Main Line of Resistance
_Three Hills Designated 105--RCT-7 North of the Han--Attack Continued
by RCT-5--Modified Plan of Corps Attack--Climax of the Marine
Assault--The Epic of Dog Company--River Crossing of RCT-1_
During the night of 21–22 September an NKPA shell crashed through the
roof of the native house serving as CP of the 5th Marines northwest
of Seoul. The explosion wounded Lieutenant Colonel Hays so severely
that the regimental executive officer required immediate evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, who escaped with a slight cut, directed that
the CP be moved to a cave on the reverse slope of a hill.
Thus did the enemy serve notice that henceforward the battle for the
northwest approaches to Seoul would be furiously contested. Yongdungpo
had been taken by the 1st Marines only after a grim, three-day struggle
in which the Korean Reds made their first real stand as distinguished
from delaying operations. And now it was the turn of the 5th Marines to
meet opposition such as that regiment had not encountered since D-day.
Two new NKPA units had much to do with the sudden stiffening of
resistance. One was the 78th Independent Regiment, commanded by Colonel
Pak Han Lin. This unit, numbering about 2,000 recruits in July, was
organized into three battalions of infantry supported by medical,
motorcycle, weapons, reconnaissance, mortar and 76mm gun companies, and
an engineer platoon.
Another recent arrival which won the respect of the Marines for rugged
fighting qualities was the 25th Brigade of 4,000 to 5,000 troops.
Commanded by Major General Wol Ki Chan, who had reportedly studied in
Russia in 1947, the unit was made up of four heavy weapons battalions
and an infantry battalion in addition to engineer, 120mm mortar, heavy
artillery, and brigade artillery battalions.[360]
[360] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Baker, and Queen Queen:Baker,
app. I.
It was literally a fight to the death for these two NKPA outfits, which
were all but wiped out of existence by the Marines of RCT-5 during the
battle for Seoul. But while they lasted, the 78th Regiment and 25th
Brigade put up a determined and at times desperate resistance in hill
country well adapted to defense.
_Three Hills Designated 105_
The grapple for the northwest approaches to Seoul began in deadly
earnest at 0700 on the morning of 22 September. From north to south,
the three assault battalions of the reinforced 5th Marines were the
3d on the left, the 1st KMC in the center, and the 1st on the right.
They were jumping off from the high ground about three miles southeast
of Haengju along a line bounded by Hill 216 on the north, 104 in the
center, and 68 on the south.
Misunderstandings in regard to routes and unit boundaries were made
inevitable by maps disagreeing as to place names and heights of ridges.
Added to the confusion was the fact that each battalion zone had a Hill
105 as one of its final objectives. (Staff officers played safe by
designating them 105-N, 105-C, and 105-S to indicate north, central and
south.)
Ahead of the Marines lay a hill complex which constituted a great
natural bastion of interlocking heights and fields of fire. Spurs and
defiles leading from one ridge to another enabled NKPA troops to move
up in concealment and launch counterattacks in the most unexpected
quarters.
Casualties of the next three days were the heaviest for a comparable
period that RCT-5 had suffered in Korea. Added to previous totals, it
meant that 17 of the original 18 platoon leaders were killed or wounded
in a 50-day period, and five of the six company commanders who landed
with the Brigade.[361]
[361] Geer, _The New Breed_, 163.
Grim as the outlook was, the Marines of the 2d Battalion enjoyed a
sideshow on the eve of battle when Sergeant James I. Higgins and a
companion made a prize of an enemy locomotive. Knowing nothing about
operating it, they found a simple but effective solution by firing up
and opening throttles or depressing levers until the gauges were at the
halfway mark. This policy of moderation led to success. The locomotive
took off with ponderous docility, and Higgins managed to bring it to
a safe stop near the regimental CP. His exploit was not applauded,
however, by supply officers taking alarm from the dense clouds pouring
out of the smokestack. They did not relish the idea of providing enemy
artillery with a target marker, visible for miles, in an area full of
exposed Marine ammunition. As a result of their anxiety, Higgins was
promptly invited to keep rolling until he reached the rear.[362]
[362] Capt G. H. Stewart interv, 17 Nov 54.
The 2d Battalion remained in reserve while the 1st KMC Battalion jumped
off in the center from Hill 104. Heavy resistance was met immediately.
In fact, NKPA detachments infiltrated all the way to Hill 104 itself,
though it had been secured by 3/5 the previous afternoon. They poured
small-arms fire into KMCs already taking a pounding from mortar and
artillery fire, and the battalion was held up until the high ground to
the front could be cleared by artillery and air strikes.[363]
[363] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
On the left, 3/5 also ran into trouble after deceptively easy progress
at first. At 0700 all three companies jumped off from Hill 216, secured
by Item Company the day before. The new objective, as directed by 5th
Marines’ Operations Order 24–50, was Hill 296.
This height was reported by How Company as taken at 0945. It was not
realized at the time that Hill 296 was actually the bastion of the Red
Korean defense complex northwest of Seoul if its three southern spurs
were considered. Attached to the main land mass like the roots of an
ulcerated molar were Hills 56, 88, and 105-N, with 105-C, 72, and 105-S
describing an arc to the southward. Nearly all of these positions would
have to be reduced before the road could be opened to Seoul.
Only long-range small-arms fire from Hill 338 was encountered by How
Company at the outset, but enemy pressure steadily increased from the
southern spurs of 296. An NKPA counterattack in estimated company
strength was repulsed with heavy enemy losses, including some 40
prisoners, by Marine riflemen supported by tanks. Communist pressure
was soon renewed, however, with How Company receiving heavy small-arms,
automatic, AT, and mortar fire.
Patrols from the other two companies, ranging to the northeast of Hill
216 in the early afternoon, met determined opposition. A reinforced
rifle platoon of Item Company encountered an NKPA force, in estimated
company strength, defending the village of Nokpon-ni. During the
ensuing fight the Marines lost two men killed and 11 wounded. Action
was broken off at dusk, when the 3d Battalion received oral orders to
defend against an enemy infiltrating from the south, southeast, and
northeast in attempts to regain lost ground.
The fight for Hill 296 had only begun.[364]
[364] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
South of the railroad, 1/5 had about 2,000 yards to cover to its
objective, Hill 105-S. The battalion plan of maneuver called for Baker
Company to deliver fire support while Able passed through Charlie and
advanced to the base of the hill. Meanwhile, Charlie was to envelop
the objective from the right. When the three Able platoons moved into
position, they were pinned down by enemy automatic fire from the
forward slope of 105-S. First Lieutenant Joseph A. Schimmenti of 3/A
and his men had a grim reminder of American reverses earlier in the
war when they found a 50-caliber machine gun and ammunition of U. S.
manufacture which the enemy had abandoned.[365]
[365] Capt J. A. Schimmenti interv, 4 Jan 55.
Schimmenti was severely wounded and First Lieutenant Nathaniel F. Mann,
Jr., killed before Able Company won a foothold on the lower slopes of
105-S. It took until 1500 for Charlie Company, supported by a machine
gun section, to complete its wide swing and close in on the right of
the enemy’s positions. Baker Company passed through Able meanwhile and
attacked the forward slopes. At 1720, after an intense mortar, air,
and artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion needed only 15 minutes in
which to secure the objective. The three companies had taken losses of
12 killed and 31 wounded during the day.[366]
[366] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan.
Close air support was provided for RCT-5 by the MAG-33 squadrons which
had begun tactical operations at Kimpo on the 20th. Although they were
still in process of moving to the airfield from Japanese bases, VMF-212
and VMF(N)-542 flew strikes in support of all three assault battalions.
Of the two carrier-based squadrons, VMF-323 almost doubled its usual
number of daily missions on 22 September.[367]
[367] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig: Appendix Fox; Annex Item:
Roger, Sugar.
[Illustration: APPROACHING THE ENEMY MLR
5th MARINES--21 SEP]
Just before nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed 1/5 to pull
back to Hill 68 with one company while holding Hill 105-S with the
other two. This shift was made necessary by the fact that the KMCs had
been compelled to withdraw to Hill 104, their starting point. As a
consequence, the center of the line was more than 1,000 yards in the
rear of the battalions on the right and left. The company on Hill 68
was to provide covering fires in the morning, therefore, when the KMC
battalion would renew its attack in an effort to regain lost ground.
_RCT-7 North of the Han_
On D-plus 8 the 1st Marine Division had its third rifle regiment in
line for the first time. OpnO 9-50, issued at 1200 on 23 September,
directed the 7th Marines (less 2d Battalion) to cross the Han into a
zone of action in the rear of the 5th Marines.
In response to verbal instructions and a fragmentary warning order the
day before, the regimental headquarters and 3d Battalion crossed late
on the morning of the 23d. Colonel Litzenberg set up his CP on the
north bank at 1710, and his men had their first contact with the enemy
the following morning. A 3d Battalion patrol ranging to the north of
the battalion zone of action encountered an estimated 200 NKPA troops,
and Marine air and artillery supported a successful attack.[368]
[368] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Roger Roger.
Division orders called for the relief of 2/7 on the 24th in the area
northwest of Kimpo by the 2d Battalion of the 187th Airborne RCT, USA.
The Marine unit was directed to cross the Han that afternoon, followed
by the 1st Battalion, which had completed unloading at Inchon.
It had been decided by the Division command and staff to give the 7th
Marines time for shaking down instead of committing the newcomers
immediately to the attack on Seoul. The regiment was assigned a series
of five objectives along a ridgeline extending from the ferry crossing
at Haengju on a gentle arc to a point north of the city. Protecting
the north flank and rear of the 5th Marines was a primary mission, and
Colonel Litzenberg was also directed to prevent the escape of the enemy
to the northward.[369]
[369] O. P. _Smith, Notes_, 251–252.
_Attack Continued by RCT-5_
On the morning of the 23d the 1st KMC Battalion was directed to attack
from Hill 104 at 0700 to straighten out the line. The 1st and 3d
Battalions of the 5th Marines were to remain in position and assist the
advance by fire.
Heavy and immediate resistance was encountered from NKPA troops dug
in on Hill 56. Although the KMCs made a valiant effort, they were
soon stopped cold. Only slight gains resulted at an excessive cost in
casualties from artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.[370]
[370] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise moved his CP forward at 1300 to the western
base of Hill 104. While his 2d Battalion assembled under cover of that
height, he conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Murray after receiving
orders to pass through the KMCs and continue the attack on Hill 56.
Both officers realized the advantages of swinging around to hit the
enemy from the left after approaching along the low ground. But it was
already midafternoon and this movement could not be completed before
darkness. The only alternative was a line-buck in the center if Hill
56 was to be taken that day. And since the line had to be stabilized
and the KMCs pulled back in reserve to give the regimental defense some
depth, Murray and Roise agreed that the situation called for a frontal
assault without delay.[371]
[371] LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 9 Nov 54.
At this stage the Marine officers did not realize that Hill 56 was
part of the enemy’s main line of resistance. It seemed logical to them
that he would make his final stand on the next ridgeline, crowned with
Hills 105-C and 105-N. As for the repulses suffered by the KMCs, it was
a logical assumption that their inexperience had been a contributing
factor. In view of these circumstances, a brief artillery preparation
and the support of a platoon of tanks seemed sufficient when Companies
D and F attacked and E contributed fires from the eastern slopes of
Hill 104.[372]
[372] _Ibid._
Captain Peters’ Fox Company was to lead off on the right, south of the
railroad, and seize the portion of the objective below the railroad
tunnel. From this high ground, his men could then support First
Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Dog Company, moving forward under cover of a
sunken road, to assault Hill 56 north of the tunnel. About 1,000 yards
of rice paddies had to be crossed at the outset, and the expected
support of the tanks in this low ground failed to materialize. The
leading M-26 bogged down in a wide ditch which prevented the advance of
the other four. One of them remained in the paddies to give supporting
fires while three took a new route along the railroad tracks. Fox
Company received increasingly heavy casualties meanwhile on the way
across the low ground.
Peters ordered Second Lieutenant S. E. Sansing’s mortar section
forward, but the officer reported afterwards that his radio did not
pick up the message. This left the three assault platoons without 60mm
support as they climbed the lower slopes of Hill 56 and became heavily
engaged with NKPA troops just below the railway tunnel.[373]
[373] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Apparently the Reds so overrated the weight of Company F’s assault that
they lost the topographical peak of Hill 56 by default. Whether their
timely withdrawal from Dog Company’s initial objective was meant to
be permanent is not known, for they might have been caught flatfooted
while shifting troops against Fox. Nevertheless, Company D emerged from
the sunken road in a column of platoons and moved onto the high ground
in its zone against negligible opposition.
Lieutenant Heck’s 1st Platoon, according to plan, then pivoted leftward
to spearhead the attack on the final objective, Smith’s Ridge--named
by the men after their company commander. Halfway into the connecting
saddle, the Marines were caught in the open by a heavy burst of fire
from a large knoll on the southern tip of the wooded ridge. Heck fell
mortally wounded, and his senior NCO, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson,
went down with a shattered leg. In the space of a few minutes, more
than half of the exposed platoon became casualties.[374]
[374] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen; McNaughton interv,
7 Jan 55.
Startled by the intensity of enemy reaction from this unexpected
quarter, Smith personally retrieved the battered 1st Platoon, while
the 2d and 3d were clearing the northeastern slopes of Hill 56. Then,
owing to the lateness of the hour, he deployed Company D defensively on
that high ground for the night. There was no contact with Fox Company
or any other friendly unit. This fact, coupled with the evidence of
strong enemy positions on Smith’s Ridge, led the company commander to
reconsider carefully his plans for the postponed attack.[375]
[375] _Ibid._
Fox Company had meanwhile been heavily engaged along the eastern
slopes of Hill 56 in the vicinity of the railway tunnel. Peters
ordered Lieutenant Anderson to lead his 2d Platoon against the strong
NKPA positions just beyond the tunnel. Only 27 men were left to fight
it out at close quarters with an entrenched enemy estimated by the
platoon leader at company strength. The Communist force was wiped out
in exchanges of small-arms fire and grenades at murderous ranges, but
the effort took a frightful toll of the 1st Platoon in KIA and WIA
casualties. Only seven able-bodied men were left when Peters ordered a
withdrawal to the company position south of the tunnel.[376]
[376] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
All of Anderson’s wounded and most of his dead were brought back, and
he combined his remnants with the survivors of Lieutenant Nolan’s 2d
Platoon. A gap of about 50 yards separated their position from First
Lieutenant Albert F. Belbusti’s isolated 3d Platoon as Fox Company dug
in for the night.[377]
[377] _Ibid._
No fault could be found with the over-all plan of attack, providing as
it did for each assault company to seize ground from which it could
support the advance of the other. But as darkness approached, it became
evident that the 2d Battalion had bargained for more North Korean real
estate than it could handle. The two isolated companies had no choice
but to cling desperately to their scorched holdings while organizing to
meet an expected NKPA counterattack.
Although the other two battalions of the 5th Marines had defensive
missions on 23 September, enemy threats and encroachments kept them
occupied. On Hill 296, in the zone of 3/5, Weapons Company took a
good deal of satisfaction in firing a captured NKPA howitzer to break
up hostile troop concentrations in the vicinity of Nokpon-ni. How
Company remained in contact with the enemy all day, supported by
50-caliber and 90mm fires from Marine tanks.[378]
[378] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
[Illustration: SMASHING THE MLR
5th MARINES--22–24 SEP]
It was in the How Company zone that Taplett’s men first made the
acquaintance of “Fireproof Phil.” This was the name applied to a
gigantic NKPA officer, towering head and shoulders over his troops, who
exposed himself with contempt for Marine bullets. Not only his burly
build but his light complexion gave some of the Marines the conviction
that he was Russian. At any rate, Fireproof Phil was both fearless and
lucky. Machine gun bullets and mortar rounds seemed to bounce off his
frame. Finally, the tanks paid the honor of making him the special
target of 90mm ammunition, and still Fireproof Phil always had the
benefit of a minor miracle at the last moment.[379]
[379] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 19 Apr 55.
Combat leadership by enemy officers and NCOs was outstanding in the
operations north of Seoul. On Hill 105-S the 1st Battalion came under
pressure all day on 23 September. Movement was impossible for the
men of Baker and Charlie Companies, and supplies of water, food, and
ammunition had to wait for darkness. Enemy smoke pots created a haze
restricting air activities, but it did not prevent a timely strike
flown by Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid and five planes of VMF-214 to
break up a threatened enemy counterattack on Hill 105-S. This was one
of six close support missions completed on the 23d by that squadron in
the zone of RCT-5.[380]
[380] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Nan; 1st MAW _SAR_,
Annex Jig:Easy.
Why the enemy did not launch a counterattack that night against the
hard-hit assault companies of the 2d Battalion is one of the mysteries
of the war. But the weary Marines on the slope of Hill 56 attributed
their respite to effective and unremitting artillery support. All
night long the howitzers of the 11th Marines lit up the night sky like
heat lightning in the rear and crashed like thunder in front as they
scourged the NKPA positions.
_Modified Plan of Corps Attack_
Up to this time the Corps plan of attack had called for the 1st
Marines to clear the south bank of the Han and cross in the vicinity
of Yongdungpo to join the 5th Marines in an assault on Seoul from the
west and southwest. In view of the location of the boundary between the
1st Marines and the 7th Infantry Division, this meant that the Army
troops would not participate in the attack on the city.
General Almond had already made it plain in conversations with General
Smith that it was highly desirable to take Seoul by 25 September as GHQ
wished to announce the liberation just three months to the day after
the NKPA invasion.
The subject came up again during a conference at Corps Headquarters
on 23 September. Almond proposed that Smith send RCT-1 around to
attack Seoul from the southeast while RCT-5 continued its assault from
the northwest. This plan struck the Corps commander as promising to
maneuver the enemy out of the city sooner than the attack as formerly
conceived.
Smith replied that the NKPA forces defending Seoul had proved to be
much stronger than had been expected. He said he was convinced that
the enemy would put up a fight from street to street regardless of any
flanking maneuvers. The Marine general added that the fierce opposition
met by RCT-5 had demonstrated that the western approaches to Seoul were
too much for one regiment to handle, and he urged that no change be
made in the original plan of crossing RCT-1 northwest of Yongdungpo to
aid the attack. This plan, Smith asserted, would offer the advantage
of keeping the 1st Marine Division together; for when the 1st and 5th
Marines had penetrated well into the city, the 7th Marines could be
brought around from the northwest to deliver the _coup de grace_.[381]
[381] This section has been derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_,
sec. 1; O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 252–253, 262–265, and
_Chronicle_, 23–24 Sep 50.
Differences between commanders are not remarkable, and it is noteworthy
that Corps and Division usually managed in the Inchon-Seoul operation
to reach an acceptable solution. Such was the case when General Almond
reconsidered on the 23d and agreed to allow the 1st Marines to cross
northwest of Yongdungpo, as originally planned, and take part in a
two-regiment attack on Seoul from the west and southwest. In place of
the 1st Marines, the 32d Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division was to
cross the Han and enter Seoul from the southeast. Amphibian tractors
for the operation would be furnished by the 1st Marine Division.
Revised 1st Marine Division plans called for RCT-1 to take position
on the right flank of RCT-5 after the crossing, then pivot to the
northeast and continue the attack through the heart of the city. RCT-7
(less one battalion in Division reserve) would have the mission of
advancing across the northern approaches to protect the left flank and
prevent the enemy from escaping while RCT-5 sliced through the western
edge of the built-up area. Thus the burden of capturing Seoul fell
chiefly upon Colonel Puller’s regiment.
_Climax of the Marine Assault_
As the eastern sky turned gray on the Saturday morning of 24 September,
the men on the firing line northwest of Seoul knew that the time had
come. They knew with the instinct of battle-wise troops that supporting
arms had done all they could. Now it was up to the infantry to come to
grips with the enemy. Supporting arms could only sue for victory and it
was up to the infantry to collect.
The two companies of 2/5 were still clinging by their eyelashes to
the scarred slopes of Hill 56. All three of the Company F platoon
leaders, Nolan, Anderson, and Belbusti were carrying on in spite of
wounds. Corporal Welden D. Harris, who had killed three Red Koreans in
hand-to-hand combat the day before, refused to be evacuated after a
second wound.[382]
[382] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
The survivors of Captain Peters’ outfit could not say too much in
praise of the support given continuously throughout the night by
Captain Arnold C. Hofstetter’s Baker Battery of the 11th Marines. There
were indications that several incipient NKPA counterattacks had been
broken up during the night by the bombardment.
In the Dog Company zone the night had been relatively uneventful except
for sniping, though the enemy could be heard digging new positions and
bringing up ammunition.
The regimental scheme of maneuver, as outlined in OpnO 26-50, called
for the 2d Battalion to continue the attack, with Hill 105-N as a final
objective. This meant going up against practically the entire Hill 296
defense system, since Smith’s Ridge and all of Hill 88 also remained
to be seized. An estimated 2,500 enemy troops, well supported by
automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery were defending every foot of
defensible ground in front of the two thinned companies of 2/5.
It was intended that 3/5 should assist by attacking down the principal
eastern spur of 296 to outflank the enemy and contribute supporting
fires. Taplett’s men were to be relieved in gradual stages on Hills
216 and 296 by elements of the 1st Battalion. As a preliminary, Newton
was to send out a patrol to secure a portion of the river bank on the
right flank of Hill 105-S in preparation for the crossing of the Han
by the 1st Marines that morning. The reserve company of 1/5 would then
commence the relief of the 3d Battalion while the 1st Battalion of
the KMC Regiment remained in an assembly area in the rear of the 5th
Marines and elements of the 7th Marines protected the left flank. Units
of 1/5 were to continue to defend 105-S--seized and held at a total
cost of 27 KIA and 72 WIA--until the crossing of the 1st Marines and
the relief of 3/5 had been completed.[383]
[383] 1st MarDiv OpnO 10-50, 24 Sep 50.
Two small enemy counterattacks were repulsed without much trouble by
elements of 3/5 on Hill 296 before dawn. Company H remained in contact
with the enemy on the eastern slopes until 1550, when Company G moved
around the right flank and a coordinated attack was launched against
moderate NKPA artillery, mortar, and AT fires. Relief of Item Company
and other 3/5 troops remaining on Hill 216 was completed by the 1st
Battalion at 2000. Casualties of the 3d Battalion for the day were five
killed and 33 wounded.[384]
[384] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
The movements of these two battalions were subsidiary to the main
attack launched by 2/5 on 24 September. H-hour at 0630 was preceded
by a 20-minute artillery preparation and an air strike by VMF-323
planes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise planned to bring up Easy Company from
reserve on Hill 104 and push it forward between Dog and Fox while those
companies completed the seizure of Hill 56 and cleared the heavily
wooded spur to the north known as Smith’s Ridge, linking up with the
main land mass of Hill 296. Easy Company would then take the lead in a
battalion attack aimed at Hills 88 and 105-N as the final objectives.
Fox Company jumped off on the eastern slope of Hill 56. Nolan having
been evacuated, Anderson led what was left of the 2d and 3d Platoons--a
total of some 20 riflemen. Belbusti commanded about the same number in
the combined assault on the heavily defended finger of high ground
east of the tunnel. Counting machine gunners, mortarmen, and troops
bringing up ammunition, Fox Company had been reduced to fewer than 90
effectives, including wounded men refusing evacuation.
Corsairs of VMF-323 swooped down to drop 500-pound bombs less than
a hundred yards in front of the attackers. Thanks to such close air
support, Fox Company soon seized high ground which enabled the men to
gain fire superiority.[385] At this point they took cover to make use
of their advantage in an exchange of small-arms and automatic fire.
[385] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Queen Queen:Oboe.
Dog Company, with two platoons still almost at full strength, had at
least a dozen walking wounded who elected to keep on fighting. Ground
mist and smoke from burning huts made for low visibility when the men
jumped off in a column of platoons. The enemy opened up from Smith’s
Ridge as the Marines came within close range, pinning them down for two
hours by concentrated and accurate artillery, mortar, AT, and automatic
fire. One of the Marine tanks moving up the road in support was
disabled by a mine and another became inoperative after a direct hit by
an NKPA mortar shell on the motor hatch.[386]
[386] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex
Queen Queen.
_The Epic of Dog Company_
The large knob across the sunken road from Hill 56 remained to be
taken before Dog Company completed its mission by advancing northward
to clear the enemy from the wooded spine of Smith’s Ridge. After
the attack stalled with heavy casualties Lieutenant H. J. Smith
ordered every available man into line, including personnel of company
headquarters. Two Marine machine guns were kept in action at a cost
of repeated casualties as First Lieutenant Karle Seydel made five
consecutive trips under fire to bring up ammunition.
At some points the opposing forces were within long grenade-throwing
distance. In these exchanges the Marines had a pronounced advantage
because of stronger arms and the control developed by baseball.
Both sides attempted without success to break the deadlock by sending
out detachments for flanking movements. Sergeant Robert Smith of
McNaughton’s platoon led a squad in a wide end sweep to the north, only
to meet such fierce NKPA opposition that Smith and eight of his men
were killed, including a corpsman. Only three wounded Marines ever got
back.[387]
[387] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
At 1000 the company commander sent the first of three messages to
inform the battalion CP of his situation and request reinforcements.
Roise could only reply that Easy Company, his reserve unit, was
irrevocably committed to the attack on the final objectives. During
the course of the battle the battalion commander himself was wounded
by a mortar fragment but returned to the CP after having his arm
dressed.[388]
[388] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe.
When Second Lieutenant George Grimes’ 60mm mortar section ran out of
ammunition, the survivors fought as riflemen. Two platoon leaders,
McNaughton and Lieutenant Howard, were wounded but continued in action.
About 1030, as the smoke and mist cleared, the howitzers of the 11th
Marines and the 81mm mortars of 2/5 poured it into the enemy positions
along the wooded ridge. The men on the firing line had another welcome
assist when four Corsairs of VMF-323 roared in to make passes with
bombs, rockets, and napalm.
Lieutenant Smith had 44 effectives left as he alerted his men for the
assault. McNaughton, Seydel, Grimes, and First Lieutenant Karl Wirth
were the other officers still on their feet. Platoons, sections, and
squads had ceased to exist as units when the 44 men of Dog Company
moved out of their foxholes and swarmed over the high ground that had
held them up for more than two hours.
First impressions under more normal circumstances would have been
shocking, for the position held more enemy dead and dying than the
Marines had ever seen before in Korea. The entire area was honeycombed
with foxholes, trenches, and bunkers, which had become the graves of
Red Koreans cut down by Marine air and artillery. There they had died
at their posts, crowded together so closely that every shell, bomb, or
rocket had caused frightful carnage. The dead outnumbered the living,
in fact, for the men of Dog Company met unexpectedly weak resistance
from the few NKPA effectives who trusted to their weapons instead of
their feet.[389]
[389] McNaughton interv, 7 Jan 55.
Lieutenant Smith paused to regroup in a skirmish line for the final
attack to clear the remainder of the ridge. Again the Marines seemed
to prevail by sheer moral ascendancy as the assault went forward by
leaps and bounds. But the victory was bought at the cost of the company
commander’s life, for Smith was killed at the head of his men.
Only five additional casualties were taken in this phase, but Marines
dropped from exhaustion until McNaughton, as acting commander, had just
26 able-bodied men left at the finish. They were greeted by the strange
spectacle of three enemy officers exhorting about 150 Red Koreans to
retreat. No second invitation was needed, and the Marines had a “turkey
shoot” at the expense of foemen scurrying down the eastern and northern
slopes in the direction of Seoul.[390]
[390] _Ibid._
Seydel was the only officer left unwounded when Dog Company notified
the Battalion CP at 1300 that objectives had been secured. Fox Company
reported about two hours later that it also had seized all assigned
ground and was digging in after a mopping-up period.[391]
[391] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
Casualties had not been heavy on the east side of the ridge as compared
to the day before. The Company F attack consisted of two prolonged fire
fights in which the Marines seized better positions and made good use
of their advantage. After reaching the objective, they took cover and
proceeded systematically to cut the enemy down to size with the support
of VMF-214 planes. Captain Peters then sent both platoons forward to
eliminate an NKPA force firing on them from a distance. Anderson’s men
passed through a small built-up area and took cover behind a stone wall
on the enemy’s flank. Opening fire on Communists about 300 yards away
in an open field, they made short work of the opposition.[392]
[392] Anderson interv, 20 Aug 54.
Second Lieutenant Wiley J. Grigsby, the machine gun platoon leader,
was killed in the day’s final Fox Company attack. Anderson’s composite
platoon had three men killed and three wounded. Among the casualties
was Corporal Harris, who received a mortal wound after twice refusing
evacuation. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.[393]
[393] _Ibid._
The attack of Easy Company on Hill 105-N was delayed until after the
other two companies took their objectives. At 1500, after moving up
from battalion reserve, Jaskilka’s men ran into heavy enemy mortar
and automatic fire soon after passing Hill 56. Two tanks of the 1st
Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion were knocked out, one by an AT
mine and the other by a direct hit of a mortar shell. The remaining
three tanks could not have continued in action except for the efforts
of Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPherson of Company A, 1st Engineer
Battalion, who went ahead and cleared a path through the enemy mine
field. By some miracle he survived the hail of NKPA fire unhurt, and
the tanks went on to destroy two enemy AT guns and several machine gun
emplacements.
The main enemy stronghold appeared to be Hill 72, a conical height
located between Hills 105-N and 105-C and enfilading both of them. Not
enough daylight remained on 24 September to mount an assault on this
position, and the effort was put off until the following morning.[394]
[394] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen:Oboe; Deptula
interv, 18 Jan 55.
Marine air had a busy day. Lieutenant Colonel Lischeid’s VMF-214,
repeating the pattern of the day before, launched strikes of five
aircraft every two hours in support of 2/5 attacks northwest of
Seoul--a total of six missions. Not only was the city a flak-trap, but
Marine pilots were flying Corsairs from which the armor around the
air-cooler system had been removed by order of BuAer as a peacetime
economy measure and never restored. As a consequence, NKPA small-arms
fire was likely to hit the oil lines and send a machine down in
flames.[395]
[395] Cushman interv, 26 Jul 54.
A 1st MAW record for combat sorties flown in a day by a single squadron
was set on the 24th by VMF-212 with 12 flights and 46 sorties. Close
support missions were about equally represented along with search and
attack.[396]
[396] 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Roger.
Nightfall of this eventful day found 2/5 in possession of ground
containing the most enemy dead in a small area ever seen in the
Inchon-Seoul operation. Lieutenant Colonel Roise estimated that 1,500
NKPA bodies were left on Hill 56 and Smith’s Ridge, and the command of
the 1st Marine Division put the figure at 1,750 enemy killed in the
Hill 296 defenses.[397]
[397] Roise interv, 9 Nov 54; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 286.
Survivors of Dog Company agreed that in spite of such frightful losses,
the Red Koreans had enough able-bodied men left at the finish to make
mincemeat of the 26 attackers who took Smith’s Ridge. But this Marine
effort seemed to break the heart of enemy resistance in the Hill 296
defense complex, thus giving fresh proof of Napoleon’s famous dictum,
“The moral is to the material in war as three to one.”
_River Crossing of RCT-1_
The battle for Seoul entered its final stage on the 24th with the
river crossing of the 1st Marines. At first light a site about 2,000
yards southwest of Hill 105-S was cleared by Charlie Company of the
1st Engineer Battalion. Extensive mine-clearing operations at the
crossing site area caused delays, and it was 0800 when reconnaissance
and assault elements of 2/1 embarked in the LVTs of Company A, 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Sutter’s troops completed their crossing
at 0945 against scattered and ineffectual fire, and made contact
that afternoon on the north bank with elements of Company C, 5th
Marines.[398]
[398] 2/1 _SAR_; and O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 268.
For lack of a ferry, the 1st Marines had no tank support at the
crossing site. Plans had been made to send Baker Company, 1st Tank
Battalion, around by the Haengju ferry to join the infantry north of
the river. As it worked out, however, the armor was delayed by a fight
on the north bank which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Hill 79, about 4,000 yards from the crossing site, had been assigned
to the 1st Marines by Division OpnO 10-50 as an objective. The 2d
Battalion began a rapid advance toward this point after moving into
position on the north bank abreast of the 5th Marines on a 1,500-yard
front.
The 1st Battalion and Regimental Headquarters were next to cross.
Puller ordered Hawkins and his men to drive eastward along the river
and pass through the 2d Battalion. Since that unit was rapidly
advancing at the time, one of the 1/1 staff officers looked dubious.
“You’ll just have to advance a little faster,” explained the veteran
regimental commander.[399]
[399] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54.
This proved to be a practical even if not exactly a school solution.
On the march the 1st Battalion had the same experience as the 2d when
small-arms and automatic fire came from Hill 105-S, supposedly secured
by 1/5. Again the enemy was demonstrating his ability to hide out
behind the Marine lines and make the most of his nuisance value. The
2d Battalion had two men killed and nine wounded by harassing fires,
and the 1st suffered four casualties while passing through at 1300 to
continue the attack.
Effective Marine artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the
advance. After drawing out of range of Hill 105-S, Hawkins and his men
encountered long-range small-arms fire, and roads into the city were
mined. Hill 79 was located in the southwest section of Seoul itself,
commanding a good view of the railroad marshaling yards and industrial
area. After seizing the objective at 1500, the men celebrated by
raising an American flag, thus precipitating a friendly race with the
5th Marines in exuberant ceremonies of this sort.
At 1515 the 3d Battalion was relieved by the Division of its mission of
defending Hill 108, south of the wrecked Han bridges, and reverted to
regimental control for a river crossing completed at 2000. On the north
bank Ridge’s outfit was thought to have pulled the last fangs of enemy
resistance on Hill 105-S after his men in their turn came under fire
from hidden opponents. Since this height dominated the new regimental
CP, Company I was given the mission of outposting the height. A small
but lively fire fight took place at dusk, and the Marines bagged ten
prisoners at a cost of one man killed and two wounded.[400]
[400] 3/1 _SAR_.
The 3d Battalion went into an assembly area near the crossing site for
the night. Hawkins set up a perimeter defense on the objective, and the
2d Battalion occupied positions about 2,000 yards in the rear. A few
probing attacks were received from enemy patrols on Hill 79, but Marine
artillery and 4.2-inch mortars made short work of these attempts.