The Drive to Uijongbu
_Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at Seoul--Crumbling
of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of
Inchon-Seoul Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report
to United Nations_
As rapidly as the advance of the troops permitted, preparations were
made for the restoration of civil government to Seoul. A group of
former city officials had arrived by plane from Pusan; and on 26
September, Mayor Lee opened a temporary office in Yongdungpo. The
police chief, construction engineer, and the health and welfare
officials also resumed their old duties.
Collecting points were set up for handling the civilian wounded. The
following statistics, comprising the patients treated for all causes by
the 1st Medical Battalion of the 1st Marine Division, show that Korean
civilians were second in numbers only to the Marines themselves:
U. S. Marine 2,811
Korean civilian 1,908
U. S. Army 358
KMC and ROK 322
U. S. Navy 78
POW [448]39
[448] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How.
The problem of food for a city with a pre-war population of a million
and a half was met during the advance when stores of rice and other
supplies were turned over to Seoul officials by the Marines. Medical
supplies found in the city were redistributed for use in Seoul and
Inchon hospitals as well as the hospital established at Yongdungpo by
Captain Hering, the Division Surgeon, expressly for the treatment of
civilian wounded.
A shipment of some 50 tons of rice through X Corps, plus large amounts
located in Seoul by the Marines, enabled the officials to take over
without critical food shortages. On the 28th, Mayor Lee moved into
the city hall at Seoul and acted immediately to re-establish police
authority, clear destroyed areas and provide for the restoration of
such public utilities as water and electricity.[449] These prompt
measures did much to ease the hardships of thousands of returning
refugees.
[449] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 312–313.
_Operations of 28 September_
The 5th Marines passed an uneventful day on 28 September, having taken
its assigned objectives and been pinched out by the 1st Marines on the
right and the 7th Marines on the left, as planned. An assembly area was
established in the vicinity of the Women’s University, and though the
regiment sent out patrols, no enemy were encountered.[450]
[450] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
The 7th Marines put in a busy day at seizing objectives which consisted
of the high ground north of Seoul on both sides of the main highway
from the capital to Uijongbu. Opposition was light to moderate, with
the stiffest resistance occurring in areas which indicated that the
enemy intended to put up a fight to protect his escape route to
Uijongbu. Seventy-five tons of American-made dynamite and explosives,
captured by the 7th Marines, were believed to have been originally
supplied to the ROK forces before the war and abandoned during the
NKPA invasion.[451] Total advances for the day ranged from 1,500 yards
in the zone of the 3d Battalion to 2,600 yards in the zone of the 2d
Battalion.
[451] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.
When the 1st Marines jumped off at 0645 on the 28th, the 1st and 2d
Battalions were in assault. The 3d Battalion remained in an assembly
area in the rear and continued mopping up along with the 2d KMC
Battalion. Although organized resistance in the city had been broken,
the 1st Battalion met stubborn resistance from enemy groups and
encountered many mines. The 2d Battalion, on the left, made headway
against light opposition.
These attacks cleared the remainder of Seoul and took the assault
battalions to Hill 133 (Objective ABLE) commanding the city on the
northeast.[452]
[452] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter.
General Smith visited the CPs of all three regiments on the 28th by
helicopter. He found Colonel Puller at the Ducksoo Palace, near the
intersection of the streetcar lines. Colonel Litzenberg’s CP was
located a short distance to the west, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray had
established his headquarters in the Women’s University on the northwest
outskirts of the city.
Later that day Generals Smith and Craig displaced the Division CP from
Oeoso-ri to a barracks area in Seoul, southwest of South Mountain. The
two Marine generals took over a former infirmary, but they decided that
the mortuary slab was too depressing and had that fixture removed.[453]
[453] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 308, 338–339.
_Liberation Ceremonies at Seoul_
Planning for impressive liberation ceremonies at Seoul had begun while
the street fighting was at its height. The 1st Marine Division was
requested by Corps to furnish two honor guards and a band. Musical
instruments having been left behind in Japan, air shipment was
prescribed.[454]
[454] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 27 Sep 50, _Notes_, 313–315.
General MacArthur had hoped to hold the liberation ceremony at Seoul
on 25 September, just three months to the day after the launching
of the NKPA invasion. The enemy, however, was not cooperative with
respect to this date; and even on the morning of the 29th, three NKPA
counterattacks were repulsed on the outskirts of the city. As it
proved, General MacArthur vetoed plans for a ceremony with band music.
“I will personally conduct the proceedings without being introduced,”
said his message to X Corps, and he specified that there be no honor
guard.[455]
[455] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50.
Two pre-dawn counterattacks on the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were
not auspicious beginnings for the day of the liberation exercises.
The first occurred at 0445 on 29 September, when the OP, located on a
spur projecting forward of the MLR and defended by a rifle platoon,
was infiltrated by an estimated 70 to 100 NKPA troops. A second enemy
attack hit the left flank of the battalion shortly afterwards. Both
attempts were repulsed with total losses of 48 to the Communists, and
the Marines had casualties of 4 KIA and 28 WIA, most of them resulting
from hand grenades.[456]
[456] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
Another assault, launched by the enemy at 0600 in the zone of action of
the 7th Marines, was repulsed without trouble. Most of the fighting on
29 September was done by this regiment, which pushed forward to gain
all the rest of its objectives before nightfall.
At dawn, in preparation for the liberation ceremony, Marine guards
were unobtrusively stationed along the route of approach from the new
floating bridge to the Government Palace. This duty fell chiefly on
3/1, with elements of the 5th Marines being responsible for security in
the western part of the city.
General MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee drove directly to the
Palace after separate arrivals at Kimpo Airfield. The guests included
Korean dignitaries and United Nations officials in addition to
high-ranking representatives of military organizations.
The commander in chief opened the ceremony with a moving five-minute
address ending with the Lord’s Prayer. The rumble of artillery could be
heard at times, and some of the guests glanced up apprehensively at the
shattered skylight overhead.
“Occasional falls of glass from the dome and drifting smoke and ashes
were part of the scene,” commented a Marine officer. “Unheeded noise
of rifle shots punctuated the talks. Grim Marines from Puller’s
regiment surrounded the seated audience.... The youth of the guards
was offset by the tall, gray-haired figures of Generals Smith and Barr
at the front of the audience. They were patently the men who had borne
precisely and capably the load of decision.”[457]
[457] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54.
With the 1st Marine Division still responsible for security, it was
a relief to General Smith when the distinguished visitors departed
unharmed. Not all the mines had been removed from the streets as
yet, and it was suspected that snipers might still be lurking in the
ruins.[458]
[458] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 29 Sep 50.
_Crumbling of NKPA Resistance_
Although more hard fighting lay ahead in the Inchon-Seoul operation, X
Corps alerted its major units on 29 September to the possibility of a
new amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. This was one of the
earliest announcements of the planning which led to the Wonsan landing
and the advance to the Chosin Reservoir, but the history of those
events belongs in the next volume of this series.
The new operation was suggested by the rapid disintegration of the
main body of the NKPA invasion forces. In a single day, 26 September,
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division had advanced more than 100 miles;
and a total of about 23,600 prisoners were taken by the Eighth Army
before the end of the month. Enemy resistance was still encountered,
to be sure, and sometimes it was of a desperate nature as Red Korean
troops fought to escape encirclement. But all hope and heart had gone
out of the Communist cause. One Eighth Army column sliced across the
peninsula to Kunsan while other spearheads drove northward and ROK
units pushed up the east coast nearly to Samchok. NKPA opposition was
crumbling everywhere as demoralized invasion troops threw away their
weapons and changed to civilian clothes in the hope of making their way
to North Korea through the ever tightening Eighth Army cordon.[459]
[459] U. S. MilAcad, _Operations in Korea_, 18–19.
The X Corps troops in the Seoul area had enough on their hands to
finish the old operation before starting a new one. 1st Marine Division
OpnO 13-50, issued at 2000 on 29 September, provided for the securing
of the captured city by these means:
(1) a continuation of the attack to the east;
(2) the conduct of reconnaissances in force to the north and
northwest;
(3) the relief of elements of the 7th Infantry Division north of
the river Han;
(4) the seizure of prescribed blocking positions.[460]
[460] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 318.
The Division plan of maneuver called for the three Marine rifle
regiments to take blocking positions forming a rough semi-circle
defending Seoul from three sides--the 5th Marines to the northwest,
the 7th Marines to the north, and the 1st Marines to the northeast.
Responsibility for the area north of the Han river and west of the
Pukhan River had passed to the 1st Marine Division, and at 1500 on 30
September the following missions were assigned by OpnO 14-50:
RCT-1--To protect the right flank of the Division and be
prepared to assemble in Division reserve by battalions for a
motor lift. Blocking positions, as assigned by OpnO 13-50,
consisted of high ground from two to five miles northeast of
Seoul.
RCT-5--To continue reconnaissance in force with minimum of
a reinforced battalion to Suyuhyon and establish a blocking
position; to protect the left flank of the Division; and to
be prepared to provide a reinforced rifle company for Task
Force Kumpo, on order. These attachments to be made: 1st
Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion,
USA; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion; and a company from the 1st Motor Transport Battalion.
RCT-7--To advance rapidly and seize blocking positions in
the vicinity of Uijongbu. These attachments to be made: 3d
Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion,
USA; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; and one company of the KMC
Regiment.
The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions and one
company of the 5th Battalion, with a detachment of ANGLICO
attached) was meanwhile to advance to the east and seize
blocking positions at the junction of the Han and Pukhan rivers
where the road leading northeast from Seoul reaches that point.
The 1st KMC Battalion had been attached to the 7th Infantry
Division, and the 3d Battalion was operating on the Kumpo
Peninsula.
Task Force Kumpo, when activated on Division order, was to
consist of the 3d KMC Battalion and Battery C, 50th AAA
Battalion, USA, plus a 5th Marines rifle company and a tank
detachment, if required. As it proved, however, X Corps held
responsibility for the defense of this area until 2 October,
when the 187th Airborne RCT was relieved by Task Force
Kumpo.[461]
[461] _Ibid._, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo”
are used in reports to designate the same area--the
peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first
name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the
second from the principal town of the peninsula.
Two more small fire fights awaited the 5th Marines in carrying out
the missions assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. At 1030 on 1 October,
while patrolling the extensive area of regimental responsibility, a
detachment of 2/5 made contact with an NKPA force estimated at 150 to
200 men. Air strikes and mortar fire soon took the fight out of the
enemy, who left 30 dead behind.
At 0600 on 1 October the 3d Battalion, reinforced with a battery of
artillery and a platoon of tanks and engineers, moved out toward
Suyuhyon. Charlie Company of 1/5 followed in trace to protect the
battalion rear and provide security for returning motor transport.
Two road blocks were cleared before the battalion tied in for the night
on high ground just short of the objective. Then, at 0230 the next
morning, the enemy struck in estimated company strength. The attempt
was repulsed by machine-gun fire, and 67 Red Korean bodies were found
at daybreak in the attack area. At 0700 the column resumed the march to
Suyuhyon, which was occupied without further incident.[462]
[462] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen: basic rpt and
Peter.
The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions
assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. In fact, the regiment had only a few
minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul.
Colonel Litzenberg’s men were now making the main effort of the 1st
Marine Division. Preparations for the drive to Uijongbu began with
every indication that the enemy was bent upon flight. A patrol from the
3d Battalion found 30 Korean bodies beside a wall, including several
women and a child, whose hands had been bound behind them before
they were shot. The victims, according to a POW, were members of the
families of ROK soldiers.[463]
[463] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.
Positions had been consolidated by the late afternoon of 30 September
in readiness for the jump-off in the morning. The 7th Marines might
well have been called Task Force Litzenberg at this stage for it was
reinforced by Major Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, Captain
Lester T. Chase’s Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion, Captain Byron
C. Turner’s Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Captain Kim’s
Company C of the 5th KMC Battalion.
The drive to the new objective began at 0630 on 1 October in a column
of battalions. Air reconnaissance had made it appear likely that any
NKPA resistance would probably take advantage of a tactical bottleneck,
about halfway to Uijongbu, where steep and rocky ridges overlooked a
narrow defile through which the road passed. Colonel Litzenberg and his
staff decided to maneuver by sending the 1st Battalion to make a broad
feint to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile with tank
support while the 2d Battalion followed in reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis secured his preliminary objectives, then
swiftly spread out on both sides of the defile for his feint.
Unfortunately, Major Roach was delayed by an enemy mine field, which
brought the 3d Battalion and the tanks to a halt while the engineers
cleared the way. Davis’ simulated attack had meanwhile disclosed that
the enemy was entrenched in depth along the high ground on each side of
the defile. Both Marine battalions took heavy NKPA artillery and mortar
fire before halting for the night.[464]
[464] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes
Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex
Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv,
22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T.
Bey interv, 17 Nov 54.
[Illustration: PURSUIT OF THE NKPA & CAPTURE OF UIJONGBU
28 SEP--3 OCT 1950]
At least the day’s attacks had unmasked the enemy’s positions and
exposed them to savage attacks by the Corsairs of VMF-312. RCT-7
continued the attack at 0630 on the 2d, with Roach on the left of the
road and Davis on the right. About halfway through the defile the 3d
Battalion was pinned down by a concentration of NKPA artillery, mortar,
and small-arms fire. Again the tanks were held up while the engineers
cleared away mines, working in a hail of bullets. The tanks of the
1st Platoon repaid the favor by closing in on two huts sheltering
NKPA troops and killing an estimated 35. Here an attached dozer tank,
without blade, had a freakish accident when two men in the turret were
wounded by enemy fire down a 105mm gun tube while the breech was open.
The 1st Battalion managed to cross the stream east of the defile and
seize the high ground just beyond. But the day ended with gains of only
300 yards in the defile.
Roach’s men returned to the attack in the morning, supported by the
tanks of the 2d Platoon. Again VMF-312 flew one close air support
sortie after another. Major Charles E. McLean was hit by enemy AA fire
but crash-landed his plane in friendly territory. First Lieutenant
Robert O. Crocker was killed in action shortly after being brought down
by NKPA small-arms fire.
VMF-312 fliers intercepted an enemy convoy and First Lieutenant
Franklin Stratton reported the destruction of seven out of eight
trucks. The tanks also gave the infantry helpful support, firing 167
90mm rounds during the day and an estimated 20,000 machine gun rounds
at enemy troops along the ridge.
While 1/7 cleared the high ground on the east side of the road and 3/7
on the west side, Colonel Litzenberg directed Major Webb D. Sawyer[465]
to pass between them with 2/7 and drive directly along the highway.
Progress was satisfactory from the start. When Sawyer’s men began to
overrun abandoned NKPA artillery pieces and supply dumps, they pounded
ahead with the realization that enemy resistance was broken.
[465] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander,
had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September.
At five that afternoon the 2d Battalion entered the ruins of Uijongbu,
evacuated by the enemy. The last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul
operation had ended in a smashing victory for the Division’s youngest
regiment.
Identifications showed that the Marines had been opposed by three
battalions of the 31st Regiment of the 31st NKPA Division. Elements of
the 17th and Seoul Divisions and of an artillery battalion were also
encountered. These troops had been supported by 13 tanks, of which
four were killed by Marine air attacks and two captured in a damaged
condition by 2/7 after the others escaped.
The three-mile advance of RCT-7 on 3 October had resulted in the
cutting of lateral communications to the east and west of Uijongbu and
the securing of an important blocking position on the X Corps final
phase line. Losses of 13 killed and 111 wounded were suffered by the
regiment in the three-day fight.
_Last Days of Inchon-Seoul Operation_
The climax of the battle was witnessed by General Cates, who visited
the front on 3 October, accompanied by Major Generals Edwin A. Pollock
and Clayton C. Jerome. After being briefed at the Division CP by the
G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, the Commandant inspected the positions of RCT-1
and RCT-5 by helicopter before taking a jeep tour along the road to
Uijongbu to watch Colonel Litzenberg’s men slug their way forward into
the battered town.[466]
[466] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 2–3 Oct 50.
That evening the fighting virtually came to an end, for the 1st Marine
Division had a total of only seven casualties during the last four days
of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The rifle regiments had only to maintain
their blocking positions while patrolling to front and flank.
Operations on the Kumpo Peninsula, which had been sputtering
intermittently ever since the occupation of the airfield, also drew
to a close.[467] Responsibility for the area having passed from Corps
back to Division on 2 October, elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were
relieved by Task Force Kumpo, consisting of the 3d KMC Battalion, a
detachment from the 1st Signal Battalion, and Battery C of the 50th AAA
Battalion, USA.
[467] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54.
Naval gunfire had found its greatest mission of the exploitation phase
in support of the widely assorted units which protected the left flank
of X Corps at various times. The 187th, being short on artillery, had
relied on the naval gunfire and spot teams commanded by Lieutenant
(jg) Leo D. McMillan, USN, and First Lieutenant J. E. Dolan, of the
2d Battalion, 7th Marines. These officers and their men remained with
Task Force Kumpo after it relieved the 187th, but patrols reported no
enemy contacts after 2 October. The chief activity on the peninsula
was listening to the baseball games of the World Series, which came in
clearly over the radios of the naval gunfire teams.[468]
[468] _Ibid._
As directed on 5 October by OpnO 15-50, the last to be issued by the
Division in the Inchon-Seoul Operation, the major Marine units were
scheduled to close into staging areas in Inchon as follows:
5th Marines 1800 on 5 October;
11th Marines 1700 on 6 October;
1st Marines Prior to darkness, 6 October;
7th Marines Midafternoon, 7 October;
KMC Regiment Prior to darkness, 7 October.
An impressive ceremony was held on the 6th, when the cemetery
established by the Marines on the outskirts of Inchon was taken over
by the United Nations. After an invocation by Chaplain R. M. Schwyhart
of the 1st Marine Division, General Almond made a few remarks and
laid a wreath on the grave of an unknown soldier. Then General Smith,
General Barr, and Colonel Lee performed the same ceremony over Marine,
Army, and ROK graves. Volleys were fired, taps were sounded, and the
dedication ended with the national anthems of the United States and
Korea.[469]
[469] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 342; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
George, 7.
There could be no doubt, as the Marines prepared to mount out for a
new amphibious operation, that the NKPA invaders had been knocked out
of the war by the combined X Corps and Eighth Army offensives. The Red
Korean retreat had become a rout, and Marine staff officers considered
it doubtful whether the enemy could hold the east coast port of Wonsan
long enough to defend it against the proposed new Marine assault
landing.[470]
[470] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the
Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal
route.
It was apparent, in fact, that only the active intervention of Red
China or the Soviet Union could save the North Korean People’s Republic
from imminent collapse. At this time, however, it did not seem likely
that any such attempt would be made.
And so it was that one of the most remarkable amphibious operations
in Marine Corps annals came uneventfully to an end on 7 October 1950.
Early in the morning the Division CP displaced from Seoul to a housing
area just north of Ascom City. At 0935, in accordance with X Corps OpnO
5, General Smith reported to Admiral Doyle, ComPhibGru One, for duty
as commander of the landing force for the proposed Wonsan assault.
And at 1200 the Inchon-Seoul operation passed into history when the
last troops of the 7th Marines were relieved in the Uijongbu area by
elements of the Eighth Army.
_Summaries and Conclusions_
At this stage the men of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing were still too close to the operation to see it clearly
in detail. If there was any one overwhelming impression they all had in
common, it was a sense of the speed with which events had raced toward
a climax.
This was by no means an illusion. Hundreds of Marine reservists had
watched baseball games or enjoyed picnics with their families on the
Fourth of July, never dreaming that shortly after Labor Day they would
be scrambling out of landing boats to assault a flaming Asiatic seaport
on the other side of the earth!
Speed was an essential if the assault landing were to be completed
on the prescribed D-day. But there was no place for the proverbial
haste that leads to waste. It had to be the speed of precision--an
acceleration of men and events made possible by the amphibious know-how
of a Navy-Marine Corps team that had worked together throughout the
Pacific operations of World War II.
Sometimes this acceleration was so unobtrusive as to pass almost
unnoticed. Shipping does not grow on trees, particularly the enormous
amounts of shipping required for a major amphibious operation. Yet the
U. S. Navy made it appear a simple and routine matter to assemble from
all the seven seas an invasion fleet made up of craft ranging from
cruisers to rowboats.
The Marines, as the Landing Force, worked hand-in-hand with the Attack
Force commanded by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who had no superior
in the world of 1950 as an amphibious specialist. From preliminary
planning to final execution, Doyle and his staff officers of PhibGru
One supplied a precision which had much to do with the success of an
operation holding so many potentialities of disaster.
Looking back, some of the Marine participants could hardly recall a
full night’s sleep from 25 July 1950, the date of the order directing
that the 1st Marine Division be brought up to full war strength, until
7 October 1950, when the operation came to a victorious end. From the
mobilization at Camp Pendleton to the street fighting in Seoul, it was
often necessary to utilize the hours of darkness ordinarily devoted to
rest. At Kobe, for instance, there were so few copies of the plans for
the Inchon landing that they were circulated on a 24-hour schedule for
study by Marine officers who took turns.
The acceleration of the 1st Marine Division in 64 days from a peacetime
basis to the capture of Seoul has been summarized as follows:
(a) Expansion from a reduced peace strength (less the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade) to a reinforced war strength, less
one RCT, was completed in a period of approximately 15 days.
(b) Administrative sea lift and movement of over 15,000
personnel, organic equipment, and partial resupply from San
Diego to the Far East Command commenced in less than three
weeks after expansion was ordered.
(c) Debarkation and unloading from administrative shipping,
and reembarkation and reloading at Kobe, Japan for the assault
landing at Inchon were done in a period averaging about seven
days per unit, two days of which were lost due to a heavy
typhoon in the Kobe area.
(d) Completed planning and the issuance of the complete
operation order for the amphibious landing at Inchon were
accomplished 17 days after the receipt of the initial directive.
(e) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disengaged from
active combat with the enemy on the South Korean front at
midnight on 5 September, moved to Pusan, and outloaded in
combat shipping in less than 7 days.
(f) A successful assault landing was executed at Inchon,
Korea, on 15 September under some of the most adverse landing
conditions in the history of amphibious operations.
(g) The Force Beachhead Line approximately six miles from
landing beaches was seized within 24 hours after the main
landing on Beaches RED and BLUE.
(h) Kimpo Airfield, a primary objective of the operation in the
1st Marine Division’s zone of action, was captured 50 hours and
35 minutes after H-Hour, D-Day.
(i) The first assault crossing of the Han River (400 yards wide
at the crossing site) was executed by RCT-5, employing LVTs,
DUKWs, and pontoon ferries, less than five days after landing
at Inchon.
(j) The remainder of the Division crossed the Han River without
bridging, and after intense fighting completed the seizure of
Seoul 12 days after landing at Inchon.
(k) The effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team and close
air support doctrine were reaffirmed with outstanding success.
(l) The ability of Marine units to participate in extended land
operations, provided additional transportation requirements are
met during the emergency, was demonstrated in the Inchon-Seoul
operation.[471]
[471] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 365–366.
In any such summary, it is understood that credit for the
accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division was shared by the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing. Two more days of fighting remained for the
squadrons at Kimpo after the relief of the ground forces, since
Marine air operations cover the period from 7 September to 9 October
1950. Altogether, 2,774 combat sorties were flown by the five Marine
squadrons during this 33-day period, most of them in close support of
infantry units. Following are the totals:
--------------+--------+----------
Squadron | Days in| Combat
| Action| Sorties
--------------+--------+----------
VMF-214 | 16 | 484
VMF-323 | 22 | 784
VMF-212 | 19 | 607
VMF-312 | 10 | 288
VMF(N)-542 | 19 | 573
| +----------
Total | |[472]2,774
--------------+--------+----------
[472] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been
derived form: 1st MAW _SAR_, Annexes Able, Item, Jim,
Queen, Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit,
“Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27.
Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38
flown by two aircraft of VMF-312, which began operating
from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron
arrived.
“No enemy air operations of any significance were encountered,” stated
the TAC X Corps report. “Some enemy antiaircraft fire from light to
moderate was encountered. Most of this AA fire was of small caliber.”
Eleven Marine planes (not counting VMO-6 aircraft) were shot down by
NKPA ground forces. Six pilots and a crewman were killed in action and
two pilots wounded.
As an example of the types of missions, the 326 combat sorties flown
by VMF-322 fell into these categories: close air support, 163;
reconnaissance, 99; rescue cover, 18; deep support, 17; helicopter
escort, 8; photo escort, 6; combat air patrol, 6; tactical air control,
4; leaflet, 2; R4D escort, 2; message drop, 2. In addition, the
squadron was credited with 151 noncombat sorties.
There could be no question that Marine close air support had won
the esteem of Army infantry units. Generals Harris and Cushman were
the recipients of many spontaneous comments of appreciation from
individuals as well as formal endorsements. (See Appendix L for the
record.)
On the other hand, the Marines had cause to be grateful for the deep
support and interdiction strikes provided by the Naval fast carrier
planes of JTF-7 in combination with the Fifth Air Force, which was
committed primarily to the support of the Eighth Army in South Korea.
During the first two weeks of September, JTF-7 had responsibility
for the gradual isolation of the Inchon target area by means of air
operations conducted as far as 150 miles north of the objective and 100
miles to the south.
The air defense of our forces at sea and in the Inchon area, and the
air interdiction operations of the first five or six days of the
landing--these were carried out largely by Naval air effort under
Commander JTF-7. Mutual assistance between JTF-7 and the Fifth Air
Force was provided for, with coordination being achieved by the
delineation of areas for each.[473]
[473] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55.
VMO-6, under the control of the 1st Marine Division and administration
control of MAG-33, completed a total of 643 helicopter and OY flights
in 515 hours. Of the 139 seriously wounded men evacuated by helicopter
from the firing line, a large proportion owed their lives to the
speed and ease with which they were transported to the hospital. The
helicopters also were credited with twelve rescue missions of friendly
pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.[474]
[474] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex William William.
In the long run, of course, it took the coordinated efforts of ground,
air, and sea forces to win the final victory in one of the most unusual
and difficult amphibious operations of all time. And though this book
is limited to an account of Marine activities primarily, the Marines
who took part would be first to acknowledge how much the final victory
owed to the efforts of other ground forces--the U. S. Army units, the
KMC Regiment, and the ROK contingents.
Many of these units, like the Marines, had been handicapped by a hasty
build-up which allowed little or no time for special training and
rehearsals. No greater feat of organization was recorded in 1950 than
the creation of a new 7th Infantry Division from the bare bones of the
old in only a few weeks. The Marines saw more of the 32d Infantry than
General Barr’s other units, for it was this regiment which protected
the right flank during critical periods of the advance on Seoul while
elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were responsible for the security of
the left flank.
The Army artillery units, amphibian tractor troops, and AAA companies
also deserve their full share of credit for the victory. And though
the Marines were not often in contact with the ROKs, they realized
how much these allies had contributed, often under the most adverse
circumstances.
Naturally, the Marines felt a special interest in the KMC Regiment,
which they had trained and equipped. The KMCs repaid this feeling by
the valor with which they fought in every phase of the operation from
the mopping up of Inchon to the battle for Seoul.
The Inchon landing and its exploitation have been made the subject of a
study by officers of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, who summed
up the over-all effects as follows:
(a) The amphibious envelopment at Inchon produced a decisive
threat to the North Korean forces which led directly to the
rapid disintegration of their front on the Pusan Perimeter. The
1st Marine Division was the landing force in this amphibious
envelopment.
(b) It completed the dislocation of the enemy’s entire
logistical system by the capture of Seoul, which, together with
the combat action of other UN forces, shattered the enemy in
all of South Korea, causing the complete rout of the North
Korean forces. The 1st Marine Division played a principal role
in the capture of Seoul.
(c) The successful completion of the campaign made available to
UN forces the port facilities of Inchon and the extensive Seoul
communications complex for carrying offensive action into North
Korea.
(d) By the direct action of the 1st Marine Division, the
enemy’s potential was reduced by the capture of 4,692 POWs, by
inflicting 13,666 casualties on the enemy, by destroying 44
tanks, and by destroying or capturing much other material.[475]
[475] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 45–46. Here again it
may be noted that later reports, not available when
this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims
were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two
others unaccounted for in records. The actual total,
therefore, is 38.
In view of such far-reaching results, total casualties for the 1st
Marine Division of 366 KIA, 49 DOW, 6 MIA, and 2,029 WIA cannot be
considered excessive for an operation fraught with so many calculated
risks. No man’s life was given in vain, for the Communist challenge
to the free nations was met in Korea and the aggressors beaten so
decisively that the world would soon have had peace except for the
intervention of Red China.
_MacArthur’s Report to United Nations_
Again it is worthy of emphasis that the victory was not won by any
one nation or any one branch of the military service. As far as this
country is concerned, the Inchon-Seoul operation was conducted jointly
by the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. General
Douglas MacArthur was spokesman for all of them late in September 1950,
in these extracts from the Sixth Report of the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command, to the Security Council of the United Nations:
“Events of the past two weeks have been decisive. The strategic
concepts designed to win the war are rapidly proving their
soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea,
and air forces.
“The seizure of the heart of the enemy’s distributing system
in the Seoul area has completely dislocated his logistical
supply to his forces in South Korea and has quickly resulted in
their disintegration. Caught between our northern and southern
forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of
our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy is thoroughly
shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our
combined combat activities.
“The prompt junction of our two forces is dramatically symbolic
of this collapse.
“The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the
enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor
beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel and
an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success
demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious
warfare, clockwork coordination, and cooperation between the
units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy
about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been.
The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with
the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and
guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had
this development been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy
would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have
been more costly to United Nations forces.”
At no time, not even when the United Nations forces were fighting with
their backs to the wall at Pusan, did the commander in chief ever have
any doubts as to the outcome. It was fitting, therefore, that he should
have summed up the results of the combined Eighth Army and X Corps
offensives in this conclusion written after the securing of Seoul:
“A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely
changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the
North Korean army has been broken and their scattered forces
are being liquidated or driven north with material losses in
equipment and men captured.”
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
AAA(AW)Bn--Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (USA).
AD--Destroyer Tender.
AE--Ammunition Ship.
AerialDelPlat--Aerial Delivery Platoon.
AF--Air Force; Store Ship.
AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship.
AH--Hospital Ship.
AK--Cargo Ship.
AKA--Assault Cargo Ship.
AKL--Cargo Ship--Light.
AKS--Stores Issue Ship.
AM--Minesweeper.
AmphTracBn--Amphibious Tractor Battalion.
AmphTrkBn--Amphibious Truck Battalion.
AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper.
ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.
AO--Oiler.
AOG--Gasoline Tanker.
AP--Transport.
APA--Assault Transport.
APD--High Speed Transport.
ARG--Repair Ship--Internal Combustion Engines.
ARH--Repair Ship--Heavy Hull Damage.
ARL--Repair Ship--Landing Craft.
ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion.
ARS--Salvage Vessel.
AT--Antitank.
ATF--Ocean Tug--Fleet.
AV--Seaplane Tender.
AVP--Seaplane Tender, Small.
Bchmstr Unit--Beachmaster Unit.
BLT--Battalion Landing Team.
Bn--Battalion.
CA--Heavy Cruiser.
CG--Commanding General.
CICDet--Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment (USA).
CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East.
CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CL--Light Cruiser.
CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CNO--Chief of Naval Operations.
CO--Commanding Officer.
Co--Company.
ComAirSupGrp--Commander Air Support Group.
ComCarDiv--Commander Carrier Division.
ComNavFE--Commander Navy Far East.
ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One.
CP--Command Post.
C/S--Chief of Staff.
CSG--Combat Service Group.
CTF--Commander Task Force.
CV--Aircraft Carrier.
CVE--Aircraft Carrier--Escort.
CVL--Aircraft Carrier--Light.
DD--Destroyer.
DDE--Escort Destroyer.
DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer.
DOW--Died of wounds.
DUKW--Amphibious Truck.
Emb Off--Embarkation Officer.
EngrBn--Engineer Battalion.
EngrPortConstCo--Engineer Port Construction Company (USA).
EngrSpecBrig--Engineer Special Brigade (USA).
ETO--European Theater of Operations.
EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea.
FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA).
FAC--Forward Air Controller.
FBHL--Force Beachhead Line.
FEAF--Far East Air Force.
FECOM--Far East Command.
F4U--Vought “Corsair” Fighter.
FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac-Pacific; Lant-Atlantic).
FO--Forward Observer.
FSA--Fire Support Area.
FSCC--Fire Support Coordination Center.
F7F-3--Grumman “Tigercat” Night Fighter.
Fum & Bath Plat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon.
GCI--Ground Control Intercept.
GHQ--General Headquarters.
H & S Co--Headquarters and Service Company.
HO3S-1--Sikorsky Helicopter.
HqBn--Headquarters Battalion.
HqCo--Headquarters Company.
HqSq--Headquarters Squadron.
InfDiv--infantry Division (USA).
interv--Interview.
JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group.
JTF--Joint Task Force.
KIA--Killed in Action.
KMC--Korean Marine Corps.
LCM--Landing Craft, Mechanized.
LCVP--Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel.
LSD--Landing Ship, Dock.
LSM--Landing Ship, Medium.
LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket.
LST--Landing Ship, Tank.
LSU--Landing Ship, Utility.
LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked.
LVT(A)--Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored).
MAG--Marine Air Group.
MAW--Marine Air Wing.
MedBn--Medical Battalion.
MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron.
MIA--Missing in action.
MOS--Military Occupational Specialty.
MPCo--Military Police Company.
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.
MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion.
NCO--Noncommissioned Officer.
NGF--Naval Gunfire.
NK--North Korea(n).
NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army.
OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA).
Off--Officer.
OP--Observation Post.
OpnO--Operation Order.
OrdAmmCo--Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA).
OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion.
OY--Consolidated-Vultee light observation plane.
PC--Submarine Chaser.
PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel.
PF--Frigate.
PhibGru--Amphibious Group.
PhibTraPac--Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.
PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report.
Plat--Platoon.
POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
POW--Prisoner of War.
RAF--Royal Air Force.
RcnCo--Reconnaissance Company.
RCT--Regimental Combat Team.
RktBn--Rocket Battalion.
ROK--Republic of Korea.
SAC--Supporting Arms Center.
SAR--Special Action Report.
SCAJAP--Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan.
ServBn--Service Battalion.
SigBn--Signal Battalion.
SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company (USA).
SPBn--Shore Party Battalion.
SpOpnsCo--Special Operations Company (USA).
TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator.
TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps.
TacAir--Tactical Air.
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center.
T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS.
T/E--Table of Equipment.
TF--Task Force.
TG--Task Group.
T/O--Table of Organization.
UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team.
UF--Unit of fire.
UN--United Nations.
UNC--United Nations Command.
USA--United States Army.
USAF--United States Air Force.
USMC--United States Marine Corps.
USN--United States Navy.
VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron).
VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron).
VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron).
VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron).
WIA--Wounded in action.
WP--White phosphorous.
YMS--Motor Minesweeper.
YTB--Harbor Tug, Big.
YW--District Barge, Water (self-propelled).
APPENDIX B
Build-Up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf)
(Figures include Marine Corps and Navy, both officer and enlisted)
------------------------------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
Authorized by CMC ltr conf. |1st Prov | Main | 7th RCT | Total in
Ser. 03C20550 of 25 Jul 54 | Marine | body | (sailed | Inchon-
and CMC ltr conf. Ser. | Brigade | (sailed | from | Seoul
03A21250 of 4 Aug 50 |(sailed | San Diego|Mediterranean| area on
---------------------+--------+San Diego| 10–22 Aug| 16 Aug 50 |23 Sep 50
| |14 Jul 50| 50 | and San | [477]
Units |Strength| arrived | arrived | Diego |
| | Pusan, | Kobe | 28 Aug- |
| | Korea | Japan | 2 Sep 50 |
| |2 Aug 50)|28 Aug to | arrived |
| | |10 Sep 50)| Inchon on |
| | | | 21 Sep 50) |
| | | | [476] |
---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
DIVISION | 22,343 | 4,770 | 12,195 | 5,336 | 20,218
+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
Hq Bn | 923 | 259 | 725 | | 860
Hq Co | (656)| (182)| | |
Mp Co | (140)| (38)| | |
RcnCo | (127)| (39)| | |
1st Serv Bn | 827 | 173 | 656 | | 785
1st Sig Bn | 960 | 249 | 591 | 116 | 661
1st MT Bn | 783 | 118 | 582 | 89 | 761
1st Ord Bn | 558 | 124 | 438 | | 518
1st Med Bn | 636 | 99 | 432 | 107 | 667
1st Tank Bn | 907 | 181 | 677 | 132 | 921
1st SP Bn | 755 | 188 | 357 | 196 | 836
1st Engr Bn | 1,180 | 218 | 815 | 163 | 969
11th Marines | 3,108 | 518 | 1,845 | 697 | 3,009
1st Marines | 3,902 | | 3,942 | | 3,393
5th Marines | 3,902 | 2,643 |[478]1,135| | 3,170
7th Marines | 3,902 | | | 3,836 | 3,666
+========+=========+==========+=============+==========
FMF TROOPS | 3,969 | 554 | 3,167 | | 2,973
+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
1st Armd Amph Bn | 526 | | 490 | |
1st Amph Trac Bn | 944 | 256 | 720 | | [479]842
1st Amph Trk Co | 245 | 77 | 166 | | 236
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ | 90 | | 89 | | 77
Rkt Bn | | | | |
Carrier Plat FMF | 94 | | 84 | | 86
1st Comb Serv Grp | 1,434 | 109 | 1,120 | | 1,167
7th MT Bn | 431 | | 418 | | 410
1st Air Delivery Plat| 63 | | 62 | | 63
1st Fum & Bath Plat | 30 | | 18 | | 30
VMO 6 | 112 | 112 | | | 62
+========+=========+==========+=============+==========
Total reinforced | 26,312 | 5,324 | 15,362 | 5,336 | 23,191
division | | | | |
---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------
[476] Activated 17 Aug 50. The 3d Bn 6th Marines, in the
Mediterranean, was assigned to the 7th Marines and,
upon arrival in Kobe, Japan, on 3 Sept 50, was
redesignated the 3d Bn 7th Marines. Augmentation
personnel for this Battalion arrived in Kobe, Japan,
on 14 Sept 50 on the USS _Thomas Jefferson_. The
regimental commander and his staff arrived by air at
Kobe on 6 Sept 50.
[477] Based on Division Personnel Periodic Report No. 1
covering the period 15–23 Sept 50. The following losses
and gains during the period are reflected in this
report:
_Net
_Losses_ _Gains_ Loss_
KIA 118 Replacements 28
WIA 845 Returned to duty 160
MIA 14 ----- -----
Non-battle Cas 286 188 1,075
-----
1,263
[478] Augmentation personnel for the 5th Marines (Reinf)
already in Korea. The CO, 1st Marines was charged with
the assembly and organization of the augmentation units
for the 5th Marines (Reinf). Augmentation personnel
were organized into three reinforced rifle companies.
(The battalions of the 5th Marines in Korea contained
only two rifle companies each.) The reinforced
rifle companies were embarked together on one ship.
Augmentation personnel for units of the Brigade, other
than the 5th Marines, were attached to the reinforced
rifle companies.
[479] The 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was left
in Kobe. In addition, at Kobe, were the Division
Administrative Center and some 500 17-year olds, who,
by order of SecNav, were removed from the troop list
just before sailing for Inchon. As of 15 Sept 50 there
were the following personnel of the 1st Marine Division
(Reinf) at Kobe:
Key: _O_: Officers
_E_: Enlisted
_Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_
-------------- -------- ----------
_O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_
59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282
APPENDIX C
Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing
In order to present a concise picture of the Task Organization of
the 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, for the period of 1 August-7
October 1950, task organizations are presented for the following five
conditions:
(1) Completion of mobilization of the Division (less 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade and RCT-7) at Camp Pendleton,
Oceanside, California, 12 August.
(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA, 15 September.
(3) RCT-7 task organization on arrival INCHON, KOREA, 21
September.
(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during
the period 15 September-7 October.
(5) Completion of INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation on 7 October.
The detailed Task Organizations are as follows:
(1) Completion of Mobilization on WAR “K” series T/O, 12 August.
_1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less Brig Det LtCol M. T. STARR
1st SigBn, less Brig Det, 2 SP
Comm Sects & Det Anglico
Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER
1st ServBn, less Brig Det LtCol C. L. BANKS
1st OrdBn, less Brig Det Maj L. O. WILLIAMS
1st MT Bn, less Cos A and D; 1st
Amph Trk Co, FMF, less 1 Plat LtCol O. L. BEALL
1st Med Bn, less Cos A and E Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN
1st EngrBn, less Cos A and D LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
1st SP Bn, less Cos A and C LtCol H. P. CROWE
1st Tk Bn, less Cos A and D;
Tk Plat AT Co, 1st Mar
Tk Plat AT Co, 5th Mar LtCol H. T. MILNE
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less Cos
A and D LtCol E. F. WANN
1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF, less
1st Plat Co A and Cos C and D LtCol F. H. COOPER
1st CSG, SC, FMF, less BrigDet;
1st Fum & Bath Plat, SC, FMF
1st Aerial Del Plat, SC, FMF Col J. S. COOK
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA
1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co; Cos
C, F, and I, Reinf, 5th Mar Col L. B. PULLER
11th Mar, less 1st and 3rd Bns;
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER
(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA (1st Prov Mar
Brig disbanded 13 September, units and detachments reverted
control parent organizations of division). Task Organization
from Annex “A”, 1st Mar Div Op Order 2-50 as derived from X
Corps Op Order No. 1.
_1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, Reinf, 1stMarDiv, less dets
163rd Mil Int Service Det
441st CIC Det
1st Sig Bn, Reinf, less dets;
Det, 205th Sig Rep Co USA
Carrier Plat, FMF
Det, 4th Sig Bn, USA
1st Serv Bn, less Dets
1st MT Bn
1st Ord Bn, less dets
Det, MTACS-2
_Blt-3, RCT-5_ LtCol R. D. TAPLETT
3dBn, 5th Mar
Det, ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Co A, 1st Tk Bn
Recon Det, 11th Mar
Team 1, SP Gp A
1stPlat, Co A, 1st SP Bn
SP Comm Sqd, 1st Sig Bn
Amm Sqd, 1st Ord Bn
Det, Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn
Det, 1st CSG, (SP Aug)
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
_RCT-5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Mar, less 3dBn & Tk Plat, AT Co
Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co C, 1st Med Bn
Det Anglico, 1st Sig Bn
ROK Marine Bn
SP GP A, less Team 1;
Co, A, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn
Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG
Det, CS Plat, CSG
Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug)
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
1st Traffic Plat, MP Co
Police Sqd, MP Co
FO & Ln Sec, 1st Bn, 11th Mar
Co A, 1st Tk Bn, less det
Det, Sig Co, 1st Sig Bn
_RCT-1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co
Co A, Reinf, 56th Amph Trac Bn, USA
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF
Co C, Reinf, 1st Engr Bn, less det;
Water Sup Sec
Co D, 1st Med Bn, less det
Det ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn
SP Gp B, less Team 3;
Co B, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat &
Equip Sec
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn
Amm Plat, less 1 Sqd, 1st Ord Bn
Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn
Fuel Sec, 1st Ser Bn
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN
Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug)
2d Traffic Plat, MP Co
Police Sqd, MP Co
FO & Ln Secs, 2d Bn, 11th Mar
_11th Mar, less 3d Bn, reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER
96th FA Bn, USA
Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn
1st Amph Trk Co, FMF
_1st Tk Bn, less dets, reinf_ LtCol H. T. MILNE
Tk Plat, AT Co, 1st Mar
Tk Plat, AT Co, 5th Mar
_1st Engr Bn, less dets_ LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
_1st SP Bn, less dets_ LtCol H. P. CROWE
H&S Co, 1st SP Bn, less dets
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Team 3, SP Gp B
3d Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn
Equip Sec, Co B, 1st SP Bn
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn
Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG
Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG
Det, GS Plat, CSG
Det, Depot Plat, CSG
_Rcn Co, 1st MAR Div_ Capt K. J. HOUGHTON
_1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN
_VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
_ROK Marine Regt_ (-) Col SHIN, KMC
_2d Engr Spec Brig reinf_ Col J. TWITTY, USA
1st CSG, SC, FMF, less dets
1st Fum & Bath Plat
1st Aerial Del Plat
Naval Beach Gp 1, less dets
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF
73d Engr (C) Bn, USA
50th Engr Port Const Co, USA
65th Ord Amm Co, USA
(3) RCT-7 Task Organization on landing at INCHON, KOREA, 21 September.
Attachments reverted to parent control on arrival assembly areas.
_RCT-7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Mar
3d Bn, 11th Mar
Co D, 1st MT Bn
Co D, 1st Tk Bn
Co D, 1st Engr Bn
Co E, 1st Med Bn
Co C, 1st SP Bn
Det, 1st Sig Bn (ANGLICO
& 2 SP Comm Sec)
(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during the
period 15 September-7 October.
18 Sept--32nd RCT USA attached 1st Mar Div
19 Sep--SpOpnsCo USA attchd 1st Mar Div
32nd RCT detached 1st MarDiv reverted to 7th Inf Div
23 Sep--17th ROK Regt attchd 1st Mar Div
17th ROK Regt detached 1st Mar Div
24 Sep--3d Bn, 187th Airborne RCT USA Attchd 1st Mar Div
3d Bn, KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div attached 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less 3 Cos, detached 1st Mar Div attchd 7th
Inf Div
Co A, 1st Amph Tk and Trac Bn, USA, detached 1st Mar Div attchd
7th Inf Div
25 Sept--3d Bn, 187th AB RCT detached 1st Mar Div, attchd X Corps
3d Bn, KMC Regt det 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT attchd 1st MarDiv
161st KMC Bn (redesignated 5th KMC Bn) attchd 1st Mar Div
Sp Opns Co, USA detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT
26 Sep--3d Bn KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 187th AB RCT
(TF ABLE)
29 Sep--1st Amph Trac Bn, less 3d Cos, detached 7th Inf Div attchd 1st
Mar Div 96th FA Bn, USA detached 1st Mar Div
30 Sep--50th AAA(AW)Bn attached 1st Mar Div
3 Oct--50th AAA(AW)Bn detached 1st Mar Div
(5) Completion of INCHON-SEOUL operation, 7 October, and prior to
mounting out at INCHON.
_1st Marine Division Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, 1st MarDiv
163d MISD
441st CIC
Civ Asst Team LtCol M. T. STARR
1st Sig Bn
Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER
1st Serv Bn LtCol C. L. BANKS
1st Ord Bn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS
1st MT Bn
1st Amph Trk Co, FMF LtCol O. L. BEALL
1st Tk Bn LtCol H. T. MILNE
1st Med Bn Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN
1st SP Bn LtCol H. P. CROWE
1st Engr Bn LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
1st Mar Col L. B. PULLER
5th Mar LtCol R. L. MURRAY
7th Mar Col H. L. LITZENBERG
11th Mar
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER
1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF
less Co D LtCol E. F. WANN
1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF
less Cos C & D LtCol F. H. COOPER
7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA
1st CSG, SC, FMF less dets;
1st Fum & Bath Plat
1st Aerial Del Plat Col J. S. COOK
APPENDIX D
Supplies and Equipment for Inchon
1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 August 1950 provided
that the following supplies and equipment would be embarked in assigned
shipping:
a. Class I
(1) Rations: 30 days as follows:
For attached Army units and 5th Marines (Reinf)
Individual Assault Type C 5 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
Operational Type B 25 days
(Unit Loaded) (25 days)
PX Accessories Pack 30 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) (10 days)
(Convoy Loaded) (15 days)
For 1st Marine Division (Reinf) (Less Army elements
and 5th Marines (Reinf)) 5 days
Operational Type B
(Convoy Loaded)
Food Packet, Individual Assault 1A1 2 days
(In hands of individuals) (1 day)
Individual Combat, Type C 10 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
PX Accessories Pack 30 days
(Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
(Unit Loaded) (10 days)
(Convoy Loaded) (15 days)
Small Detachment 5 in 1 Type 5 days
(Unit Loaded) ( 5 days)
Individual Combat Type C
(Convoy Loaded-Corps Reserve) 150,000 Rations
(In hands of 1st Serv Bn)
(2) Water
(a) All water containers filled, not less than 5 gallons per
man combat loaded; 5 gallons per man to be unit loaded.
(b) Assault Elements: 2 filled canteens per individual.
(c) Others: 1 filled canteen.
b. Class II
(1) Essential Class II items as determined by unit commanders.
Vehicles to be loaded on priority basis within available space.
(2) Initial (less chemical warfare) in hands of units.
(3) Chemical warfare in hands of 1st Serv Bn.
(4) 30 day replenishment in hands of appropriate service units.
(5) All distillation units to have high priority for unloading.
(6) No special services gear to be lifted in assault shipping.
(7) Tentage: not to exceed 10% of T/E allowance.
(8) Other Class II in accordance AdOrder 2-50.
c. Class III
(1) Vehicle tanks ¼ full. Jeeps-1 filled expeditionary can
(5 gal); all other vehicles: 2 filled cans (5 gal each).
(2) Replenishment 30 days
Assault units:
(Combat Unit Load) (15 days)
(Unit Load) (15 days)
Other Units:
(Combat Unit Load) ( 5 days)
(Unit Load) (25 days)
d. Class IV
(1) In accordance with AdOrder 2-50.
e. Class V--5 units of fire
(1) Assault Units
(Combat Unit Load) ( 2 U/F)
(Unit Load) ( 3 U/F)
(2) Other than Assault Units
(Combat Unit Load) ( 1 U/F)
(Unit Load) ( 4 U/F)
(3) Flame thrower fuel 15 U/F
(Combat Unit Load) ( 5 U/F)
(Unit Load) (10 U/F)
APPENDIX E
Task Organization Joint Task Force Seven
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN VAdm Arthur D. Struble
Task Force 90--Attack Force RAdm James H. Doyle
92.1 Landing Force MajGen Oliver P. Smith
1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
92.11 Regimental Combat Team 1 Col Lewis B. Puller
92.11.1 Battalion Landing
Team 1, 1st Marines LtCol Jack Hawkins
92.11.2 Battalion Landing
Team 2, 1st Marines LtCol Alan Sutter
92.11.3 Battalion Landing
Team 3, 1st Marines LtCol Thomas L. Ridge
92.12 Regimental Combat Team 5 LtCol Raymond L. Murray
92.12.1 Battalion Landing
Team 1, 5th Marines LtCol George R. Newton
92.12.2 Battalion Landing
Team 2, 5th Marines LtCol Harold R. Roise
90.00 Flagship Element
_Mount McKinley_ AGC Capt Carter A. Printup
_Eldorado_ (RAdm Lyman K.
Thackrey embarked) AGC Capt Joseph B. Stefanac
90.01 Tactical Air Control Element
Tactical Air Squadron 1 Cdr Theophilus H. Moore
90.02 Naval Beach Group Element Capt Watson T. Singer
90.02.1 Headquarters Unit
90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr Martin C. Sibitzky
90.02.3 Boat Unit 1 LCdr Herman E. Hock
90.02.4 Amphibious
Construction
Battalion LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr.
90.02.5 Underwater
Demolition
Team Unit LCdr David F. Welch
90.03 Control Element LCdr Clyde Allmon
_Diachenko_ APD LCdr James R. Wilson
90.03.1 Control Unit Red LCdr Ralph H. Schneeloch, Jr.
_Horace A. Bass_ APD LCdr Alan Ray
90.03.2 Control Unit Green Lt Reuben W. Berry
PCEC 896 PCEC Lt Reuben W. Berry
90.03.3 Control Unit Blue Lt Theodore B. Clark
_Wantuck_ APD LCdr John B. Thro
90.04 Administrative Element Capt Virginius R. Roane
90.04.1 Service Unit
_Consolation_ AH Capt Charles M. Ryan
12 LSU (plus additional
LSUs on arrival) 12-20 LSU
90.04.2 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
_Lipan_ LCdr Howard K. Smith
_Cree_ Lt George E. Poore
_Arikara_ 3 ATF LCdr Kenneth A. Mundy
_Conserver_ ARS Lt James L. Thompson
_Askari_ ARL LCdr Robert J. Siegelman
YTB 406 YTB
_Gunston Hall_ Cdr Charles W. Musgrave
_Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr.
_Comstock_ 3 LSD Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
90.1 Advance Attack Group Capt Norman W. Sears
92.12.3 Advance Landing
Force Unit
Battalion Landing Team 3 LtCol Robert D. Taplett
5th Marines
90.11 Transport Element Capt Norman W. Sears
_Fort Marion_ Cdr Noah Adair, Jr.
3 LSU embarked
90.11.1 Transport Unit Cdr Selden C. Small
_Horace A. Bess_ LCdr Alan Ray
_Diachenko_ LCdr James R. Wilson
_Wantuck_ LCdr John B. Thro
90.2 Transport Group Capt Virginius R. Roane
_George Clymer_ Capt Raymond S. Lamb
_Cavalier_ Capt Daniel J. Sweeney
_Pickaway_ Capt Samuel H. Crittenden, Jr.
_Henrico_ Capt John E. Fradd
_Noble_ 5 APA Capt Michael F. D. Flaherty
_Union_ Capt Gerald D. Zurmuchlen
_Alshain_ Capt Robert N. S. Clark
_Achernar_ Capt Crutchfield Adair
_Oglethorpe_ Capt Paul F. Heerbrandt
_Seminole_ Capt Henry Farrow
_Thuban_ Cdr Erle V. Dennett
_Whiteside_ Capt Eugene L. Lugibihl
_Washburn_ 8 AKA Capt James A. Prichard
_President Jackson_ AP Capt Charles A. Ferriter
_Gunston Hall_[A] Cdr Charles W. Musgrave
_Comstock_[A] Cdr Emmanuel T. Goyette
90.3 Tractor Group Capt Robert C. Peden
LST 611 Lt Delmar E. Blevins
LST 715 Lt Willie J. Gros
LST 742 Lt Robert B. Leonnig
LST 802 Lt Vladimir Fedorowicz
LST 845 Lt John F. Butler
LST 1048 Lt Rayburn M. Quinn
LST 1123 Lt Charles L. Wall
LST 1134 Lt William B. Faris
LST 1138 Lt Mike Stapleton
LST 857 Lt Dick Weidemeyer
LST 859 Lt Leland Tinsley
LST 898 Lt Robert M. Beckley
LST 914 Lt Ralph L. Holzhaus
LST 973 Lt Robert I. Trapp
LST 799 Lt Trumond E. Houston
LST 883 Lt Charles M. Miller
LST 975 17 LST Lt Arnold W. Harer
SCAJAP LSTs 30 LST
LSM 419 LSM Lt John R. Bradley
90.4 Transport Division 14 Capt Samuel G. Kelly
(7th RCT U. S. Marines and MAG
33 embarked; did not arrive
Inchon until 21 Sept.)
_Bayfield_ Capt William E. Ferrall
_Okanogan_ Capt Timothy F. Donohue
_Bexar_ Capt Clarence E. Coffin, Jr.
_Thomas Jefferson_ 4 APA Capt Tyrrell D. Jacobs
_Algol_ Capt John A. Edwards
_Winston_ Capt Jack Maginnis
_Montague_ 3 AKA Capt Henry P. Wright, Jr.
_Catamount_ Cdr Kenneth Loveland
_Colonial_ 2 LSD Cdr Thomas J. Greene
90.5 Air Support Group RAdm Richard W. Ruble
90.51 CVE Element RAdm Richard W. Ruble
Badoeng Strait Capt Arnold W. McKechnie
Sicily 2 CVE Capt John S. Thach
90.52 CVE Screen Cdr Byron L. Gurnette
_Hanson_ DDR Cdr Cecil R. Welte
_Taussig_ Cdr William C. Meyer
_George K. MacKenzie_ Cdr William R. Laird, Jr.
_Ernest G. Small_ 3 DD Cdr Franklin C. Snow
90.6 Gunfire Support Group RAdm John M. Higgins
90.61 Cruiser Element RAdm John M. Higgins
90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 1 RAdm John M. Higgins
_Toledo_ Capt Richard F. Stout
_Rochester_ Capt Edward L. Woodyard
_HMS Kenya_ Capt P. W. Brock, RN
_HMS Jamaica_ Capt J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O.,
O.B.E., RN
90.62 Destroyer Element Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr.
90.6.2 Fire Support Unit 2 Capt Halle C. Allan, Jr.
_Mansfield_ Cdr Edwin H. Headland
_De Haven_ Cdr Oscar B. Lungren
_Lyman K. Swenson_ 3 DD Cdr Robert A. Schelling
90.63 Fire Support Unit 3 Cdr Robert H. Close
_Collett_ Cdr Robert H. Close
_Gurke_ Cdr Frederick M. Radel
_Henderson_ Cdr William S. Stewart
90.63 LSMR Element Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr.
90.6.4 Fire Support Unit 4 Cdr Clarence T. Doss, Jr.
LSMR 401 LCdr Melvin E. Bustard, Jr.
LSMR 403 Lt Frank G. Schettino
LSMR 404 3 LSMR Lt George M. Wrocklage
90.7 Screening and Protective Group Capt Richard T. Spofford
_Rowan_ DD Cdr Alan R. Josephson
_Southerland_ DDR Cdr Homer E. Conrad
_Bayonne_ LCdr Harry A. Clark
_Newport_ LCdr Percy A. Lilly, Jr.
_Evansville_ LCdr Elliot V. Converse, Jr.
_HMS Mounts Bay_ Capt J. H. Unwin, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Whitesand Bay_ LCdr J. V. Brothers, RN
_HMNZS Tutira_ LCdr P. J. H. Hoare, RNZN
_HMNZS Pukaki_ 7 PF LCdr L. E. Herrick, D. S. C., RNZN
_RFS La Grandiere_ 8 PF Cdr Urbain E. Cabanie
_Pledge_ AM Lt Richard Young
_Partridge_ Lt(jg) Robert C. Fuller, Jr.
_Mockingbird_ Lt(jg) Stanley P. Gary
_Kite_ Lt(jg) Nicholas Grkovic
_Osprey_ Lt(jg) Philip Levin
_Redhead_ Lt(jg) T. R. Howard
_Chatterer_ 6 AMS Lt(jg) James P. McMahon
90.8 Second Echelon Movement Group Capt Louis D. Sharp, Jr.
92.2 7th Infantry Division
(Reinforced)
_General G. M. Randall_ Capt Alexander C. Thorington
_General J. C. Breckinridge_ Capt Fremont B. Eggers
_General H. W. Butner_ 3 AP Capt Dale E. Collins
_Fred C. Ainsworth_
_General Leroy Eltinge_
_Aiken Victory_
_Private Sadao S. Munemoi_ 4 T-AP
_SS African Rainbow_
_SS African Pilot_
_SS Robin Kirk_
_SS Helen Lykes_
_SS Meredith Victory_
_SS Empire Marshall_
_SS Mormacport_
_SS Lawrence Victory_
_SS Southwind_
_SS Beaver Victory_
_SS Robin Goodfellow_
_SS California Bear_
90.9 Third Echelon Movement Group Capt Albert E. Jarrell
X Corps troops
_General William A. Mann_ AP Capt Charles H. Walker
_General William Weigel_
_Marine Phoenix_ 2 T-AP
_SS Robin Trent_
_SS Dolly Turman_
_SS Charles Lykes_
_SS Twin Falls Victory_
_SS American Veteran_
_SS American Attorney_
_SS Empire Wallace_
_SS Green Bay Victory_
_SS P. & T. Navigator_
_SS Luxembourg Victory_
_SS Belgium Victory_
_SS Bessemer Victory_
_SS Cotton State_
91 Blockade and Covering Force RAdm Sir William G. Andrewes,
K. B. E., C. B., D. S. O., RN
_HMS Triumph_ CVL Capt A. D. Torlesse, D. S. O., RN
_HMS Ceylon_ CL Capt C. F. J. L. Davies, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Cockade_ LtCdr H. J. Lee, D. S. C., RN
_HMS Charity_ LtCdr P. R. G. Worth, D. S. C., RN
_HMCS Cayuga_ Capt Jeffry V. Brock, D. S. C., RCN
_HMCS Sioux_ Cdr P. D. Taylor, RCN
_HMCS Athabaskan_ Cdr R. T. Welland, D. S. C., RCN
_HMAS Bataan_ Cdr W. B. M. Marks, RAN
_HMAS Warramunga_ Cdr O. H. Becher, D. S. C., RAN
_HNethMS Evertsen_ 8 DD LtCdr D. J. Van Doorninck
ROK NAVAL FORCES Cdr Michael J. Luosey, USN
_Paik Doo San_ (PC 701) Cdr Chai Yong Nam, ROKN
_Kum Kang San_ (PC 702) Cdr Lee Hi Jong, ROKN
_Chi Ri San_ (PC 704) 4 PC LCdr Hyun Sibak, ROKN
YMS 302
YMS 303
YMS 306
YMS 307
YMS 501
YMS 502
YMS 503
YMS 510
YMS 512
YMS 515
YMS 518 11 YMS
TASK FORCE 77--FAST CARRIER GROUP RAdm Edward C. Ewen (in
_Philippine Sea_)
Carrier Division 1 RAdm Edward C. Ewen
_Philippine Sea_ CV Capt Willard K. Goodney
Carrier Division 3 RAdm John M. Hoskins
_Valley Forge_ CV Capt Lester K. Rice
Carrier Division 5
_Boxer_ CV Capt Cameron Briggs
77.1 Support Group Capt Harry H. Henderson
_Worcester_ Capt Harry H. Henderson
77.2 Screen Group Capt Charles W. Parker
DesDiv 31 Capt Charles W. Parker
_Shelton_ Cdr Charles B. Jackson, Jr.
_James E. Kyes_ Cdr Fran M. Christiansen
_Eversole_ 3 DD Cdr Charles E. Phillips
_Higbee_ DDR Cdr Elmer Moore
DesDiv 111 Capt Jeane R. Clark
_Wiltsie_ Cdr Carrol W. Brigham
_Theodore E. Chandler_ Cdr William J. Collum, Jr.
_Hamner_ 3 DD Cdr Jack J. Hughes
_Chevalier_ DDR Cdr Blake B. Booth
DesDiv 112 Capt Bernard F. Roeder
_Ozbourn_ Cdr Charles O. Akers
_Mc Kean_ Cdr Harry L. Reiter, Jr.
_Hollister_ 3 DD Cdr Hugh W. Howard
_Frank Knox_ DDR Cdr Sam J. Caldwell, Jr.
CortRon 1
_Fletcher_ Cdr W. M. Lowry
_Radford_ 2 DDE Cdr Elvin C. Ogle
TASK FORCE 79--COMMANDER
SERVICE SQUADRON 3 Capt Bernard L. Austin
79.1 Mobile Logistic Service Group Capt John G. McClaughry
_Cacapon_ (Initially) Capt John G. McClaughry
_Passumpsic_ (Initially) 2 AO Capt Frank I. Winant, Jr.
_Mount Katmai_ AE Capt Albert S. Carter
_Graffias_ AF Capt William W. Fitts
79.2 Objective Area Logistic Group Capt Philip H. Ross
_Navasota_ (Initially) AO Capt Robert O. Strange
_Virgo_ AKA Capt Philip H. Ross
_Grainger_ AK Cdr Horace C. Laird, Jr.
_Hewell_ Lt Stanley Jaworski
_Ryer_ Lt Gurley P. Chatelain
_Estero_ 3 AKL Lt Tom Watson
79.3 Logistic Support Group Capt Bernard L. Austin
_Piedmont_ Capt James R. Topper
_Dixie_ 2 AD Capt Jose M. Cabanillas
_Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG Cdr Lester C. Conwell
_Jason_ ARH Capt William B. Epps
_Cimarron_ AO Capt Stanley G. Nichols
_Warrick_ Capt George Fritschmann
_Uvalde_ 2 AKA Capt Louis F. Teuscher
_Nemasket_ AOG Lt Harry F. Dixon
_Karin_ AF LCdr Berley L. Maddox
79.4 Salvage and Maintenance Group
_Mataco_ ATF Lt Frank P. Wilson
_Bolster_ ARS Lt Billis L. Whitworth
TASK FORCE 99--PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE
FORCE RAdm George R. Henderson
_Curtiss_ AV Capt Anson C. Perkins
_Gardiners Bay_ AVP Capt Frank G. Raysbrook
_Salisbury Sound_ AV Capt Francis R. Jones
99.1 Search and Reconnaissance Group Capt Joseph M. Carson
99.11 Patrol Squadron 6 Cdr Arthur F. Farwell, Jr.
99.12 88th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Helme
99.13 209th Squadron RAF Squadron Leader P. Le Cheminant
99.2 Patrol and Escort Group Capt Joseph M. Carson
99.21 Patrol Squadron 42 Cdr Gordon F. Smale
99.22 Patrol Squadron 47 Cdr Joe H. Arnold
[A] 3 LSU embarked
APPENDIX F
Final Troop List of Division for the Inchon Landing
Below, as nearly as can be determined, is the troop list of the 1st
Marine Division (Reinf) for the Inchon Landing. The list is correct as
to units included, but it has been difficult to reconcile the totals
given for units.
_Unit_ _Actual
Strength_
Headquarters Bn 916
1st Serv Bn 873
1st Sig Bn [480]652
1st MT Bn 686
1st Med Bn 566
1st Am Trk Co 244
1st Ord Bn 533
1st Shore Party Bn [481]648
1st Engr Bn 1,038
1st Tank Bn [482]811
11th Marines [483]2,360
1st Marines 3,850
5th Marines 3,611
7th Marines 0
1st Am Trac Bn 868
1st CSG [484]1,291
7th MT Bn 430
Det MTACS-2 55
VMO-6 62
-------
Total Marine Corps and Navy 19,494
-------
Korean MC Regt 2,786
-------
Co A, 56th Am Trac Bn, USA 151
Hq Det, USA 38
Sig Det, USA 37
96th FA Bn, USA 388
2d Engr Spec Brig, USA 952
73d Engr (c) Bn, USA 724
50th Engr Port Const Co., USA 214
65th Ord Amm Co., USA 256
------
Total U. S. Army 2,760
------
Grand Total 25,040
[480] Includes Carrier Platoon, FMF.
[481] Includes Detachments of Naval Beach Group 1.
[482] Includes Anti-Tank Platoons of the Antitank Companies
of the 1st and 5th Marines.
[483] Includes Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Bn, FMF.
[484] Includes 1st Fumigation and Bath Plat., FMF; 1st Aerial
Delivery Plat., FMF; and Naval Beach Group 1 (less
dets. with the 1st Shore Party Bn).
_Distribution of Units of the Division Not Participating in the Inchon
Landing_
The following units of the Division, distributed as indicated, did not
participate in the Inchon Landing:
Key: _O_: Officers
_E_: Enlisted
_Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_
-------------- -------- ----------
_O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_
RCT-7, en route to the Far East. 233 4,905 21 224 254 5,129
Administrative Center Pusan,
Korea 9 172 1 9 173
Division Administrative Center,
1st Armd Amph TracBn,
17-year-olds and casuals
at Kobe, Japan 59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282
------------------------------------
Total 301 6,345 24 239 325 6,584
APPENDIX G
Summary of Operation Orders Issued by 1st Marine Division for the
Inchon-Seoul Campaign
1-50 9 Aug 50 Movement of the Division to the Far East
2-50 4 Sep 50 Inchon Landing
3-50 15 Sep 50 (2328) Seizure of Objective O-3 short of the FBHL
4-50 16 Sep 50 (1045) Seizure of FBHL
5-50 16 Sep 50 (1600) Capture of Kimpo Airfield. Prepare to seize
Corps Phase Line C-C
6-50 18 Sep 50 (1814) Seizure and preparation of crossing of Han
River by 5th Marines. 1st Marines to
continue attack relieved on the right
(south) flank by the 32nd Infantry now
attached to 1st MarDiv
7-50 19 Sep 50 (1430) Crossing of the Han River by the 5th Marines
and uncovering crossing sites by 1st
Marines
8-50 20 Sep 50 Continuation of attack by 5th Marines toward
Seoul to uncover the northern approaches
of the main Seoul bridge sites.
Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to
seize the southern and western approaches
and the Seoul bridge sites, prepared to
cross the Han River in that vicinity
9-50 23 Sep 50 (1200) Continuation of attack by 1st Marines to
seize high ground south of the road and
rail bridges leading to Seoul prepared to
cross the Han River. Continuation of attack
by 5th Marines to uncover the bridge
sites. Crossing of the Han River at
Haengju by the 7th Marines to seize
objectives covering the north flank of the
Division
10-50 23 Sep 50 (2200) Crossing of the Han River by the 1st Marines.
Continuation of the attack by the
5th Marines. 7th Marines to continue or
Mission assigned by 1st MarDiv OpnO
9-50
11-50 24 Sep 50 (2400) Continuation of the attack with all three
regiments to capture Seoul and the high
ground north thereof
12-50 26 Sep 50 (1230) Continuation of the attack to capture Seoul.
Boundary between 5th and 7th Marines
changed to pinch out 5th Marines beyond
the Government Palace. The 7th Marines
to make an enveloping attack from the
northwest
13-50 29 Sep 50 (2000) Continuation of the attack to the east to
secure Seoul and conduct a reconnaissance
in force to the northwest prepared to
relieve elements of the 7th Infantry
Division north of the Han River. Seizure of
prescribed Corps blocking positions
14-50 30 Sep 50 (1500) Continuation of the attack and prescription
of blocking positions to be occupied by the
Division
15-50 5 Oct 50 Movement of the Division to staging area
in the vicinity of Inchon in anticipation of
the move in assault shipping to Wonsan
APPENDIX H
Enemy Units During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign
The enemy’s method of operation, except for a brief determined stand
near and in Seoul, consisted of moderate to strong delaying actions.
The first reaction following the initial disorganization at Inchon
was an attempt to contain our advance until such time as sufficient
reinforcements could arrive to warrant initiating a counteroffensive.
In view of the scarcity of reinforcements and our own rapid advances,
this never materialized.
The Order of Battle of the units which opposed the advance of the
Division from the time of the landing at Inchon until the capture of
Uijongbu, north of Seoul, is given below:
--------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------
Unit | POWs | Area of |Strength| Remarks
|captured| employment | |
--------------+--------+-------------+--------+------------------------
226th Marine | 183 |Inchon | 2,000 |In the Inchon area
Regt | | | | prior to the landing.
| | | | Newly conscripted
| | | | and poorly trained.
| | | |
918th (Coast) | 2(?) | do | 200 |In the Inchon area prior
Art Regt | | | | to the landing. 8 76mm
(Elements). | | | | guns. Wiped out or
| | | | scattered by naval and
| | | | air bombardment.
| | | |
Air Force | 91 |Kimpo | [485] |When out troops
Division | | Airfield | | approached the
| | | | airfield area part
| | | | of the personnel from
| | | | this unit withdrew
| | | | across the Han River.
| | | |
42d Mech | 11 |Between | 500 |Arrived in Seoul from
(Tank) Regt | | Inchon and | | Sinuiju in early Sept.
| | Seoul. | | 18 T-34 tanks.
| | | |
| | | |
107th Security| 270 |Kimpo Area | 2,500 |In the Kimpo area when
Regt | | | | we landed. A
| | | | quasi-military
| | | | organization.
| | | |
Rehabilitation| 16 |West of | 230 |This unit was organized
Bn (Special | | Yongdungpo.| | on 19 Sept and contained
Cultural) | | | | NK prisoners serving
Bn. | | | | sentence in Seoul.
| | | | Officers were also
| | | | former prisoners. Most
| | | | were serving sentence
| | | | for desertion.
| | | |
3d Regt, 9th | 23 |Yongdungpo | 2,000 |Remainder of the division
Rifle Div | | | | on the southern front.
| | | |
25th Inf Brig | 179 |Seoul |4,000- | Arrived from Chorwon on
| | | 5,000 | 20 Sept. An excellent
| | | | unit which opposed the
| | | | 5th Marines on the
| | | | western approaches
| | | | to Seoul.
| | | |
18th Rifle Div| 301 |Seoul and |8,000- |Arrived from Chorwon in
| | Yongdungpo.| 10,000| mid-August. Known as
| | | | the Seoul Defense
| | | | Division. It was the
| | | | only unit of division
| | | | strength in the area.
| | | |
43d Tank Regt | 56 |Seoul | 500 |Arrived from Wonsan 23
| | | | Sept. 10–15 T-34
| | | | tanks.
| | | |
19th AA Regt | 5 | do | 1,200 |In Seoul when we landed.
| | | | 37mm, 85mm, and 12.7mm
| | | | AT guns.
| | | |
76th Ind Regt,| 218 | do | 3,000 |Arrived from Wonsan after
42d Div | | | | 17 Sept. Was opposite
| | | | the 5th Marines but
| | | | withdrew from Seoul
| | | | almost intact.
| | | |
78th Ind Regt | 528 | do | 2,000 |Arrived from Sariwon on
| | | | 20 Sept. Opposed the
| | | | 5th and 1st Marines.
| | | | Put up stubborn defense
| | | | and suffered heavy
| | | | losses.
| | | |
513th Art Regt| 33 | do | 1,500 |Arrived from Chorwon on
| | | | 23 Sept. 1 76mm and 5
| | | | 45mm guns. Most of
| | | | the regiment served
| | | | as infantry.
| | | |
10th Railroad | 17 | do | 900 |In Seoul when we landed.
Regt. | | | | Its mission was to
| | | | maintain the security
| | | | of the railroad lines
| | | | and keep them in
| | | | operation. It
| | | | participated in the
| | | | defense of Seoul.
| | | |
31st Rifle | 345 | do | 3,600 |In Seoul when we landed.
Div/or Seoul| | | | Formed as a division
City Regt. | | | | on 20 Sept by an
| | | | amalgamation of units
| | | | in Seoul. Participated
| | | | in the defense of Seoul
| | | | and delayed our advance
| | | | north to Uijongbu.
| | | |
36th Bn, 111th| 32 | do | 750 |In Seoul when we landed.
Security | | | |
Regt | | | |
| | | |
2d Regt 17th | 41 |Seoul- | 3,500 |Withdrawn from the
Rifle Div | | Uijongbu | | southern front after
(Reinforced)| | | | the landing at
| | | | Inchon.
| | | |
75th Ind Regt.| 16 |Uijongbu | 2,000 |Arrived from Hamhung on
| | | | 30 Sept. Used as a
| | | | covering force to
| | | | cover the withdrawal
| | | | through Uijongbu.
| | | |
27th Inf Brig.| 123 |Suyuhyon | 5,000 |Arrived from Kumchon on
| | | | 1 Oct. Withdrew in
| | | | the face of the
| | | | advance of the 5th
| | | | Marines to Suyuhyon,
| | | | 17 miles northwest
| | | | of Seoul.
| | | |
Total Enemy Strength 44,380
[485] Unknown.
A total of 428 prisoners interrogated did not know enough of their own
units to be further identified. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were not
interrogated due to the heavy initial influx.
Prisoners were captured from some 24 units not listed above, but the
number of prisoners captured from individual units was not sufficient
to accept the presence of the unit. Further, many of these POWs were
deserters or wounded from the southern front.
The identification, by date, of North Korean units opposing the 1st
Marine Division is indicated below:
15 September 226th Ind Marine Regt 2,000 defending Wolmi-do
(2 Bns). and Inchon
918th Art Regt (2 Cos) 200 defending Wolmi-do
16 September 18th Rifle Div (Opposing 300 POWs and 1,350
1st Marines) enemy casualties for
the first two days,
15 and 16 Sep
17 September 42d Mech (Tank) Regt Lost 14 T-34 tanks
(Opposing 1st Marines)
107th Security Regt 400 POWs and 350 enemy
(Kimpo) (Opposing casualties
KMC & 5th Marines)
18 September NK Air Force EngBn 197 POWs and 450 enemy
(Opposing 5th Marines) casualties
19 September No additional 126 POWs and 600 enemy
identifications on casualties
fronts of 1st and
5th Marines
20 September 78th Ind Regt (Opposing 326 POWs and 600 enemy
5th Marines) No casualties
additional identifications
on front of 1st Marines
21 September No additional identifications 355 POWs and 1,350
enemy casualties
22 September Rehabilitation Bn (Opposing 395 POWs and 1,250
1st Marines). casualties
25th Inf Brig (Opposing
5th Marines)
31st Rifle Div (Seoul City
Regt) (Opposing 5th Marines)
23 September No additional identifications 169 POWs and 900
casualties
24 September do 67 POWs and 950
casualties
25 September do 142 POWs and 1,750
casualties
26 September 76th Ind Regt 407 POWs and 950
43d Tank Regt casualties
19th AA Regt
513th Art Regt
17th Rifle Div
(Opposing 1st & 5th
Marines)
27 September No additional identifications 139 POWs and 1,252
casualties
28 September do 206 POWs and 332
casualties
29 September do 507 POWs and 102
casualties
30 September do 328 POWs and 305
casualties
1 October do 124 POWs and 75 casualties
2 October 27th Inf Brig (Opposing 5th 82 POWs and 350 casualties
Marines)
75th Ind Regt (Opposing 7th
Marines)
3 October No additional identifications 103 POWs and 800 casualties
4 October do 118 POWs
5 October do 57 POWs
6 October do 144 POWs
In the above tabulation, a unit is shown only for the first day upon
which it was identified by the capture of prisoners. In the cases of
most of the units there were recurring captures of prisoners.
APPENDIX I
Congratulatory Messages
The following messages, of a commendatory nature, were transmitted
to the 1st Marine Division by the X Corps upon completion of the
Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
_From CG, X Corps to CG, 1st Marine Division under date of 28 September
1950_
“On this date the X Corps attained one of its distinct objectives--the
securing of the city of Seoul. In recognition of the heroic efforts of
the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division I extend my deepest
thanks and my continuing admiration for a task well done.” Signed
Edward M. Almond, Major General, United States Army, Commanding.
_From the President to General MacArthur_
“I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you
my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved
under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can
match either the delaying action where you traded space; for time in
which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now
resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by
the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. I wish you
would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those
services--Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T.
Joy and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of
our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My
thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to
your gallant forces--soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen--from the
United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the
United Nations Banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all
of us at home, ‘well and nobly done.’” Signed Harry S. Truman.
_From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur_
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are proud of the great successes you have
achieved. We realize that they would have been impossible without
brilliant and audacious leadership and without the full coordination
and the fighting spirit of all forces and all arms. From the sudden
initiation of hostilities you have exploited to the utmost all
capabilities and opportunities. Your transition from defensive to
offensive operations was magnificently planned, timed, and executed.
You have given new inspiration to the freedom-loving peoples of the
world. We remain completely confident that the great task entrusted to
you by the United Nations will be carried to a successful conclusion.”
_From CG, X Corps to all units of the X Corps under date of 2 October
1950_
“It is desired that this message be disseminated to all members of
your command. The achievements of the U. N. forces comprising the X
Corps should be a pride and inspiration to all who participated in
the recent operations so successfully concluded and which resulted in
the liberation of Seoul, the capital city of Korea. Your efforts have
greatly contributed in freeing the Republic of Korea of the forces of
Communism that threatened to enslave her people. Koreans may now take
their rightful place among the freedom-loving people of the world.
History will long remember the feat of arms that you, through your
untiring efforts and superb valor have accomplished. I am proud of the
units comprising the X Corps. Each of you should be proud of the unit
in which you serve, the nation it represents, and your part in this
military operation. I am confident that the tasks that are before us
will be accomplished with the same splendid cooperation, leadership,
and determination that you have so recently displayed.” Signed Major
General Edward M. Almond, Commanding General, X Corps.
_Division Commander’s Message to the 1st Marine Division upon
Completion of the Inchon-Seoul Campaign_
On 8 October 1950, the Division Commander issued Division Memorandum
No. 192-50, quoted below, in recognition of the accomplishments of the
1st Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign:
“1. Upon completion of the campaign in the Inchon-Seoul area of Korea
I desire to express my appreciation and admiration of the superb
manner in which all hands have cooperated in bringing to a successful
conclusion a very difficult operation.
“2. From the time the decision was made to bring the Division to
war strength and to commit it in Korea until the city of Seoul was
captured, urgency has been the order of the day. Urgency has been
necessary because tidal conditions dictated that a landing at Inchon be
made on September 15th. For the Division this meant that its elements
in the United States had to be brought to war strength immediately, had
to be re-equipped and, in the absence of amphibious shipping, had to be
loaded on such other ships as could hurriedly be made available. Upon
arrival in Kobe, Japan, there was the pressing necessity of reloading
in minimum time in amphibious shipping, with the disruption caused by
a destructive typhoon. Elements of the Division comprising the First
Provisional Marine Brigade were not released from combat in South Korea
until midnight of September 5th and between that date and September
12th were required to move to Pusan, re-equip and mount out.
“3. It is now history that the First Marine Division did meet its
commitments, did land at Inchon on September 15th under conditions
which required the maximum of coordination, aggressive action, and
devotion to duty; went on to capture the Kimpo airfield three days
after landing, to effect a difficult amphibious crossing of the Han
River, and to liberate the city of Seoul by driving the North Korean
invaders far beyond its limits.
“4. I fully appreciate, and I am sure the American people now fully
appreciate and realize, that only well-trained and determined troops,
completely devoted to duty, could have accomplished what the First
Marine Division did in Korea. You have established your place in
history. The memory of those who made the supreme sacrifice in the
accomplishment of this mission will forever remain an inspiration to
all Marines.”
APPENDIX J
Casualties During the Inchon-Seoul Campaign
Following is a daily breakdown of the casualties suffered by the 1st
Marine Division during the Inchon-Seoul Campaign (15 September-7
October 1950), together with a tabulation of the number of POWs
captured by the Division and the estimated casualties inflicted on the
enemy.
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
Date |KIA |DOW |MIA | WIA | Total | POWs | Estimated
|[486]|[486]|[486]| [486]| battle | captured | enemy
| | | | |casualties| [487] |casualties[488]
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
15 Sep| 20 | 1 | 1 | 174 | 196 | [488] | [489]
16 Sep| 2 | 1 | 1 | 22 | 26 | 300 | [489]1,350
17 Sep| 6 | 0 | 0 | 70 | 76 | 400 | 350
18 Sep| 7 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 102 | 197 | 450
19 Sep| 10 | 1 | 0 | 61 | 72 | 126 | 600
20 Sep| 24 | 1 | 3 | 119 | 147 | 326 | 600
21 Sep| 30 | 3 | 0 | 198 | 231 | 355 | 1,350
22 Sep| 27 | 3 | 0 | 135 | 165 | 395 | 1,200
23 Sep| 19 | 7 | 0 | 117 | 143 | 169 | 900
24 Sep| 68 | 4 | 0 | 217 | 289 | 67 | 950
25 Sep| 33 | 4 | 1 | 238 | 276 | 142 | 1,750
26 Sep| 29 | 7 | 0 | 167 | 203 | 407 | 950
27 Sep| 33 | 3 | 0 | 153 | 189 | 139 | 1,252
28 Sep| 8 | 4 | 0 | 31 | 43 | 206 | 332
29 Sep| 19 | 1 | 0 | 49 | 69 | 507 | 102
30 Sep| 11 | 2 | 0 | 48 | 61 | 328 | 305
1 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 16 | 19 | 124 | 75
2 Oct| 15 | 1 | 0 | 81 | 97 | 82 | 350
3 Oct| 2 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 38 | 103 | 800
4 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 118 | 0
5 Oct| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 57 | 0
6 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 144 | 0
7 Oct| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
Total | 366 | 49 | 6 |2,029 | 2,450 | 6,492 | 13,666
------+-----+-----+-----+------+----------+-----------+---------------
[486] Based on compilation on 15 March 1951 by Casualty
Reporting Officer.
[487] Based on G-2 Report included in the Special Action
Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign. The figures
shown are less than the total of regimental reports of
captures, as only those POWs remaining after processing
by the G-2 were counted. Oftentimes civilians were
turned over to the G-2 as POWs. A lag is also reflected
in the figures of the G-2 Section. Both regiments
captured prisoners on D-Day, 15 September, but the
prisoners were not processed until 16 September.
[488] Estimated enemy casualties do not include POWs. Figures
shown are based on the G-2 Report included in the
Special Action Report for the Inchon-Seoul Campaign.
[489] The figure shown for 16 September includes the
casualties inflicted on the enemy on 15 September.
APPENDIX K
Comments on Close Air Support Provided by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
HEADQUARTERS
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 7
10 January 1951
Subject: Marine Air Support
To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.
Thru: Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7.
1. In my capacity as Division Artillery Commander and Fire Support
Coordinator of the Seventh Infantry Division I have been able to
observe closely the most effective system of close air support
currently used by the Marines. During the period 19 September to 20
December 1950, close air support of this division was furnished almost
exclusively by the First Marine Air Wing.
2. In an effort to parallel as nearly as possible the Marine system of
controlling close support air this division had attached to it the Far
East Detachment, ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic. This detachment was augmented
by nine (9) Tactical Air Control Parties, Fifth U. S. Air Force,
trained in the Marine system of control by the ANGLICO detachment.
This enabled the placement of Tactical Air Control Parties with each
infantry battalion. Such placement proved to be ideal and gave the
battalion commander a means of controlling and coordinating the close
air support he received.
3. It is worthy to note that in 57 days of combat 1024 sorties were
flown by Marine Aircraft in close support of the division without a
single casualty among our own troops due to friendly air action. This
record I attribute to the fact that adequate control was available with
front line units. In many instances Marine planes were bombing and
strafing within 200 yards of our front lines.
4. I wish to express my appreciation for the superior cooperation
of Captain Charles E. Crew, 023897, USMC, Far East Detachment,
ANGLICO, FMF, Atlantic and his enlisted assistants during the period
19 September 1950 to 20 December 1950. In his capacity as Marine
Air Liaison Officer to the Seventh Infantry Division Captain Crew
functioned as a member of the division team with a common objective.
The excellent air support received by this division was due in no
small part to the enthusiastic manner in which Captain Crew performed.
Unfortunately, I was not able to observe the work of the other two
Marine Forward Air Controllers attached to the division. Reports
indicate that they performed equally as well.
5. Again, allow me to reemphasize my appreciation for the outstanding
air support received by this division. The Marine system of control, in
my estimation, approaches the ideal and I firmly believe that a similar
system should be adopted as standard for Army Divisions.
(s) HOMER W. KIEFER
_Brigadier General, USA_
_Commanding_
[1st Endorsement]
Subject: Marine Air Support
Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, APO 7 12 January 1951
To: Commanding General, X Corps, APO 909
I wish to express my own appreciation to all members of the 1st Marine
Air Wing who assisted in the fine air support given to the 7th Infantry
Division and also to commend Forward Air Controllers, Captain Edward P.
Stamford and 1st Lieutenant Jack R. Grey as well as Captain Crew for
outstanding performances of duty in connection with the support.
(s) DAVID G. BARR
_Maj Gen., USA_
_Commanding_
[2nd Endorsement]
Headquarters, X Corps, APO 909, 16 January 1951
To: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, APO 301
1. The effective close air support rendered by the 1st Marine Air Wing
through the Forward Air Controllers with the 7th Infantry Division
greatly aided in the successful accomplishment of X Corps operations.
The actions of the personnel concerned are worthy of commendation, and
I wish to add my appreciation for their assistance.
2. Further, I wish to emphasize the statements of General Kiefer in
paragraph 5, basic letter, in which he endorses the Marine system of
Tactical Air Control. It has proved itself on every occasion.
(s) EDWARD M. ALMOND
_Major General, United States Army_
_Commanding_
[3rd Endorsement]
CHO FEC-SCAP
AG RECORDS
FIEDAG 330.13
4795
AG 373 KAR (10 Jan 51)
Subject: Marine Air Support
Hq Eighth U. S. Army Korea (EU AK), APO 301 30 JAN 1951
TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, APO 500
I note with gratification the splendid spirit of cooperation that
existed between the 1st Marine Air Wing and the 7th Infantry Division
in recent combat operations. I congratulate not only Captain Crew,
Captain Stamford, and Lieutenant Grey but all officers and men of the
1st Marine Air Wing for their magnificent performance.
(s) M. B. RIDGWAY
_Lieutenant General, United States Army_
_Commanding_
[4th Endorsement]
AG 330.13 (10 Jan 51) GA
General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500, 4 February 1951
To: Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Navy No. 1165
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, takes pleasure in forwarding this
correspondence which again illustrated the outstanding support that
Marine Air is providing ground forces in the Korean operations.
By Command of General MacArthur
(s) K. B. BUSH
_Brigadier General, USA_
_Adjutant General_
CNFE/P15 05/RVW/the
Serial: 1213 12 Feb 1951
Fifth Endorsement on CG, 7th INFDIVART ltr of 10 Jan 1951
From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East
To: Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing
(2) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subj: Marine Air Support
1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, takes great pleasure in
forwarding correspondence and desires to recognize also the outstanding
performance of duty of Marine Corps personnel concerned.
(s) C. T. JOY
APPENDIX L
Presidential Unit Citation
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following Citation:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces
in Korea from 15 September to 11 October 1950. In the face of a
determined enemy and against almost insurmountable obstacles, including
disadvantageous tidal and beach conditions on the western coast of
Korea, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, rapidly and successfully
effected the amphibious seizure of Inch’on in an operation without
parallel in the history of amphibious warfare. Fully aware that the
precarious situation of friendly ground forces fighting desperately
against the continued heavy pressure of a numerically superior hostile
force necessitated the planning and execution of this extremely
hazardous operation within a period of less than thirty days, and
cognizant of the military importance of its assigned target, the
Division moved quickly into action and, on 15 September, by executing
three well-coordinated attacks over highly treacherous beach approaches
defended by resolute enemy troops, captured the island of Wolmi-do,
the city of Inch’on and Kimp’o Airfield, and rendered invaluable
assistance in the capture of Seoul. As a result of its aggressive
attack, the Division drove the hostile forces in hasty retreat over
thirty miles in the ensuing ten days, completely severed vital hostile
communication and supply lines and greatly relieved enemy pressure on
other friendly ground units, thereby permitting these units to break
out from their Pusan beachhead and contributing materially to the total
destruction of hostile ground forces in southern Korea. The havoc and
destruction wrought on an enemy flushed with previous victories and the
vast accomplishments in turning the tide of battle from a weakening
defensive to a vigorous offensive action reflect the highest credit
upon the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, and
the United States Naval Service.”
The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division
participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from
15 September to 11 October 1950:
_Fleet Marine Force Units and Detachments_: Radio Relay Platoon, 1st
Signal Operations Company; Battery C, 1st 4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion;
1st Amphibian Truck Company; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less
Company “D”); 1st Combat Service Group, Service Command; 1st
Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Aerial Delivery Platoon; 7th Motor
Transport Battalion, Service Command; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion;
Detachment Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two; Team #1, First
Provisional Historical Platoon; Marine Observation Squadron Six;
Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced, including Headquarters
Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine Service Squadron Thirty-Three, Marine
Ground Control Intercept Squadron One, Marine Fighter Squadron Two
Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Two Hundred Fourteen, Marine
Fighter Squadron Three Hundred Twelve, Marine Fighter Squadron Three
Hundred Twenty-Three, Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred
Thirteen, and Marine Night Fighter Squadron Five Hundred Forty-Two.
_United States Navy Units_: Naval Beach Group One.
_United States Army Units_: Detachment 205th Signal Repair Company;
Detachment 4th Signal Battalion; 163rd Military Intelligence Service
Detachment; Company “A” Reinforced, 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion;
96th Field Artillery Battalion; 441st Counter-Intelligence Corps
Detachment; 2nd Engineer Special Brigade; 73rd Engineer (C) Battalion;
50th Engineer Port Construction Company; 65th Ordnance Ammunition
Company; 32nd Regimental Combat Team; Special Operations Company;
3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team; and the 50th
Antiaircraft Artillery Air Warning Battalion.
For the President,
(s) DAN A. KIMBALL
_Secretary of the Navy_
Bibliography
_Documents_
Earney, William R. Maj, USMC. Notes on operations of Third Battalion,
Seventh Marines, in South Korea. MS. Manuscript File, Records and
Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps
(HQMC Historical).
Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of special report. n. d. MS.
Manuscript File, HQMC Historical.
Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the operations of the 1st
Marine Division during the first nine months of the Korean War,
1950–1951. MS. Manuscript File, HQMC Historical.
----. Notes on the operations of the 1st Marine Division during the
first nine months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript
File, HQMC Historical.
U. S. Congress. _National Security Act of 1947._ 61 _U. S. Stat. at
L._ 495.