anything about that. When he heard
about it, one of his men arrived so that he could in any case recruit
skilled workers on this occasion; but this actually did not take place,
for the Armed Forces sent these men into the Reich right away.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the regular worker transports to Germany, in
connection with the recruitment of workers by Sauckel, take place under
normal transport conditions or under very bad conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether the recruitment was voluntary or compulsory,
transport conditions were always normal. The same as for everybody else
in the Netherlands. They were not accompanied by Police, but by
officials of the Labor Employment Office, with the exception of the
2,600 whom the Police had arrested and who were sent to a camp of
Sauckel’s in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the transporting of
internees or Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the working conditions were for the
workers who came from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I knew about them in the main. They were the same
conditions as applied to workers in the Reich. But difficulties arose.
First of all, the employers in the Reich asserted that the Dutch people
had in part given false information at the time of their recruitment and
did not meet with requirements. Secondly, these labor contracts were for
a certain duration and the employers wanted to have the Dutch people
remain in the Reich for a longer period.
I saw to it that nothing was written into these labor contracts which
would not actually be observed in the Reich, no matter what one might
find out in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Witness, I wanted to put one question to you
regarding the floodings. What did you, your offices, or the Commander,
West undertake in order to prevent the pump stations from being flooded
and so avoid a great flooding of Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not quite understand the question. The pump stations
could not be flooded, only the polder area.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: There were two dangers. One was that of blowing up, and
in that case the pump stations would not have been of any use; anyway it
was not done, as is known, but was prevented. The second danger was lack
of coal and oil. We tried, as long as possible, to supply the pump
stations with coal. This coal was listed as a top priority need. It was
thus placed in the same category as every other Armed Forces
requirement. When we received less and less coal, we allowed certain
very low-lying reclaimed areas to run full, so that others would not be
flooded. There was completely frictionless co-operation with the Dutch
offices; and a deputy of the Dutch Government in England, with whom I
spoke later, to whom I sent my expert, said that from the technical
point of view our flooding measures were not objectionable.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, a second point. In answer to a question from your
counsel, you said that you intervened against the destruction in the
harbor of Rotterdam. With whom did you intervene?
SEYSS-INQUART: With General Christiansen, who was then
commander-in-chief and Wehrmacht commander, who took my side
immediately.
DR. LATERNSER: Then you found him in agreement at once with regard to
your intervention with this military office?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, you mentioned
yesterday the protected industries (Sperrbetriebe). Can you tell me when
these industries were established in Holland and how they aimed to
affect the labor employment program, that is, the transportation of
workers from Holland to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the protected industries were established
during 1943, if I remember correctly in the second half of 1943. The
workers in these industries were protected. Thus, the recruiting and
transporting of Netherlands workers to the Reich was partly slowed down
and partly prevented altogether.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: When the protected industries began to function and work
was taken up, were raw materials brought from Germany to Holland, coal
in particular, so that the orders could be fulfilled?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe all raw materials, with the exception of coal.
Coal was brought in from Limburg.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You mentioned yesterday the Organization Todt. Do you
know to what extent this Organization Todt in Holland used Dutch
construction firms for construction work there on the Atlantic Wall and
to what extent this construction was carried out by Dutch construction
firms?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the bulk of construction work in Holland,
Northern France, and Belgium was done by indigenous construction firms.
This is definitely true of Holland; and Dutch construction firms also
carried out work in Belgium and in Northern France. These firms brought
their workers along with them. In this manner some 35,000 to 40,000
Dutch workers who were not drafted by compulsion were working in Belgium
and Northern France in the middle of 1942.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Can you tell us what results this procedure had generally
on the recruitment of native labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: The indigenous workers naturally preferred to go into the
protected industries or the firms of the Organization Todt, for there
they were at least more certain of not being transported to the Reich.
And in addition, while they were with the Organization Todt they
received special food rations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, when in August or September 1944, because of
enemy bombings on the distribution system, production in Holland was
hampered or even paralyzed, what measures were taken in order to protect
the unemployed workers of the protected industries?
SEYSS-INQUART: Three courses were open to us: First of all, to bring the
workers into the Reich; secondly, to dismiss these workers and give them
unemployment relief; and, thirdly, to retain these workers and to pay
them their wages even though they did little or no work.
I believe it was because of a decree issued by Reich Minister Speer that
the third course was chosen. The workers in those industries received
their pay, and I took care that the factory owners received a certain
compensation for wages which they paid those workers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Witness, you mentioned before a discussion which you had
on 1 April 1945 with Codefendant Speer. Can you tell us what the purpose
of this discussion was?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned already that I, for my part, wanted to talk
with Minister Speer about the “scorched earth” decree. But Minister
Speer also had a purpose in mind. He wanted us to transport potatoes
from north Holland into the Ruhr region and in exchange to bring coal
from the Ruhr area into the Netherlands: In view of the potato supply in
north Holland this could readily have been done, but we did not have
enough transportation means at our command to carry out this plan.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Did Speer tell you about precautionary measures for the
securing of food supplies during the period after the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Minister Speer told me that behind the Ruhr area he had
stored trainloads of food and that he had appropriated the means of
transportation from the armament program, so that if the Ruhr area were
invaded there would be trains with food for this area available.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? I
am sorry, Dr. Kubuschok, did you have something to say?
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner has asked me, as the defense counsel sitting nearest him,
to state that he had discussed with his attorney a number of questions
which he would like to put to Seyss-Inquart. I just tried to reach Dr.
Kauffmann, Kaltenbrunner’s defense counsel; at present and probably all
this afternoon it will not be possible for us to reach him. The
Defendant Kaltenbrunner asks for permission to have these questions
asked of Seyss-Inquart tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will expect some explanation from Dr.
Kauffmann as to why he is not here to cross-examine. He must have known
that the time was about to arrive for him to cross-examine. But the
Tribunal will assent to the suggestion that those questions may be put
at a later date, tomorrow, if possible.
Now, do Counsel for the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. DELPHIN DEBENEST (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic):
Defendant, you have studied law, and you have told us that you had even
obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at the University of Vienna in
1917?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You were a lawyer from 1929 to 12 February 1938, at which
date you became Minister for the Interior?
SEYSS-INQUART: From 1921.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Now, was not your clientele mainly composed of
Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not mainly, but there were some among them.
M. DEBENEST: And yet you told us yesterday that you had been an
anti-Semite ever since the first World War.
SEYSS-INQUART: My clients knew that. It was widely known.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. But it did not, at the same time, cause you to despise
Jewish money.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither did it prevent the Jews from coming to me.
M. DEBENEST: Were you a Catholic?
SEYSS-INQUART: What do you mean by that?
M. DEBENEST: I am asking you whether you were a Catholic.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am a member; that is, I belong to the Catholic Church.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not also a member of a Catholic fraternity when
you were a student?
SEYSS-INQUART: I never belonged to any student organization, Catholic or
national.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. You were appointed Reich Commissioner for
Holland by a decree of Hitler’s dated 18 May 1940; is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Your orders, on reaching the Netherlands—as you told us
yesterday—were: To maintain the independence of the Netherlands and to
establish economic relations between that country and Germany. You added
that these orders were never afterwards modified by the Führer; is that
true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand one word, the reference to
economic relations.
M. DEBENEST: I said that you had arrived in the Netherlands with the
following orders: 1) to maintain the independence of the Netherlands and
2) to establish economic relations between that country and Germany. Is
that so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not put it that way exactly; rather, I was to try
and bring about as close an economic relationship between Holland and
Germany as possible. The economic stipulations, too, were, in the long
run and apart from war necessities, not intended to be dictatorial.
M. DEBENEST: But you did say that you had not come with the intention of
giving a definite political outlook to the people of the Netherlands. Is
that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I would not put it that way. It was my intention to
further National Socialist policy wherever possible in Holland; not to
decree it, but to promote it as much as possible.
M. DEBENEST: Was it also your intention not to introduce but to impose
it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for one cannot force a political ideology on anyone.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. I am going to have a Document, Number 997-PS,
handed to you. This document has already been submitted both by the
Prosecution under Number RF-122, and yesterday by the Defense.
Will you kindly turn to Pages 7 and 8 of the German text? It is Page 7
of the French text, at the paragraph “Measures.” This document, as you
will note, is a report which you yourself made.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You write:
“In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first of all
to eliminate Winkelmann’s influence, which was done in the
following manner: The secretaries general were expressly
informed that from now on they would take orders only from the
Reich Commissioner, which they expressly agreed to. The offices
of secretaries general were retained and the same persons kept
in office, since in the event of their resignation it would
probably be impossible to find Dutch people who would be willing
to take over the administration. In the rightist parties there
were hardly any people qualified to do this; but it seemed
necessary, from a political point of view, that a certain number
of measures, above all economic measures, and indirectly, police
measures as well, signed by the Dutch secretaries general, be
made known to the Dutch nation.”
In short, according to this document, it appears that if you decided to
retain the secretaries general, it was because you needed them for
imposing certain measures on the Dutch people? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but what has that to do with politics? This is a
matter of administration.
M. DEBENEST: As far as I know, this refers to political as well as to
economic questions.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in the German text it says “police question.”
Economic and police questions, not political; there is a difference.
M. DEBENEST: In that case, I will re-read the sentence, bearing your
answer in mind.
“But it seemed necessary, from a political point of view...”
Now is that “political” or “police” which we see?
SEYSS-INQUART: Just a moment, please. Yes, that is correct. But that
does not mean politics in the sense of party politics, but political in
respect to the treatment of the Dutch people as such. Whether they
thereby became National Socialists or not was quite immaterial to me.
M. DEBENEST: Was it in the interests of Dutch or of German policy?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, I admit without any hesitation at all that I
followed a German policy. That was part of my task.
M. DEBENEST: But the German policy of that day was surely the policy of
the National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The German policy was, at that time, the policy of a
fight for existence on the part of the German people, and this struggle
was led by the National Socialist Party. But the basic concern was not
the carrying out of the 25 points of the Party program, but rather the
carrying through of our fight for existence, and that is what I think
this means.
M. DEBENEST: In your administration, in the Netherlands, you were helped
by four Commissioners General: Wimmer in Administration and Justice,
Fischböck in Finance and Economy, Rauter for Public Security, and
Schmidt for Special Questions.
The Commissioner General for Public Security, Rauter, was directly
subordinate to you, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The four Commissioners General were immediately
subordinate to me; Rauter, insofar as he, as Commissioner General for
Security, headed the Dutch police, and not insofar as he was chief of
the German Police.
M. DEBENEST: You had decided to rule and administer the Netherlands
alone; to accomplish this you dissolved the two Assemblies which then
existed; and by the same decree, you restricted the powers of the State
Council to the juridical field.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember this decree, but it may very well have
been that way.
M. DEBENEST: You also seized control over the finances, and over the
Treasury of the Netherlands. For this purpose you issued a decree on 24
August 1940 authorizing you to appoint the president of the Bank of
Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the date exactly, but I did issue such a
decree.
M. DEBENEST: When you arrived in the Netherlands, Mynheer Trip was
president of the Netherlands Bank and Secretary General for the
Treasury?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: For what reason did you have him replaced?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was replaced because he objected to the lifting
of the existing foreign currency and clearing limitations. I put it to
him that he could resign if he did not want to carry out my measures.
M. DEBENEST: And by whom did you replace him?
SEYSS-INQUART: By Mynheer Rost van Tonningen.
M. DEBENEST: You had known Mynheer Rost van Tonningen for a very long
time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe I knew him—only by name at the most. He
obviously had been judged capable of holding the same office for
Austria—in connection with the League of Nations—in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: Since when did you know his name?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most probably since the time when he assumed his office
in Vienna. I do not know the date.
M. DEBENEST: You were not associated with him when he was in Vienna?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I never saw him.
M. DEBENEST: Was Mynheer Rost van Tonningen not a member of the Dutch
National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Was that the reason why you appointed him?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was one of the reasons. Not so much the fact that he
was a member but rather that he represented our views.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly look again at the document which I have
just shown to you, 997-PS, Page 5 of the German text, and Page 5 of the
French text. This is what you say about Mynheer Rost van Tonningen:
“Rost van Tonningen: Meets perfectly all the ideological
requirements, is in line with the Germanic idea and National
Socialism, speaks effectively and animatedly, has a strong
desire to be active, does not find his strength in himself but
seeks the support and backing of other people.”
As far as I can see, we do not find in what you write here about Rost
van Tonningen that he was particularly competent in financial matters.
SEYSS-INQUART: In reference to the other gentlemen as well, I never
described their technical qualifications but merely their political
attitude. I did not say that Mr. Mussert was really a recognized
engineer in the Netherlands and so forth. I described merely their
political attitude.
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. Therefore, you set up in the Netherlands a civil
government, a German civil government.
SEYSS-INQUART: My four Commissioners General could not be considered as
having the same offices as ministers normally have. Certain functions,
however, had been delegated to the secretaries general. But these
secretaries general did not represent a government or a ministry. I
mentioned yesterday that I took over the Government.
M. DEBENEST: But the secretaries general did represent the Government of
the Netherlands, did they not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; the secretaries general were the supreme heads,
officials of certain ministries; but they were not what we call the
bearers of sovereignty in the State. Those gentlemen were in England.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew, nevertheless, that they had been left in the
Netherlands by the Government in order to carry on the duties of the
Government in its place?
SEYSS-INQUART: What intentions the Government which had gone to England
had in making this appointment, I do not know. I assumed that they
remained there in order to direct the administration technically. It is
within the jurisdiction of an occupying power, in the case of complete
occupation of a country, to determine just how the government is to be
carried on.
M. DEBENEST: But did you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country was in conformity with international
conventions?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I object to this question. In my opinion,
it is a question which should be solved by the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question may be asked. The
defendant has already given his views of international law in his
examination-in-chief. We allow the question.
M. DEBENEST: Then answer me, please.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please have the question repeated?
M. DEBENEST: Do you consider that the creation of a German civil
government in an occupied country is in conformity with international
convention?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the way in which it took place in Holland, certainly.
M. DEBENEST: And why?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because, as a result of the complete occupation, Germany
had assumed responsibility for the administration of this country and,
therefore, had to establish a responsible leadership in this country.
M. DEBENEST: You yourself created the secretariats general, particularly
the Secretariat for Information and Fine Arts?
SEYSS-INQUART: We call it the Propaganda Ministry.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: And whom did you put at the head of this Secretariat?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe Professor Goedewaagen first. He, too, was a
member of the Dutch National Socialist Party.
M. DEBENEST: That is true. Was not the staff of the General Secretariat
mainly composed of members of the Dutch National Socialist Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced of that, but I did not know them
individually.
M. DEBENEST: Do you also know that in one of the offices a member of the
SS even acted in an advisory capacity?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch SS?
M. DEBENEST: No, the German SS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then he was a consultant?
M. DEBENEST: He was a consultant for national education and national
development.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite follow you—he was a consultant for...
M. DEBENEST: For national education.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I did not know him. I consider it possible; but I do
not believe that he was there as an SS man in particular, but rather for
other reasons.
M. DEBENEST: You ordered the dissolution of the municipal and provincial
assemblies; why?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say the dissolution of the administration. I
eliminated merely the elected representatives of the communities and the
provinces. I not only kept the administration itself, but also
strengthened it in its functions.
M. DEBENEST: You even turned out the mayors of the more important
municipalities?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly; and I am convinced, with the full right of an
occupying power. The burgomaster of Amsterdam did not prevent the
general strike but rather promoted it.
M. DEBENEST: But was that the same reason that made you turn out all the
mayors, or at least a certain number of them?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not remove any mayors from office until they became
unbearable for me because of their actively hostile attitude. Otherwise
their political attitude was of no significance to me. Up to 1945 I kept
Herr Boraine’s brother as mayor in a Dutch city, even though he was a
very bitter enemy of National Socialism and of us Germans.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. And by whom did you replace all these mayors?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that until the year 1943, at least, the posts
were filled in agreement with Mr. Frederiks, the Secretary General of
the Interior, who was left behind for me by the Dutch Government to
administer interior affairs. There were National Socialists; there were
those who were not National Socialists. For instance, the son of the
province commissioner of Holland was a firm enemy of National Socialism
and of Germany, and yet I appointed him mayor of one of the largest
Dutch cities, Zwolle.
M. DEBENEST: You are not exactly answering my question. I am asking you
to tell me by whom you replaced all the mayors whom you had turned out?
Were they members of the NSB?
SEYSS-INQUART: In part they were members of the Dutch National Socialist
Party. In part they were nonpolitical men; and in part they were members
of political trends which were absolutely against National Socialism and
against Germany. In time there were more and more people of the Dutch
National Socialist Party, for other people did not put themselves at our
disposal any longer. That was the greatest success of the Dutch
resistance movement that politically it resisted us so completely. That
was Holland’s significance in this war.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore assert that it was the Dutch resistance
movement which led you to put a great number of NSB people in all the
important positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that would be going a bit too far. The Dutch
resistance movement merely induced the population not to co-operate with
the occupying power at all, so that outside of the members of the Dutch
National Socialist Party there was no one who wanted to work with us.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the
Low Countries, you installed agents who were directly subordinate to you
and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the
NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by “agents”? I had
German representatives in the provinces and in the big cities. Do you
mean the German or the Dutch ones?
M. DEBENEST: No; I meant to speak of the Beauftragten (delegates).
SEYSS-INQUART: They were Germans, and I assume that all were members of
the NSDAP. I do not know for certain, but it is quite possible and I
believe that was the case.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, in order to refresh your memory, will you
please take Document 997-PS, which I had handed to you this morning. I
refer to Page 9, in the French and German texts.
I would like to inform the Tribunal that I gave an incorrect reference
this morning. The document was submitted under the Number USA-708, but
it is RF-122.
[_Turning to the defendant._] At the top of Page 9 you write:
“Delegates have been provided for the provinces which have a
far-reaching independent administration. The creation of these
posts was delayed due to the necessity of making a preliminary
examination of the situation. It has now been shown that it must
be less a question of administrative officers than of men who
have had political experience. Therefore, through
Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt, Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess’ staff) was
asked for men who, coming mostly from the Party, are now on
their way and can be installed in their functions in the
provinces in a few days.”
That was true, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I find my assertion confirmed that they were not
all from the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, but I also notice that these men were specially
selected.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, they were politically experienced men for I did not
want any administrative bureaucrats but men who were experienced and
skillful in public political life, not Party political life.
M. DEBENEST: On what basis did you organize the municipal councils and
the regional councils?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, it seems to the Tribunal—I don’t know
whether we are right—that it would be better if you would pause after
the sentence rather than after each word.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by municipal and
provincial councils? According to our concept, the word “council” means
a corporate body, but I did not establish any such bodies, I appointed
individual men to direct the administration.
M. DEBENEST: In the communes, in the Netherlands, there were municipal
councils and in the provinces provincial councils, however differently
you may have termed them.
SEYSS-INQUART: Thank you. I understand. In 1941 I dissolved the
provincial and community assemblies which had previously existed. I
provided for such councils in the community regulations which I issued
then, but never actually appointed such councils because the Netherlands
population did not co-operate and as a result these community councils
would have been only artificial bodies. This provision of my community
regulations did not go into effect.
M. DEBENEST: But on what basis did this regulation establish this
organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall any certain basis. I assume that it was
established by law, if it was provided for at all.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will put the question in a different manner and
perhaps you will be able to answer it. Did you introduce, by means of
your regulations, the Führer Principle?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I called it the “one-man responsibility,” and I am
of the opinion that in times of crisis a “one-man responsibility” is the
correct thing.
M. DEBENEST: That was, in fact, the system which was also applied in
Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Perhaps it was not exactly the same, but
under the circumstances I considered it correct.
I repeat what I said yesterday: We committed an error here. We committed
the error of considering the order imposed by the occupational forces
better than that already existing in the occupied territory.
M. DEBENEST: Well, the introduction of this principle had a particular
importance, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly thought it did; especially in these
territorial districts I had to have a man who was responsible to me for
the administration and not an anonymous majority of a representative
body.
M. DEBENEST: I am having Document F-861 handed to you, which I submit
under Number RF-1524. From the last paragraph you will see the
importance which was attached to that in the Reich. It is a letter of
the Minister of the Interior dated 6 September 1941. It reads as
follows:
“Particular importance must be accorded to the decree because it
contains detailed regulations concerning the introduction of the
Führer Principle in the municipal government of the
Netherlands.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The Minister of the Interior was interested in this.
I should only like to point out, to get things straight, that the Reich
Minister of the Interior exerted no influence, and in the second place
that these larger powers were given in 1941 to at least 80 percent of
the mayors, who belonged to the democratic party and were therefore my
political opponents.
MR. PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you established, by the questions
that you have put to this defendant, that he did alter, to a
considerable extent, the form of government in the Netherlands, and that
he introduced a different form of government? Isn’t that all that you
really require for the argument which, no doubt, you intend to present?
The details of it don’t very much matter, do they?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I simply wish to demonstrate that, contrary
to what the defendant said, he had sought to impose the National
Socialist system upon the people of the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, to a large extent, I think he had admitted that. He
said just now that he introduced what he called “one-man
responsibility,” which is another phrase for the Führer Principle, and
that he had dissolved various organizations of the Netherlands
Government. All I am suggesting to you is that, having got those general
admissions, it isn’t necessary to go into details about the exact amount
that the Government of the Netherlands was interfered with or the exact
way in which it was replaced. Isn’t it really all stated in a document
drawn up by the defendant, namely, the document you have been putting,
997-PS?
M. DEBENEST: More or less, Mr. President, but not entirely.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only question is whether the details are really
very important for the Tribunal.
M. DEBENEST: I thought that those details might have a certain
importance, since the governors of the Reich itself attached a great
deal of importance to it and, in fact, the whole was part of a plan
which had been definitely laid down.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is inclined to think that you have got
all that is necessary for the argument which you are indicating that you
would present. If there are any particular details that you think
important to us, no doubt you can bring them out.
M. DEBENEST: Quite so, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] For what purpose had you centralized the
police into a police directorate?
SEYSS-INQUART: I will repeat my testimony of yesterday. The Netherlands
police was under three or four different agencies, the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, I believe the Army Ministry, and so
forth. For the sake of a clear police administration, I thought it
necessary to combine these various police organizations in one and to
place it under the Ministry of Justice.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not appoint as chief of this police a National
Socialist?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: In short, the end that you had in view—was it not to place
the Netherlands in the hands of the NSDAP and thus adapt the internal
organization of the Netherlands to that of the Reich? In other words, to
do something similar to what you had done in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that one can say that. In particular,
the policy of the NSB was not that of the NSDAP. The NSB was different
in many respects. In the second place, if I had wanted to do that, I
would have been able to make Herr Mussert Prime Minister; that would
have been less complicated. The simple explanation is that I used,
possibly in a somewhat schematic way, the example of the Reich as a
model in setting up an administration in the Netherlands, which, at
least in part, made it possible for me to carry out my task of watching
over safety and order. Yesterday I only asserted that I forced no Dutch
citizen to become a National Socialist. I did not deny that a certain
co-ordination was undertaken due to the mistakes which I have repeatedly
admitted.
M. DEBENEST: But you placed members of the NSB in all the administrative
bodies, the higher offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not exclusively, but I did it because in the last
analysis I could rely only on them; all others sabotaged my orders.
M. DEBENEST: You told the Tribunal yesterday of the dismissal of the
magistrates of the court of Leeuwarden. Would you tell us again the
exact causes of this dismissal?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were not the magistrates but the administrators of
the court. This court of Leeuwarden had said in a public judgment that
those Dutch citizens who were condemned by Dutch courts and sent to a
Dutch prison would be transferred to German concentration camps,
maltreated, and executed. As a result, the court no longer felt in a
position to sentence a Dutch citizen.
This statement of the court was wrong in my opinion. In my opinion Dutch
citizens have not been sent from Netherlands prisons to German
concentration camps to be executed there.
In the meantime I cleared up the situation at the suggestion of the
Amsterdam judges, and through the Secretary General for Justice I had
the court in Leeuwarden requested to continue passing sentence. The
court in Leeuwarden did not do so. Thereupon, I dismissed this court.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I have here the document “Verdict of the Court of
Appeal of Leeuwarden” and there is no question of Dutch prisoners being
sent to concentration camps or being tortured or otherwise put to death.
All that is mentioned is that the magistrates of that court do not wish
that the detainees be sent to concentration camps after they have served
their sentence.
I shall hand you the original of this document so that you can check it.
The document has already been submitted under Number RF-931.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not receive a German translation or the original
German.
M. DEBENEST: Then I shall read you the translation of the judgment; you
may check it:
“Considering that the court wishes to take into account the fact
that for some time past various terms of imprisonment have been
imposed by the Dutch judges upon the people contrary to the
intentions of the legislation, and the penalties of the judges
have been executed in a manner which aggravates those penalties
to such an extent that it is impossible for the judge to foresee
or even to suppose the penalty to be inflicted....”
THE PRESIDENT: Why not summarize the document to the witness, do it in
that way? You can give the effect of the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
This judgment sets out in detail that the judges no longer wish to
pronounce a penalty which might result in preventive detention.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear the question?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Mr. President, but why did they not want to pass
sentence? I had the German translation here in my hands, and I took this
translation as my basis in this matter because I did not recall this
judgment. I read it here, and I remember that it stated there that these
Dutch prisoners were to go to German concentration camps to be tortured
and executed.
THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t appear to say anything about that in the
judgment before us. There is nothing about that in the judgment, is
there?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, the defendant claims that the judges did not
wish to pronounce any such judgment any more so that people would not be
sent to concentration camps to be tortured or executed. There is no
question of that in the judgment. The only thing that is mentioned is
that the court did not want to inflict any penalty which would result in
the people being sent away to concentration camps. I do not see that
there is anything in this judgment which the defendant might consider as
a personal insult or injury.
SEYSS-INQUART: Now I have the German text. It reads:
“The court wishes to take into consideration the fact that for
some time judges have imposed penalties and that Dutch criminals
of male sex, contrary to legal prescription and contrary to the
intention of the legislator and the judge, have been executed
and are being executed in the camp in a manner which”—and so
forth.
Those are the concentration camps which the court meant. It concerns the
fact that prisoners were sent from Dutch prisons to German camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: As regards education, did you not bring about very
extensive changes?
SEYSS-INQUART: I introduced the supervision of the curriculum of the
schools, and I made my influence felt in the appointment of teachers,
particularly in the very numerous private schools in the Netherlands.
Two-thirds of the Netherlands schools were private. I felt it necessary
because in these schools there was definitely an anti-German tendency
which was taught to the students. The Netherlands Education Ministry had
the supervision of these matters.
M. DEBENEST: You thereby prevented a large number of clergymen from
taking part in public education.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe so. I ordered, or agreed to the order,
that clergymen should not be heads of schools. As for clergymen who were
teachers, I agreed to have their pay reduced by one-third. They were
able to continue to teach with two-thirds of their income, and with the
money which was saved I gave positions to 4,000 young teachers out of
work.
M. DEBENEST: Talking of teachers, did you not cause the creation of a
special school for teachers?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I believe you mean courses which were given in
Amersfoort or for those who volunteered for them.
M. DEBENEST: No. What I mean is those teachers who were compelled to
take a course for a few months in Germany before their appointment.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the case. It might be those who were to
teach German in the Netherlands schools. In that case, it is possible
that I demanded that they first spend a certain time in Germany in order
to be employed.
M. DEBENEST: You did, as a matter of fact, make the study of the German
language in certain classes obligatory?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the 7th grade, and also in the 8th grade which I newly
introduced. But at the same time, I also had instruction in the Dutch
language increased in order to prove that I did not want to germanize
the Dutch, but only wanted to give them an opportunity to study the
German language.
M. DEBENEST: But they already had that opportunity. German was taught
simultaneously along with English and French. You imposed the teaching
of the German language at the expense of the other two foreign
languages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I spoke of the elementary schools in which the study of
German had not yet been introduced. It is conceivable that in the
secondary schools instruction in German was increased at the expense of
instruction in English and French.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not order the closing down of several universities?
And why did you do so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I recall only the closing of the University of Leyden.
When, according to my instructions, Jewish professors of the faculty
were dismissed, the students of the University of Leyden went on strike
for an extended period of time, and I thereupon closed its doors. I do
not recall having closed any other universities. The Catholic University
in Nijmegen and the Calvinistic University in Amsterdam, as far as I can
recall, closed of their own accord.
M. DEBENEST: And the Polytechnic Institute at Delft? You did not order
it to be closed either?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. That was a temporary measure. It was reopened, as
far as I recall.
M. DEBENEST: How about the Catholic Commercial College at Tilburg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember that.
M. DEBENEST: It was in 1943.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. It is quite possible that for some
reason or other it was closed, probably because it seemed to me to
endanger the interests of the occupation forces.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to investigate this in detail, is it?
If the defendant said that he closed one school without giving an
adequate reason why, isn’t that sufficient for you to develop your
argument?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Later on you attempted to turn the
University of Leyden into a National Socialist university?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you consider the appointment of 2 or 3 professors out
of some 100 or 50 professors as such, I should have to say yes. I cannot
recall any other measures. Once it was suggested to me to establish a
university in Leyden at which German and Dutch students could study, and
that studies there should find suitable recognition in Germany. This did
not come about.
M. DEBENEST: Anyway, you admit that you had the intention of creating
this school?
SEYSS-INQUART: “Intention” is a little too strong. These ideas were
discussed. There was another idea. In the Netherlands, in the German
Wehrmacht, we had a number of university students who had not been able
to continue their studies for understandable reasons. It was considered
at that time to hold courses at Leyden for these university students in
the Wehrmacht, which would be a sort of continuation of their studies.
M. DEBENEST: I shall have Document F-803 presented to you, which I
submit under the Number RF-1525. This is a report from the Ministry of
National Education of the Netherlands. It is on Page 23 of the French
version and Page 16 of the German version.
I shall read the passage:
“Attempts were made to make the University of Leyden a National
Socialist university by appointing National Socialist
professors. However, these attempts failed as a result of the
firm attitude taken by the professors and by the students.
Certain professors even....”
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on Page 15?
M. DEBENEST: That is on Page 23 of the French text, in the last
paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: What is it?
M. DEBENEST: It is F-803.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask what document it was. I asked what is the
nature of the document.
M. DEBENEST: I pointed out to the Tribunal that it was a report of the
Minister for Education in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Was he appointed by the defendant, or appointed before
the war?
M. DEBENEST: It is the present Minister for Education. I would point out
to the Tribunal that I am obliged to go into a certain amount of detail,
because when the French Prosecution presented its case, we did not have
all the documents at our disposal, and the Dutch Government is anxious
to have these facts presented in as detailed a manner as possible.
I might add that today I am producing documents which emanate from the
Dutch Government.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Page 23?
M. DEBENEST: Page 23 of the French text, six lines before the end of the
last paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: “Attempts were made to make the University of
Leyden a National Socialist university by appointing National
Socialist professors. However, these attempts failed as a result
of the firm attitude taken by the professors and by the
students. The professors even presented their collective
resignation in May 1942, and as there was no reaction to it,
they presented it a second time in September of the same year.”
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the defendant has already said this, has he not?
This is Leyden University that you are speaking about, is it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. If I understood correctly, I believe
the defendant said that there had been question of creating a National
Socialist school in Leyden but that he had not put this project into
effect. On the other hand, it appears from this document that it did not
depend upon him but that it was a result of the attitude of the
teachers. That is what I wanted to bring out.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I comment on that?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: The fact that there was an attempt to make Leyden a
National Socialist university is stated only in this document. I repeat
my assertion that I appointed two, or at the most three, professors who
were National Socialists, and this document shows clearly what my
attitude was. I did nothing at all against the demonstrative gesture of
resignation of the professors. The second attempt was also unanswered.
The fact that arrests occurred then is connected with the fact that part
of the professors were otherwise suspected, and these professors were
sent to St. Michelsgestel. That is this concentration camp where the
inmates played golf.
M. DEBENEST: Then that was a coincidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not say that. Certainly after the second attempt
we checked up on the gentlemen a little.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not take measures to oblige the students to do
forced labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think that this was done as long as they were
studying, for I had issued express orders for the exemption of all
students. Advanced technical students were given exemption and
university students who were actually studying or had fulfilled the
requirements for study were not forced to work, either, as far as I
remember.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I shall give you briefly an account of Paragraph 2 of
your regulation. It is the Ordinance of 11 March 1943, Number 27.
“Any student who, after the present regulation has been put into
effect, has successfully passed the final examination or a
similar test in one of the studies mentioned in Paragraph 1 and
specified as such by orders of the Secretary General in the
Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture, is compelled to
work for a determined period within the scope of the allocation
of labor.”
Is that your ordinance?
SEYSS-INQUART: Does it say labor service?
M. DEBENEST: I have not got the German version in front of me. It is
Ordinance Number 27.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ordinance Number 27. May I ask what paragraph it is?
M. DEBENEST: Second paragraph.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. It says, “Students who have taken the
final examination,” that is, who are no longer studying but have
finished their studies. Members of the same age groups were meanwhile
drafted for labor commitment, and those exempted by me now had to make
this up. But their study was not disturbed or interrupted.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore, the students were able, freely, to continue
their studies?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall any obstacles.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you please look at the next decree, that is,
Number 28, which is a decree of Secretary General Van Damm. This decree
forces the students to make a declaration of loyalty.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct.
M. DEBENEST: What were the consequences?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not understand the consequences. The universities
were, at that time, the seat of anti-German activities. I demanded from
the university students a declaration promising they would uphold the
laws in effect in the occupied Netherlands territories, that they would
abstain from any action against the German Reich, the Wehrmacht, and the
Netherlands authorities, and that they would not interfere with public
order in the university.
I cannot understand why a university student could not make such a
statement. Those who did make it were able to continue their studies
without any hindrance. But the Dutch professors, by way of sabotage,
refused to give them any instruction.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, those who did not subscribe to this
declaration, what happened to them?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were no longer university students, and if they
belonged to the age groups which I had called up for labor commitment,
they were drafted.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not apply the Führer Principle to the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe quite as strictly as in the community
administrations. But I gave the president of the university greater
power because I demanded greater responsibility from him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Was not a certain National Socialist propaganda
made in the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that could not be entirely prevented.
M. DEBENEST: In particular, did not the students have to visit certain
exhibitions and be present at lectures organized by the Party or even by
the Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know, but it is possible.
M. DEBENEST: In short, you interfered in the administrative domain, in
the realm of teaching, and you also interfered in a similar manner in
the cultural life of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, to the extent which I stated yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You did, in fact, create various professional syndicates,
is not that what you told us?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged that the acceptance into these syndicates was
not obligatory and that you never imposed payment of dues?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is not correct. Membership in these syndicates was
obligatory. I am also convinced that the head of the syndicates required
the members to pay their dues. I refused to conclude from the failure to
pay dues that a person was no longer a member of the syndicate, and
consequently could no longer practice his trade, or that his dues could
be collected by way of court action.
M. DEBENEST: However, do you not recall the difficulties which arose in
this manner with the medical profession?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was just thinking of the Medical Syndicate. Certain
circles therein desired that the members who did not pay their dues
should be prohibited from carrying out their profession, or that at
least the dues should be collected through court pressure. I told these
gentlemen that if it was not possible to persuade the members to pay
their dues, I, for my part, would not assert any force.
M. DEBENEST: What were these circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps you can tell me, then we shall save more time.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not the NSB for instance?
SEYSS-INQUART: In what connection?
M. DEBENEST: Did you not yourself say that certain circles had demanded
the payment of dues? I am asking, what circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean what friends or co-workers of mine urged me
to insist on payment? The question is not very clear to me.
M. DEBENEST: I am just asking you to say exactly what you mean by
“circles.” You yourself used the word—unless it is a mistranslation.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal thinks really that you are
spending too much time on these various small subjects. We have spent
the whole afternoon on these various measures which the defendant
introduced in the Netherlands. It is perfectly clear according to his
own admission that he was altering the whole force of administration in
the Netherlands.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not also take part in the persecution of the
churches?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the measures could be called
“persecution of the churches,” but I took measures concerning the
churches.
M. DEBENEST: What measures in particular? What measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the most serious, in your eyes, would be
the confiscation of various Netherlands monasteries. One of them was
turned into a German school and the church building was torn down.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged yesterday that priests or at least one priest
could visit concentration camps? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I did not say that. I said only that in the Jewish
camp at Westerborg there were Catholic and Protestant Jews, who were
visited on Sundays by a clergyman from outside. I do not believe that
clergymen were allowed to pay visits to the concentration camps under
the control of German Police or were able to enter them.
M. DEBENEST: Just one question as regards the press. Did the press
retain a certain—I repeat, a “certain”—liberty during the time of the
occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: From my point of view, much too little. The press was
under fairly strict control by the Propaganda Ministry. The editors were
employed after being judged suitable by the Netherlands Propaganda
Ministry. I believe that it is a matter of course for an occupying power
that for such an important instrument one takes only people who have a
certain positive attitude. I would have wished that these men could have
been given much more freedom of speech, and I believe that I can say
that so far as I exerted any influence, this was the case; but even the
Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands was not almighty.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not reprisal measures taken against certain
newspapers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: We might get on a little bit more quickly. There is a
very long pause between the question and the answer.
SEYSS-INQUART: I must first recall the circumstances. If unexpectedly I
am questioned about something which happened 5 years ago I must think
over carefully what actually happened in individual cases. For example,
I can say “no” immediately, but I am sure that the answer is wrong.
Now, for instance, reprisals—I know that once in The Hague the editor’s
office of a newspaper was blown up. That was a measure taken by the
Security Police. It was the seat of an illegal propaganda group.
M. DEBENEST: You spoke yesterday of the sterilization of the Jews in
Holland. Who introduced this measure?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you say “introduced,” I believe that I can answer the
question correctly. The Security Police informed me that a number of
Jews had themselves sterilized by Jewish doctors and that thereupon
these Jews were freed of all restrictions and could dispense with the
wearing of the Jewish star. These were not Jews who otherwise would have
been evacuated, but who would have remained in Holland subject to
certain restrictions.
I asked the head of my health department to investigate the matter. He
informed me that this was a very serious operation in the case of women,
and thereupon I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to forbid this
action, at least in the case of women. Then the Christian churches
protested to me. I answered the Christian churches—I assume you have
the letter in your files—describing the state of affairs and pointing
out expressly that no compulsion must be exerted here. Shortly
thereafter this action was finished. As I heard, the Christian churches
informed the Jews, and when they were sure that no compulsion would be
exerted on them they no longer submitted themselves to this operation.
I myself returned their property to the Jews in question, and the matter
was ended; although I must say today that the further away one is from
this period of time, the less understandable it is.
M. DEBENEST: But was it you who had the idea of this sterilization?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the matter was reported to me by the Security Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, I shall have Document 3594-PS handed to you,
which I shall submit under Number RF-1526. It is an affidavit by
Hildegard Kunze, an agent of the RSHA. Third paragraph:
“I remember that either in this report or in another report
he”—that is, Seyss-Inquart—“suggested that all Jews who were
privileged to remain in Holland should be sterilized.”
There is no question of police agencies there.
SEYSS-INQUART: This involves the correctness of the memory of a
stenographer. In the third point, moreover, she does not even assert
that the report in the third paragraph is the one she mentions in
Paragraph (2), and which she ascribes to me. It is out of the question
that she saw any report from me wherein I made such a suggestion. The
case was reported to me as a fact by the Security Police, as an already
existing fact or one in process of realization.
M. DEBENEST: So you contend that it was not you but the Police. In any
case, you tolerated it?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the male Jews were concerned I tolerated it for
a time; that is true. It was made clear to me that no direct compulsion
was exerted on these Jews, no threat to their disadvantage.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, do you claim that you forced no one to go and
work in Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the contrary, I believe I enrolled 250,000 Dutch
people to work in Germany, and I testified to that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Good. I shall not dwell on that point.
Did you not also introduce certain legislative clauses as far as
nationality was concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: You mean the nationality of Dutch citizens?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: Did you take part in the arrest, interning, and deportation
to concentration camps in Germany of Dutch citizens, and in what way?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to explain briefly the matter of
citizenship.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: Quite a few Dutch enlisted in the Waffen-SS. It was the
intention of the Führer to give them German citizenship. However, with
that they would have lost their Dutch citizenship, and that was
something they certainly did not want to happen. Therefore, I issued a
decree that upon the acquisition of German citizenship, the Dutch
citizenship would not be lost for a year, during which time the person
involved could make his decision.
This should serve to clarify the purpose and the object of this decree
of mine.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to put to you again the question which I put to
you a few minutes ago. Did you take part in arresting, interning, and
deporting to concentration camps Dutch citizens, and under what
conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bringing anybody into and keeping him in a concentration
camp was exclusively a matter for the Police. I do not recall a single
instance in which I requested the Police to put any Dutchman into a
German concentration camp. It may have happened that I ordered the
German Police to take Dutchmen to Hertogenbosch or Amersfoort.
Especially at the time when the Netherlands courts were very lenient
with black-market operators and slaughterers who supplied the black
market, I did demand their internment in a concentration camp for 2 or 3
months.
However, if you have specific cases in mind, please mention them and you
may be assured that I will tell you everything exactly as I remember it.
M. DEBENEST: No, your answer is sufficient.
Did you participate in the seizure of hostages and in their execution?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated yesterday that I recall only one actual hostage
case, which took place in 1942, and I told you what I had to do with it.
The so-called shooting of hostages, beginning with July 1944, was not
actually shooting of hostages, but rather executions carried out by the
Police on the basis of a Führer decree.
I myself never ordered a single shooting. But I would like to repeat:
If, for instance, I called the attention of the Police to the fact that
in any certain locality of the Netherlands an illegal resistance
movement was causing much trouble, and gave the Police instructions to
investigate the case, it was perfectly obvious to me that the leaders of
the resistance movement could be arrested by the Police who, on the
basis of the Führer decree, would shoot them.
But I must repeat: I had to meet my responsibility, even in the face of
a difficult situation whereby those who were guilty—that is, legally
guilty and not morally, because morally I probably would have acted the
same way as they did—those who were guilty were not put before a court.
M. DEBENEST: As far as the facts which you mentioned yesterday are
concerned, this deals with hostages who were shot following an attempt
upon the railroad at Rotterdam?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who selected those hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hostages were selected by the Security Police, and the
Higher SS and Police Leader submitted this list to me. As I testified
yesterday, I asked why he selected the people that he did and he
explained that to me. Then, in checking the matter over, I crossed off
the names of fathers who had several children. I returned the list to
the Higher SS and Police Leader and asked him to take my attitude into
consideration in the execution of this decree.
Therefore, through my direct intervention, I saved fathers of several
children from being shot.
M. DEBENEST: How many hostages were selected in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall that today, perhaps 12 or 15. Out of that
number, 5 remained. That was the number finally arrived at after cutting
down on the original figure of 50 or 25.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to have you shown a document concerning the
seizure of these hostages. It is Document F-886, which becomes RF-1527.
This is a statement made by General Christiansen, or rather, it is a
copy of a statement made by General Christiansen, which was taken from
an affidavit by the head of the Dutch Delegation. Will you please look
at the fourth paragraph before the end of the first statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I just said that this was only the copy of a
statement which comes from an affidavit of the head of the Dutch
Delegation. If the Tribunal desires, we can certainly have the original
submitted as soon as we have received it.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, there is no certificate at all identifying
the copy, is there?
M. DEBENEST: I thought, Mr. President, that an affidavit of the
representative of the Dutch Delegation existed in Nuremberg. On the
original—I beg your pardon; it was not reproduced, but the original
does contain the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to prove by this affidavit? About the
hostages?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. It says that the defendant himself
selected these hostages.
THE PRESIDENT: In what proceedings was the affidavit made?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, it was during the proceedings which were
taken against General Christiansen in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you say it is admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that we have already submitted
documents of this nature—that is, copies—to the Tribunal, copies which
have been certified as being copies of an original which is being kept
in the country where it originated.
THE PRESIDENT: If the original from which the copy was taken were a
document which is admissible under the Charter, that would probably be
so, if there were an authentic certificate saying it was a true copy of
a document which is admissible under the Charter. But is this document
admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that it is admissible because it
is purely and simply an affidavit. It is an affidavit which has been
legally received in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: And you haven’t got a German edition of it?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, this document has been translated into
German. I have had it translated into German.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, this appears to be a document which is in
Dutch, and General Christiansen, who gave the evidence, was a German,
was he not?
M. DEBENEST: No, Mr. President, the original affidavit is in Dutch.
THE PRESIDENT: The original is in Dutch, is it?
M. DEBENEST: The original is in Dutch, yes. That is according to the
information that I have. Yes, the original is in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: And what was the affidavit given in, what proceeding?
M. DEBENEST: In Dutch, with interpreters.
THE PRESIDENT: I mean what proceeding, before what court?
M. DEBENEST: I suppose before a Dutch Military Tribunal. Yes, before a
Dutch Military Tribunal.
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May
it please the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: This document is an excerpt from criminal proceedings in the
Netherlands taken against General Christiansen upon the request of the
Dutch Government. The Minister of Justice of the Netherlands has let us
have an extract of the minutes which were taken in the Netherlands in
legal form during the proceedings which were carried on against General
Christiansen. The text was, therefore, made in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: This deposition, this affidavit is in Dutch. Now, General
Christiansen, is he a Dutchman?
M. DUBOST: General Christiansen is a German.
THE PRESIDENT: If he is a German why does he give his evidence in Dutch?
If he did not give it in Dutch, why isn’t the German copy here? You see,
we have a certificate here from a colonel, who is said to represent the
Government of the Netherlands, that this document is a true copy of
General Christiansen’s evidence. Well, the document which we have here
is in Dutch, and if General Christiansen gave his evidence in German,
then it can’t be a true copy and it is subject to the translation in
Dutch. What do you say to that?
M. DUBOST: The deposition made by General Christiansen was received
through an interpreter in conformity with Dutch procedure and was
transcribed in Dutch. It is not possible for a Dutch Tribunal to receive
minutes in a foreign language. The minutes are taken in the Dutch
language.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I just say a few words in this
connection, please? I know, for I am in contact with the defense counsel
for General Christiansen, that there was a court-martial proceeding on
the part of the English instituted against him. I have misgivings about
this document, since it is not confirmed, and we cannot judge whether
the interpreter who interpreted from German into Dutch was a suitable
and adequate interpreter; and also, since in this manner I do not have
the opportunity, as defense counsel, to cross-examine General
Christiansen. It seems to me that through the mere submission of this
document the rights of the Defense have been greatly infringed upon.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I have just been informed that General
Christiansen is right now imprisoned at Arnhem by the Dutch authorities.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Debenest, the Tribunal will admit the document
if you get a certificate from the court who tried General Christiansen.
But the only certificate you have at present that this is a true copy is
from a Colonel Van—some name that I can’t pronounce. There is nothing
to show, except his statement, that he is an official on behalf of the
Dutch Government. We don’t know who he is.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President, but we will get the original for
the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will submit an original later on.
M. DEBENEST: Van—is the accredited representative of the Dutch
Government with the French Delegation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have only a French translation in front
of me which reads as follows:
“Christiansen is not here as a witness, but rather as a
defendant, and he was interrogated as such, and he is not bound
by oath to tell the truth. He can say whatever he pleases
without being held responsible for what he says.”
For that reason alone, I believe the document is to be refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the reason why the Tribunal is prepared
to admit the document, when it is certain that it has got the document,
is that Article 21 provides that reports, including the acts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for
the investigation of war crimes and the reports and findings of military
or other tribunals of any of the United Nations, shall be taken judicial
notice of. It is for that reason that the document is, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, admissible when the authentic document is before it.
[_Turning to M. Debenest._] Now, you undertake then to produce a
properly certified copy of the document.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please comment on this document?
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly wait until I read to you the passage which
I wish to submit to you.
It is on Page 4 of the French text, the fourth paragraph before the end
of the first statement, the second paragraph of the page:
“I think that I can recall that already upon that occasion
Seyss-Inquart said that five hostages would be shot. I didn’t
know any one among these hostages. I did not select these five
men, and I had nothing whatsoever to do with their execution. It
was a case of a purely political nature in which I became
involved in my capacity as commander.”
Now you may give us your attitude if you choose to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: The picture which is given here by General Christiansen
as a defendant, not as a witness, completely coincides with the picture
that I gave. In the beginning of this record General Christiansen says
that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and the OKW gave him the order through
his chief of staff to take the hostages, and he says further that
through his legal department he had issued a proclamation that the
hostages would answer with their lives if further sabotage acts should
take place. He then says that they did take place, and he contacted the
Commander, West or the OKW and received the answer that the hostages
were to be used. Then he goes on to relate that he advised me of this
order, indicating that the original ruling with regard to the hostages
still applied, and so I said that 5 of them were to be executed. That is
what I have always maintained, and I also said that 25 were to have been
killed and that I negotiated for the lives of the remaining 20.
The report, therefore, is fundamentally correct and agrees with what I
have said.
M. DEBENEST: But in this document no mention is made of 25 hostages. We
are only dealing with the fact here it was you who chose these 5
hostages.
Take the following page of the statement of 5 March 1946. General
Christiansen declares:
“I remember now that Lieutenant Colonel Kluter also took part in
this conference. There were thus seven participants in all. I
therefore transmitted the order to use hostages and
Seyss-Inquart said immediately that five men were to be
apprehended. You are asking why it was as simple as all that.
Obviously Seyss-Inquart had authority to do this.”
It was therefore you, in fact, who designated and chose these hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: The repetition of these words in no wise changes the fact
that 25 hostages were demanded, as the witnesses will confirm to you
tomorrow, and that I intervened so that only 5 were demanded, and that
altogether the entire matter was in the hands of the Army and the Higher
SS and Police Leader; the proclamations were issued in the names of both
of them. As Reich Commissioner I assumed the right to reduce the number
of hostages as much as possible. The final figure was determined by the
Commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, did you read the last paragraph in the
affidavit, Page 4 at the bottom?
M. DEBENEST: That is right, Mr. President, I did not read it. I am going
to read it.
“I will ask you to note that at this conference with
Seyss-Inquart he expressly reserved the right to appoint
hostages.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I can say nothing more than what I have already said. The
selection of hostages was probably made by the Higher SS and Police
Leader according to directives which he had received from the Armed
Forces commander, or, rather, from his superiors. I myself asked to be
shown this list, for I, as Reich Commissioner, was interested in knowing
who was to be selected, and I tried to exert influence to the effect, as
I have already said, that the fathers of many children were crossed off
this list.
Furthermore, I do not wish to be polemic in face of the subjective
descriptions of General Christiansen. We got along very well together in
our work. The Court will decide whether I am not telling the truth or
whether he is mistaken in this case.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly what I was thinking. You therefore do
contend that this is the only case in which you intervened as far as the
seizure and execution of hostages is concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe so, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did you know about the execution of hostages following the
assassination attempt made on Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated the extent of my information yesterday. I did
not know the exact figure. It was known to me, however, that shootings
were taking place, the shooting of those men who, on the basis of their
demeanor and actions, were to be shot under the decree of the Führer by
the Security Police. The actual figure was made known to me later.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you did not intervene in this question of the
shooting of hostages at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I cannot say that, for I discussed at length with the
deputy of the Higher SS and Police Leader what should be done in such a
case—for after all it was a very grave matter—and whether he should
carry out these executions; I said yesterday that I agreed. I declared
yesterday that I could not contradict him in his decision actually to
carry out the executions at this point.
M. DEBENEST: Who was this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: What do you think of Dr. Schöngarth?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Dr. Schöngarth was not a man who was
especially harsh and very eager to deal with this matter. He must
certainly have found the matter unpleasant.
M. DEBENEST: But was he a man whom one could trust?
SEYSS-INQUART: I always had confidence in him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case, I am going to have a document
shown to you, Document F-879, which I submit under Number RF-1528.
I wish to inform the Tribunal that once again this is a copy of
proceedings which was received at Amsterdam by the War Crimes agency. It
is signed by people who were questioned, and it also comes with an
affidavit as in the preceding case. Here again, if the Tribunal wishes
it, I shall obtain the original for the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will submit the original as before.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Or else get it from somebody in the Government.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
Defendant, will you kindly look at Dr. Schöngärth’s statement on Page 5
of the French document; it is the third statement, the fifth paragraph.
Have you found it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I have.
M. DEBENEST: This is what Dr. Schöngarth says:
“After the investigation, I personally went to see Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner in Holland, with whom I
discussed the matter. Seyss-Inquart then gave me the order to
take increased measures of reprisal by executing 200 prisoners,
who were condemned to death, at the place where the
assassination attempt had been made.
“This execution was aimed at intimidating the population. It was
announced by a public notice that a large number of persons
would be executed because of this assassination attempt.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Well?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event, it is confirmed that we are concerned here
with the shooting of Dutchmen who, as this man says, had been condemned
to death for having participated in some sort of sabotage or other
matter; they were, in line with the Führer decree, to be shot anyhow.
That is the first and most important point. The question is whether the
figure of 200 was mentioned; and the question further is whether I
demanded that number. I still maintain what I have already said in reply
to the testimony of former collaborators; but I also maintain my own
declaration to the effect that I never even would have had the power to
give an order like that to Dr. Schöngarth. He was not at all my
subordinate in such things. I certainly did state that we must act with
severity in this case. That is quite right. The figure of 200—I even
believe it was 230—only came to my knowledge later. The public notice
which he mentions here is signed by Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: You did not say “severe measures”; you said “stricter
measures of reprisal.” It’s not quite the same thing.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand the question.
M. DEBENEST: I repeat: You did not say “severe measures,” but “stricter
measures of reprisal.”
SEYSS-INQUART: The severe measures which were to be taken would, of
course, serve to intimidate. But we were not concerned with reprisals;
that is, the shooting of people whom otherwise one would have had no
reason to shoot.
M. DEBENEST: But it seems to me that this document is extremely clear.
It deals with “measures of reprisal” following the assassination attempt
against Rauter.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which were to be carried through in such a way that
Dutchmen were executed who would have been executed in any event; for he
confirms here that the people had been condemned to death.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly repeat the explanation. I did not get the
translation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Here we were concerned with the shooting of men who would
have been shot in any event, for it says specifically here that they had
already been sentenced to death, as it says in the next paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I already wrote it down 5 minutes ago. You have said it
already. He has said it already. The document speaks for itself, M.
Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
You stated yesterday as well that no hostage had been shot at the
hostage camp of Michelsgestel.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is unknown to me.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you stated that yesterday. Or are you still
claiming that none had been shot at that time?
THE PRESIDENT: Will the defendant answer, please? Don’t just nod your
head. It does not come through the sound system.
SEYSS-INQUART: I wanted to say only that I know of no case. Perhaps on
some occasion such a case did occur, but I do not remember.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you are not denying that some may have been
shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: There might have been reasons which necessitated such a
shooting. But I do not recall a single case.
M. DEBENEST: The hostages who were executed in this manner, were they
all people who had been sentenced to death?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know because I do not know whether anyone was
shot at all.
M. DEBENEST: In the case of the execution of hostages at Rotterdam, was
not one of the hostages arrested the day before the execution, and shot
the very next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am not informed on that point. I can see from this
document that we are talking about hostages from Michelsgestel. I do not
recall that hostages were taken from this camp. But in the circumstances
it may have been possible, for this was an actual hostage case.
M. DEBENEST: No. I am not asking you whether hostages were taken from
the camp of Michelsgestel. I am asking you, in the case of the execution
of the hostages of Rotterdam, whether one was not arrested on the eve of
the execution and shot the next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know.
M. DEBENEST: I will give you the name. Maybe that will help you remember
the case: Baron Schimmelpennink.
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I recall Baron Schimmelpennink came from
Zeeland. But I do not know any more than that.
M. DEBENEST: You do not know under what conditions he was arrested, and
why?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I know only that a Baron Schimmelpennink was among
those five hostages who were shot.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore do admit that numerous executions followed
the setting up of the summary justice courts in the Netherlands by you?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. That is certainly not the case. For these shootings,
from the middle of 1944 onward, cannot be traced to my directives and my
summary justice courts, but rather to a direct decree of the Führer.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that there was not a single case of
execution as a result of your order of 1 May 1943?
SEYSS-INQUART: The executions did not come about on the basis of summary
courts which I had provided for in this decree against violations of
this decree. It is possible that the Higher SS and Police Leader used
this decree as the basis for his decisions.
M. DEBENEST: But you are still contending that you had no power over
this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not have the power to command him, but we certainly
worked together in a close understanding.
M. DEBENEST: He therefore consulted you about all reprisal measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. How do you mean?
M. DEBENEST: Were not the reprisal measures which were taken or which
were announced by him applied with your agreement?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reprisal measures and his announcements were made in
his domain. In many cases I myself did not learn of these announcements
at all, or not until afterward. There was no directive which I gave for
these measures. I again and again refer to the fact that this resulted
from the Führer decree given by Himmler to the Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Were you in favor of these measures of reprisal?
SEYSS-INQUART: I fully approved of action being taken against members of
the resistance movement who committed sabotage and other acts. There
were no other means for taking steps except arrest by the Police,
passing of judgment on the part of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and
shooting on the part of the Police. I could not oppose these measures.
You may interpret that as agreement, if you want to. I would have
preferred it if courts had given the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, certainly.
I am going to have you shown Document F-860, which is a letter which I
am submitting under Number RF-1529. This is a letter written by you,
dated 30 November 1942 and addressed to Dr. Lammers. I will pass over
the first part.
I am sorry. I forgot to tell the Tribunal that the originals are not
here; they are just photostat copies. But I have in my possession an
affidavit which I shall submit to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: It is all right, M. Debenest. You need not bother to give
us an affidavit. We have the photostat copy.
M. DEBENEST: I will pass over the first two pages of the French copy,
and will pass on to the second paragraph.
“The drafting of the special police law (Polizeistandrecht) was
effected in accordance with the views expressed in a letter of
the Reichsführer SS. I believe that I have conformed with all
the wishes which are contained in it, only I would not like to
appoint the Higher SS and Police Leader as court administrator,
for, from the point of view of the Dutch, this would mean a
curtailment of the authority of the Reich Commissioner,
particularly in view of the fact that the Reich Commissioner is
designated in the Führer decree as the guardian of the interests
of the Reich. However, in the decree I have assigned to the
Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers which a court
administrator needs. I believe that this special police law may
be a useful instrument and to a certain extent an example for
all further regulations.”
You did, therefore, have authority over the Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had the authority over the special police court, but
not over the Higher SS and Police Leader. I remained the top court
administrator, even for the police court in an emergency state. All the
same I could not give executive orders to the Police. Anyway, this
police law existed in the Netherlands for two weeks at the most.
M. DEBENEST: It is nevertheless certain that we here find special
tribunals and that you entrusted them to the Police Leader.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct, but only within the scope of police
courts in an emergency state, and what the police courts did at that
time I assume responsibility for. This was on occasion of the general
strike in May 1943.
M. DEBENEST: Well, we quite agree then. You did entrust these emergency
courts to the Police.
Very well, I will now have you shown Document 3430-PS. This document is
a collection of all the speeches which you made during the occupation of
the Netherlands. Will you please take...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, is that the only reference you are making to
this Document Number 860?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, I am only concerned with the second
part. The first part concerns the Police.
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think it is imposing a very heavy burden on the
Translation Department? There are 18 pages of it.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I quite agree with you. I intended to use
this document for the police organization, which is in the first part.
But I did not think it was necessary to do so right now because I wished
to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: I only mean this: If you are only going to use a small
part of the document it does not seem necessary to make the Translation
Department, who have a very great deal of work to do, translate 18 pages
of it.
Here’s another one—F-803, which has got many more than 18 pages in it,
and of which very little use has been made. But go on.
M. DEBENEST: I know, Mr. President. I did not use more of it because the
Tribunal considered that it dealt with details which it did not consider
important. That is the only reason.
THE PRESIDENT: You have passages on each of these 18 pages? I am very
much surprised.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, anyway.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, we will now pass to another subject.
When you arrived in Holland, didn’t that country possess very
considerable stocks of foodstuffs and of raw materials?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, a great many supplies were on hand. An extraordinary
amount.
M. DEBENEST: Were not important requisitions made during the first years
of the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, in accordance with a decree within the scope of the
Four Year Plan all supplies were requisitioned and a 6 months’ reserve
supply was set up in the Netherlands with the obligation on the part of
the Reich to supply all further needs as required.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that these stocks were to be reserved
for the Dutch population?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly? Very well. Will you take the document which I
have shown to you this morning, 997-PS, Pages 9 and 10.
SEYSS-INQUART: Do I have the document before me?
M. DEBENEST: Page 12 of the French text and Page 11 of the German. You
write:
“The stocks of raw materials have been collected and with the
agreement of the Field Marshal have been distributed in such a
manner that a quota sufficient to keep Dutch economy running for
6 months will be left behind. Raw material quotas and food
rationing, _et cetera_, will be assigned the same way as in the
Reich. Considerable stocks of raw materials have been guaranteed
for the Reich, such as, for example, 70,000 tons of industrial
fats which represents about one-half of the amount which the
Reich still needs.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that coincides with the description I have just
given you.
M. DEBENEST: But I thought you said that the stocks were at the disposal
of the Dutch people and not for the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is an error in transmission. I said that the
supplies were confiscated and enough left there for only 6 months and
that future needs would be supplied by the Reich in the same proportion
as the Reich was supplied. But primarily these stocks were confiscated
for the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the translation did not come through. You
received numerous complaints about these requests, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: And what measures did you take?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attention of the gentlemen who were with me, that is,
Secretary General Hirschfeld and the other secretaries, was called to
the fact this was a strict directive in the framework of the Four Year
Plan. In some cases I may have transmitted the complaints to the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan, if the stocks were taken away in what
seemed to me excessive quantities.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to these requests, were there not mass
purchases made by the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes...
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now? Will you be much longer, M.
Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, everything will depend upon the length of
the answers which the defendant will make, but I think that in half an
hour or three-quarters of an hour at the most I shall have finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD DAY
Wednesday, 12 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand._]
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Tribunal, the
report is made Defendants Hess and Jodl are absent.
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, you agree that very important stocks were sent
to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is quite true.
M. DEBENEST: Concerning another system, for pillage, used in the
Netherlands, I would like to submit to you a document which indicates
moreover that you were not the only one to participate in this pillage;
but Göring and the OKW are involved too. This is Document F-868, which
becomes Exhibit RF-1530. It concerns a teletype message which is
addressed to you by the OKW and which is signed Reinecke. This teletype
message is dated 5 December 1940 and begins as follows:
“Meeting at the office of the Reich Marshal on 7 October 1940.
Regulation concerning the dispatch and the taking of merchandise
from Holland by members of the Armed Forces or of the units
attached to it.
“In agreement with the Reich Marshal and the Reich Commissioner
for the occupied Netherlands territories, the regulations in
force up to now concerning the dispatch and the taking of
merchandise out of Holland are rescinded. Members of the Armed
Forces and of the units, organizations and affiliations attached
to it”—then follow the designations of these organizations—“as
well as the officials of the services employed in Holland, can,
within the means at their disposal, send home by military post
packages of a maximum weight of 1,000 grams, without any limit
on their number. If the parcels weigh more than 250 grams....”
I won’t read what follows; it deals with a question of postal rates.
“The taking along of merchandise on the occasion of furlough or
other crossing of the frontier is not subject to any
restriction.”
This regulation was drawn up with your agreement, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: “Agreement” is putting it a little strongly in this case.
An authority for confiscation is not involved here, but rather only
instructions for transport. These things had to be bought in some
manner. They could not be confiscated. The Reich Marshal decreed this
and I put it into force. That was the so-called “Schlepp-Erlass,”
meaning that any soldier who returned from the Netherlands could bring
with him as much as he could carry of any of the things he had bought.
And I then gave this order for civilians in accordance with the military
decree. I believe this decree was rescinded after 2 years, for the fact
was constantly brought up that it, in particular, promoted the black
market.
M. DEBENEST: I did not say that it concerned requisitions. Yesterday I
said to you that there had been mass requisitions and you answered that
this was correct. Today I tell you, and I submit this document in order
to demonstrate to you, that there was also another way of pillaging the
produce of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: But previously you did mention confiscation. I only
wanted to correct that point.
M. DEBENEST: I merely spoke yesterday of it. Let us go on. Will you tell
me what the task was of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the wording of this decree. I believe it
has been read here. At all events it dealt with the organizing of the
entire economic wealth within the German sphere of interests in favor of
the policy carried on by Germany and during the war, in favor of the war
economy, of course.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the liquidation of the property of the
Freemasons?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must admit that I really do not know that. My attention
was called to the case after the property had been confiscated. I assume
that this emanated from Himmler by way of Heydrich.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will refresh your memory, I will have handed to you
Document F-865, which becomes Exhibit RF-1531. It concerns a letter
which comes from you, doesn’t it? It is dated 11 March 1944. It is
signed by you, isn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely correct.
M. DEBENEST: Good. You express yourself as follows in this letter:
“Dear Dr. Lammers:
“I have had the property of the Freemasons in the Netherlands
liquidated. As the liquidation took place through me, that is to
say, through a government office, unlike the liquidation in
other areas, it is for the Reich Finance Minister to decide on
the further utilization thereof.
“I have written a letter today to the Reich Finance Minister,
and I enclose a copy of it for you. I beg you to support my
suggestion.”
You, therefore, did not hear of this liquidation until after it had been
undertaken, since you yourself had undertaken it, isn’t that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I still entirely uphold my first assertion. The question
was who decreed this; I understood you to ask me who was the person in
the Reich who demanded this. It is a fact that I did not hear about this
whole matter until a few months had passed. Then I took over this
liquidation and had it carried through to the end through my offices,
and then I wrote this letter. Thus the execution rested with me.
M. DEBENEST: You said just now—and I understood the translation very
clearly—that you heard of it only after it had been done. You
contradicted your own declaration, as I was able to note yesterday on
several occasions, when the documents were submitted to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand that. Is that a question to me?
M. DEBENEST: I am simply making a remark.
Was this liquidation of the property of the Freemasons a big
undertaking?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, certainly. I should like to say that it was started
by another office. The property was confiscated, then I took over this
task and had it carried through by my competent offices.
M. DEBENEST: Did you make arrangements for the utilization of the funds
which this liquidation produced?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made the proposal that this money be given to the
Party.
M. DEBENEST: You discussed this beforehand?
SEYSS-INQUART: I wrote a letter as well. I believe the enclosure to my
letter to the Finance Minister, which was mentioned just now, contains
the proposal that this property be given to the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not threaten to let the people of the Netherlands
starve as a result of the railroad strike in September 1944?
SEYSS-INQUART: You can look upon it as a threat, but in any event I
described it as very probable.
M. DEBENEST: You asked the secretary general to stop this strike?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal would like to have further
investigation as to who ordered the confiscation of the Freemasons’
property.
Defendant, do you know who ordered the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I do. The confiscation was ordered by Heydrich and
was set in motion by the Police. Then a trustee of the Party started the
actual liquidation and at that stage I took it over and transmitted it
to my offices.
M. DEBENEST: At what date was this liquidation ordered?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the first few months. The whole thing went very
rapidly. It was only a matter of weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Was any reason given for it?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Freemasons were declared to be enemies of the Reich
according to the decree about the taking over of the property of those
who were inimical to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the order of Heydrich in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I can’t say. It went to the Security Police, and the
commander of the Security Police insured its execution. I assume that it
was a teletype message, although this entire action might have been
planned in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean that you carried it out without having
any order in writing about it at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a report from the Security Police—it may have
been in writing, or it may have been oral—that this confiscation was
being carried through by the RSHA, and I took over this matter at this
stage.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the amount involved by the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the final amount of the liquidation was more
than 8 or 9 million guilders.
THE PRESIDENT: And then I think you said that you proposed that it
should be handed over to the Party.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I proposed that these 9 million guilders be turned
over to the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: And were they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I received no decision. This property must have
remained in the Netherlands in some form of securities, probably in
treasury bonds.
THE PRESIDENT: You were the Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands,
weren’t you? What happened to the money?
SEYSS-INQUART: The money was deposited in a bank account, and perhaps
Dutch treasury bonds were bought. It was treated as a separate fund, and
it was not used.
THE PRESIDENT: But this was all in 1940, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I estimate that the liquidation continued until the year
1942, and from that period on the money remained in a bank account.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the bank?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I cannot tell you, Mr. President. But there is no
doubt that the Dutch have ascertained this.
THE PRESIDENT: And when you said it was confiscated in the first few
months, you meant in 1940, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, immediately after the invasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Were the funds from this liquidation utilized in the same
way as the money from the liquidation of Jewish property?
SEYSS-INQUART: For the most part the proceeds from the liquidation of
Jewish property were transferred to the Administrative Office for
Property and Pensions. The funds were not absorbed, but certain
expenditures were met from them. For instance, the erection of Vught
Camp was paid for from these proceeds. The funds derived from the
liquidation of Jewish property amounted to perhaps 400 million guilders
or slightly more. However, they were not taken over.
M. DEBENEST: How were the funds actually used? Were they used for the
purpose of the German Government or for other purposes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Jewish property, first of all, was confiscated. Then,
as far as possible, it was liquidated, and we called that
“Aryanization.” The proceeds of the Aryanization were pooled in the
Administrative Office for Property and Pensions, but as a whole were
not...
M. DEBENEST: Pardon me, but will you answer more directly without
recounting to us how this liquidation was effected. I asked you about
the utilization of the funds.
SEYSS-INQUART: The funds were not used at all. The 400 million guilders
must have been placed on deposit in the Administrative Office for
Property and Pensions of the Netherlands, partly in Dutch treasury bonds
and partly in the original securities. Only relatively small amounts
were used for certain purposes. I believe the largest amount was 14
million guilders which was used for the erection of Vught Camp.
I called the attention of the Reich Finance Minister...
M. DEBENEST: Excuse me. I asked you a question. Were the funds from this
liquidation used for the benefit of the Reich? Yes or no?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, unless you call the erection of the Vught Camp using
the proceeds for the Reich; but the funds were used because Vught Camp
was to be a Jewish assembly camp.
M. DEBENEST: So you consider that the building of the Vught Camp was in
the interest of the Dutch?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most certainly it was. The cost of Vught Camp, as far as
I was informed, was covered out of this property—I believe 14 million
guilders were spent—because this camp was to be a Jewish assembly camp.
It was only later that Himmler transformed this into a concentration
camp.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion, and the Tribunal will decide about it.
But regarding the property of the Freemasons, what was done with the
sums produced by this liquidation, exactly how were they utilized—for
the Reich, or also for the construction of concentration camps in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither the one nor the other.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, he has said already, hasn’t he—I thought he
said quite clearly on deposit in some unknown bank, and that there were
about 400 million which came from the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, I know the bank. The property of the Jews
is deposited in the “Vermögens-Verwaltungs und Rentenanstalt.”
M. DEBENEST: Well, I am now going to submit to you a document, which is
a letter, Number F-864, which becomes RF-1532. This document states
exactly the destination of the property which was thus liquidated.
First, you indicate at the beginning of the letter that the total
resulting from the liquidation amounted, as you say, to 6,134,662
guilders up to that date, and you indicate that this sum is located in
the Reich Foundation (Reichsstiftung) of the Netherlands. This is a
German organization, and not a Dutch organization, as far as I
understand. You indicate further on how the various sums were to be
allocated.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you don’t need trouble about the details of where
it is. He says it is there in the bank.
M. DEBENEST: Exactly, Mr. President, I would merely like to read the few
lines at the end where he states exactly the purpose of the allocation
of the various sums.
“I believe I am complying with your intentions if I assume, with
reference to this liquidated Freemasons’ property, that it too,
as we discussed with reference to Jewish property, should be
used for specific purposes within the Netherlands, according to
an agreement to be reached between us.”
Consequently, your intention was to use the sums in the same manner as
the Jewish fortunes, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: It doesn’t say that at all.
M. DEBENEST: We have it in writing. That’s still better.
SEYSS-INQUART: The purpose of utilization is perfectly plain. The Reich
Minister of Finance wanted to exercise control over Jewish capital; and
I called his attention to the fact that it had not been called in,
suggesting to him not to call this money into the Reich but to wait and
see what the course of events would be.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not proposing to him here that it should be
utilized for the same purpose?
SEYSS-INQUART: I suggested to him to use it for certain purposes in the
Netherlands, that is, not to send this money into the Reich, but to
leave it in the Netherlands; but the use to which it was to be put was
left entirely open. He wanted to bring it to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, I think you can pass on.
M. DEBENEST: I was just thinking that we could leave that to the
judgment of the Tribunal.
Let us come back to the matter of these railroad strikes. Did you not
ask the secretaries general to stop these strikes?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not put an embargo on the means of transport and on
the food in transit?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: That was you, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I said that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you knew very well at that time what the food
situation was in Holland and the grave consequences which would
inevitably result from the decision which you made—a very serious
decision.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not really. The fact was that traffic had already
been disrupted because of requisitioning by the Armed Forces, and it was
only a question of finding a _modus vivendi_ and after insuring the
needs of the Armed Forces, which appeared urgent to me, of resuming the
transport of foodstuffs into Holland. If the railroad strike had not
taken place, I would have succeeded in persuading the Armed Forces to
refrain from requisitioning, and navigation would have been left
undisturbed.
M. DEBENEST: But we are not discussing the Armed Forces. You knew very
well that the moment you placed this embargo on ships, on the fleet,
that it was the time when they were transporting foodstuffs for the
winter to Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, at the moment when I declared the embargo, there was
actually no more traffic; and the few ships carrying food were
requisitioned by the Armed Forces together with the foodstuffs.
M. DEBENEST: Then your decision was useless?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, because in making this decision I prevailed upon the
Armed Forces to make the requisitioning as short as possible and they
promised me that the ships which I earmarked would not be interfered
with by them.
M. DEBENEST: How long did this embargo last?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that between 15 and 20 October I instructed the
chief of my traffic department to lift the embargo. Actually, it lasted
some weeks longer because the Dutch traffic organization didn’t
function.
M. DEBENEST: Until what date, approximately?
SEYSS-INQUART: It may have lasted until the middle of November.
M. DEBENEST: Was not that the period when the traffic was heaviest?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite correct. In November and December we could
only bring enough foodstuffs to Holland to tide us over these 6 weeks of
frost, at the most; and in September I was of the firm conviction that
in November and December the shipping facilities would be at my
disposal.
M. DEBENEST: And actually, did you obtain them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Unfortunately, no. For due to the failure of the Dutch
traffic authorities, coupled with the other war conditions, these
facilities were not at my disposal.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew very well that the decision which you were
making was fraught with grave consequences?
SEYSS-INQUART: In September this decision was not as serious as the fact
that the Armed Forces, in view of the railroad strike, was in sore need
of this transport and these facilities; and as it was up to me to
safeguard the Reich’s interests, there could be no graver accusation
against me than for the German people to say that I did not do
everything humanly possible to help to win the struggle.
M. DEBENEST: The Tribunal will take note of your answer.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, you dealt with the subject yesterday, didn’t
you?
M. DEBENEST: I do not think I did, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the embargo on shipping surely was gone into
yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I think I spoke yesterday only of the
requisitions which were carried out and I only asked one or two
questions of an economic nature. I do not think I touched upon this
subject. If I did, I apologize to the Tribunal. In any case, I am
finished with it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the position of the Netherlands
Bank on your arrival in 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Netherlands Bank as an issuing bank was, I believe,
set up primarily on the basis of a private bank. The president was Mr.
Trip. The State probably had a certain influence, since it served as the
issuing bank.
M. DEBENEST: Give us a briefer explanation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then it would not be stating the whole truth.
M. DEBENEST: Did the gold reserves cover the amount of notes issued?
SEYSS-INQUART: I assume so on the basis of the gold cover or the
reserves of gold currency. In fact the gold cover was higher than the
amount of notes issued. The Netherlands Bank had more gold and more gold
currency, than it had notes issued.
M. DEBENEST: And what was the position at the time of the German
capitulation?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were several thousand million guilders in paper
money in circulation, and perhaps another 23 million in gold guilders.
M. DEBENEST: But, above all, Reichsmarks?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I said 23 million guilders in gold. The rest of the
coverage might have been bills from the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not you who ordered the abolition of the “Currency
Frontier”? Will you answer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were you absolutely in agreement with the necessity for
abolishing these frontiers?
SEYSS-INQUART: The proposal originated in my office. I took it over. Mr.
Trip protested. I sent it to Berlin. In Berlin the Reich Marshal decided
in its favor. The Reich Minister Funk was against it; I carried out the
proposal which I had made and which had been approved by the Reich
Marshal.
M. DEBENEST: But personally you agreed with it?
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean exactly by the Currency Frontier that
you are dealing with now? We merely want to understand what you are
talking about.
M. DEBENEST: I mean the free circulation of German currency in Holland.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did not Holland also have to pay large
sums in the form of so-called voluntary contributions, among other
things, for the war against Bolshevism?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have explained this matter quite clearly. The
Reich demanded during a certain period of time, as direct occupation
costs, 50 million marks for the defenses of Holland. In Holland we
called this a “voluntary contribution” for obvious political reasons. In
reality it was a demand of the Reich which would have had to be paid one
way or another, and I would not lay it to the charge of any Dutchman
that he paid this contribution voluntarily.
M. DEBENEST: You agreed to these measures, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: What were the economic and financial consequences of all
these measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: The financial consequences were a greatly increased
circulation of bank notes, and extremely large banking accounts which
remained the same in the Reich as in all occupied countries. We applied
one system in Holland, another in France, and in view of the collapse of
the Reich, the financial consequences were the same. If Germany had not
lost the war, Holland would have had a claim of more than 4,500 million
guilders against a sovereign Germany.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you then look at Document 997-PS, which you had
in your hands yesterday. I will read to you what you thought of these
measures. It is Page 14 of the French text and Page 12 of the German
text. It is the big Seyss-Inquart report, RF-122, 997-PS.
You write there—and I am reading from the sixth line:
“This regulation goes far beyond all similar regulations which
have been introduced so far with the national economics of
neighboring countries, including the Protectorate.”
Page 12 of the German text, 14 of the French:
“It actually represents the first step toward a currency union.
In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which
almost affects the independence of the Dutch State....”
And then you add:
“....it is of decisive importance that the president of the
bank, Trip, who is very well known in western banking and
financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in
the above sense.”
That was your impression of these measures, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, but I must admit today that the opinion I
held at that time was wrong. Otherwise I would incriminate the bank
president, Herr Trip, too deeply. What is written down here is not yet
the situation as it existed later when the Currency Frontier was
abolished. This was only the agreement between the two issuing banks
concerning the unlimited acceptance of bank notes. I should also like to
refer to the statements which I made about the qualities of Herr Trip.
The fact that he gave his approval does, in my eyes, establish the
admissibility under international law.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not state that it affected the independence of the
occupied country?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was an exaggerated optimism in my presentation of
the facts.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the Tribunal will judge as to that. On the other
hand, you contemplated the suppression of customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand your question.
M. DEBENEST: You do not wait until you have had the translation. How can
you expect to understand? I said: Did you not contemplate the
suppression of the customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not in the Netherlands certain agencies which
were charged with the looting of art objects?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot call it looting, but at any rate the
administration and care of them, and so forth.
M. DEBENEST: That is your opinion. At any rate there were several
agencies?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You are particularly well acquainted with the agency of Dr.
Mühlmann?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who called him to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I sent Mühlmann to the Netherlands ahead of me so that he
could arrange for premises for my offices.
M. DEBENEST: But it was only to set up your offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time, only to set up the offices.
M. DEBENEST: But later?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mühlmann then left and some time after he returned as an
agent of the Four Year Plan, for the safeguarding of works of art. It
was similar to what took place in Poland.
M. DEBENEST: What do you understand by “safeguarding”?
SEYSS-INQUART: In point of fact—I do not want to talk a lot about
it—but actually he had to determine whether there were any works of art
in the confiscated fortunes and then he had the task of reporting these
works of art to the various Reich offices.
M. DEBENEST: Only to report them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, because the purchasing was taken care of by these
various offices themselves. I assume—that is, I know—that he also
dealt privately in works of art, as an intermediary.
M. DEBENEST: Did you also, obtain some pictures for yourself through his
mediation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Not for myself, but for the purposes that I
described yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. You also stated yesterday that you had placed in
safekeeping a large number of works of art, particularly pictures. What
was your purpose in doing this?
SEYSS-INQUART: Many works of art I secured only in the sense that when
the decree about confiscation of enemy and Jewish property came out,
they were secured and liquidated. I bought perhaps three or four
pictures which, as I mentioned, were to be presented as gifts to the
Museum of Art History in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: No, no, I asked you for what purpose you placed these works
of art in safety.
SEYSS-INQUART: The confiscation of Jewish and enemy property had, as its
primary purpose, sequestration; but in time it became clear that these
art treasures were being bought by the Reich. These three or four
pictures I purchased with the immediate purpose of giving them to
certain Reich institutions, the Museum of Art History in Vienna, for
instance.
M. DEBENEST: But there was not only Jewish property there.
SEYSS-INQUART: I said enemy property as well, but that was not enemy
property in general, but only in cases where a specially hostile
attitude towards the Reich was proved. Such property was confiscated
also.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. That is what you wrote in a document which has
already been submitted to the Tribunal, and which you certainly know. It
is Document F-824, submitted under Number RF-1344. You know that
document. It is a letter which came from you and is addressed to Dr.
Lammers. This letter concerns the acquisition of pictures, which was
done for the Führer. In Paragraph 3 of this document, in the French
text, you write as follows:
“From the list which had been submitted to me I deduce that in
this manner a comparatively large number of valuable pictures
has been secured which the Führer was able to acquire at prices
which, according to investigations which I have made in the
country, must be described as extraordinarily low.”
Then you add that Rembrandt’s self-portrait had been found again, thanks
to Mühlmann.
Consequently, the placing in security of works of art was clearly a
means of allowing the Reich authorities to take them into Germany; isn’t
that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no doubt about that. Regarding the Rembrandt
picture, I should only like to say that it had come into Holland
illegally; and therefore it was confiscated.
M. DEBENEST: And it was taken to Germany by legal means?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that in the case of the Rembrandt picture there
was no question at all, because in this case a German regulation had
been violated.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to paintings, you also procured for yourself a
large number of works of art and diamonds, precious stones, and so on?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: You know nothing about that, but do you know that you have
a house in Vienna at Untergasse, Number 3?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is Iglauer Strasse 15. However, that may be
true, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not deposited a certain number of works of art
which had come from the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will pass on to something else.
Who ordered the confiscation of the property of the Royal House?
SEYSS-INQUART: I personally.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore you took the initiative in this matter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, not only was I the instigator, but I decided to do
that and I carried the decision through.
M. DEBENEST: So you only carried it through?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I also carried it through.
M. DEBENEST: I did not ask if you also carried it through. I asked quite
clearly if you only executed this order?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I stated very clearly yesterday the reasons why I
decided to confiscate the royal property. I also carried out the
confiscation.
M. DEBENEST: You maintained that it was the result of a speech made by
the Queen. Isn’t that what you stated yesterday?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: I will show you Document F-828, which I submit under Number
RF-1533. This document is a letter from Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of 3 July 1941. At the beginning of the
letter Bormann discusses the speech of the Queen of Holland; and in the
last paragraph, which is the one which is important to me, he writes:
“The Führer has therefore given permission to confiscate the property of
the Netherlands Royal House, for which the Reich Commissioner had
already applied at an earlier date.”
Do you still maintain that it was because of the speech made by the
Queen?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon. There was a hitch in the sound
apparatus.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, there was, but in any case you have the document in
your hands.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I know what the question is here.
M. DEBENEST: Of course you know it.
SEYSS-INQUART: It had escaped my memory entirely, that I might have
asked for that permission at an earlier date. I really cannot remember.
Perhaps I discussed the question as to whether this property was to be
confiscated or not, but the only thing I do remember is my suggestion at
the time this speech was made. After all, that was not the first speech
made by the Queen of the Netherlands. She had spoken in the same manner
previously.
M. DEBENEST: That is an explanation, and the Tribunal will take note of
it.
Now, in regard to the looting of the Netherlands and the attempt to
nazify and germanize that country—were these not the actions of the
civil government of which you were the head?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes and no. It is quite obvious to me that from the
economic point of view the Dutch people considered our conduct as
looting. Seen from the legal point of view I do not think it was. I did
not germanize the Netherlands in any way.
M. DEBENEST: Will you take Document 997-PS, Page 26 of the French text
and Page 22 of the German text? I refer to the section of your report
entitled “Remarks.” Have you got it? I will read the remarks which you
made concerning your own activities. That was on 18 July 1940:
“2) The administration is at present sufficiently under the
direction and control of the German authorities and will be
increasingly so in the future.
“3) The national economy and communications have been set in
motion again and adapted to a state of war. Plans are on foot
for large-scale reconversion geared to the continental economy,
and practically everything is ripe for this change-over. Stocks
in the country have been placed at the disposal of the Reich war
economy. Nearly all the financial resources”—that is in
1940—“have been made available and placed under the control of
the Reich, all this on the basis of extensive co-operation by
the Netherlanders.”
Isn’t that exactly what you wrote? Isn’t that exactly what you thought?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I believe that any occupation power would fully
understand Point 2, and Point 3 was a constructive conception of a new
Europe.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion which the Tribunal will judge.
I would like to return briefly to the Jewish question. You stated
yesterday that you protested against the deportation of 1,000 Jews to
Mauthausen or Buchenwald and that there had been no more deportations to
these camps. But why did you not protest against the transports to
Auschwitz? Did you think that this camp was very different from the
other two?
SEYSS-INQUART: Naturally, because Mauthausen and Buchenwald were
concentration camps, whereas I was informed that Auschwitz was an
assembly camp in which the Jews were to remain until such time as the
war would be decided or some other decision would be made.
M. DEBENEST: Before coming to the Netherlands you had been adjutant to
the Governor General of Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not adjutant, but the deputy.
M. DEBENEST: All the better. Consequently you had heard about this camp,
had you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time Auschwitz did not even exist.
M. DEBENEST: But did you not know that the ashes of those 1,000 Jews who
had been sent to Buchenwald or Mauthausen were sent back to their
families against payment of 75 guilders? This happened in 1941. That did
not prevent you later on from taking other measures against the Jews,
measures which necessarily led to their being deported?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because to my thinking this measure, which was first of
all called an evacuation, is something completely different from a
deportation or removal to a concentration camp.
M. DEBENEST: But after all you knew the fate of these Jews who were
transported to a camp in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most people, the great majority, did not know of this
fate as it is known to us today; and I testified yesterday as to my
misgivings.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion. You spoke yesterday of reprisals taken
against the newspaper in The Hague...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Is this something you cross-examined
about yesterday?
M. DEBENEST: These are questions which were handed to me this morning as
a result of statements made yesterday by the defendant. Otherwise I have
finished.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you should not go over this matter
again.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, since all of the questions concern
either hostages or—
There is still one question which I would like to ask, if the Tribunal
permit; it is a question about the flooding. All the other questions I
had in mind concern hostages; and if the Tribunal so wishes, I will not
ask them. However, may I be permitted to ask a question concerning the
flooding?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you went over the flooding
yesterday. I don’t know.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:45 in order
to sit in closed session.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have noticed that counsel for the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner is here this morning. I understood there was to be some
cross-examination of this defendant by counsel for Kaltenbrunner, and I
thought we might save time if he preceded us and finished his
cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I beg to apologize for having incurred the Tribunal’s displeasure
yesterday by not being here. But I had a very special reason, for
circumstances are sometimes stronger than the will. If I may say this, I
have been through a serious illness in the last few years and I did not
feel well, although I firmly intended to be present at the session
yesterday and had prepared everything. I respectfully beg to be excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Kauffmann, the Tribunal accepts your
explanation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much.
Witness, since when have you known the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was either 1935 or at the beginning of 1936 that I met
Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in connection with the “Langot” relief work for
National Socialist families who were in need. This was a form of support
tolerated by the police.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What part did Kaltenbrunner play in Austria before the
Anschluss in March of 1938? Did he belong to the radical elements or was
he a moderate?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the time I was told that Kaltenbrunner was closely
connected with the SS, but he was not the leader of the illegal SS. That
was an engineer from Styria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it the engineer named Leopold?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I spoke several times to Zernatto about
Kaltenbrunner. We called him the “policeman of the 11th of July” in the
Party; that is to say, it was due to his influence that radical elements
were dissuaded from excesses, such as those of July 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then Kaltenbrunner became an under state secretary in
Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the suggestion for his appointment as an under state
secretary made by Austrian circles, or did it come from Himmler and
Hitler or the Defendant Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I know, it was only made by Austrians. I myself
did not receive or accept any suggestions from the Reich regarding my
own Ministry. The Party in Austria drew my attention to Kaltenbrunner
because we wanted also to have a man in the police organization.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were his actual tasks as an under state secretary?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that as an under state secretary he did nothing
at all. After Skubl retired, the President nominated him state
secretary. In that capacity he had administrative and economic
functions. He could not intervene in the actual executive. For instance,
if I wished a man to be released from custody, then Kaltenbrunner would
have had to get in touch with the commander of the Security Police; and
if he said “no,” then we would have had to go to Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, it has been established that in 1943 Kaltenbrunner
was appointed head of the Reich Security Main Office. He has testified
here that he repeatedly tried not to accept that post. Can you say
anything about that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I only know that I was at headquarters at the end of
November or the beginning of December, 1942. On that occasion I also
visited the field headquarters of Himmler; and one of the adjutants, I
think it was Wolff, told me that the Reichsführer wanted to have
Kaltenbrunner for the Reich Security Main Office and that Kaltenbrunner
was reluctant to accept. He was now to be ordered to appear at field
headquarters and remain there for 4 weeks, where he would be handled in
such a way that he would take over the post.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that the actual reason for the
appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office
was that he was to organize and direct a political and military
intelligence service?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know certain things which go to prove that he did not
have control of Security Police matters to the same extent as Heydrich,
and I had definite facts regarding his intelligence work. In Heydrich’s
time the commander of my Security Police, when he wished to get a
decision from Berlin, only talked about Heydrich. When Kaltenbrunner
came into office, I do not remember his mentioning Kaltenbrunner; but he
talked about the Reich Security Main Office, and sometimes mentioned
Müller. I myself, as far as I can remember, only discussed Security
Police matters with Kaltenbrunner on two occasions. One was about Dr.
Schuschnigg’s further fate, and Dr. Kaltenbrunner has already told you
about that. The second time was when a relative of mine was to be taken
to a concentration camp. I went to Kaltenbrunner because he was the only
man I knew in the RSHA and I assumed he had some say there. I knew
nothing about the line drawn between the various functions. On that
occasion Kaltenbrunner telephoned to Müller in a manner such as a
superior would never adopt when talking to a subordinate official. I
have positive proof of his activities, because since 1944 I worked
closely with Kaltenbrunner in that respect. I placed at his disposal
foreign currency for his foreign intelligence service, that is, I
obtained it for him from the departments concerned; everything was done
in conjunction with the appropriate department in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just now you mentioned Müller. Do you mean Gestapo Chief
Müller?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have the impression that this man really held the
reins as far as Security Police matters were concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can only say that I know that in the course of that
telephone conversation Kaltenbrunner said to Müller: “What will you
decide in this case?”
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you received military and political reports directly
from Kaltenbrunner? Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, quite often. Those were the very secret reports of
which only four copies were made, I believe.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was this the case before Kaltenbrunner’s nomination?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Kaltenbrunner only introduced these reports at the
end of 1943 or 1944, if I remember rightly.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the difference between those reports and the
reports formerly prepared by Canaris?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about the Canaris reports, or very little.
I know them from the former Reich Security Main Office.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that the reports made by Kaltenbrunner were
noted for their particularly sharp and open criticism of all public
measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that too. Kaltenbrunner’s reports were, above all,
really objective; and not prepared reports serving certain ends.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How big were these reports?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think these reports generally ran into 40 to 60 pages,
sometimes more; and they probably were issued every three or four weeks,
as far as I know; but there must have been special reports as well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether these special reports were addressed
to military offices or did they—the ones you have just mentioned—sum
up the situation from the military point of view?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reports of which I am speaking were predominantly
political and they were addressed directly to the Führer. In connection
with these reports I remember they contained particularly severe
criticism of the attitude of the Reich toward the Poles and toward the
Catholic Church and that they were written on stationery with the Reich
Security Main Office heading, which appeared to me then to be an
impossible state of affairs.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned two criticisms. Can you perhaps
tell me what was the gist of that criticism of the two phases of public
life which you have just mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: With regard to the Poles, it demanded quite tersely that
the Poles should once again be given an autonomous and independent
existence as a state, or at least they should be promised it; and
speaking of the Catholic Church, it demanded that all administrative and
other measures should be rescinded and that the Catholic and Protestant
Churches should in no way be molested.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that you became a Party member
in 1938 and that your Party membership number was somewhere in the
millions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Seven million. The membership came into effect from 13
March 1938. That is when I formally became a member of the Party.
MR. DODD: Well, when you say “formally,” you are trying to distinguish
then, as I understand it, and point out that you were in fact, although
maybe not formally, a Party member for some time. You paid dues and you
supported the Party, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: The first two points are incorrect. I only paid
subscriptions from the autumn of 1937—I beg your pardon, from the
autumn of 1932 until 1933; inwardly I felt myself to be a National
Socialist and a Party member, without however having made any formal
declaration of loyalty.
MR. DODD: Were you a member of the Styrian Home Protective Organization
(Steierischer Heimatschutz)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Styrian Home Protective Organization, yes, from the
autumn of 1932.
MR. DODD: And that organization was taken over, practically in its
entirety, by the National Socialists at a time when you were a member,
wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That had been the intention, but it was not carried out.
There had been an agreement that the Styrian Home Protective
Organization was to be taken into the Party, but Munich did not carry
this out. Individual members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization
had to join the Party individually.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man with the name of Dr. Andreas Morsey,
M-o-r-s-e-y?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean Andreas M-o-s-e-r? I think he was a
solicitor, but I did not know him personally.
MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he was also a member of the Styrian
Home Protective Organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: Do you remember having a conversation with him on 7 March
1938, just a few days before the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have no recollection of it.
MR. DODD: Well, let me see if I can help you. Do you remember telling
him that you entered the Styrian Home Protective Organization in 1932
and that that was shortly before that organization was forbidden?
[_The Interpreter translated: “....telling him that you were Chief of
the Styrian Home Protective Organization....”_]
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite out of the question. The Chief of the
Styrian Home Protective Organization was Konstantin Kammerhofer. The
whole of Austria knew that.
MR. DODD: You don’t remember, then, having any conversation in which you
said such as I have just stated to you? Is your statement that you never
said it or that you don’t remember the conversation? That is what I am
trying to get at.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do remember that conversation; but I am stating that it
is out of the question that I could have said that I was the Chief of
the Styrian Home Protective Organization, because the whole of Austria
knew that it was Konstantin Kammerhofer. At most I may have told him
that I was very friendly with Kammerhofer, as indeed I was.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to show you then his statement, or his testimony
rather, in the Case of the People _versus_ Dr. Guido Schmidt. It is
Document Number 3992. This testimony was given before the Supreme Penal
Court in Vienna on 19 March 1946 before Judge Sucher.
We offer this as USA-882.
I ask you to look at the second page and you will find a sentence which
begins:
“On 7 March 1938 Seyss-Inquart personally informed me that he
had entered this organization in 1932, that is, before it was
made impossible; shortly before the Styrian Home Protective
Organization was forbidden.”
Then he goes on and makes reference to the man Kammerhofer, whom you
just made reference to, and further down, in the next sentence, he says:
“He (Seyss-Inquart) had entered this organization and had been
admitted by the leader, Engineer Pichler (Franz), in Waitz and
he had never left the organization.”
Therefore your statement that you had not been a member of the NSDAP can
be considered formally correct; but the statement that you had not
worked illegally, he says, is not true.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Moser could not possibly know whether I worked
illegally. He is basing his statement on the assumption that the Home
Protective Organization was actually amalgamated with the NSDAP, and
that is incorrect. The witness Uiberreither can confirm this. I still
hold entirely to my testimony.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man named Rainer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Very well, indeed. Dr. Friedrich Rainer.
MR. DODD: Yes. You have asked for him and he is coming here as a witness
on your behalf, isn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: But what do you say if he says that you became a member of the
NSDAP when that Styrian Home Protective Organization went over?
SEYSS-INQUART: To that I wish to say for all...
MR. DODD: By the way, before you answer let me tell you something that
will help you. This document is already in evidence, so I assume you may
have seen it. It is Number 812-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It is a letter, a report from Dr. Rainer.
MR. DODD: So you know what he has said, I assume. You have seen the
document, have you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: You agree that he does say in this document that you were a
member through your membership in the Styrian Home Protective
Organization and that you joined the Party, so to speak, when that
organization was taken over?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I should like to say that until 1938 that was also
my opinion, and I never doubted whether I was or was not. But in 1938
the Party stated clearly that it did not recognize that fusion and that
the members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization were not members
of the Party but that every one of them had to join the Party
individually to be a Party member. Rainer will surely confirm that.
MR. DODD: Well, tell me this, whether or not you were formally a member,
didn’t you during all this time acknowledge the leadership of Klausner,
who was the leader of the National Socialist Party in Austria; and
didn’t you follow his wishes and obey his directions?
SEYSS-INQUART: The leadership in Austria or in Germany?
MR. DODD: In Austria. I am talking about Klausner, who was in Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It was clear to me and I recognized the fact that
Klausner was the leader of the Austrian National Socialists. I did not
recognize Klausner as my political leader, a fact which is made clear by
the same report which you, Mr. Prosecutor, have just mentioned. There
Rainer says, “Seyss-Inquart recognized Klausner in political matters
which were actually not binding.”
MR. DODD: Well, he says precisely the opposite, if you will take a look
at it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh, no.
MR. DODD: Well, now, wait a minute and look on Page 9, I think, of the
German text, Line 7 from the bottom; in the English text it is Page 7:
“Relations between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner were as follows:
Seyss acknowledged unconditionally the Party leadership with
respect to the whole program and thereby also Klausner’s
leadership. As a Party member, he therefore subordinated himself
specifically and literally to Klausner’s leadership.”
Do you find that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have only a draft before me, but it goes on to say:
“Over and above that, he declared himself, on the basis of the
agreement at Berchtesgaden and particularly on the basis of the
declarations made to him by the Führer on the occasion of his
staff visit to Berlin, as being a trustee of the illegal NSDAP
in Austria directly responsible to the Führer within his
political and state functions.”
Then there must be another passage where I say that in regard to
political matters I would not subordinate myself to Klausner.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway, to move along, it is a fact, isn’t it, that very
early in this period you acknowledged your unqualified allegiance to
Hitler, and long before the Anschluss, too? You acknowledged your
political allegiance, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: One can almost say that. As far as “unqualified
allegiance” was concerned, that was not clear to me at the time, because
it was my opinion that Hitler, too, wanted a revolutionary course.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Didn’t you have something to do with the
Dollfuss matter other than what you have told the Tribunal? You know, of
course, that Rainer says that you did, in this same Document 812-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: And I think it is important that you make some answer to it.
You haven’t done it on your direct testimony, and the document is in
evidence, and in it he says that you supported...
SEYSS-INQUART: The reason, Mr. Prosecutor, why I did not do it was
because Rainer is coming here as a witness. Rainer will have to tell us
here under oath on which facts he bases his statements. I can only say
“no.”
MR. DODD: Well, I know. I understand that, and that is another reason
for asking you now. You see, you will be off the witness stand when he
is on it; and I would like to know what you say now to what Rainer has
said in this document, which is in evidence, to the effect that you were
involved in the Dollfuss plot on 25 July 1934.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite wrong.
MR. DODD: All right. In connection with this there is one other matter I
think we should clear up now if we can. You didn’t mean to convey to the
Tribunal, did you, that the ceremonies—if I may use that
expression—commemorating the assassination of Dollfuss had nothing to
do with Dollfuss at the time that they were held?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly do wish to create that impression, because
that ceremony was for the seven National Socialists who had been hanged
at that time. On that occasion, as far as I remember, there was no
thought of Dollfuss’ death; but only of the fact that several men of the
Standarte, I think Number 107 or 108, had made an attempt to do away
with a system which in National Socialist opinion was hostile to the
Reich, and as a result seven were hanged. The fact that Dollfuss was
shot on that same occasion was not mentioned during the ceremony.
MR. DODD: Well, I don’t say that it was, but the ceremony certainly
commemorated the attack on Dollfuss; and I think it is quibbling, is it
not, to say that it had no reference to it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, if Dollfuss had not been shot, then the ceremony
would have been carried out just the same.
MR. DODD: Are you sure of that; you think that all would have been
hanged if he hadn’t been shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I know they were hanged.
MR. DODD: Well, you were appointed a State Councillor in 1937—and of
course again we are going to talk a good deal about this in this short
time, about Rainer and this document. You know Rainer also says that you
were appointed through the influence of Keppler and other Nazis in
Austria and Reich officials. Is that so? Did they influence your
appointment in 1937? Rainer is wrong about that as well, is he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all—Keppler had no influence at all on the
nomination as State Councillor.
MR. DODD: And Rainer, in your judgment, is in error when he says that
they did have? You disagree with his statement, as I understand it. I
want to make that clear.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely incorrect.
MR. DODD: All right.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was appointed State Councillor because Zernatto had
discussed the matter with a friend of mine and then suggested it to
Schuschnigg. A proposal from Keppler would probably have been a reason
for Schuschnigg’s not nominating me.
MR. DODD: It was just a casual thing, and Schuschnigg appointed you
because somebody spoke to him; and the Nazis with whom you were familiar
in those days had nothing to do with it, had they?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I would not say. I discussed with Rainer the
possibility of an appointment as State Councillor, because our mutual
acquaintance had previously discussed the question with Zernatto. I then
discussed it with Rainer, but he exercised no influence with regard to
the appointment.
MR. DODD: You have seen the document known as the Hossbach Minutes,
USA-25, 386-PS, introduced before this Tribunal many months ago. Do you
recall then that Hitler, in the course of this discourse, as is reported
by Hossbach, stated some of the plans that he had for Austria as well as
for Czechoslovakia? Do you remember that? It is in the document, I can
assure you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: That was the 11th of November 1937—no, I’m sorry—it was on
the 5th of November 1937. When did you first hear about that meeting?
For the first time in your life, when did you hear about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Here, in this room.
MR. DODD: Now, do you remember the letter you wrote on 11 November to
Dr. Jury?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Do you remember it very well, or would you like to see a copy
of it? I will show it to you. We have a copy here. You haven’t seen
this; this is a new document.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have also got a copy.
MR. DODD: It is 3396-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is right.
MR. DODD: What did you mean when you wrote to Jury on 11 November 1937,
when you wrote:
“....I personally believe that there will be no visible results
until early next year. In the meantime, I have received an
authentic report from Linz....”
and you go on to talk about a newspaper article.
What I wanted to know was, what did you mean by the events in the early
part of 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the situation prevailing in Austria at that time, it
was clear that the internal political position would not remain static.
The optimistic National Socialists thought that during the coming weeks
either Schuschnigg would retire or something else would happen. I viewed
the situation more correctly, and it was my opinion that the new
internal political development in Austria would not take place until the
spring, that is to say, developments in the direction of further
permissible activities on the part of the National Socialists. The
newspaper article is something quite different.
MR. DODD: I am really not concerned about that unless you feel that it
is important to your answer. I wanted to go back a little bit. You see,
you open your letter by referring to a conversation with Mr. Keppler.
Now, he is the man who was Hitler’s emissary on 11 and 12 March when
Austria was handed over to the Nazis, isn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: And you say:
“The conversations with Mr. Keppler today were carried on in an
atmosphere of complete calm, and they were also extremely
revealing. I do not believe that things are so ripe for
discussion as they appear to be from the national side and in
the Reich.”
Then you go on:
“I should be pleasantly surprised if an initial solution were to
be found before the end of this year.”
What you were really talking about was the handing over of Austria to
the Nazis. Isn’t that what you had in mind when you wrote this letter?
Isn’t that the “initial solution”?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. First of all, it does not say that my conversations
with Keppler were secret, but only that they were informative.
MR. DODD: It says “in complete calm.” I don’t know whether that is
secret. I don’t know what that means.
SEYSS-INQUART: It means that we talked very realistically. The Reich was
very insistent. We might have discussed the possibility of applying some
diplomatic pressure, but the aim was to promote the activities of the
National Socialists in Austria, with the intention, however, of
achieving the ultimate goal of the Anschluss.
The contents of the Hossbach Document were not mentioned at all, and I
am convinced that Keppler had no knowledge of it. Keppler did not have a
very strong position with the Führer at all.
MR. DODD: Yes. You recall you wrote Keppler a letter a little later, in
January of 1938. Do you remember that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: That you wanted to give up your mandate or your trust or your
responsibility or whatever the proper expression is.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: What kind of mandate did you have from Keppler or from Göring,
to which Keppler refers in his letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the mandate was the Austrian State Councillorship. I
wanted to give it up, as well as the task of investigating the
understanding necessary for obtaining the co-operation of the National
Opposition. I did not receive any mandate at all from Keppler, and I
could hardly have accepted one.
MR. DODD: You know the document that is in evidence, 3397-PS. It is
USA-702. And Keppler says that he informed Göring of the situation and
that Göring told him to keep you at your task, or that is the sense of
it.
Now, my question is, why should Göring be interested in this mandate if
it only had to do with your position as State Councillor in Austria? He
wasn’t an official of the Austrian Government, and you were.
SEYSS-INQUART: In that case may I have the document?
MR. DODD: Yes, indeed. You will also find reference in here to Dr. Jury,
the very man concerning whom we talked a few minutes back and to whom
you wrote that letter on 11 November.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which passage do you mean, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, my question about it is this, I am wondering why Keppler
would go to Göring with your desire to withdraw from whatever position
it was that you occupied with respect to the Nazis or, as you put it,
with respect to your place as State Councillor; and it is even more of a
problem to us with respect to your explanation. What did Göring have to
do with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that Dr. Schuschnigg had given me the
task of investigating conditions for co-operating with the National
Opposition. I always told Schuschnigg that the Austrian National
Socialists would not accept any offers without Hitler’s agreement. With
the knowledge of Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg I visited Göring and Hess.
Both these gentlemen knew that I not only had contact with the Austrian
National Socialists, but also with the gentlemen in the Reich, through
Keppler. This was also known to these gentlemen in the Reich, and they
were interested. If now I were suddenly to say, “I’m through, I’m not
going on with it,” then I considered it my duty to inform these
gentlemen in the Reich that they could no longer count on my
co-operation. That, I believe, is a matter of course. One could not do
otherwise.
MR. DODD: Yes, and the letter that you wrote to Jury on 11 November was
after your meeting with Hess and Göring; too, wasn’t it? Of course it
was; you saw Hess and Göring in July 1937.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the Reich Marshal testified to that already.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now I will ask you a little bit about this
meeting with Von Papen in Garmisch. That just happened casually and was
not planned, as I understood you. You talked about the possibility of
the place of the Minister of Security being filled by a member of the
Nazi Party. What I want to know is, did you also talk about the possible
trip of Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, which didn’t come so long after
this meeting, did it? Was it mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, we did not talk about the technical means, whether a
meeting between Dr. Schuschnigg and Hitler would take place and so forth
or whether this should be accomplished through diplomatic channels—that
was not discussed by us.
MR. DODD: Wasn’t it discussed at all, that’s all I want to know? Wasn’t
there any discussion about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: A meeting between these two state leaders was not
discussed, but only the material content of our plan.
MR. DODD: When, for the first time, did you learn about the proposed
meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and from whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think 2 days—it must have been on 10 February that I
received information from Rainer or Globocznik telling me that this
meeting was expected to take place. At about the same time Zernatto
asked me to come to Vienna, but he still did not tell me what it was
about.
MR. DODD: Actually, isn’t it a fact that you prepared notes or, if you
prefer to call it, a memorandum for Hitler which he used as the basis of
his discussions with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made a written proposal for clearing up the matter; and
I gave it to Zernatto, on the one hand, and to Dr. Rainer on the other.
It is perfectly possible that Rainer passed it on to the Reich. I would
also have seen nothing wrong with that.
MR. DODD: You know very well, don’t you, that Mühlmann was sent up there
that night by you and your associates; and he got to Berchtesgaden ahead
of Schuschnigg and Von Papen with that memorandum, isn’t that a fact?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann is...
MR. DODD: Yes, the same gentlemen you referred to as having been in
Holland with you, and in Berchtesgaden.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann went to Berchtesgaden at that time and was
informed about my last conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg. He will
probably have noted that down.
MR. DODD: Don’t you know that he did, and Schuschnigg didn’t know—and
that’s the important thing—what Mühlmann was doing up there ahead of
him with the notes or the conditions that you had presented to
Schuschnigg the night before. Schuschnigg didn’t know that, did he, when
he went there like a lamb to Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced Schuschnigg did not know that Mühlmann was
in Berchtesgaden and had quite probably informed Keppler who in turn
informed the Führer. Schuschnigg certainly did not know that. When I
talked to Dr. Schuschnigg, I did not know Mühlmann would go along.
MR. DODD: When did you find out that Mühlmann would go?
SEYSS-INQUART: After the discussion with Dr. Schuschnigg I returned to
my office, and there I found Dr. Rainer and perhaps someone else; and I
told Dr. Rainer about our conversation. Possibly Mühlmann was present,
and then we—I say we, because I do not want to except myself from
this—we decided to inform Keppler of the nature of our conversation. In
the meantime, Dr. Schuschnigg had probably gone to the station. I really
did not see any reason for informing him directly at this time.
MR. DODD: And so you did want to inform Hitler then—did I hear you
correctly—of the nature of your conversation with your Chancellor
Schuschnigg that night?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time I had no opportunity or cause to inform Dr.
Schuschnigg of the fact that Mühlmann was going there.
MR. DODD: I know you may not have seen any cause, but what I am trying
to make clear is that you did want to let Hitler know that you had had
this conversation with Schuschnigg and what you had said to Schuschnigg.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Why in the world were you notifying the head of another State
about your conversation with the head of your own State, to which you
owed allegiance?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not see that this is a breach of faith. It was
giving information to heads of two parties to an agreement, for whom I
was negotiating.
MR. DODD: Would you say that you could negotiate between your country
and Germany at that time without notifying your own Chancellor?
Schuschnigg didn’t know that you’d sent that note on to Hitler, did he?
Now be frank about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is certain that Dr. Schuschnigg did not know
this. But Dr. Schuschnigg did know very well that I was in constant
contact with the Reich through Keppler and that the outcome of our
conversations was always passed on to the Reich, for the Reich also had
to express an opinion. I always said there can be no internal political
understanding unless Hitler agrees with it. That is a fact, and nothing
can be done about it; whether it is morally right or not, that was the
position. Otherwise there should have been no attempt at carrying
through a policy of understanding.
MR. DODD: That was not the only time that you did not play completely
fairly with Schuschnigg, was it? Do you remember when you gave him your
word of honor that you would not make known his plans to announce the
plebiscite? Remember when he first told you and asked you on your word
to keep quiet and you told him that you would?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: You went right from that meeting to the Regina Hotel, and do
you remember what your associates asked you and what answers you made?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot help you; I think you are
confusing two events. At that time I did not go to the Regina Hotel. It
was on the evening of 10 March, and it was an entirely different matter.
First of all, it was wrong for Dr. Schuschnigg to ask me for my word of
honor, for he himself employed me as liaison man in connection with the
agreement of 12 February. Had I known in advance what he wanted of me, I
would have turned it down, for on the basis of the agreement of 12
February it was my duty immediately to inform the Reich of this. But I
kept my word. On the same evening Jury came to me. He had heard about
this from other sources, and I did not mention a single word to Jury
that I knew about it. During the forenoon of the following day, Rainer
came. I did not take part in these negotiations until it was nearly
midday. Rainer says that it was in the forenoon, but it was really
towards noon.
MR. DODD: Well, I will accept the correction as to the time, but I don’t
think it is very important. The point is...
SEYSS-INQUART: It is very important in my opinion.
MR. DODD: Very well, if you think it is, we will settle for that. I want
you to read what Rainer says about your keeping of your word.
“Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a
few hours but that he could not talk about it because he had
given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
conversation he made us understand that the illegal information
we received was based on truth and that in view of the new
situation, he had been co-operating with the regional leaders
(Landesleiter) from the very first moment.”
Now, certainly, that is not keeping silent or keeping your word as both
you and Schuschnigg understood it, is it?
SEYSS-INQUART: In this case, it was absolutely impossible to do
otherwise. It was getting on towards noon on the day on which my pledge
of silence expired. The gentlemen sat in front of me and told me all the
details. I could not now suddenly say that this was all a bunch of lies,
for I did not promise Schuschnigg to lie either. Instead, I kept silent
about it, and from that the others deduced that that was probably so.
MR. DODD: You knew when to keep silent and you knew when to make
observations in order to give information to your associates what
Schuschnigg had asked you to keep confidential.
Now, when did you learn the true nature of what happened at
Berchtesgaden, about the threats and about the terrible way that
Schuschnigg was treated up there?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I heard from Zernatto. I think that was already on
13 February. Then I heard it from Foreign Minister Schmidt, and Dr.
Schuschnigg told me more or less the same thing. It was therefore
probably on 13 or 14 February.
MR. DODD: Well then, you had a rather complete picture of the way that
Schuschnigg was threatened; and I suppose you knew about Keitel being
called in to frighten him, and all the threats of marching in by
sundown. You had a rather full knowledge of what happened up there,
didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember the story of Keitel, but Schuschnigg
told me that the generals were up there, and obviously military pressure
was to be exercised.
MR. DODD: And you knew, too, that Hitler had demanded your inclusion in
the Government as Minister of Security. Schuschnigg told you that,
didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I believe that Hitler had demanded that the National
Socialists should be given the Ministry of the Interior and Security.
Schuschnigg agreed and to Hitler’s question as to whom he proposed
Schuschnigg was supposed to have mentioned my name. But that is nothing
but rumors and stories and I do not know any details. At any rate, that
happened in the course of these very dramatic conversations.
MR. DODD: I think this is rather important, because you have a witness
coming here who was there at that meeting, Dr. Schmidt. Are you now
telling this Tribunal that it was Schuschnigg who suggested your name,
and not Hitler who demanded that you be appointed?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do hot want to tell the Tribunal any stories; I merely
want to make my contribution to clear up the background of events as far
as the Charter allows. I say explicitly, I have heard that it was so. If
Schmidt was there and says that it was otherwise, then of course I will
believe him.
MR. DODD: Can you tell us who told you that, because we have the sworn
testimony of President Miklas, who says Hitler demanded it. We know that
Schuschnigg says Hitler demanded it and Dr. Guido Schmidt is going to
tell you that Hitler demanded it. Now, who told you that it was
Schuschnigg?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Mühlmann told me that. But I wish to say that the
facts are as you state them, Mr. Prosecutor, for this is just a tactical
detail. If the Führer forced Schuschnigg to cede the Ministry of the
Interior, and then there was an exchange of words and he stated my name
first, then I do not want to draw the slightest conclusion from that for
my defense.
MR. DODD: Well, I think that is very brave. The fact of the matter is
that it was all arranged; you knew it, and so did Hitler, that you were
to be included in their government and that anything that went on there
was unimportant as to who actually mentioned your name first.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. But I did not know for sure that on that
day Hitler would demand the Ministry of the Interior and would nominate
me, because Herr Von Papen did not inform me about the outcome of his
conversation with Hitler. I only supposed that things would take that
course. I was by no means such a persona grata in Berlin that Berlin
would certainly decide on me.
MR. DODD: Now, not many days after that so-called agreement, which was
reached in Berchtesgaden, Hitler broke it, did he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: On 17 February, yes.
MR. DODD: He broke it before the 17th, didn’t he? Do you remember when
he appointed Klausner as the head of the Party, despite the fact that he
had agreed with Schuschnigg that no such thing would be done and that
there would be no such political organization? You knew about that,
didn’t you, when it was done?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon, but I think perhaps I misunderstood
your first question...
MR. DODD: Maybe it is a little involved. The point is that a few days
after this meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler appointed Klausner as the
head of the illegal Nazi Party in Austria; isn’t that so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that only happened after 17 February, because I
myself suggested to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner’s being
the leader of the Nazis in Austria. It was perfectly clear to me that no
National Socialist in Austria would follow anybody unless Hitler was
agreeable.
MR. DODD: Would you accept the recorded history of Guido Zernatto, whose
book you have offered to the Tribunal? Would you accept his record of
when it happened?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I would.
MR. DODD: He says it was a few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting. I
suppose that could be the 17th, but it is not likely. Wasn’t it before
you went to Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Who said that—I?
MR. DODD: Zernatto.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the first time in my life that I saw Hitler was on 17
February; and at that time I think Klausner had not yet been nominated,
because I myself mentioned to Hitler that he ought to agree to
Klausner’s becoming the leader of the Austrian National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Now I see that you recognize that. That is a very crucial
matter in your whole dealing between Austria and Germany, because if, as
Zernatto indicates, this agreement was broken a few days after the
meeting, then when you went to Berlin and talked about a Trojan Horse
you knew that Hitler had already started his illegal activity in
Austria, didn’t you, if, indeed, it was before you went there.
SEYSS-INQUART: I would like to say that the illegal activities—not
necessarily Hitler’s but several people’s—never ceased, and it was my
intention to shape this illegal activity in such a way that we could
control it from the Austrian side. I also told Schuschnigg repeatedly
that the Austrian Nazis would do nothing without Hitler.
MR. DODD: Well, that is not the point. I am not going to labor it
further. I am going to ask you one other question about your meeting
with Hitler. You surely knew by the 17th how badly Schuschnigg and Guido
Schmidt had been treated at Berchtesgaden. Did you say anything to
Hitler about that in the course of your 2½ hours’ conversation with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for I am not responsible for the policy of the
Fatherland Front against the National Socialists in 1934. It was only
the reaction to the suppression of the National Socialists in Austria.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now we come down to 8 March. That is the day
that Schuschnigg told you about the plebiscite that he intended to hold
in a few days.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: It was on 9 March that you wrote the letter to Schuschnigg and
sent the copy of it to Hitler, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Did you tell Schuschnigg that you were sending a copy by
courier to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know; but I would have had no qualms about it,
because after 12 February 1938, I had to inform the Reich.
MR. DODD: You certainly also had to inform Schuschnigg, didn’t you, as
his State Councillor, that you were sending a copy of this very
important letter to Hitler? You did not tell Schuschnigg anything about
that, isn’t that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is possible, but I believe that I may have told
Zernatto. I certainly told Zernatto that I was informing the Reich. Of
that there is no doubt.
MR. DODD: We will see about that. The next night you had a meeting with
Schuschnigg and with Schmidt and with Skubl, I guess in the Chancellery
office. You never mentioned the fact to any one of them there, did you,
that you had already communicated with Hitler by special courier; do you
remember that meeting?
SEYSS-INQUART: Actually I have no clear idea of it. I only remember the
meeting on the evening of 10 March, but I think it is quite possible
that it...
MR. DODD: That is the night that you did go to the Regina Hotel and saw
Klausner; immediately after that meeting you went right down to the
street and saw your associates. Did you tell them what Schuschnigg had
said to you and what you had said to Schuschnigg in the conversation a
little earlier?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I found a most amazing lack of interest.
MR. DODD: But your courier was back from Berlin, wasn’t he; Globocznik
had returned from Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Globocznik came back and informed us that Berlin
refused to agree to this plebiscite, and that the following day I would
receive a letter indicating Hitler’s attitude.
MR. DODD: Now, during that same meeting at the Regina Hotel you heard
Rainer give instructions for the mobilization of the Party in Austria to
be ready to put on demonstrations or to seize power the next day. You
were there when he laid out his plans. Do you remember that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that is a considerable exaggeration on Rainer’s
part. I only remember that Klausner said, “Well, then everybody is to
keep in touch with him tomorrow.” That demonstrations might of course
take place was so obvious that everybody was aware of it. If the matters
were not cleared up now, there would be serious demonstrations. But the
Government also knew that.
MR. DODD: I think we can get over it pretty quickly if you will agree
with me that these demonstrations were not spontaneous at all, as I
thought you were trying to convey to the Tribunal, but they were well
planned out by your associates.
SEYSS-INQUART: That the actions were not spontaneous? Certainly they
were not spontaneous.
MR. DODD: They were not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The entire situation after 8 March became more and more
heated.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, when Glaise-Horstenau came back from Berlin on
the next morning, 11 March, he told you about the planned military
events or the talk of military events in Berlin, didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and we told Dr. Schuschnigg the same thing.
MR. DODD: You went to see Schuschnigg and you wrote him another letter
that same morning.
SEYSS-INQUART: Before that, during a conversation which lasted for
nearly 2 hours, I reported all details. The letter was merely a
confirmation.
MR. DODD: Well, the letter was an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, wasn’t it;
and it was written by you at the direction of your political superior,
Klausner?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Rainer has asserted that—that again is one of his
assertions. If you can call it an ultimatum, then I had already given
that orally, because when I left Dr. Schuschnigg I asked him to reply to
me by 2 o’clock in the afternoon; and I said that in the event of his
refusal Glaise-Horstenau and I would have to resign, but at that time I
had not even spoken to Klausner yet.
MR. DODD: Well, as I take it, everything that Rainer has said in this
report, in this Document 812-PS, you say is untrue. He also says
there...
SEYSS-INQUART: Not untrue, but slightly exaggerated.
MR. DODD: All right. I just want to get your views, I repeat, because
you will not be available after he comes on the stand. You know he also
says that he talked with you about the seizure of power in the event
that Schuschnigg refused your ultimatum. Do you say that is so or not
so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. I do not think so.
MR. DODD: What do you say about his statement that you discussed three
definite possible steps for the taking over of Austria and handing it
over to Germany? Is that true or not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that that is a construction placed on it
afterwards by Rainer.
MR. DODD: Now, I have to ask you about these things because we must get
your view, I think.
SEYSS-INQUART: Please do.
MR. DODD: Rainer also says that the telegram, the now well-known
telegram to Hitler saying that there was a bad situation in
Austria—that that telegram was actually brought back from Berlin by
Glaise-Horstenau. He says that in the same document. What do you say to
that?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is not quite correct. Hitler’s letter...
MR. DODD: Well, how is it correct, if it isn’t quite correct? You
indicate that there is some truth in it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I received Hitler’s letter through a courier, not through
Glaise-Horstenau. And in that letter there was a draft for a telegram.
MR. DODD: And that is the same telegram that Göring referred to when he
talked to you on the telephone, and the same one that Keppler referred
to when he talked to Dietrich on the telephone, isn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that telegram was at least twice as long and I very
decidedly rejected this telegram.
MR. DODD: Well, finally, let me ask you this about that particular day.
This radio speech that you made was really made at the direction of
Göring, was it not? He told you...
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: ...to make a statement, didn’t he?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no question of it. That would have been of no
interest to me.
MR. DODD: You had better look at the transcript of his telephone
conversation with you. It was 1957 hours that night, when he told you to
make a statement to the people, and about 3 minutes later you went on
the radio and made it. What do you mean that Göring did not tell you to
do it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but Göring asked me to do something quite different.
He asked me to declare myself head of a provisional government and to
take over power. At least that is what I believe. I introduced myself as
Minister of Interior and Security and I demanded that the people should
keep calm and should not put up any resistance to the German troops who
were marching in, which was exactly what Schuschnigg had said half an
hour before me.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway it only took you 2 or 3 minutes to get to the
microphone after you talked to Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: I talked to Field Marshal Göring such a lot—I do not
want to involve him or myself in all that we did on the basis of the
telephone calls. I believe that I did hardly any of these things.
MR. DODD: You are not indicating, are you, that Göring was not
interested in your selling out Austria to Germany? He certainly had a
great interest in what happened there that day, had he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I do not think the expression “selling out” is
very suitable. Obviously Göring was extremely interested in bringing
this thing to a final conclusion, perhaps in some drastic way.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that there were about 40 SS
men in the building and that you thought they were there because Miklas
and Schuschnigg did nothing to remove them, that they could very easily
have removed them. Now, the truth of the matter is that you were the
Minister for Security; and it was your responsibility to remove them,
was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not the master of the Federal Chancellery.
Apart from that, there was Dr. Skubl; and one word from Dr. Miklas or
Dr. Schuschnigg would have sufficed to bring in 300 men from the Guard
Battalion to restore order. One could not expect me, at that moment, to
proceed against National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Well, if one word from them would have sufficed, just the wave
of your finger would have sufficed, would it not, to get them out of
there? They were your National Socialist SS men; beside the fact that
you were the head of the police.
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether they would have obeyed me or not I do not know. I
did not have command over the Guard Battalion because it was part of the
Armed Forces. Undoubtedly I could have exercised my influence and it
might have been successful, but the fact that these 40 men were there
seemed to me to be quite insignificant.
MR. DODD: The place was surrounded with them, was it not? They were not
only in the building, but they were outside of it and on the roofs of
neighboring buildings. You remember all that?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were a few thousand National Socialists in front of
the Federal Chancellery at the time.
MR. DODD: Well, we had better refer to your friend Rainer, who is coming
here on your behalf, and see what he says about it.
Have you seen the article—yes, I guess it is fair to call it an
article—that he wrote about that historical night? Are you familiar
with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh yes; one can really call it more than an article.
MR. DODD: Yes. He called it “The Hours of Historical Decision.”
This is 4004-PS, Mr. President, USA-883.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You will agree, then, that it is quite a
different picture that Rainer gives from what you have given this
Tribunal, is it not? If you know the article, and you say you do. He
says, you know, that Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men there that night
and that Lukesch had 6,000 SA men within half an hour, and they received
the order to advance and occupy the Federal Chancellery and to hold the
Ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was
proclaimed; and that 40 SS men under Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant, Rinner,
received the order to force their way into and occupy the Federal
Chancellery, and so on. And you ordered—he says that you are the man
who ordered—that Rinner be let in. That is very important, and I would
like to know what you say about that. Rinner was in command of the 40 SS
men that you say somebody else should have removed. You will find that
he says:
“It was getting on towards 10 o’clock when the commanding
officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr.
Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by
40 others was demanding to be let in through the gate on the
strength of higher orders. I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that
these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed to occupy
the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be
brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by
a lanky guardsman, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian champion
runner....” and so on.
He was the first National Socialist Sturmführer who entered the
headquarters that night; and you are the man, actually, who let him in.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is a victory article, written in the flush of
victory. All I can say is that I saw these National Socialists, in black
trousers and white shirts, in the corridors; and I asked, “What is going
on?” But this dramatic account about my opening the gate—well, let’s
wait and see whether Rainer confirms that.
MR. DODD: Well, I understand that; we look forward to it as well as you
do.
You will notice that a little further on he says that you, on your own
responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and let these men in.
But you say that isn’t so. That is all I want to know.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite new to me.
MR. DODD: Well, I think we can pass on. There isn’t any truth at all, I
expect, is there, in this whole article by Rainer? Or is there something
in it that you might admit is true? You know he is going to be your
witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am also extremely interested in hearing what he has to
say here. This is a somewhat poetical account of these events. The basis
is certainly correct, but there is a lot of victorious exultation
attached to it.
MR. DODD: I think I should also tell you, by way of a preliminary to a
question, that Guido Schmidt, in testimony which we have here and which
I will be glad to present to you, says that the place was surrounded by
these SS men and that they were in there with your knowledge. What do
you say to that? He is also going to be your witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have said that a few thousand National Socialists had
collected around the Federal Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA
men, that I do not know. There were quite a lot of women among them.
This so-called mobilization order of the Party was unknown to me; but I
told Dr. Schuschnigg that very morning that if we could not agree, then
he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations by the Party.
MR. DODD: Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal—did I
understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned
without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then
the Bundespräsident of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned
without any request from you?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was my request that he should sign the Anschluss Law,
and he said he would not do that. According to the Constitution his
powers would then pass to me. He did not want to stand in the way of
developments. I do not think I told him to resign; I merely demanded
that he sign the law.
MR. DODD: Well, he has testified before a court in Vienna, in which
testimony he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember or have you
forgotten or do you say that is untrue?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I consider that is out of the question because I
clearly remember that he said:
“I cannot sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of
developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the
Anschluss should be carried out, then I shall resign and you
will have my powers.”
If he understood that as a demand to resign, then I do not want to
contradict him. I do not want to make his position any more difficult,
because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to offer this in evidence, and you may look at it
if you like. In any event, it is his testimony before a court in Vienna
on 30 January 1946. It is Document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If
you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you,
that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for
you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from
Germany and therefore he had to resign. That is on Page 17 of the
English text of the testimony of President Miklas.
Did you once write a letter to Himmler, or did you twice write letters
to Himmler, about Bürckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask
you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you
wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were
interfering with the deportation of the Jews; that you had only insisted
that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner’s men, the SD?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know it. It was submitted here. I know I have seen it
in this Court.
MR. DODD: I think you have seen it, but it has not been submitted in
evidence; however, I wish to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the letter is certainly correct.
MR. DODD: It is Number 3398-PS, which is USA-885.
In the letter you said that you gave instructions that the deportation
of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and
through the SD and that you could not permit wild actions.
SEYSS-INQUART: Right. Do you want me to state my views with regard to
it, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and
I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination.
You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part
to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to
make with you, and I assume that you agree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course I knew that a few trains had been loaded
with Jews in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded. No
preparations whatsoever had been made, and the Jews were in serious
difficulties. I opposed this state of affairs; and when Bürckel
complained, I told Himmler, “If such actions take place, then they ought
to be carried out by the SD,” because I was under the impression that
then better preparations would be made. When I say that today it sounds
very tragic and bitter, but I thought that at least emergency quarters
and so on would be provided somewhere. Apart from that I knew from 9
November 1938 how these things were carried out. The Party forged ahead,
and then the State had to take over these matters and carry them out.
MR. DODD: Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time
was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of
Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in this connection. I think
that was done by the Party alone. I believe Kaltenbrunner had no part in
it.
MR. DODD: Didn’t you say the SD, and wasn’t that under Kaltenbrunner in
Austria, at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I said that it ought to do it, but these transports were
not run by Kaltenbrunner, Globocznik ran them.
MR. DODD: Well, they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the
head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, he was rather the commander of the Security Police;
and how much influence he had there I could not say, but I think it was
very little.
MR. DODD: You found out since you have been sitting here that he had
quite a lot, didn’t you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
MR. DODD: You mean to say you haven’t heard here that Kaltenbrunner had
something to do with the removal of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. From my own
observations I do not know it.
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn’t what I asked
you. I asked you if you haven’t heard in this courtroom that
Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don’t you? And
don’t you now know that he had something to do with the removal of Jews
at the time you wrote the letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my opinion, Kaltenbrunner had nothing at all to do
with the evacuation of Jews as mentioned here, because that was a wild
action carried out by the Party or Gauleiter Globocznik.
MR. DODD: Do you remember when you got the authority, through Lammers,
for the confiscation of property that you asked for in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Have you seen these documents? They are new; your letter to
Lammers, his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your
request. Those are three documents.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
MR. DODD: Your letter to Lammers is dated 23 October 1938, and it is
3448-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-886. And Lammers’ reply to you is
dated 24 October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-887.
The order itself is 3450-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-888.
That was a confiscation of the property of the Jews in Austria, was it
not, which you requested?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I
co-operated in this matter by issuing decrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in 5 minutes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
MR. DODD: I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it.
Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were
dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: About the many Austrians who died in concentration camps?
I really learned about that in this courtroom, but about the numerous
Austrians who were in concentration camps, perhaps in the course of
1943-44. In 1938-39 I knew that some political opponents were in
concentration camps, but they were gradually being released again, or at
least some of them.
MR. DODD: Didn’t you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as
early as 1939? Didn’t you know some of the people, and know about their
deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn’t you know about
the death in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
MR. DODD: You never heard a word about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not mean to say that at all. If you give me a name,
then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
MR. DODD: I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I
suppose. However, I am asking you first if you didn’t in fact know that
some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know. It
was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I shall most certainly admit that it is possible that I
was told that one or another died in the camp even as early as 1938 or
1939.
MR. DODD: Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis, although at
least you knew that vast numbers of your fellow countrymen were being
thrown into concentration camps. Didn’t that make any difference to you?
Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they
were doing after it.
SEYSS-INQUART: That I knew that large numbers were dying is out of the
question. That there were a few, one or another, who died would not have
affected me particularly because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as
many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr.
Dollfuss and the Fatherland Front, that is to say, of the Austrian
State.
MR. DODD: Well now, wouldn’t you agree with me that conditions were very
bad in Austria after the Nazis took over and they went from bad to worse
and you knew it and everybody else in Austria knew it? Or do you want to
take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what
your opinion is.
SEYSS-INQUART: I will tell you quite frankly. Of course, if you listen
today to the leaders of the political opposition, then it was terrible.
However, if you saw the people up to 1939, then you could see that they
had a new lease on life, because unemployment disappeared and there was
quite a different spirit. But then the war altered all that.
MR. DODD: One last question, if you can answer it for me briefly.
Do I understand you to accept responsibility for whatever went on in
Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is,
joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, that can only apply to the time when I was
there and acted as deputy.
MR. DODD: Of course. I certainly don’t mean after you left there. I am
only talking about the time that you were there.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, then, as deputy, only where I acted as deputy, or
where crimes came to my knowledge without my taking measures against
them.
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a
document that has already been offered in evidence, Mr. President. It is
Document 2233-PS; and from that document, Page 1, Paragraph 4, I would
like to read this, because part of it was read by the Defense, but this
part was left out. It is under the small Arabic Figure 3:
“The necessary police and other measures arising therefrom will
be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Security
Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly avoided.”
This had to do, by the way, with the “AB Action,” concerning which this
witness has testified.
The records show that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the
time that the Defendant Frank discussed this AB Action and made this
statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don’t
deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you?
Because you did know about that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither in connection with the AB case nor in any other
case did I deny anything. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, Document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now
available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted
by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was
offered. It has now been completely translated into the French, and I
offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
I have concluded my examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of 11 November 1937,
3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, Mr. President. I will check that. I meant to
offer it, and I fear that I did omit to do so. That would become
USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at 10
minutes past 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you
were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that reason knew
Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the Government
General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with
the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name of Kunze, in
3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly repeatedly sent
reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with this
matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in
contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under
Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection with
me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler by way
of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews. That is
utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich Commissioners
were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the Jewish question was
concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters concerning individual
cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but never by way
of the Security Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient. You were, in addition, confronted
with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schöngarth in connection with the
question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schöngarth was the successor, or more accurately,
the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had
inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler
demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was
aghast; and Schöngarth said immediately that that was completely out of
the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schöngarth: “But we
must do something, we must react in some way to this.” He then told me
that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be
carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He suggested
that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to the effect
that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in the
Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue warnings
to the population, as is customary under international law?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which contains a
warning by me against sabotage, _et cetera_, in which I threatened, in
the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and to draft
the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Further, I have to confront you with a
document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General
Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the
order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He admits
that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was
urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but perhaps
the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since he was
present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this question,
since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that
this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation of an
accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion, Paragraph 21
of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a partial
matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically
possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the
grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay
this Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement
of Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in
Document Number 77, Page 199.
Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor
asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the
Dutch Government to serve as a government, and that you were not
justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What
have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it is of no
consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for the entire
region except Zeeland.
The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From the
civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on
the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the
government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should
like to submit a document which takes issue with this question. This is
a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January 1942. In
my final speech I shall refer to this from the legal standpoint. It will
be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages through
the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is 96.
Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out mass
shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the
displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the
Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show
that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a war
losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given more
attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented
something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures
are decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase
in the population.
Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of the
statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to
10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12
per thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50
percent even though the Dutch people were under their own Government,
were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the
statistics which I received from the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, from
1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-half. In the year of my
administration, up until 1944, the population increased from 20 per
thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-fourth increase. Of
course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch people. But it is
surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I
should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics
Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a German and
English version, but it is not certified. The original should be in the
office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the proceedings here,
it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the
Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he is also held
responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the decrease
in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made in the
Dutch Government report and in part also produced here. Yesterday, with
the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to the Dutch
Government and I received this answer. In fact it answered more than I
requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But we will pay
homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in
evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the General
Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate
in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report which I
received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding Austria. The
first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged that you
gave Mühlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes
contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion which I had
just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the agreement
to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischböck, and the
institution of national political sections within the Fatherland
Front—in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf
Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the
Austrian National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew
that Austrians died in concentration camps after the Anschluss. You
answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did die in Austrian
concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of months, you
have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you mean to say that
they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might have
been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps. The
Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what we have
heard here about German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief of
the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to
call my first witness on the Austrian question, General
Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):
Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land
warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual stipulations
for the protection of the civilian population were outdated by technical
developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike measures like
total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, _et cetera_, are directed
primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and consequently
are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a war
potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then
the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in
such a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say “considered in such a way,”
you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population
to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is that not the
conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks,
approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the bombing
attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two short questions.
You said that you told the Führer that you would not act as a Trojan
Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that you should
act as a Trojan Horse?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my difficult
position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for such
purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation could
be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after you had
been talking to the Führer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself
had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the discussion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for some time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this Austrian
matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a difference of
opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity
could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented both sides
at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter of
declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those
declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree of the
Führer’s giving you authority to do that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in the Reich,
and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask you about
the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That practice was
under a decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all occupied
countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree in the
Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about on the
basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to get you
confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Führer, was it
not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Führer; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it been
put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in it. What
was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of persons
who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated. I had
already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was
issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the Netherlands
who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an
enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the
decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police and the
courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go to the
courts to get that determination surely, did they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision of this
kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court
sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on the
basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the Freemasons was
confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other
groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that direction of the
Führer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others, although
there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect—see if I state the practice
correctly—the Police would decide that an individual or group of
individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies of
the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was that of
Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through his
decisions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through Heydrich’s decisions;
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich’s decisions when it came to
property rights. The association of Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to
those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to the group
too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah’s Witnesses was
confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but what they had
was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to serve in the
war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused—let me get this straight. This
is interesting. Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to fight or to serve in the
German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany refused to
serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited there and
then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I
am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Netherlands were not
prohibited because they refused to serve in the German Army, but rather
because we were against this group on principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As
pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property;
right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper Austria. I came
of an officer’s family of French descent. In 1918 I was a major in the
General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on politics and
the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the Austrian
Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the civil service
as director of archives at the university, a historian and author. Among
other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old
Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only
your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July 1936 on, I
was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of the July
Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet
of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in the
obscure job of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I had
to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb without
troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb
because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was against the official
policy and was one of the basic opponents of the Ustashi terror. Another
reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the State, who
was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a “criminal subject,”
among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and
it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a characterizing
phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss
itself, but everything as to how it came about. Therefore I ask you very
briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you in any way connected
with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may be
characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6
million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, counting
their families, that more than a million were in the misery of
unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of
the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and immediately
that all the possibilities always received “no” as an answer. If Austria
wanted the Anschluss, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to call the
Hapsburgs back, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to enter a German
customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was “no.”
And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of a Danube federation,
we received only cold shoulders from our autarchically minded neighbors.
That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the Anschluss as
the main point of its program. What were the combat methods of this
party?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of this Anschluss
was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer who the
year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only possibility for
the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to
the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end of the
twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf
Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler,
however, sent a land inspector by the name of—what was his name; a
Prussian—I cannot think of the name at the moment—who was evicted from
the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht—Dr. Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain
Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of
the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with
respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by absolute obedience
and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached.
After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about
his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with Seyss-Inquart shortly
before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me then
about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with what he
later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but only as a
support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the
Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front—at the same time
its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria,
and had Adolf Hitler’s blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, or
did you talk with him?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three
opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government after 12 February
1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on
17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with Hitler to
Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite which was
to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the plebiscite, I
left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks’ leave. Therefore, I cannot
give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had been decided
upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart or
not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not handled by any
Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from my leave,
certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a
plebiscite. Where were you and what did you experience at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I went on leave,
and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned for a long
time. And the subject of my speech was “Central Europe in the Year 1000
A. D.”
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the facts.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau in the
Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Bürckel, whom I had told
nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard over
the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it
was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in view of
Hitler’s nature, certainly bring about some form of grave
countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Bürckel was to
have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery and
Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the
reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and
subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin.
I heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did
not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all
solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached
Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 2½ hours, a
conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no concrete
decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at 11
o’clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did not
call me until 8 o’clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts
for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b)
of a radio speech.
I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I
asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on I received a third draft from Göring, who was Field Marshal at
the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second request to
Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should like to say
from the beginning, all these drafts—as far as I know also the third
draft—had no actual significance. These were my experiences on the 11th
in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met Seyss-Inquart. What did
you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him
briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made entirely clear to
him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-Inquart and I, at
11 o’clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went to see
Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before Schuschnigg certain inner
political problems which I did not know about because I had been absent,
I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of tears, that there
was great danger of new world complications, even of a new world war,
and, implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite which was
scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far orally. This
discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about 1 o’clock,
we offered to resign.
For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National
Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I
had made my decision in the home of Bürckel that, in connection with the
plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of
ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this proposal to
postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about
2 o’clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido Zernatto—I do not
have to tell you who these gentlemen were—made efforts to establish a
_modus vivendi_ with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in the background
since my mission had already been fully accomplished on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to no result,
Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in accordance
with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday plebiscite. I
believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter
Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly
agitated, saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could
not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to
demand succession to the post of Chancellor.
Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned this
down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and returned
after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me to be of
importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the
Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret: “Now
we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with the
Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political
combine with which I shall govern.” However, he was going to demand of
Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5
years’ tranquillity.
DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that. Instead he
marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law. You were named
Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered into the
Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned this law,
for three reasons:
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the
world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and
I must say something here which has been said in the southern German
press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street
demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass
psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and
it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the
Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands—I
did not participate in the origination of this law—the German tanks
were rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf
Hitler was accomplished. With him this meant “bend or break.” If Austria
had tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible.
Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that it
should have committed suicide from fear of death...
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr. President, I
have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result of pressure
from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual desire and
mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete confidence in
Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my relationship to
Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of Herr Von
Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called “Langot aid fund”?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which was established
quietly by the Government in typical Austrian fashion—this is not
intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian
fashion—for the help of National Socialist family members of National
Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have knowledge of this
fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they both knew
definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and particularly of
Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were completely opposed to Von
Papen. They were inimical toward him to begin with because he was a
Catholic, and they distrusted him additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that went on
in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No.
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to
Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about some topic but
that I should let myself be used as an informer was contrary to my
tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for
by Bürckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your trip when
you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March 1938, when
Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but rather from
the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered
this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know what was
going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip
when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is all. What
did you understand was the purpose?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler’s invitation
and to see just what was taking place in Berlin.
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you were
interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you
got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for
Seyss-Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a
peaceful and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned; did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained the absolute
impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday plebiscite,
then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with that
telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of
disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that
this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent to
carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a sharp
difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Göring. I did not
take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in which you
said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was contrary to the
truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these three things
along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I should
like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the agreement
of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich and Party
agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a
falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was
not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with
this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart whether
this telegram had ever been sent off and he said “no,” it had never been
sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown
away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they
were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of Seyss-Inquart who,
according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and
Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of
answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to
think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any
further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I
do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any
point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew
about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I
think you said either by Hitler or by Göring. You were then a Minister
without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was
a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and
deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged,
and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the
fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg
explicitly—leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say
anything more specific—that Hitler would march in if we did not call
off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not
going on with it.
Do you remember telling us that at the time that Göring was talking to
Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von
Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Göring in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse
in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann, whom I just
happened to be with.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, you know Defendant Von Papen once wrote a
letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with
him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany,
and that was way back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence
in this case, USA-67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator
with Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a willing collaborator for the normalization of
the relations between the two countries; but I am not familiar with this
document.
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
[_The witness Rainer took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH RAINER (Witness): Friedrich Rainer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: What functions, and for how long, did you have in the
NSDAP?
RAINER: I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until
1934 I had no functions. Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Carinthia
called me to the Gauleiter’s office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the
Landesleitung. Landesleiter Leopold, in the autumn of 1936, relieved me
of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In
February of 1938 Klausner again appointed me his political adviser and
co-worker in the Landesleitung. In May 1938 the Führer appointed me
Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to
Carinthia. Those were my political functions.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were therefore Gauleiter of Carinthia at the end?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And through years of work in the NSDAP you had a chance
to get to know it well?
RAINER: Yes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you get to know Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The first time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1935. We
had a conversation which lasted a few minutes. A few days later I was
arrested, and for 6½ months I was in the custody of the Austrian police.
After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart
again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was he a member of the Party?
RAINER: During the time that the Party was prohibited Seyss-Inquart was
not a member of the NSDAP, but he was a member of the Styrian Home
Guard. That organization was, I think in 1933 by agreement between its
leaders and Habicht, taken over entirely as part of the Austrian NSDAP.
After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich
Treasurer, Schwarz, and the members of the Styrian Home Guard, among
them, I believe, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply again for membership.
DR. STEINBAUER: So your statement in the famous “Rainer letter”—I shall
call it the Rainer letter henceforth for short—is incorrect?
RAINER: At that time I did not know that the transfer in its original
form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had
talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his
ideas regarding the Anschluss?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What were these ideas? Please be very brief.
RAINER: The Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our
discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all
Austrian parties; it remained the ideal goal for all of us. In this
case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State
should once again steer a course toward Germany and that internal
conditions should be peaceful. The difficulty in this connection was
that the State founded by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, by disregarding the
democratic constitution, was going to permit only a one-party system. It
was particularly difficult, therefore, to draw into participation and to
legalize the great mass of the opposition of the National wing. That
task, according to Seyss-Inquart’s conception and my own, was to be
carried out without further bloodshed by peaceful means. With good will
on both sides and a postponement of radical means such a way seemed
possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then came the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to
clarify his attitude toward the party. What did Adolf Hitler say to you
at the time?
RAINER: A few days after 11 July 1936 I was called to Berchtesgaden, and
on 16 or 17 July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little quicker than you are going,
Witness.
RAINER: The Führer made very serious and thorough observations, and he
demanded in very severe words that the Austrian National Socialists
should respect the Agreement of 11 July under all circumstances. He
criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they
had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of
such methods would lead to continuous difficulties in foreign politics.
He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the
existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question whether this
included the Fatherland Front, he said “yes.” He assured us that in the
near future the general tension would be relieved by an improvement in
the relationship between these two German states.
DR. STEINBAUER: In its essentials, therefore, he approved of
Seyss-Inquart’s policy?
RAINER: The Führer’s statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the
correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Seyss-Inquart also the leader of the Party?
RAINER: No, Seyss-Inquart was never the Party leader.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he subordinate himself to the leadership of the
Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was a member of the National Opposition group, and
in that capacity he recognized the existing leadership.
I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner in
that letter because Klausner, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement,
had replaced Leopold by request of the Führer, since he promised to
steer a quiet, clear, and open course. Co-operation with him appeared to
assure adherence to the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as
trustee for the Berchtesgaden agreement and Minister in Schuschnigg’s
Government he was independent of Klausner.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, Witness, after the understanding of 12 February
1938 did you, during a railway journey, meet Seyss-Inquart who was
coming back from his visit to the Führer?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did he tell you about his conference with the
Führer?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his
compartment. He had a piece of paper—I think it was an envelope—and on
that there were notes. I remember that he described the formalities
which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his
capacity as an Austrian Minister, bound by oath to the Constitution, and
responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that
he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans. Afterwards
he told me in detail about points of that conference, not all of which I
can remember now. My whole impression was that the discussion had passed
satisfactorily, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted
in a spirit of full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can
remember, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you remember his telling you that he had stated to
Hitler that he would be Schuschnigg’s living guarantor, and not a Trojan
Horse?
RAINER: I do not wish to confirm those exact words. The expression which
Dr. Seyss-Inquart repeatedly used was that he was not a Trojan Horse
leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression
frequently that he was the living guarantor for mutual adherence to the
agreement of Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural
fight?
RAINER: I do not believe that I can remember that. At any rate, that was
his point of view, and I certainly assume that he spoke to the Führer
about that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Führer agree to these proposals?
RAINER: I had the impression that Adolf Hitler was in full agreement
with the suggestions of Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
RAINER: That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his
intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he tell the Austrian National Socialists the same
thing?
RAINER: Yes, because that was particularly necessary. Seyss-Inquart made
a speech at a conference of leaders at the beginning of March and
pointed out that an evolutionary course and measures which were to a
certain extent disappointing to the radical followers—namely, the
dissolution of the illegal organization—were specifically desired by
Adolf Hitler.
I think I can also remember that during the large demonstration at Linz,
and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that
specifically; for the visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the
necessary legitimate foundation in the eyes of the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter of yours you wrote that
Seyss-Inquart had been informed of preparation for revolutionary steps.
RAINER: May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you
mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: Those of 10 March.
RAINER: May I have permission to go into some detail in this connection?
The expression “revolutionary steps” is too far-reaching. The measures
which were introduced were mainly these: After Chancellor Schuschnigg’s
speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that thereby every
basis for an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that
this speech would be like a spark in a powder barrel.
Whereas previously we had had consultations under what circumstances the
vote might be “yes,” it had now, in view of the attitude of the broad
masses, become impossible.
A clear-cut indication of attitude by the National Socialist leaders had
to be brought about. During the night, the new Gauleiter were still
being given their first piece of information about the Party not being
agreeable to the proposed plebiscite, and that therefore the slogan
would be, for the time being, to refrain from voting. The strictest
discipline was demanded, because we feared that feeling would soon run
very high. On 10 March the long-prepared propaganda of Zernatto began,
and clashes occurred. We also had reports to the effect that large
groups of the Protective Legion, forbidden in February 1934, were being
armed. Strictest alert was ordered for the formations, therefore, and
the formations received orders to provide protection for the Nationals.
Essentially, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; I think I
informed Dr. Seyss generally, in the afternoon, regarding the atmosphere
in the provinces. I probably did not inform him about individual
organizational measures.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he promote that atmosphere?
RAINER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he demand demonstrations, or did he prevent them?
RAINER: He neither promoted them, nor did he urge them. Prevention at
that stage was no longer possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
RAINER: On 11 March in the forenoon I was working at the office of State
Councillor Jury at 1 Seitzergasse. I no longer know at exactly what
task. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, and several others about noon
in the office of Dr. Fischböck, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the
outcome of the conferences with Dr. Schuschnigg.
The result of our consultation was the letter which the Ministers and
State Councillors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which set a time limit for 2
o’clock in the afternoon, demanded the cancellation of this
unconstitutional plebiscite and the fixing of a new plebiscite a few
weeks later in accordance with the regulation of the Constitution, or we
would resign.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened? Schuschnigg postponed the
plebiscite. How did you hear about that?
RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to
give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the
Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported
to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it
produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a
half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that
started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through
the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a
letter from Adolf Hitler to Vienna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at
midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had
been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that
morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my
opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the Reich
on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean “conspiracy” by “collaboration,” then I must say
definitely, “no.” But the collaboration which was agreed upon at
Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to
act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound
not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been
retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the
plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner
did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize
power?
RAINER: That order was given by Klausner on the evening of 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart approve?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until some time later.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I must put to you the fact that Gauleiter Eigruber,
of Upper Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram
in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about
that?
RAINER: I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know
that Klausner’s order was telephoned from 1 Seitzergasse. That evening
Globocznik was also putting through calls from the Chancellery. I assume
that Eigruber is referring to one of these telephone calls.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that Globocznik, who was Gauleiter of
Vienna before this illegal period, told you that he misused the name of
Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
RAINER: Globocznik told me that several inquiries had been directed to
the Chancellor’s office which were passed on to him over the telephone,
and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One
special case relative to Salzburg is known to me very well.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter you also made a statement which
mentions some assistance rendered on 25 July 1934. The Prosecution
considers that this has some connection with the murder of Chancellor
Dollfuss.
RAINER: That remark goes back to a conversation during which
Seyss-Inquart told me that after 25 July he had been afraid for a few
days that his name might be connected with those events. But after a few
days it turned out that there was no such connection. Subsequently he
tried to exert his personal influence toward reconciliation and he took
over some defense cases. That is what I meant.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that is your explanation for the expression
“rendering assistance”?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that pressure was exercised on President Dr.
Miklas by the Austrian National Socialists, so that he would appoint
Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The negotiations, which occupied the entire late afternoon and
evening, were under a certain amount of pressure; for practically in the
whole of Austria the change had already been carried out. The overthrow
of Schuschnigg’s Cabinet loosed a tremendous avalanche. During the
negotiations that fact made itself felt.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you mean that clearly there was
pressure, but not physical, directly upon the person of the President?
RAINER: There can be no question of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But then, how do you explain that at that time 40 SS men
marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it?
RAINER: An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When,
toward 8 o’clock in the evening, Miklas had again refused to nominate a
National Socialist as Chancellor, Keppler stated that at 8 o’clock—not
as originally declared—they would march in and he stated his fear for
the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as was said in Austria, things
were generally in commotion and the situation appeared very unsafe. The
Chancellery building was occupied by the police and by the guards and
was put in a state of defense. I informed the Landesleitung of this
situation and asked them to take protective measures so that willful
acts would not cause unnecessary misfortune. In consequence of the
measures which were then introduced, I estimate that no earlier than 10
o’clock in the evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes,
stating that he and his men had been assigned to protect the
negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step excessive but I asked
him to take the measure into consideration, and he then allowed these
men to pass through the police and guards, and they were admitted to the
courtyard of the Chancellery building. There was never any pressure nor
were there acts of force; it was merely a precautionary measure.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were Gauleiter of Carinthia. Did you also
have administrative powers during the war in the neighboring area of
Italian sovereignty?
RAINER: Yes. In September 1943, I was appointed Supreme Commissioner in
the operational zone “Adriatic Coastland,” with my seat in Trieste, and
I had six provinces under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you recruit foreign workers there for employment in
Germany?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner was this done?
RAINER: It was done through recruiting, that is to say, without
employing coercion, since for many decades these workers were accustomed
to go north to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: These workers were put to work in your Gau, were they?
RAINER: The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts
of the Alpine regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the living conditions of these people in your
Gau?
RAINER: Their living conditions were the general and normal ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Where were they accommodated? In camps? Did you see any
such camps?
RAINER: They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of
them existed they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian
consulate and the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Labor Front supervise matters in practice?
RAINER: Yes, it was bound by an agreement to that effect, of which I was
informed, and it took great pains to carry out that task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself inspect any camps?
RAINER: Yes. I inspected camps repeatedly and I found conditions to be
in good order. In the case of certain industries, for instance the water
works, I found that conditions were exceptionally good.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you give us the names of these camps?
RAINER: A particularly good impression was made on me by one camp
attached to some water works at Münd on the Drau River; the same applies
to Schwabeck.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did these foreign workers behave at the end of the
war? Were there riots?
RAINER: No. Due to the considerable number of workers in my small Gau I
was worried about the food supply. Relations with the population were
good because the Carinthian is a good-natured and agreeable type of
person. I myself have experienced that French workers who had already
been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back
to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than in the camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in
Carinthia?
RAINER: Yes. There were so many National Socialists in Carinthia that
Schuschnigg said on one occasion: “One ought to put barbed wire around
that county and the concentration camp would be complete.”
DR. SERVATIUS: But their relations with the foreign workers were good?
RAINER: Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this
Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the Party as you stated in
your letter? When did you change your mind about that?
RAINER: I did not learn until fairly late after the Anschluss that he
was not a member of the Party. I cannot tell you the exact year any
more.
MR. DODD: But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that
you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so? You had
misunderstood?
RAINER: In that report I made various attempts to describe matters in a
manner favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the
Prosecution against Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact
that you found out soon after you wrote this letter that you were in
error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the Party. Now
you can answer that very directly, I think, without any long statement.
RAINER: I do not believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
MR. DODD: Well, when was it? That is all we want to know. If at any time
you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it?
RAINER: That I can no longer say and it did not appear important to me
at the time.
MR. DODD: All right. Now when did you change your mind or find that you
were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated
in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations
which were to take place in Vienna? When did you find that that was
misinformation or a mistake?
RAINER: I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in
demonstrations in Vienna.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am
sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a
little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question from Dr.
Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he
could not prevent them at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you
was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans
was true. You know what you say in your letter or your report, do you
not? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart
and his participation?
RAINER: The details of my report are no longer in my memory.
MR. DODD: Would you like to look at it?
RAINER: Yes, please.
MR. DODD: While you are waiting for it I can clear some other things up
here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November,
swearing that this was true, did you not?
RAINER: I specifically stated in this connection that I was partly
relying on information received from authoritative individuals and that
afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had
been correctly represented. I also stated specifically, and had it
included in the record, that I had made these statements with a certain
bias. A supplement to my affidavit was also made.
MR. DODD: Just a minute. On 15 November 1945, right here in Nuremberg,
under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you
confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the
best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you
received since 15 November and from whom, that warrants you in making
statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal?
RAINER: I wish to state in this connection that the point of view which
I adopted on 15 November is maintained by me today.
MR. DODD: Well, is this report true or not in its entirety, as you told
us it was on 15 November?
RAINER: The report must not be taken literally. Partly it is based on
statements made by reliable people, and I made it to the best of my
knowledge and belief according to the situation existing, I believe, in
July 1939, with a certain bias.
MR. DODD: Well, you told us it was true in November, did you not?
RAINER: I did not say that. I said specifically...
MR. DODD: I will show you your affidavit. Your affidavit is attached to
that document that you have, and that is your signature, is it not, and
you have sworn to the truth of it?
RAINER: I made a specific statement in connection with it, and as a
precaution I made a short note about it afterward. The formulation of
the reservations was discussed at length.
MR. DODD: Now you answer my question. Is that the affidavit that you
executed under oath on 15 November here in Nuremberg? Yes or no?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, in there you say that you testify and confirm that “The
facts which form the basis of the above-mentioned letters and reports
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief,” and you also say
further up that you have read the letters and the report.
Now, is that affidavit true? Were you telling the truth when you said
that to us under oath in November?
RAINER: That affidavit is correct, but I demand that the explanations
which I gave in connection with it and which were made apart from the
record at that time—at least they were taken down in shorthand—be
added to it.
MR. DODD: Why did you not ask that there be included in the affidavit
anything that you wanted about this report if it was not altogether
true? You were swearing to it. Did you ask that something be added to it
or that it be changed?
RAINER: I considered this statement to be a statement of the genuine
character of the documents which had been submitted to me. The record of
my statements contained my opinion of the contents of these documents,
and as a precaution I added a statement that in this case, too, I wished
certain reservations to be taken down. They were subsequently formulated
by one of the gentlemen interrogating me, stating “...to the best of my
knowledge and belief...” and then he went on to say that all these
reservations which I had stated had been expressed in accordance with
the method customary with you.
MR. DODD: Now, are you really serious in telling this to this Tribunal
today about this affidavit? Are you really serious about this last
statement?
RAINER: I am absolutely serious about it. I have nothing to hide.
MR. DODD: Now maybe we can shed a little more light on the kind of
reports that you make. I have another one here that you have not seen.
You made a speech in 1942. This is Document 4005-PS. It becomes USA-890.
You had better have a copy of this in front of you, USA-890. Do you
remember that speech that you made on 11 March 1942 in Klagenfurt before
the Leader Corps and the bearers of honor insignia and blood orders of
the Gau Carinthia, in which you told the whole story of the development
of the events of March 1938? Do you remember the day you made that
speech?
RAINER: I did make a speech of that kind.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, let us look at it. Were you telling the truth
the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I represented the events in a way in which my audience would
understand.
MR. DODD: Were you telling the truth when you made that speech? I did
not ask you if you made it interesting; I asked you if you told the
truth.
RAINER: I believe I spoke the truth at the time, but I also believe that
there were certain things on which I was not correctly informed.
MR. DODD: Now, let us take a look and see what you said in 1942 with
reference to this report, 812-PS.
Now, if you will turn to—I think it is Page 8 of your text, I am trying
to locate for you the sentence that begins:
“Only in co-operation with us, Jury, and a number of co-workers
of Leopold, and also with Leopold’s consent, was it possible to
achieve Seyss-Inquart’s appointment to the post of State
Councillor. More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever
negotiator. We knew he was the one who would best represent the
interests of the Movement in the political forefield. He also
unconditionally subordinated himself to Klausner’s leadership.
He always conducted himself as Klausner’s deputy and
conscientiously followed Klausner’s instructions.
“With Seyss’ appointment to the post of Staatsrat, we found a
new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time
there were a number of grotesque situations. We were informed on
events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus; our
own connection to Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler we had via
Keppler.”
Did you say that in your speech as reported there in the text of it, and
how do you reconcile that now with what you have told the Tribunal about
the report to Bürckel?
RAINER: It is not known to me where that record of the speech
originates. I should have to have an opportunity....
MR. DODD: I will tell you. It is a captured document that was found down
there in the files, so you need not worry about that. What I want to
know is whether or not you now admit that you made this speech and you
said these things at the time that you made it.
RAINER: I made the speech, but I declare emphatically that whatever I
have said under oath today about that point is the true version. This is
a broad statement designed for the audience of that time, which cannot
be taken as literally as something which I say today, conscious of my
responsibility.
MR. DODD: You are not speaking broadly for the benefit of an audience
here today, are you?
RAINER: That is correct.
MR. DODD: Let us turn a page and see what you said about Papen, and
about the conference. You go on to say how you got information, how you
met in the Ringstrasse, and so on. If you will follow right along now,
we will not lose the places.
“Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the
conference confidentially. In Austria, only Schuschnigg,
Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our
side only Papen was informed. Papen, too, thought that only he
knew about it, but we too were informed and had had
conversations with Seyss about the subject.”
That is the Berchtesgaden conference. Now, were you telling the truth
when you said this in 1942, or not? Or was that a broad statement for
the benefit of the audience?
RAINER: I cannot today check this document against a correct
reproduction of what I said then.
MR. DODD: Well, why not? It was in 1942. Do you not remember? Do you
mean that you do not know whether you told the truth or not, or you do
not know whether you said this or not?
RAINER: In those days I gave a description before the simple people of
Carinthia and I...
MR. DODD: Did you lie to them or did you tell them the truth?
RAINER: No, but I speak to people like that differently than I would
speak under oath before this Tribunal, having to make concrete
statements about concrete points. It seems impossible to me that I
should today be required to confirm individual points of a speech which
was made 4 years ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have an answer? He is not answering your
question.
MR. DODD: No, Sir, he is not.
[_Turning to the witness._] I asked you whether or not you made these
statements on that day, and if you did so, were they true? Now, you can
tell us that very simply and we do not need any long answer. You have
read it over and you have heard me read it. Now, please give us an
answer.
You do not need to read any more. You have read it once and I have read
it to you. Was that true and did you say it?
RAINER: In details it is not correct.
MR. DODD: Well, is it true in any respect? Is it true that Papen was
informed and that Seyss-Inquart knew about that conference long before
it took place or sometime before it took place? That is what we want to
know.
RAINER: When we met during the Olympic winter games in Garmisch, we
encountered...
MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. You are not answering my question. That is
the next paragraph or the next sentence which you have been reading. I
know that is coming and I am going to ask you about the meeting in
Garmisch. I am now asking you if what you said about Von Papen and
Seyss-Inquart is the truth, and that is all I want to know.
RAINER: It is correct that at about this time we were informed about the
intention of having a conference.
M. DODD: And that Seyss-Inquart knew about it.
Now, let us go on a little bit further and find out about this Garmisch
meeting. You were invited down there to the Olympic games, you say, and
you had a meeting with Papen and Seyss-Inquart and they went through
some negotiations, and then you went on to Berlin.
Now, I want to move down a little bit. There is a lot of interesting
material here. We do not have the time to go into it all just now. You
go on down quite a bit, and I want to ask you about what you say you had
already prepared.
“We had already prepared the following”—and you are talking about
Schuschnigg and the impending conference. It is on the back of Page 9 of
your text, Witness, and it is on Page 5 of the English text, the last
paragraph. You say:
“We had already prepared the following:
“The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in
a shop in the Kärntnerstrasse. I called the telephone number
where Globus was to be reached in Berlin....
By the way, for the benefit of the Tribunal, Globus is Globocznik, is he
not? He is the same person, is he not?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: “....and told him about the negative result of the
conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had
a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a
terrible dialect so that not a soul would have understood us.
Globus immediately wrote down this report....”
and so on.
“In the meantime, Keppler had gone to Munich by sleeping car.”
Then, a sentence or two further down:
“I then forwarded instructions by Party member Mühlmann, who
proved to be an excellent liaison man to government offices in
the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as
Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg
and spent the night there and went on by car to the
Obersalzberg, Mühlmann continued on and got to Berchtesgaden.
Keppler and he went to the Führer before Schuschnigg and were
able to tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning,
was received, and experienced boundless surprise that the Führer
took up the negotiations where they had been broken off without
results the day before between Seyss and him. The Führer did not
conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the
whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time, in a manner
one can hardly imagine. The Führer got hold of him, assaulted
him, and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty
tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the past years.
Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. There was connection even
with his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was
smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now, in the presence of the
Führer, he was not allowed to smoke. Schuschnigg could not even
smoke.
“Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood
at attention before the Führer, held his hands against the seams
of his trousers and all he said was ‘Yes, sir,’ ‘Jawohl.’”
Now, what about that? You say all these things in your speech and were
they true when you said them? Right up to that point, Witness, you have
read it with me. Did you say this or not, and was it true when you said
it?
RAINER: The events as I have described them here are, as a whole,
correct. Individual expressions which I read here are not mine. In that
point this document has been supplemented by somebody else. Whether the
events described here are correct in detail, is something I cannot say
for certain because much of it did not happen in my presence.
MR. DODD: I just wanted to know if you said it; that is all. Very well,
we will go on.
You also told them that Schmidt finally went to Ribbentrop and asked him
to give Schuschnigg one cigarette and so they gave him one. Let us go on
quite a few pages to a more important matter. It is on Page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you be able to finish tonight, because we
were going to adjourn at a quarter to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will. I shall need only 2 more minutes to finish. I do
not think it takes much time. I just have one or two items in this
speech.
[_Turning to the witness._] You know in this speech you told your
listeners about the day that Seyss-Inquart came to a meeting and told
you that he had been bound by his word of honor not to talk about the
plebiscite. You know what you told your listeners that day. You will
find it on—well, you can find it, I can assure you it is in the text
and it will save time if you believe me. It is on Page 13 of the English
text. You say:
“We asked Seyss: Is it true? Seyss said: I am bound by my word
of honor not to speak, but we want to act as if it is true.”
“Diplomat that he was ...”—was your observation—“... the
matter was clear to us.”
He let you know, did he not, that Schuschnigg had told him about the
plebiscite. He let you know, did he not? Please, can you not answer my
question without—you will not find the answer to that on that page.
RAINER: The description here coincides with my memory.
MR. DODD: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] Just one last matter and I am not
going to have many more questions for him.
You also told your listeners that in the night from Thursday, 10 March
to Friday, 11 March, all Gauleiter were in Vienna waiting for
information:
“On 10 March we issued orders to the SA and SS, Lukesch and
Kaltenbrunner, to call out, beginning Friday, half of the
formations, and that the best men were to remain armed in their
barracks in the event of a civil war,” and so on.
Did you say that?
RAINER: With arms and in barracks? That cannot be right. The
instructions at that time were, and it is unlikely that I recounted them
otherwise, that half the strength should remain assembled at home, that
is, in assembly areas. There is no question of barracks, and weapons we
had almost none.
MR. DODD: You know, in this whole speech almost everything, except in
more detail, that you wrote in your report to Bürckel, is contained. The
truth of the matter is that you were telling, in both instances, what
you believed to be the truth, is it not? That is the truth of the
matter. When you made your report to Bürckel and when you made the
speech to the leaders and the members of the blood order, you were
reporting what you thought were the facts, and what of course, you know
now are still the facts.
RAINER: I cannot recognize this matter as being authentic.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not have many more questions, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH DAY
Thursday, 13 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the question of the time to
be taken by counsel in their concluding speeches. The provisions of
Article 18 of the Charter directing the Tribunal to confine the Trial
strictly to an expeditious hearing must be observed, and counsel clearly
could not be permitted to speak at any length they choose. Necessity
dictates that there must be some limitation, or this already lengthy
Trial might be prolonged beyond all reason.
The Tribunal understands that the Prosecution will voluntarily limit
their concluding speeches to 3 days in all, and some voluntary
limitation should be made by Counsel for the Defense. The evidence for
the defendants has been fully heard in great detail, and what is now
needed is not a detailed analysis of the evidence but a concise review
of the main matters.
The Tribunal wishes to make clear that no admission will be inferred
from failure to mention any particular matter in argument. On this view,
in the opinion of the Tribunal, the speeches of the Counsel for the
Defense—including the speech to be made on behalf of all the defendants
on the submission of law—should be concluded in 14 days in all. This
will allow the Defense double the time taken by the Prosecution, both in
opening and in summing up. By mutual arrangement between counsel, these
14 days could be apportioned as they think fit; and the Tribunal would
prefer that they make the apportionment rather than make the
apportionment itself.
The Tribunal expects, therefore, that Counsel for the Defense will
prepare their speeches in accordance with what I have said and will
advise the Tribunal as soon as possible of the apportionment of time
that they have made. If they find themselves unable to agree on this
apportionment, the Tribunal will give further consideration to the
matter.
The Tribunal desires also to point out to counsel—both for the
Prosecution and for the Defense—that it will materially help the
Tribunal if counsel would submit translations of their speeches at the
time they make them.
That is all.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the
decision which you have just announced to us has surprised the Defense,
since they have not been previously heard with reference to this
question. This appears to us to be all the more regrettable since the
decision is against the most elementary rights of the Defense, because
it prevents us from stating in Court what, in this most important Trial,
has to be said with regard to the defendants and the problems with which
they are confronted.
At this moment we are not yet in any position to survey the entire
material. If I were to state, without wishing to forestall the other
defendants’ counsel, the case of the Defendant Keitel as an example, you
will understand that the material alone which has appeared after the
cross-examination puts me in an extremely difficult position. I am sure
that a large number of the other defendants’ counsel will also share my
opinion that these matters cannot be dealt with collectively. While
every attempt should be made to deal comprehensively with these matters,
nevertheless, in my opinion, the cases of the individual defendants
should be dealt with separately.
Fourteen days appears to me a very short time. In practice, it is almost
impossible to make a fair apportionment, that is, to deal properly with
the individual questions.
Might I suggest, therefore, that the decision which you have just
announced—I am not sure whether it was only a suggestion—should be
reconsidered after consultation with the Defense. Without wanting to
anticipate the argument which the whole Counsel for the Defense intends
to offer, I wish, nevertheless, formally to raise objection now to the
decision limiting the Defense beyond the limits of what is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Do counsel either for the Prosecution or the Defense wish
to make any other observations to the Tribunal upon this subject?
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to state that I take exception to
Dr. Nelte’s argument. What I wish to say very briefly is that with
respect to Dr. Nelte’s argument that a restriction in time with respect
to the final argument is a violation of a fundamental right of these
defendants, I wanted to call the Tribunal’s attention that in our
country it is, I would say, rather common practice for our courts to
restrict counsel in time in final argument, as the Tribunal has pointed
out.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel wish to make any other
observations?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Mr. President, to begin with, I should like to make some remarks
regarding the limit imposed upon our time. If we are limited to 14 days,
then that means approximately 4 hours per defendant for our final
speeches. But in reality these 4 hours are not 4 hours, since, because
of the technical arrangements in this courtroom, we are forced to speak
much more slowly than we would speak in a direct final speech, in a free
statement. That is to say, from the 4 hours left to us on an average, we
must deduct the time which we lose through having to speak more slowly.
In my opinion, 4 hours would in reality amount to only 3 hours.
Mr. President, I believe that if you consider these facts you will agree
with us that in these 3 hours we cannot possibly do justice to all the
material available for every defendant, and thus fulfill that purpose
which the final address is intended to fulfill.
The main purpose of this Tribunal, which is unique in history, is to
establish the truth; but we cannot establish the truth by merely making
an arbitrary selection of individual actions. Our main task must be to
show what led to these individual actions. Accordingly, it is for me in
my capacity as defense counsel for the Defendant Von Neurath, who was
the responsible leader of the foreign policy of the Reich until 1938, to
show that all the actions of which my client is accused were logically
and unavoidably the outcome of the circumstances as they developed. This
sequence of historical events explains everything that happened up to
the day when my client handed in his resignation. But I can make that
clear only if I am able to present the different stages of development,
at least in broad outline. Moreover, Gentlemen, if you take into
consideration that I still have to deal with the activities of my client
as a Reich Protector, which for legal reasons is not altogether as
simple as it might appear, you will no doubt admit that I cannot
possibly do that in a period which is tantamount to only 3 hours.
I want to say to the statement of the American prosecutor, that we are
not before an American court here. I have just been trying to make
inquiries about this, and there is no information to the effect that in
international tribunals, such as, for instance, the Hague Courts, or the
courts in Egypt, a limitation has ever been imposed upon the duration of
the final speeches of the defense. That is why I beg to take into
consideration that we are not before an American court here but that
this is an international tribunal and that this International Tribunal
goes far beyond anything that has existed before. It also goes far
beyond the task of any military tribunal in Germany which has up to now
dealt with small particles of this tremendous complexity, and never have
the military tribunals imposed a time limit upon the defense when making
their final speeches.
Gentlemen, if you take all this into consideration, then I hope you will
allow me to ask you once more to reconsider your decision and not have
us give the impression that we are not able to do our duty in presenting
our cases for our clients.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Gentlemen of
the Tribunal, I will only add very little to what my colleague Mr. Dodd
has already said. The penal code of our country admits the right of the
tribunal to impose limitations upon both the prosecution and the defense
in their final plea.
I believe that the argument of the Defense, to the effect that this
decision of the Tribunal is putting limits on their rights and is
unjust, is unfounded. In practice the Defense is already submitting
evidence now in the case of their clients and has every opportunity to
give a complete presentation. I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that
justice does not consist in the endless conduct of the present Trial.
I therefore uphold the argument of Mr. Dodd and consider the decision of
the Tribunal quite just.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, will you please permit me to make a brief
statement? At no stage of the proceedings can the duration of a trial be
foreseen.
At the beginning one cannot foresee the time required and therefore one
cannot limit the time which the taking of evidence will require. Neither
can the following stages of the proceedings, the length of the
statements presented by the Defense, be forecast and cannot therefore be
limited. The value of the Defense—and, after all, that is the only
reason why a defense is included in these proceedings at all—is that a
man who is given that professional task and who possesses the necessary
qualities must be able to put before the Tribunal all the material
which, after long hours of work and intimate conversations with his
client, he has found worthy of presentation.
That must be done through such an intermediary; and to what extent he
should state his case is something that he, as an expert, must be able
to decide. Nobody participating in the proceedings, whether of the
Tribunal or of the defendants’ counsel, can even approximately foresee
what might be necessary in this connection.
That is why I believe that no dates should be fixed for the case for the
Prosecution or the hearing of evidence or the case for the Defense.
During the other stages of this Trial we have had to contend with the
same difficulties. In limiting the proceedings as to time we can only be
guided by what is relevant and expedient. Thus in this Court we have
witnessed again and again how the President has steered the proceedings
with skill and benevolence, always keeping them within the necessary
limits. I cannot understand why the same procedure should not be applied
to the final speeches, and I believe that the self-discipline which
naturally every experienced counsel applies to himself, will keep the
speeches within suitable limits. But I honestly believe that no one,
with the exception of the immediate participant, and he probably only
after all the evidence has been heard, can anticipate how much time will
be required; and this, in my opinion, precludes the imposing of a time
limit at this stage. If the statement made by the Tribunal should be
considered as a suggestion to limit our speeches—and in this connection
we are particularly grateful for the indication given as to the way the
evidence should be handled—then by following the Tribunal’s suggestion
we shall most certainly be able to impose upon ourselves a limitation
which will do justice to all parties.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t propose to go fully or at all into the argument
which led the Tribunal to make the announcement which I made this
morning, but I think it would be desirable for Counsel for the Defense,
before they make any formal objection to that announcement, to study it.
But I do desire to say on behalf of the Tribunal that that announcement
was not made without consultation both with Counsel for the Prosecution
and Counsel for the Defense and that was done in closed session; and we
heard both Counsel for the Prosecution and counsel whom we understood to
be representative counsel for the Defense, and they made the suggestion
which they thought right to us at that time, and we fully considered it.
We intimated to them that they should draw the attention of their
brethren to what passed at that hearing in closed session. Therefore, it
is entirely inaccurate to say, as Dr. Nelte did, that the announcement
was made without hearing Counsel for the Defense.
I only desire to add to that that in the circumstances the Tribunal will
give further consideration to the matter, but the suggestion made in the
announcement was that the 14 days, which the Tribunal thought sufficient
for the speeches for the defendants, should be apportioned voluntarily
among counsel. Those 14 days are full days and will not be taken up at
all by any argument on the organizations; and until the defendants’
counsel have attempted to make that apportionment, it must be obviously
impossible for them to know whether they will be able to make their
speeches, which are not speeches that are necessarily detailed
examinations of the evidence but are arguments drawing the attention of
the Tribunal to the main points which they desire to draw the attention
of the Tribunal to. It will not be possible for them to know whether
they can make their speeches satisfactorily within the 14 days. The
Counsel for the Defense ought, therefore, to go into the matter
together, as the Tribunal understood they were doing, and see whether
they can satisfactorily present their speeches within that time. All the
arguments which have been presented to us this morning were fully
presented to us by Counsel for the Defense who appeared before us at the
closed session, one of whom has addressed us this morning.
Now the Tribunal will go on with the hearing of the case.
[_The witness Rainer resumed the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in answer to the last question put by the
American prosecutor yesterday you stated that you wrote your letter with
a certain purpose, and I now ask you what that purpose was?
RAINER: Some time after the Anschluss there were hostile activities,
intrigues against Dr. Seyss-Inquart and some other people. They came
from dissatisfied radical elements in Austria and the Reich. They took
advantage of Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s hesitant attitude on 11 March, his
clinging to the revolutionary line and to the principles of the two
agreements between the two States, to accuse him of being a separatist
or even worse...
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps, Witness, you can be a little more brief.
RAINER: These people seemed to be dangerous, because Bürckel and, I
believe, Heydrich too, were behind them. I considered these attacks to
be unfair and therefore I brought out certain facts and arguments and
worded my report in such a way that the addressees would understand it
and be calmed down.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that, if I have understood you correctly, in this
letter you sought to stress the merits of the Party on the one hand, and
to claim indulgence for Seyss-Inquart on the other hand?
RAINER: Yes. That is how I would express it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, my second question. In this letter you mentioned
that Seyss-Inquart had taken a letter of ultimatum to Schuschnigg. Have
you any recollection to the effect that he himself dictated it and had
this letter written in his office?
RAINER: Dr. Steinbauer, you mean the letter of ultimatum written in the
afternoon of 11 March?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is the one.
RAINER: I believe that that letter was written in his office and I also
believe I participated in writing it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you go on to say, in the letter put to you by the
prosecutor, that, through the collaboration of Dr. Jury and Dr. Leopold,
Seyss-Inquart had become State Councillor. I ask you whether Dr. Jury
and Dr. Leopold had any influence at all on Schuschnigg?
RAINER: No, that cannot have been the intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: The prosecutor, in support of his statement yesterday,
submitted a second document. It was a speech which you had made as Gau
speaker in Carinthia. Do you remember that?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was that a typical Gau speech? I mean, from the point of
view of the propaganda of Goebbels? A speech which gives prominence to
one’s own merits and disparages one’s opponents?
RAINER: I would not say that. It was a comradely meeting of the Old
Guard on the occasion of the 11th of March. We drank beer and there was
music and I described events rather like telling a story; I spoke for a
very long time: in fact, it was the longest speech I ever made. I spoke
more than 3 hours. I spoke quite freely and without any notes, and the
shorthand record which is submitted here appears to me not to tally with
my statements on every point.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean, therefore, that it was more your intention to
procure an effect upon the members of the Party than to write history?
RAINER: Yes, of course.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much. That is enough for me and I have no
further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the cross-examination yesterday it was mentioned
that on one occasion you were with Von Papen at Garmisch. What did you
talk about to Von Papen at the time, and how did that conversation come
about at all?
RAINER: Dr. Seyss-Inquart and I had been invited to Garmisch by the
Reich Sport Leader. The German-Austrian Alpine Club was to be discussed.
Together with Von Tschammer we were watching the bobsled races at the
Riesser Lake and there we met Von Papen. Herr Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart,
and I then walked from there to Garmisch, and on the way we discussed
the political situation and the...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you don’t need to give the details of it.
I suppose the point of the question is that the conversation was not
political. Is that the point of the question?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The conversation was political, but it is a question of
the type of political conversation it was.
Perhaps, Witness, you can confine yourself to the facts. You just said
it was an accidental meeting. You were coming back from the bobsled
track. What did you talk about?
RAINER: We talked about the situation in Austria, about the pacification
of the country; and while we did not exhaust the subject, we did discuss
other matters which interested us and which dealt with the immediate
future.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: So that nothing was discussed which could not have been
put before the Austrian public?
RAINER: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were these matters in keeping with the July Agreement?
RAINER: Yes, of course they were.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: But then, in the course of the speech which has already
been mentioned, you said that you had been with others in Von Papen’s
apartment on the evening of 9 March 1938. I should like to know whether
that was a prearranged meeting or whether it was a more or less chance
meeting?
RAINER: It was just a casual meeting. I do not remember who arranged it.
The conversation dealt, naturally, with the situation arising out of
Schuschnigg’s plan for the plebiscite, which was an entirely new and
most surprising move, so that we had to think it over from every point
of view and clarify it by discussion.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What stand did Von Papen take during that conference?
RAINER: I remember that Von Papen, who just happened to be in Vienna
that evening, acted in a reserved way. I think he considered that an
affirmative vote would have met the situation perfectly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What reason had you for thinking he considered that an
affirmative vote was plausible and necessary? Was it for practical
reasons or was it due to the plebiscite which the Austrian Government
had suggested?
RAINER: It was because of the plebiscite.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Once again, my question is: Would the matters which were
discussed have led one to believe it was a specially called conference,
or rather was it a social gathering during which political questions
cropped up and this topical matter came up for discussion?
RAINER: It was a casual meeting which had been improvised because Von
Papen’s presence in Vienna coincided with the new political situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were any resolutions passed?
RAINER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall now call the
witness Dr. Guido Schmidt.
[_The witness Schmidt took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
GUIDO SCHMIDT (Witness): Dr. Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what positions did you hold in the Austrian
Republic?
SCHMIDT: I was a diplomat by profession. I was in the Austrian Foreign
Service under Dr. Seipel and for about 6 years I was a member of the
Austrian Legation in Paris. In 1936 I was recalled and assigned to the
Austrian State for service with the diplomatic corps and the Foreign
Office. In 1936 I became State Secretary under Dr. Schuschnigg, and
later Foreign Minister.
I was a member of the Schuschnigg Government until his resignation by
violence. From that time on, I had no political activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what were the reasons in regard to foreign
policy and economics which led to the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
SCHMIDT: At the beginning of 1936, the situation of Austria with regard
to foreign policy had changed to Austria’s disadvantage. After the
events of July 1934, England, France, and Italy drew up a three-power
declaration at Stresa concerning the maintenance of Austrian
independence. Over and above the international obligations existing up
to that time, the three powers now set up a new guarantee for the
maintenance of Austria, the Stresa Front, which during the whole year of
1935 gave protection to Austria. The collapse of the Stresa Front, as a
result of Mussolini’s Abyssinian enterprise, meant for Austria the loss
of the only practical international guarantee, and for Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg the creation of a completely new situation.
According to his conception of foreign policy, Austrian independence
should rest not only on the shoulders of Italy, but if possible on other
shoulders as well, that means of England and France. Then there were
difficulties resulting from the developments of the situation in Europe
from 7 March 1936, the day on which Adolf Hitler started his surprise
tactics by occupying the Rhineland without encountering serious
resistance from the Western Powers. This gave the Austrian Government
cause for anxiety and fear lest some day the Austrian question as well
might be solved by surprise or, as we later saw, by violence.
These are the reasons we must give if we are asked about the
considerations on which the agreement was based. There was also the
_rapprochement_ between Rome and Berlin which began at this time and was
due to the sanctions policy of the League of Nations. Austria, lying
between Italy and Germany, had to expect that one day that
Austrian-Italian friendship, which had existed since the time of
Dollfuss, would fall victim to the closer relationship between Rome and
Berlin.
For this reason and for other considerations, Dr. Schuschnigg sought a
means to improve relations, that is, to restore relations, between
Austria and the German Reich.
It would perhaps be useful in this connection to give a few of the
guiding rules of Austria’s foreign policy. The underlying idea was the
maintenance of Austrian independence. Austrian foreign policy was
furthermore based on the knowledge of the extremely difficult and
delicate geographical situation of the country between two totalitarian
states at the crossroad of European ideologies. Therefore, it had to be
the task of Austrian foreign policy to reach an understanding with her
big neighbor, the German Reich. The foreign policy further had to be
based on the determination to avoid everything that could lead to a
conflict with the German Reich, to avoid everything that could
antagonize the Reich, in order to prevent any violent action which,
after 7 March, was to be feared.
There were reasons in practical politics which were decisive in this
determination to restore relations with the German Reich, to the
ethnographic area of which we belonged, relations which had been
unnaturally interrupted. Apart from the reasons of foreign policy, there
were also economic considerations. Because of Austria’s economic
constitution, which, although alive, was nevertheless extremely weak,
the world economic crisis had affected Austria very seriously.
This can be understood only if we look back to the beginnings of this
young state. From the very start, all Austria’s neighbors had carried on
an economic policy of egotism, of chauvinistic self-interest, and in no
case had it been possible to reach really close co-operation of all the
Danube countries. It is true that some separate agreements had been
reached, such as the Rome Protocols; but the mutual distrust which all
had brought from their former home, their common home, the Austrian
Monarchy, continued to exist and obstructed any healthy development.
From 1931, the beginning of the world economic crisis, there were a
number of attempts to relieve the situation. I will mention them one
after the other. It begins with the attempt of the Government to create
a customs union, which failed because of the resistance of the League of
Nations. In 1932, there was an attempt by France to bring Austria and
Hungary into the Little Entente and to reach economic co-operation here.
Germany and Italy opposed this. England was also against it. In 1933,
the economic crisis was aggravated by the internal struggle against
National Socialism. That also had its effect on the economic life of
Austria, because the economic life of Austria was also used as a weapon
in the internal struggle.
THE PRESIDENT: This is undoubtedly interesting, but it has rather a
remote bearing, perhaps, upon the questions which the Tribunal has to
decide. I don’t know whether the witness has dealt with it sufficiently
for your purposes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this presentation of the facts I
wanted to show that from the economic and foreign policy point of view
the situation was such that the role of the defendant was forced into
the background; but we can continue now.
Witness, will you speak quite briefly.
SCHMIDT: All this led to the breaking-off of economic relations with the
German Reich, and now Austria’s life-and-death struggle for economic
existence entered upon a very serious phase. Because of these
considerations, that is, for economic reasons, too, Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg attempted to reach an agreement with the German Reich and to
restore economic relations which had been completely broken off, to
remove the “1,000 mark blockade,” to restore tourist traffic, to restore
the flow of economic goods, to silence the complaints which were coming
from the provinces in Austria because of the lack of a market for
agricultural products, wood, grain, cattle and so forth. These were,
generally speaking, the main considerations.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I now ask you: Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart help in
preparing or concluding this Agreement of July 1936?
SCHMIDT: No. The Chancellor worked with Glaise-Horstenau who represented
the so-called National Opposition.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there is a defect in the sound equipment, so
we had better adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in the spring of 1937 Seyss-Inquart entered
politics, and presumably you met him then.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I met him first in the summer of 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I shall go on, and I should like to ask you what
reasons in domestic and foreign policy led to the well-known meeting
between Adolf Hitler and Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: This question calls for a detailed answer. I ask for permission
to express myself in somewhat more detail.
By New Year 1938, the Austrian foreign policy situation had become
worse. Italy had entered into an engagement in Spain in favor of Franco,
which reduced still further her military and political influence in
Central Europe. What we called “The Watch at the Brenner” had in effect
ceased to exist, and Germany had more or less a free hand with regard to
Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal has common knowledge of the
history of this time. It is not necessary, really, to go into it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I should like to ask you to tell me if you were
present at the Obersalzberg at that time.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I should like to add, if I am to pass over the historical
events—that is how I understood the question—that the Federal
Chancellor accepted the invitation in order to prevent Austria’s being
reproached for having refused a peaceful attempt to clear up existing
differences between Austria and the German Reich. The Chancellor was by
no means optimistic, the more so because the existing differences of
opinion were very great and also because of the personality of his
partner in the talks. I recall that Schuschnigg, before leaving for this
meeting, told me that he was of the opinion that instead of him it might
have been better to send Professor Wagner-Jauregg, the greatest
psychiatrist of Vienna; but he believed, in view of the exposed position
of Austria, that he had to accept in order to forestall a coup and to
gain time until the international situation should improve in Austria’s
favor.
Unfortunately, we were right. Our fear of a coming attack or of coming
difficulties was justified. The fear that Austria would be left entirely
alone was also justified. The realization of the fact that we were
completely deserted was perhaps one of the primary reasons which carried
greatest weight with Schuschnigg together with the need of bridging over
this difficult period and gaining time. Austria had to tread this path
in the dark winter days from the end of 1937 until March 1938 without
the hope of any immediate or prospective assistance. And then we came to
Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: As Foreign Minister, did you inform the big powers of
the events of Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes. Contrary to frequent press reports, the interested big
powers were informed in detail both before and after Berchtesgaden. I
gave all the material to the head of the political section to whom the
diplomatic corps applied first. The Federal Chancellor himself and I
gave detailed reports to the accredited foreign representatives in
Vienna and drew their attention to the dangerous situation of the
country.
THE PRESIDENT: Forgive my interrupting you. We don’t want the details.
You said you informed the foreign powers beforehand and after. That is
sufficient.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we return to the defendant. Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart
take part in these talks?
SCHMIDT: What talks?
DR. STEINBAUER: The talks in Berchtesgaden.
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: He became Minister of the Interior and Police Minister,
and went to see Hitler in Berlin. Did he report to Schuschnigg the
substance of his first talk with Adolf Hitler?
SCHMIDT: I do not know, but I do know of individual statements by State
Secretary Zernatto, the head of the Fatherland Front, from which I can
conclude that a conversation between Minister Zernatto and
Seyss-Inquart, at which this talk was mentioned, must have taken place.
DR. STEINBAUER: It can therefore be assumed that, through Zernatto,
Schuschnigg also learned of it?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will pass over events until we come to March.
Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Do you know whether Schuschnigg
informed Seyss-Inquart of this and discussed it with him?
SCHMIDT: Yes, Seyss-Inquart was informed of it. I learned that an
agreement between Seyss-Inquart and the Federal Chancellor was reached
on or about 10 March. The Chancellor told me that Seyss-Inquart had
declared himself willing to speak on the radio in favor of the election.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Glaise-Horstenau reported that there was a threat
of invasion, did you, in your capacity as Foreign Minister, inform the
foreign powers of this?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I did not receive a direct report from Glaise-Horstenau. I
learned of the critical situation only from the ultimatum which demanded
the cancellation of the plebiscite planned by the Federal Chancellor on
13 March. From then on there was constant contact during 11 March with
the diplomatic corps in Vienna and later, during the hours which
followed, with our foreign representatives also.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the demands of the German Reich followed closely
upon one another. Especially, the demand was made that Schuschnigg
should resign. The ministers were assembled, and a member of the
Government is said to have told Seyss-Inquart the following: “We now see
clearly that the Reich is putting an end to Austria. It would be best
for Seyss-Inquart to take over the office of Chancellor so that the
transition may at least be bearable.”
Do you remember such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. Only later did I hear of a statement by Minister
Glaise-Horstenau which contained this request to Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the impression that with the farewell
speech of Schuschnigg, the Fatherland Front which was directed by him
had also collapsed?
SCHMIDT: I believe the question does not quite fit the situation. The
resignation of the Chancellor was demanded by ultimatum; and finally the
State itself was taken over, so that the Fatherland Front no longer
existed. With the entry of the German troops, National Socialism had
become a reality and developments showed that it did not permit the
Fatherland Front to live any longer.
DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart was then appointed Chancellor. He set up
his Cabinet; and you, Witness, were proposed as Foreign Minister, is
that correct?
SCHMIDT: That is correct. I refused. I was approached again, and I
refused again, and I was asked to give my reasons. Seyss-Inquart told me
that he intended to keep Austria independent as long as possible; but he
was afraid that with his Government, which had a National Socialist
majority, he would encounter difficulties in the West. Therefore, he
wanted to retain my diplomatic experience and connections for the
Government. He added that he intended to create a broader platform for
this Government by calling in positive Austrian representatives.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you find the names of such positive Austrians on the
list of ministers?
SCHMIDT: There were names of such men. I have been puzzled about it
myself, but I cannot recall any individual names with any certainty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know why another list of ministers was drawn up
which was the final list?
SCHMIDT: In the evening State Secretary Keppler arrived from Berlin; and
as I learned later, he rejected me, and others too, I believe. I think I
can remember one name. I believe that he suggested at the request of
Berlin that Weber should take over the Foreign Ministry. Thus this list
was discarded and Seyss-Inquart no longer tried to persuade me to go
back on my decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of
keeping Austria independent, even under National Socialist leadership?
SCHMIDT: As a witness, I can only say what I know. Opinions are very
difficult to express. I have stated what he told me.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to a statement by the American Ambassador in
Vienna at that time, Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen, at the beginning
of his activity in Vienna, is said to have stated that his real task in
Vienna was the economic and political incorporation of southeast Europe
into Germany, and that southeast Europe was the natural hinterland of
Germany.
Did you, Witness, ever hear of such a statement?
SCHMIDT: No. In view of the close contact which I had already with Mr.
Messersmith before my appointment as a member of the Government, and
especially later, I would probably have heard of it. I assume, however,
that no special significance was attached to this question at the time,
because in first visits between diplomats, as a rule, a _tour d’horizon_
is usually made and questions are discussed which interest both
countries, that is, general political questions. Nor did I observe later
that a southeast Europe policy was being carried on from the German
Legation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: According to Mr. Messersmith, Herr Von Papen is supposed
to have said at that time that he was working to weaken and undermine
the Austrian Government.
Did the witness Messersmith report such a statement by Herr Von Papen to
you?
SCHMIDT: No.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Austrian Government consider it advisable and
necessary to normalize relations with the Reich by an agreement in July
1936?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I have already explained the reasons for conducting a
realistic policy which were of an economic nature and based on foreign
policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In these and in later negotiations, did the international
political situation, particularly the settlement of the Party question,
also have a part in deciding this?
SCHMIDT: Of course, it was the task of the Government to ease inner
political tension. The Federal Chancellor had to try to find a way out
of the difficult situation which he had inherited from Dollfuss by
liquidating the inner political fronts.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you believe that Herr Von Papen concluded the July
1936 Agreement with treacherous intent?
SCHMIDT: No, I have no reason to disbelieve that he considered this
agreement a serious endeavor to create a _modus vivendi_ between Austria
and the Reich. The fact that it resulted in a _modus male vivendi_ does
not alter this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Germans complain that after the Agreement of 11
July 1936 there was no essential change in the inner political course of
the Austrian Government?
SCHMIDT: Yes, many reproaches were made; and thus we come to the last
and the real cause of the conflict with the Reich. The struggle against
National Socialism within the country in the interests of maintaining
the independence of the country and, on the basis of the Agreement of 11
July, insuring co-operation with the German Reich, whose leaders were
National Socialists—these were the two imperative demands which, after
a time, the Austrian Government found to be irreconcilable. This also
explains the difficulties encountered by all persons entrusted with
carrying out this agreement in Vienna, including the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a result of these conditions, particularly those
arising out of the July Agreement, were questions of internal policy,
such as questions of policy and personnel of the so-called National
Opposition, the subject of discussions between the Federal Chancellor
and Herr Von Papen?
SCHMIDT: The situation as just described shows that such discussions
were unavoidable; and talks on the inner political situation also took
place between the Chancellor and the German Minister, as well as with
the Italian Minister, in a general way that is not unusual. I know of no
diplomatic memoirs which do not contain such entries. The Chancellor
would never have tolerated interference of any kind. In questions of
personnel Schuschnigg was especially reticent, because, if I may say so,
he was afraid of “Trojan Horses.”
That, more or less, represents the situation which was discussed in
talks between the Chancellor and the German Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen make it clear that he was opposed to
the methods of the illegal Party?
SCHMIDT: Yes. According to the information received by the Government,
Papen opposed the leaders of the illegal Party, that is, Leopold in
particular. This was doubtless due to fundamental differences, differing
political ideas and differing political methods, which Von Papen on the
one hand and the leaders of the illegal Party on the other were
determined to pursue.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen, on the basis of the July Agreement,
ever adopt an aggressive attitude in Austrian foreign policy?
SCHMIDT: There existed between Austria and the Reich, not only in
cultural and inner political relations, but also in the field of foreign
policy, irreconcilable differences of opinion. I will only mention the
demand of the Reich that Austria should leave the League of Nations,
which we rejected by pointing to the fact that Austria, by reason of her
geographical position and her history, had a continental mission, and
also to the loans received from the League of Nations. A second point
was Austria’s attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this at all answering the questions that you have put
to him?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He is introducing the answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Try and get on with the answer to it, will you? Get the
witness on to the answer rather than the introduction.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to know whether Herr Von Papen took
advantage of the opportunities for an aggressive intervention in
Austrian foreign policy in the individual cases mentioned by you.
SCHMIDT: I wanted to say that in spite of the deeply rooted differences
this did not occur and that an ambassador with a more radical point of
view would certainly have had the opportunity and the occasion to adopt
a more severe attitude towards Austria. There was not a single case
where we reached an agreement with the German Reich on a joint foreign
policy. Von Papen did remind us of that, but that was all. As for
aggression, or aggressive activities, I cannot say anything about this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did Herr Von Papen act on occasion as
mediator? I would like to recall the Pinkafeld case.
SCHMIDT: The Pinkafeld flag incident is an example of Von Papen’s
activity as mediator. In itself it was a minor incident, but it led to
threats of invasion by Hitler. Von Papen was called to Berlin and had a
great deal of difficulty in calming down Hitler’s fury, who, as I said,
threatened to invade Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, if it is convenient to you, it would be more
convenient to the Tribunal if you spoke a little faster.
SCHMIDT: He succeeded in settling the matter and there were no
consequences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He settled the matter. Did Herr Von Papen speak to you
about the reasons for his being recalled on 4 February 1938?
SCHMIDT: On the occasion of a visit on the 5th he expressed his
astonishment—and I might say his anger—at his being recalled, which in
his opinion and also in our opinion was due to the events of 4 February
1938, the dismissal of General Von Fritsch and of 30 other generals, and
the dismissal of Von Neurath. He thought that Austria would not be
unaffected either, especially in view of the man who had been proposed
to succeed him. At that time, Bürckel or Consul General Kriebel was
proposed. That was approximately what Von Papen said to me and I believe
also to the Federal Chancellor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then he believed and feared that his successor would
adopt a more severe policy against Austria?
SCHMIDT: That conclusion was inevitable in view of the two persons just
mentioned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Von Papen take part in the pressure exerted on you
and Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden talks?
SCHMIDT: No, he did not.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the contrary, did he not, insofar as he had any
opportunity of taking part in the negotiations, attempt to tone down
Hitler’s demands?
SCHMIDT: In view of the atmosphere of violence which prevailed and the
program of demands which was presented, this was not difficult. I
believe that he, like many others who were present, endeavored to
restore calm and thus enable the negotiations to proceed in an
atmosphere of reason.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the course of the negotiations, a number of
concessions were made. Do you believe that Von Papen’s attitude and his
part in these negotiations had a restraining effect, and led to your
obtaining these practical results?
SCHMIDT: His attitude on the whole was no doubt mediatory. One cannot
speak of success at Berchtesgaden as far as the result is concerned; but
that is not Von Papen’s fault.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, do you think you will be able to finish in
a few moments?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] In order to answer my question I believe it
would be better if you would not consider the final result of
Berchtesgaden but rather the fact that Hitler had presented to you a
very large program of demands going far beyond the final results, and if
you would consider that actually some points which were of great
importance to you were changed in the course of the negotiations.
SCHMIDT: As far as there was any help coming from the other side it came
from Von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you perhaps recall that the Hitler-Schuschnigg
negotiations were especially violent because Hitler was trying to win
Schuschnigg over to his German attitude and Von Papen came to
Schuschnigg’s aid and thereby put Schuschnigg in a better position to
negotiate than at the beginning?
SCHMIDT: I was not present for the first hour or two of the talk. I
cannot answer the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: My last question is this: Did Herr Von Papen, after 26
February, the day on which he took leave of the Austrian President,
still carry on any official activity in Vienna?
SCHMIDT: No; the Vienna Embassy was administered by the Chargé
d’Affaires, Embassy Counsellor Von Stein, who made the two official
_démarches_ of the Reich, on the afternoon of the 9th or the morning of
the 10th, against the plebiscite planned by Schuschnigg. Von Stein,
together with General Muff and State Secretary Keppler, also handed to
the Austrian President the ultimatum demanding the resignation of
Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. This shows that Ambassador Von Papen was
no longer active.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until a quarter past two.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask the indulgence of the Court and have permission
to put one more question to witness Schmidt, a question which I had
overlooked putting before the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, in November 1937, in the course of measures
introduced against the illegal movements, certain materials were
confiscated which were given the name “Tafs papers.” Is Herr Von Papen
referred to personally in these “Tafs papers”?
SCHMIDT: As far as I can recollect, a number of documents were
discovered one after the other along with this material which we called
the “Tafs plan.” I think I can remember that in one of these documents
Papen was mentioned. An attempt on the life of the German Ambassador to
Vienna was to be the cause for internal disturbances in Austria, which
were to be followed by repressive measures by the Government; and then
later this was to lead to measures on the part of the German Reich. I
cannot remember the details of that plan any more.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: With the permission of the Tribunal, I should now
like to put a few questions to this witness.
Dr. Schmidt, when and on what occasion did you meet Herr Von Neurath?
SCHMIDT: I met Von Neurath in November 1937 in Berlin, where I paid him
a visit in response to his invitation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us what attitude Von Neurath, as
German Foreign Minister, had with regard to the relations of the German
Reich with Austria? In particular, can you tell us his views regarding
the Agreement of 11 July 1936? In this connection I should like to draw
your attention to the fact that the Prosecution has alleged that, as it
is expressed, Von Neurath concluded this agreement in a deceptive way.
SCHMIDT: During the few times I met Von Neurath he always expressed the
view that he was in favor of an independent Austria, and together with
this he wanted the closest possible co-operation in the foreign
political, economic, and military spheres. Our negotiations always
proceeded on the basis of the 11th of July Agreement, and differences of
opinion arose only about the interpretation of the agreement. Neurath,
on behalf of the German Government, held that the agreement should, if
possible, work actively in his interest, while we, for defensive
reasons, preferred a different interpretation. At any rate, Neurath
rejected means of violence and followed approximately the line of an
Austria which was independent, but as close as possible to Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Neurath’s attitude toward the extreme
factions of the Party in the Reich which, in practice, followed a policy
of intervention in the internal affairs of Austria?
SCHMIDT: As I already mentioned, Neurath rejected methods of violence,
and with them the methods of intervention, and also the methods of the
illegal party in Austria. From conversations which I had with him I
believe that I can state this unequivocally. This is also attested by
his complete rejection of the activity of State Secretary Keppler and
Veesenmeyer, who were certainly among the pioneers of the new
development in the Southeast and primarily in Austria. The expressions
which he used, in that connection allow no doubt regarding his attitude.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr.
President, may I have permission to represent my colleague Dr. Stahmer,
who is absent, and put a few questions on behalf of Defendant Göring to
the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have just stated that in November 1937 you paid
an official visit to Berlin?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: On that occasion, did you also talk to the then Field Marshal
Göring?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even at that time Field Marshal Göring
already told you that the Austrian problem could only be solved by the
complete union of the two sister nations, that is to say, by the
annexation of Austria to the Reich, and that he for his part would do
everything to achieve that end?
SCHMIDT: It was not told me in those words. The former Reich Marshal
probably did refer in an insistent way to close co-operation with
Austria, but a demand for an Anschluss was not mentioned, as far as I
can remember. As an illustration of that, I might say that at that time
the events of 25 July 1934 were discussed. I expressed the view that the
Agreement of July 1936 ought to put a final touch to that development,
and Reich Marshal Göring stated that he had called the wire-puller of
this affair to account—I believe he mentioned Habicht—and had banished
him to some obscure part of Germany. From this remark alone it appears,
therefore, that there can have been no talk of an Anschluss. The former
Reich Marshal welcomed the development caused by the 11th of July 1936,
that is, that a full stop had been put to the then existing development,
which one had to describe as a state of war, as it had been up to the
11th of July 1936.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the morning of the Anschluss, that is
to say, the morning of 12 March 1938, Göring had you come to Berlin by
airplane?
SCHMIDT: No. That was either Monday or Tuesday; it must have been the
15th or 16th.
DR. SEIDL: When you were in Berlin, did he put the question to you
whether you yourself or Schuschnigg had asked for help from foreign
powers, military help, on the day before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember having heard that question.
DR. SEIDL: You stated this morning that with the Anschluss National
Socialism in Austria became a reality. I now ask you, was not National
Socialism also a political reality in Austria even before the Anschluss?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly a political reality, but I am talking of a
political reality in the sense of an organized power in the State.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are going a little too fast—well, I do
not know what it was. Anyhow, you had better repeat it, because the
interpreters do not seem to have it.
DR. SEIDL: The question was whether or not National Socialism in Austria
had been a political reality even before the Anschluss, and I put this
question with reference to the fact that the witness had said this
morning that National Socialism did not become a reality in Austria
until the German troops marched in.
SCHMIDT: By the term “political reality” I meant that National Socialism
had then got the State power into its hands, because until then it
represented a prohibited party, which of course after the agreement of
February 12 was supposed to be drawn within the framework of the
Fatherland Front for responsible co-operation in political affairs.
In other words, I wanted to show the basic change which came about for
National Socialism with the arrival of the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question: After the Anschluss, did you not
repeatedly tell the Reich Marshal that the Fatherland Front, on the
occasion of the Anschluss, collapsed like a house of cards?
SCHMIDT: Yes; of course, I cannot remember individual statements, but
the collapse of the Fatherland Front did naturally come about when the
Chancellor resigned. The Fatherland Front was the gathering point of the
resistance, and with 11 March the resistance collapsed.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Dr. Schmidt, when, for the first time—if you know—did the
Defendant Von Papen suggest to Chancellor Schuschnigg that he,
Schuschnigg, have a meeting with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Late in the autumn of 1937—it must have been November—Von
Papen made the suggestion for such a meeting. These discussions did not,
however, have any concrete results at the time. The official invitation
was brought by Von Papen on or about 6 or 7 February, after he had
returned from his visit to Hitler. I heard about the invitation on that
day.
MR. DODD: Will you also tell us if you know whether or not Von Papen
assured Schuschnigg that this meeting would be restricted to very
well-defined points, and that it would concern itself only with matters
that were agreed upon between Schuschnigg and Von Papen before the
conference took place?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor himself demanded exact wording for the agenda of
the conference, that is, as a basic topic the 11th of July, the final
removal of existing differences, and so on and so forth. That had been
agreed between Von Papen and Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: And did Von Papen assure Schuschnigg that the meeting would
proceed favorably for Austria?
SCHMIDT: Assure him? No. But a declaration was given by Von Papen to the
effect that the situation at the time was favorable. In this connection,
Von Papen referred to the conditions such as had been created on 4
February. He believed then that Hitler would need a foreign political
success, following these events, and so a certain success could be
scored by the Chancellor for a low price.
MR. DODD: Of course, what I am trying to clear up here—and you can
answer briefly, which, I think, will help us—is that: You and
Schuschnigg had the impression that advantage would accrue to you and to
Austria if you attended the meeting, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I said earlier that the Chancellor was not optimistic. An
improvement of the situation, therefore, was hardly expected, only a
removal of the existing differences.
MR. DODD: Now, the night before you left for Berchtesgaden, you had a
conversation with a man by the name of Hornbostel, is that so? The
Minister.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And had you already had a conversation with Seyss-Inquart that
same evening, you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: It is possible. During those days, repeated discussions took
place.
MR. DODD: Well, maybe I can help you a little. Do you not recall that
Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were drawing up a memorandum of some sort
about domestic questions, while you and, I believe, Hornbostel, or
someone else, were preparing a paper or papers on international matters
or matters of foreign policy? Does that help you any?
SCHMIDT: I could not understand.
MR. DODD: Well, I am referring to the time when you and some of your
associates were preparing a memorandum of some sort about the foreign
questions, and Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart were preparing papers about
domestic affairs. You remember that, do you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, you were alarmed that night about Seyss-Inquart, were you
not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And why were you alarmed? What was the cause of your alarm?
What did you fear at the hands of Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: The drafts which I saw before my departure and which had been
worked out by Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart as a basis for a part of the
political discussions appeared to me to be politically useless and
impracticable. It was my impression that two men were at work here who
perhaps enjoyed making up stories, but who did not do justice to the
seriousness of the situation. There were expressions used, such as the
difference between the Austrian National Socialist ideology and the
National Socialist. But there is no difference. An Austrian National
Socialist ideology can only be National Socialist. I criticized these
matters in one of my talks.
MR. DODD: Will you agree that he was in some kind of combination with
Hitler and that bad things would result from it for Austria? By “him” I
mean Seyss-Inquart.
SCHMIDT: No, at that time I had no fear that there was a secret
agreement between Hitler and Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now, when you got to Berchtesgaden the next day, you found
that much of the material that had been discussed between Zernatto and
yourself and Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg was the basis for Hitler’s
demands on Schuschnigg, is that not so?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And were you not convinced, at least that day, that
Seyss-Inquart had been in communication with Hitler some time before you
got to Berchtesgaden and had communicated to him these basic demands?
SCHMIDT: We merely had the impression that the basis for this conference
was a draft which had been prepared by men who knew the conditions.
Therefore, this list of demands was based on a large portion of the
Zernatto-Seyss-Inquart agreements. The entire program of demands had not
been made known to us previously.
MR. DODD: You and Schuschnigg represented Austria that day at
Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Hitler, Von Papen, Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Sperrle, and
Reichenau, is that not so, were there for Germany?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: You and Von Papen and Schuschnigg rode from the border
together in the same railroad coach, did you, to Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And in the course of that...
SCHMIDT: Whether Papen was in the same coach I am not sure, but we were
together on the way back.
MR. DODD: Well, he was on the train, was he not, whether he was in the
same coach or not? Did he not get on the train at the border and ride on
with you and Schuschnigg?
SCHMIDT: That I no longer know.
MR. DODD: Did he not meet you at the border?
SCHMIDT: He was waiting for us at the border.
MR. DODD: Perhaps I am confused, but what I am getting at is a
particular conversation that you and Schuschnigg had with Von Papen,
either right at the time you met him at the border, or in the course of
your trip up to Berchtesgaden, when he told you that, “Oh, by the way,
there are going to be a few generals up here. I hope you would not
mind.” Do you remember Von Papen saying that?
SCHMIDT: Well, generals were mentioned, yes. Schuschnigg had
said—whether Keitel’s name was mentioned, that I can no longer
remember—that he would be there.
MR. DODD: Well, it was rather casually said, and you did not have any
opportunity to object at all, did you? And up to that time you had not
known there were to be military men there?
SCHMIDT: No, up to then we did not know.
MR. DODD: Now, you got to Berchtesgaden at what time of day? Early in
the morning or midmorning? What time of the day?
SCHMIDT: In the course of the morning.
MR. DODD: Yes, and I wish you to tell the Tribunal, as well as you can,
just what happened there that day. We have heard much testimony about
this meeting at Berchtesgaden, and you are the first person on the stand
who was actually there. I guess that is not so—Keitel was there also.
Well, but at any rate, you participated in the discussion. How did the
discussion start?
SCHMIDT: To begin with, the discussion started with a conversation
between Hitler and Schuschnigg. That conversation took place privately,
so that neither I nor the other gentlemen were present. Later, the
gentlemen were called in individually, and then there were also
conferences without Hitler with the then Foreign Minister Ribbentrop,
during which the points of the program which had been submitted to us
before were discussed. In the course of these conversations, individual
demands were canceled.
MR. DODD: While Hitler and Schuschnigg were talking, who were you
talking with, if you were talking with anybody, or what were you doing?
SCHMIDT: I was together with the other gentlemen whom you have already
mentioned; some of us were in the large hall and some of us sat and
waited in the anteroom right outside the room where the four-man
conference was taking place.
MR. DODD: Did you talk to Von Ribbentrop, for example, while Schuschnigg
was talking to Hitler? What was going on there? What were you talking
about with Ribbentrop, if you were talking to him?
SCHMIDT: In the afternoon session we went through the list of demands
with Ribbentrop—I did that partly on my own—and I succeeded in having
certain points eliminated.
MR. DODD: Well, during the morning—I wish you would limit yourself to
time here, so that we will know the exact sequence of events. During
that morning session between Hitler and Schuschnigg were you just
sitting around in an informal conversation or were you actually in
conversation about Austria and Germany with Ribbentrop or with anybody
else?
SCHMIDT: Not in the morning, no, because we, or at least I, had not yet
seen the program, and the political talks could only take place on the
basis of the demands presented by both sides.
MR. DODD: Well, there were recesses, were there not, so to speak,
between the conferences, and during those recesses, did you not have a
chance to talk to Schuschnigg? During those few intervals?
SCHMIDT: Yes, after about an hour Schuschnigg came out, gave me a
summary of the situation, and discussed it with me.
MR. DODD: Tell us what he told you, right there at first hand.
SCHMIDT: He first of all described the atmosphere, the violence of the
language used, and then said that the demands which had been presented
had the character of an ultimatum.
MR. DODD: Try to tell us what he said if you remember. What did he say
about the atmosphere, about the language used? That is what we want to
know.
SCHMIDT: First of all, he began with the greeting he had received. He
said that the Führer had accused him of not being a German, or that
Austria was not following a German policy. It had always been so, even
during the time of the Hapsburgs. He also held the Catholic element in
Austria responsible for this. Austria was always a stumbling-block in
the way of every national movement, and the same was true today. Then
Hitler also mentioned the fact that Austria had not left the League of
Nations. Then there were very serious arguments between Hitler and
Schuschnigg personally, during which the Federal Chancellor felt that
even he personally was being attacked badly. The details of this
conference I cannot now remember, but the atmosphere, according to the
Federal Chancellor’s description, was extremely rough.
MR. DODD: You had luncheon there, I assume, at midday or shortly after?
SCHMIDT: After the conference, at or about 12:00 or 12:30, there was a
joint luncheon. Here there was a perfectly normal tone of conversation
again. In the meantime the tense feeling had subsided once more.
MR. DODD: Now, was Schuschnigg quite a heavy smoker?
SCHMIDT: You mean then, or when?
MR. DODD: I mean at that time, of course.
SCHMIDT: Of course, Schuschnigg was a heavy smoker.
MR. DODD: Now, we have heard that during that day of conferences, he was
not permitted to smoke, until you pleaded with Ribbentrop to let him
have one cigarette. Now, what about that? Is that so, or is that a
story?
SCHMIDT: We were told at the time that there could be no smoking in
Hitler’s presence. That is true. Then I tried to find a chance for the
Chancellor to be allowed to smoke one cigarette. Whether I asked
Ribbentrop about it I cannot remember exactly, because that detail was
not of any importance.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Anyhow, at this conference did Schuschnigg
tell you that Hitler demanded that Seyss-Inquart should be made Minister
of Security of the Government?
SCHMIDT: That was one of the demands on the program.
MR. DODD: Made by Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that Glaise-Horstenau be named Minister for
the Army?
SCHMIDT: That was the second position which was demanded.
MR. DODD: Did he also demand that certain expelled students from the
universities in Austria be reinstated?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the expelled students were to be pardoned and admitted to
the universities.
MR. DODD: And certain discharged officials were to be reinstated in
their offices?
SCHMIDT: That too.
MR. DODD: Second, certain discharged members of the police forces of
Austria were to be restored to their places as well?
SCHMIDT: That was included in the chapter “Acts of Reprieve.”
Accordingly, officials who had been discharged from executive positions
were to be returned to status again.
MR. DODD: Were there also demands made with regard to currency exchange
and customs unions?
SCHMIDT: Yes, economic demands of this kind were discussed. The
expression customs union itself was not used. However, there were
demands that came close to it.
MR. DODD: Now, as soon as Schuschnigg heard these demands, of course,
you knew that the conference was exceeding the limitations that had been
placed upon it by the agreement between Von Papen and Schuschnigg, did
you not? You knew that right away?
SCHMIDT: Yes, the program was more far-reaching than we expected, that
is quite true, but I do not know whether Von Papen knew the program
beforehand. I assume not.
MR. DODD: Well, I did not ask you that, but that is all right, if you
want to say something for Von Papen. My question is however: Did you not
immediately go to Von Papen or did you not go to Schuschnigg and say:
“There, this is not what you told us we came here to do”? Did you not
have any such conversation with him during one of these recesses?
SCHMIDT: Of course, statements were made to the effect that this program
was more far-reaching than we had expected.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: We had the impression that Von Papen himself was unpleasantly
affected by certain points.
MR. DODD: Did he not suggest, however, that you agree to Hitler’s terms?
SCHMIDT: Papen certainly recommended that the final conditions be
accepted, that is, after we had already obtained some of the concessions
because in his opinion an agreement ought to be reached. The Federal
Chancellor, too, gave his personal word, because he did not want to go
away without a result being reached, so as not to endanger Austria’s
position.
MR. DODD: Now, also, Hitler agreed that he would dissolve the new
National Socialist Party in Austria, did he not? Did he not assure you
that day that he would do so?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
MR. DODD: That he would recall Dr. Tafs and Dr. Leopold, the leaders of
the Nazi Party in Austria?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And also, you agreed to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Minister for
Security?
SCHMIDT: The Chancellor agreed with this decision.
MR. DODD: And you agreed to take men by the names of, or men like,
Fischböck and Wolf, into the Austrian press service?
SCHMIDT: They were to be admitted. Fischböck was to be in the Ministry
of Commerce, and Wolf in the press section. Nothing was said about the
form in which that was to take place.
MR. DODD: And you agreed also to try to absorb some of the National
Socialists into the Fatherland Front, to absorb them into your own
political group?
SCHMIDT: The expression “some of the Nazis into the Fatherland Front”
does not meet the situation. It was the question of incorporating the
National Opposition—which at that time was described as the Austrian
National Socialist ideology—into the Fatherland Front, and so insure
the co-operation of this entire group in the political life of Austria.
MR. DODD: All right; now, Hitler told you that you had until 15 December
to accept his terms, did he not? I mean, 15 February.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: And he told you that if you did not do so, he would use force?
SCHMIDT: The ultimatum was—yes, it was an ultimatum—to the effect that
Hitler intended to march into Austria as early as February, and was
still prepared to make one last attempt.
MR. DODD: And what about these generals, were they walking in and out
while the conference was going on? Men like the Defendant Keitel?
SCHMIDT: The generals were called in several times.
MR. DODD: Were you and Schuschnigg frightened? Did you think at one time
that you were to be taken either into custody or to be shot?
SCHMIDT: We were worried that possibly we might not be allowed to leave,
yes; but that we might be shot, no.
MR. DODD: Well, do you remember Schuschnigg telling you, when on your
way back to Vienna, that he was frightened when Keitel was called in,
that Schuschnigg thought he was going to be shot, or something drastic
was to be done to him, and you told Schuschnigg that you, too, were
frightened at that time, that the end had come, or words to that effect?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not remember that conversation. There was never any
talk about shooting, but as I have already said, we were just afraid.
The Chancellor was also of that opinion that if the negotiations did not
go well we might not get away.
MR. DODD: Very well. What was Von Papen doing while the generals were
moving in and out? Did he see that as well as you?
SCHMIDT: After such a heated discussion it is quite difficult to say,
after 8 years, what each individual was doing at the time.
MR. DODD: There were not too many of you there—six or eight. Were you
pretty generally in a group?
SCHMIDT: There were continuous changes. We were not always in there
together. Various combinations were certainly made.
MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: There was not any possibility
of Von Papen failing to see the generals there that day, was there?
SCHMIDT: On that day he must have seen them when we were there.
MR. DODD: Von Ribbentrop told you that Hitler was in a very angry frame
of mind, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, we were all agreed on that.
MR. DODD: And he also urged that you, of course, accept the terms as the
best thing for you and for Schuschnigg, did he not?
SCHMIDT: At any rate, Ribbentrop at the time did not take part in this
pressure. He represented the German demands, too, yes, but not in an
unpleasant or forceful way. I mentioned that to the Chancellor even at
the time.
MR. DODD: Yes, this is what the situation was, was it not: Von
Ribbentrop was playing the role of the nice man, while Hitler inside was
playing the role of the horrid man, and you and Schuschnigg were being
passed back and forth from one to another?
SCHMIDT: It was my impression, at the time, that Ribbentrop was not
acquainted with the subject very well and that for that reason alone he
had kept himself somewhat in the background.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is interesting, and it is not altogether news in
this case; but in any event, is it not a fact that you were being played
off, so to speak, as between the nice man Von Ribbentrop and the bad man
Hitler?
SCHMIDT: It cannot be described like that. That was not the case. We had
to negotiate the details with Ribbentrop. Hitler had stated that we
should discuss the detail together with the experts.
MR. DODD: Well, could it be that you do not realize it yet? Are you sure
that that was not the situation, or is it only that you have not
realized it to this day?
SCHMIDT: About what?
MR. DODD: That situation that I suggested—that you were being
maneuvered between the good man and the bad man.
SCHMIDT: No.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand, I do not think we need to go
on with it.
Now, how late did you stay there that day, and what time did you leave
Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: In the late hours of the evening. It must have been between 9
and 10, as far as I remember.
MR. DODD: And when you got back to Vienna, did you tell Seyss-Inquart
about what had happened in Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: First of all there was a conference between Zernatto and
Seyss-Inquart in which Zernatto gave Seyss-Inquart an exact picture of
the situation, since Zernatto had been informed by the Federal
Chancellor as well as by myself. Later I joined in this conversation.
However, I had the impression that most of the description was already
over and only details were still being mentioned.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal this morning that Seyss-Inquart told you
that he wanted to retain some independence for Austria—some semblance
of independence, anyway. Now, you did not believe that, did you, when he
told you?
SCHMIDT: I cannot say either “yes” or “no” to that. I turned him down,
and therefore I did not bother my head any more about Seyss-Inquart’s
political ideas because I did not intend to enter the Government. The
demand had to be regarded as being meant seriously.
MR. DODD: Well, you used some particular language when you turned him
down, did you not? What did you say about wanting to be truthful and
decent?
SCHMIDT: I stated at that time that I belonged to Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg, that the laws of decency and loyalty still applied for me,
and that therefore I would resign with him.
MR. DODD: Then did you not use the language, “I still believe in the
rules of truth and decency”?
SCHMIDT: No, the laws regarding loyalty and decency were still
applicable to me. That is what I said. I had been with Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg all the time, and I would also resign with him.
In this connection you would have to know my relationship to the
Chancellor; anyone who knows that knows what it means and that I could
not have acted any differently.
MR. DODD: Now, I am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that
you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indicated that
you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Is that not so?
SCHMIDT: I did not mean that by it. What I said then referred to myself,
to my reason for refusing. There was indeed a difference, was there not,
which arose from the fact that I was on terms of friendship with the
Chancellor.
MR. DODD: Well, you know we have your testimony down there in Vienna
where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember
telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the
violent removal of Schuschnigg.
SCHMIDT: Yes, I stated that I could not belong to Seyss-Inquart’s
Government since it was, after all, partly responsible for the removal
of Schuschnigg’s Government. Since I was a friend of Schuschnigg, I
could not participate in such a Government.
MR. DODD: Well, the point of it all is that, knowing Seyss-Inquart, and
as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had
your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious when you tell the
Tribunal that you really thought—you really believed Seyss-Inquart when
he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria?
SCHMIDT: I doubted that, too, at the time, just as I still doubt it
today. What went on in his head I cannot say.
MR. DODD: I am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in
your head.
Now, you had a conversation with the Defendant Von Papen about
Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago, did you not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, tell the Tribunal when and where that conversation took
place.
SCHMIDT: I met Von Papen in Turkey—it must have been in the late autumn
of 1943. Our conversation turned on the events of 11 March 1938. At the
time Von Papen expressed himself in a severely critical way about the
procedure at that time, about Seyss-Inquart, for the reason, he thought,
that he had done nothing for the independence of Austria, and also
because the procedure had not served German interests either. He wanted
to express his criticism by this, and I had the impression that he was
indeed against a violent solution, that is, against a solution by
violence such as had occurred.
MR. DODD: Well, I want you particularly to tell the Tribunal just what
it was that Von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart—and this was 1943, was
it not, not 1940? It was when you were in Turkey and so was Von Papen?
Or was he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, he was.
MR. DODD: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Did
not Von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart?
SCHMIDT: He did say that. He said that he would—that he would have—it
must have been some time after the Anschluss—refused to shake hands
with him, and actually he referred to his behavior in 1938.
MR. DODD: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible?
Is that not the language that Von Papen used about Seyss-Inquart, or
some of the language?
SCHMIDT: He did express himself in that way.
MR. DODD: What were the other things that he said? You told down there
in Vienna that Von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in
describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is
of some interest to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly
what it was. It is only 3 years ago, you know, that you and Von Papen
had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it.
SCHMIDT: He spoke in a very vehement way, passing judgment to the effect
that Seyss had offered no protection to the Austrians and that he had
done nothing to keep order in Austria, that is, to safeguard Austria’s
individuality and Austria’s interests.
That was Papen’s basic thought. His second thought was that the German
interests had not been served by this either, by which he meant more or
less that a quite justified interest of the German Reich had been made
to look wrong in the eyes of the world because of the way in which it
had been handled and that the foreign political interests of the Reich
had been damaged thereby.
That was the principal thought in his conversation, and I think he made
similar remarks during conversations with other people.
MR. DODD: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and
have omitted something that is probably of some importance.
Do you remember—some time, I guess not long before you broke up your
session there—Hitler turning to Von Papen and saying, “Von Papen, you
made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it.”
Did you hear Hitler say that to Von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden?
SCHMIDT: Yes, some such remark was made.
MR. DODD: What did Von Papen say?
SCHMIDT: That I can no longer tell you.
MR. DODD: He said, “Yes, my Führer,” or something like that, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had
to give an answer.
MR. DODD: He certainly did not deny it, did he?
SCHMIDT: I do not assume he did, but I cannot remember the answer. I can
only remember the question.
MR. DODD: The night in Vienna, when the SS and the SA people were
climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellery, did Seyss-Inquart
do anything to have them excluded?
SCHMIDT: Not to my knowledge. I do not know; I was on the other side.
MR. DODD: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of
fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, were
you not?
SCHMIDT: It was a very tense situation.
MR. DODD: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the
Chancellery?
SCHMIDT: We left in three cars—the Federal Chancellor in one, the
President in the other, and I was in the third. The departure was
escorted and organized and accompanied by SS men.
MR. DODD: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart’s private
automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so?
SCHMIDT: No, they left in a car together. I myself heard Seyss-Inquart
say: “Then I will take him home.” Whether it was the Federal
Chancellor’s car or Seyss-Inquart’s car, I do not know, but at any rate
they traveled in the same car.
MR. DODD: Escorted by the SS?
SCHMIDT: No, that was not the case. The SS, as far as—I do not know
whether there were SS in the Chancellor’s car. The SS only escorted us
during the actual departure, that is, out of the house. There was nobody
else in my car, or the President’s car, after that.
MR. DODD: That is not what you told the court in Vienna. Down there you
said, “Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS.”
SCHMIDT: No, I said the SS escorted or conducted us during the departure
from the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who
conducted the departure from there. Whether someone remained in the car
after that, I do not know.
MR. DODD: All right. You probably can help us clear up one other
question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually
a member of the Government, was he, or was he not?
SCHMIDT: There has been a lot of debate about that question. The Federal
Chancellor had resigned in the afternoon session. At first, the
President had not accepted the resignation, so therefore he was still
Chancellor, and Seyss was still Minister. Whether the resignation was
accepted later on I cannot say. Some are of the opinion that the
President may, for all practical purposes, have entrusted the Federal
Chancellor with the continuation of business, and Seyss-Inquart along
with him. Others think that that would not have happened. Only the head
of the State himself can answer that question.
MR. DODD: As a former member of that Government, I want you to look at
one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen
it before.
It is Document 4015-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-891.
That states that President Miklas had relieved not only Schuschnigg as
the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the Federal Government,
as well as all secretaries of state, of their respective offices; and
that is March 11.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
MR. DODD: That establishes, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was not in
office when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it.
Is that so?
SCHMIDT: Well, I believe that I have had a lot of experience in this
question, because I worked with the Federal President for a long time.
Releases of this kind go...
MR. DODD: Just tell us exactly—is that true or not? Is our
understanding correct?
SCHMIDT: It does not necessarily have to be interpreted in that way.
Releases of this kind go out to the offices days later, because red tape
will have its way, despite revolutions and in disregard of history.
Therefore, it cannot be said when that was actually done. I assume that
this release was not issued until long after 11 March.
MR. DODD: Did Seyss-Inquart use the term “Trojan Horse” quite often in
the days preceding the events of 12 March? Was that a common expression
of his?
SCHMIDT: He has stated a few times that he was not a “Trojan Horse
leader,” by which he wanted to express his loyalty, and wanted to
explain that it was not his job to open the back doors to National
Socialism.
MR. DODD: Did you ever think he protested too much?
SCHMIDT: Against what?
MR. DODD: About not being a Trojan Horse.
SCHMIDT: I did not hear that expression more than two or three times and
it was used by Zernatto.
MR. DODD: That is all.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have only one brief question in connection with these
last events. Witness, did Seyss-Inquart not also post men from the
guards battalion outside the Minister’s room?
SCHMIDT: Guards were present.
DR. STEINBAUER: At what time did Schuschnigg’s actual resignation occur?
SCHMIDT: Well, it is difficult to say when that happened; at any rate
when the new Government was formed. I assumed that it must have taken
place roughly between 9 and 10 o’clock, since the Federal President had
conducted serious negotiations at this time about the choice of a new
Chancellor, and I think the former Federal Chancellor, Dr. Enders, was
up for debate.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call
Chief of Police Dr. Skubl as witness.
[_The witness Skubl took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
MICHAEL SKUBL (Witness): Michael Skubl.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the absolute truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what offices did you hold in the Austrian
Republic?
SKUBL: At the end I was Chief of Police in Vienna, and State Secretary
for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector
General of the Austrian executive authorities.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of
Dr. Dollfuss, in accordance with instructions he gave before he died?
SKUBL: Dr. Dollfuss had appointed me Inspector General of the Police the
day before he was murdered on 24 July. I had enjoyed his full
confidence.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can one, therefore, describe you as having had the
confidence of his successor and friend, Dr. Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Seyss-Inquart became Minister, were you attached to
him in your capacity as State Secretary and Inspector General at the
same time?
SKUBL: Yes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior
and of Security, I was attached to him as State Secretary. Consequently,
I was directly subordinate to him, whereas until that time I had been
subordinated directly to the Federal Chancellor as Chief of Security.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were the police and the constabulary in your hands or in
the hands of Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking?
SKUBL: Practically speaking, they had been in my hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have the particular task of combating illegal
movements?
SKUBL: As Chief of Police and State Secretary for Matters of Public
Security, one of my leading tasks was, of course, to combat illegal
movements, and particularly National Socialist aggression.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you observe any connection between Seyss-Inquart and
the July 1934 Putsch? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
SKUBL: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was his attitude in general towards National
Socialism?
SKUBL: Dr. Seyss-Inquart admitted being a National Socialist. However,
as far as I know, the so-called 120 or 150 percent National
Socialists—that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement—did not
consider him a 100 percent National Socialist. He was, however,
considered a very suitable person to be used as a piece on the
chessboard of the National Socialist movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, he was more a
person who was led than a person who was leading?
SKUBL: It was my impression that he was more led than leading.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, how did you work together with Seyss-Inquart in his
capacity as Minister of the Interior?
SKUBL: There were no rifts in our understanding. It was a completely
harmonious understanding.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he exert any influence upon the police? Did he, for
instance, bring National Socialists into the police corps?
SKUBL: No; that happened in no case.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have an opportunity to by-pass the Minister and
report directly to Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg was the chief of the Government,
and in that capacity he was naturally my highest superior. It was
natural that I should make reports to the Federal Chancellor regularly
and upon special summons, and that I should also have received
instructions from him in return.
DR. STEINBAUER: Soon after Dr. Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister he
went to visit Hitler in the Reich. Was that an official journey, or was
it kept secret?
SKUBL: It was official.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you come to that conclusion?
SKUBL: It had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg, so far as I know, also knew about the journey.
It was also suggestive that in his capacity as liaison man between the
Austrian Government and the Reich he must necessarily have an
opportunity to speak to Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well then, when Seyss-Inquart came back, did he make a
report on the contents of his discussions with the Führer?
SKUBL: Yes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I
asked him how the conferences with Hitler had gone off. Seyss-Inquart,
still being fresh under the impression of the meeting and discussions,
informed me of what he had stated to the Führer. I still remember the
individual points exactly. Seyss-Inquart told the Reich Chancellor the
following:
“Herr Reich Chancellor:
“1. I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I have taken an oath
of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have taken an
oath, therefore, to Austria’s autonomy and independence.
“2. I am a believer and an active Catholic, and therefore, I
could not follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle.
“3. I come from a country where a totalitarian regime is out of
the question.”
DR. STEINBAUER: In spite of these views, did the Reich appoint a new
Landesleiter for the illegal NSDAP?
SKUBL: Yes. As far as is known to me, on 21 February Klausner was
appointed Landesleiter.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite, did he
order any special security measures?
SKUBL: The order for the plebiscite naturally had the effect of a
bombshell on the National Socialists, not only on the National
Socialists in Austria, but also in the Reich. There was feverish
activity, therefore, and preventive measures naturally had to be
introduced.
This special activity can be explained by the fact that the National
Socialists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite they would
suffer a great defeat, for the election slogans would have been accepted
by the overwhelming majority of the Austrian population.
In this connection it is most interesting to draw your attention to an
article which appeared on 11 March in the _Deutsch-Österreichische
Tageszeitung_, in which the fear could be read that this plebiscite
would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the formation of a
people’s front, and subsequently as a result of this, for
bolshevization. From this one could recognize the consciousness that the
Austrian National Socialists were a minority.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we come to the memorable 11th of March 1938. When
did you, as chief of the executive authorities, learn that German troops
were marching in?
SKUBL: The 11th of March was, of course, an exceptionally exciting and
eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those
hours. I know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me
showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could
not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that
unusually alarming troop movements were taking place on the Austrian
border.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg’s resignation,
say on the radio that in order to avoid chaos he was asking the
population to remain quiet and orderly since he was still Minister of
Security?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart did make that statement on the radio.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you make any observations to the effect that before
Schuschnigg’s resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, gave instructions, sent
telegrams, made telephone calls, or transmitted any other information
regarding the seizure of power in the State by himself?
SKUBL: What I observed was that Seyss-Inquart’s behavior until the
critical moment was certainly very passive, and as I have already said
earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was being
led rather than a man who was leading, and indeed there were clear
indications that he felt embarrassed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not yourself, in the afternoon or evening,
receive an offer from President Miklas to take over the Federal
Chancellorship?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg first summoned me in the late
afternoon, and he stated to me there had been an ultimatum from
Germany—that is to say, from Hitler—to the effect that he would no
longer be satisfied with calling off the plebiscite, but was demanding
Schuschnigg’s resignation. Then Schuschnigg told me that he personally
was ready to resign, but that he could not expect his staff to accept
Seyss-Inquart’s appointment as Federal Chancellor. He had a question to
ask me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the
Chancellor’s office. He did this in agreement with the President who, a
few moments later, made me the same offer.
I refused this offer, and I refused it because I considered that my
appointment as Chancellor would, in Hitler’s eyes, mean a declaration of
war. As State Secretary for Matters of Public Security I was at the head
of the defensive front against National Socialist aggression, and
consequently was also in personal opposition to Hitler. Therefore, had I
accepted the Chancellorship, this would have offered Hitler a welcome
opportunity to have his troops march in. My acceptance of the
Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the
struggle against invasion, and such a struggle was probably hopeless, in
view of the superiority of the German Armed Forces compared with the
Austrian Armed Forces and Austrian executive personnel.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then Seyss-Inquart formed his Cabinet and took you over,
too, as State Secretary. Why did you join that Ministry?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart proposed that I retain direction of matters of
public security in the State Secretariat under his Government. I
accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember
the conditions which he had stipulated with the Führer; that is, that he
would be Federal Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that,
I was impelled by the desire and hope that I could keep the executive
force in my hands, and that in the event that Seyss-Inquart had
difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, I could be of
assistance to him. In other words, there should be an Austrian strong
point, an Austrian enclave, in the Cabinet of the Austrian Federal
Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart still at that time speak in favor of
Austrian independence?
SKUBL: He did not speak about it in detail. We took that for granted
during the conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you leave the Cabinet, and why?
SKUBL: During the night between March 11 and 12 I took over the task of
going to the airfield to receive the Reichsführer SS Himmler, who had
been announced from Berlin. On that occasion he did not arrive alone,
but with a whole entourage. I can no longer remember the names of the
individuals, the number was too large; one name I understood very
clearly, and that was the name of Meissner—Meissner, the Austrian naval
officer who had joined the National Socialist uprising on 25 July, and
who then, after the collapse of this uprising, had fled to the Reich and
now had returned under Himmler’s protection.
That to me was such an impossible situation that I made the firm
decision not to have any more to do with all this, and so when I entered
the Federal Chancellery at noon and received the surprising news from
Glaise-Horstenau that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered,
“He can have that very cheaply, because I had already decided on that in
the early hours of the morning.”
Subsequently I also informed Federal Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart that I
had had knowledge of Himmler’s request, and that I had naturally decided
to resign and asked him to take official notice of my resignation.
Upon this Seyss-Inquart replied, “It is true that Himmler has demanded
your resignation, but I am not going to have anything dictated to me
from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it is
perhaps better for you to disappear for a few weeks, but then you must
come back because I consider your co-operation important.”
Naturally I declared that I would not do that. And the following day, in
writing, I handed in my resignation as Chief of Police and State
Secretary, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually
handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been
attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive force.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were then confined and have not gone back to Vienna
to this day?
SKUBL: First of all, I was held prisoner in my official apartment under
SS and police guard and then, on 24 May, two officials of the Kassel
Gestapo conducted me to a forced residence in Kassel, where I remained
until my liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr.
President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions? The Prosecution?
MR. DODD: No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr.
Friedrich Wimmer?
[_The witness Wimmer took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH WIMMER (Witness): Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have finished the questions concerning
Austria with the cross-examination of the witness Skubl and I shall now
proceed to deal with the Netherlands.
Witness, were you, from July 1940 until May 1945, commissioner general
for internal administration and justice in the Netherlands?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In that position did you have to deal with internal
administration, justice, education, health, archives, museums, and the
legislature?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the
Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: In exceptional cases, not otherwise.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also participate in the regular weekly official
conferences of the commissioners general and the secretaries general
with the Reich Commissioner?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Therefore, you were fully informed about events in the
occupied Netherlands?
WIMMER: In general, yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I ask you: Was the German Police a part of the
offices of the RK, or the Reich Commissioner, or was it not rather
independently subordinate to the Berlin central offices?
WIMMER: The German Police was a distinct office, separate from the Reich
Commissioner’s office, and was subordinate to the respective central
offices in the Reich, both administratively and actually.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is to say, then, directly subordinate to the
Reichsführer SS Himmler?
WIMMER: It was directly subordinate to the Reichsführer SS.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, did the German Police, apart from the duties of the
Regular and Security Police, have other special duties in the
Netherlands?
WIMMER: They had a number of special duties in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you enumerate them?
WIMMER: I could not enumerate them completely but, for example, the
combating of resistance movements in the Netherlands belonged
exclusively to their sphere of activity; furthermore, the establishment,
direction, and supervision of concentration camps belonged to their
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the removal of Jews from the body of the
Dutch nation belonged exclusively to their sphere of activity.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we come to internal administration. At the head of
each of the former ministries there was a secretary general, that is to
say, a Dutchman. Were these men persecuted in any way if they resigned?
WIMMER: No. The Reich Commissioner had told the Dutch secretaries
general upon assuming office that if they should feel in any way
embarrassed by the decrees or demands of the occupation authorities,
they should apply to him without any fear and explain their difficulties
to him, and that then, if so desired, he would let them resign from
their office in such a manner that in no way would they ever have to
fear any unpleasantness, of any kind whatsoever, and that they would
also be assured of financial security and get their pensions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner also dismiss provincial
commissioners?
WIMMER: He probably dismissed provincial commissioners also, but these
changes also occurred—I can recall two cases—through the death of the
provincial commissioner.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the mayors?
WIMMER: As far as the appointment of mayors is concerned, in principle
the same thing holds true as for all other officials in the Netherlands.
The mayors in the Netherlands, contrary to the rule in many other
nations, are not elected to office, but are civil servants in the true
sense of the word. They were appointed by the Queen, even the mayors of
the small communities. Since the head of the State was not present in
the Netherlands, the Reich Commissioner was confronted with the
necessity of regulating the appointment and dismissal of mayors and he
made the regulations in such a way that insofar as the most important
positions of the State were concerned, he reserved for himself the right
to make appointments, whereas he placed the appointments and dismissals
of lesser importance in the hands of the Dutch Secretary General.
DR. STEINBAUER: So if you look back today and examine the question of
how conditions were between 1940 and 1945 regarding the offices and
civil servants in the Netherlands, what can you state in that respect?
WIMMER: I believe I may say that at the end of the period of German
occupation the majority of the civil servants who had been in office
when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands were still in
office.
DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart has been accused of dissolving the
political parties. When and why did that take place?
WIMMER: The dissolution of the political parties was necessitated by the
fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, especially
in critical times, the occupying power could not tolerate, apart from
the fact that in an occupied territory it is generally difficult, if not
impossible, to deal with political parties. Report after report came
from our intelligence services about conspiracies of the most various
kinds, and so the Reich Commissioner felt himself called upon to
dissolve the parties. Nevertheless, he did not constitutionally remove
the parties as such; the institution of parties, as such, still
remained.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was suggested on the part of the Reich that the
administration be reorganized and that the Netherlands be divided into
five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces. Did
Seyss-Inquart do that?
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner refused such suggestions or demands every
time, and indeed he could do that all the more easily because the Dutch
administration was on a high level and primarily because the Reich
Commissioner expected, and on the basis of all kinds of assurances was
able to expect, that the Dutch administration would co-operate with the
occupying power.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we also have a party which was very close to the
National Socialists, the NSB, led by Mussert. Did this NSB party gain a
leading influence in the administration or not?
WIMMER: The NSB, as a party, gained no influence at all in the
administration. It was only that the occupying power, as was very
natural, applied to the NSB and consulted it in certain cases, for no
occupying power, in history, I believe, as well as in our day, is going
to approach those parties or groups which assume a hostile attitude
towards it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a
similar situation as existed in Norway under Quisling; that is, for him
to become Prime Minister of the Netherlands?
WIMMER: Mussert did have that aim. He expressed it persistently, again
and again, and I can say that by doing so he put the Reich Commissioner
into disagreeable situations.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, briefly, the Reich Commissioner...
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner rejected this every time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Another question. Did Seyss-Inquart in any way exert
pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied
territory?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he, in the field of education, issue decrees which
reduced the rights of the Netherlands?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he not encourage the Dutch Red Cross, although there
were cells of the illegal resistance movement in it?
WIMMER: He not only permitted the Red Cross to carry out its functions
without hindrance, but, as you say, he even encouraged it. As far as the
political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to
interfere because broadcasting stations, illegal broadcasting stations,
had been found under Red Cross control.
DR. STEINBAUER: They were resistance centers?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Furthermore, he has been accused of interfering with the
existing legislation by issuing laws concerned with citizenship and also
with marriage. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can
you say about that, quite briefly?
WIMMER: Acts of interference of that kind did occur. However, they
occurred because they were necessary from the point of view of the
conduct of the war and for the Armed Forces in particular for, to
mention the question of citizenship, those Dutchmen who had entered the
German Army wanted to have the assurance of also obtaining German
citizenship. The Reich Commissioner, however, who was of the opinion
that by acquiring German citizenship they should not incur any
disadvantage in Holland, decreed—and this can be found in the
corresponding decree—that these Dutchmen who acquired German
citizenship should retain their Dutch citizenship, so that by so doing
they would not be alienated from their people and their nation.
So far as marriage laws are concerned, the necessity arose that if
soldiers, in particular, wanted to marry Dutch girls, the parents’
approval of the marriage was not asked, and not for political reasons.
This approval was of some importance in that connection because the
parents, contrary to the rule in many other nations, retained this right
of approval until, I believe, the thirtieth year of the daughter
concerned.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of
the so-called summary courts-martial (Standgericht). Will you tell us
how these courts-martial were organized and how long and when they were
in session?
WIMMER: The creation of courts-martial was seen as a necessity after a
general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and we wanted to have a legal
basis for future cases so as to prevent future strikes as far as
possible, that is, to be able to combat them effectively after they had
broken out on the basis of the proper law.
How these courts-martial were organized and when they had to function is
exactly set down in the corresponding decree of the Reich Commissioner.
However, if I am to answer your specific question here about the
composition of these summary courts-martial, I can in any case only say
from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, and moreover
a judge who fulfilled all the requirements which a judge in the German
Reich had to fulfill.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, that is the essential point, and if I understand
you correctly, before these courts became police courts a judicial
functionary was president of these courts-martial. Is that correct?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you whether Seyss-Inquart had so-called
collective fines imposed on certain cities and communities?
WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner actually imposed such collective fines.
The largest which was imposed, I believe, was the one which was imposed
once on Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have
already mentioned. The fines were decreed in accordance with established
procedure on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed in
an official decree by the police.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, therefore, these
collective fines—you mentioned the words “general strike”—were imposed
when actions of a large community were involved, and not actions by
individuals.
WIMMER: The collective fines were imposed in cases of violations which
were charged to a fairly large portion of the community in question.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you did
not tell me how long these so-called police courts-martial were in
session.
WIMMER: The police courts-martial were in session as long as police
martial law was in force. That was 2 weeks. Moreover, that was the only
time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich
Commissioner, that is, if you do not count the state of emergency that
was declared after the invasion as such.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to one of the most severe accusations brought
against my client. That is the accusation that he had hostages shot
illegally and contrary to international law, or participated in their
execution.
With the permission of the Tribunal I submit two statements to you which
were put to my client yesterday by the Prosecution. One is a statement
by General of the Air Force Christiansen, as a defendant, dated 20
February 1946, and the other one is also an interrogation of a
defendant, a higher police official, Dr. Schöngarth. It is F-886.
Will you please look at it and tell me what you know about these
questions. Take your time—I remind you of your oath—and answer these
questions as far as you can do it in good faith.
Have you read it?
WIMMER: No, not yet.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I will help you. Are you through?
WIMMER: No, I am not through yet, but please go ahead.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that hostages were shot in August 1942, on
the occasion of an act of sabotage in Rotterdam?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Why were these hostages shot? On whose orders?
WIMMER: It is well known what the Rotterdam incident was all about. It
was an attempt to blow up an Armed Forces leave train. In this affair,
the Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner and therefore...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was:
Who gave the order?
WIMMER: The order for what?
DR. STEINBAUER: For shooting the hostages.
WIMMER: The order for the execution was, I believe, given by the Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did the Reich Commissioner have to do with it? You
have read here how Christiansen accuses him in that connection.
WIMMER: The Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner, because it
was customary in fairly important matters for the two offices, that is,
the commander of the Armed Forces and the Reich Commissioner, to get
together and discuss these things. I recall that the commander of the
Armed Forces appeared in a very determined manner and demanded that an
example should be made so that such cases might be prevented in the
future as far as possible. It was stated on the part of the Armed Forces
that they considered hardly any other means possible than the shooting
of a considerable number of hostages.
I no longer recall the figure very exactly today, but as far as I do
remember it was about 50. I also recall that it was stated on the part
of the Armed Forces that they could dispense with such a selection of
hostages if the assurance could be given by the Police that on the basis
of some sort of material which the Police had in their possession there
was a chance that the perpetrators might be found and brought to
punishment by a German court, that is to say, by the court of the Armed
Forces.
On the part of the Armed Forces it was also pointed out that at the time
resistance in the Netherlands was beginning to develop in increasing
measure, and that this was finding expression in an increase in sabotage
and other acts hostile to the occupation forces. I also recall that it
was pointed out that if the Armed Forces and the Police had been present
in larger numbers than was actually the case, it would perhaps not have
been necessary to take a severe step of that kind. The forces at that
time at the Army’s disposal in the Netherlands were extremely small and
in case of an increase in the resistance movement the position of the
Armed Forces in the Netherlands might have been seriously endangered.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I shall ask you several questions so that we
can go ahead.
You have stated that the commander of the Armed Forces came and reported
that in view of this outrage he would have to shoot some hostages.
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that there was a Reich decree stating
that saboteurs in the occupied western territory should not be tried by
the courts but turned over to the Police? Can you remember that?
WIMMER: I do not think that was the case at this particular time,
especially if you refer to the so-called “Night and Fog Decree” which,
to my recollection, is of a later date. I remember very clearly that an
order was mentioned at that time, but I believe this order was one which
applied exclusively to the military sector, so I do not know the wording
of that order.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that the Reich Commissioner used his
influence to see that instead of the 50 you mentioned—in reality, it
was only 25 hostages—the number was reduced to 5?
WIMMER: That is known to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And that he also succeeded in having this done?
WIMMER: And that he succeeded.
DR. STEINBAUER: And that he particularly succeeded in having fathers of
families excluded?
WIMMER: Yes, indeed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That concluded one case. There is another case which has
been presented to you. That is the case of the attempt made on the life
of the Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter when, in fact, more than 150
persons were shot as hostages. Have you finished reading that?
WIMMER: Partly.
DR. STEINBAUER: Please read it all then.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, why is it necessary for the witness to
read the whole document? You can put the facts to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
Witness, at that time it was demanded that as a reprisal for the attempt
on the Police and SS Leader hostages should be shot?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who ordered that and who carried it out?
WIMMER: I know of the case because—that is, I know of it from the
report of Brigadeführer Schöngarth, who was at that time the Chief of
the Security Police. He had applied to me to find out what his proper
title was, after Rauter had become incapacitated for duty and he had to
sign a proclamation and in so doing add his official title. On that
occasion he told me this story and he also told me that he had gotten in
touch with Berlin, to find out what they would consider necessary as
reprisals for the attempt on Rauter. Berlin wanted a considerable number
of hostages shot. He mentioned a figure to me which was something like
500, at any rate, not less than 500, but rather more than 500. Then he
also told me that he had talked to the Reich Commissioner and told him
about this wish on the part of Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Would you be more specific please; Berlin is large and
had various Reich offices.
WIMMER: That was the Reichsführer SS, of course; it was quite clear that
where one of the highest functionaries in the sphere of the Police and
SS was concerned one had to approach the Reichsführer SS personally, and
not only his office. He also told me he reported it to the Reich
Commissioner, and that the Reich Commissioner, who as such was not
authorized to deal with that matter, had asked him to tell the
Reichsführer SS that he asked and advised him to refrain from carrying
out such a large number of executions. Thereupon—naturally everything
was done only by telephone—the Reichsführer agreed to reduce the number
and I believe that in the end, on the basis of several telephone
conversations back and forth, a number of about 200 or 150—I no longer
know it exactly today—was decided upon.
I am convinced that if this advice and this request and these
representations had not been offered by the Reich Commissioner through
Schöngarth, the number originally demanded by Berlin would have lost
their lives, so that one can say with full right that in this case the
Reich Commissioner saved the lives of several hundred Netherlanders.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were the people who were actually shot collected at
random in the streets or were they people who had already been
officially condemned?
WIMMER: Of course, on this point, I can only report what Brigadeführer
Schöngarth told me at that time during the conference. Indeed I have no
reason to assume that he did not tell me the truth. He informed me that
only such persons were considered who had already been condemned, so
that it was only a question of advancing the time of the execution, and
if the number should not suffice, then possibly others might be selected
who in any case were already in prison and would certainly be sentenced
to death.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this chapter by asking you what
happened to the hostages who were sent as such to Buchenwald by way of a
so-called Dutch East Indian reprisal.
WIMMER: After some time, I no longer remember just how long, when
complaints were received about their treatment, a large number of these
hostages, or perhaps all of them, were brought back into the Netherlands
and a very large number of them were released; not all together and at
once, as I remember, but a few at a time.
DR. STEINBAUER: A small town, Putten, was destroyed because of serious
acts of sabotage; was this ordered by the Reich Commissioner or someone
else?
WIMMER: Since it was a purely military affair, just like the Rotterdam
incident, where a plot was directed against the Armed Forces the
incident was handled by the Armed Forces. The order was given by the
commander of the Armed Forces and if I remember correctly, the Reich
Commissioner—in any case, I—only learned about the incident after the
execution had taken place.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I pass over to the next chapter, and that is the
combating of so-called enemies of the State.
Yesterday it was mentioned that the property of the Freemasons and
Jehovah’s Witnesses was confiscated. I should like to ask you, so that
there may be no mistake, whether it was only the property of the
organizations which was claimed, or was it also the property of the
individual members? And so, taking the Freemasons as an example, was the
property of the individual Freemason claimed as well as the property of
the lodges?
WIMMER: In all these cases property that belonged to organizations was
demanded, never that belonging to individuals. If there were individual
cases where this happened, then these were abuses by individuals, but I
cannot recall any such abuses.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Dutch Jews were also counted among the so-called
enemies of the State. Who was responsible for handling the Jewish
question in the Netherlands—you have really already told me that.
WIMMER: From the very beginning, the Police laid claim to the handling
of the Jews, to jurisdiction over the treatment of the Jews, as a matter
of fundamental principle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we have an entire list of decrees here which bear
the name of Seyss-Inquart and which indicate encroachments on the right
of the Jews. Can you remember when the legislation against the Jews was
introduced and in what form?
WIMMER: The development was briefly more or less as follows:
Seyss-Inquart was opposed to the entire idea of taking up the Jewish
question at all in the Netherlands, and in one of the Reich
Commissioner’s first conferences it was ordered that this question was
not to be dealt with.
After a certain time—it may have been a few months—the Reich
Commissioner informed us that he had received an order from Berlin to
take up the Jewish problem because Jews had participated in a relatively
large number in various movements and actions in the Netherlands which
at that time, indeed, could only be characterized essentially as
conspiracies.
Apart from that, one had to expect that if the war should last a fairly
long time, the Jews who naturally because of the treatment they had
undergone were not, and could not be, friends of the Germans, might
become dangerous, and, therefore, that they should be considered as
enemies—if not in the formal sense of the word, at least, practically
so.
The Reich Commissioner began to carry out this order with much
hesitation, although in the official conference he pointed out that he
could not help doing so because he could not assume such a
responsibility.
So far as I remember, this can be ascertained immediately from the Reich
Commissioner’s ordinance bulletin. At first, steps were taken to
register the property of the Jews, then to prevent German maidservants
from being in Jewish households; the Police requested that especially,
because naturally all kind of information could be carried back and
forth in this way. Then, when Berlin became more insistent in that
question, the Reich Commissioner finally decided to decree and regulate
a registration of all Jews by ordinance. It was pointed out particularly
that we would at least have to know where the Jews were, because only in
this way could the proper Security Police control and supervision be
made possible.
In themselves those were measures which were far behind those which were
already being carried out in the Reich at that time.
Then more pressure was exerted; I do not know whether it was perhaps
Heydrich who did this at that time, whether he was already in the
Netherlands at that time—I never saw him. I know only that he visited
the Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands at least twice.
At any rate, in the course of the year 1941 and particularly in 1942, a
comprehensive treatment of the question was urged. At first the Reich
Commissioner still believed that he could meet these demands by bringing
the Jews in the Netherlands together in one place where they could be
more easily supervised, and therefore the idea arose that in Amsterdam
one, two, or three districts of the city might be used to house the Jews
there, which was also connected with the necessity of resettling a part
or a considerable number of non-Jewish Netherlanders because there was
not yet a completely separate Jewish quarter at that time. The
non-Jewish Dutch did not live completely apart from them.
THE PRESIDENT: All this evidence that the witness is giving is all in
the decree and has already been given by the defendant, has it not? What
is the difference?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point of it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I wanted to say only one thing, and that
is that on such an important question I wanted to have confirmation
briefly by the witness.
WIMMER: I have not much more to say.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, I shall now summarize. Is it true that one
wanted to put the Jews together in a ghetto in Amsterdam?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that Heydrich demanded the evacuation of the
Jews?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner tried, insofar as
was possible under existing conditions, to use more humane methods in
this deportation of the Jews?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that I have now finished that chapter, too.
There were also concentration camps in the Netherlands. Is it known to
you that Seyss-Inquart had these camps inspected by judicial commissions
and corrected abuses found there?
WIMMER: Yes. Not only in concentration camps, but in camps of this kind
in general.
DR. STEINBAUER: At the end of 1944 and early in 1945 there was a
large-scale operation to deport all the men in Holland able to bear
arms. Was that operation directed by the Reich Commissioner or by a
different office?
WIMMER: That was an operation by the Reich, primarily an operation by
the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Why did that operation take place?
WIMMER: It took place because during those critical times there were
objections to the fact that men who were able to bear arms remained in
Holland. First, because a large number of former prisoners of war who
were released by order of the Führer in 1940 were later on mostly
brought back to the Netherlands and a part of them remained there.
Secondly, the resistance movements increased greatly during that time,
and so it was stated that, from the military point of view, the
responsibility of leaving those people able to bear arms in the
Netherlands could not be assumed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner, in order to moderate that
operation, issue so-called “release certificates”
(Freistellungsscheine)?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not a part escape this operation by way of the
Allocation of Labor?
WIMMER: As far as I know, yes; but I have no detailed knowledge of it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know what happened to the diamonds confiscated
after the battle of Arnhem?
WIMMER: These diamonds were placed in safety in Arnhem, during artillery
fire, by a German office, the Economic Testing Office I believe, and
then after some time they were taken to Berlin, from where, as indeed I
learned in Holland, after the surrender they were brought back to
Amsterdam again.
DR. STEINBAUER: How was the financial economy in the administration? Was
the tax money used sparingly, or was a very lax management displayed?
WIMMER: I am not really competent in this field. The Commissioner
General for Finance and Economy could say much more about that and with
much greater authority than I can, but so far as my impressions went, I
may say...
THE PRESIDENT: If he is not competent to speak about it, I do not see
why he should speak about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the witness Fischböck cannot be found.
However, as a deputy of the Reich Commissioner, this witness must know
something about the general features of it. I will ask him for details.
Did the Reich Commissioner save fairly large sums of money in his budget
and deposit them in a special fund?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know nothing about foreign currency restrictions,
apparently?
WIMMER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: How were raw materials, manufactured items, and
foodstuffs requisitioned in the civilian branch of the administration?
WIMMER: It was regulated by an ordinance in the Reich Commissioner’s
ordinance bulletin and can be seen there. As a matter of principle, the
requisitions were sent from the Reich to the Reich Commissioner and the
Reich Commissioner passed them on to the Dutch offices concerned, which
then carried out those requisitions themselves.
DR. STEINBAUER: So it was not the German offices, but the Dutch offices
headed by the Dutch secretaries general?
WIMMER: Yes. They also were authorized to do this by a special decree.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner or his offices take anything
from the large museums?
WIMMER: I did not quite understand that. From where?
DR. STEINBAUER: From the public museums.
WIMMER: No. I do not recall a single case, and I would have had to know
about it because the museums were under me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is why I asked you. Were there possibly any
archives that were carried away?
WIMMER: In general, no; but an exchange of archives was probably worked
out during the occupation, which had been under consideration even
before the war. There was an exchange of archives between, in
particular, the “Hausarchiv,” but also other Dutch archives, and German
archives, and—to be exact, this was done according to where they came
from—on the so-called principle of origin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was it possible for everybody to confiscate what he
wanted, or was that controlled in any way?
WIMMER: No, that was controlled, and the respective regulations were
again repeated in an especially stern decree of the Reich Commissioner
during the last year. Those who transgressed or intended to transgress
these regulations were given serious warning. There were only two
agencies which, according to the decree, were allowed to carry out
confiscations at all, and these were the Police and the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: In conclusion, I should like to refer back once again to
the Armed Forces operations. Was that discontinued in the fall? By
“Armed Forces operation” I mean the deportation of those members of the
population able to carry arms.
WIMMER: That was stopped on the basis of an objection made by myself on
behalf of the Reich Commissioner to General Student, who at that time
was chief of the army group, and under whose jurisdiction the
Netherlands also came at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then one last question. Can you remember the Jewish
Library Rosenthaliana?
WIMMER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened to that?
WIMMER: As far as I know, it remained in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was that not to have been removed?
WIMMER: Yes. There were such intentions, but since this library was
public property, the property of the City of Amsterdam, the Reich
Commissioner, upon my suggestion, ordered that this library was to
remain in Holland.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded the questioning of this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. DEBENEST: Witness, you were selected to fill the office of
commissioner general in the Netherlands by Seyss-Inquart himself?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You had known Seyss-Inquart for several years?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not been one of his assistants ever since 1938?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Is it true that during the occupation of the Netherlands a
large number of members of the NSB and pro-German elements were
appointed not only to leading positions, but also to subordinate
positions in the Dutch police, and that they were charged with executing
orders issued by the occupation authorities, such as the arresting of
Jews, members of the resistance, and hostages?
WIMMER: I can confirm the fact that members of the NSB and of groups
friendly to the Germans were employed in high and low positions by the
Reich Commissioner. However, as to their proportional part within the
total of Dutch civil servant employment in the civilian branch, I
believe that even at the end of the occupation period the participation
of these groups in proportion to the Dutch population was not greater...
M. DEBENEST: I spoke to you expressly about the police; reply to that
point.
WIMMER: You mean only the police?
M. DEBENEST: I told you, the police.
WIMMER: Yes, that is known to me. However, I do not believe that those
members of pro-German groups received special assignments, but rather I
believe that they received their assignments in exactly the same way as
the other civil servants in the same positions. I cannot, however, say
anything in detail about that, because I had very little to do with the
police.
M. DEBENEST: When officials of the Dutch police refused to carry out
orders which had been given to them by the occupation authorities and
abandoned their posts, did not the German authorities take members of
their families as hostages—women and children, for instance?
WIMMER: I cannot recall that.
M. DEBENEST: In no case?
WIMMER: That relatives of police officials were arrested? Members of
their families?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, of those who were not carrying out the orders of the
German authorities.
WIMMER: I do not remember that.
M. DEBENEST: That is fine. Well, perhaps you may remember that members
of families of Dutch citizens who offered resistance in one way or
another were arrested as hostages?
WIMMER: I have heard about that.
M. DEBENEST: There were some hostages arrested in such cases, for
example, were there not? There were hostages arrested in those cases?
WIMMER: You call it “hostages.” Do you also use that expression in cases
where the individuals concerned did not have to expect that they would
lose their lives, that it would cost them their heads?
M. DEBENEST: So far I have been asking you the questions, and you have
been answering them.
For instance, did you not receive protests from the Board of the
University of Amsterdam against the fact that the wife and children of a
professor of that university had been arrested as hostages?
WIMMER: I do not remember that. It is possible, however, that such a
complaint came to the Main Department for Education, which belonged to
my Commissariat.
M. DEBENEST: In any case, you do not deny the fact?
WIMMER: I could not deny it 100 percent, but I do not know anything
about it.
M. DEBENEST: Another question. Following the declaration of loyalty
which was imposed on the students, those who refused, were they not
forced to present themselves immediately for work, and were they not
deported to Germany without waiting for their group to be called up?
WIMMER: Yes, but not by the Labor Service. Do you mean the Office for
the Allocation of Labor?
M. DEBENEST: That is of little importance; but they were deported to
Germany for that reason, were they not?
WIMMER: Yes, by virtue of a decree by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
M. DEBENEST: Is it not true that numerous and extensive reforms were
introduced by the Reich Commissioner in all the activities of the life
of the Dutch people, and that these reforms were all contrary to the
Constitution?
WIMMER: One cannot say that.
M. DEBENEST: But there were reforms, were there not?
WIMMER: Certainly, yes, which were caused by the necessities of war and
the fact of the occupation. And there is a third factor involved, too,
which was that there were measures necessitated by the absence of the
head of the State and the Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, would it not be better to put the
particular points you want to him, rather than general questions, which
will enable him to deal with the matter at length?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did the civil administration service in the
Netherlands enjoy a certain freedom?
WIMMER: Yes, a great deal of freedom.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to read to you a passage from a report by the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, a report drafted on 19 July 1940. You shall
tell me whether you still maintain the reply that you have just given
me. This is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:
“The civil administration”—he means the civil administration in
the Netherlands—“at present finds itself in a sufficient and
otherwise progressive way under the direction and control of the
German authorities.”
Is the answer which you have just made in agreement with what
Seyss-Inquart wrote?
WIMMER: If mention is made in Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s reply that the control
was in German hands, that can only mean that the supervision was in the
hands of German authorities, for it is naturally to be taken for granted
that the German occupation authorities reserved for themselves a certain
control and supervision over Dutch legislation, as well as over all
important acts of administration and government; and if everything went
as it should, important decrees could not be issued without the approval
of the occupying power.
M. DEBENEST: That is enough. The Tribunal will judge your answer with
regard to this document.
Will you explain why a civilian government was established in the
Netherlands, whereas no such government was set up in other countries,
such as Belgium, for instance?
WIMMER: I do not know the real reason for that, but from what I have
heard and could find out myself the main reason was that Germany
attached the greatest value to establishing a good relationship with the
Netherlands, and the leaders in the Reich probably thought that this
could be more easily done through men of the civilian administration
than through the Armed Forces.
M. DEBENEST: More exactly, were they not pursuing a political goal in
this, the goal of placing the country in the hands of the National
Socialists, in order to bring about some sort of Germanic federation of
Germanic states?
WIMMER: Whenever I spoke with the Reich Commissioner about such things,
the Reich Commissioner expressed the point of view that the Dutch people
had all the characteristics of a distinct and independent people and
therefore should remain independent and sovereign as a state. It goes
without saying that during the occupation period the Reich Commissioner
and the German administration maintained fairly close contact with these
parties and groups which were pro-German, and I do not have to give any
reasons for that. But that the Netherlands, especially during a period
of occupation, were not going to accept completely the political
ideology of the occupying power was quite clear to the Reich
Commissioner, as indeed to anyone who was able to judge the conditions
at all reasonably.
M. DEBENEST: You said a few moments ago, if I understood correctly, that
the Reich Commissioner did not want to force the secretaries general of
the Netherlands to make decisions which might be contrary to their
conscience, and if they felt uneasy about it, they could ask for their
dismissal. Is that what you stated?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did he dismiss any secretaries general who had not asked to
resign?
WIMMER: There was only one exception, that of Secretary General Spitzen.
That was the Secretary General to the Ministry of Waterways who did not
carry out an order of the Reich Commissioner and in spite of this did
not hand in his resignation.
M. DEBENEST: What secretary general was this? In which department?
WIMMER: That was the Ministry of Waterways; that was the Ministry that
was responsible for canals, reclaimed land, highways, inland waterways,
and so forth.
M. DEBENEST: Is that the only case that you knew of?
WIMMER: That is the only case of which I knew.
M. DEBENEST: In what year was that?
WIMMER: That, I believe—one moment—at any rate, that was in 1944; in
the summer, I believe.
M. DEBENEST: Do you not remember the dismissal of the Secretary General
for National Defense, Mr. Ringeling?
WIMMER: The dismissal of the Secretary General for National Defense was
not a matter for the Reich Commissioner, but fell within the
jurisdiction of the military commander, since by virtue of the Führer’s
decree all military matters fell within the jurisdiction of the military
commander.
M. DEBENEST: Why was he dismissed?
WIMMER: That is not known to me.
M. DEBENEST: Try to refresh your memory with the aid of Seyss-Inquart’s
report and then we will see whether this was in agreement with the head
of the Armed Forces. This is what the defendant writes:
“One of the secretaries general tried....”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the witness does not know anything about it,
apparently.
M. DEBENEST: He says that he does not know the reasons, Mr. President,
but he adds—he had previously added—that it was in agreement with the
military authorities.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter which would come under the competence of
the military authorities; and he does not know about it. That is what he
said.
WIMMER: All the matters of the Ministry for National Defense fell within
the jurisdiction of the military commander, for it is perfectly clear
that everything of a military nature which took place or was directed in
the Netherlands there was directed by this Ministry, and it is clear
that the commander, the German military representative of the Reich, was
competent in this sphere.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have a document which proves that the man’s
dismissal was done by Seyss-Inquart, I suppose you can put it to him.
M. DEBENEST: I wanted simply to demonstrate that the answer he gave was
inexact, merely by reading four lines of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: As I said, if you have a document which proves that the
man’s dismissal was by Seyss-Inquart, you can put it to him.
M. DEBENEST: That is what I intended to do, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do it; put it to him, then.
M. DEBENEST: I do not have the original in German. I handed it in
yesterday evening to the Secretary of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Read it to him, M. Debenest. Read it to him.
M. DEBENEST: That is what I am going to do, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Here is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:
“One of the secretaries general tried to appeal to the authority
of Winkelmann”—Winkelmann was the military chief—“concerning
the question of the continuation of work in armament factories
for the Armed Forces, but this official....”
WIMMER: I did not understand that. Will you please read the last two
sentences once more?
M. DEBENEST: “....concerning the matter of the continuation of
armament factories for the Armed Forces. But this official was
immediately dismissed.”
WIMMER: But that does not say that the Reich Commissioner dismissed this
official.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly it is not said that the Reich Commissioner did
it; but it is none the less clear in this report that the Reich
Commissioner indicates here that when an official, no matter who he may
be, does not obey the orders which are given to him, he is dismissed
from his office and he quotes this case as an example.
WIMMER: But here it is a question of the military branch. What I have
said before deals exclusively with the civilian sector branch, the Reich
Commissioner’s branch. It is perfectly clear and possible that in a
report to Hitler the Reich Commissioner should speak about other things
also, because he was the guardian of the interests of the Reich. And he
reported about other things to his superior, besides those which were
exclusively within his sphere of activity. Nor do I know whether by
these officials or these workers, for example, the secretary general is
meant, the Secretary General for National Defense.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. We will leave this question.
Did you not require that the Secretary General for Education should
place the Kammerlingh Onnes laboratories in Leyden at the disposal of
the German authorities for research on atomic energy?
WIMMER: But only in the Netherlands; not in Germany.
M. DEBENEST: But if it was not for Germany, the Secretary General for
Education had perfect freedom to decide for himself; you did not have to
intervene, did you?
WIMMER: No. That was a German measure which had been demanded by the
Reich and which was now carried out in such a manner that all the
materials, machinery, and so on, remained in the Netherlands, and German
scientists were to have the opportunity to carry out their researches
there. Moreover I do not believe that that had anything to do with
atomic matters. Who said that?
M. DEBENEST: You claim that important public libraries and private
libraries were not confiscated or transported to the Reich? You said so
just now, is that not a fact?
WIMMER: Just now? I did not talk about libraries at all just now.
M. DEBENEST: But just now when Seyss-Inquart’s defense counsel was
questioning you, you certainly said, unless I misunderstood you, that no
libraries had been transported to the Reich which came from the
Netherlands.
WIMMER: I did not say that. Will you please show me that in the
transcript?
M. DEBENEST: Then it is doubtless a mistake. Were not the professors of
the University of Amsterdam threatened with the death penalty if they
handed in their resignations, and did you not threaten them yourself?
WIMMER: I neither expressed such a threat, nor do I know of any such
threat. I consider it quite impossible that anybody could have uttered
such a threat.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH DAY
Friday, 14 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Wimmer resumed the stand._]
M. DEBENEST: I still have a few questions to put to this witness.
Witness, in view of the answers which you made yesterday about the
libraries which have been looted and taken to Germany, I would like to
read to you a few lines taken from a document which I submitted the day
before yesterday to the Tribunal. This document is F-803, Exhibit
RF-1525, on Page 34 of the French text. This is a report from the
Minister of Education and Art of the Netherlands. We find the following:
“The collections as well as the libraries of the International
Institute for Social History at Amsterdam have been closed down.
The library, which has about 150,000 volumes, as well as a very
important collection of newspapers, has been taken to Germany.
The Library Rosenthaliana of the University of Amsterdam, which
belongs to the city, has been packed in 153 crates and has also
been taken to Germany. Famous collections concerning natural
history of the College of St. Ignace at Valkenburg and the
Museum of Natural History at Maastricht have also been taken to
Germany, as well as the library which belonged to it.
“In 1940 all the property of the Freemasonry Lodges was
confiscated and taken away to Germany. It included the
well-known Klossiana Library.”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you put enough for the purpose of
your question now? We have got the document already, and you have put
about half a dozen libraries which you are suggesting to him were taken
to Germany, and you want to know what he has to say to it, I suppose. It
is not necessary to go into the whole detail.
M. DEBENEST: What do you think about this story, Witness? Are these
facts correct?
WIMMER: The question which you have put to me was answered in part
yesterday, as far as it concerns the property of Freemasons. It was said
yesterday, and I confirmed it, that it is known to me that the property
of the organizations, but not of the individual members, was
confiscated.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question is,
was it true that these libraries were moved to Germany?
WIMMER: I know nothing of the removal of these libraries.
M. DEBENEST: But you did, nevertheless, claim that the Rosenthaliana
Library had remained in the Netherlands, did you not?
WIMMER: The Rosenthaliana, I said that.
M. DEBENEST: The Rosenthaliana, yes; the report specifies that it was
packed in 153 crates and taken to Germany.
WIMMER: I do know that instructions were given by the Reich Commissioner
that this library was to remain in Amsterdam. If it was removed in spite
of this, the action was contrary to instructions and I have no knowledge
of it.
M. DEBENEST: But still it was you who were responsible for education, or
at least for supervising education in arts?
WIMMER: Yes, but not of the arts.
M. DEBENEST: No, but as far as the libraries and universities were
concerned?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: It is rather curious that you should not have been kept
informed of this.
WIMMER: I do not know whether the library was removed or not.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, then. According to the statements which you made
yesterday evening you seem to claim that the Reich Commissioner did all
he could for the Dutch nation; is that not so?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: At any rate, he always did everything he could to avoid the
worst; is that so?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: On the other hand, you know that numerous people in that
country were interned, deported, and shot; that that nation was hampered
and coerced in every sphere, under threat of heavy penalties and
reprisals. Finally you know that that country was looted. Who were then
the people who ordered these crimes and committed them?
WIMMER: I said that the Reich Commissioner did for the country what he
could, and prevented as much as he could. In a 5-year period of
occupation measures had to be taken which were difficult for the country
to bear. I do not deny the fact; it is undeniable. I would ask you to
formulate your question more concretely, and to mention the actions
which you call crimes. The question is too general for me to answer it
“yes” or “no,” or even briefly.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the arrests?
WIMMER: Which arrests?
M. DEBENEST: The arrests of the Dutch people, of course.
WIMMER: The arrests were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader; he
was chief of police.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the internments?
WIMMER: Which internments? Do you mean internments in the concentration
camps?
M. DEBENEST: In concentration camps and in internment camps.
WIMMER: They were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader. That was
his department.
M. DEBENEST: Who chose the hostages?
WIMMER: The Police.
M. DEBENEST: Who appointed Rauter as Commissioner for Public Security?
WIMMER: As Commissioner General for Public Security? He was appointed by
the Reich Commissioner, but his main function was that of the Higher SS
and Police Leader. For this function he was appointed by the
Reichsführer SS.
M. DEBENEST: But he had been appointed—I suppose you know the order—to
assist the Reich Commissioner in his job of helping with the Police and
for security.
WIMMER: He was to be at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, but the
Reich Commissioner did not have the unconditional right to issue
instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leader. The Reichsführer SS had
this right. The appointment as Secretary General for Security was a
formality. It was made because the Reichsführer SS wished the Higher SS
and Police Leader to have this title too. Originally he was not to be
appointed Commissioner General.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore consider that Seyss-Inquart had no authority
over Rauter?
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case I am going to read a document to
you, and you will tell me what you think of it, whether Seyss-Inquart
had no authority; and you can also make any explanations you choose.
That is Document 3430-PS, which has already been submitted as Exhibit
USA-708. This is an excerpt from Seyss-Inquart’s speeches made in
Holland, and is to be found on Pages 124 and 125 of the German text. I
submit it to the Tribunal. It will most probably also be found in the
trial brief of Seyss-Inquart. I am afraid I do not have the exact page
but I think it is Page 57 or 58.
[_Turning to the witness._]
Seyss-Inquart in that speech of 29 January 1943 said:
“I will give the orders, and they must be strictly carried out
by everybody. In the present situation, the refusal to carry out
such an order cannot be called anything except sabotage. It is
equally certain that we must, more than ever, eliminate and do
away with all resistance directed against the struggle for
life.”
And further on, he says:
“At a time when our husbands, our sons, our fathers are fighting
and meeting death in the East with bravery and fortitude and
without weakening and are making the greatest sacrifices, it is
unthinkable that we should tolerate conspiracies which seek to
render insecure the rear of the front in the East. The person
who dares to do that must perish.”
If Seyss-Inquart had had no authority over the Police, would he have
been able to make such a speech and say that he would issue the orders?
WIMMER: I did not say that Seyss-Inquart had no authority with regard to
the Police, I only said that the orders were given by the Higher SS and
Police Leader. The relationship with the Police was as follows:
The Reich Commissioner could, of, course, turn to the Police in any case
in which he needed them; but this only amounted to a wish and not a
binding order. In such cases, if they were important, the Police first
consulted the Reichsführer SS or his office; and only if this office
approved could a wish of the Reich Commissioner be carried out by the
Police.
M. DEBENEST: The question is simpler than that. Could he—“yes” or
“no”—issue orders in cases such as are mentioned in his speech? He
himself mentioned this, you know.
WIMMER: He could make a request but not give orders.
M. DEBENEST: I merely note that you do not agree with Seyss-Inquart’s
speech.
I will now speak to you of another document; and you will tell us how
you explain that. Seyss-Inquart could only make requests, as you term
it, and not give orders. This is Document F-860, which I submitted
yesterday. This document is a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Lammers.
In this letter he writes that he had wanted to reorganize the Dutch
police in order to adapt it to the German police organization; and in
the same document he states the opinion that the police must be the
strongest expression of the internal administration of a country, which
should not be transferred to another agency. That is what Seyss-Inquart
says in that document. How can you then co-ordinate your answer with
what Seyss-Inquart writes?
WIMMER: This reorganization was not suggested by the Reich Commissioner
but originated from the Police itself. The Reich Commissioner by this
reorganization—and I myself, too—tried to have the Dutch police at
least not completely separated from the administration, which in the
main was already the case in Germany, and was what the German Police in
the Netherlands also wanted.
M. DEBENEST: You contradict what Seyss-Inquart himself wrote in this
document. How do you explain what Seyss-Inquart wrote further on in the
same document:
“I would not like to appoint expressly as administrator of court
procedure the Higher SS and Police Leader here, for this
appointment suggests to the Dutch a limitation of the authority
of the Reich Commissioner. This is of particular importance
because the Reich Commissioner was appointed as the guardian of
the interests of the Reich by order of the Führer. But I have
myself given to the Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers
which an administrator of courts needs.”
WIMMER: Would you please read the first two sentences again?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the document is before us, don’t you think?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is scarcely worth while to argue with the witness
about it.
M. DEBENEST: I will not insist upon it, Mr. President.
Witness, how do you explain the fact that Schöngarth—you saw the
document yesterday, did you not, which counsel for the defense submitted
to you, the interrogatory of Schöngarth—how do you explain the fact
that Schöngarth, on the very morning after the attempt on Rauter’s life,
went to Seyss-Inquart and that Seyss-Inquart gave him the order, as he
himself states in the document, to take increased measures of reprisal
and to execute 200 prisoners, and this with the aim of intimidating the
population?
WIMMER: Yesterday, I believe, I exhausted this subject. I said
everything I knew about it.
M. DEBENEST: Will you give me the explanation I am asking you to make?
WIMMER: I said yesterday that Brigadeführer Schöngarth came to me
and—to be brief about it—represented the matter to me to the effect
that the Reichsführer SS had demanded 500 shootings and that Schöngarth,
on the advice and the request of the Reich Commissioner, had succeeded
in reducing the number to 200. That is what I said yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You maintain that he had received orders previous to the
ones he received from the Reich Commissioner then?
WIMMER: Not from the Reich Commissioner but from the Reichsführer SS.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, from the Reichsführer?
WIMMER: I can only say that Brigadeführer Schöngarth reported the matter
to me in that way. I was not there when he telephoned the Reichsführer
SS.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Didn’t you yourself take part in a meeting
during which hostages were chosen?
WIMMER: A meeting?
M. DEBENEST: A meeting—a conference, if you prefer.
WIMMER: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: On what occasion?
WIMMER: I recall that in the Rotterdam case the Reich Commissioner had a
conference with the Commissioners General, and the matter was reported.
M. DEBENEST: Were you present at the meeting with General Christiansen?
WIMMER: I cannot say with certainty; I believe I was.
M. DEBENEST: Do you know what Seyss-Inquart said during that meeting,
what his attitude was?
WIMMER: His attitude was that the intention of the Armed Forces to carry
out 50—or as I heard yesterday, 25 shootings—was going too far and
could not be done. In this connection, I already testified yesterday
that the Reich Commissioner was able, after repeated remonstrations, to
persuade the Armed Forces to agree finally to have only five hostages
shot.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, this has all been gone over with
Seyss-Inquart, has it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And with this witness?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. I just wished to see whether the
witness agreed with the document which I submitted to the Tribunal.
I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no questions to put to the witness, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: With the approval of the Court, I shall call the witness
Dr. Hirschfeld to the stand.
[_The witness Hirschfeld took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HEINZ MAX HIRSCHFELD (Witness): Heinz Max Hirschfeld.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when the Netherlands was occupied on 12 May
1940, were you Secretary General of the Economic and Agricultural
Ministries?
HIRSCHFELD: Before I answer your question, I should like to state that I
would have preferred to speak Dutch, but in order not to delay the
proceedings, I will speak the foreign language which I speak best; I
will speak in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
HIRSCHFELD: As for your question, I can say “yes.”
DR. STEINBAUER: In this same capacity, did you direct the affairs of
both Ministries until the end of the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in the first
conference, told all the secretaries general that he expected loyal
fulfillment of their duties, but that no one would have to fear any
disadvantage if he should resign?
HIRSCHFELD: In answer to that, I should like to say that the Netherlands
secretaries general, who were ordered by the Netherlands Government to
remain in the Netherlands, told the Reich Commissioner at that time
that, in the interests of the Netherlands people, they would remain in
office after they had received approval to do so from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Army who, at that time, was the
authorized representative of the Netherlands Government. In answer to
the question of the Reich Commissioner we said, yes, under those
conditions.
As for his remark about not fearing disadvantages if we should resign,
we answered that that had nothing to do with our decision.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the secretaries general who resigned receive their
pension? For example, Mr. Trip, who was president of the Netherlands
Bank.
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Secretary General of the Interior, Frederiks,
remain in office until September 1944?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we will speak of your own department, Agriculture
and Economy.
Did the Reich Commissioner interfere in the administration of your
Ministry? In particular, did he release or transfer officials from the
food service?
HIRSCHFELD: The Reich Commissioner personally did not interfere. His
officials attempted to do so several times, but we refused to allow it.
DR. STEINBAUER: A so-called State Political Secretariat of the NSB
existed. Did it have any influence on the administration?
HIRSCHFELD: According to the order of the Reich Commissioner, this State
Political Secretariat had no influence on the Netherlands
administration. However, I should like to add that through the
appointments of NSB secretaries general later such influence actually
took place in various departments, though not in mine.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner have the head of the food
service, Louwes—who was known as being hostile to the Germans—retained
in the interest of the food supply for the population?
HIRSCHFELD: I believe the Netherlands officials left behind by the
Government had in general the same attitude as M. Louwes. However, M.
Louwes was left in his office.
DR. STEINBAUER: Although it was demanded that he should be removed?
HIRSCHFELD: This was reported to me by M. Van der Vense at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the trade economy was reorganized, was this done by
order of the Reich Commissioner or by the secretary general?
HIRSCHFELD: The reorganization of the trade economy was carried out on
the basis of an order signed by me; although there was originally a
draft, which was to be signed by the Reich Commissioner. I refused this
because I was of the opinion that this was a Dutch affair, and if the
order was signed by me the danger of German influence could be
prevented.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Reich Commissioner organized agriculture in the
so-called “Landstand.” Did this Landstand receive any executive powers?
HIRSCHFELD: The Landstand did not receive any executive powers. I should
like to add that in a personal talk I advised the Reich Commissioner not
to form the Landstand.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was the so-called Conscription Order of 1941 enforced to
a great extent, particularly in the Netherlands?
HIRSCHFELD: As far as I know, the Conscription Order was only enforced
to a limited extent in the Netherlands; but it was applied all the more
to the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: There was also a drive to remove members of the
population who were capable of military service, especially from
Rotterdam and The Hague—who carried out this drive?
HIRSCHFELD: Which drive do you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: To remove members of the population capable of military
service.
HIRSCHFELD: In 1944?
DR. STEINBAUER: 1944.
HIRSCHFELD: This drive was carried out by the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner weaken this action by making
exemptions, particularly in your department?
HIRSCHFELD: As for issuing exemptions, I heard very little of this at
the time.
DR. STEINBAUER: The shipyards and dock installations in Rotterdam and
Amsterdam were to be blown up. Do you know the attitude of the Reich
Commissioner on this subject?
HIRSCHFELD: I only know, from statements of the deputy of the Reich
Commissioner, Völkers, in Rotterdam, that he resisted these measures in
the face of the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I must remark that Völkers’ affidavit has
not yet arrived and at the moment cannot be traced at all; that is why I
am putting this question to the witness.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you confirm the fact that through the
intervention of the Reich Commissioner the area which was to be flooded
was reduced by about 100,000 hectares?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that through the intervention of the Reich
Commissioner, or his office, the area to be flooded in 1933 was reduced;
I do not know exactly to what extent.
DR. STEINBAUER: You mean 1943. You made a mistake; you said 1933; it
must be 1943.
HIRSCHFELD: 1943.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it possible that this figure of 100,000 hectares is
correct?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that it might be about half of what the Armed
Forces had intended to flood at that time.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner, in view of the
blockade, changed agriculture over to the production of food at an
opportune moment?
HIRSCHFELD: When in 1940 the Netherlands was invaded and occupied by the
Germans, the authorities who dealt with agriculture were of the opinion
that a reorganization of agriculture was necessary. The Reich
Commissioner and his office did not oppose us in this work.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true, in particular, that the stock of high
quality cattle in the Netherlands was retained by these measures?
HIRSCHFELD: The livestock in the Netherlands was, to my knowledge,
reduced by about 30 percent in the period of occupation. These measures
of reorganization of agriculture made it possible to retain this 70
percent of the livestock throughout the war. Pigs, however, had been
reduced to a much greater extent and it was necessary to slaughter
almost all the poultry.
DR. STEINBAUER: The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in
detail here. I have one question to put to you:
When did you speak to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for the first time
about lifting the embargo?
HIRSCHFELD: In answering this question, I must go back a little. When
the railroad strike was proclaimed, M. Louwes and I on 17 September—I
beg your pardon, on 22 September 1944—were visited by Van der Vense who
on behalf of the Reich Commissioner told us that he expected that M.
Louwes and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men in order to put
an end to the railroad strike in the interests of the food supply for
the country. If we did not do so, countermeasures would immediately be
taken to threaten the Netherlands population in the west of the country
with famine.
We refused to issue such a statement, and we told Van der Vense that he
should report to the Reich Commissioner that reprisals against the
population in connection with the railroad strike would place
responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissioner. That was the
decisive discussion. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being.
Thereupon protests were issued on this subject to the various agencies
of the Reich Commissioner, and on 16 October 1944 the first discussion
took place in which it was announced that the intention was to lift this
embargo.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that unfortunately in this particular year
the frost came earlier than in other years?
HIRSCHFELD: Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in
Holland the question of frost is always uncertain. From the Dutch side
it was pointed out—I did this myself in a press report—that we always
have to expect an early frost.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the invasion threatened and a large part of the
population was drawn upon to build fortifications, did the Reich
Commissioner agree to your suggestion that a large number of the
agricultural workers should be allowed to go home early?
HIRSCHFELD: I know of two cases. In the first place, it was a question
of workers from the big cities who were sent to the northeastern
provinces in order to dig potatoes; and the promise was made that these
workers would not be used for fortification work. This promise was kept.
Secondly, at the same time a large number of agricultural workers in the
province of Drente, who were already being used for fortification work,
were released for digging potatoes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I was unfortunately not able to ask the witness
Fischböck about questions relating to finance. Do you know that M. Trip,
who resigned on the question of the foreign currency blockade, was left
in the Bank for International Payments by the Reich Commissioner in
agreement with Funk, the Minister for Economy?
HIRSCHFELD: I recall in this connection that M. Trip intended to resign
as a member of the administrative council of the International Bank.
When this became known, the Germans were apparently somewhat scared; and
M. Trip was asked not to hand in his resignation. I know that he did not
hand it in. What this implied and what reasons were behind it, I do not
know from my own experience.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have two last questions, which are extremely
important. We know of an order of the Reich authorities under the title
“scorched earth.” It was actually issued in March 1945 for the
Netherlands. Locks, pump stations, dikes, et cetera, were to be
destroyed. Do you know what was the opinion of the Reich Commissioner
with respect to this important matter? Did you speak with him about this
question?
HIRSCHFELD: This question was discussed for the first time in a
conversation which I had with the defendant on 14 December 1944. In this
conversation he told me that in view of military developments he feared
that the Armed Forces might receive an order to destroy the western part
of the country. At that time he discussed with me to what extent it
would be possible to keep the western part of the Netherlands out of
hostilities. On 7 January 1945 this conversation was continued. As a
result of this conversation I attempted to establish contact with London
on this question. I did not succeed in obtaining an answer. These
reports had to be made by secret radio stations. I never learned whether
it was even possible to get one through. Then the Reich Commissioner
visited me on 2 April and told me that the “scorched earth” order had
arrived and that he had called on Speer for that reason. Speer had told
him that the Reich Commissioner did not need to carry out this order in
the civilian sphere. But Speer could not speak for the Armed Forces.
Therefore, the Reich Commissioner had also talked with General
Blaskowitz. Blaskowitz had told him that orders were orders, but if a
way could be found to avoid this order he would be ready to do so. Then
the Reich Commissioner asked me what possibilities I could see. This
discussion was the result of a communication which I reported to London
by telegram in April 1945. It was confirmed to me that this report had
reached London. Further conversations followed then.
DR. STEINBAUER: The last question: Did the Reich Commissioner, in
contrast to the central authorities, establish any contact with the
agents of the resistance movement in order to stop the war prematurely?
HIRSCHFELD: A few days after the conversation on 2 April 1945 I had a
talk with the deputy of the Reich Commissioner, Schwebel. He asked me to
what extent the Reich Commissioner could have been in contact with the
agents and whether the few men designated by Herr Schwebel were the
proper men. I then confirmed this.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel want to ask
questions?
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): I should like to ask the
witness a few questions.
Dr. Hirschfeld, you just said that the former president of the Dutch
State Bank, Dr. Trip, was in the administrative council of the Bank for
International Payments at Basel and remained there after he had resigned
his office as bank president in Holland. You just confirmed that. I
should like to ask you, do you know that the Reich Minister of Economy,
Funk, urged the bank in Basel to allow Dr. Trip to remain in the
International Bank in Basel although Dr. Trip was no longer authorized
to represent Dutch interests?
THE PRESIDENT: How are we concerned with this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: In questioning the Defendant Seyss-Inquart the French
Prosecution brought out the fact that the former president of the Dutch
State Bank, Dr. Trip, was forced to resign or did resign; and the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart was charged with this. As defense counsel for
the Defendant Funk I should like to prove that the Defendant Funk took
the part of Dr. Trip as president of the Netherlands State Bank and saw
to it that Dr. Trip was retained in the International Bank at Basel.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks it so remote and so
trivial that really it is quite a waste of time for the Tribunal to
listen to this sort of thing.
DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President, then I will ask another question.
Witness, do you know that at the time when Dr. Funk was president of the
Reichsbank, the Reichsbank shares in the possession of Dutch capitalists
were taken over and that Dutch circles generally acknowledged that this
was done in a fair and satisfactory way by Dr. Funk?
HIRSCHFELD: I know nothing at all about taking over shares in the
Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything, Dr. Hirschfeld, about the opinion Dr.
Funk expressed to you on the question of the treatment of the clearing
debts?
HIRSCHFELD: After the outbreak of the war between Holland and Germany I
never spoke to Funk. Therefore he did not express any opinion at all to
me during the war.
DR. SAUTER: Did you not learn from any other source what Funk’s point of
view was on the action to be taken in regard to the clearing debts?
HIRSCHFELD: I know from various reports and from publications during
that time that the Germans represented these clearing debts as actual
debts. We Dutch, however, never believed this; and if an expert on
national economics had observed the development from the time when
central clearing was organized during the war, he could have realized
without difficulty that these debts could not represent any de facto
value. In the course of the war they rose to more than 42,000 million
marks. When the president of the Dutch Bank, who was appointed by
Seyss-Inquart, compared the Reichsmark to the pound sterling in his
annual reports, we in Holland laughed at it.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hirschfeld, you just spoke of a president of the Dutch
State Bank who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. I believe that was M.
Rost van Tonningen?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Funk, who was the president
of the German Reichsbank at that time, endeavored to prevent the
appointment of Rost van Tonningen and wanted Dr. Trip to remain in
office as president of the Dutch State Bank?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question again, isn’t it? That is
practically the same question as we have already said we did not want to
hear about—about Funk’s support of Dr. Trip?
DR. SAUTER: If I may say so, Mr. President, the first time I wanted to
ask whether Funk tried to have Dr. Trip retained on the administrative
council of the International Bank in Basel although he was actually no
longer competent to represent Dutch interests, you said that that
question was immaterial. The present question refers to whether Dr. Funk
endeavored to have the Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the
Dutch Bank. That is the last question which I have to ask, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to the witness._] Well, do you know?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. I should like to explain this a little. To understand
this matter it is necessary...
THE PRESIDENT: Please, be very short about it then.
HIRSCHFELD: It is necessary to know that the Reich Commissioner and Dr.
Fischböck were in favor of Rost van Tonningen, although it was known
that we in the Netherlands considered Rost van Tonningen a traitor. When
Trip was forced to resign, Wohlthat, the German Reichsbank Commissioner,
told me that this matter was discussed in Berlin, and the basis of this
information...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I think what you were asked was whether Funk
tried to get Trip appointed to the presidency of the Dutch Bank when
this other man was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. Do you know whether
Funk...
HIRSCHFELD: I only know from Wohlthat that Funk attempted to do so and
that Göring made a different decision at the suggestion of the Reich
Commissioner and Dr. Fischböck.
DR. SAUTER: Anyway, you confirm that Funk attempted to have the
Dutchman, Dr. Trip, retained as president of the Dutch State Bank?
HIRSCHFELD: I confirm that, having been told so by Wohlthat.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
M. DUBOST: Of what nature were the orders left to you by the Dutch
Government when it left for England?
HIRSCHFELD: There were written instructions by the Dutch Government for
all Netherlands officials of the administration. These instructions were
based on the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare.
M. DUBOST: These orders, therefore, did not imperil the German Army?
HIRSCHFELD: No.
M. DUBOST: Will you then please explain, if you are capable of doing so,
why Holland had an exceptional regime, since she was the only country in
the West to have a Gauleiter immediately after the invasion?
HIRSCHFELD: We considered the appointment of a Reich Commissioner who
was chief of the civilian administration in the Netherlands as an
indication that the German Government had political intentions in the
Netherlands and not purely the intentions of an occupying power.
M. DUBOST: In your opinion, therefore, Seyss-Inquart was appointed the
day after the invasion had started because the German Government had the
intention of altering the Dutch national institutions in contravention
of international law?
HIRSCHFELD: We were convinced—and this was confirmed by
experience—that all possible forms of National Socialist institutions
would be introduced in the Netherlands and that one would attempt to
force them upon the Netherlands.
M. DUBOST: This attempt was made?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that during the occupation a great number of the
members of the Dutch National Socialist Party were at the head of the
police and carried out German orders to arrest Jews or members of the
resistance movement or to take hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: When the Dutch police itself became involved in these
arrests, did it make them only because it was forced to do so?
HIRSCHFELD: The conditions were such that old Netherlands policemen, if
they ever took part in such matters, did so because they were forced to;
but there were Dutch policemen who had been appointed by the German
authorities. They were, in general, members of the NSB and they, in
part, volunteered for such malodorous tasks.
M. DUBOST: Is it true that the wives and children of those members of
the Dutch police who refused to carry out German orders were taken as
hostages?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that in various cases the families were taken as
hostages when police officials refused to carry out orders. It is
further known that this did not happen only in the case of the police,
but also in other cases.
M. DUBOST: It has been alleged here that the diamonds taken at Arnhem
had all been found in Holland. Does that agree with the facts?
HIRSCHFELD: What was stolen at Arnhem?
M. DUBOST: Diamonds.
HIRSCHFELD: Diamonds. The diamonds affair is a typical example of how
they wanted to deal with Dutch property. These diamonds were in a bank
safe in Arnhem. After the invasion of Normandy attempts were made by the
Germans to seize these diamonds. The director of the Netherlands agency
which is concerned with diamonds and later I myself were asked for the
keys to the bank safe. We refused. And then on the day of the airborne
landings near Arnhem, the German Armed Forces blew up this safe.
Apparently only half of the diamonds were found and they were sent to
the Reichsbank in Berlin.
When I protested, Fischböck said that they had only been put in the
custody of the Reichsbank in Berlin. Then I demanded that these diamonds
should be given back. Meanwhile, it was learned that half of the
diamonds were still in Arnhem. The Currency Protection Command again
demanded the keys which were in my personal possession. I refused and
had another discussion with Fischböck. The matter was obviously
distasteful to him; and he agreed to the concession that the remaining
diamonds, which we later found in Arnhem, be returned to the owner. But
they were willing to give back the half which had been sent to Berlin
only if they could be placed under German lock in a bank in the eastern
Netherlands. I demanded from Fischböck that they be turned over without
restrictions. Apparently Fischböck could not agree, and for this reason,
after the liberation of the Netherlands, these diamonds were not given
back; and as far as I know they have not yet been returned.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart return the property of the 1,000 Jews who
were deported to Theresienstadt?
HIRSCHFELD: As to the Jews who were deported to Theresienstadt, I know
that these people, on the basis of a promise given to my colleague
Frederiks, were to be given preferential treatment; but that their
property had been given back is not known to me and I do not believe it.
M. DUBOST: Was that property returned to them?
HIRSCHFELD: It had been confiscated. I did not hear that it was returned
to them.
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart said that in February 1941, 400 Jews had been
transported from Amsterdam to Mauthausen as a measure of reprisal for
the fact that a member of the NSB was supposedly murdered at Amsterdam
by Jews. What do you know about this?
HIRSCHFELD; I know that in February 1941 there were two difficult
situations in Amsterdam. One referred to shipyard workers. I believe
3,000 of them were to be forcibly sent to Germany. I intervened with
Seyss-Inquart and succeeded in preventing this. There was, however,
unrest in Amsterdam on this subject. In the second place, Jews were
already being arrested in Amsterdam, which was the occasion for a
strike. The incident of these 400 Jews of whom you speak took place
after this strike in Amsterdam as far as I recall, because they wanted
to make the Jews responsible for the strike. Fischböck told me so
himself, and I said that I did not believe it and that this was only an
excuse.
M. DUBOST: If I have understood you correctly, these Jews were arrested
because the population in Amsterdam was opposed to their deportation.
There were demonstrations and riots during which members of the NSB were
killed. These Jews were therefore not deported in reprisal for the
murder of the members of the NSB; on the contrary, the men of the NSB
were killed at the time when they were going to arrest the Jews, before
there was any idea of reprisal.
HIRSCHFELD: I recall that in these days the Amsterdam workers resisted
when the Jews were being arrested, and this led to an uprising in
Amsterdam and to the strike. Exactly what happened I do not know from my
own experience.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart prohibit ration cards to be given to
workers who evaded deportation to Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: When in May 1943 the so-called age groups were called up for
labor commitment in Germany, instructions were sent on 6 May to the
competent Netherlands authorities announcing that workers who were
called in these age groups could no longer receive any food cards. That
was a decree of 6 May 1943, signed by an official of the Reich
Commissariat by the name of Effger. We received this instruction; and
although it reached us when martial law was in effect, the instruction
was not carried out by the Netherlands authorities. What the German
authorities argued, in effect, was: “Whoever does not work for Germany
gets nothing to eat.”
M. DUBOST: Seyss-Inquart claimed that the Dutch people who left to work
in Germany up to 1942 were all volunteers. Is that correct?
HIRSCHFELD: No, they could not all be volunteers. The unemployed in the
Netherlands received unemployment compensation, and shortly after the
occupation a directive was issued that people who were suited for work
in Germany and refused to volunteer for this work were no longer
entitled to receive unemployment compensation. Thus they were under
economic pressure.
M. DUBOST: Much has been said here as to whether Rauter was subordinate
to Seyss-Inquart. Could you inform us on this?
HIRSCHFELD: So far as we in the occupied territories knew, Rauter was
appointed by Seyss-Inquart at the beginning of June 1940 as Commissioner
General for Security. No order which was then known indicated that
Rauter had any kind of special position. The decree of the German Reich
Chancellor of 18 May 1940 made it clear to us Dutch that the Reich
Commissioner was the only responsible man in the Netherlands for the
occupying power within the civilian sphere. Much later, from talks, I,
and perhaps others who were better informed, realized that Rauter
received direct orders from Himmler or from the Reich Security Main
Office. But the population of the Netherlands could not know this.
M. DUBOST: Perhaps you know the result of the abolition of the “currency
frontier” and its repercussion on life in Holland.
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. I will try to describe this matter in a few words. At
the outbreak of war there was a clearing agreement between the
Netherlands and Germany. Thus we Netherlands officials, at the beginning
of the occupation, were able to exercise special control for deliveries
of goods and such to Germany, because there was not only border control
by customs officials, but we could also control payment. It was
particularly disagreeable to Fischböck that Dutch authorities could
still refuse anything, and this was a cause for friction. He attempted
to remove this clearing, and on the 1st of April 1941 the foreign
currency border was removed. This made it possible for all goods to be
bought in the Netherlands for Reichsmark, and they could be taken to
Germany under the protection of the German authorities. I will give an
example: According to an investigation, which I ordered at that time,
there were a few hundred buyers of jewelry and gold and silver articles
in the Netherlands. These articles are easy to carry with one. If there
had been control of payment, it would not have been possible that in
1942 alone, according to our estimate, 80 to 100 million guilders’ worth
of such goods was taken away at high prices to Germany. The important
point was that by lifting this control of foreign currency one could
operate more freely. Furthermore, this was a possibility of buying Dutch
securities on the Amsterdam stock exchange, for one of the German aims
at that time was to tie Netherlands and German economy together. The
easiest way to do this was to lift the “currency frontier,” or more
exactly, the currency control between the occupied territories and
Germany; and thus Netherlands interests were prejudiced more severely
than those of other occupied territories where this currency control was
retained. I should like to add that of course even there ways of
carrying out this exploitation were found.
The lifting of the currency control made the German policy in this
connection much easier. This was clearly shown by an order of Hermann
Göring of 1942, in which the control of the Netherlands German border
was abolished and the Delegate for the Four Year Plan could write that
there must be no control at the border even when price regulations or
rationing regulations were infringed. That was what Hermann Göring
added.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that this should be
shortened, this discussion of the question of the abolition of the
frontier policy for money.
M. DUBOST: I have no more questions on this point, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] What amount of money did Holland pay Germany
for the cost of occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: The total sum which was paid by the end of the occupation
was 8,500 million guilder.
M. DUBOST: In what form were these payments demanded?
HIRSCHFELD: These 8,500 million guilder consisted of credits which the
Armed Forces demanded for the direct occupation costs in the
Netherlands; furthermore, for the cost of the machinery of the Reich
Commissariat; and third, payments which were imposed on the Netherlands
under the expression which was used at first, “outside occupation
costs,” that is, expenses which the Armed Forces incurred in Germany in
the interest of the occupation forces in the Netherlands. The form in
which it was paid, as far as it concerned payments in the Netherlands,
was in Dutch money. Payments in Germany were made in gold, which was
demanded from the Netherlands Bank, or were taken from the account which
the Netherlands Bank had with the Reichsbank.
M. DUBOST: Were these payments the result of one of the conditions of
capitulation?
HIRSCHFELD: I know the capitulation conditions of 14 May 1940 and they
do not mention anything about occupation costs.
M. DUBOST: What is the damage sustained by Holland in other ways as a
result of the looting of the means of construction, machinery, stocks,
ships, and so forth?
HIRSCHFELD: It is extremely difficult to give an exact figure because it
could not be determined during the occupation. But, after the German
capitulation, the Netherlands Government reported the sum of about
25,000 million guilders to the Reparation Committee in Paris as damages
for occupation. This would include the 8,500 million in occupational
costs which I just mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, isn’t this all contained in the Dutch report?
M. DUBOST: Oh no, Mr. President, certainly not.
How did Seyss-Inquart’s attitude change during the occupation?
HIRSCHFELD: I should like to make a clear distinction with regard to his
point of view after September, after the autumn of 1944, and during the
first 4½ years. After the autumn of 1944 he was much more outspoken in
the Netherlands’ interests than previously.
M. DUBOST: Before being the secretary general of the various
administrations, which you administered during the German occupation,
you were Director of Foreign Trade in Holland; and as such you were
present at international negotiations, and in particular, you negotiated
with the representatives of Germany about economic questions concerning
your country. You therefore knew Schacht?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes, I believe I first met Schacht in 1933 at the World
Economic Conference in London.
M. DUBOST: During your negotiations with Schacht were you not led to ask
him to restrict the rearmament of Germany which was ruining her credit?
HIRSCHFELD: If I am to answer this question, I must go back to a
conversation in 1936, when I was in Berlin and saw Schacht in connection
with trade treaty negotiations. During this conversation the
international financial situation came up for discussion because there
were various currency devaluations at that time affecting the French
franc, the Swiss franc, and the Dutch guilder. The situation of German
currency was also discussed in this connection. When I voiced my
criticism, Schacht said, “How would you do it?”
I said I could only give him my private opinion. Then I asked if
Germany—a question under discussion at that time—when taking up more
international loans, would be ready to assume the consequences, as the
interests and amortizations would imply a blocking of the importation of
raw materials which would have an unfortunate effect on the labor market
and on rearmament. Would Germany be willing to accept such consequences?
If so, then, according to what was my private opinion in 1936,
international loans might be discussed. If not, such a discussion would
have little point.
Then Schacht gave me his opinion. Germany needed rearmament in order to
be equal to the other great powers in international politics. Only on
such a basis could one negotiate. And Schacht said to me in his own
ironical pointed way, “I want a big and strong Germany; and to achieve
that, I would even ally myself with the devil.” In the course of this
discussion, Schacht asked a few questions. First, he wanted to clear up
the currency question, and secondly, he considered the colonial question
important.
Regarding the colonial question, he said to me that in his opinion it
was possible for Germany to take over colonies again and that she would
accept the responsibility not to arm these colonies and not to set up
any naval bases there. If such a policy was to be adopted, he believed
that German economic and foreign policy might be reoriented. In this
connection Schacht told me that he did not approve of the anti-Semitic
tendencies then prevalent in Germany. He gave me examples of his
attitude toward anti-Semitism and how he rejected it. I may add one
example here that he gave me, his conversation with a certain Klagges,
who was Prime Minister of Brunswick, and who made Hitler a German
citizen.
M. DUBOST: That is of no interest to me. Schacht told you he had
defended the Jews.
Now, as to the General Staff, was it not the German General Staff who
gave the order to have raids carried out in Rotterdam?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of German
Armed Forces): Mr. President, if I understood the question correctly,
the witness is to be questioned about the charges against the General
Staff and the OKW. I object to this question for the following
reasons...
THE PRESIDENT: You go too fast. Do you not see the light?
DR. LATERNSER: As defense counsel for the General Staff and the OKW, I
was prohibited by a court decision promulgated on 8 June to question or
cross-examine any witnesses. The same ought to apply to the Prosecution.
If I am not allowed to question witnesses, then the Prosecution must not
be allowed to question them either since the rules must be the same for
Prosecution and Defense.
M. DUBOST: I will forego my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear what you said, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: I said, Mr. President, that I would forego my question about
the General Staff; and I have two more questions about Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, just one moment—go on, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: Did Seyss-Inquart give the order to have raids carried out in
all the large Dutch cities?
HIRSCHFELD: Not to my knowledge.
M. DUBOST: Who gave the order for these roundups to be carried out? Who
was it?
HIRSCHFELD: These raids were carried out by the German Armed Forces. I
do not know who gave the orders. It is only known that in Rotterdam,
when these raids—I believe it was on 11 November 1944—were carried
out, the divisional commander in Rotterdam made a speech in the town
hall on the subject and organized this raid.
M. DUBOST: But didn’t Seyss-Inquart have orphan children from the
hospitals taken away for work in Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: The question is not clear.
M. DUBOST: Was it Seyss-Inquart who had orphan children seized and sent
to work in the service of Germany?
HIRSCHFELD: From my own experience I know nothing about this.
M. DUBOST: Were orphan children compelled to serve in certain of the SS
units, on Seyss-Inquart’s orders?
HIRSCHFELD: I know that the SS in the Netherlands recruited soldiers. As
far as I know from the newspapers, bulletins, and handbills, it was
always done by the SS as such.
M. DUBOST: Who pledged himself not to use chemical products made in
Holland for war? Was it Seyss-Inquart who had pledged himself not to do
so?
HIRSCHFELD: I beg your pardon?
M. DUBOST: Who had pledged himself not to use chemical products made in
Holland for warfare and to have them reserved exclusively for Dutch
agricultural purposes?
HIRSCHFELD: This is the question of the nitrogen fertilizer?
M. DUBOST: Yes.
HIRSCHFELD: With regard to the nitrogen fertilizer, the promise was made
from the beginning that the nitrogen fertilizer industries in the
Netherlands should only produce artificial fertilizers. This was done
until about the middle of August 1944, when instructions came that the
nitrogen fertilizer industry was to change its production over to
explosives. These instructions had been issued by an office of the Reich
Commissioner. It was signed by a certain Herr Brocke. Thereupon, after I
had spoken to an official of the industry, I attempted to speak to
Seyss-Inquart personally on this matter and to intervene. I was given
the answer by his adjutant that he had already made his decision and
that I could establish contact with Herr Fiebig, the representative of
Speer in the Netherlands. I discussed the matter with Herr Fiebig and
told him that Netherlands industry and Netherlands labor could not work
on explosives. Thereupon I was told...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, cannot this question be answered a little more
shortly? The question is, did Seyss-Inquart promise that chemicals
should be used, I suppose, on the land in Holland and not used for
purposes in the Reich? Isn’t that the question?
M. DUBOST: You have heard what Mr. President has said. Try to answer
more briefly.
HIRSCHFELD: We had the promise that only artificial fertilizer would be
produced. Then the demand was made to produce explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, we do not want it all again. Can’t you get the
question answered?
M. DUBOST: I did not hear the answer of the witness, Mr. President. It
did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. DUBOST: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall ask the witness
one more question.
Witness, do you know under what conditions and for what reasons the
newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed by the agencies of the
Reich Commissioner?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes.
M. DUBOST: Can you tell us?
HIRSCHFELD: Yes. The newspaper published in The Hague was destroyed
because the employees of this newspaper refused to publish an article
which spoke against the railroad strike—an article which had been
compiled by the information chief of the Reich Commissioner. That was
the reason for refusing to publish it.
M. DUBOST: Yes. It was destroyed by means of dynamite, was it not? The
buildings and machinery were blown up, were they not?
HIRSCHFELD: The equipment was blown up with dynamite.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal, I should
like to call my last witness to the witness stand, Ernst Schwebel.
[_The witness Schwebel took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ERNST AUGUST SCHWEBEL (Witness): Ernst August Schwebel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what functions did you have before you assumed
service in the Netherlands?
SCHWEBEL: I was Oberverwaltungsgerichtsrat at the Prussian
Administrative Court in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you come to the Netherlands?
SCHWEBEL: On 18 May 1940.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that, beginning with June 1940, you were the
delegate or plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissioner in the province of
South Holland, including the cities of The Hague and Rotterdam?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this capacity, as plenipotentiary for this province,
did you have constant contact with the Dutch administrative authorities
in this province and with the local authorities?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many of the former mayors in the
province were left in their office?
SCHWEBEL: At the end, about one-half to two-thirds.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner replace and change many of
the officials of the province and of the local government?
SCHWEBEL: No, he made very few changes. Shall I discuss these changes?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but briefly. Perhaps you can just cite the reasons
for the changes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the changes have already been stated by
other witnesses, have they not, and have not been cross-examined to. Is
not that right? Did not Seyss-Inquart state the changes, and they were
not cross-examined to?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall turn to another question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it true that in the second half of the
year 1944 a state of emergency was declared?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, on 4 September.
DR. STEINBAUER: And the executive powers were turned over to the Armed
Forces within a radius of 30 kilometers?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, but this transfer did not take place due to the
regulation declaring this emergency state but as a result of a special
military regulation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Due to military developments?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that at the beginning of the year 1945
special Kommandos of the Reichsführer SS Himmler began to place time
bombs in the public buildings of your province in case of an evacuation
of this territory?
SCHWEBEL: As far as these special Kommandos of Himmler’s were concerned,
I know nothing about them. I know only one case in which an Oberleutnant
appeared, but I believe that that was prior to the time you mentioned.
He wanted to take such steps. I immediately got in touch with the Reich
Commissioner and the military commander, and I learned that none of
these gentlemen knew about this. Thereupon, at the request of the Reich
Commissioner, this Oberleutnant was told to cease his activity, to
remove the bombs which he had already planted, and to leave immediately.
I know of no other cases like that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that difficulties arose in Gouda as a result
of the so-called “Wehrfähige ins Reich” drive, meaning that these who
were fit for military service should be taken into the Reich?
SCHWEBEL: Yes; the Armed Forces was carrying through this drive at the
time and with them a deputy of Minister Goebbels in his capacity as
Reich Delegate for Total War Effort. They set up special agencies in
Gouda and in two other places in the province. The director of the Gouda
office carried these duties out in an improper way—rather harshly.
Thereupon I discussed this matter with the Reich Commissioner, and he
immediately got in touch with the commanding general and had this
officer dismissed on the spot.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know anything about the extent of the resistance
movement in your province?
SCHWEBEL: The resistance movement was fought by the Security Police in
connection with the Armed Forces. What I know is not from my own
experience in my administrative post, but knowledge I received through
my connection with the agencies. Thereby I know that the resistance
movement approached 50,000, as an estimate. These were people who might
be counted as such. By that I do not mean that they were people who were
organized in groups or in permanent action.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Reich Commissioner started a food
drive for 250,000 Dutch children?
SCHWEBEL: Yes, I know that he initiated this drive.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were an eye and ear witness to the attempt on the
part of Seyss-Inquart to end the war quickly. Will you tell us briefly
how connections were established with the Chief of Staff of General
Eisenhower?
SCHWEBEL: At the beginning of April 1945 a M. Van der Vlugt approached
me. He was the leader of the so-called IKO. That was an
interdenominational organization to assist in the food problems.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, please speak a little more slowly and clearly.
I cannot understand you even in German.
SCHWEBEL: I was approached by M. Van der Vlugt, who was the director of
an interchurch group whose purpose was to supply the population with
special foodstuffs. I knew him for that reason. He told me that he was
acting on behalf of the Dutch Government in London. He asked me whether
the Reich Commissioner would be ready to negotiate with him briefly on
three questions:
1. A more extensive food supply for the Netherlands people through the
Allies,
2. The stopping of flooding, and
3. The cessation of the fight against the resistance movement.
I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissioner and he
immediately declared himself ready to enter into discussions. Then, 2
days after that, we dealt with M. Van der Vlugt and another
representative...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the yellow light means that you are going too
fast, you see. So when you see the yellow light go a little more slowly.
SCHWEBEL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You were telling us what Seyss-Inquart did.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. Seyss-Inquart declared himself ready to negotiate about
these questions immediately. A discussion then took place between us and
M. Van der Vlugt and another representative of the Dutch Government in
London. That was Jonkheer Six. This discussion took place among the four
of us.
On this occasion we agreed first of all about one point, to the effect
that any combating of the resistance movement was definitely to be
stopped immediately; and the resistance group, on its part, undertook to
dispense with sabotage.
Secondly, the Reich Commissioner declared himself ready to give his
permission to a generous food supply for the population on the part of
the Allies and to stop the floodings. However, there were to be more
detailed negotiations in this respect.
The result of this discussion was communicated to London and I brought
two Dutchmen through one part of the front line as truce officers. Then,
after various negotiations had been going on for some time, we received
an inquiry from London as to whether the Reich Commissioner was ready to
negotiate with the Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, and deal with
him about these questions. The immediate answer was “yes.” Thereupon,
first of all, I crossed the front line on 28 April at Amersfoort, and
there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the
Chief of Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery, and...
THE PRESIDENT: You do not need any more detail about it, do you?
SCHWEBEL: ...and in this discussion with Sir Francis Gengard we agreed
that another discussion was to take place 2 days later between...
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we are not really concerned with the details.
We are concerned with the results of this conversation, and how it
worked out in the interests of the Dutch population.
SCHWEBEL: Yes. This discussion took place on 30 April, between the Reich
Commissioner and the Chief of Staff of General Eisenhower, who was
General Bedell Smith. In this discussion the Reich Commissioner agreed
completely to the wishes of General Bedell Smith that there should be a
very generous food supply for the Dutch population.
THE PRESIDENT: If he said he agreed with the demands of General Bedell
Smith, surely that is all you want, isn’t it?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is quite sufficient.
[_Turning to the witness._] Through these negotiations—I would like to
ask you—the war was ended 2 months earlier, was it not?
SCHWEBEL: One cannot say that exactly. The situation was as follows. For
the Dutch population, of course, the war ended, practically speaking, on
that day, because the supplies that could be carried by air, over
highways, over canals, rivers, and by sea to Rotterdam, were so
generous. In order to make these transports possible, an armistice had
to be arranged from place to place, so that in fact, though not
formally, we had a general armistice and the population at that time
immediately benefited by it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this
witness.
SCHWEBEL: May I just make a few remarks, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I think not. If counsel has finished examining you, we do
not want any more remarks.
Do any other counsel wish to ask questions?
Is there any cross-examination?
M. DEBENEST: Witness, you spoke a short while ago of the negotiations
which you undertook with delegates of the London Government. Are you
aware of the fact that these delegates, before undertaking the
negotiations with the Reich Commissioner in April 1945, laid down as a
condition that no more people would be shot because of attacks against
any German civil or military authority unless a court sentence had first
been pronounced?
SCHWEBEL: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: As a further question did those delegates not request the
Reich Commissioner whether the SS would conform to the conditions of an
agreement which would put an end to hostilities?
SCHWEBEL: That also took place. After that time, nothing more was
undertaken against the resistance movement.
M. DEBENEST: Very good. Is it correct to say that the Reich Commissioner
replied that in his capacity as Obergruppenführer of the SS he was in a
position to force the SS to observe the conditions of this agreement and
that he could answer for it?
SCHWEBEL: An agreement in its true sense—all these conversations were
gentlemen’s agreements...
M. DEBENEST: Wait a minute. No, I am asking you whether the Reich
Commissioner made that reply to the negotiators, that is, the delegates
of the London Government?
SCHWEBEL: He said he was Obergruppenführer of the SS as well, and in
that capacity he was able to see to it that the SS would comply with
this agreement.
M. DEBENEST: Thank you. The last question is this: Did you know Kiehl?
He was an official in the Reich Commissariat.
SCHWEBEL: Kiehl? Yes, I knew him.
M, DEBENEST: Didn’t he give instructions to flood the Wieringer Sea in
April 1945?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl, to my knowledge, did not give any instructions; he
could not do so. Herr Kiehl was an expert on waterworks, and he was a
very good expert. But orders for the flooding could be given only by the
highest military authority, and that was Generaloberst Blaskowitz.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I object to this manner of questioning the
witness. The Prosecution is again questioning this witness in order to
charge the General Staff and the OKW. In the objection I mentioned
previously I said that if I must not question the witnesses with a view
to exoneration, the same must apply to the Prosecution with regard to
incriminating questions. I ask that the last statement be stricken from
the record.
M. DEBENEST: I beg your pardon.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I merely wanted to say that if I ask this
question, it is based on the information that was given to me. There is
no question of the Army; but of instructions that were given by a civil
servant of the Reich Commissioner, and therefore originating from the
Reich Commissariat. Therefore, I do not understand the interference of
the defense counsel. There is no question of the Army and I am
completely ignorant as to whether the witness is going to tell me
whether the Army was responsible or an office of the Reich Commissioner,
when I was talking of an official of the Reich Commissioner.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You may ask the question.
M. DEBENEST: Will you proceed?
SCHWEBEL: Herr Kiehl was the hydrostatic expert for the Reich
Commissioner; but at the same time, he was a hydrostatic expert under
the military commander. He was consulted by both authorities as an
expert only. He was a very fine expert. But nobody had given him any
right to give instructions...
M. DEBENEST: Please, do not make any speeches; answer directly. “Yes” or
“no,” did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: But I must say how it was! Kiehl? No. He could not have done
that.
M. DEBENEST: I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking
whether he merely transmitted this order.
SCHWEBEL: I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far
Kiehl was involved in this order.
M. DEBENEST: That is sufficient.
What was the interest at that time in flooding the Wieringer Sea? Did
not people think that the war was over?
SCHWEBEL: No. When the Wieringer Sea—the Wieringer Polder—was flooded,
the war had not yet ended and these agreements had not been concluded
either. When the Wieringer Polder was flooded—and I found this out
later from military men—there was the danger that an aerial landing on
the terrain of the Wieringer Sea would take place, which might place the
dike in the hands of the enemy, giving them access to Friesland and
North Holland. That was the reason why the military authorities
considered this flooding necessary. That is what I was told.
M. DEBENEST: But at that moment in Holland wasn’t the war considered as
being lost for Germany?
SCHWEBEL: No. At that time, it was not considered lost. At any rate, our
Army had, at that time, the order to defend us which it had to carry
out. There was the danger that this landing would take place.
M. DEBENEST: I have finished, Mr. President.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would not have had to put another question to you if
the French prosecutor had not broached a certain subject. What did
General Smith tell you about the flooding of the Wieringer Sea?
SCHWEBEL: General Smith said toward the end of the negotiation that any
flooding that had been undertaken up to that time could be justified on
the basis of military necessity. But no more was to be undertaken from
that moment.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was any undertaken after that?
SCHWEBEL: No, none was undertaken after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, with this I have concluded my examination
of witnesses. Now I should like to refer to those documents contained in
my document books and which I have submitted to the Tribunal. I was
notified that Document Book Number 3 has been submitted to the Tribunal,
and to conclude my case I should like to submit another document, as
Number Seyss-Inquart-91, concerning the Apostolic letter of the Catholic
bishops on the plebiscite in Austria. In this statement, reference is
made to the attitude of Gauleiter Bürckel. We can gather from it that
the persecution of the Churches cannot be charged to Seyss-Inquart, but
rather the responsibility is to be placed on Bürckel. In order to save
time, I should like to ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of
this document without my reading it, and I conclude herewith my
presentation of evidence on the case of Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, have you offered all the documents that
you want to offer in your books? Have you offered them as evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you offered all the documents that you want to offer
as evidence and given them exhibit numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. Only a few affidavits are missing,
affidavits which were admitted by the High Tribunal: Völkers’, Bolle’s,
and Rauter’s. I hope that we shall have them within a short time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, you must offer each of these documents as
evidence; you must say so. Merely putting them in the book does not
offer them as evidence; and, therefore, you must offer these things to
us as evidence, if you wish to do so, giving them the numbers. You can
offer them all together, saying you offer...
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to offer your Documents Numbers 1 to—I do
not know what the last number is; 105 seems to be the last one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. I ask that all numbers in my three
document books be included, up to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, are the numbers given in the books the
exhibit numbers which you wish to give to the documents?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. They are in numerical order and they
are found in that order in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish, then, to offer Numbers 1 to—whatever the last
number is, as evidence. Is that right?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You offered some in the course of your presentation of
the witnesses.
DR. STEINBAUER: Some of them I submitted and quoted according to the
numbers given in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You now wish, then, to offer the remainder?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the remainder as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the numbers which they bear in your document book?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are offering all the originals under those
numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Insofar as they are in my possession and I can say upon
oath that the extracts tally with the books.
THE PRESIDENT: You have certified that they are true copies of the
originals in accordance with the Tribunal’s rules?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I ask
the permission of the High Tribunal that the Defendant Fritzsche be
absent Monday and Tuesday of next week. He requires this time for the
preparation of his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Mr. President, I wanted to put the same request on behalf
of my client, as he will be in the witness box immediately after Von
Papen, who is the next, and I ask that he have permission to be absent
Monday or Tuesday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall only take a little of the
Tribunal’s time, but I must make a motion which is particularly
important to me, a motion which concerns procedure; and I should like to
give the reasons for my motion.
I move that the Tribunal, first of all, rescind the resolution given on
8 June 1946, and secondly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Latemser, if your motion is an important motion, it
should be in writing. If it is not in writing, it must be put in
writing. You know perfectly well that is the rule of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it is very important to me that this
motion should appear in the record. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Laternser, it will appear in the record if you
make the motion in writing. You have been here for many months and you
know perfectly well what the rule of the Tribunal is, that motions be
made in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but since we are concerned with a motion which
applies to procedure and which applies to a resolution announced by word
of mouth, I believe I am justified in putting my motion in this manner.
THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal does not think so. The Tribunal would
wish to have your motion in writing in accordance with the rule of the
Tribunal.
Now the Tribunal will continue with the case against the Defendant Von
Papen, which is, I believe, the next.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am beginning with my presentation of evidence on behalf
of my client, Von Papen, by calling the Defendant Von Papen as a
witness.
[_The Defendant Von Papen took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRANZ VON PAPEN (Defendant): Franz von Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the High Tribunal, briefly, a picture of your
life, especially from the time you entered politics.
VON PAPEN: In order to describe my life briefly, I shall emphasize only
such points as are essential for the High Tribunal to form a judgment of
my personality and how they influenced my life and my political attitude
and opinion.
I was born on soil which has been in the possession of my family for 900
years. I grew up with conservative principles which unite a man most
closely to his own folk and his native soil, and as my family has always
been a strong supporter of the Church, I of course grew up in this
tradition as well.
As the second son I was destined for a military career. At the age of 18
I became a lieutenant in a cavalry regiment and I went...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you gave us the date of your birth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give the date of your birth.
VON PAPEN: The date of my birth is 29 October 1879.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us you joined a cavalry regiment at the age
of 18.
VON PAPEN: Important for my development was my marriage with the
daughter of a Saar industrialist, Geheimrat Von Boch. The relatives of
this family brought me in contact with many French and Belgian families,
and in this way I acquired an intimate knowledge of the spiritual and
cultural factors of these neighboring countries, which made a very
strong impression on me at the time. From that time on, that is from
1905, I have been convinced of how wrong a certain political attitude
can be, namely, that France and Germany should be condemned to consider
themselves eternal enemies. I felt how much these two peoples had to
offer each other on a mutual basis, provided their peaceful development
was not disturbed.
In the years that followed I graduated from the Kriegsakademie (War
Academy), and in 1913, after training for 5 years, I was taken into the
General Staff. At the end of 1913, at the command of His Imperial
Majesty, I was appointed military attaché in Washington and Mexico. In
this capacity, in the summer of 1914, I accompanied the U.S.A.
Expeditionary Corps, which was dispatched to Vera Cruz as a result of
the incident at Tampico. In Mexico, I was surprised by the outbreak of
the first World War. Until the end of 1915 I remained at my post in
Washington.
This period is of decisive significance for my political life. Our
strife, carried on with legal methods, against the unilateral supplying
of our enemies with war materials, led to heated polemics and
propaganda. This propaganda, which was fostered by the enemy, tried by
all means to cast suspicion upon the military attachés of Germany,
accusing them of illegal acts and especially of having organized acts of
sabotage.
At the end of 1915 I left the United States. I regret to say that I
never tried to rectify and correct this false propaganda; but this
propaganda followed me until the thirties and even until today, and has
impressed its stamp upon me. In order to cite just one example, even
after 1931, the Lehigh Valley Company stated before the Mixed Claims
Commission that their claim of $50,000,000 against the German Reich was
justified, since I, the German military attaché, had caused an explosion
which had taken place in the year 1917, 2 years after I had left the
United States.
I am just mentioning this fact, Mr. President, since this propaganda
honored me with titles such as “master spy,” “chief plotter,” and other
pretty names; for this propaganda was the background for the judging of
my personality, as I found out in 1932 when I entered public life.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendants Funk and Speer are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, we stopped when you were talking about the
formation of public opinion concerning you personally. Please continue
telling us of your career.
VON PAPEN: I had spoken about the propaganda about myself which was
carried on in the United States at the time of the first World War. No
effort was in fact ever made to investigate whether this opinion was
true or false. What I was able to accomplish in those years, that is,
the fact that I opposed sabotage and fought against submarine warfare,
never became known.
This propaganda was public defamation, and it reached its height in 1941
in a pamphlet published in New York, with the beautiful title “The Devil
in Top Hat.” It repeats all these fairy stories without criticism, and
adds new ones. Thus a so-called public opinion was formed about me
which, I believe, gives a completely distorted picture of my character,
my opinions, and above all my motives during the period from 1932 to
1945. I ask the Tribunal to keep in mind these psychological
associations as I attempt to give now a true picture of my thoughts and
my acts.
After returning to Germany in 1916 I did my duty as a soldier, as a
battalion commander and as a General Staff officer in the war in France.
In 1917 I became Chief of the Operational Section of Army Group
Falkenhayn in Turkey. When Falkenhayn was recalled in 1918, I became
Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish Army until the
Armistice.
Perhaps I may recall briefly—after so many bad things have been said
about me by the world—an episode which shows that I was able to do
something useful for the history of humanity. On 8 December 1918, after
a hard struggle with the German and Turkish headquarters, I succeeded in
getting Falkenhayn to evacuate Jerusalem. Because of this decision the
city was not shelled or destroyed by the British Army.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I thought, the 8th of
December 1918. That must have been 1917.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, My Lord, 1918.
VON PAPEN: 8 December 1918.
When in November 1918 I was negotiating with Ataturk about the
evacuation of the German troops, we received the news of the collapse of
the German armies and the abdication of the German Kaiser. This fact
meant for me not only the loss of the war, a whole world had collapsed
for me. The German Reich had collapsed after a thousand years of
development, and everything that we had believed in was shrouded in the
mists of the future. At this juncture I decided to face the issue.
After my return to Germany, I asked for and received my release from the
Army. I went back to my home where I lived on a modest agricultural
estate. There I was on traditional soil and devoted myself to home
tasks. Before long my farmer friends entrusted me with the
administration of their community affairs. They elected me honorary
mayor and in 1923 they sent me to the Prussian Parliament.
When I was requested to do this, I decided not to join the Right, the
German National Party, but the Center Party. This decision was
influenced by my conviction that in this party I would be able to do
much more in making adjustments in the social sphere than among the
Conservatives. At the same time this party represented the principles of
a Christian concept of the State.
The 8 years in which I belonged to Parliament were filled with struggles
for the internal recovery and strengthening of the German Republic. In
the Center Party I represented the conservative ideas of my agricultural
electors. I endeavored to make this party, which in Prussia had formed a
coalition with the Left, form a coalition with the Right also. Thus I
wanted to help create an outlet for the tensions out of which National
Socialism was really born. Also, into the same period fall my efforts to
remove the discriminations against Germany through the numerous terms of
the Versailles Treaty, and that by way of reaching a better
understanding with the French people. I became a member of the
German-French Study Committee, a committee founded by the Luxembourg
industrialist Meirisch, comprising a large number of outstanding men of
both countries. Close relations and conversations also united me with
the veterans’ organizations of both countries, on the French side with
the well-known leader of the Gueules Cassées, Colonel Piccat. I took an
active part in the congresses of German-French Catholic circles which
took place in Paris and Berlin. All these efforts had as their aim to
place European peace on the basis of a deeper knowledge and closer
co-operation of our two countries.
This realization of mine was further strengthened when I moved to the
Saar in 1929 which at that time was, as is well-known, under
international control. When in 1929 the Young Plan was accepted by
Germany I asked Herr Stresemann to arrange with M. Briand a settlement
of the Saar question without plebiscite, because I was always of the
opinion that a candid solution of this thorny question by both sides
would leave less resentment and an increased sense of solidarity than a
decision brought about by an election campaign carried on heatedly on
both sides. Unfortunately, this did not come about.
Then in 1930 the great economic world crisis set in embracing victors
and vanquished alike. Germany’s new democratic regime was not able to
cope with such a burden, and under the ever-increasing economic pressure
and increasing internal tension, the Papen Cabinet was formed in the
spring of 1932. Here starts the political development which I am pleased
to be able to account for before the Tribunal. I should like to add a
request to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ruled that the defendants have
to be brief because the Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has completely
presented the history of National Socialism. I ask that it be taken into
consideration that I am not speaking here for National Socialism. My
defense will be that of the other Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In questioning the witness it will be necessary to go
into the details of the events and the activities of the witness as
Reich Chancellor in the year 1932. The Indictment covers the time from 1
June 1932, the date of the appointment of Herr Von Papen as Reich
Chancellor. The Indictment sees in the conduct of his official activity
as Reich Chancellor the preparation for Hitler’s Government.
The defense will set forth that the Papen Government consistently fought
for a new program, entirely independent of the ideas of National
Socialism, a program representing Papen’s own basic political ideas to
which he remained loyal in the following period also. As the
Indictment...
THE PRESIDENT: It is not proper for a counsel to make a statement of
that sort. You must elicit the evidence from the witness by questions;
and the questions ought to be questions which are not leading questions,
which do not suggest the answers. You are now telling us what the
witness is going to say. We want to hear it from the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I wanted only to point out that this
period of time before 1933 must also be discussed and I wish to ask for
your indulgence. We shall...
THE PRESIDENT: We have not attempted to stop you from giving the
evidence—from eliciting the evidence. Ask the witness. But you must not
state the facts yourself.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you explain to the Court what the situation
was in Germany when Hindenburg called upon you on 1 June 1932 to form a
Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: Before I answer this question, will you please permit me, as
one of the last Chancellors of the Reich, to make a brief statement on
the Government directed by me? If and to what extent the Charter of the
Tribunal, in our opinion, is compatible with the sovereignty of the
Reich and its different governments, will later be expounded by one of
the other counsels.
When the Prosecution deals with my activity as Reich Chancellor in 1932,
I assume that this is done in order to get a clear, historically
accurate picture of the developments and to form a judgment on my
character as a whole. For this reason I will comment on this part of the
accusation. However, I must state here emphatically that this Cabinet of
1932 governed, to the best of its knowledge and ability under the
Constitution and under the emergency powers of the President, at a time
of the most severe internal economic depression. It is a historical fact
that the activity of my Cabinet would not justify the slightest
suspicion of a crime in the sense of the Charter. I believe I must make
this statement, My Lord, to uphold the integrity of my ministerial
colleagues, and above all, the integrity of the President, Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg, the last great historical figure of Germany.
As to your question: Dr. Brüning, my predecessor in office, was highly
esteemed by all of us and had been welcomed with great expectations.
During his period of office came the great economic crisis, the customs
blockades by other countries, with production and trade almost
completely at a standstill, with no foreign currency for the procurement
of necessary raw materials, increasing unemployment, youth out on the
streets, and the economic world depression leading to bankruptcy of the
banks. Government was possible only through emergency decrees; that is,
by one-sided legislative acts of the President. Support of the
unemployed empties the Treasury, is unproductive, and is no solution. As
a result of the wide-spread unemployment, the radical parties were
increasing. The political splitting up of the German people reached its
height. In the last Reichstag election there were 32 parties.
After the war we had all hoped that we might be able to build up an
orderly democracy in Germany. The English democracy was our model, but
the Weimar Constitution had given the German people a great number of
rights which did not correspond to its political maturity. In 1932 it
had long been clear that the Weimar Constitution made the mistake of
giving the Government too little authority. I remind you that the
forming of governments often took weeks because all parties wanted to
participate.
In Prussia, the Social Democrats had ruled since 1919. They shared with
the “Zentrum” in filling political offices in Prussia. The dualism
between Prussia, the greatest of the provinces, and the Reich was
constantly increasing. My wish that Brüning should return to the old
construction of Bismarck’s, to be Reich Chancellor and at the same time
Prime Minister of Prussia, in order to co-ordinate the policy of the
greatest province with that of the Reich, was rejected by Brüning. In
all these years, in the last years, nothing was done to restrain the
ever-increasing National Socialist movement, that is to direct it into a
politically responsible course.
The entire political confusion and the realization that something had to
be done in order to make it possible for the Reich Government to govern
and to make it more independent, forced Hindenburg to the decision to
appoint a Cabinet independent of the parties, directed by experts. The
members of this Cabinet of mine were all experts in their fields. Von
Neurath was an old diplomat; the Minister of the Interior, Gall, was an
old administrative official; the Agricultural Minister was general
director of great agricultural societies; the Finance Minister was
formerly Ministerial Director in his Ministry; the Railroad Director,
Eltz, had been president of the board of directors of a railroad, and so
forth.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the intention to govern authoritatively bring about a
struggle of the parties?
VON PAPEN: Field Marshal Hindenburg had great confidence in Brüning, but
he did not forgive him for failing to succeed in winning over the
rightist parties, which had elected Hindenburg for the first time in
1925, for his re-election as President in 1932. At that time Hindenburg
had been elected over the determined opposition of the Left and the
Center. Now, in 1932, he was to be elected precisely by these leftist
parties who had opposed him, and against the Right.
Beside the great old soldier of the World War, the opposing candidate
was an unknown steel-helmeted soldier. This, of course, hurt the Field
Marshal deeply. I wish to point out that in the presidential election in
1932 Hitler had already received over 11 million votes, which was more
than 30 percent of the total in the presidential election.
Why the President chose me as Chancellor, I do not know. I can only say
that I myself did not lift a finger. The course of events was the
following.
I am telling this, My Lord, in order to answer the charge that this
formation of a Cabinet was the beginning of an intrigue and a
conspiracy. On 26 May 1932 I was on my estate in the Saar. Herr Von
Schleicher, the Defense Minister, called me up there and asked me to
come to Berlin. On the evening of the 27th I arrived in Berlin. On the
28th I went to see Herr Von Schleicher. Herr Von Schleicher said to me:
“There is a Cabinet crisis; we are looking for a Chancellor.” He
discussed various personalities with me, and finally he said: “The
President would like to have you.” I was greatly surprised, and said as
much. I then asked for time to think it over. On the next day I
discussed the matter with my friends. On the 30th I went to see Herr Von
Schleicher again. I said to him: “I have decided not to accept.” Herr
Von Schleicher said: “That won’t do you any good, the President wants
you under all circumstances.” I answered Herr Von Schleicher: “The
President probably has a wrong conception of the political forces which
I would bring to him for this government; he probably thinks that the
Center would support me politically. But that is out of the question.”
On the afternoon of this day I went to see the head of the Center Party.
I asked him and he said: “Herr Von Papen, do not accept the office; the
party would immediately oppose you.” I said: “Thank you, that is what I
thought.”
I then went to see Hindenburg and presented the situation to him.
Hindenburg stood up and said: “I did not call you because I wanted the
support of any party through you; I called you because I want a cabinet
of independent men.” Then he reminded me of my duty toward the
fatherland. When I continued to contradict him, he said: “You cannot
leave me, an old soldier, in the lurch when I need you.” I said: “No,
under these circumstances I will not leave you in the lurch; I will
accept.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof for that discussion...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal think this might be dealt
with in slightly less detail. The facts could be stated with less
detail.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We will act accordingly.
As proof for the discussion with the Center Party I refer to Document
Book 1, Document 1, Page 1. I submit Document Book 1 as Exhibit Number
1.
Witness, you have been accused of having intrigued against Brüning in
some way. Is that true?
VON PAPEN: In no way. I have already said that I had a very high opinion
of Dr. Brüning personally, and that from the day when Herr Von
Schleicher called me in—that is, 3 days before my appointment—I never
had the slightest idea of being appointed Brüning’s successor.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you previously talk to Hitler about the government to
be formed by you?
VON PAPEN: No, that is a completely false imputation on the part of the
Prosecution. The _History of the NSDAP_ by Volz, in which that is
stated—and that is Document 3463-PS—is a purely private work and was
probably sponsored by Goebbels and his Ministry. I state that my
government, according to the wish of the Reich President, was to be
created by a _fait accompli_, without any negotiations with any party or
the head of any party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You did not promise Hitler the dissolution of the
Reichstag beforehand either?
VON PAPEN: This statement of the Prosecution is also untrue. I did not
previously discuss the dissolution of the Reichstag with Hitler for the
Reichstag was dissolved on 4 June, and I saw Hitler for the first time
in my life 5 or 6 days later. The dissolution of the Reichstag, as such,
was a matter of course, because the new Government wished to have the
opinion of the electors on the new course and on the Government’s
program.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the political aims of your Cabinet? Please
state this briefly.
VON PAPEN: The central problem which occupied us was the economic one:
The big economic crisis, and the 1½ million unemployed young people, the
6 to 7 million completely unemployed, and the 12 to 13 million in
part-time employment. Attempts of my predecessors to help with purely
State means proved inadequate. They were a burden on finances and had no
result. The aim of my Government, therefore, was to employ private
economy to solve this problem. We wanted to bring the whole production
machinery into working order again. With the investment of 2,200 million
marks we wanted to put this process into operation and expected to
return into the production process 1¾ million workers in the current
year.
Such a program could not have been agreed upon with the parties. The
political aim was to achieve, simultaneously with the reorganization of
the economy, the practical co-operation of the strongest of the
opposition parties, the NSDAP. That was the central problem of German
internal policy. It had been shown, through National Socialist
Government in Thuringia, in Brunswick, and in Oldenburg, that this
attempt could be made without becoming exposed to the danger of
revolutionary movements. I could hope, therefore, through a national and
social program to find the approval of the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: For the Government’s statement, I refer to Document 1,
Exhibit 1, Pages 2 and 3.
You spoke of the solution of the social problem as the main task of your
Government. Will you please explain briefly how you regarded the problem
and how you attempted to solve it?
VON PAPEN: In no country in the world, I believe, was the problem of
capital and labor as acute as it was in Germany, as a result of
overindustrialization and alienation of the soil. The reason is known; I
need not speak of it. However, one of the reasons, which is generally
overlooked, was the German inflation which had destroyed all mobile
fortunes in Germany. This inflation had deprived the middle class and
the workers, who form the backbone of the nation, of their savings and
fortunes and it had proletarianized the workers, tradesmen, and the
middle class.
Simultaneously with the social processes in Germany, a new social order
had arisen in our great neighboring country, the order of a classless
society and the totalitarian state. The democratic powers of the world
resisted the exportation of this system. They took protective measures
in the economic field, but these protective measures, the “New Deal,”
and “Ottawa,” weakened the German position all the more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I think the defendant must realize that
this is all very familiar ground to the Tribunal, and it is not
necessary to restate it in detail.
VON PAPEN: I only wanted to explain to the Tribunal that this social
problem was the basis for the whole historical development.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of the social problem is at the same time a
question of the development of the NSDAP, and the witness is going to
comment later from this point of view.
Witness, you said a little while ago that you had no contact with Hitler
before the formation of the government. When did you see Hitler for the
first time and what agreements did you reach?
VON PAPEN: I have already said that I saw Hitler for the first time on 9
or 10 June. The aim of the talk was to determine under what conditions
Hitler would be willing to tolerate my Government. My program contained
so many points in the social field that an approval of that program by
the National Socialists was to be expected. Hitler’s condition for such
an approval of the Government program was the lifting of the ban on
uniforms for the SS; that is, the political equalization of his party
with the other parties.
I agreed to that at that time; all the more so as the ban of the SS by
the Brüning Government was an obvious injustice. The SS, or rather the
SA, had been prohibited; but the uniformed formations of the Socialists
and the Communists, that is, the “Rotfront” and the “Reichsbanner,” had
not been prohibited.
The result of my promise to Hitler was that Hitler obligated himself to
tolerate my Government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to correct a mistake made by the witness.
He spoke of the SS, meaning the SA. There was no SS at that time.
I refer to Document 1, Page 3, which is a statement of the President
concerning the lifting of the ban against the SA. The President points
out that he decreed the lifting of this ban under the express condition
that there would be no more acts of violence in the future. He says
furthermore that he was determined—that he would use all constitutional
means at his disposal to act against all violations of any kind if this
expectation were not fulfilled.
Will you, Witness, make a brief statement concerning your efforts, and
the course of the Lausanne Conference in June 1932 which had such a
great influence on the growth of the NSDAP?
VON PAPEN: I ask for permission to go somewhat more into detail about
this conference, because the result was closely connected with the
enormous increase of the NSDAP immediately thereafter. This conference
had been prepared long beforehand, as is known. It was to abolish
reparations.
But I went to Lausanne with many other aims and hopes. The abolition of
reparations was, so to speak, a _cause jugée_. But what was necessary
was to remove Germany’s moral discomfort, if Europe was to return
peacefully to normalcy. This moral dissatisfaction had many causes.
Germany had become a “second-rate nation.” It had been deprived of
important attributes of its sovereignty: No military sovereignty; the
Rhineland unprotected; the Corridor, the Saar, and others. I have
already described the economic conditions. These economic and political
difficulties helped advance political radicalism, and the extremists
increased in every election.
If therefore help was to be forthcoming, then not merely the reparations
question had to be solved—that was a negative help—but positive, moral
aid was required. My program was the restoration of the sovereignty of
the Reich. In the first place, the famous Article 231 of the Versailles
Treaty was to be struck out. That was the article which stated Germany’s
sole responsibility for the war. Historians of all countries had long
established that we were not the only ones responsible. In the second
place, relations with France based on confidence were to be established.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal do not think that this really
is very important for them.
VON PAPEN: I shall briefly...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I explain quite generally that the events of 1932,
the internal and foreign political events, formed the key for judging
the growth of the NSDAP which, after all, led to the 30th of January
1933. If we discuss certain questions here, we will be able to refer to
them when we discuss the events of 1933. I believe we will thus save
time. Therefore, I ask that a discussion of this period be permitted in
somewhat greater detail.
VON PAPEN: I will make it as brief as possible, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better go on, as you suggest, from 1933.
Is that not what you were suggesting, that you should go on to 1933, and
then possibly comeback to 1932, if it is necessary?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not what I suggested. I said that the
discussion of conditions in 1932 provides the key for the growth of the
NSDAP and the formation of the Hitler Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but the defendant has been discussing the conditions
of 1932 for a long time now. Surely we can get on to something which has
something to do with the National Socialist Party, now.
VON PAPEN: I will come to that immediately, Mr. President. I wanted only
to say that I took up these subjects at Lausanne and tried to bring
about understanding for the internal situation in Germany. I negotiated
with the French Prime Minister, M. Herriot, about the cancellation of
that famous article. I negotiated a consultation pact with him, but
nothing came of all this, for reasons which I do not want to discuss any
further. The final result of the conference of Lausanne at any rate was
negative, so that the elections which were subsequently held...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your point of view in the armament question?
VON PAPEN: I had established my point of view in the armament question,
which played a role even in the year 1933, already at that time in
Lausanne. I had discussed it with the British Prime Minister, Mr.
Macdonald, and M. Herriot. Later, in an interview, I discussed this
point of view with M. Herriot, so that it is on record. It is Document
55. In this document I said that it was not a question of German
rearmament, but a question of the fulfillment of the disarmament promise
of the other nations. Nothing is said about German rearmament, but only
about German equality and equal treatment for Germany.
I need not quote this document. It is in the hands of the Court,
Document 55.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I submit Document 55 as Exhibit 55, and further refer to
Document 1, which has already been submitted, Page 9; and Document 6,
which I submitted as Exhibit 3, Page 22.
VON PAPEN: At the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference, I told
Macdonald and Herriot, “You must provide me with a foreign political
success, for my Government is the last bourgeois government in Germany.
After me there will be only extremists of the Right and the Left.” But
they did not believe me, and I returned from Lausanne with only partial
success.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you said that the outcome of the Lausanne
Conference did not come up to your expectations. Why did you, in spite
of that, sign the Treaty of Lausanne?
VON PAPEN: In the first place, I had to sign it because otherwise the
conference would have ended in a complete failure and Germany would have
been confronted with an economic vacuum. We were faced also with the
Reichstag election and I had to try to make the best of the situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, I should like to submit
Document Number 7, to become Exhibit Number Papen-4. This document is a
statement by Von Papen, in the _Trierische Landeszeitung_ of 12 July
1932, about Lausanne. I take the liberty of reading a short extract in
which Papen says:
“But just as little as we are unable to erase by a one-sided act
the signatures given since 1918 by former governments, just as
little was this possible with regard to the solemn obligations
which were undertaken by the then governing parties in the name
of the German people. The present Government simply had to
liquidate a situation which had been created by all the former
governments since the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The
question as to whether this situation can be liquidated by
Germany’s denying the validity of her signature and thus, at the
same time, placing herself outside the conception of cultural
and other standards, must be answered with an emphatic ‘no.’”
In mentioning this quotation, I should like to point out that this
attitude under the then prevailing situation and especially in view of
the propaganda by the NSDAP is especially noteworthy.
On 18 July 1932 the Reich Minister of the Interior decreed a general ban
on demonstrations after, as you have already said, the ban on uniforms
had been lifted for National Socialists on 16 June. What were the
reasons for the new ban on demonstrations?
VON PAPEN: The condition under which Hindenburg had rescinded the ban on
uniforms for the SA was not fulfilled. Election campaigns became more
and more radical and therefore I decided to suggest to the Reich
President a decree prohibiting demonstrations. Contrary to the decree
banning the uniforms, this decree applied to all parties equally.
Therefore it did not only prohibit the SA, but all fighting formations
of the other parties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I shall turn to the 20th of July 1932. The
Prosecution calls your action on that date a _coup d’état_. The witness
Severing has also fully elaborated on that point. What was the reason
for your action on the 20th of July 1932?
VON PAPEN: The action was based on the necessity of restoring orderly
conditions. I had received reports about the co-operation of the police
department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior with the Communists.
The situation of the Reich Government in Berlin must in this case be
specifically taken into consideration, and I do not know whether the
High Tribunal is cognizant of the legal position. The Reich Government
at Berlin was not an extraterritorial area like Washington, D. C., in
the United States, but came within the police power of the Prussian
State. My own protection, that is, the protection of the Reich
Chancellor, lay in the hands of the Prussian police. If, therefore,
combinations with the Communists were made in the Prussian Police
Ministry, then this affected the security of the Reich Government. This
action against the Prussian Government did by no means constitute an
action against Socialism as such. Neither did a Nazification of the
republican police take place, as the witness Severing testified here.
The officials, with the exception of a few higher officials, remained
completely unchanged. How I regarded the situation there, I made known
to the German people in a radio speech on the evening of the 20th of
July. The High Tribunal will find this speech in Document 1, Page 4.
However, I shall forego the reading of this speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should further like to point to Document 2, which I
wish to submit as Exhibit Number 5. I should like to point out, on Page
15, the part where the Defendant Von Papen gives his account about the
necessity of this measure.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was this action of yours on the 20th of
July brought before the highest German tribunal, the Reich Supreme
Court, and was any decision made?
VON PAPEN: Yes. The Prussian Cabinet brought an action against the Reich
Government before the Reich Supreme Court at Leipzig; there the matter
was properly argued and judgment passed. This sentence upheld entirely
the action of the Reich President. It is therefore impossible for the
Prosecution to characterize this matter as a Putsch.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to call your attention to Document 8, which
I wish to submit as Exhibit Number 6. This is an extract—I beg your
pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, is it necessary for you to give the
document exhibits numbers different from the document numbers? You see,
it becomes a little bit confusing. Each one of these documents has got,
at the head of the document, a number; 1, 2, 3, and so forth, and they
follow each other...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to acquiesce to the suggestion of the High
Tribunal and retain the same number. Therefore, Document 5 shall become
Exhibit Number 5.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be much less confusing, I think, if you could.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, My Lord. This Exhibit Number 5 is an extract
from the judgment of the Reich Supreme Court, dated 25 October 1932. On
Page 19, at the beginning, is the opinion which says that the decree of
the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was entirely legal.
How did the Prussian Government, and specifically Prime Minister Braun,
react to this judgment of the Supreme Court?
VON PAPEN: The Prussian Government and the Prussian Prime Minister
absolutely accepted the judgment, which became apparent from the
discussions which I personally had later on in October with the Prussian
Prime Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding the position taken by the Prussian Government,
I should like to submit Document Number 86, which is contained in Volume
III of my document book, which, however, because of technical
difficulties, is not completely translated and cannot be submitted
today.
Witness, on 29 July 1932 you had an interview with a United Press
correspondent and you stated in detail your position on the armament
problem. Since this topic is of special significance for your case and
your defense, I should like to have you comment on this matter.
VON PAPEN: I should like to clarify my attitude on the armament
question, for it is the same which I held at the time when I was Vice
Chancellor in the Government of Hitler. I should like to refer to
Document 1, which sets forth my interview for the United Press, and I
will quote from Document Number 86, which is the radio speech which I
made on 12 September. On that occasion I said:
“We want disarmament....”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Perhaps, Witness, you could just give us the contents in
a few words.
VON PAPEN: If the Tribunal would like to check on the contents of my
speech, in Document 86 the Tribunal will find that I was speaking for
disarmament and for peace. On that occasion I appealed to the major
powers, and I would like to quote this sentence:
“In these days Germany is undertaking a gigantic attempt,
through the mobilization of her last internal reserves, to bring
about work and social peace. That gives us a right to expect
that the leading statesmen of the major powers, now, for their
part, will decide to bring to an end the poisoning of foreign
political relations through agreements which cannot be kept.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 31 July 1932 the Reichstag election took place. First
of all, I should like to submit a diagram in which the election results
of the various elections held in the years 1930 to 1933 are tabulated.
This is Exhibit Number 98, which I hereby submit. From the figures shown
there we can see the internal political development of Germany.
Witness, what was the result, and what were the political conclusions
you drew from the result of the elections?
VON PAPEN: On 30 July, the eve of the elections, I spoke to the United
States and I said:
“The world does not realize that Germany is confronted with a
civil war. The world did not help us to overcome our
difficulties at Lausanne, and it is unbearable that 14 years
after the end of the war there is no equality of rights for us.”
The election of 31 July brought more than a doubling of the Nazi votes,
from 6.4 million to 13.7 million votes, or 230 members of the Reichstag
as against 110. The conclusions to be drawn from the results of this
election were that no majority could be formed, from the extreme right
to the Social Democrats, without the NSDAP. With that, the Party had
achieved a parliamentary key position. The Prosecution is trying to
ascribe the increase of the Nazi vote to the lifting of the ban on
uniforms. That is an explanation which is altogether too simple.
Actually, the ban on uniforms was lifted from 16 June till 18 July, for
1 month. And already 2 weeks prior to the election I had issued a decree
prohibiting demonstrations. The real reason for the increase in the Nazi
votes was the desperate economic situation of Germany and the fact of
the general disappointment about the lack of foreign political successes
at Lausanne.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now, what was your conclusion from the results of this
election?
VON PAPEN: The conclusion I drew was the same opinion which I had held
before. On the next day I gave an interview to the Associated Press, and
through this interview I told the entire world:
“The National Socialists have to be given responsibility, and
when that has been done we have to bring about a reform of the
Constitution.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding these historical facts I refer to Exhibit
Number 1 which has already been submitted, and especially to Pages 4, 5,
and 6.
Witness, please tell the Tribunal briefly about your negotiations with
Hitler.
VON PAPEN: As a result of this opinion of mine I had a long discussion
with Hitler on 12 August. I impressed upon him the necessity of his
participation, and my own readiness to resign as Chancellor in a few
months if the co-operation should prove successful, and after Von
Hindenburg had gained confidence in Hitler.
Of the political parties, the rightist parties, as is well known, had
supported my Cabinet. The Center Party was in opposition. Now, after
these elections, the Center Party wanted Hitler as Chancellor, but
Hitler himself did not want to become the head of a majority government.
The correctness of my statements is shown in Document 1, Page 6, the
first paragraph, last line. I quote:
“Kaas, the leader of the Center Party, demands a so-called total
solution of this crisis by the full responsible participation of
the former opposition in the Reich Government.”
I made an offer to Hitler that he should enter my Cabinet as Vice
Chancellor. Hitler declined. On the next day we continued with our
negotiations in the presence of the Reich President.
Hitler voiced the demand to the Reich President to join the Government
with his Movement, but only on condition that he himself be appointed
Chancellor. And this may be seen in this document on Page 6.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is Document Number 1, Page 6, Your Honor.
VON PAPEN: The Reich President did not believe that he should transfer
complete authority to Hitler and rejected his proposal. At this point
our efforts of drawing National Socialism into a responsible government
activity had failed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Defendant Von Papen voiced his opinions about this in
a speech at Munich, which can be found in the document book, Exhibit
Number 1, Pages 10 and 11.
After the failure of these negotiations, the National Socialists entered
into the most intense opposition against the Government. Did this in any
way change your basic course?
VON PAPEN: The oppositional attitude of the Nazis against my Government
did not change my basic course at all. I spoke fully about this matter
at Münster on 28 August.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] This speech may be found in
Document Number 1, Exhibit Number 1, Page 7. And on this page I would
also like to call your attention to a report on a judgment of a special
court at Beuthen. There the first death sentence was passed on the basis
of the terror decree of 9 August. This terror decree, with which the
Prosecution wishes to incriminate the Defendant Von Papen, resulted in
the death sentence against five National Socialists.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 4 September you issued an emergency
decree to revitalize economy. As this decree is the nucleus of your
Government’s activity in the solution of economic problems, I should
like to have you comment on this emergency decree.
VON PAPEN: I have already discussed this emergency decree and stated
that it concerned a program involving 2,200 million Reichsmark with the
aim of creating work for 1¾ million workers. We made this gigantic
effort without increasing our foreign debt by a penny. It was, if I may
characterize it in these words, the straining of our utmost and our last
reserves of strength. The success became noticeable already in the first
month through a decrease of 123,000 in the number of unemployed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1 month?
VON PAPEN: Yes, in 1 month.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Within this general labor procurement program was
rearmament contemplated?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. My Government did not spend a penny for
rearmament.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The details of this emergency decree may be found in
Document 1, Pages 8 and 9.
Why was there another dissolution of the Reichstag on 12 September? What
did you say about this on that evening over the radio?
VON PAPEN: The new Reichstag met according to the Constitution. My
Government, as I have already said, could not obtain a majority; but the
formation of any other government without Hitler was quite impossible.
Therefore, I was justified in the hope that this Reichstag would give my
Government time to test itself, especially as I had submitted to it a
comprehensive and decisive economic program. But just then something
unexpected and unheard-of happened.
The thing that happened was, so to speak, the prostitution of the German
Parliament. Herr Göring, the President of the German Reichstag, gave to
the Communist delegate, Clara Zetkin, the floor for a vehement attack on
my Government. When I, the responsible Chancellor of this Government,
asked for the floor in order to give an account of what I wanted to do,
I was refused permission to speak, and the Reichstag President asked for
a vote on a motion of no confidence brought in by the Communists, the
Socialists and the National Socialists. The fact of this concerted
motion on the part of the three parties should really show what would
have taken place in Germany if these three parties were to have ruled in
Germany together, and should also show how imperative it was for me to
try not to crowd National Socialism into the leftist wing, but to bring
it into my Government instead.
I was forced to put the order for the dissolution of the Reichstag on
the table, and to leave.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: These historic facts may be found in Document 1, Page 8,
and in the document which I have already referred to without having
submitted it, Document 86, Page 192.
In a speech in Munich on 12 October you also dealt with the question of
reforming the Constitution. Please tell us briefly just what opinion you
voiced on that occasion.
VON PAPEN: The reform of the Constitution, as I have already mentioned,
was one of the most urgent aims of my Government. The reasons for it are
set forth in this document, on Page 9. This reform was to include an
electoral reform, in order to end the multiplicity of parties, and the
creation of an upper House. Above all, it was to give the Government
more authority and more opportunities to govern than was possible under
the Weimar Constitution.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As an explanation I should like to mention that the
reform of the Constitution which was to do away with the conditions at
that time—that Government measures were issued solely on the authority
of Article 48, the emergency decree. To what extent this took place may
be seen in Document 4, which gives a picture of the great number of
emergency decrees which were issued.
Witness, on 6 November 1932 the election for the Reichstag took place.
What was the election slogan of the Government and what was your opinion
about the result?
VON PAPEN; Unfortunately, we had to vote once again. The program of my
Government was the same as it had been before—that is, the endeavor to
establish a new state leadership, a state leadership with the
co-operation of an effective parliament with a government vested with
strong authority.
In this manifesto to the electors of 4 November I addressed Hitler and I
told him:
“It is the exclusiveness of your Movement, your demand for
everything or nothing, which the Reich President could not
recognize and which led to his decision of 13 August. What is at
stake today is this: The question is not whether this or that
party leader occupies the Chancellor’s chair, whether his name
is Brüning, Hitler, or Von Papen, but rather that we meet on
common ground so that the vital interests of the German people
can be assured.”
I hoped that through this Reichstag election the National Socialists
whom I opposed would be weakened in such a way that this party would be
squeezed out of the central parliamentary position.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the result?
VON PAPEN: This result was not achieved. The National Socialists lost 34
seats, but that was not sufficient to crowd them out of their key
position, for again the formation of a majority in the Reichstag from
the Socialists to the extreme Right was possible only with Hitler;
without him, no majority.
In order that we might be in a position to continue governing in a
constitutional way, I tried once more to negotiate with the various
parties and the National Socialists.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us a description of these negotiations.
VON PAPEN: These negotiations are interesting, and the Tribunal must be
made familiar with them so that they can judge the events of 30 January
1933.
First of all, I tried to clear the situation with those parties that
were in opposition to my Government, and especially with the Social
Democrats and with the Center Party. The Center Party took an adverse
position. They desired a majority government with Hitler, but Hitler did
not wish to govern with a parliamentary majority. From Document 2, Page
13, we can see what the attitude of the Center Party was.
Since Hitler’s collaboration in a coalition government was out of the
question, I again turned to Hitler in order to ask him whether he was
now ready to enter my Government. I did this out of a sense of
responsibility in order to achieve any sort of result at all; and,
therefore, I wrote him the letter dated 13 November 1932, which is
Document D-633, which was submitted by the Prosecution as an
“undignified” document because, after all of my failures, I had once
more turned to Hitler. In this letter I said:
“I would consider it a violation of duty if I did not turn to
you, in spite of everything; and I am of the opinion that the
leader of such a great Movement, whose service to the country
and the people I always appreciated despite much that I had to
criticize, that this leader should not refuse to confer with the
responsible statesman.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then on 8 November you again turned to the foreign press
and spoke to them on foreign political matters...
VON PAPEN: May I interrupt you for a moment? I should like to add here,
with regard to the opinion on the letter as voiced for the Prosecution
by Mr. Barrington: It is customary in every parliamentary state that, if
the leader of the government turns to the opposition in order to obtain
its co-operation, he writes a courteous and cordial letter to the leader
of the opposition; that he does not call him an ass. Therefore, I cannot
quite see why these remarks of mine are characterized as lacking
dignity.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 8 November you turned to the foreign press and spoke
about the revision of the Versailles Treaty. Can you explain briefly the
statement you made at that time?
VON PAPEN: I only mention the speech made to the representatives of the
foreign press in order to show to the High Tribunal the frequency of my
appeals to foreign countries—appeals to foreign countries, to the
victorious powers—to urge them to undertake a moral reconciliation; for
then, Gentlemen, the radical tendencies in Germany would have
disappeared of their own accord.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech before the foreign press will be found in
Document 1, Pages 11 and 12.
What were the consequences of the failure of your negotiations with the
party leaders?
VON PAPEN: The failure of my negotiations with the party leaders and
Hitler led to my resignation on 17 November. I was instructed to carry
on the affairs of the Government until a new government could be formed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What efforts were made by the Reich President, after your
Cabinet resigned, towards forming a new government?
VON PAPEN: My resignation gave the Reich President the opportunity to
try once more to form a parliamentary majority.
He immediately tried to do that and beginning on 18 November he received
all the party leaders, from the Right to the Center; and on the 19th he
received Hitler. The topic was: How can we form a parliamentary majority
government? He instructed Hitler to form a majority government; Hitler
would then be Chancellor.
On 23 November Göring presented Hitler’s answer to Hindenburg; it was:
“Hitler could not undertake the formation of a majority government.”
On the 24th, Hindenburg received Monsignor Kaas, the leader of the
Center Party. He declared that Hitler had not even tried to find out
whether a majority government could be formed, but Monsignor Kaas
promised the Reich President to try once more to form a majority
government. On 25 November he reported to Hindenburg that the attempt
had been in vain, that the leader of the Nazi faction, at that time Herr
Frick, had stated that the Party would not be interested in such
discussions. The result: The formation of a majority government with
Hitler is impossible.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did other possibilities for a coalition present
themselves? Were there other possibilities for a coalition?
VON PAPEN: No. There was only the possibility of a cabinet such as I had
had, or a majority cabinet.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With regard to these negotiations I should like to refer
you to Document 2, Pages 14 and 15.
After the discussion between the Reich President and the party leaders
had failed, a conference took place on 1 December between the Reich
President and you and General Von Schleicher. This consultation is
especially important for the future political development and has a
considerable historical significance. Therefore I ask you to go into the
details of this conversation.
VON PAPEN: The Field Marshal on 1 December asked General Von Schleicher
and me to meet him for a conference. I should like to remark that
previously no conversation between Herr Von Schleicher and myself about
the possibilities for the formation of a future government had taken
place. Herr Von Hindenburg asked us about our attitude; I set forth the
following:
The attempt to include the Nazi movement into the Presidential Cabinet
of Hindenburg had twice failed. Hitler equally refuses to form a
majority government. On the other hand, he is exercising a tremendous
amount of opposition and is trying to have all my decrees rescinded by
the Reichstag. If therefore there is no possibility to form a
parliamentary government or to include Hitler in our Government without
making him Chancellor, then a state of emergency has arisen which
requires extraordinary measures. Therefore, I proposed a recess of
Parliament for several months and immediate preparation of a
constitutional reform bill later to be presented to the Reichstag or to
a national assembly. This proposal involved a violation of the
Constitution.
I emphasized that I knew how the great soldier and statesman cherished
the sacredness of his oath, but my conscience led me to believe that a
violation of the Constitution seemed to be justified in view of the
extraordinary situation, for which the German Constitution provided no
remedy.
Then Herr Von Schleicher spoke. He said:
“Field Marshal, I have a plan which will make it unnecessary for
you to break your oath to the Constitution, if you are willing
to put the Government into my hands. I hope that I will be able
to obtain a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag by splitting
the National Socialist Party.”
During the discussion of this plan, I said that it was doubtful to me
whether a splitting of the Party which had sworn loyalty to Hitler could
be achieved. I reminded the Field Marshal of the fact that he should
free himself of weak parliamentary majorities through a basic reform.
However, the proposals were thrown overboard through the solution
offered by Schleicher. The solution offered by Schleicher was only a
provisional matter, and a very doubtful one.
DR. KUBUS CHOK: What was the decision of the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: The decision of the Field Marshal was perhaps the most
difficult that he had to make in his long life. Without giving any
further reasons, he told me: “I have decided in favor of the solution of
Herr Von Papen, and I request you to start immediately negotiations for
the formation of a government to which I can give the instructions in
accordance with your proposals.” The conference was over.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did Herr Von Schleicher do then?
VON PAPEN: I exchanged only a few brief words with Herr Von Schleicher
and tried to persuade him to recognize the decision that the Reich
President had made. Herr Von Schleicher said “no.”
Then, the same evening, I started discussions with several ministers
with regard to the formation of a new government. These ministers told
me, “The plan is excellent, but Herr Von Schleicher has told us that we
will have a civil war and in that case the Reichswehr will not be in a
position to keep law and order in the country.”
I interrupted the discussion and called the Cabinet together the next
morning, presenting the situation and informing them of Hindenburg’s
decision. Then I asked Herr Von Schleicher to tell the Cabinet now why
he believed that there would be a civil war and why the Reichswehr would
not be in a position to keep law and order in the country. Herr Von
Schleicher called on one of his General Staff officers to tell the
Cabinet that this case had been considered from a practical and
theoretical point of view and that they had come to the decision that
the Reichswehr and the police were not in a position to keep law and
order in the country. Then I said to the gentlemen: “This is a new
situation which I have to report to the Reich President.”
I went to Hindenburg and reported to him. Herr Von Hindenburg, deeply
stirred about my report, said to me, “I am an old man and I cannot face
a civil war of any sort in my country. If Herr Von Schleicher is of this
opinion, then I must—as much as I regret—withdraw the task with which
I charged you last night.” With that, Herr Von Schleicher was appointed
Chancellor on the conditions which he had offered to the Reich President
at this meeting.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Schleicher offer you the post of Ambassador
to Paris?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Schleicher, who for a long time knew of my interest
in German-French relations, asked me whether I wanted to become
Ambassador in Paris. This would have been quite in accordance with my
inclinations. But the Reich President objected to this, and...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal think that this is going in
far too great detail into all this, all of which is known through
history, and most of which we have heard before.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now we shall turn to the year 1933. On 4 January a
conference between Hitler and you took place at the home of the banker,
Schröder. The Prosecution is presenting this conference as the actual
beginning of your common conspiracy. Please give the Tribunal a
description of how this conference came about.
VON PAPEN: I was...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we have been hearing for the whole of the
afternoon the background of the conference. Surely we can hear of the
conference now.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The defendant is charged with the fact that he was the
promoter of the negotiations, which supposedly started on 4 January, for
the formation of the government formed on 30 January. The role which Von
Papen played in it is of decisive importance. Therefore, I consider it
necessary that he tells us briefly about the background...
THE PRESIDENT: The negotiations did not start on 4 January. The
defendant told us earlier, about a couple of hours ago, that they
started on 12 August 1932. The negotiations started earlier than this.
VON PAPEN: I may perhaps quite briefly say, Mr. President, what it
concerns. This conference on 4 January, on the occasion of which the
Prosecution asserts that I pledged myself to National Socialism, was a
conference which took place on the initiative of Hitler. At this
conference nothing was said about the overthrow of the Government of Von
Schleicher; and there was nothing said about the formation of a
government by Hitler, as it later actually took place on 30 January. We
merely discussed the necessity for Hitler to decide to take a
responsible part, not as Chancellor, but with his Party. And, My Lord,
that I did not engineer this conference or have it called may be seen
clearly from the statement of Herr Von Schröder, at whose home this
conference took place.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This may be seen from Document 9, Page 26.
Witness, you are accused of the fact that in this conference you
discussed plans for the overthrow of the Cabinet of Von Schleicher. Did
you keep the fact of this conference from Herr Von Schleicher?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary. Immediately after this conference at
Cologne, I wrote a letter to Herr Von Schleicher, which must have
reached him the next morning. And after I had returned to Berlin, I went
at once to Herr Von Schleicher and told him just what had been discussed
at this conference. Thereupon, Herr Von Schleicher caused an official
communiqué to be issued. Document Number 9.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 9(a)—I submit Document 9(a).
VON PAPEN: In this document it says:
“The conversation revealed the complete lack of foundation for
the assertions deduced from this meeting by the press about
controversies between the Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher and
Herr Von Papen.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then, that is, during the time until 22 January,
participate in any political discussions about the formation of a new
government?
VON PAPEN: No. Between 9 and 22 January I did not participate in any
political discussions about the formation of a government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us a short summary of the political
development from 10 until 21 January.
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution asserts that now, in the interval between 9
and 30 January, I was the chief factor in forming the government of
Hitler on 30 January. A chronological recapitulation of the days between
the 11th and the 30th will reveal how completely wrong this assertion of
the Prosecution actually is. Therefore, I shall have to mention a few
dates in this connection.
On 11 January: Hitler was in Berlin. He did not see Von Schleicher,
Hugenberg, or Von Papen. But the Reichstag decided through the Council
of Elders: “We have to give a reprieve to the Government of Von
Schleicher.”
On 13 January: Schleicher receives Hugenberg, the chief of the rightist
movement.
On the 14th: Hindenburg receives Hugenberg.
Later on we shall see that on both of these days, Hugenberg, the leader
of the Right, negotiated with Von Schleicher about his entry into the
Cabinet, not about the formation of a government with Hitler.
Then on 15 January, the well-known elections in Lippe took place. The
Lippe elections gave the National Socialists a new impetus.
On 20 January, the Reichstag, the Council of Elders, decided to postpone
their meeting from the 24th to the 31st.
The State Secretary of the Reich Government, Schleicher, declared in
this connection: “The Reich Government intends to clarify the political
situation as quickly as possible, but the Reich Government is not
interested in majority questions.”
From that can be seen that Herr Von Schleicher no longer considered the
formation of a government on the basis of a majority.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now we can leave the political developments and turn to
your personal...
THE PRESIDENT: If you are going into another subject, we had better
adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH DAY
Monday, 17 June 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, report is made that the Defendants
Fritzsche and Speer are absent.
[_The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am now going to deal with the events of January 1933
and I should like to say that I shall then not require any more time.
The rest of the examination will be shorter so that I shall be able to
conclude my examination of the defendant in the course of today.
Witness, on Friday you told the Tribunal that during the well-known
conversation with Hitler on 4 January 1933 at the home of Schröder, you
did not discuss the formation of the Cabinet which took place later, on
30 January. You also said that up to 22 January you did not take part in
any political discussion. The Prosecution, however, asserts that you
influenced the Reich President to name Hitler Chancellor on 30 January.
Did you influence Hindenburg to that effect?
VON PAPEN: Before I reply, may I make a brief correction? Your Lordship
asked me on Friday for the date of the evacuation of Jerusalem. I said
it was 1918, but of course Your Lordship was right; it was in 1917. I
beg your pardon.
Now in reply to your question: I did not exert any such influence on
Reich President Von Hindenburg, but even if I had done so, it would not
have carried any weight in the final decision of the Reich President.
The political situation, as we shall see, left the Reich President only
the choice between a violation of the Constitution and a Hitler Cabinet.
Furthermore, and I already mentioned this at the conclusion of the last
session, it is plain from the historical events of January as reproduced
in Document 9, Pages 27 through 31, that during the entire month of
January until the 22d almost daily negotiations without my participation
took place between the Reich Government and the various parties or among
the parties themselves. All of these negotiations were concerned with
the possible formation of a majority in the Reichstag, but all of them
were of no avail. I have explained that the Reich Chancellor, Von
Schleicher, was trying to bring about a majority in the Reichstag by
splitting the Party. This attempt, too, finally failed on 20 January;
and that was obvious to the world, for on that day the Reich Chancellor
authorized a statement in the Reichstag to the effect that he no longer
attached importance to forming a majority in the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 9
in the first document book. I shall just read a few extracts from this
document, Document 9, Page 27. The heading is:
“January 11, Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher receives leader of
the German People’s Party, Dingeldey.”
On the next page, Page 28, is proof that on 12 January efforts to split
the NSDAP through Strasser had not yet been abandoned. I shall quote
from the beginning of the page:
“At the same time it has only now become known that the Reich
President received Gregor Strasser last week for a conference.
Strasser apparently expressed his intention of keeping in the
background for the time being; only in the event of an
unexpectedly sharp conflict between Hitler and Schleicher’s
Reich Cabinet would Strasser be likely to play a definite part.”
In the meantime the Lippe elections took place and gave a clear picture
of the development of the NSDAP.
I am quoting now from the middle of the paragraph under 15 January:
“The electoral victory of the NSDAP not only surprisingly
refutes the assertions of the opposition concerning a decline of
the National Socialist movement, but is also proof that the
Movement is no longer at a standstill, and that a sharp rise has
now become apparent.”
Significant for the talks on the creation of a parliamentary majority
were Schleicher’s negotiations with the Center Party, led by Prelate Dr.
Kaas. I quote from the last paragraph on Page 28:
“Reich Chancellor Von, Schleicher receives Prelate Dr. Kaas,
Chairman of the Center Party, for a lengthy conference.
“In regard to the predictions on a reorganization of the
Cabinet, the fiction is kept up in government circles that a
Strasser-Hugenberg-Stegerwald combination is possible, despite
the difficulties which these plans have undoubtedly encountered.
Privy Councillor Hugenberg is said to have laid down the
condition that undisturbed activity within the Cabinet for at
least 1 year should be guaranteed.”
On the next page, Page 29, I would like to refer to the last 10 lines or
so of the statement of State Secretary Planck before the Council of
Elders of the Reichstag.
“In the conversations referred to, the National Socialists are
to assume the lead and to attempt to form all groups, from the
National Socialists to the Center, into a majority front of the
sort which failed to materialize at the end of 1932. The conduct
of these negotiations, in which the Schleicher Cabinet is in no
way involved, rests with Hitler. If on 31 January the Reichstag
should be summoned and a conflict arise between Government and
Reichstag or if such a conflict is brought about by other
events, the proclamation of the often discussed state of
emergency must to an increased extent be expected. The
Government would then dissolve the Reichstag and set the date
for the new elections in the early fall.”
On the following page, Page 30, I should like to refer finally to the
first heading...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal does not think it necessary
to read all this detail. It is evident from the headlines of these
entries that there were political negotiations which led to the
assumption of power by the National Socialist Party. Is that not all
that you want to say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I want to prove that the formation of the Government on
30 January was an imperative solution arising out of the political
parliamentary incidents of the day. Therefore, it is of relevance to
note what took place at the time, what attempts failed, what other
possibilities existed, and what...
THE PRESIDENT: What I mean is this: It appears, does it not, from the
headlines of these entries. Really, you can read the headlines without
reading the details. For example, on Page 30, the entry on 21 January,
and those other entries, give the substance of the matter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, Mr. President. May I then be permitted to read
Page 31, part of the text describing the historical events of the
overthrow of Chancellor Schleicher on the 28th? Regarding the decisive
conversation between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President the
following was officially announced:
“Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher submitted to the Reich
President today his report on the situation, and declared that
the present Reich Cabinet, on account of its character as a
minority Government, would be in a position to represent its
program and its views in the Reichstag only if the Reich
President placed the dissolution order at his disposal. Reich
President Von Hindenburg stated that in view of the prevailing
situation he could not accept this proposition. Reich Chancellor
Von Schleicher hereupon submitted the collective resignation of
the Reich Cabinet, which the Reich President accepted; the
Cabinet was entrusted with continuing provisionally to discharge
official business.”
As proof for the fact that the possibility of Hitler forming a
parliamentary government did not exist, I want to refer to a brief
extract on Page 32:
“National Socialist sources again state categorically that for
the National Socialists only a Hitler government can be
considered. Any other attempts towards a solution must be
prevented with the utmost vigor. This, of course, applies to a
Papen cabinet; but a Schacht cabinet also is out of the
question.”
I should now like to refer to the next document, Document 8. In this
document all the possibilities for the formation of a government are
discussed in detail.
Witness, how did Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher react to this political
situation?
VON PAPEN: After his efforts to split the Party and to bring about a
majority in the Reichstag had failed, Reich Chancellor Von Schleicher
asked the Reich President to give him dictatorial powers, which meant a
violation of the Constitution. Thus he wanted the very thing which I had
proposed to the Reich President on 1 December 1932 as the only way out
of the situation, a proposal which the Reich President had accepted at
that time but which General Von Schleicher had thwarted.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A discussion took place on 22 January at the home of Von
Ribbentrop at which, besides yourself, Göring, Meissner, and Oskar von
Hindenburg were present. Was this discussion arranged on your
initiative, or who suggested it?
VON PAPEN: The initiative for this discussion on the 22d was Hitler’s,
and he also suggested that Herr Von Ribbentrop should place his home at
our disposal. The Reich President wished to know what Hitler thought
about the solution for the political crisis, and what his proposals
were. Therefore, the conversation of the 22d concentrated exclusively on
the demands of the National Socialists, while the formation of a
government as it took place on the 30th was not discussed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 28 January, at noon, the Reich President instructed
you to begin negotiations for the formation of a new government. What
possibilities for the formation of a government did you consider the
political situation offered?
VON PAPEN: The idea of forming a parliamentary majority government had
been abandoned since 20 January; it was impossible. Hitler was not
willing to lead or participate in such a government.
Secondly, further support of the Schleicher presidential cabinet by
means of a declaration of a state of emergency and the prorogation of
the Reichstag, which was against the Constitution, had been rejected by
the Reich President on the 23d. He had rejected these proposals, as we
know, because Von Schleicher had told him in December that a violation
of the Constitution would mean civil war and a civil war would mean
chaos, “because I am not in a position,” he said, “to maintain law and
order with the Army and with the Police.”
Thirdly, since Hitler offered to participate in a presidential cabinet,
this was the only remaining possibility, and all the forces and
political parties which had supported my Government in 1932 were
available for this.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the instructions which the Reich President gave
you?
VON PAPEN: The instructions given me by Von Hindenburg were as follows:
Proposal for the formation of a government under the leadership of
Hitler, with the utmost restriction of National Socialist influence and
within the framework of the Constitution.
I should like to add that it was quite unusual for the Reich President
to ask any person to form a government which would not be headed by the
person himself. In the normal course of events Hindenburg should, of
course, have entrusted Hitler himself with the formation of a
government; and he entrusted me with this task because he wished to
minimize Hitler’s influence in the government as far as possible.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And with whom did you negotiate?
VON PAPEN: I negotiated with the leaders of the rightist groups which
might participate in the formation of this government; namely, the
NSDAP, the German National People’s Party, the “Stahlhelm,” and the
German People’s Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On what lines did you suggest the formation of the new
cabinet to the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: I suggested the only possibility which existed, namely, a
coalition cabinet consisting of these groups.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks that the defendant is
going into far too much detail about this, because he has given his
account of why the President sent for him and why he had anything to do
with it. And that is the only matter that concerns him. After he has
given that explanation, it should not be necessary to go into any
further detail about it at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the Prosecution has made the charge that
the very act of forming the government was a crime; he is therefore
defending himself by stating that he tried to provide for a safeguard
against the preponderant influence of Hitler in the government. It is
relevant...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but that is what I said. He has given that
explanation. He does not need to add all sorts of details to support
that explanation.
I have written down, some moments ago, that the President asked him
because he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler. Now he is going
on with all sorts of details.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, he is merely trying to set forth in what
way he wanted to limit Hitler’s influence, and that is a very important
point. He is going to tell us for what safeguards within this government
he provided; the selection of personalities, all the other restrictions
which were agreed upon to rule out the possibility of Hitler’s influence
becoming overpowering. This is a very important point in reply to the
Prosecution’s charges.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can do it as shortly as possible, and not
do it in too great detail. That is all the Tribunal wants.
VON PAPEN: I shall be very brief, My Lord.
The safeguarding measures which I introduced at the request of the Reich
President were the following: 1) A very small number of National
Socialist ministers in the new cabinet; only 3 out of 11, including
Hitler. 2) The decisive economic departments of the cabinet to be placed
in the hands of non-National Socialists. 3) Experts to be put into the
ministry posts as far as possible. 4) Joint reports of Reich Chancellor
Hitler and Vice Chancellor Von Papen to Hindenburg in order to minimize
the personal influence of Hitler on Hindenburg. 5) I tried to form a
parliamentary bloc as a counterbalance against the political effects of
the National Socialist Party.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: To what extent did Reich President Von Hindenburg himself
select the members of the new cabinet?
VON PAPEN: The Reich President reserved the right to appoint the Foreign
Minister and the Reichswehr Minister. The first of these two key posts
was given to Herr Von Neurath, in whom the President had special
confidence; and the Reich Defense Ministry was given to General Von
Blomberg, who also enjoyed the particular confidence of the Reich
President. The National Socialist members of this cabinet were only the
Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, whose activity as Minister of the
Interior for the State of Thuringia had been completely moderate, and
the Minister without Portfolio, and later Prussian Minister of the
Interior, Göring.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
Book 3, Document Numbers 87 and 93, namely, an affidavit of the former
Minister, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, and an interrogatory of Freiherr von
Lersner.
THE PRESIDENT: What page in Book 3 did you say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Hugenberg’s statement is on Pages 194-195; Lersner’s on
Pages 210-212.
The Prosecution asserts that the Government formed on 30 January took
over the program of the NSDAP as its own. Will you explain now, Witness,
what the basis of that Government’s policy was.
VON PAPEN: The view held by the Prosecution is completely incorrect. The
program which on 30 January we decided to adopt was not the program of
the Nazi Party, but it was a coalition program. And this is perfectly
plain from the proclamation which this Government issued to the German
people on 1 February. And to give historical proof of this, may I quote
two sentences from that proclamation? It says:
“The National Government will consider it as its first and
foremost task to restore the spiritual and political unity of
our people. It will consider Christianity as the basis of its
general moral outlook and will firmly protect the family as the
determining unit of the nation and the State.
“The tremendous problem of reorganizing our economy will be
solved with two large Four Year Plans.”
I should like to add just one sentence:
“This Government is fully conscious of the magnitude of its duty
to support the maintenance and affirmation of peace, which the
world now needs more than ever.”
In addition, this coalition program, which the Prosecution describes as
the Nazi program, contained the following points: Continued existence of
the Länder and the federal character of the Reich; protection of justice
and the legal system, permanent tenure of office for judges; reform of
the Constitution; safeguarding of the rights of the Christian churches;
and, above all, abolition of the class conflict through a solution of
social problems, the restoration of a true national community.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you yourself do anything else to assure the
application of your own political ideas?
VON PAPEN: I did everything within my power, together with my political
friends, to carry through the ideas which I myself had contributed to
this political program. At that time the essential point seemed to me
the creation of a counterbalance to National Socialism; and therefore, I
asked the leaders of the rightist parties to give up the old party
programs and to unite in a large, common political organization with the
aim of fighting for the principles which we had enunciated. However, the
party leaders did not act on this suggestion. Party differences were too
marked and no changes took place. The only thing I accomplished was the
establishment of a voting bloc of all three parties, and on behalf of
this voting bloc I made many speeches in which I presented this program,
this coalition program, to the country.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I want to refer to a speech delivered by the witness on
11 February on behalf of the voting bloc; it may be found in Document
12, Pages 54 and 55. I quote from about the middle of Page 55, the
following brief passage:
“Therefore, I consider the circumstance that the present Reich
Cabinet is not made up of one single party or movement, but of
various groups of the national movement, of free politicians and
experts, not a disadvantage, but rather an advantage.”
What specific questions were emphasized and underlined in the program of
this voting bloc? You spoke of these questions in various speeches. In
order to save time, I should like only to submit to the Tribunal the
document dealing with this point, Document Number 10. Will you briefly
explain your attitude, and comment on the various questions; first of
all, the social problem?
VON PAPEN: The social problem was, of course, at the head of my program,
because this question dominated all others. It was our task to make
well-satisfied citizens out of the workers who were now engaged in class
conflict and to give to each the opportunity of a livelihood and a home.
I stated in the speech, which is contained in this document, that there
would always be differences in property but that a small group should
not possess everything while the great mass of the people had nothing.
And above all, I again and again emphasized the fact that if we could
succeed in solving the social problem we would, in that way, make an
eminent contribution to peace in Europe.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your program in foreign political matters?
VON PAPEN: The program was very simple. It consisted merely of the
desire to do away, in a peaceful manner, with the discriminations
against the German people and against our sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your platform on religious questions?
VON PAPEN: It is plain from all of my speeches that I considered the
regeneration of the German people in a Christian sense as the
prerequisite for the solution of the social and all other problems which
confronted us. I shall return to this point later.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to submit as evidence the document which I
have already mentioned, Document Number 10; and I ask that the High
Tribunal take judicial notice of it. Since a mistake affecting the sense
of the translation has been made on Page 39 and since the question of
dissolving the trade unions will play an important role later, I should
like to read a brief paragraph on Page 39, about the middle of the page:
“I recognize that the trade unions have done much to imbue the
working classes with professional honor and professional pride.
Many trade unions, for instance the Union of Clerks, have made
exemplary achievements in this respect. The conception of class
conflict, however, stood in the way of real reform and
constructive work in this direction.
“The Socialist parties prevented the trade unions’ efforts to
convert the workers into a class. If the trade unions would
recognize the signs of the times and remain out of politics to a
greater extent, then they could, especially now, become a strong
pillar of the national life.”
Please comment on the results of the elections on 5 March 1933.
I just want to draw the Court’s attention in this connection to Document
Number 98, in which I have set down a diagram of the election results in
the years in question.
VON PAPEN: This election became extremely significant for later
developments. First of all, I should like to state that this election
was a truly free one, for it was conducted together with the old
functionaries of the Republic; and that it was actually free is also
shown by the fact that the votes of the Communists and of the Social
Democrats did not decrease at all. I, personally, had expected that the
NSDAP would be successful at the polls. In November 1932 I had taken
away 36 of its seats in the Reichstag, and I expected that it would
regain some of those seats. I had also hoped that my own voting bloc
would be very successful. I hoped that the people would realize the
necessity of creating a counterbalance. However, this did not happen...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the figures are sufficient for us. We can form our
own conclusions from the figures. We can see the figures. We do not need
to have them all explained and commented on to us. There are very much
more important things for us to consider.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you now describe the events leading up to
the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933.
VON PAPEN: The Enabling Act arose out of the necessity to have the
economic measures carried out in an untroubled Reichstag session.
Negotiations were conducted with the Center Party to obtain a 1-year
parliamentary truce, but these negotiations failed. Hence this law which
had some parallels in the past became a necessity. The Prosecution has
emphasized this law as clear proof for the existence of a conspiracy.
May I say, therefore, that I myself tried to provide for a certain check
by desiring to maintain the veto power of the Reich President. The
Cabinet records of 15 March show, however, that State Secretary Meissner
did not consider the participation of the Reich President necessary.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Number 25, which is
identical with Exhibit USA-578, to the attitude taken by Von Papen in
this Cabinet discussion and to the standpoint just mentioned of State
Secretary Meissner.
“Meissner, State Secretary of the minority Cabinet, of the
Cabinet of the Reich President, and his excellent assistant.”
I should also like to refer to Document 23, because from the enumeration
of the emergency decrees in that document it is clear that in the state
of emergency which obtained then it was not possible to govern by means
of Reichstag laws and that the Enabling Act was to be a substitute for
these emergency decrees which were being repeatedly issued.
I must make one correction: The standpoint of State Secretary Meissner
is contained in Document 91, Exhibit USA-578.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 21 March 1933, an amnesty decree was
issued. The Prosecution has described this decree as an unheard-of law.
What can you say about it?
VON PAPEN: The Prosecution calls this law “sanction of political
murder.”
I should like to say the following about it: This law was issued in an
emergency decree of the Reich President, not of the Cabinet; and it was
a natural end of a revolutionary period which had lasted 7 weeks. There
are very many historical parallels for this amnesty decree; for example,
the law which was issued by the young German Republic on 21 July 1922
and which includes murder in the amnesty measures.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now refer to Document 28, Page 99 of Document Book
1. This contains the law of 21 July 1922, which concludes “the period of
a state of unrest which obtained in the years 1920 and 1921.” May I also
refer to Page 100 of this Document Number 28 which contains the law of
20 December 1932 which has been mentioned.
On 23 March the law dealing with the special courts was issued. What can
you say in that connection?
VON PAPEN: These special laws, or special court laws, are also not
entirely new. I, personally, as Chancellor of the Reich issued such a
law on 9 August 1932; and I based my action then on a directive of the
Brüning Cabinet dated 6 October 1931. In revolutionary periods
punishable political acts must be brought to speedy trial under the law.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I now point out Document 27, Page 89 of Document Book
1, especially the introduction preceding Paragraph 1, which shows that
this emergency decree was based on the Brüning emergency directive of
1931.
On 1 April 1933 the Jewish boycott was carried out. Was this a measure
taken by the Government? Did you participate in it in any way?
VON PAPEN: The assertion of Dr. Goebbels that the Cabinet had approved
this measure was completely false. On the contrary, at the suggestion of
the Cabinet Hitler had on 10 and 12 March made public announcements
which my counsel will submit.
The Prosecution refers to the telegram which I sent to New York on the
25th as a “white lie of the greatest magnitude”; I can only say,
however, that this assertion is completely unfounded. The public
statements of Hitler gave us, in fact had to give us, the assurance that
such excesses would not take place again. In that belief I sent my
telegram. It would be inconceivable that on the 25th I should send a
telegram to New York...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I thought your question was: Did the
defendant participate in these measures? I do not know what his answer
is. He has been answering for some minutes, but I do not know what the
answer is.
The question was: Did you participate? And I do not know what he has
answered.
VON PAPEN: I said that the assertion of Goebbels that the Cabinet had
approved this Jewish boycott was a lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Why not answer directly; did you or did you not
participate?
VON PAPEN: No, we did not participate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I refer to Document 33, Page 113, a statement by
Hitler on 10 March, the last two lines:
“Annoying individuals, obstructing automobiles, or disturbing
business life must absolutely be discontinued.”
On the same page, Page 113, a declaration of Hitler on 12 March, last
sentence of the paragraph next to the last:
“Whoever, from now on, attempts by individual action to cause
disturbances in our administrative or business life, acts
consciously against the National Government.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I did not intend to prevent the defendant
telling the Tribunal what he had done with reference to his telegram to
the _New York Times_, but I wanted him in the first instance to answer
your question.
Now, if he wants to add anything about what he telegraphed to the _New
York Times_, let him do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you then, please, go back to this point in
connection with the _New York Times_.
VON PAPEN: I can only add, My Lord, that it would be quite inconceivable
that on 25 April I should send this telegram to New York knowing that 3
or 4 days later a new Jewish boycott would be carried out; that is
completely nonsensical. Moreover, I might point out that on the same day
Herr Von Neurath sent a similar wire to Cardinal O’Connell.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you now give an account of your attitude to the
Jewish problem?
VON PAPEN: My attitude toward the Jewish problem can be briefly
delineated; it has always, throughout my life, been the attitude
expected by the Catholic Church of its members. I stated my view on the
question of race, as regards National Socialist doctrine, quite publicly
in a speech in Gleiwitz in the year 1933, and my counsel will submit
that speech as evidence.
A completely different question not connected with my basic attitude
toward the Jewish problem was, however, the kind of foreign monopoly,
the overwhelming influence of the Jewish element in the spheres which
form the nation’s public opinion, such as press, literature, theater,
film, and especially law. There seemed no doubt in my mind that this
foreign monopoly was unhealthy and that it should be remedied in some
way. But as I said, that had nothing whatever to do with the racial
question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer now to Document 16, Page 68, which contains an
extract from the speech which, as the defendant mentioned, he made in
the year 1934 at Gleiwitz. I quote:
“There are certainly no objections to race research and eugenics
which endeavor to keep the characteristics of a nation as pure
as possible and at the same time to kindle the feeling of a
racial community. This love of one’s own race will never
degenerate into hatred of other nations and races. That is the
decisive point. Eugenics must never be brought into conflict
with Christianity for they are not opposed, they only differ. It
was Christianity which first made of the German tribes a German
nation, and it is really not necessary to create a new
Nordic-Germanic religion in order to give testimony to our
race.”
May I refer also to Document 29, Page 103, which deals with the second
topic discussed by the defendant; it is an excerpt from the diary of Mr.
Dodd on 4 July. I then refer to Document 35, Page 115, which contains an
article from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ dated 19 August 1932. The
heading of that, article is:
“The Papen Government Has Inscribed the Protection of Jews on
its Banner.”
THE PRESIDENT: That was August 1932? Where is it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 35, Page 115. I just read the heading of this
article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ dated 19 August 1932.
“The Papen Government Has Inscribed the Protection of Jews on
its Banner.”
The article deals with a statement of Herr Kareski, Berlin, as
representative of the Jewish People’s Party. Kareski was head of the
synagogue in Berlin. He stated at that time—and I quote the last
paragraph of this article:
“Fortunately, the Constitution of the German Republic still
protects the legal position of the Jews and the Papen Government
has inscribed the protection of the Jews on its banner.”
The Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933 contains certain exceptions
applying to Jews. Originally these exceptions were planned to be much
more extensive; did you do anything to restrict them to the form in
which they were then issued?
VON PAPEN: May I just add one thing? I believe you forgot to submit to
the Tribunal Document 33, relevant to the question of foreign monopoly
in the German legal system.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall submit that document after your answer to the
question I have just put.
VON PAPEN: I approved of the Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933 only
insofar as it applied to Jewish civil servants appointed after the year
1918. For after the war large-scale immigration into Germany had taken
place from the east, especially from Poland, a country which was
strongly anti-Semitic at the time.
I successfully pleaded with Hindenburg that soldiers who had taken part
in the war should under no circumstance be affected by this law, for I
always held the view that a German, no matter of what race, who had done
his duty to his country should not be restricted in his rights.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer now to Document 33, Page 114. It is a report of
the Ministry of Justice, which shows that when the Civil Service Law was
issued 3,515 Jewish attorneys were practicing. On the basis of the
mitigation which the witness has just mentioned, 735 ex-service men and
1,383 other attorneys who had been admitted to the bar before 1914 were
exempted from this law. Thus 2,158 Jewish attorneys remained, whereas
923 had to resign from office.
What was your view of the Civil Service Law as a whole?
VON PAPEN: I think it was completely normal that the National
Socialists, since they were partners in the coalition government and
controlled more than 50 percent of the German people’s vote, should have
a part in filling civil service posts.
I might point out that the National Socialists, in the propaganda which
they conducted for years, fought with all means against the so-called
“Bonzentum” (boss rule); but one could not, of course, predict that they
themselves would later make that same mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to adjourn?
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We have been speaking of the Civil Service Law, which in
the points we have discussed corresponds to some extent to the trend of
thought of the NSDAP. Why did you feel impelled to urge certain
concessions which were then, in fact, made?
VON PAPEN: I was convinced at the time that with this Civil Service Law
we were creating something basic. I did not anticipate, and I could not
guess, that the Party would continually in the following years introduce
new laws in this field and would thereby completely ruin the civil
service.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your attitude towards the dissolution of the
parties?
VON PAPEN: The exclusion of parties was a necessary result of the
Enabling Act. For 4 years Hitler had demanded the reforms which we
wanted to make. Document 25 shows that I asked Hitler to create a new
basic State law, and, in his speech of 23 March Hitler promised that. In
that speech he spoke of a reform of the Constitution to be carried
through by the appropriate existing constitutional organs. That reform
would have given us, in my opinion, in a revolutionary way, a new and
sounder democratic and parliamentary form of government. Moreover, I
must say that I saw no danger in the temporary use of the one-party
system. There were excellent examples for it in other states, for
instance in Turkey and Portugal, where this one-party system was
functioning very well. Finally, I should like to point out that in my
speech at Marburg on 17 June 1934 I criticized this development and said
that one could only regard it as a transitional stage which a
reconstructed Constitution would have to terminate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What is your view of the Reichsstatthalter Law of April
1933? Will you also state your attitude to the question of German
federation?
VON PAPEN: This question, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, has been brought up
by the Prosecution in order to accuse me of duplicity, untruthfulness,
or deceit. The Prosecution has alleged that in 1932 my views on the
federal character of Germany were different from those I expressed in
1933. But even if I had changed my mind in this respect, I cannot see
why the question of a federal or a central government should be a crime
within this Charter. Besides, I did not change my mind at all. The view
I expressed in 1932 was this: I recognized the advantages of a federal
system for Germany, and I wanted to maintain it; but I always wished,
even in 1932, that there should be joint agreement on the bigger
political issues in Germany. That a federal country is governed on
uniform principles is surely a matter of course. That was the only
question, and it was also the basis of my intervention in Prussia on 20
July.
If one knows the history of Germany, one will be aware that Bismarck
overcame that difficulty by combining the offices of the Reich
Chancellor and the Prussian Prime Minister. Therefore, when in 1933 we
appointed Reichsstatthalter in the various Länder, we merely intended to
establish a common political line. Besides, the rights of the Länder
remained unaffected. They had their own financial, legal, and
educational systems, and their own parliaments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With regard to the Reichsstatthalter Law, may I refer to
Document 31, particularly Page 111 of that document. The passage quoted
there from the Pfundtner-Neubert works shows that the authority of the
Länder was abolished only by the later Reichsstatthalter Law in the year
1935, when the Defendant Von Papen was no longer in office.
Why did you on 7 April 1933 resign as Prime Minister of Prussia?
VON PAPEN: My letter to Hitler dated 10 April 1934 has been submitted by
the Prosecution. It contains the reasons for my resignation. In
Prussia—I have already stated this—I had already carried through the
co-ordination of political aims on 20 July. The Reichsstatthalter Law
enabled the Reich Chancellor to be Prime Minister of Prussia himself or
to nominate a substitute. And so my task in Prussia was completed. Apart
from that, I should like to mention the following point: The elections
of 5 March had given the National Socialists a strong majority also in
the Prussian Parliament. The Prussian Parliament then met and naturally
desired that a National Socialist should become Prime Minister of
Prussia. For all these reasons I resigned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution charges that, as a prominent lay member
of the Catholic Church, you were particularly able to consolidate the
Nazi regime in the field of the churches. We must therefore discuss your
attitude regarding the Church. Will you give an account of the situation
of the German Church at that time?
VON PAPEN: This charge, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, is for me the most
serious of the entire Indictment—the charge that I, as a Catholic,
contributed to this conspiracy against world peace. May I be permitted,
therefore, to discuss my attitude in the Church question quite briefly.
The Catholics in Germany had organized themselves in the Center Party.
Before 1918 the Center Party, as a moderate party, had always endeavored
to establish a balance between the left and the right political wings.
After the war that picture was altered entirely.
We then find the Center Party mostly in coalition with the left. In
Prussia, this coalition was maintained during all the years from 1918
until 1932. Undeniably the Center Party deserves much credit for the
maintenance of the life of the State during the years after the
collapse; but the coalition with the Social Democrats made co-operation
of the Center Party with the right impossible, particularly with regard
to Church policy. In political questions and matters of internal party
policy the Center Party, therefore, followed a line of compromise which
was the result obtained through the concessions of others in the field
of Church policy. That this state of affairs...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, to what is this all relevant?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has said:
“Papen used his position of a prominent Catholic to consolidate
the Nazi regime. He was double-faced, and that characteristic is
especially obvious in this connection and throws light on his
personality.”
The defendant is now explaining what his attitude in Church matters has
been from the beginning of his political activity. Since he was first a
member of the Center Party and then left it, it is necessary to discuss
the split which developed between him and the leaders of the party.
Later we shall...
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into this extreme detail?
Surely the thing that he wants to show is that he was not assisting the
Nazi Party. He was undoubtedly a Catholic, and he wants to show that he
was not assisting the Nazi Party. He does not want to go into all of
these details about Catholic influences and his part in Catholic
influences.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, may I say quite generally that in dealing
with the case of Papen it is our intention to prove that from the very
beginning the defendant consistently adhered to his principles. For this
purpose it is essential that the conditions prevailing at particular
times should be elucidated. We are now not very far from the point at
which we can leave the internal political conditions, and the other
subjects will be very much briefer. I do think, however, that for the
sake of completing the picture of the defendant’s personality, I must go
into certain details; but of course we shall make every effort to omit
all superfluous and avoidable particulars.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we are perfectly well aware that the case
of every one of these 21 defendants is different from the others. We are
perfectly aware of that, but what we desire is that their cases should
be put forward fairly but without unnecessary and burdensome detail.
They hope that you will try to confine the defendant to the really
essential matters. Will you go on?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, Mr. President. We shall do our best.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue, please.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may wind up this question by saying that my
opposition within the Party, my plea for the use of conservative forces,
gave me the reputation of being a bad Catholic. A foreign judge, a
non-German judge cannot know that in those years a Catholic who was not
a member of the Center Party but belonged to the right-wing parties was
regarded as a bad and inferior Catholic; and that is the state of
affairs against which I always fought.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In his government statement of 4 June 1932 Von Papen
referred to the fact that the outcome of the previous coalition policy
in Prussia was fully evidenced in the entire public life of Germany. I
refer to Document 1, Page 2, and I quote the last part of the first long
paragraph:
“The disintegration of atheistic-Marxist thoughts has already
too deeply invaded all the cultural fields of public life,
because the Christian forces of the State were all too easily
ready for compromises. The purity of public life cannot be
maintained or re-established by way of compromises for the sake
of parity. A clear decision must be made as to what forces are
willing to help reconstruct the new Germany on the basis of the
unchangeable principles of the Christian ideology.”
I also refer to Document Number 37, on Page 119, a speech at Munich on 1
March 1933, when the witness discussed the aspects which he has just
mentioned.
Witness, how did you think the position of the churches was safeguarded
by the new Government, and what did you do in that respect?
VON PAPEN: First of all, I asked Hitler to make a clear-cut statement on
this question; and he did so in a positive manner. In the foreword to my
speeches made at that time, there is the observation that it is the
first and most important task to revise the Nazi program with reference
to the religious problem, since such a revision is a prerequisite for a
united front of the two Christian confessions in that coalition.
Secondly, I attempted to protect Church policy by giving it, after the
conclusion of the Concordat, a certain foreign political context.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection may I refer to Document 37, Pages 119
and 120, containing an extract from several speeches delivered by the
witness, and to Volume I, Document 38, further down on Page 119, which
is a speech made at Dortmund in February 1933. In it the Defendant Von
Papen said...
THE PRESIDENT: We have that document before us.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 37, Page 119.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have got that, yes. All I was suggesting was that
it was sufficient to refer us to the document. As a matter of fact, you
have already got to the time when he resigned his post as Prime Minister
of Prussia in 1934, and now you are going back to 1933.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He resigned in Prussia in 1933. May I draw the Tribunal’s
attention, then, to this speech on Page 120.
THE PRESIDENT: Did he resign in 1933 or 1934?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1933.
I draw the Court’s attention to this speech, and to Page 120, a
proclamation of the Reich Government of 1 February 1933.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were the events leading up to the
Concordat?
VON PAPEN: I reiterate that I wanted to secure a Christian basis for the
Reich at all costs. For that reason, I suggested to Hitler in April 1933
that the rights of the Church should be firmly laid down in a Concordat,
and that this Concordat should be followed by an agreement with the
Evangelical Church. Hitler agreed, although there was strong opposition
in the Party; and thus the Concordat was concluded. The Prosecution has
adopted the view that this Concordat was a maneuver intended to deceive.
Perhaps I may in this connection point to the facts that the gentlemen
with whom I signed this Concordat were Secretary of State Pacelli, the
present Pope, who had known Germany personally for 13 years, and
Monsignor Kaas, who for years had been the Chairman of the Center Party,
and that if these two men were willing to conclude a Concordat, then one
can surely not maintain that this was a maneuver intended to deceive.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 39, Page 121. I should like to read
now a quotation from Document 40, on Page 122. After the conclusion of
the Concordat, Hitler published a decree, which is worded as
follows—near the middle of Page 122:
“I therefore order:
“1. All Catholic organizations which are recognized by the
present Treaty and which were dissolved without directions from
the Government are to be immediately reinstated.
“2. All measures of coercion against members of the clergy and
other leaders of these Catholic organizations are to be
rescinded. A revival of such measures is prohibited in the
future and will be punished under prevailing laws.”
I read that quotation to prove that only later did Hitler change his
mind, probably under the influence of the circle nearest to him.
I refer to Document 41, Page 123, a telegram of Von Papen. In the
English translation of this telegram there is a mistake which changes
the sense considerably. Paragraph 2 of the telegram says, “Thanks to
your generous and wise statesmanlike conception....” The English
translation reads “sportsmanlike” instead of “statesmanlike.”
On the next page I draw attention to the telegram addressed by Von Papen
to the Bishop of Treves. There are also affidavits relevant to the
questions which have been discussed. Document 43, Page 127 is the
affidavit of Freiherr von Twickel, and it takes the place of an
affidavit which the late Cardinal Von Galen was to have signed. The
matter had already been discussed with Cardinal Von Galen; but before
being able to put it into writing, he died. Freiherr von Twickel, who
discussed the questions with him, has now stated the details in his
affidavit, Document 43, on Page 127.
I also draw particular attention to Document 52, on Page 139. This is an
affidavit of the Abbot of the Benedictine Abbey at Grüssau, Schmitt, who
for many years had been the spiritual adviser of the defendant. In the
last but one paragraph on Page 139, he discusses the question of the
Concordat, and says:
“Herr Von Papen was deeply upset by the disloyal attitude of the
German Government, which became apparent soon after the
conclusion of the Concordat. He continually and fully discussed
with me his great anxiety in this respect, and he pondered ways
and means of ending these violations. I can also testify, from
my own experience, that he personally worked actively in the
interests of the Church to assure a loyal observance of the
Concordat.”
Witness, did you, apart from the Concordat, endeavor to see to it that
your views on Church policy were adopted?
VON PAPEN: Yes. On 15 June 1933 I created an organization in Berlin
which we called the “Cross and Eagle,” and a little later I founded the
Union (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) of Catholic Germans. Catholic forces were to
gather within these two organizations, outside the political parties.
The Union of Catholic Germans had the particular task of collecting
complaints and reporting them to me, so that I could try my best to
help.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution charges that by dissolving the Union of
Catholic Germans you yourself violated the Concordat. What can you say
to that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and furthermore the Prosecution already describes the
period which followed the Concordat as “the characteristic development
of the Church policy of the conspirators, and Papen’s participation in
it.”
The accusation raised by the Prosecution, with regard to my own sabotage
of the Concordat, is a tremendous accusation, which is connected with
the dissolution of the Union which I have just mentioned. The documents
show that this Union had already been paralyzed during the Röhm Putsch
on 30 June 1934 and that its later dissolution through me was merely a
formal affair. Moreover, this Union had no connection whatever with the
Concordat. It was a political union which never enjoyed the protection
of the Concordat.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 45, on Page 129. It is an exchange of
telegrams between Hitler and Hindenburg on the question of the
appeasement of the Evangelical Church.
For the subject of the Union of Catholic Germans I refer to Document 74,
Pages 130 to 132. This document contains an affidavit—I beg your
pardon, I gave a wrong figure—I refer to Document 47, on Page 130,
which is an affidavit of the executive of the Union of Catholic Germans,
Count Roderich Thun. He discusses the dissolution on Page 131, and I
quote the second paragraph:
“On 30 June 1934 the office of the Union of Catholic Germans was
occupied by officials of the Gestapo. The files were confiscated
and taken away. I myself was arrested.”
The fact that as a result of these measures the dissolution became a
mere formality is mentioned in the last paragraph of Page 131:
“Even after my release, which was effected after a time, the
confiscated files were not returned. In view of the attitude
taken up by the Party authorities, a revival of any further
activity on the part of the organization could no longer be
considered. Furthermore, in practice, any further activity of
the Union of Catholic Germans was no longer possible, as the
only person who could have undertaken the constantly necessary
interventions, Herr Von Papen, was out of the picture since he
had moved to Vienna. The only question which remained for the
heads of the Union was that of officially declaring an end of
the Union’s activities, which in practice had already occurred.
But one had to consider that in the event of an official
announcement of the enforced dissolution, the large number of
Catholics who had distinguished themselves through their work
for the organization would be persecuted. In order to prevent
this the dissolution was pronounced by the Union’s own leaders.”
Then I quote the last sentence:
“In order to do everything still possible to safeguard Catholic
interests, this pronouncement did not neglect to point out again
that official authorities, above all Hitler himself, had
solemnly vowed to protect Christian and ecclesiastical
interests.”
THE PRESIDENT: Will you remind me of the date when the Defendant Von
Papen moved to Vienna?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 15 August 1934 he went to Vienna; he was appointed at
the end of July 1934.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the summer of 1934 it became obvious
that the Party was sabotaging the Concordat, and that Hitler’s
assurances were not being kept. How do you explain Hitler’s behavior in
this respect?
VON PAPEN: I believe that in those days Hitler himself had been entirely
willing to keep peace with the Church, but that the radical elements in
his Party did not wish it, that most of all Goebbels and Bormann
continually instigated Hitler to violate assurances in the Church
question. Often and repeatedly I protested to Hitler, and in my speech
at Marburg I branded these violations publicly. I stated at Marburg,
“How can we fulfill our historic mission in Europe if we ourselves
strike our name from the list of Christian peoples.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw attention to Document Number 85 on Page 186 and
ask that judicial notice be taken of it. It is an affidavit by Dr.
Glasebock, former leader of the Front of German Conservative Catholics.
Witness, on 14 March 1937 Pope Pius XI expressed his burning anxiety in
an Encyclical and solemnly protested against the interpretation and the
violations of the Concordat. The Prosecution said that if you had been
serious in giving the assurances contained in the Concordat, you would
at that point have had to resign from your official post. What do you
say to that?
VON PAPEN: What could I have improved by resigning? Apart from the
Austrian affair, I no longer had any political influence at all on
Hitler; and my own conviction that in the critical time of 1937 there
was an urgent necessity for me to remain in Austria did not permit me to
leave my post there. We shall see that later from the developments.
Besides, if the Prosecution assumes that on account of the certainly
quite justified Encyclical of the Pope I should have left my post, then
I must ask what did the Church do? The Church did not recall the Papal
Nuncio from Berlin, and Bishop Berning did not leave the State Council
in which he represented Catholic interests. No doubt all this was quite
justified, because all of us at that time still hoped for inner changes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw attention to Document 48, Page 133. The document
has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-356; it is on Page 133 in my
document book. It is the speech of Pope Pius XII on 2 June 1945. I
quote:
“It must, nevertheless, be recognized that the Concordat, in the
years that followed, brought some advantages, or at least
prevented worse evils. In fact, despite all the violations to
which it was subjected, it gave Catholics a juridical basis for
their defense, a stronghold behind which they could shield
themselves in their opposition—as long as this was possible—to
the ever-growing campaign of religious persecution.”
A practical effect of the Concordat is shown in Document 49, on Page 134
of my document book. It has already been presented as Exhibit USA-685.
It is a letter from the Deputy of the Führer to the Reich Minister of
Education and deals with the dissolution of the theological faculties of
the universities. I quote the last paragraph of that letter:
“In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter,
the directives of the Concordat and the Church treaties are to
be taken into consideration. In the case of those faculties
which are not mentioned by a specific directive in the Concordat
and the Church treaties, as for example, Munich and a few
others, the dissolution may begin at once. This is equally true
of the theological faculties in Austria: Vienna and Graz.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] During the following years public
discussion of questions regarding Church policy was almost entirely
suppressed, since the Catholic press and, in violation of the Concordat,
even Catholic Church papers were to a large extent banned. What did you
do against this?
VON PAPEN: It appeared to me necessary, since the Catholic press had
been completely muzzled, to do something to continue public discussion
of the struggle against tendencies inimical to the Church. I very often
talked about this question with Bishop Hudal, an outstanding churchman
in Rome, whose book written in 1936 will be submitted to the Tribunal by
my counsel. This book contains my severe criticism of the antireligious
tendencies and contains also an objective appreciation of the positive
social ideas of National Socialism; it is all the more notable because a
high authority of the Church was then, in 1936, making yet another
attempt to create a synthesis between Christian ideas and the healthy
doctrines of National Socialism.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In what way do you consider the book of importance with
regard to the charge brought by the Prosecution?
VON PAPEN: I consider it to be relevant for the following reason: The
Prosecution makes its task very easy: In view of the criminal end of
National Socialism, it shifts all blame to the initial years of
development and brands as criminals all those who, out of pure motives,
attempted to give the Movement a constructive and creative character.
But here in this book of 1936 a churchman of high rank lifts his voice
in an attempt, made on his own initiative, to bring about an improvement
of conditions. Today we know that all such attempts failed and that a
world crumbled in ruins. But is it right, on that account, to accuse
millions of people of crimes because they tried to attain something good
in those days?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to extracts from Bishop Hudal’s book, contained
in Document 36, Page 116, and ask that judicial notice be taken of that
document. With reference to the subject which the witness has just
mentioned, the attitude of high-ranking churchmen to the question of a
possible synthesis of ideas, I refer to Document Number 50, Page 135,
which is an appeal made by Cardinal Innitzer on behalf and at the
request of the Austrian bishops.
Witness, as you have said, Bishop Hudal aimed at a change in Hitler’s
ways along the lines proposed in his book. What was Hitler’s reaction to
the book?
VON PAPEN: At first Hitler was, I thought, very much impressed by this
book; but then the anti-Christian forces among his advisers gained the
upper hand once more and convinced him that it would be dangerous in the
extreme to allow such a book to appear in Germany. The book had been
printed in Austria, and therefore a permit for its publication in
Germany was required. All I could obtain was permission to print 2,000
copies, which Hitler wanted to distribute among leading Party members
for a study of the problem.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you think that the foreign policy of the Reich was
being pursued on the principles laid down when the Government was
formed?
VON PAPEN: Yes. While I was a member of the Cabinet it was certainly
conducted on the agreed principles. I might mention the Pact of
Friendship with Poland, which was concluded at that time and which was
an important step towards peace. Hitler concluded this treaty although,
on account of the problem of the Corridor, it was most unpopular. I
might also mention the Four Power Pact concluded in the summer of 1933,
which affirmed the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. I mention also
the visit in January 1934 of Mr. Eden, to whom we submitted proposals
for the demilitarization of the SA and the SS. Thus we tried to remove
the discriminations against Germany by peaceful means. In my opinion,
the great powers made a disastrous mistake by not showing understanding
and assisting Germany during that phase and thus checking radical
tendencies.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 14 October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament
Conference. Was this a departure from the previous policy which you have
just discussed?
VON PAPEN: The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference was not in any
way intended to be a departure from our political principles, but it
took place because the equality of which we had been definitely assured
on 11 December 1932 was then revoked.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, would you tell me, is the defendant saying
that the principles adopted in 1933 were contained in any document or
not?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The proclamation of the Reich Government of 1 February
1933 contains the principles of the policy of the new Cabinet. These
principles are supplemented in the statement of the Reich Government
dated 23 March 1933, a statement which deals with the Enabling Act.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give me the reference to the first document
that you mentioned?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall give it to you after the recess, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What were the reasons for, and what was
the attitude regarding Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations?
VON PAPEN: The withdrawal from the League of Nations was a question on
which there could be many differences of opinion. I myself was in favor
of remaining in the League of Nations; and I remember that on the day
before Hitler decided on this step, I myself traveled to Munich in an
effort to persuade him to remain a member of the League. I was of the
opinion that we would have gained much by remaining in the League, where
we had many good connections dating even from the time of Stresemann.
Nevertheless, if we left the League it was perhaps a tactical question
insofar as we might then hope that direct negotiations with the major
powers would be more promising. Besides, Herr Von Neurath’s discussion
with Ambassador Bullitt, which is Document L-150, shows—Herr Von
Neurath says in that document that Germany had proposed a reorganized
League of Nations, which she would rejoin.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Lersner’s interrogatory, Document 93. In
question Number 5, the witness speaks of Von Papen’s journey to Munich;
this is Page 213, Document 93.
Mr. President, I come now to a rather more lengthy question; may I ask
therefore whether this would be a suitable moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before the recess, I was questioned about the documents
on the Governmental Proclamations of 1 March 1933 and of 23 March 1933.
Excerpts from the Governmental Proclamation of 1 March 1933 are
contained in Document Papen-12, Page 53. This is only a short extract. I
shall submit the proclamation in its entirety later.
The Proclamation of 23 March 1933, in Document Papen-12, Pages 56 to 58,
has also been submitted in extract form. This proclamation has already
been submitted in full under USA-568.
[_Turning to the defendant._] On 2 November 1933, in a speech in Essen,
you stated your opinion in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite on
the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and you approved the
Government’s policy. The Prosecution has drawn conclusions from this
speech which are unfavorable to you.
What reasons caused you to make that speech at that time?
VON PAPEN: Our withdrawal from the League of Nations was an
exceptionally important decision of foreign policy. We wished to
emphasize to the world that this withdrawal was not to be construed as a
change in our methods of foreign policy. Therefore, Hindenburg and
Hitler in free appeals emphasized that the German people should decide
by means of a plebiscite the question of whether a withdrawal from the
League of Nations would be in the exclusive interests of peace and our
equality of rights.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Papen-60, Page 167,
and Documents Papen-61 and Papen-62, on Pages 147 to 152 of the document
book. These are the statements made by Hitler, by the Reich Government,
and by Hindenburg. The purport of all these proclamations: Only a change
in method, not a change in our attitude toward affairs.
[_Turning to the defendant._] At that time you were Reich Commissioner
for the return of the Saar. What policy did you follow in connection
with the Saar question?
VON PAPEN: As far as the Saar question was concerned, I always worked on
the basis of a friendly understanding with France, and with a view to
finding a solution for the Saar problem without recourse to a
plebiscite. Our reasons for not wanting this plebiscite were not in any
way selfish, for the plebiscite was at all times certain to be in favor
of Germany. My proposal was rather a sacrifice willingly made in the
interest of understanding, and at the same time I proposed that France
should receive compensation to the amount of 900 million francs for the
return of the Saar mines. And I should like to repeat that even after
our withdrawal from the League of Nations, my commissioner for Saar
questions, Freiherr von Lersner, always negotiated with the League of
Nations organs about the Saar on the principle of a friendly settlement
of the Saar. In the summer of 1934 my commissioner negotiated with the
French Foreign Minister M. Barthou on this question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document Papen-59, Page 145.
This document contains the published comments of the witness with regard
to the Saar problem. Freiherr von Lersner in his interrogatory (Document
Papen-93, Page 212) in reply to Question 3 defined his attitude on this
question of the Saar.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Were there any signs that after leaving
the League of Nations this generally peaceful policy was just a policy
of expediency and that a policy of aggression was planned for the more
remote future?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. Leaving the League of Nations was for us simply a
change in method. And at that time we were conducting direct
negotiations with the major powers. The fact that we were pursuing a
policy of peace was something I emphasized in many public statements.
And in this connection I should like to refer to Document Papen-56,
which will be submitted by my counsel.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document Papen-56, Page 44, contains a speech made by the
witness at Kottbus on 21 January 1934. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of this document.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you know of any rearmament measure
which might have led to the expectation of an aggressive policy in the
future?
VON PAPEN: It seems to me that the proceedings so far conducted before
this Tribunal have shown clearly that the actual rearmament did not
begin until much later. If Hitler, in fact, did take steps to rearm in
1933 or 1934, then he discussed these measures personally with the
Defense Minister and the Air Minister. In any event I was never
concerned with such measures. Apart from that, it has already been
ascertained here that this much-talked-of Reich Defense Committee in
1933 and 1934 was purely a committee of experts under the direction of a
lieutenant colonel.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: A short time ago you mentioned the safeguards adopted
when the Hitler Government was formed, in order to minimize the
influence of the Party. How did Hitler’s position and the influence of
the NSDAP develop in the course of the year 1933 and at the beginning of
1934?
VON PAPEN: A confidential relationship gradually developed between
Hitler and Hindenburg.
This led in the end to the joint report which was agreed upon at that
time. The influence exerted by Hitler on Reichswehrminister Blomberg was
a very decisive factor in this development. Even at that time, in 1933,
Hitler tried to exert a decisive influence on the Army. He wanted to
have the then General Von Hammerstein removed and replaced by General
Von Reichenau, who at that time passed for a friend of the Party. At
that time I persuaded the Reich President not to grant Hitler’s wish in
this connection and advised him to take General Von Fritsch. Another
reason for this development was the integration of the “Stahlhelm,” that
is, a rightist conservative group, into the SA of the NSDAP. Then there
were new cabinet members who were selected from the Party. Hugenberg,
the leader of the conservative Right, left the Cabinet, and the two
important ministries which he filled, the Ministries of Economy and
Agriculture, were occupied by National Socialists. A decisive
psychological factor, as I have already mentioned, was the election
result of 5 March, for the governments of all the Länder had National
Socialist majorities, and these local governments exerted constant
pressure on Hitler. Hitler drew his support now from Party dynamics and
thus changed in an ever-increasing degree from a coalition partner ready
for compromise into an autocrat who knew no compromise.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to the affidavit of the former
Minister Hugenberg, Document Number Papen-88, Pages 196 to 198 in the
document book. I should further like to refer to Document Papen-13,
Pages 59 to 61 in the document book, an affidavit by Dr. Conrad Josten.
On what was your position as Vice Chancellor based?
VON PAPEN: As Vice Chancellor it was intended that I should be the Reich
Chancellor’s deputy, but without a department of my own. It very soon
became apparent that the position of deputy was quite impossible, as
Hitler dealt with every question himself. The fact that I had no
department of my own weakened my position, for this position was now
based upon nothing but the confidence of Hindenburg, a confidence which
decreased proportionately with the growth of Hitler’s importance.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the constitutional basis of Hitler’s position in
the Cabinet?
VON PAPEN: The position of the Reich Chancellor in the Cabinet is
constitutionally provided for in Article 56 of the Constitution of the
Reich. This article says: “The Reich Chancellor will lay down the
general principles of policy and will be responsible for them to the
Reichstag.” If the policy of a department minister is not in accordance
with these principles laid down by the Reich Chancellor, no decision
will be made by the Cabinet on a majority ruling, but the Reich
Chancellor alone will decide the point in question. And under Article 58
of the Constitution, it says: “The Reich Chancellor cannot be outvoted
by the Cabinet in cases where his policy is opposed.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, which has so far been
incorrectly submitted in the evidence taken, I should like to refer to
the leading commentary on the Weimar Constitution by Gerhard Anschütz,
Document Papen-22, Pages 80 and 81 of the document book.
I should like to refer to Page 81, Note 4 to Article 56. This note
states clearly that if differences of opinion should arise as to the
application of the basic principles of the policy, the Reich Chancellor
alone will decide, and that in these basic problems no vote will be
taken and no majority decision made.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What conclusions did you think had to be
drawn from this development of affairs?
VON PAPEN: In the middle of the year 1934 the internal tension in
Germany grew more and more serious. The situation was such that the
concessions which we as partners of the coalition had made did not lead
to any definite internal agreements but were considered by the Party as
being only the beginning of a new revolutionary movement. This was quite
obviously a divergence from the Coalition Pact concluded on 30 January.
The many objections which I made in the Cabinet were without success.
Then, since there was no possibility in the Cabinet of forcing the Reich
Chancellor to change his policy, as we have just shown from the
Constitution, the only possibilities left were a resignation or a public
statement. If I resigned, I should no longer be in a position to speak.
Therefore, I decided to speak at once, and publicly, and I decided to
appeal on principle in this matter to the German people. If, as the
Prosecution asserts, I had been an opportunist, I would have kept silent
and remained in office, or I would have accepted another office. But now
I decided to put my case before the public and to shoulder all the
consequences that might follow.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 17 June 1934 you made that speech at Marburg. What did
you expect to accomplish with this speech?
VON PAPEN: In this speech I brought up for discussion and put up to
Hitler for decision all those points which were essential for the
maintenance of a reasonable policy in Germany. In this speech I opposed
the demand of a certain group or party for a revolutionary or national
monopoly. I opposed the coercion and abuse of others. I opposed
anti-Christian endeavors and totalitarian encroachment on religious
domain. I opposed the suppression of all criticism. I opposed the abuse
and regimentation of the spirit. I opposed violation of fundamental
rights and inequality before the law, and I also opposed the Byzantine
principles followed by the Party. It was clear to me that if I succeeded
in penetrating, even at one point only, the circle of Nazi ideology, we
could force the system into order and restore, for instance, freedom of
thought and speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech may be found in Document Papen-11, Page 40.
The Prosecution has already stressed its significance. First of all, I
may say that the English text contains a misprint. The date is not 7
July, as appears in the translation, but 17 June. Because of the basic
significance of this speech, the critical nature of which is unique in
German history since 1933, I am going to read a few passages from it.
I am starting at Page 41, about the middle of the page:
“We know that rumors and whispering propaganda must be brought
out from the darkness where they have taken refuge. Frank and
manly discussion is better for the German people than, for
instance, a press without an outlet, described by the Minister
for Propaganda ‘as no longer having a face.’ This deficiency
undoubtedly exists. The function of the press should be to
inform the Government where deficiencies have crept in, where
corruption has settled down, where grave mistakes have been
committed, where incapable men are in the wrong places, where
offenses are committed against the spirit of the German
revolution. An anonymous or secret information service, however
well organized it may be, can never be a substitute for this
task of the press. For the newspaper editor is responsible to
the law and to his conscience, whereas anonymous news sources
are not subject to control and are exposed to the danger of
Byzantinism. When, therefore, the proper organs of public
opinion do not shed sufficient light into the mysterious
darkness, which at present seems to have fallen upon the German
public, the statesman himself must intervene and call matters by
their right names.”
Then on Page 42, just below the middle of the page:
“It is a matter of historical truth that the necessity for a
fundamental change of course was recognized and urged even by
those who shunned the path of revolution through a mass-party. A
claim for revolutionary or nationalist monopoly by a certain
group, therefore, seems to be exaggerated, quite apart from the
fact that it disturbs the community.”
And now Page 43, a sentence from approximately the middle of the page:
“All of life cannot be organized; otherwise it becomes
mechanized. The State is organization; life is growth.”
And on Page 45, just a little beyond the center of the page:
“Domination by a single party replacing the majority party
system, which rightly has disappeared, appears to me
historically as a transitional stage, justified only as long as
the safeguarding of the new political change demands it and
until the new process of personal selection begins to function.”
As to the religious question, the witness states his view on Page 46,
near the middle of the page:
“But one should not confuse the religious State, which is based
upon an active belief in God, with a secular State in which
earthly values replace such belief and are embellished with
religious honors.”
Then, about five lines following:
“Certainly the outward respect for religious belief is an
improvement on the disrespectful attitude produced by a
degenerate rationalism. But we should not forget that real
religion is a link with God, and not substitutes such as have
been introduced into the consciousness of nations especially by
Karl Marx’s materialistic conception of history. If wide circles
of people, from this same viewpoint of the totalitarian State
and the complete amalgamation of the nation, demand a uniform
religious foundation, they should not forget that we should be
happy to have such a foundation in the Christian faith.”
Then, the third line from the end on this page:
“It is my conviction that the Christian doctrine clearly
represents the religious form of all occidental thinking and
that with the reawakening of religious forces the German people
also will be permeated anew by the Christian spirit, a spirit
the profundity of which is almost forgotten by a humanity that
has lived through the nineteenth century. A struggle is
approaching the decision as to whether the new Reich of the
Germans will be Christian or is to be lost in sectarianism and
half-religious materialism.”
Then, on Page 48, just a little beyond the center of the page:
“But once a revolution has been completed, the Government only
represents the people as a whole and is never the champion of
individual groups.”
Then, a little further down, about 10 lines from the bottom:
“It is not permissible, therefore, to dismiss the intellect with
the catchword of ‘intellectualism.’ Deficient or primitive
intellects do not justify us in waging war against
intellectualism. And when we complain frequently today about
those of us who are 150 percent Nazis, then we mean those
intellectuals without a foundation, people who would like to
deny the right of existence to scientists of world fame just
because they are not Party members.”
Then, on the first line of the next page—Page 49—it says:
“Nor should the objection be made that intellectuals lack the
vitality necessary for the leaders of a people. True spirit is
so vital that it sacrifices itself for its conviction. The
mistaking of brutality for vitality would reveal a worship of
force which would be dangerous to a people.”
In the next paragraph he speaks of equality before the law. I read the
last few lines:
“They oppose equality before the law, which they criticize as
liberal degeneration, whereas in reality it is the prerequisite
for any fair judgment. These people suppress that pillar of the
State which always—and not only in liberal times—was called
justice. Their attacks are directed against the security and
freedom of the private sphere of life which the German has won
in centuries of hardest struggle.”
In the next paragraph he speaks against Byzantinism; the second sentence
reads:
“Great men are not made by propaganda, but rather grow through
their deeds and are recognized by history. Even Byzantinism
cannot make us believe that these laws do not exist.”
He deals with education in the next paragraph, and I should like to
begin with the second sentence:
“But we must have no illusions regarding the biological and
psychological limits of education. Coercion, too, ends at the
will for self-expression of the true personality. Reactions to
coercion are dangerous. As an old soldier I know that the most
rigid discipline must be balanced by certain liberties. Even the
good soldier who submitted willingly to unconditional authority
counted his days of service, because the need for freedom is
rooted in human nature. The application of military discipline
to the whole life of a people must remain within limits
compatible with human nature.”
Then on the next page—Page 50—I should like to read the second
sentence of the last paragraph:
“The Movement must come to a standstill sometime; a solid social
structure must sometime come into existence which is held
together by an impartial administration of justice and by an
undisputed governmental power. Nothing can be achieved by means
of everlasting dynamics, Germany must not go adrift on uncharted
seas toward unknown shores.”
As my last quotation, I shall read the first paragraph on the following
page:
“The Government is well informed on all the self-interest, lack
of character, want of truth, unchivalrous conduct, and arrogance
trying to rear its head under cover of the German revolution. It
is also not deceived about the fact that the rich store of
confidence bestowed upon it by the German people is threatened.
If we want a close connection with and a close association among
the people, we must not underestimate the good sense of the
people; we must return their confidence and not try to hold them
everlastingly in bondage. The German people know that their
situation is serious, they feel the economic distress, they are
perfectly aware of the shortcoming of many laws born of
emergency; they have a keen feeling for violence and injustice;
they smile at clumsy attempts to deceive them by false optimism.
No organization and no propaganda, however good, will in the
long run be able to preserve confidence. I therefore viewed the
wave of propaganda against the so-called foolish critics from a
different angle than many others did. Confidence and readiness
to co-operate cannot be won by provocation, especially of youth,
nor by threats against helpless segments of the people, but only
by discussion with the people with trust on both sides. The
people know what great sacrifices are expected from them. They
will bear them and follow the Führer in unflinching loyalty, if
they are allowed to have their part in the planning and in the
work, if every word of criticism is not taken for ill-will, and
if despairing patriots are not branded as enemies of the State.”
Witness, what were the consequences of the Marburg speech?
VON PAPEN: This speech was banned at the instigation of Propaganda
Minister Goebbels. Only one or two papers were able to publish the
contents, but that sufficed to attract attention to it both at home and
abroad. When I heard of the ban placed on it by the Propaganda Minister,
I went to the Reich Chancellor and tendered my resignation. I told him:
“It is an impossible situation for the Vice Chancellor of your
Government to be forbidden to open his mouth. There is nothing to be
done but to take my leave.”
However, Hitler said: “That is a blunder on the part of the Propaganda
Minister; I shall speak to him and have him rescind this decree.”
In that way he stalled me along for several days. Today I know that even
at that time he lied to me because my Codefendant Funk had stated that
he was instructed by Hitler to go to Hindenburg and tell Hindenburg that
the Vice Chancellor had uttered sentiments contrary to the policy of the
Cabinet and of Hitler, and must be dismissed. If the witness Gisevius
testified here to the effect that Herr Von Papen was silent and that he
should at least have mobilized the diplomats then I should like to point
out that Mr. Dodd’s diary makes it very evident that the world—the
outside world—was well informed of this last appeal of mine.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to the last remark made by the
witness, which may be found in Document Papen-17, Pages 71 and 72, in
Ambassador Dodd’s diary.
I beg your pardon, it is on Pages 69 and 70 of the English text. I quote
from the second paragraph, the first line:
“There is great excitement everywhere in Germany.”
He had previously mentioned the Marburg speech.
“All the older and more educated Germans are highly delighted.”
Then, under the date of 21 June, he reports that the speech was cabled
to _The New York Times_, that the papers in London and Paris were
featuring the “Von Papen episode,” as he calls the Marburg speech. I
refer in this connection to the beginning of Page 72, in the English
text on Page 70.
As regards the Government’s measures against the Marburg speech and its
propagation, I want to refer you to Document Papen-15, Page 66, an
affidavit by Westphalen, which shows that even possession of a copy of
the speech was sufficient to cause disciplinary action to be taken
against an official.
Witness, the events of 30 June 1934 took place in the meantime. To what
extent did these incidents affect you personally?
VON PAPEN: On the morning of 30 June, I received a telephone call from
Minister Göring, asking me to come to have a talk with him. I went to
see Göring; he told me that a revolution had broken out in the Reich—an
SA revolution—that Hitler was in Munich to put down this uprising
there, and that he, Göring, was charged with restoring law and order in
Berlin. Herr Göring asked me, in the interests of my own safety, as he
said, to return to my apartment and stay there. I protested quite
vehemently against this demand, but Herr Göring insisted. On my way back
to my apartment, I went first to my office in the Vice Chancellery. On
arriving there, I found my office occupied by the SS, and I was
permitted only to enter my own room and get my files. I went on home to
my apartment, where I found a large number of SS. The telephone was
disconnected; the radio was disconnected; and I was completely cut off
from the outside world for 3 whole days.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What measures were taken against your staff?
VON PAPEN: I naturally did not hear about the measures taken against my
staff until 3 July, after I had regained my freedom. I learned that my
press adviser, Herr Von Bose, had been shot in his office. I further
learned that two of my male secretaries, Herr Von Tschirschsky and
another gentleman, had been taken to a concentration camp and a few days
later, I learned of the death of my friend and colleague—a private
colleague of mine—Herr Edgar Jung.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you try to inform the Reich President?
VON PAPEN: I finally succeeded, on the third day of my arrest, in
contacting Göring by telephone. I demanded to be set free at once. Herr
Göring apologized and said that it was only a mistake that I had been
kept under arrest for this long period of time. I then went immediately
to the Reich Chancellery. There I met Hitler, who was about to start a
Cabinet session. I asked him to step into the next room so that I could
speak to him and I refused to comply with his request that I should
attend the Cabinet meeting. I said to him: “What has happened here to a
member of your government is so incredible and fantastic that there is
only one answer for me to give: A repetition of my request to
resign—and at once.”
Herr Hitler tried to persuade me to remain. He said: “I will explain to
you in the Cabinet and later in the Reichstag how everything happened,
and why it happened.”
I said to him: “Herr Hitler, there is no explanation and no excuse for
this incident; I demand that the fate of these members of my staff be
made the subject of immediate investigation and the facts be cleared
up.” I demanded that he publish my resignation immediately.
When he saw that I could not be persuaded to remain, Herr Hitler told me
that he could not make my resignation public because the agitation among
the German people was too great. He said that he could not make my
resignation public for some 3 or 4 weeks.
When I left Hitler, I tried personally and through one of my secretaries
to get in touch with Hindenburg, but that attempt failed. My secretary
found out—I must add that Herr Von Hindenburg was then in Neudeck in
East Prussia—my secretary, who had gone to East Prussia, found that it
was impossible to reach Hindenburg. He was completely cut off. My own
telephone calls did not get through.
I went to my friend General Von Fritsch, the Chief of the Armed Forces,
and said to him: “Why don’t the Armed Forces intervene? The Armed Forces
are the only means for maintaining order that we still have in the
country. When General Von Schleicher and his wife were murdered, as well
as other officers, it would in my opinion have been quite proper for the
Wehrmacht itself to try to restore order in this situation.”
Herr Von Fritsch said to me: “I can take action only when I have Field
Marshal Von Hindenburg’s order in my hands.”
But Hindenburg was not accessible to us. He had obviously been informed
by the other side of the complete legality of the events which had taken
place, and which Hitler declared in the Reichstag to be in conformity
with the law. I did not attend that session of the Reichstag, either, as
the witness Gisevius testified; and during the time that elapsed between
30 June and my appointment to Austria, I did not participate in a single
act carried out by the Government.
I should like to add that at the same time I asked the Reich Chancellor
to hand over to me the body of my friend Bose. We knew that the Gestapo
had cremated the bodies of the others. I succeeded
THE PRESIDENT: I believe it would be a good time to recess now.
[_A recess was taken._]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Hess is not present
in this session.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Will you please go on. You were just answering the last
question.
VON PAPEN: I was only going to finish the question by saying that I
succeeded in having the mortal remains of my friend Bose properly buried
and that on that occasion, at his grave, I made a speech emphasizing
that one day this injustice would be avenged.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I draw your attention to Document
Number Papen-14, Pages 62 and 63, an affidavit by Maria Rose, who for
years was the private secretary of the witness. On Page 63 she refers to
Bose’s funeral service which we have just discussed.
I further refer to Document Number Papen-19, Pages 77 and 78, an
affidavit by Schaffgotsch who devotes particular attention to the
witness’ vain attempts to reach Hindenburg in Neudeck. This was Document
Number 19, Pages 77 and 78.
Witness, you were offered a Vatican post at that time—a post as
Ambassador to the Vatican. Will you please tell us the exact
circumstances?
VON PAPEN: It is true that Hitler tried to keep me attached to his
staff, and that about a week after the incidents I have described he
sent State Secretary Lammers to ask me if I was prepared to accept the
post of Ambassador to the Vatican. Of course, I refused this
unreasonable request, which I mention here only because a few weeks
later I accepted the Vienna post for an entirely different reason, and
to prove that I was not interested in obtaining a post as such. I
refused this request of Hitler’s most bluntly at the time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Document Number Papen-18, Pages 75 and 76
of the document book; an affidavit by Martha von Papen, the wife of the
witness, who describes Lammers’ visit.
With regard to the subject with which the witness has been dealing,
namely, nonparticipation in the Reichstag meeting of 13 July, I refer to
Document Number Papen-21, Page 79, an extract from the _Völkischer
Beobachter_ regarding the Reichstag meeting.
The names of the ministers present are listed there. The name of the
witness Von Papen does not appear.
[_Turning to the witness._] When did Hitler approach you on the subject
of going to Vienna as Ambassador Extraordinary?
VON PAPEN: It was on the day of the murder of Dollfuss, 25 July 1934...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you remind me, Dr. Kubuschok, whether any question
was put to the witness Lammers about this offer?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, a question was put to the witness Lammers. The
witness Lammers was asked about it when he was examined.
THE PRESIDENT: What did he say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: He said that Papen had refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON PAPEN: On 25 July, the day of the murder of Dollfuss, Hitler rang me
up in the middle of the night, and asked me to go to Vienna at once as
his Ambassador. I asked: “What gave you this odd idea?” He informed me
of Dollfuss’ murder, of which I had not yet heard, and said: “It is
absolutely essential that someone who knows the conditions there should
take over affairs at once.” I replied that I could not possibly give my
decision on such a step over the telephone, whereupon he asked me to
come to Bayreuth at once to discuss it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: How did these negotiations in Bayreuth turn out? Did you
state your own terms for accepting the appointment?
VON PAPEN: In the discussion in Bayreuth, Hitler put it to me that I was
the only available person who could re-establish a favorable situation
in Austria, because, of course, Hitler knew my attitude toward that
problem from the numerous protests I had raised in the Cabinet against
Austria’s treatment. He also knew that I had been a friend of the
murdered Dr. Dollfuss and that I knew Herr Von Schuschnigg. I stated my
conditions and these conditions were: The immediate recall of the Party
Gauleiter, Herr Habicht, who was in Austria by Hitler’s order. Hitler
was of the opinion that if he did this it would amount to an admission
of guilt.
THE PRESIDENT: Gauleiter of where?
VON PAPEN: Habicht?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said that was his name. I wanted to know
what Gau he was the Gauleiter of.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps “Gauleiter” is the wrong word. He had been sent to
Austria by Hitler as a liaison man, to exert influence on the affairs of
the Austrian National Socialists.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, perhaps you ought to point out that his title
was “Landesleiter,” which probably corresponds to the title “Gauleiter”
in Germany.
VON PAPEN: He was Landesleiter, which was the title given to people who
directed the Party organization abroad. Hitler replied that if he
recalled this man, it would look like a confession of complicity in the
Dollfuss murder. I replied that the whole world was in any case
convinced of the complicity of the Party in Germany or its
organizations, generally speaking; and that as far as I was concerned,
it was only important that those connections should be broken off
forthwith. I further demanded an assurance in writing from Hitler that
the German-Austrian policy of the future—what is generally termed the
Anschluss policy—would move on a purely evolutionary level, that is to
say, that no recourse would be had to forcible measures, and aggression.
Hitler immediately ordered this man Habicht to be recalled and gave me a
written assurance with reference to the second question. And finally, I
said that I was prepared to take over the pacification program in
Austria, but only until normal and friendly relations had been
re-established. This meant that later on in Austria I had the additional
title of “Ambassador on a Special Mission.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, we have heard of your political break with
Hitler after the speech at Marburg, your resignation from the Cabinet
and your treatment on 30 June. I should now like you to give us your
reasons for accepting that post in Austria in spite of the events
already described.
VON PAPEN: My decision to go to Austria has been made the subject of a
special charge by the Prosecution. In order to understand this decision
of mine you must be acquainted with German history and you must know
that the Austrian problem was the central problem of German policy
generally. As Dr. Seyss-Inquart has discussed this problem at length, I
can dismiss it quite briefly; and I need only add that the achievement
of German unity, for which we had fought for three centuries, was
considered by Germany herself to be the most significant and important
aim of our national policy. The events of 30 June had brought about the
collapse of the coalition which I had formed on 30 January. It had been
historically established that I had failed to achieve my intentions and
aims in home policy. After the Dollfuss murder, the danger existed that
Germany would now suffer bankruptcy also in her one great foreign
political aim of the desired unity. All this was in my mind when I
weighed the very serious decision as to whether I should accede to
Hitler’s request. If he put a Party man in that post, then obviously all
hope would be lost. If he appointed a diplomat from the Foreign Office,
it could be assumed that that official would have no personal influence
on Hitler. Therefore, if the situation was to be saved, it would have to
be someone who was at least in a position to influence Hitler and
moreover someone who, like myself, was independent and had his own
political line. Today, just as at that time, I am fully aware that many
of my friends did not understand the step I took and that they
interpreted it as lack of character. But I hold the view that this is a
question which the individual has to settle with his conscience, without
regard to understanding or the lack of it; and my conscience told me
that I must do everything to restore order in this one question at
least.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: With reference to the subject of Austria generally, I
call your attention mainly to the documentary material which has been
submitted in the previous case. To supplement this, I will only refer to
Document Number Papen-64, Page 157, Document Number Papen-65, Page 158
and Document Number Papen-81, Page 178. This last document has already
been presented in connection with the case of Seyss-Inquart. It refers
to the views held by State Chancellor Dr. Renner on the Anschluss
question. I should like only to quote the last four lines on Page 179:
“As a Social Democrat, and therefore as a champion of the right
of self-determination of nations, as first Chancellor of the
Austro-German Republic and former president of its peace
delegations to St. Germain, I shall vote in the affirmative.”
I have produced the document at this particular point in order to
support the testimony of the defendant, who considered the Austro-German
question from both points of view as a fateful problem; and the fact
that this leading statesman, Dr. Renner, also placed in a difficult
situation, expressed himself as in favor of Austro-German friendship is
best shown here.
Witness, on 26 July Hitler wrote a letter to you confirming your
appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna. That letter has been
mentioned by the Prosecution. What is the explanation of the contents of
that letter?
VON PAPEN: The contents of that letter can be explained very easily. If
I was to have a chance of re-establishing normal and friendly relations,
if I was to have a chance of creating a proper position for myself in
relation to the Austrian Government, then after the events of 30 July a
public statement of confidence had to be made. In that letter Hitler was
to certify that my mission was one of pacification, and that he intended
to disavow his terrorist methods. That is stated in the letter. And I
find the Prosecution’s statement that this letter was a “masterpiece of
deceit” quite impossible to understand.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith, in his affidavit, 2385-PS, alleges that
you pursued from Vienna a policy of aggression towards the states of
southeastern Europe and quotes as your personal verbatim statement, made
on the occasion of the return visit he paid to you, the following:
“....southeast Europe as far as Turkey constitutes the German
hinterland; and I have been assigned to carry out the task of
incorporating it into the Reich. Austria is the first country on
this program.”
Did you make any such statement?
VON PAPEN: I took up my position in Vienna in the autumn of 1934; and
one of the first colleagues whom I saw was Mr. Messersmith. I never
received an assignment to pursue a policy such as Mr. Messersmith
describes in his affidavit; and I never made any such statement to Mr.
Messersmith.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I refer to Horthy’s interrogatory,
Document Number Papen-76, Pages 172 and 173.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, before you turned to the Messersmith
affidavit, you were speaking, or the defendant was speaking, of some
letter. Is that letter a document which is before us?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the Prosecution have already presented that letter.
It is the letter written on the occasion of the defendant’s appointment.
It is Number 2799-PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, if Your Lordship has the British Document Book Number 11, it is
Page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness has just dealt with the statement in the
Messersmith affidavit, 2385-PS. The same question, namely the return
visit paid to Papen by Mr. Messersmith, is treated in a further
affidavit by Messersmith, 1760-PS.
I should like to point out that the wording of the statement referring
to the influence of Germany on the states of southeast Europe differs
considerably in Messersmith’s two affidavits.
As I have already indicated in my previous question, Mr. Messersmith
says in 2385-PS that Papen said that he had been assigned to carry out
the task of incorporating southeast Europe into the Reich. In contrast
to that, the statement is worded very differently in 1760-PS. There Mr.
Messersmith states that Papen said on that occasion that he had been
ordered to see to it that the whole of southeast Europe, up to the
Turkish border, should be regarded as Germany’s natural hinterland, and
that German economic control over that entire area should be facilitated
by his work; thus, in one affidavit, incorporation is mentioned and in
the other the facilitation of economic control.
In connection with this latter much less strongly-worded affidavit
1760-PS, I ask the witness whether he did at that time make such a
statement, namely, that the whole of southeastern Europe as far as the
Turkish border was Germany’s natural hinterland and that he had been
called upon to facilitate German economic control throughout the entire
area on Germany’s behalf.
Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: The actual remark I made to Mr. Messersmith is perhaps...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: [_Interposing._] My Lord, I don’t know whether
it would be useful for the Tribunal to have the two references, the two
passages. The passage in 2385-PS Your Lordships will find in Document
Book 11a, that is, the second document book, at Page 24 at the bottom of
the page. The reference in 1760-PS is in Document Book 11, Page 22,
about one-third down the page, and then it goes on to the next third of
the page.
VON PAPEN: My actual remark to Mr. Messersmith is perhaps not quite so
far from my defense counsel’s last quotation as the difference between
Mr. Messersmith’s two statements would seem to indicate. It is perfectly
possible that we discussed the question of southeast Europe and I can
well imagine pointing out to him that the economic and political
questions of the southeastern area were of great importance not only for
Germany’s policy, but also for Austria; for the expansion of our trade
toward the Balkans was a perfectly legitimate aim. I kept Berlin
informed of everything that I learned in Vienna regarding the policy of
the countries of the southeastern area because naturally that was one of
the functions of the Ambassador to Vienna. But except for that I did
nothing in the whole course of my work in Vienna which tallies in any
way with what Mr. Messersmith alleges here.
Apart from that, may I say that it would be extremely foolish and
contrary to the most elementary rules of diplomacy if I had made such a
disclosure to an unknown ambassador in the course of my first conference
with him. That would have made a sensation and would certainly have come
to the ears of the Austrian Government and the whole world the next day.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On this point, I refer to Prince Erbach’s interrogatory,
Document Papen-96, Page 238, Questions 8 and 9, which deal with this
subject. Page 232 of the English text.
VON PAPEN: Perhaps, My Lord, I might add that the Prosecution are in
possession of all my reports from the Vienna period, and that these
reports are bound to show whether I was pursuing such an objective.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you ever, during your time in Vienna, negotiate with
Hungary and Poland about a division of Czechoslovakia? Mr. Messersmith
makes such a statement.
VON PAPEN: No, I never did. The policy of the Reich in Czechoslovakia
was the exclusive responsibility of our Legation in Prague.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the Horthy interrogatory already presented as
Document Papen-76. I also refer to Document Papen-68, Page 162, a report
from Papen to Hitler, dated 31 August 1935.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Mr. Messersmith asserts in the affidavit
mentioned that you stated during this conference that you were in
Austria for the purpose of undermining and weakening the Austrian
Government. Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: May I make a general statement with reference to this
affidavit. If I may express myself in diplomatic terms, I must describe
it as in the highest degree astonishing. In this affidavit, Mr.
Messersmith himself relates that on the occasion of my first visit he
received me icily. That is perfectly correct. I was quite well aware
that Mr. Messersmith was the keenest opponent of the Nazi system. It is
therefore all the more astonishing to read here that during the second
visit I opened my heart, so to speak, to Mr. Messersmith; the passage
quoted here—that I came to undermine and weaken the Austrian
Government—is, of course, not true either, because such a statement
would naturally have been communicated to the Austrian Government by Mr.
Messersmith at once, and would have rendered all my work of pacification
and my position generally impossible from the outset. May I refer in
this connection to the statement made by the Austrian Foreign Minister
Schmidt, to whom such activities on my part were entirely unknown.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer in this connection also to Glaise-Horstenau’s
deposition in the case of Seyss-Inquart. Mr. Messersmith further alleges
that you said to him during the discussion that you were trading on your
reputation as a good Catholic with, among others, certain Austrians like
Cardinal Innitzer. Further on in his affidavit he even asserts that you
used your wife’s reputation as a fervent and devout Catholic for this
purpose, without scruples or qualms of conscience. Will you kindly state
your views on this assertion of Mr. Messersmith’s.
VON PAPEN: I think that of all the accusations raised against me, this
is the most mortifying. I can understand that the policy pursued by a
diplomat may be criticized and misinterpreted, but I cannot understand
why anyone should be accused of misusing his own religious convictions
for dirty, political, commercial purposes; I can understand even
less—and find it the height of bad taste—that anyone should say that I
even used the religious convictions of my wife for such purposes.
Perhaps I can leave this to the judgment of this High Tribunal.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith in his affidavit also refers to a
document whose author he does not, however, mention. This document is
alleged to have been shown him by Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg in
January 1935, and is said to reveal the substance of your conference
with Hitler, Schacht, and Von Neurath on the occasion of your visit to
Berlin. An agreement is alleged to have been made at that conference to
the effect that for the next 2 years intervention in the internal
political affairs of Austria was to be avoided. Finally Dr. Schacht is
said to have made available 200,000 marks monthly for support of the
National Socialists in Austria.
What do you say about Mr. Messersmith’s statement?
VON PAPEN: The details given by Mr. Messersmith show that this is
obviously an agent’s report received by the Austrian Foreign Minister on
my trip to Berlin. The contents of that report are largely incorrect.
The inaccuracy of the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been
shown by Dr. Schacht’s testimony. But in that report there is something
which is true. At that time there was a so-called relief fund in
Austria, which was managed by a certain Herr Langot.
It has already been testified here in the witness box that this relief
measure, which was intended to benefit wives and children of Austrian
National Socialists who had emigrated to Germany, existed with the
knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I neither requested
Herr Schacht to make available official funds for this relief fund, nor
did I myself pay out such money. Obviously this money originated from
Party sources in Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to the testimony of
Glaise-Horstenau, who stated here that the Austrian Government knew of
the Langot relief fund.
Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the
Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, he can reproduce the
following statement made by you at the beginning of 1935: “Yes, now you
have your French and English friends, and you can maintain your
independence a little longer.”
Did you make such a statement?
VON PAPEN: Such a statement would have been not only extremely foolish
from a diplomatic point of view, but actually impossible, because it
would certainly have put an end to all diplomatic activity. In no case
could the co-operation, which Mr. Messersmith states was carried on
successfully for years, or the political activity which he describes as
also having been carried on for years, have been reconciled with an open
admission of this kind to the effect that I wanted Austrian independence
to be of short duration only.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in this affidavit that you
had publicly stated you wished to get rid of certain members of the
Austrian Government, among them Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that
true?
VON PAPEN: The contrary is true. I never aimed at the removal of
Chancellor Schuschnigg; it was rather my aim to give him confidence in
my policy, in the policy of reconciliation. I know Herr Von Schuschnigg
as an upright Austrian patriot, but also as a man who was far from
wishing to deny his German ties, and in spite of many differences in
policy these German antecedents of his made an excellent basis for
collaboration. I can only ask in addition whether a diplomat who desires
a change to come about in the government to which he is accredited would
proclaim it from the roof tops.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution have submitted a report which you made to
Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, as proof of your desire to steer Schuschnigg
into a government including the National Socialists. This is Exhibit
USA-64, included again in my document book as Document Papen-66, on
Pages 159 and 160.
Witness, what were your intentions, actually?
VON PAPEN: I must be a little more explicit with reference to this
document. This report was written 8 months after the Dollfuss murder,
that is, within the first 2 years, during which period the Prosecution
themselves admit that I had instructions to remain entirely passive.
When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg, in
conjunction with Mussolini, was pursuing a policy which would have put
serious difficulties in the way of an understanding between Austria and
Germany. For this reason I suggested to Hitler a drastic intervention: I
proposed that Schuschnigg and the Christian Socialist elements, which
were hostile to a Heimwehr dictatorship, should be played off against
Starhemberg by the offer of a final agreement on German-Austrian
interests. This report states that if Germany were to recognize the
national independence of Austria and were to undertake to refrain from
influencing the National Opposition in Austria, by which I meant the
Nazis, a coalition between these factors would be bound to result. The
consequence would be that Germany would participate in the Danube
Agreement, which would be tantamount to a peaceful solution of the
entire European situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: You have just explained that you were pursuing an honest
policy of balancing interests?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more
clearly what the defendant means, by what he just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the translation came over very
badly; the English translation is said to have come through very badly.
Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire
answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is
very unlikely that the English translation came over badly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, will you please repeat your answer but rather
more slowly so that the interpreters will have no difficulty?
VON PAPEN: When this report was written, we had news that
Starhemberg—Starhemberg was the chief of the Heimwehr—wanted to link
himself with Mussolini in a policy which would be hostile in future to
any Germanophile tendencies in Austria. In order to counter Prince
Starhemberg’s maneuver, I advised Hitler to suggest to Schuschnigg that,
instead of forming a coalition with the Heimwehr, he should do so with
the Christian Socialist elements, who were not opposed to a
reconciliation of Germany with Austria. In order to induce Schuschnigg
to enter into such a coalition, Hitler was to offer him a final
settlement of German and Austrian interests. In other words, Hitler was
to tell him that Germany would recognize the national independence of
Austria and would undertake not to interfere in future in the internal
affairs of Austria.