Seoul as a Battlefield
_Two More River Crossings--Division Attack of 25 September--Night
Pursuit Ordered by Corps--Renewal of Drive Through Seoul--Entrapment of
Dog Company, RCT-7--Last Fight on Hill 296--1st Marines in the Heart of
Seoul--Objective Secured_
On the morning of 25 September 1950, with RCT-1 across the river, the
1st Marine Division was in a position for the first time since D-day to
launch an attack of all three regiments abreast.
This was but one of the portents indicating that the days of the North
Korean People’s Army were numbered. Exactly three months had passed
since the invasion of the Republic of Korea, and now the forces of the
Communist puppet state were reeling under blows from two directions.
While X Corps pounded inland to seize the NKPA main communications hub,
the Eighth Army had smashed through the Pusan Perimeter and was driving
northward to place the enemy between two fires.
The big break in South Korea came on 23 September. Up to that time,
the NKPA 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions had put up a stubborn
resistance on the northern front of the Pusan Perimeter against six ROK
divisions. Then the enemy crumpled and the ROKs began an advance (see
map in end papers) that would take them 70 miles during the ensuing
week.[401]
[401] Almond, _UN MilOps_, 13.
It was much the same story along the Kumchon-Taejon axis of the central
front. There the U. S. I Corps, comprising the U. S. 24th Infantry
and 1st Cavalry Divisions, the 1st ROK Division, and the British 27th
Brigade, drove a deep salient into the line of the 1st, 3d, 13th,
10th, and 2d NKPA Divisions. UN gains of 35 miles were made from the
22d to the 25th.
In the south the U. S. 2d and 25th Divisions had hurled the NKPA 6th,
4th, 9th, and 7th Divisions back from the vicinity of Masan to the
Chinju area. This gain of about 15 miles from 21 to 23 September was
only a prelude as the two U. S. divisions pressed their advantage
against a retreating enemy.[402]
[402] _Ibid._
The ultimate purpose of the joint Eighth Army and X Corps offensive
must already have been made alarmingly apparent to NKPA generals. Not
only was the Eighth Army salient along the Kumchon-Taejon axis being
extended northwest, but a X Corps regiment was driving southeast toward
a junction. This was the 31st Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division,
which had been given the mission of following in the trace of the 32d,
then wheeling southward toward the Suwon area to meet the elements of
the 1st Cavalry Division spearheading the Eighth Army advance. Thus was
the drawstring being rapidly pulled on the remnants of the invading
NKPA army, soon to have its main routes of escape cut off by UN forces.
_Two More River Crossings_
After nearly a week of commanding a division in combat on both sides
of an unbridged tidal river, Generals Smith and Craig now had a
consolidated front north of the Han, with RCT-1 on the right, RCT-5 in
the center, and RCT-7 on the left. The 11th Marines was in position
on the south bank. The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions lined up northwest
of Yongdungpo, while the 2d Battalion and the U. S. Army 96th Field
Artillery emplaced to the east of that shattered suburb.[403]
[403] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37.
Two more river crossings took place on 25 September. First, the 32d
Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division moved to the north bank in
accordance with the revised Corps plan. The Marine 1st Amphibian
Tractor Battalion (less Company B) and the Army’s Company A, 56th
Amphibian Tractor Battalion had to make a 25-mile round trip that night
to bring the troops to an embarkation point about 5,000 yards east
of the railroad bridge at Yongdungpo. Scattered enemy small-arms and
artillery fire was received during the crossing, resulting in a few
casualties among crews and soldiers. The LVTs took the troops about 200
yards inland, where they advanced on foot to their objectives on South
Mountain without encountering any opposition other than long-range
harassing fires.[404]
[404] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 37; Irick interv, 16 Nov
54.
Later that same day the 17th ROK Regiment, under the control of the 7th
Infantry Division, crossed in the LVTs. It was hoped by United Nations
leaders that this unit, known as the Seoul Regiment, could take part in
the liberation of the ROK capital. Apparently the second river crossing
of the day alarmed the enemy, for it drew mortar and artillery fire in
greater volume and accuracy than had been encountered before.
The support given to the two crossings by the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion was commended by General Barr in a letter to General Smith.
“Despite long hours, loss of sleep, maintenance difficulties, and
exposure to fire,” said the commanding general of the 7th Infantry
Division, “the personnel of your battalion performed so magnificently
that I have nothing but praise to offer. If at any time in the future
elements of this Division are called upon to cross a river, it is my
sincere wish that they may be supported by the 1st Amphibian Tractor
Battalion.”[405]
[405] MajGen D. G. Barr (USA) ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 5
Oct 50.
From South Mountain the troops of the 32d Infantry looked down upon the
city. They could not enter as yet because of the danger of interfering
with the fires of the 1st and 5th Marines. But the 32d and the ROK unit
were assigned a zone of action by Corps for an advance on the right of
the Marines when the time came for a concerted effort.
_Division Attack of 25 September_
At 0700 on the 25th the 1st Marine Division launched the final phase of
its attack on Seoul. The following objectives were assigned by Division
OpnO 11-50:
RCT-1, with the 2d KMC Battalion attached, was to seize the part of
Seoul within its zone of action and Objective ABLE, consisting of the
high ground beyond the northeastern outskirts and about six miles from
the jump-off positions. The zone of action, ranging from a mile to
a mile and a half wide, carried the attack through the heart of the
city, with South Mountain on the right and Ducksoo Palace on the left.
Mopping-up operations were assigned to the KMCs, who would revert to
their own regimental control afterwards.
RCT-5, with the Division Reconnaissance Company and 1st KMC Battalion
attached, was to seize that part of Seoul within its zone of action
and Objective BAKER, comprising the high ground overlooking the
Seoul-Uijongbu road six miles from the line of departure. About a mile
and a half wide, this zone included the northwest section of the city
and the Government Palace, though the regiment would be operating in
open country after an advance of about two miles. The KMCs were to be
used for mopping up after RCT-5.
RCT-7 had the mission of protecting the left flank of the Division and
seizing Objective CHARLIE--the high ground astride the Seoul-Kaesong
road about six miles northwest of the center of Seoul in the vicinity
of Chonsong-ni.
The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 2d Battalions) was designated the
division reserve. It was to be prepared to resume control of detached
battalions and occupy Seoul.
The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, with Special Operations Company
attached, was to continue under operational control of the 1st Marine
Division and protect the Corps left flank west and south of the river
Han.[406]
[406] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 133–135.
Following the artillery and air preparation, 3/5 and 2/5 jumped off
abreast from left to right in an attack on the remaining defenses of
the Hill 296 complex. Roise’s objective was Hill 105-N. He was to
be supported by fires from Taplett’s men, attacking down the slopes
of Hill 296 in an advance that would eventually pinch out the 2d
Battalion, which would go into reserve. The 1st Battalion had completed
its relief of 3d Battalion elements on Hills 216 and 296, thus placing
it in position to move up on the left of the 3d.[407]
[407] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
During the air strikes, VMF-214 had its second pilot fatality in two
days when Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid was shot down in flames over the
western edge of the city. His death brought to light a curious train
of circumstances. It was recalled that the squadron had lost its first
pilot on D-plus 2 when enemy fire killed Captain Simpson in plane No.
17. Two days later, while inspecting the new No. 17 on the flight deck
of the _Sicily_, Technical Sergeant George C. Underwood received a
mortal wound from an accidental discharge of the guns. Major Robert
Floeck was flying this Corsair when he met his death on 23 September,
but the machine was saved. And it was in plane No. 17 that the squadron
commander crashed on the 25th. This was enough for Captain John H.
Thach of the _Sicily_, and he issued an order banning the number
forever on the carrier.[408]
[408] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig:Easy; Karig, _Korea_, 259.
Within two hours of Lischeid’s death, two other squadron commanders
were shot down, Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski of VMF-212 and Lieutenant
Colonel Volcansek of VMF(N)-542. Both escaped with moderate injuries,
but in the space of a few minutes Volcansek had pressed his luck within
a hair’s breadth of the point of no return. Wounded, his plane badly
damaged by enemy fire from Seoul, the squadron commander stubbornly led
his flight in two more passes on Red positions. Approaching Kimpo, he
was forced to keep the battered F7F-3N at almost 200 knots--twice the
landing speed--to prevent its stalling.
There was no alternative but to bail out. When he jettisoned the
canopy, his altimeter needle wavered around the 1,000-foot mark.
Slipstreams from the twin engines pinned him to the cockpit as the
plane continued losing altitude. In desperation he kicked violently at
the stick with both feet. The aircraft lurched downward and Volcansek
was thrown clear, the big tail of the machine missing him by inches
as both plummeted earthward. A few seconds after the officer’s chute
opened and broke the fall, his feet touched earth a few miles northwest
of Kimpo. Within 45 minutes he was aboard a helicopter rattling back to
the airfield.[409]
[409] _Ibid._, Annex Item:Sugar; Col M. I. Volcansek, Jr.
interv, 15 Mar 55.
It was the last day for the Sicily and VMF-214 in the Inchon-Seoul
operation. That evening the CVE left the area for maintenance work, and
the _Badoeng Strait_ took over with VMF-323.
Easy Company led the attack of 2/5 on the 25th, with Dog on the left
and Fox in reserve. The advance was supported by a platoon of tanks as
well as fires from 3/5 on Hill 296. An effective artillery preparation
aided the advance, but Captain Jaskilka’s men were enfiladed by enemy
mortar and automatic fire from Hill 72. Lieutenant Deptula’s platoon
led the assault and seized this position by 1335 after suffering
heavily along the way. Lieutenant Seydel commanded the remnants of
Dog Company which jumped off from Smith’s Ridge and took Hill 88 at
1320.[410]
[410] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
While Fox Company moved up to occupy Hill 72, an airstrike was called
on Hill 105-N at 1310, and the artillery bombardment began 15 minutes
later in preparation for the final assault by Easy Company. Second
Lieutenants James W. Epley and Samuel L. Eddy, Jr., led the advance
with their platoons, and Hill 105-N was reported as secured at 1545.
The 2d Battalion, with the exception of Deptula’s platoon had met
moderate opposition as compared with the last two days. It was in the
zone of the 3d that the enemy put up his most stubborn resistance on
25 September. George and How Companies, the latter on the exposed
left flank, led the attack on the remaining NKPA positions along the
two southeastern spurs of Hill 296. Initial progress was slow, the
attackers being harassed by long range fires from Hill 338 on the
left and 105-N on the right. Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed the
battalion to hold up until the situation around 105-N clarified.
Resuming the attack against mounting resistance on the left, at 1435,
the two companies reached their objectives two hours later and made
contact with 2/5 on the right.[411]
[411] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
Since 105-N capped the terminus of the lower of 3/5’s two spurs, the
whole length of the 1,000-yard projection was tagged with that number.
This fact accounts for both Roise and Taplett reporting that they
were in possession of the height. Actually, 2/5 was on 105-N, and
George Company of 3/5 held an unnumbered peak to the north on the same
ridge.[412]
[412] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and LtCol H. S.
Roise interv, 11 May 55.
Company H, in moving down the huge spur on the open left flank, had
taken heavy casualties before reaching its objective, an intermediate
peak. Just as Item Company was passing through to continue the attack
at about 1700, the Marines were hit hard by a force of 200 Reds, who
advanced under cover of accurate supporting fire. The close-in fire
fight raged until after nightfall, and both depleted companies were
hard-pressed to hold their own. Weakened by the loss of 100 dead, the
enemy finally withdrew, thereby allowing Item Company to take over the
front line while How reverted to battalion reserve.[413]
[413] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; Taplett interv, 11
May 55; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 25 Aug 54.
Thus, the 3d Battalion was now in position to pinch out the 2d on the
morrow and to trace Item Company’s spur into the very heart of Seoul.
In preparation for the assault of Hill 338, Newton’s 1st Battalion had
shifted to the regimental left, where, with the Division Recon Company
and the 1st KMC Battalion, it blocked the precipitous approaches to 216
and 296.
In the zone of the 7th Marines, the 2d Battalion had jumped off at 0630
and occupied Objective CHARLIE at 1215 without meeting resistance.
Patrols of the 1st Battalion devoted the day to reconnoitering the
area between RCT-7 and RCT-5, maintaining contact with both. The 3d
Battalion was employed defensively along roads and trails in an arc
around the ferry crossing site at Haengju.[414]
[414] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286–287.
_Tank Victory on Hill 105-S_
In preparation for the attack of the 1st Marines, the 3d Battalion
moved forward before daybreak in a column of companies. Passing
eastward through the 2d Battalion, Ridge’s men began a sharp wheel to
the north. The 1st Battalion, on Hill 79, withdrew slightly, pivoting
on its left flank in order to reorient its direction of attack and tie
in with the 3d Battalion on the left.
Thus did RCT-1 carry out the Corps plan of maneuver on the morning of
the 25th by making a 90-degree change of direction, after advancing
eastward to Hill 79, and driving straight northward toward the heart
of Seoul. It was necessary to jump off without tank support, however,
since the assigned armor had been delayed by a fight on the way.
The 2d and 3d Platoons of Captain Bruce F. Williams’ Baker Company, 1st
Tank Battalion, had crossed the river at the Haengju ferry on the 24th.
Reports of enemy mines along the railroad leading into Seoul caused
Lieutenant Babe’s 2d Platoon of Company C Engineers to be attached to
the tanks. And since the column was to pass through the zone of the 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, a depleted infantry platoon of Company F was
attached under the command of Staff Sergeant Arthur Farrington.
Owing to the shift of 1/5, a gap existed at this time between the zones
of the 1st and 5th Marines; and the little task force entered this area
with the infantry at the point and the engineers sandwiched between the
tanks--a total of some 50 men supporting the armor. About half of the
gap between the regiments had been safely traversed when the head of
the column received a few scattered shots from the slope of Hill 105-S.
After being supposedly secured by 1/5, with a final mopping up by 3/1,
this troublesome position now erupted into enemy small-arms fire that
could only have come from at least a company-size pocket of resistance.
Lieutenant Babe was severely wounded before he could carry out his plan
of sending Farrington’s platoon around to envelop the left flank of the
NKPA troops entrenched on the slope. After Technical Sergeant Pasquale
Paolino took command of the engineers, his men and the infantry platoon
were so badly outnumbered that Captain Williams considered pulling them
inside the tanks and withdrawing. Then it occurred to him to send a
flame-thrower tank, escorted by Staff Sergeant Altaire’s M-26, around
the enemy’s left flank by way of a primitive trail leading southward
from the railway tracks.[415]
[415] The description of this fight is based upon the
following sources: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter;
Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54; and Babe-Paolino interv, 15
Nov 54.
This maneuver had a spectacular success. The flame tank moved into
a position enabling it to sear the length of the NKPA trenches with
bursts of napalm. When the terrified Red Koreans fled down the slope,
they became targets for the machine guns of Lieutenant Cummings’
platoon of tanks.
Sergeants Paolino and Farrington had meanwhile been organizing an
infantry and engineer base of small-arms fire from men taking cover
along the railroad embankment and the lower slopes of the hill. The
engineer NCO noticed that enemy grenades were being lobbed from three
thatched huts below the NKPA trenches on the left flank. Closer
inspection revealed the mouth of a cave, concealed by the third house
and extending back into Hill 105-S.
Paolino, after getting Williams’ permission to direct tank fire, banged
on the hull of Cummings’ M-26 and indicated the huts and mouth of the
cave as targets. A few 90mm rounds destroyed the huts; but before
Cummings could fire into the cave, eight or ten NKPA soldiers came out
with upraised hands. When they were allowed to surrender unharmed, the
example had an amazing effect as a seemingly endless file of enemy
troops poured out of the cave. Altogether, 131 prisoners were taken, in
addition to an estimated 150 killed, on a hill first reported secured
two days before. Apparently the undiscovered cave had provided a refuge
for nearly 300 Red Koreans.
Among the captives, as the Marines discovered later were two women in
uniform who had evidently been armed. Because of the NKPA reputation
for treachery, it was considered necessary to search them; but they
were treated with respect and provided with garments more appropriate
to their sex. In spite of the consideration shown them, the incident
resulted in sensational articles in stateside publications after the
women reached the rear and claimed mistreatment on the grounds that
they were nurses.
Two wounded engineers and an infantry casualty were the price of the
Marine success after a surprise encounter had been turned to the
disadvantage of the enemy. Since the NKPA prisoners were more than
double the numbers of the engineers and infantry, they were placed
between two M-26s when the column resumed the march.
It was 1200 when Cummings reported to Colonel Puller at the
intersection of the railroad and a boulevard with street car tracks
leading into the heart of the city. The tanks took the lead, joining
3/1 in its fighting advance up both sides of the north-south boulevard.
Enemy mines knocked out two of the M-26s, one of them being Cummings’
tank, but both were retrieved in spite of heavy NKPA fire.
Successive road blocks consisting of earth-filled rice bags were
stubbornly defended by enemy infantry supported by NKPA automatic,
AT, and mortar fire from the roof tops. The Marines pressed forward
methodically and by evening the 3d Battalion had penetrated about 2,000
yards into the city to occupy positions astride the streetcar line
and on the western slopes of Hill 97. The 1st Battalion, on the high
ground to the right, had advanced about 2,000 yards when both assault
units tied in for the night with defensive positions on Hill 82. The 2d
Battalion, as regimental reserve, deployed in the rear of the 1st to
protect the right flank and rear.[416]
[416] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; O. P. Smith,
_Notes_, 284–285.
_Night Attack Ordered by Corps_
The battle for Seoul took a sudden and unexpected new turn at 2009 on
the night of 25 September 1950 when the following X Corps flash (plain)
message was received at the CP of the 1st Marine Division:
“Info addressee (X Corps TacAir Commander) reports enemy fleeing city
of Seoul on road north of Uijongbu.... He [TacAir] is conducting
heavy air attack and will continue same. You will push attack now to
the limit of your objectives in order to insure maximum destruction of
enemy forces. Signed Almond.”[417]
[417] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 288–289.
The Division G-3 immediately called the Corps G-3 for corroboration.
Colonel Bowser questioned the ability of night air observation to
determine whether the movement out of the city consisted of urban
refugees or enemy troops. He was informed, however, that the intention
of Corps was for the attack to begin at once.
General Smith then called the X Corps chief of staff for confirmation,
pointing out the inadvisability of attacking at night in an unfamiliar
Oriental city of the size and complexity of Seoul, particularly as
there was no indication of the enemy fleeing from the Division front.
But General Ruffner replied that General Almond himself had dictated
the message and it was to be executed without delay.[418]
[418] _Ibid._
General Smith gave the attack order to the commanding officers of the
1st and 5th Marines, directing them to coordinate their efforts and
confine them to avenues of advance which could be identified at night.
His order was receipted by the 1st Marines at 2205 and the 5th Marines
at 2215 just a few hours after the NKPA counterattack hit the 3d
Battalion of Murray’s regiment.
While the two rifle regiments made preparations to jump off, the order
was relayed to the 7th and 11th Marines. Colonel Puller coordinated
hastily with the 5th Marines and supporting arms for an attack
scheduled to begin at 0145 on 26 September, following a 15-minute
artillery preparation.[419]
[419] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen;
MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 38–39.
At 0138, deciding that the preparation was inadequate, he notified the
assault battalions to “stand fast, preparatory fires to be repeated.” A
new jump-off time of 0200 was set, but at 0153 a dramatic interruption
came in the form of a flash message from the 3d Battalion of the 1st
Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge reported that a heavy enemy attack,
supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, was moving down the main
avenue leading from the center of the city to the southwest in the zone
of the 1st Marines.[420]
[420] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
It was the enemy’s misfortune that 3/1 had sent out a patrol of eight
Marines and three natives under Corporal Charles E. Collins to make
contact with a similar patrol from the 5th Marines. But at 0130 the
clamor of a fire fight about 400 yards in front of 3/1 was followed
by the return of members of the patrol who gave the alarm. Corporal
Collins was still missing when Major Simmons heard the sound of tracked
vehicles and was warned that two enemy tanks were approaching the
George Company roadblock defended by heavy machine guns, 3.5-inch
rocket launchers and 75mm recoilless guns.[421]
[421] 3/1 _SAR_.
These weapons accounted for the destruction of one enemy tank and the
hasty retreat of the other. The Division attack scheduled for 0200 was
indefinitely postponed, of course, until 3/1, astride the principal
avenue of approach, could deal with a large-scale enemy counterattack
launched by an estimated battalion of infantry and about 12 tanks
supported by self-propelled guns and mortars. A terrific concentration
of Marine artillery was called down upon an NKPA effort that reached
its peak about 0230. High-angle Marine howitzer and 81mm mortar fire
almost literally blasted the attacking column out of existence, and
enemy infantry action was negligible afterwards.[422]
[422] _Ibid._
At 0315 the artillery liaison officer informed Puller that the three
battalions of the 11th Marines must cease barrage fire at the penalty
of burning out the tubes of their howitzers. During the comparative
lull the T-34s continued to attack at intervals until daybreak, and
the last two tanks were killed at 0630.[423] About that time Corporal
Collins returned safely after having been given up as dead. Exposed
to friendly as well as enemy fire all night, he had made his way back
through enemy-held areas in a disguise of Korean civilian garments.
[423] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
POW interrogation and examination of the ground revealed that seven
enemy tanks and two self-propelled guns were destroyed or disabled
by Marine mines, rockets, mortars, or artillery. An estimated 475 to
500 infantry of the NKPA 25th Brigade had been killed and many more
wounded, and the Marines took 83 prisoners at a relatively light cost
in casualties.[424]
[424] _Ibid._
At 0500, as 3/1’s fight in the city was tapering off, another Red
force of battalion strength hit the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, on
South Mountain. A section of the Army unit’s front was overrun, but
a counterattack restored the line by 0700. Finally driven from the
ridge, the North Koreans left behind 394 dead and 174 prisoners,
according to the regimental report.[425]
[425] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
_Entrapment of Dog Company, RCT-7_
On the morning of 26 September it may have occurred to some of the
Marines that yesterday’s announcement by X Corps of the capture of
Seoul was a bit premature. The lines of the Division remained where
they were the night before, with only the difference that hundreds of
enemy dead gave testimony of a busy night.
Division OpnO 12-50, issued at 1230 on the 26th, directed a
continuation of the attack on Seoul, the principal change from the last
order being the commitment of the 7th Marines. This regiment, augmented
by the Division Recon Company and 5th KMC battalion, was given the
mission of pinching out the 5th Marines about 1200 yards beyond the
Government Palace and attacking abreast of the 1st Marines toward
the northeast. In the 7th’s zone of advance north of the city lay
Objectives DOG (northern half of Hill 338), EASY (Hill 342), FOX (Hill
133), GEORGE (Hill 343), and BAKER (Hill 171)--as rugged an order of
terrain as any outfit could be served. Puller’s regiment, with the 2d
KMC Battalion attached, would drive northward from Hills 97 and 82 in
lower Seoul, clear the center of the city, then wheel to the right to
take Objective ABLE, Hill 133 in the northeastern outskirts.
The 5th Marines, with the 1st KMC Battalion attached, was to support
Litzenberg’s attack until being pinched out, whereupon it had orders to
assemble in Division reserve and relieve elements of the 7th Marines.
The KMC Regiment was still under orders to resume control of its
detached battalions for the occupation of Seoul. The 3d Battalion,
however, was detached from the 1st Marine Division and ordered to
report to the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT, for operational control
in Kumpo Peninsula operations. Responsibility for the security of Kimpo
Airfield now rested upon X Corps.[426]
[426] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 294–295.
Thus, the Marine front prior to the assault formed a semicircle
extending from the Kaesong Highway in the northwest to Hill 82 in the
south, and the concave side faced Seoul like a giant scythe poised to
mow down the last remnants of NKPA resistance.
[Illustration: SEOUL ASSAULT PLAN
26 SEP 50
SHOWING DIVISION & REGTL BOUNDARIES]
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF SEOUL
SHOWING ATTACKS BY 5th MARINES, 1st MARINES, & 32d INF]
Colonel Litzenberg dispatched Dog Company of the 7th Marines southwest
along the Kaesong Highway at 0630 on 26 September. The mission of the
unit was to approach Seoul and make contact with the 5th Marines on the
right. In the van of the column was the company machine gun officer,
First Lieutenant William F. Goggin. For a while it seemed as though
this untried unit was reaping the laurels earned by its battle-weary
relatives of the 1st and 5th Marines, since hundreds of Koreans lined
the highway to welcome the “victors” with resounding cheers.[427]
[427] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; and Maj J. D. Hammond interv,
17 Aug 54.
Progress was marked off rapidly in the absence of enemy resistance. The
Marines passed through Hoengjeoe-ri, and by 0900 the great slopes of
Hill 296 loomed up on the right and those of 338 on the left. Tracing
the road through the narrow valley between, the company approached the
Sodaemun Prison at the northwest corner of Seoul. Suddenly the column
came under machine-gun fire from a high tower about 400 yards down the
road. The initial burst caused several casualties, including Lieutenant
Goggin, and the Marines quickly deployed on both sides of the road.
Several more enemy machine-guns and rifles opened up from hillside
positions only a hundred yards away. Since the throngs of well-wishers
along the highway had prevented the use of flank guards, Company D was
caught flatfooted in the low ground by the hail of lead.
After a few minutes, other Red weapons began firing from the lower
slopes of Hills 296 and 338, directly to the flanks, and encirclement
seemed imminent. Dog Company’s commander, Captain Richard R. Breen,
reacted by ordering the 2d Platoon to attack the high ground around
the prison. Simultaneously, First Lieutenant Paul P. Sartwell set up
two 60mm mortars on the road and silenced one of the North Korean
emplacements. Directing his crews from an exposed position, the young
officer was wounded three times before finally being put out of action.
First Lieutenant Edward H. Seeburger closed on the prison with his 2d
Platoon, while First Lieutenant Paul V. Mullaney’s 1st ascended the
slopes of Hill 338 on the left. The 3d, under First Lieutenant James
D. Hammond, Jr., remained in position along the road. When the assault
platoons were stopped on the high ground by stiffening resistance,
Company D settled down in an elongated perimeter for a battle of
survival. There was no artillery support, but Marine air assisted by
pounding the crescent of Red positions.
The S-3 of the 7th Marines, Major Raymond V. Fridrich, radioed Captain
Breen and asked about the situation. Though now wounded himself, Breen
stated that he could hold his ground. A small tank-infantry column was
dispatched from regiment to reach the beleaguered force with ammunition
and supplies. By this time, however, the Reds had set up in the rear of
Dog Company, and the relief force was turned back.
Faced with the bleak fact that it was now surrounded, Company D
withdrew 1000 yards to a defensible road cut between Hills 296 and
338. The Marines completed the move with their wounded and dead at
1600. After being resupplied by air drop in their tight perimeter, they
prepared grimly for an all-night stand.
Elsewhere in the 7th Marines’ zone, 26 September would be remembered
as much for exhausting marches and climbs as for enemy contacts.
In the morning the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Davis,
had taken over flank responsibility far to the northeast along the
Kaesong highway, thereby relieving the 2d (less Company D) and 3d for
the advance on Seoul. The 2d Battalion then moved out in trace of
Dog Company, but according to plan veered leftward into the hills at
Hoengjeoe-ri, one mile short of the ambuscade. While 2/7 reconnoitered
the high ground above the village, Major Roach’s 3d Battalion completed
an eight-and-a-half-mile forced march to gain an assembly area in
preparation for the assault of northern Hill 338.
At 1400 Fox and Easy Companies of 2/7 attacked eastward from the height
above Hoengjeoe-ri to seize Hill 343. After an advance of 1000 yards,
they were stopped cold by heavy fire from the direction of Hill 338 to
the south. Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle ordered 2/7 to dig in short of the
objective, since any further progress would only make his right more
vulnerable to the enemy guns on the flank.
Captain Thomas E. Cooney led Company G of 3/7 through Hoengjeoe-ri
about 1700, circled the northern half of Hill 338, then launched a
two-platoon assault on the crest. His Marines gained the north summit
against no opposition, but Company H, led by Captain Nicholas L.
Shields, was taken under fire in a draw to the right and held up on the
slopes for the night.[428]
[428] _Ibid._; and Capt H. H. Harris--Capt R. R. Van Cleve
interv, 10 Aug 54.
[Illustration: ACTION NORTH OF SEOUL
7th MARINES]
_Last Fight on Hill 296_
While the 7th Marines were fighting uphill on 26 September, the 3d
Battalion, 5th Marines, punched downward in a bitter contest to clear
the last NKPA resistance from the Hill 296 complex. The attack was
launched early in the morning after preparatory fires by artillery and
81mm mortars. Item Company on the left was to sweep the remainder of
the giant spur which descended into the very heart of Seoul. George,
upon jumping off from the ridge above Hill 105-N, would clear the low
ground on Item’s right.
Dissatisfied with the accuracy of the preparatory barrages, and
underestimating the enemy’s strength and determination, Captain
McMullen called off supporting arms and based the success of his
two-platoon assault on organic company weapons alone. No sooner had the
Marines lunged downhill than great gaps were torn in the skirmish line
by fire from swarms of North Koreans on the lower slopes. Both assault
platoon leaders were wounded before an intermediate knoll was taken,
and McMullen was forced to commit his reserve to bolster the hard-hit
3d Platoon on the right.
Continuing the attack under the personal leadership of its commander,
the entire company waded into a maze of entrenchments manned by 200
enemy soldiers. In the close-in fighting that followed, the Reds were
driven from their emplacements to seek cover farther down the spur. The
depleted ranks of Item Company ground to a halt.
There followed a brief calm--abruptly shattered when the North Koreans
rallied and counterattacked uphill against the company center. A wild
melee enveloped the ridgeline, and the tactical situation gradually
became a blur. Just as it seemed the Marines’ hold on the lower spur
would be pried loose, Lieutenant Williamson plowed into the tumult at
the head of a small supply party. Ammunition distributed in the heat of
the fighting tipped the scales in favor of the Marines, but not before
McMullen was carried from the field as a result of his seventh battle
wound in two wars.
The heavy fighting finally eased toward the close of the day. Although
the last organized defenses of the enemy were smashed, Company I was
too badly battered to seize the tip of the spur before nightfall.
Abreast on the right, First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize led Company
G into defensive positions after a day of inching forward against
stubborn opposition in the low ground.[429]
[429] As is frequently the case after heavy fighting, 3/5’s
_SAR_ contains inaccuracies in its account covering
24–27 September, leaving the reader with the impression
that the entire spur leading into the city was secured
on the 26th. In retracing the progress of the attack
during interviews with the authors, both Lieutenant
Colonel Taplett and Captain (now Major) McMullen agree
that the foregoing account is correct.
Other units of the 5th Marines experienced little action during 3/5’s
day-long engagement. While the 2d Battalion mopped up in its zone south
of the 3d, the 1st KMC Battalion moved into position between the latter
and the Reconnaissance Company, now manning the topographical peak
of Hill 296 in the northwest. To the rear of 3/5, the 1st Battalion
enjoyed a quiet interlude in regimental reserve.
_1st Marines in the Heart of Seoul_
Early in the morning of 26 September, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,
moved out of reserve to pass through the 3d on the streetcar line
and continue the attack northward into the center of Seoul. On the
right of Puller’s zone, 1/1 prepared to descend Hill 82 and clear the
main railroad station and adjoining slopes of South Mountain, where
increasing enemy activity had been noted below the positions of the 32d
Infantry.[430]
[430] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Peter Peter; 2/1 _SAR_;
Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cummings
interv, 12 Oct. 54.
Sutter’s unit completed the passage of lines at 0900 and attacked along
the boulevard with Fox and Easy Companies in the assault. Leading the
advance up the street were the tanks of Baker Company, Cummings’ M-26
in the van. The young officer’s machine had proceeded only a few yards
when it struck an American M6 mine, overlooked by Marine engineers
while they were removing their hasty field of the previous night. Not
only did the explosion wreck the tank, but it also caused several
casualties among the infantry on either side.
The attack edged forward in the second day of the “Battle of the
Barricades.” Every 200–300 yards, fanatical Red detachments manned
rice-bag barriers about eight feet high and five feet thick,
stretching the whole width of the street. It fell to the M-26s to
smash the emplacements and silence the NKPA antitank guns behind each
one. Marine tank action in turn hinged on mine clearance by supporting
engineers, who looked to flanking infantry for covering fire. Thus was
a system of three-party teamwork developed and perfected during the
roar of battle.
Aiding the Communists behind the barricades were other North Koreans
who fired their rifles and submachine guns from roof tops, windows,
and side streets. The Marine infantry, therefore, had to defend in
every direction as it attacked to the front. Intense heat from burning
buildings along the street added to the handicaps, and the constant
discovery of South Korean civilians, including women and children,
huddled in the rubble further strained the taut nerves of men who
looked for trouble from every quarter.
It was a dirty, frustrating fight every yard of the way, perhaps
best described by Puller himself, who reported that “progress was
agonizingly slow.” A principal deterrent to speed was the fact that all
supporting tanks simultaneously expended their ammunition and fuel,
so that all had to return to the rear for replenishment at the same
time. During their absences from the fight, the infantry understandably
chose to await their return rather than pay heavily in casualties by
assaulting barricades with small arms alone.
At one point in the street battle, an enemy soldier darted from behind
a building and charged a flame tank advancing behind two lead M-26s.
Ignoring the Marine infantrymen, who gaped in disbelief, the North
Korean hurled a huge satchel charge over the engine compartment of the
armored vehicle, then escaped unharmed as the explosion rocked the
area. The flame tank was wrecked, but the crew escaped serious injury
with the assistance of supporting infantry. Apparently a suicide squad
of NKPA demolitions men had been assigned the mission of destroying
Marine armor in this fashion, for several other Red soldiers tried
single-handed assaults shortly afterwards. The riflemen of 2/1 were
alert for the later attempts, however, and the enemy fanatics were cut
down before inflicting further damage.
The crucial period in the 2d Battalion’s day-long fire fight came as
Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company approached a street junction
below Hill 97. It had been planned that this unit would advance through
the intersection and continue along the streetcar line, while Company
E, moving behind in column, veered off on the right branch. Enemy
resistance against Fox’s advance proved so fierce that Captain Norman
R. Stanford by-passed the fork and threw Easy Company’s weight in
support of the other unit. The North Korean strong point crumbled under
the two-company onslaught, but not before Stanford and several others
were added to the casualty rolls.[431]
[431] Capt N. R. Stanford, “Road Junction,” _Marine Corps
Gazette_, 35 no. 9 (Sep 51): 16–21.
By dark, 2/1 had measured off a hard-won gain of 1200 yards. Lieutenant
Colonel Sutter ordered the battalion into defensive positions astride
the boulevard a scant 100 yards from the tip of the ridge spur which
was costing Item Company, 5th Marines, so dearly.
In the right half of Puller’s zone on 26 September, the 1st Battalion
stamped out a hornets’ nest around the main railroad station, nestled
at the foot of South Mountain.[432] Charlie Company had led off the
early morning attack in the wake of a preparation by air, artillery,
and mortars. After descending Hill 82 in a column of platoons, the
company formed on line along a stream paralleling the rail yard. Then,
at a signal from Captain Wray, the platoons crossed over, wheeled to
the north, and advanced up the tracks by leaps and bounds.
[432] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Peter Peter; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54;
and Capt F. B. Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
Though the over-all intensity of enemy resistance in this quarter
could be termed only moderate, the random deployment of the Reds
among buildings and train cars made the going slow and costly for the
Marines. After clearing out the yard, the attackers converged on the
station house itself and drove the last North Koreans from the building
during a sharp exchange. The interior of the bullet-pocked structure
produced only a handful of enemy dead, but in one corner were heaped
the bodies of several South Korean women and children. It was obvious
that the latter had been gunned by Communist executioners, since their
sheltered location within the building was ample protection against the
small arms of the advancing Marines.
By darkness, Company C was in undisputed control of the railroad
terminal, a patrol led by Lieutenant Carlon having mopped up the fringe
area. To the right, Company A had secured the park promontory on the
northwestern tip of South Mountain in conjunction with Baker Company’s
drive which included the nose jutting out below.
East of the 1st Marines, the 32d Infantry’s zone was the scene of
considerable activity throughout 26 September. After the 2d Battalion
repulsed the enemy’s pre-dawn counterattack, the 3d jumped off at 0800
from positions a mile and a half east of South Mountain. Its objective,
Hill 106, lay more than 3000 yards away, just south of the highway
leading eastward out of Seoul. Approaching the base of the ridge,
Company L surprised and destroyed a strong NKPA position, while Company
I swept up the objective itself against light opposition.
Reaching the summit, the company commander called an air strike on an
enemy column marching out of Seoul on the highway. As the planes broke
up the Red formation, Company L, reinforced with tanks and additional
infantry, drove down the road to mop up and block the escape route.[433]
[433] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
In the day-long attack, 3/32 and its supporting armament accounted for
500 enemy dead, five tanks, 45 vehicles, three artillery pieces, and
two ammunition dumps, according to regimental reports. The remainder of
the 32d, now augmented by the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, in addition
to the 17th ROK, saw spots of heavy fighting during the mop-up and
consolidation on and around South Mountain. Casualties for the 32d, as
reported on 26 September, were six KIA, 92 WIA, and three MIA. Most of
those reported the following day--32 KIA, 33 WIA, and nine MIA--could
also be traced to action on the 26th.[434]
[434] _Ibid._
Thus the Army regiment, having been impressively blooded in its eight
days of action, could lay claim to clearing both South Mountain and
that 15 per cent of Seoul’s built-up area east of the great height.[435]
[435] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 42.
In the course of the day, the 1st Marines had made patrol contact with
the 5th Marines in the left rear and with Army elements atop South
Mountain on the right flank. Prospects for the morrow appeared much
brighter at Division and Corps levels, where there must have existed
some apprehension over the complicated maneuvering which had denied the
attackers a solid front until they were in the heart of the sprawling
capital.
_Objective Secured_
The twenty-seventh of September dawned as the day of reckoning.
Applicable to the tactical situation in Seoul was the old law of
physics, that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
With X Corps troops pouring into the city and environs to share them
with the Communist garrison, it was axiomatical that one side or the
other would shortly have to go.
Oddly enough, despite the electrified atmosphere, the night of 26–27
September had passed quietly, even for Dog Company, 7th Marines,
isolated in the road cut between Hills 296 and 338.[436] At dawn a
tank-infantry team supported by engineers of Company D, 1st Engineer
Battalion, advanced down the Kaesong Highway against negligible
resistance and escorted the beleaguered rifle company back to the 7th
Marines CP at Hoengjeoe-ri.
[436] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv
_SAR_, Annex Roger Roger; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54;
Harris--Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54; and Maj W. R.
Earney, _Notes on Operations of 3d Bn, 7th Mar, in
South Korea_ (Earney Notes), MS.
While the anticlimatical “rescue” was taking place, the 3d Battalion
jumped off in the attack, supported by fire from the 2d on the left, to
clear the northern reaches of Hill 338. How Company pressed forward up
the draw on George’s right but was stalled by heavy fire which suddenly
erupted on the slopes above. The 3d Platoon, under Second Lieutenant
Paul E. Denny, broke through in its zone, only to be recalled by
Shields when the rest of the company failed to regain the lost
momentum. Captain Richard H. Sengewald’s Item Company, en route to take
positions on the left of George, paused to assist Shields’ outfit for
a short time. After further attempts by Company H to gain the summit
were unsuccessful, Sengewald led his unit to the north and attacked the
right flank of the NKPA elements scattered indiscriminately over the
remote humps of Hill 338. The situation on the northern half of the
towering objective did not change appreciably in the course of the day.
Colonel Litzenberg developed further pressure against the enemy’s right
by ordering 2/7 to continue the attack against Hill 343 in midmorning.
On the right of the battalion zone, Captain Walter D. Phillips, Jr.,
led Company E forward in the face of stubborn enemy resistance from the
crest. Owing to steady North Korean fire and the rugged terrain, gains
were measured off by the yard, both for Phillips’ unit and for Captain
Elmer J. Zorn’s Fox Company on the left. By nightfall, nevertheless,
the Marines had mastered the situation to the extent that Company E sat
firmly entrenched atop Hill 343--2500 yards from its starting point.
More force was applied to Litzenberg’s flanking lever north of Seoul
when Company G was withdrawn from its ridgeline on Hill 338 and ordered
to attack eastward to seize Hill 342, which loomed above the capital
building in the northern tip of Seoul. Circling through the low ground
north of Hill 338, the company passed safely through an extensive
minefield that had been conveniently marked off by friendly South
Koreans. As the Marines approached the base of their objective and
came under heavy sniper fire, Captain Cooney ordered the 1st Platoon,
under Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Mooney, to set up a base of fire on
intermediate high ground in order to support an assault by the 2d and
3d.
The plan backfired, for the 1st Platoon became engaged in a hot fire
fight as it moved toward the designated position. The two assault units
fared no better when, without the expected covering fire, they were hit
by a hail of lead on the lower slopes of Hill 342. Several officers
and NCOs were killed or wounded within a matter of minutes, and the
scattered fighting that continued until nightfall brought about no
significant change in the local situation.
Thus, the day ended on Litzenberg’s “Seoul Front” with the 7th Marines
in control of Hill 343 but sharing parts of 338 and 342 with the
NKPA. The story would not be complete, however, without a brief visit
to the regiment’s “Haengju Front,” several miles to the west, which
had crackled with activity during the early afternoon. About 1200, a
company of North Koreans emerged from the northern hills and attacked
toward the old ferry crossing at Hill 125. On the way the Reds had
the misfortune to stumble into Captain David W. Banks’ Able Company
of 1/7, manning a blocking position at Ryokoku. (See map of Han
River crossing). To avoid the danger of infiltration in the bustling
bridgehead, Lieutenant Colonel Davis promptly committed Company C,
under Captain Richard F. Delamar, III.
Despite their disadvantages in numbers and fire power, the dogged
Reds extended the fight sufficiently to involve even a platoon of
Captain Myron E. Wilcox’s Baker Company. After a prolonged clatter, the
engagement ended almost as abruptly as it had begun; and the immediate
result was that all Communist troops above the ferry site withdrew to
Kaesong.
The 7th Marines claimed 375 enemy killed and 34 taken prisoner in the
fighting which ranged its vast front from 23 to 27 September. The
spoils of war included the strangely unbalanced assortment of four
machine guns, six rifles and 600 bayonets.
While the 2d and 3d Battalions of Litzenberg’s regiment struggled among
the massive ridges north of Seoul on the 27th, the 1st and 5th Marines
struck at the vital nerve center of the ROK capital. The regimental
attacks through the center of the city began as separate thrusts in the
morning, but as the day wore on they took on aspects of a coordinated
foot race. It could even be said, finally, that the battle became a
flag-raising contest between the two Marine units, as the last NKPA
resistance died in heaps of rubble and torn rice bags.
At 0645, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, jumped off to clear the tip
of Hill 296’s troublesome eastern spur. For the first time in longer
than they cared to remember, the infantrymen were greeted not by a
sheet of small-arms and machine-gun fire, but by occasional, erratic
pops from the rifles of dispirited snipers. Groping through the smoke
and haze boiling up from the shattered city, Companies G and I swept
the high ground by 0730 and--at long last--slowly filtered through the
first streets of western Seoul. In short order they were encountering
the expected barricades and minefields. There was a hint of stiffening
opposition, but it quickly dissolved as the riflemen, backed by
supporting tanks and engineers, ground forward relentlessly.[437]
[437] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
By 0930, George Company made contact with the 1st Marines on the
right.[438] Less than an hour later, after wheeling northward 3/5
controlled Middle School and adjacent high ground--the springboard
for the assault on the capital building 1000 yards away. At 1200,
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered Companies G and I to continue the
attack, guiding on the two Red flags which whipped the wind defiantly
on both sides of the great dome ahead. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion
moved up behind and prepared to advance on the left of the 3d. Its
mission in the final assault was to seize the craggy peak of Hill 338,
which reared upward on the left of the capital building like a grim
fortress.[439]
[438] Contact on 26 September was between rearward elements
of the 1st and 5th Marines, not between assault units.
[439] _Ibid._
On the right of the 5th Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
had smashed through another series of rice-bag barriers on the
boulevard and at 1057, the United States colors unfurled above the
French Consulate. A furious fight exploded around the city’s main
intersection, where the principal streetcar lines crossed to form an X
not far from Middle School. Company D, spearheading 2/1’s drive, waded
into the fray with determination. Lieutenant Cummings, who by this time
appeared to have a remarkable affinity for heavy trouble, again lost
his tank to enemy mines, but not before he had knocked out two Russian
76mm self-propelled guns emplaced in the middle of the intersection.
Staff Sergeant MacDonald’s M-26 obliterated an NKPA truck with two
90mm rounds when the vehicle tried to escape with a howitzer and its
crew.[440]
[440] 2/1 _SAR_; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54.
The afternoon of 27 September was a time of climax as the 1st Marine
Division front surged forward of Middle School and the central
intersection. Though beaten and faltering, the North Koreans still
managed to fight stubbornly here and there; but their over-all
deployment no longer bore any semblance of tactical integrity.
By early afternoon the Reds facing the 5th Marines broke and fled.
Troops of 3/5 poured into the government compound, their final
objective, and secured it at 1508. The North Korean flags were struck,
and in their place rose the United States colors. Somewhat awed by
the historic import of their accomplishment, young Marine riflemen
wonderingly probed the spacious halls and chambers of the huge building
that shortly would be reoccupied by the government of the Korean
Republic.[441]
[441] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
On the left of the 3d Battalion, Company A of 1/5 had launched its
attack on Hill 338 at 1300 in the wake of devastating preparations by
air, artillery, and mortars. Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell
led off with the 1st Platoon, which seized an intermediate piece of
high ground against moderate resistance. The 2d Platoon, under Second
Lieutenant Edward E. Collins, then drove forward on the left of the
ancient wall leading to the crest of the objective; but the attack was
stopped by heavy mortar and small-arms fire. Marine air thundered down
to rake the target with machine guns and rockets. The ground troops
followed up with heavy concentrations of 60mm and 81mm mortars. Moving
closely behind the supporting fire, the 1st Platoon overran a knob
situated below the dominating peak. The 2d Platoon then resumed its
advance on the left of the wall, and the 3d, under Technical Sergeant
George W. Bolkow, took the lead on the right. It was the latter unit
that smashed through the last resistance and secured the cliffs at the
summit of Hill 338 at 1850.[442]
[442] _Ibid._
While the 5th Marines completed its final mission in Seoul, 2/1 on
the right continued along the streetcar line which curved below the
government buildings to run eastward to the far edge of the city. Since
the 7th Marines had been slowed in the hills north of the capital, the
expected tie-in on the left flank did not occur, and Puller’s troops
had to go it alone through the dense maze of streets in eastern Seoul.
At 1530 infantrymen of 2/1 raised the American flag over the Russian
Consulate, just to the right of the curve in the boulevard. Seven
minutes later the flag also waved above the United States Consulate,
about 350 yards farther off on the flank.[443]
[443] 2/1 _SAR_.
To the right of 2/1, the 1st Battalion was making good progress after
a slow start against stiff opposition. Charlie Company had been
held up at the outset in the neighborhood of the railroad station,
but supporting tanks, including flame throwers, had paved the way
by blasting and burning a formidable nest of NKPA automatic weapons
and AT guns. One armored vehicle was disabled by a mine and another
by antitank fire before the Marines finally broke through. As the
battalion pivoted eastward in accordance with the general plan, both
Charlie Company and Able on the right hammered through the usual
barricades and suicide detachments.[444]
[444] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
The 32d Infantry and elements of the 17th enjoyed a relatively quiet
day on and around South Mountain, for these units had only to hold firm
in their positions until the 1st Marines could complete its wheeling
movement and come abreast, facing east.[445]
[445] 32d Inf _War Diary_, 18–30 Sep 50.
Shortly before 1630, 2/1 was pounding eastward through a stretch of the
streetcar line south of the government compound. Fire poured into the
ranks of Dog Company from three sides, and Marines sweltered in the
heat of burning buildings that offered dubious protection. Corsairs
screamed down to plaster enemy positions only a block ahead of the
foremost infantry. Immediately after each pass by the gull-winged
planes, Second Lieutenant Carl B. Thompson, Jr., led his 1st Platoon in
the assault with covering fire provided by supporting tanks.[446]
[446] 2/1 _SAR_; and Capt T. Culpepper interv, 9 Feb 55.
There was a final surge up the street by the green-clad riflemen and
BAR-men, and then it was all over. At 1630 enemy resistance across
the 1st Regiment’s front abruptly collapsed, with the result that the
Battle of Seoul came to an end. Snipers and bypassed pockets remained
to be mopped up by the Marines, KMC units, and South Korean Police; but
the NKPA had clearly quit the fight and abandoned the city. The 1st
and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines marched rapidly through desultory
sniper fire to the eastern part of town, where they dug in for the
night.[447]
[447] _Ibid._; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv,
1 Mar 55.